Allied bank vs CA
Durano and the assailed Decision of
Facts:
Private respondent Potenciano Galanida was hired by petitioner Allied
Banking wherein it is agreed that the bank reserves the right to transfer or
assign respondent to other departments or branches of the bank as the
need arises and in the interest of maintaining smooth and uninterrupted
service to the public.”Private respondent was promoted several times and
was transferred to several branches.
Petitioner listed respondent as second in the order of priority of assistant
managers to be assigned outside of Cebu City having been stationed in Cebu
for seven years already. Private respondent manifested his refusal to be
transferred toBacolod. He then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter
for constructive dismissal.Subsequently, petitioner bank informed private
respondent that he was to report to the Tagbilaran City Branch but the
respondent refused.
On 5 October 1994, Galanida received a memo that Allied Bank had
terminated his services effective 1 September 1994. The reasons given for
the dismissal were: (1) Galanida’s continued refusal to be transferred from
the Jakosalem, Cebu City branch; and (2) his refusal to report for work
despite the denial of his application for additional vacation leave.
Labor Arbiter- Galanida’s transfer was inconvenient
NLRC- Allied Bank terminated Galanida without just cause.
CA- Affirmed NLRC ruling.
Issue:
w/n Galanida’s continued refusal to obey the transfer orders constituted
willful disobedience or insubordination, which is a just cause for termination
under the Labor Code.
Held:
The memorandum prepared by Atty.
the Labor Arbiter, both misquoted the Supreme Court’s ruling in Dosch v.
NLRC.The phrase refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered
insubordination where employee cited reason for said refusal, such as that
of being away from the family” does not appear anywhere in the Dosch
decision. (misleading the court. Gawa gawa)
GR: The employer exercises the prerogative to transfer an employee for
valid reasons and according to the requirement of its business, provided the
transfer does not result in demotion in rank or diminution of the employee’s
salary, benefits and other privileges.[24] In illegal dismissal cases, the
employer has the burden of showing that the transfer is not unnecessary,
inconvenient and prejudicial to the displaced employee.Dosch case not
applicable to the present case. The transfer of an employee to an overseas
post cannot be likened to a transfer from one city to another within the
country. Willful refusal to be transferred within the Philippines based on
personal grounds was considered willful disobedience.
Barayoga v. Asset Privatization Trust, G.R. No. 160073
FACTS:
Asset Privatization Trust (APT) is a public trust whose mandate is to
provisionally manage and dispose of non-performing assets of the
government. When former President Aquino issued AO No. 14, which
identified certain assets of government institutions that were to be
transferred to the National government, among those transferred assets
were the financial claim of PNB against Bicolandia Sugar Development Corp.
(BISUDECO) in a form of a secured loan. BISUDECO is a sugar plantation mill
located in Camarines Sur. Consequently, APT was constituted as trustee
over BISUDECO’s account with PNB by virtue of a trust agreement between
the government and APT.
In August 1988, BISUDECO contacted the services of Philippine Sugar Corp
(Philsucor) to take over management of the sugar plantation and milling
operation until August 1992. And because of the continued failure of
BISUDECO to pay its outstanding loan with PNB, its mortgage properties
were foreclosed and subsequently sold in a public auction to APT. In July
1992, APT accepted the offer of Bicol-Agro-Industrial Coop (BAPCI) to buy
the sugar plantation and mill. And in the event of the company’s
privatization, ATP authorized the payment of separation benefit’s to
BISUDECO’s employees. Then BAPCI purchased the foreclosed assets of
BISUDECO and took over its sugar milling operations under the trade name
Peñafrancia Sugar Mill (Pensumil).
The Bisudeco-Philsucor Corfarm Workers Union filed a complaint for unfair
labor practice, illegal dismissal, illegal deduction and underpayment of
wages and other labor standard benefits plus damages in 1991. The again
they filed a similar complaint in 1992. Then in 1993, they filed an amended
complaint impleading as additional party respondents APT and Pensumil.
In 1998 Labor Arbiter ordered APT to pay complainants of the mandatory
employment benefits. The NLRC affirmed APT’s liability for petitioners’
money claims. Respondent sought relief from the CA and they ruled that
APT should not be held liable for petitioners’ claim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the liabilities of the previous owners to their employees are
enforceable against the buyer or transferee who purchased the company’s
assets.
Whether or not ordinary preferred credits is the first choice over special
preferred credit.
HELD:
Petition is DENIED and the assailed decision is AFFIRMED.
RULING:
Any assumption of liability must be specifically and categorically agreed
upon. Unless, expressly assumed, labor contracts like collective bargaining
agreements are not enforceable against the transferee of an enterprise.
Labor contracts are in personam and thus binding only between the parties.
The liabilities of the previous owner to its employees are not enforceable
against the buyer or transferee, unless (1) the latter unequivocally assumes
them; or (2) the sale or transfer was made in bad faith.
Under Art 2241 and 2242 of the Civil Code, a mortgage credit is a special
preferred credit that enjoys preference with respect to a
specific/determinate property of a debtor. On the other hand, the workers
preference under Art 110 of the Labor code is an ordinary preferred credit.
While this provision raises the worker’s money claim to first priority in the
order of preference established in Art 2244 of the Civil Code, the claim has
no preference over special preferred credits. Being a mortgage credit APT’s
lien on BISUDECO’s mortgaged assets is a special preferred lien that must be
satisfied first before the claims of the workers.
China Airlines v. Chiok, G.R. No. 152122
Facts: Daniel Chiok purchased from China Airlines a passenger ticket for
air transportation covering Manila-Taipei-Hong Kong-Manila. The said
ticket was exclusively endorsable to PAL.
Before Chiok his trip, the trips covered by the ticket were pre-scheduled
and confirmed by the former. When petitioner arrived in Taipei, he went to
CAL to confirm his Hong Kong- Manila trip on board PAL. The CAL office
attached a yellow sticker indicating the status was OK.
When Chiok reached Hong Kong, he then went to PAL office to confirm his
flight back to Manila. The PAL also confirmed the status of his ticket and
attached a ticket indicating a status OK. Chiok proceeded to Hong Kong
airport for his trip to Manila. However, upon reaching the PAL counter, he
was told that the flight to Manila was cancelled due to typhoon. He was
informed that all confirmed flight ticket holders of PAL were automatically
booked for the next flight the following day.
The next day, Chiok was not able to board the plane because his name did
not appear on the computer as passenger for the said flight to Manila.
Issue: Whether or not CAL is liable for damages?
Held: The contract of air transportation between the petitioner and
respondent, with the former endorsing PAL the segment of Chiok’s
journey. Such contract of carriage has been treated in this jurisprudence
as a single operation pursuant to Warsaw Convention, to which the
Philippines is a party.
In the instant case, PAL as the carrying agent of CAL, the latter cannot
evade liability to respondent, Chiok, even though it may have been only a
ticket issuer for Hong Kong- Manila sector.
Commission on Elections v. Noynay, G.R. No. 132365
Facts:
In 1996, the Commission on Elections filed criminal cases against certain
individuals for violations of the Omnibus Election Code. The cases were filed
with a Regional Trial Court in Samar presided over by Judge Tomas Noynay.
Judge Noynay however dismissed the said cases as he ruled that the RTC
has no jurisdiction over the said cases because said criminal offenses were
punishable with less than six years imprisonment. He said that said cases
should be filed with the MTC.
Atty. Jose Balbuena, member of COMELEC’s legal department, filed a motion
for reconsideration. He cited a case entitled: “Alberto Naldeza vs Judge Juan
Lavilles, Jr., A.M No. MTJ-94-1009, March 5, 1996 (245 SCRA 286)”.
According to Atty. Balbuena, in the said case he cited, the Supreme Court has
already settled the issue and Atty. Balbuena even copied in toto the said ruling
by the Supreme Court in his motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Tomas Noynay is correct in dismissing the case.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court admonished Judge Noynay for dismissing the
case as the same was contrary to Section 32 of B.P. 129 as well as Section
268 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that election cases are
within the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts except certain cases (which
were not the cases filed by COMELEC in this case).
Section 32 of B.P. 129, on the other hand, provides that as a rule, Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine EXCEPT otherwise
provided by special law. The Omnibus Election Code is a special law which
provides that election offenses, regardless of penalties, are under the
jurisdiction of the regional trial courts.
Judge Noynay was not able to follow these rules. It is a judge’s duty to be
studious of the principles of law, to administer his office with due regard to the
integrity of the system of the law itself, to be faithful to the law, and to maintain
professional competence.
On the other hand, Atty. Balbuena is also admonished for being reckless in
citing cases. The Supreme Court said that the passage cited by Balbuena in
his Motion was not the actual decision of the Supreme Court in the said case
cited but rather the memorandum of the court administrator which was quoted
in the said case. Further, his citation of “Naldeza vs Lavilles, Jr.” was
wrong. Not only did he spell Naldeza wrong (as the correct spelling was
NALDOZA), he also cited the wrong SCRA. It should have been 254 SCRA
286 and not 245 SCRA 286.
Balbuena is reminded of Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which requires that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the text of a decision or authority.
Heirs of Enrique Tan, Sr. v. Pollescas
FACTS:
 Petitioners Tan were co-owners of a coconut
farmland.Esteban Pollescas was the original tenant of the
land. Upon Esteban’s death, his son Enrique succeeded him
and was appointed tenant by the landowners. However,
respondent Reynalda, Esteban’s surviving second spouse,
demanded that the Tans recognize her as Esteban’s successor.
 Reynalda filed a complaint before DARAB, questioning the
tenancy relationship of Tan and Enrique. DARAB ruled in favor
of Reynalda, declaring her as the lawful tenant of the Land.
DARAB apportioned the harvests between the Tans and
Reynalda based on the customary sharing system which is 2/3
to the landowner and 1/3 to the tenant.
 Reynalda failed to deliver the 2/3 of the harvest. Tan heirs
demanded the payment thereof, but Reynalda ignored such
demand.
 Tan heirs filed a case for estafa for her failure to pay and
deliver the share.
Petitioner: The agreement was extinguished due to non-payment of lease
(the 2/3 of the harvest).
Respondent: The Tans demand excessive amount
ISSUE:
  WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY RULED THAT
REYNALDA IS OBLIGED TO PAY ONLY 1/4 OR 25% OF THE
NORMAL HARVEST AND NOT 2/3 WHEN THE SUBJECT LAND
WAS NOT YET PLACED UNDER THE LEASEHOLD SYSTEM
PURSUANT TO SECTION 12 OF RA 6657
HELD: YES
In this case, the Tans seek ejectement of Reynalda from the Land due to
non-payment of lease rental. In order for non-payment of the lease rental
to be a valid ground to dispossess the agricultural lessee of the landholding,
the amount of the lease rental must first of all be lawful. If the amount of
lease rental claimed exceeds the limit allowed by law, non-payment of lease
rental cannot be a ground to dispossess the agricultural lessee of the
landholding.
Section 34 of RA 3844 as amended mandates that not x x x more than 25%
of the average normal harvest shall constitute the just and fair rental for
leasehold. In this case, the Tan Heirs demanded Reynalda to deliver 2/3 of
the harvest as lease rental, which clearly exceeded the 25% maximum
amount prescribed by law. Therefore, the Tan Heirs cannot validly
dispossess Reynalda of the landholding for non-payment of rental precisely
because the lease rental claimed by the Tan Heirs is unlawful.
G.R. Nos. 174813-15 581 SCRA 320
Hipos vs Bay
Facts:
Two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the
crime of acts of lasciviousness were filed against petitioners Darryl
Hipos et al., before Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. Petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s]
before the City Prosecutor. They claimed that there was no probable
cause to hold them liable for the crimes charged. The Office of the
City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on the reinvestigation affirming
the Informations.
2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating the Joint
Memorandum to Dismiss the Case as an appeal of the 10 August
2004 Resolution, reversed the Resolution dated 10 August 2004,
holding that there was lack of probable cause. On the same date, the
City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge
Bay. Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations in an
Order of even date.
Issue:
Can the Supreme Court compel respondent judge bay to dismiss the
case through a writ of mandamus.
Held:
The rule is settled that once a criminal complaint or information is filed
in court, any disposition thereof, such as its dismissal or the conviction
or acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court.
While the prosecutor retains the discretion and control of the
prosecution of the case, he cannot impose his opinion on the court.
The court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case.
Accordingly, a motion to dismiss the case filed by the prosecutor
before or after the arraignment, or after a reinvestigation, or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records upon
reinvestigation, should be addressed to the discretion of the court.
The action of the court must not, however, impair the substantial
rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.
In Re: Plagiarism Charges Against Justice Mariano del Castillo
(2010)
On April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a decision which
dismissed a petition filed by the Malaya Lolas Organization in the
case of Vinuya vs Romulo. Atty. Herminio Harry Roque Jr., counsel
for Vinuya et al, questioned the said decision. He raised, among
others, that the ponente in said case, Justice Mariano del Castillo,
plagiarized three books when the honorable Justice “twisted the true
intents” of these books to support the assailed decision. These books
were:
a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan
Fox-Descent, Yale Journal of International Law (2009);
b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis,
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2006); and

c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams,
Cambridge University Press (2005).
As such, Justice del Castillo is guilty of plagiarism, misconduct, and at
least inexcusable negligence.
Interestingly, even the three foreign authors mentioned above, stated
that their works were used inappropriately by Justice Del Castillo and
that the assailed decision is different from what their works advocated.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is plagiarism in the case at bar.
HELD: No. Even if there is (as emphasized by the Supreme Court in
its ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Vinuya et al in
2011), the rule on plagiarism cannot be applied to judicial bodies.
No Plagiarism
According to Black’s Law Dictionary: Plagiarism is the “deliberate and
knowing presentation of another person’s original ideas or creative
expressions as one’s own.”
This cannot be the case here because as proved by evidence, in the
original drafts of the assailed decision, there was attribution to the
three authors but due to errors made by Justice del Castillo’s
researcher, the attributions were inadvertently deleted. There is
therefore no intent by Justice del Castillo to take these foreign works
as his own.
But in plagiarism, intent is immaterial.
On this note, the Supreme Court stated that in its past decisions, (i.e.
U.P Board of Regents vs CA, 313 SCRA 404), the Supreme Court
never indicated that intent is not material in plagiarism. To adopt a
strict rule in applying plagiarism in all cases leaves no room for errors.
This would be very disadvantageous in cases, like this, where there
are reasonable and logical explanations.
On the foreign authors’ claim that their works were used
inappropriately
According to the Supreme Court, the passages lifted from their works
were merely used as background facts in establishing the state on
international law at various stages of its development. The Supreme
Court went on to state that the foreign authors’ works can support
conflicting theories. The Supreme Court also stated that since the
attributions to said authors were accidentally deleted, it is impossible
to conclude that Justice del Castillo twisted the advocacies that the
works espouse.
No Misconduct
Justice del Castillo is not guilty of misconduct. The error here is in
good faith. There was no malice, fraud or corruption.
No Inexcusable Negligence
The error of Justice del Castillo’s researcher is not reflective of his
gross negligence. The researcher is a highly competent one. The
researcher earned scholarly degrees here and abroad from reputable
educational institutions. The researcher finished third in her class and
4th in the bar examinations. Her error was merely due to the fact that
the software she used, Microsoft Word, lacked features to apprise her
that certain important portions of her drafts are being deleted
inadvertently. Such error on her part cannot be said to be constitutive
of gross negligence nor can it be said that Justice del Castillo was
grossly negligent when he assigned the case to her. Further,
assigning cases to researchers has been a long standing practice to
assist justices in drafting decisions. It must be emphasized though
that prior to assignment, the justice has already spelled out his
position to the researcher and in every sense, the justice is in control
in the writing of the draft.
Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno dissenting
There is such a thing as judicial plagiarism. And though judicial
plagiarism does not necessarily carry with them the imposition of
sanctions nor does it mean that a case should undergo retrial based
on it, the existence of which should be acknowledged.
In Re: Plagiarism Charges Against Justice Mariano Del Castillo
(2011)
The Malaya Lolas received an adverse decision in the case Vinuya vs
Romulo decided by the Supreme Court on April 28, 2010. The Malaya
Lolas sought the annulment of said decision due to the alleged
irregularity in the writing of the text of the decision. Allegedly, the
ponente of said case, Justice Mariano del Castillo copied verbatim
portions of the decision laid down in said case from three works by
three foreign authors without acknowledging said authors hence an
overt act of plagiarism which is highly reprehensible.
Plagiarism as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary is the “deliberate and
knowing presentation of another person’s original ideas or creative
expressions as one’s own.”
ISSUE: Whether or not plagiarism is applicable to decisions
promulgated by the Supreme Court.
HELD: No. It has been a long standing practice in this jurisdiction not
to cite or acknowledge the originators of passages and views found in
the Supreme Court’s decisions. These omissions are true for many of
the decisions that have been penned and are being penned daily by
magistrates from the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court
of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts nationwide and with them,
the municipal trial courts and other first level courts. Never in the
judiciary’s more than 100 years of history has the lack of attribution
been regarded and demeaned as plagiarism.
As put by one author (this time acknowledged by the Court), Joyce C.
George from her Judicial Opinion Writing Handbook:
A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is
exempted from a charge of plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases
from a law review article, novel thoughts published in a legal
periodical or language from a party’s brief are used without giving
attribution. Thus judges are free to use whatever sources they deem
appropriate to resolve the matter before them, without fear of reprisal.
This exemption applies to judicial writings intended to decide cases
for two reasons: the judge is not writing a literary work and, more
importantly, the purpose of the writing is to resolve a dispute. As a
result, judges adjudicating cases are not subject to a claim of legal
plagiarism.
Further, as found by the Supreme Court, the omission of the
acknowledgment by Justice del Castillo of the three foreign authors
arose from a clerical error. It was shown before the Supreme Court
that the researcher who finalized the draft written by Justice del
Castillo accidentally deleted the citations/acknowledgements; that in
all, there is still an intent to acknowledge and not take such passages
as that of Justice del Castillo’s own.
In AM No. 10-1-13-SC, Re: Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated
January 11, 2010 of Acting Director Aleu A. Amante, PIAB-C,
Office of the Ombudsman, March 2, 2010, the Philippine Supreme
Court reiterated he following basic doctrines:
1. The Court held that under the ruling in In re Wenceslao Laureta
andAlzua v. Arnalot, a criminal complaint for violation of sec. 3(e) of
RA 3019, based on the legal correctness of the official acts of Justices
of the Supreme Court, cannot prosper and should not be entertained.
This is not to say that Members of the Court are absolutely immune
from suit during their term, for they are not. The Constitution provides
that the appropriate recourse against them is to seek their removal
from office if they are guilty of culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust. Only after removal can they be criminally proceeded
against for their transgressions. While in office and thereafter, and for
their official acts do not constitute impeachable offenses, recourses
against them and their liabilities therefor, are as defined in the above
rulings.
2. The Court also found that the Lozanos also brazenly misquoted
and misused applicable constitutional provisions to justify their case
against the retired Justices. Citing sec. 4(3), Art. VIII of the
Constitution, the Court stressed that cases or matters heard by a
division can be decided or resolved with the concurrence of at least
three members of a division.
3. “In our view, the complainants’ errors do not belong to the genre of
plain and simple errors that lawyers commit in the practice of their
profession. Their plain disregard, misuse, and misrepresentation of
constitutional provisions constitute serious misconduct that reflects
ontheir fitness for continued membership in the Philippine Bar,” the
Court said.
G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, Petitioner, (UP student regent) is among those enumerated and the
vs Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over her.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

Facts:
Hannah Serana was appointed by former President Estrada as a
student regent of UP Cebu, to serve a one-year term. President
Estrada gave P15,000,000.00 to the Office of the Student Regent
Foundation, Inc as financial assistance for the proposed renovation.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The
Ombudsman filed estafa case against her before the Sandiganbayan.
She moved to quash the information. She claimed that the
Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense
charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent
because the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; the
petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; the offense
charged was not committed in relation to her office; and the funds in
question personally came from President Estrada, not from the
government. As to jurisdiction over her person, she contends that as a
UP student regent, she is not a public officer who held the position in
an ex officio capacity.
The Sandiganbayan denied her motion for lack of merit.

Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over Serana’s
case.

Held:
No, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over this case. In Geduspan v.
People, the SC held that while the first part of Sec. 4(A) covers only
officials with Salary grade 27 and higher but who are by express
provisions of law placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
as she is placed there by express provisions of law. Sec. 4(A)(1)(g) of
PD No. 1606 explicitly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction
over Presidents, directors and trustees, or manager of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities, or educational
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the
Sandiganbayan pointed out, the Board of Regents performs functions
similar to those of a board of trustee of a non-stock corporation. By
express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as
contemplated by PD No. 1606. Thus, her position as a board of regent