Knapp v.

State
168 Ind. 153, 79 N.E. 1076 (1907)
J. Gillet

SUMMARY:
Knapp was accused and convicted of murder for killing a marshal. During the trial, as a witness on his
own behalf, Knapp, attempting to establish that the killing was in self-defense, testified that, before the
killing, he had heard that the deceased had previously injured an old man who eventually died. The state
offered the testimony of a physician to prove that the old man died of senility and alcoholism. On
appeal, Knapp assailed the admissibility of the testimony. He contended that the true question was as to
whether he had heard the story and not as to whether the story was true. The judgment of conviction
was affirmed. It was held that the testimony was relevant because it had the tendency of making it less
probable that the accused has indeed heard the story.

DOCTRINE:
The competency by of a collateral fact to be used as the basis of legitimate argument is not to be
determined by the conclusiveness of the inferences it may afford in reference to the litigated fact. It is
enough if these may tend in a slight degree to elucidate the inquiry, or to assist, though remotely, to a
determination probably founded in truth.

FACTS:
1. Knapp was charged with murder for killing a marshal (police officer).
2. The accused, as a witness, on his own behalf, offered testimony tending to show that the killing
was in self-defense. He testified that, presumably for the purpose of showing that he had reason to fear
the deceased, before the killing, he had heard that the deceased, in the process of conducting an arrest,
had clubbed and seriously injured an old man who died afterwards.
3. When asked on cross-examination, the accused was not able to identify who told him this. He
answered, “Some people around Hagerstown there. I can’t say as to who it is now.”
4. The state (prosecution) was permitted to prove by a physician that the old man died of senility
and alcoholism, and that there were no bruises or marks on his person.
5. The accused was convicted.
6. On appeal, the accused contended that the lower court erred in admitting the testimony of the
physician; that the question was as to whether he had, in fact, heard the story, and not whether the
story was true.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the physician’s testimony was relevant and thus admissible— YES

HELD:
1. While the accused is correct in asserting that the question was whether appellant had heard the
story, it does not follow that the testimony of the physician as to how the old man died did not tend to
negate the claim of the accused as to what he had heard.

2. To show that there was no basis in fact for the statement the accused claims to have heard had a
tendency to make it less probable that his testimony on this point was true.

3. The fact proved by the state tended to discredit the accused, since it showed that somewhere
between the fact and the testimony there was a person who was not a truth speaker, and, the accused
being unable to point to his informant, it must at least be said that the testimony complained of had a
tendency to render his claim as to what he had heard less probable.

4. While it is laid down in the books that there must be an open and visible connection between
the fact under inquiry and the evidence by which it is sought to be established, yet the connection thus
required is in the logical processes only, for to require an actual connection between the two facts would
be to exclude all presumptive evidence. The competency of a collateral fact to be used as the basis of
legitimate argument is not to be determined by the conclusiveness of the inferences it may afford in
reference to the litigated fact. It is enough if these may tend in a slight degree to elucidate the inquiry, or
to assist, though remotely, to a determination probably founded in truth.
Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 2014 Ind. LEXIS 485, 2014 WL 2617279 (Ind. June 12, 2014)

Brief Fact Summary

Knapp is the (D). He claims self defense and had been told the victim actually killed a different person. In
this case the prosecution was allowed to prove that the victim did not cause the other person’s death.

Synopsis of Rule of Law

Relevancy is determined on a specific item of evidence by proof of the relevancy could reasonably help
to resolve the main issue at trial.

Facts
Knapp (D) killed a deputy sheriff in Hagerstown who attempted to arrest him and D claimed that he
murdered in self-defense. People around the town had told D that the deputy killed the old man. The
prosecutor then showed that the deputy did not kill the old man, that the old man died of natural
causes. D was convicted of murder and he then appealed, claiming that the real issue was whether D
had heard that the deputy had killed the old man.

Issue
Is evidence relevant of a particular item if it tends to support whether proof of that evidence would
assist to resolve the to a central issue of a case?

Held
Yes, the judgment is affirmed.
D was correct in asserting that the real issue was whether or not D had heard that the deputy had killed
the old man. Yet their may be some evidence that does not have a direct connection to the trial. In this
case D claimed that he had heard that the deputy killed the old man. If in fact the deputy had not killed
the old man, it is less likely that someone would have told D such a story. People have a tendency to tell
the truth.

The problem for the prosecutor was that he could not show what D had, or had not, heard. Obviously,
there are multiple ways prosecution could handle the case. He attacked the problem by showing that the
deputy had not killed the old man, which in turn meant that somewhere between the truth and D’s
testimony there was a person who was not telling the truth. This, coupled with D’s being unable to
identify the informant, was his claim of what he heard was less probable. No error having been shown,
therefore conviction is affirmed.

Discussion
The court shows that admissibility of evidence in this case indicates that if even a slight inference can be
made, then the court should admit the evidence of a collateral fact. In actual practice, the courts tend to
weigh the value of the evidence against the amount of time that will be consumed by its introduction.
The more there is a direct connection to the case; the court will be more liberal.
Knapp v. State
168 Ind. 153, 79 N.E. 1076 (1907)

Knapp was accused of murdering a police officer.

In his defense, he offered testimony that it was self-defense.

Knapp stated that he'd heard a story (from some unidentified person) about how the police officer had
beaten an old man to death.

In rebuttal, the State offered evidence that the old man died of "senility and alcoholism" not from being
beaten by the police officer.

The Trial Court found Knapp guilty. He appealed.

Knapp argued that the testimony about what really killed the old man should not have been admitted.
He argued that the facts of the old man's death were not relevant, only whether Knapp had heard and
believed the story about the old man's death.

The Indiana Supreme Court upheld the conviction.

The Indiana Supreme Court agreed with Knapp that the true question was whether Knapp had heard the
story, not the actual facts of the old man's death.

However, the Court felt that the testimony about the old man's death was relevant because it showed
that somewhere between the fact and the testimony there was a person who was not a truth speaker.

Since Knapp couldn't point to who told him the story, the implication was that Knapp's claim wasn't
probably telling the truth.

Even if there had been a witness that testified that they personally told Knapp that the old man was
beaten to death, evidence about whether the cop actually killed the old man is still relevant, because it is
for the jury to decide how much weight to give to the witness' testimony.

The jury was free to believe that Knapp had genuinely thought that the cop killed the old man. The job
of the jury is to listen to opposing arguments and make a decision on who to believe.
State v. Ball
Annotate this Case
339 S.W.2d 783 (1960)

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. William Arthur BALL, Appellant.

No. 47575.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

November 14, 1960.

Dewey S. Godfrey, St. Louis, for appellant.

*784 John M. Dalton, Atty. Gen., Richard R. Nacy, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

BARRETT, Commissioner.

A jury has found William Arthur Ball guilty of robbery in the first degree; the jury also found prior felony
convictions and, therefore, a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment was imposed. V.A.M.S. §§
560.120, 560.135, 556.280.

The facts, briefly, as the jury could find them were that about 2:30 in the afternoon of October 15, 1958,
two colored men, one of them tall and the other short, entered the Krekeler Jewelry Store at 1651 South
39th Street. The taller man spent ten or fifteen minutes selecting and buying a cigarette lighter, he also
talked about buying and looked at watches and rings. As the taller man looked at jewelry and made his
purchase the shorter man looked in the cases and moved about in the store. Later in the day, about 5:50,
as John Krekeler was placing rings and watches in the safe preparatory to closing the store two men
entered, one of them tall and the other short, and Krekeler immediately recognized them as the two
men who had been in the store at 2:30, especially the taller man. He recognized the taller man's narrow-
brimmed, tall hat, brown jacket, gray stirt and particularly a scar on his face. The shorter man started to
walk behind the counter and as Krekeler intercepted him he "drew a long barreled blue .38 and stuck it
in my face." Both men followed Krekeler, the shorter man with the gun in "his back," directing him to the
watch repair department and finally into the rest room in the rear of the store. He was told not to turn
around and stood facing the wall. He could hear jewelry being dumped into a bag and the "jingle" of the
cash register. The two men left Krekeler in the rest room and after hearing the door slam he called the
police. The two men had taken watches and rings of the stipulated value of $4,455.21 and $140 in cash
from the register. Krekeler identified the appellant from pictures, and three weeks later, after his capture,
in a hospital and upon the trial positively identified him as the taller of the two holdup men.

In his motion for a new trial one of the claims is that there was no direct evidence of an injury or any
evidence to show that Krekeler was put "in fear of some immediate injury to his person," one of the
essential elements of robbery in the first degree. V.A.M.S. § 560.120. Krekeler did not affirmatively testify
that he was in fear but he could well apprehend injury if he did not comply with their requests and in the
circumstances the jury could reasonably find "the fear" contemplated in the statute. 77 C.J.S. Robbery §
16, p. 459; State v. Thompson, Mo., 299 S.W.2d 468, 474. The element of fear being a reasonable
inference from the evidence, the facts and circumstances support and warrant the finding of robbery in
the first degree. State v. Eckenfels, Mo., 316 S.W.2d 532.

Another of the appellant's sufficiently preserved claims in his motion for a new trial (V.A.M.S. § 547.030;
Supreme Court Rule 27.20, V.A.M.R.) has to do with his arrest and the testimony of the two arresting
officers. On November 4, 1958, about three weeks after the robbery, police officers in a squad car saw
Ball walking on Easton Avenue. The officers stopped him, told him that they were officers and that he
was under arrest. As officer Powell faced and searched Ball officer Ballard "holstered" his gun and
attempted "to cuff" him. Ball shoved Powell over and ran down Easton Avenue, the officers ran after him,
Powell being closest. Powell yelled, "Halt Ball, you're under arrest," and fired one shot high in the air but
Ball continued running and Powell fired four more shots, two at his legs, one at his buttocks, and he
finally fell from a bullet in his back. It is claimed that this evidence was not material or relevant, that it
was too remote from the date of the robbery to indicate a consciousness of guilt and since it was of
course prejuducial *785 that he is entitled to a new trial. But unexplained flight and resisting arrest even
thirty days after the supposed commission of a crime is a relevant circumstance (State v. Duncan, 336
Mo. 600, 611, 80 S.W.2d 147, 153), the remoteness of the flight goes to the weight of the evidence
rather than to its admissibility. 20 Am.Jur., Sec. 293, p. 274.

When Ball was finally subdued and arrested the officers took from his person and impounded a brown
felt hat, "a brownish" windbreaker type jacket, trousers, gray shirt and shoesthese were exhibits one and
two, Ball admitted that they belonged to him although his evidence tended to show that he had
purchased the jacket after October 15. In identifying Ball, in addition to the scar on his face, Krekeler was
impressed with and remembered the brown ensemble, particularly the "tall brown hat." These items
were of course relevant and admissible in evidence and there is no objection to them. State v. Johnson,
Mo., 286 S.W.2d 787, 792. The appellant objects, however, in his motion for a new trial that a police
officer was permitted to testify that $258.02 in currency and two pennies were taken from his person. It
is said that the introduction of these exhibits was "immaterial and irrelevant, neither tended to prove
nor disprove any of the issues involved in this case; that said money as seized at the time of the arrest
was neither identified by Mr. Krekeler nor by any other person as the money which was allegedly stolen
from the A. L. Krekeler & Sons Jewelry Company on the 15th day of October, 1958; that said evidence
was considered by this jury to the prejudice of this defendant convincingly."

The circumstances in which this evidence was introduced were these: After the clothes were identified
and introduced as exhibits one and two the prosecuting attorney inquired of officer Powell, "Did you also
seize his personal effects?" Defense counsel immediately objected to any testimony relating to personal
effects found on the defendant "at the time." The court overruled the objection and state's counsel
inquired, "Well Officer, what personal effects were seized?" Defense counsel, evidently knowing and
anticipating, objected "to any testimony relevant (sic) to any personal effects seized upon this Defendant
at the time he was arrested by reason of the fact it is immaterial and irrelevant and tends to neither
prove nor disprove any facts involved and ask that the jury be discharged and a mistrial be declared."
The court overruled the objection and the officer said, "Ball's personal effects consisted of two hundred
and fifty eight dollars and two cents in cash, with the denominations of the bill(s), two one hundred
dollar bills, a twentytwo twenties, a ten, a five, three ones and two pennies. He had a ladies ring and a
man's wristwatch. He had a crusifixion along with a small pen knife and a black leather wallet. Maybe
one or two other personal articles." All of these items were then marked as exhibits, from three to nine,
offered in evidence and described by the officer, exhibit three being the bills and pennies comprising the
$258.02. According to the officer Mr. Krekeler was unable to identify any of these articles or the money
as having come from the jewelry store robbery and there is no objection in the motion to any of the
items other than the money and some of them were obviously not prejudicial, for example the keys, a
small penknife and wallet.

Unlike the roll of dimes in State v. Hampton, Mo., 275 S.W.2d 356, the testimony as to the $258.02 was
not offered in proof of the substantive fact of the crime. In that case the five-dollar roll of dimes
wrapped in a roll of green paper was found on the defendant the same day of the burglary and while the
fact was a circumstance admissible in evidence it was held to not constitute substantive evidence
inconsistent with the hypothesis of the defendant's innocence of burglary. In State v. Gerberding, Mo.,
272 S.W.2d 230, there was no timely or proper objection to the proof but $4,000 was taken in a robbery
and *786 the appellant had $920 in currency in his topcoat pocket when captured the day of the
robbery. The proof of the money here was evidently on the theory that Ball did not have or was not likely
to have such a sum of money on his person prior to the commission of the offense. 1 Wharton, Criminal
Evidence, Sec. 204, p. 410. As to this the facts were that he had been out of the penitentiary about eight
months and the inference the state would draw is that he had no visible means of support and no
employment and could not possibly have $258.02 except from robberies. Of course, there was no such
proof and Ball claimed that he had worked intermittently for a custodian or janitor of an apartment
house and that he had won the $258.02 in a series of crap games at a named place. Not only was
Krekeler unable to identify the money or any of the items on Ball's person as having come from the
jewelry store so that in fact they were not admissible in evidence (annotation 3 A.L.R. 1213), the charge
here was that Ball and his accomplice took jewelry of the value of $4,455.21 and $140 in cash from the
cash register. There was no proof as to the denomination of the money in the cash register, it was simply
a total of $140. Here nineteen days had elapsed, there was no proof that Ball had suddenly come into
possession of the $258.02 (annotation 123 A.L.R. 119) and in all these circumstances "The mere
possession of a quantity of money is in itself no indication that the possessor was the taker of money
charged as taken, because in general all money of the same denomination and material is alike, and the
hypothesis that the money found is the same as the money taken is too forced and extraordinary to be
receivable." 1 Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 154, p. 601. In the absence of proof or of a fair inference from
the record that the money in Ball's possession at the time of his arrest came from or had some
connection with the robbery and in the absence of a plain showing of his impecuniousness before the
robbery and his sudden affluence (State v. Garrett, 285 Mo. 279, 226 S.W. 4), the evidence was not in fact
relevant and in the circumstances was obviously prejudicial for if it did not tend to prove the offense for
which the appellant was on trial the jury may have inferred that he was guilty of another robbery. State
v. Bray, Mo. App., 278 S.W.2d 49; People v. Orloff, 65 Cal. App. 2d 614, 620-621, 151 P.2d 288; annotation
123 A.L.R. loc. cit. 132-134 and compare the facts and circumstances in State v. Garrett, supra. The
admission of the evidence in the circumstances of this record infringed the right to a fair trial and for
that reason the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion by BARRETT, C., is adopted as the opinion of the Court en banc.

WESTHUES, EAGER, STORCKMAN and HOLLINGSWORTH, JJ., concur.

HYDE, C. J., and LEEDY and DALTON, JJ., dissent.