Lease (6)

Guzman, Bocaling and Co vs. Bonnevie
 The Court agrees with the respondent court that it
was not necessary to secure the approval by the
probate court of the Contract of Lease because it
did not involve an alienation of real property of the
estate nor did the term of the lease exceed one
year so as to make it fall under Article 1878(8) of
the Civil Code. Only if Paragraph 20 of the Contract
of Lease was activated and the said property was
intended to be sold would it be required of the
administratrix to secure the approval of the
probate court pursuant to Rule 89 of the Rules of
Court.|||
 A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who
buys the property of another without notice that
some other person has a right to or interest in such
property and pays a fill and fair price for the same
at the time of such purchase or before he has
notice of the claim or interest of some other person
in the property. Good faith connotes an honest
intention to abstain from taking unconscientious
advantage of another. Tested by these principles,
the petitioner cannot tenably claim to be a buyer in
good faith as it had notice of the lease of the
property by the Bonnevies and such knowledge
should have cautioned it to look deeper into the
agreement to determine if it involved stipulations
that would prejudice its own interests.|||

YekSeng Co vs. CA  The contract being on a month-to-month basis, is a

lease with a definite period. Since the
contract of lease is for a definite term, the lessee
cannot avail ofthe benefits under Article 1687
which applies only if there is no definite term. And,
even assuming arguendo that Article 1687 applies,
plaintiff would still not be entitled to have the term
fixed for a longer period since his action was filed
only after the contract had expired.|||
 If the contract of lease had not yet expired, its
extension would still be subject to the sound
discretion of the court and was by no means
obligatory upon it as a merely ministerial duty. To
quote again from the decision of the Regional
Trial Court: As correctly cited by the plaintiffs, "The
power of the Courts to fix a longer term for lease is
protestative or discretionary, 'may' is the word —
to be exercised or not in accordance with the
particular circumstances of the case; a longer term
to be granted where equities come into play
 demanding extension, to be denied where none
appears, always with due deference to the parties
freedom to contract."

Clutario vs. CA  Case law is to the effect that the acceptance by the
lessor of the payment by the lessee of the rentals in
arrears does not constitute a waiver of the default
in the payment of rentals as a valid cause of action
for ejectment. 10 The Court notes that when
petitioners paid the back rentals on May 15, 1981,
private respondents had already filed the
complaint for ejectment earlier, to be specific, on
March 4, 1981. The conduct of private respondents
subsequent to their acceptance of the back rentals
belies any intention to waive their right to eject
petitioners as a result of the latter's failure to pay
the rent for more than three (3) months. They did
not enter into an amicable settlement with
petitioners. Neither did they notify the
trial court of their intention to have the complaint
dismissed. Instead, they participated actively in the
proceedings before the MTC during all the time
that the case dragged on for almost three
years. 11 When the MTC decided adversely against
them, private respondents appealed the judgment
to the RTC. Not only have they participated
earnestly in all subsequent proceedings even after
they obtained favorable judgments from the RTC
and the Court of Appeals, but they have likewise
been consistent in their position that petitioners
should be ejected, not only because they need the
leased premises, but also because of petitioners'
default in the payment of rentals for more than
three (3) months|||
 Proof of any one of the factors enumerated in
Section 5 of B.P. Blg. 25 (1979) is sufficient cause
for judicial ejectment of a lessee. Having proved
one of such grounds, i.e., arrears in
payment of rent for three (3) months at any one
time, private respondents may legally eject
petitioners without having to prove the other
grounds for ejectment. Nevertheless, to bolster
their action for ejectment, private respondents
invoked in their complaint a second ground for
ejectment, namely, their need for the leased
premises.|||
 For the lessor to be able to validly eject the lessee
on the ground of need for the leased property, it
must be shown that there is no other available

Yap vs. Cruz
United Realty Corp vs. CA
LegarMngt and Realty Corp vs. CA
residential unit to satisfy that need. The non-
availability must exist at the time of the demand by
the lessor on the lessee to vacate the property.|||
 The Court ruled in favor of private respondent.
When the petitioners and the landlord executed a
new contract of lease, the lease of private
respondent was still valid and subsisting. There is
no question that private respondent has not
effectively relinquished his leasehold rights over
the premises in question in view of the failure of
negotiations for the sale of the goodwill. Clearly,
the transfer of the leasehold rights is conditional in
nature and has no force and effect if the condition
is not complied with.
 Since the lease agreement in question is for a
definite period it follows that petitioner has a right
to judicially eject private respondent from the
premises as an exception to the general rule
provided for in Section 4 of P.D. No. 20 which
provides as follows: "Except when the lease is for a
definite period, the provisions of paragraph
(1) of Article 1673 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines insofar as they refer to dwelling unit or
land on which another's dwelling is located shall be
suspended until otherwise provided; but other
provisions of the Civil Code and the
Rules of Court of the Philippines on lease contracts
insofar as they are not in conflict with the
provisions of this Act, shall apply." Moreover,
under Section 5(f) of B.P. Blg. 25 one of the
grounds for ejectment is the expiration of the
period of a written lease contract. In this case,
because of the failure of the private respondent to
pay the increased rental demanded by petitioner,
petitioner elected to terminate the contract and
asked the private respondent to vacate the
premises. A lease contract may be terminated at
the end of any month, which shall be deemed
terminated upon the refusal to pay the increased
monthly rental demanded by the petitioner,
provided the same is not exorbitant.|||
 Section 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 877, which is
exactly the same as Section 6 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 25 does not suspend the effects of Article 1687
of the New Civil Code. Thus, lease agreements with
no specified period, but in which rentals are paid
monthly, are considered to be on a month-to-
month basis. They are for a definite period and
expire after the last day of any given thirty-day
period, upon proper demand and notice by the
lessor to vacate. . . . Where the verbal lease
agreement entered into has been validly
terminated, there is sufficient cause for ejectment
under Section 5(f) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 877.|||