G.R. No.

140179 March 13, 2000 The Court is clothed with discretionary power to execute judgment pending appeal upon good reasons.
The good reasons mentioned in protestant's Motion for Execution Pending Appeal is the possibility that
the term of the contested seat of Barangay Captainship in Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City might
ROQUE FERMO, petitioner,
have expired long before the appeal has been decided, considering also that the term of the contested
vs.
office had past almost midway of the whole term. To do otherwise would not serve the end of justice. 3
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MANUEL D. LAXINA SR., respondents.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari (with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction)
assailing the Resolution1 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)2 in SPR No. 4-99 entitled "MANUEL D. LAXINA, SR.
vs. ROQUE FERMO and Hon. AMANTE T. BANDAYREL" which annulled the order of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC)
of Quezon City, Branch 40 granting petitioner Roque Fermo's (FERMO) motion for execution pending appeal.
Not satisfied with the decision of the MTC, respondent Manuel D. Laxina (LAXINA) appealed to the COMELEC,
which reversed the order of the MTC granting herein petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal. In reversing
the MTC, the COMELEC found that the possibility that the term of the contested seat might expire by the time the
appeal is decided was not a "good reason" to warrant execution pending appeal.
Hence this petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction
where petitioner assigns the following errors:

The factual antecedents of this case are as follows:

Manuel Laxina, Sr. and Roque Fermo were both candidates for the position of Punong Barangay, Barangay Batasan
Hills, District II, Quezon City, during the May 12, 1997 elections. The canvassed results showed Laxina obtaining
1,957 votes and Fermo getting 1,712 votes. With a plurality of 245 votes, Laxina was proclaimed duly elected to the
post. Subsequently, Fermo filed an election protest questioning the results in four (4) clustered precincts of Capitol
Bliss and twenty four (24) COA precincts on the ground that the elections therein was attended by massive fraud and
serious irregularities.
Summoned to answer, protestee Laxina filed his responsive pleading denying protestant's allegations of anomalies
and interposed the defense that the "conduct of the elections in Barangay Batasan Hills, District II, Quezon City, from
the special registration of voters, the campaign as well as the voting and all the way to and until the counting,
canvassing and tallying of votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates during the recent barangay elections
has been generally honest, orderly and peaceful, with the result of the elections being truly reflective of the will of the
electorate in the said barangay."
Protestee then moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the same was filed beyond the ten day period
allowed by law. The Court ruled that the case was seasonably filed, dismissed the motion to dismiss and ordered a
judicial recount. For the purpose, a revision committee was constituted. After all the proceedings were terminated, the
Court a quo rendered its decision holding that Fermo won the contested post. The Court's decision was promulgated
on January 8, 1999. On the same date, Laxina filed a Notice of Appeal manifesting his intent to elevate the case to the
Commission on Elections.
On January 12, 1999, Roque Fermo filed a Motion for Execution pending Appeal grounded on the following
averments:
That a decision was promulgated by the Honorable Court on January 8, 1999 whereby the protestant
Roque Fermo was declared the winner in the May 12, 1997 Barangay Election in Batasan Hills, District II
by a plurality of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR (134) votes over protestee, Manuel Laxina;
That there is good and special reason for the issuance of a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal, i.e., the
possibility that the term of the contested seat might have expired already long before the appeal has been
decided;
On January 19, 1999, Laxina opposed the motion maintaining that the Court had lost jurisdiction over the case
because of the perfection of the appeal.
On January 20, 1999, the Court issued an Order granting execution pending appeal, the pertinent part of which reads:
RESPONDENT COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT OR INEXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND/OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION —
A. IN HOLDING THAT THE REASON INVOKED BY PETITIONER IN HIS MOTION FOR
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL, i.e., SHORTNESS OF TERM IS INSUFFICIENT OR DOES NOT
QUALIFY AS "GOOD REASONS" TO WARRANT EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL.
B. IN ANNULLING THE JANUARY 20, 1999 ORDER OF MTC GRANTING THE MOTION FOR
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL ON THE GROUND THAT THE MTC COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
C. IN ORDERING PETITIONER TO CEASE AND DESIST FROM FURTHER PERFORMING THE
FUNCTIONS OF PUNONG BARANGAY AND TO RELINQUISH THE SAME TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENT PENDING FINAL RESOLUTION OF THE LATTER'S APPEAL, IN EFFECT,
GRANTING EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT WITHOUT
ANY MOTION THEREFOR.4
In support of his petition, FERMO maintains that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that
the possibility that the term of the contested seat might expire long before the appeal is decided is not a good reason
to warrant execution pending appeal. FERMO's theory is that such reason taken together with the finding of the MTC
that the election was tainted with fraud and irregularities is sufficient reason to grant execution pending appeal. He
further argues that even assuming the COMELEC did not err in annulling the order of execution, the COMELEC
should not have ordered him to relinquish the position as this is tantamount to granting execution pending appeal in
favor of LAXINA who did not file any such motion for that purpose nor cite any "good reasons" therefor. Moreover,
the order of COMELEC in effect prejudged the pending appeal of FERMO considering that it ordered LAXINA to
discharge the functions of Punong Barangay pending the resolution of the appeal.
On the other hand, private respondent LAXINA agrees with the COMELEC's conclusion that the "shortness of term"
is not "good reason" to justify execution pending appeal. He argues that petitioner's allegations are mere conjectures
unsupported by any factual or legal basis.
Public respondent COMELEC contends that since the term of Barangay officials was extended to five (5) years or
until 2002, the reliance of the petitioner on the "shortness of term" to justify execution pending appeal is not justified.
Moreover, the decision of the MTC "contains questionable rulings which casts doubt on its validity." It was not
clearly established that petitioner in fact won.5
The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of or excess of jurisdiction in annulling the order of the MTC granting herein petitioner's motion for execution
pending appeal on the ground that there were no "good reasons" for the issuance therefor.
 We rule in the negative.
Execution of judgments pending appeal in election cases is governed by Section 2, Rule 39 6 of the Rules of Court
which reads:
Sec. 2. Discretionary execution. —
(a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal. — On motion of the prevailing party with
notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession
of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such
motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before the
expiration of the period to appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the
appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due
hearing.
A valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal requires that it should be based "upon good
reasons to be stated in a special order." The following constitute "good reasons" and a combination of two or more of
them will suffice to grant execution pending appeal: (1.) public interest involved or will of the electorate; (2.) the
shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office; and (3.) the length of time that the election
contest has been pending (emphasis supplied).7 In Lauban vs. COMELEC8 , this Court ruled that "shortness of the
remaining term of office and posting a bond are not good reasons for execution of a judgment pending appeal . . ." . 9
In the present case, the petitioner relies solely on one ground to support his petition i.e. "shortness of term". We find that the
COMELEC committed no reversible error in ruling that:
c the term of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for five (5) years,
which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1997 . . . .
...
Sec. 2. The provisions of this Act shall apply to the incumbent barangay officials . . . . . . . .
13
Perfunctorily, the term of the contested office will expire in the year 2002 or more or less, three years from now.
Petitioner's argument that COMELEC's nullification of the MTC order does not imply that LAXINA is entitled to discharge the
functions of Punong Barangay and that FERMO should cease and desist from performing said functions is flawed. The order of
the COMELEC annulling the grant of execution pending appeal would be inutile if it did not have the effect of authorizing
LAXINA to discharge the functions of Punong Barangay during the pendency of the appeal. When the COMELEC nullified the
writ of execution pending appeal in favor of FERMO, the decision of the MTC proclaiming FERMO as the winner of the
election was stayed 14 and the "status quo" or the last actual peaceful uncontested situation preceding the controversy 15 was
restored. Thus, the COMELEC correctly ordered FERMO to cease and desist from performing the functions of Punong
Barangay considering that LAXINA was the proclaimed winner of the election prior to FERMO's filing of the election protest.
The order for FERMO to relinquish his post to LAXINA pending final resolution of the appeal is a logical and necessary
consequence of the denial of execution pending appeal.
Finally, there is nothing in the COMELEC Resolution which shows that the COMELEC made "conclusionary findings" which
would in effect "pre-judge" the MTC decision itself. The Resolution categorically stated that the COMELEC shall not attempt to
resolve who between LAXINA and FERMO has the right to occupy the contested seat for that question will appropriately be
settled in the pending appeal. Although the Resolution cited certain "lapses patent on the decision itself" which "cast a cloud of
uncertainty over the victory of Fermo", the observation was made to stress that no other justification other than the "shortness of
term" would justify premature execution.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for failure of the petitioner to show that respondent Commission on
Elections acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the challenged Resolution dated September 16, 1999 in SPR No. 4-
99.1âwphi1.nêt

"Shortness of term", alone and by itself cannot justify premature execution. It must be manifest in the decision sought Costs against petitioners.
to be executed that the defeat of the protestee and the victory of the protestant has been clearly established. 10
SO ORDERED.
Moreover, Republic Act No. 8524, 11 which took effect in 1998, has extended the term of office of barangay officials to five (5)
years, and this negates, or removes the factual basis for the finding of the MTC that the term of the contested office "had past
almost midway of the whole term." COMELEC Chairman Harriet Demetriou correctly points out in her SEPARATE
CONCURRING OPINION 12 that:

Obviously, the court a quo erroneously assumed that the term of the barangay captains is only for three (3)
years.1âwphi1 Hence, the conclusion that the term of the contested office is almost in its midway. This, too, has no
leg to stand on.

It shall be worth stressing that Republic Act No. 8524 which took effect sometime in 1998 extended the term of
office of barangay officials to five (5) years. Thus, it provides:

Sec. 1. Section 43 of Republic Act No. 1760, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, is
hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 43. Term of Office. — . . . . . . .

G.R. No. 154616 July 12, 2004
GOV. ANTONIO CALINGIN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Special 17th Division, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RENATO S. DE VILLA, DEPT. OF
INTERIOR & LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECRETARY JOEY LINA,*UNDERSECRETARY EDUARDO R.
SOLIMAN, JR., DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR & LOCAL GOVERNMENT, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 10,
DIRECTOR RODOLFO Z. RAZUL, respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review seeking to annul the Resolution 1 dated May 11, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 64583, which denied petitioner Governor Antonio Calingin’s petition for prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining
order and/or the issuance of an order of status quo ante, as well as its Resolution2 dated July 1, 2002, denying the motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts, as summarized by the Court of Appeals and borne by the records, are as follows:
3
The Office of the President issued a Resolution dated March 22, 2001 in OP Case No. 00-1-9220 (DILG ADM. Case No. P-16-
99) entitled Vice Governor Danilo P. Lagbas, et al. versus Governor Antonio P. Calingin (Misamis Oriental) suspending Gov.
Calingin for 90 days. On April 30, 2001, Undersecretary Eduardo R. Soliman of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG), by authority of Secretary Jose D. Lina, Jr., issued a Memorandum 4 implementing the said Resolution of the
Office of the President. On May 3, 2001, Gov. Calingin filed before the Office of the President a Motion for Reconsideration. 5
The DILG Memorandum bore the authority of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which granted an exemption to the
election ban in the movement of any public officer in its Resolution No. 3992 6 promulgated on April 24, 2001. This was in
pursuance to COMELEC Resolution No. 3401 which provides in part that
Section 1. Prohibited Acts – (a) During the election period from January 2, 2001 until July 13, 2001, no public
official shall make or cause any transfer/detail whatsoever of any officer or employee in the civil service, including
public school teachers, or suspend elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay official, except upon prior written
approval of the Commission.
On May 7, 2001, Gov. Calingin filed a petition for prohibition before the Court of Appeals to prevent the DILG from executing
the assailed suspension order. However, on May 11, 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the said petition and by resolution
issued on July 1, 2002, denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal by certiorari where petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in
… FINDING THAT THE EXECUTION OF THE SUSPENSION ORDER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DURING THE ELECTION PERIOD IS WITH AUTHORITY FROM THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.
… FINDING THAT THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IS FINAL AND EXECUTORY AS
PROVIDED IN SECTION 67, CHAPTER 4, OF REPUBLIC ACT 7160, THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF
1991.7
In dispute is the validity of the DILG Memorandum implementing the suspension order issued by the Office of the President. We
are asked to resolve in this connection two issues: (1) Was the decision of the Office of the President already final and
executory? and (2) Was the exemption from the election ban in the movement of any public officer granted by COMELEC
valid?
Petitioner contends that decisions of the Office of the President on cases where it has original jurisdiction become final and
executory only after the lapse of 15 days from the receipt thereof and that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration shall
suspend the running of the said period8 in accordance with Section 15,9 Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Petitioner further contends that Section 67,10 Chapter 4 of the Local Government Code (Rep. Act 7160), which provides that
decisions of the Office of the President shall be final and executory, applies only to decisions of the Office of the President on
administrative cases appealed from the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod of highly-urbanized cities and
independent component cities, and sangguniang bayan of municipalities within the Metro Manila Area. It does not cover
decisions on cases where the Office of the President has original jurisdiction such as those involving a Provincial Governor. 11
In Lapid v. Court of Appeals,12 we held that it is a principle of statutory construction that where there are two statutes that apply
to a particular case, that which was specially intended for the said case must prevail. The case on hand involves a disciplinary
action against an elective local official. Thus, the Local Government Code is the applicable law and must prevail over the
Administrative Code which is of general application.13 Further, the Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted much later than
the Administrative Code of 1987. In statutory construction, all laws or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the later law are
repealed or modified accordingly.14
Besides, even though appeal to the Court of Appeals is granted under Sec. 1, 15 Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court, Sec.
12,16 Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Sec. 6817 of the Local Government Code provides for the immediate
execution pending appeal. Under the same case of Lapid v. Court of Appeals,18 we enunciated that the decisions of the Office of
the President under the Local Government Code are immediately executory even pending appeal because the pertinent laws
under which the decisions were rendered mandated them to be so.
In sum, the decisions of the Office of the President are final and executory. No motion for reconsideration is allowed by law but
the parties may appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals. The appeal, however, does not stay the execution of the decision.
Thus, the DILG Secretary may validly move for its immediate execution.
As to the validity of the exemption granted by COMELEC in its Resolution No. 3992, petitioner claims that the exemption was
invalid for being based on a mere draft resolution. According to him, a draft resolution does not operate as a final resolution of a
case until the proper resolution is duly signed and promulgated. Petitioner maintains that a draft cannot produce any legal effect.
A perusal of the records, however, reveals that the Resolution in O.P. Case No. 00-1-9220 was approved and signed on March
22, 2001 by Executive Secretary Renato de Villa by the authority of the President. Hence, the approval was before the
promulgation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3992 on April 24, 2001. The record also shows that the request to implement the
said suspension order was filed on March 22, 2001 by the Senior Deputy Executive Secretary of the Office of the President
pursuant to the requirements stated in the Resolution.
Moreover, COMELEC Resolution No. 352919 – which may be applied by analogy and in relation to Sec. 2 20 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 3401 – merely requires the request to be in writing indicating the office and place from which the officer is
removed, and the reason for said movement, and submitted together with the formal complaint executed under oath and
containing the specific charges and the answer to said complaint. The request for the exemption was accompanied with the
Affidavit of Complaint, Affidavit of Controversion, Reply and Draft Resolution. The pertinent documents required by the
COMELEC to substantiate the request were submitted. There being a proper basis for its grant of exemption, COMELEC
Resolution No. 3992 is valid.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals’ resolutions dated May
11, 2002 and July 1, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 64583 are hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 182865 December 24, 2008
ROMULO F. PECSON, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT and LYNDON A.
CUNANAN, respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This petition for certiorari - filed by Romulo F. Pecson (Pecson) under Rule 64, in relation with Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court - seeks to set aside and annul the Resolution dated May 21, 2008 of the Commission on Elections en banc (COMELEC) in
SPR 60-2007.1 The assailed Resolution nullified the grant (via a Special Order) by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 56,
Angeles City, of the execution pending appeal of its Decision in the election contest between Pecson and the private respondent
Lyndon A. Cunanan (Cunanan), the proclaimed winner in the 2007 mayoralty election in Magalang, Pampanga.
THE ANTECEDENTS
Pecson and Cunanan were candidates for the mayoralty position in the Municipality of Magalang, Province of Pampanga in the
May 2007 elections. On May 17, 2007, Cunanan was proclaimed the winning candidate, garnering a total of 12,592 votes as
against Pecson's 12,531, or a margin of 61 votes. Cunanan took his oath and assumed the position of Mayor of Magalang. Soon
thereafter, Pecson filed an election protest, docketed as EPE No. 07-51, with the RTC.
On November 23, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision in Pecson's favor. The RTC ruled that Pecson received a total of 14,897
votes as against Cunanan's 13,758 - a vote margin of 1,139.
Cunanan received a copy of the Decision on November 26, 2007 and filed a Notice of Appeal the day after. The RTC issued on
November 27, 2008 an Order noting the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of appeal fee and directing the transmittal
of the records of the case to the Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) of the COMELEC. Pecson, on the other
hand, filed on November 28, 2007 an Urgent Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal, claiming that Section 11, Rule
14 of the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay
Officials2 (Rules) allows this remedy.
The RTC granted Pecson's motion for execution pending appeal via a Special Order dated December 3, 2007 (Special Order) but
suspended, pursuant to the Rules, the actual issuance of the writ of execution for twenty (20) days. The Special Order states the
following reasons:
1. The result of the judicial revision show[s] that the protestant garnered 14,897 votes as against protestee's 13,758
votes or a plurality of 1,139 votes. The victory of the protestant is clearly and manifestly established by the rulings
and tabulation of results made by the Court x x x;
2. It is settled jurisprudence that execution pending appeal in election cases should be granted "to give as much
recognition to the worth of a trial judge's decision as that which is initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation by
the board of canvassers." The Court holds that this wisp of judicial wisdom of the Supreme Court enunciated in
the Gahol case and subsequent cases citing it is borne by the recognition that the decision of the trial court in an
election case is nothing but the court upholding the mandate of the voter, which has as its source no other than the
exercise of the constitutional right to vote. While it is true that the protestee can avail of the remedy of appeal before
the COMELEC, the Court is more convinced that between upholding the mandate of the electorate of Magalang,
Pampanga which is the fruit of the exercise of the constitutional right to vote and a procedural remedy, the Court is
more inclined to uphold and give effect to and actualize the mandate of the electorate of Magalang. To the mind of
the Court, in granting execution pending appeal the Court is being true to its bounden duty to uphold the exercise of
constitutional rights and gives flesh to the mandate of the people. The foregoing is, as far as the Court is concerned,
considered far superior circumstance that convinces the Court to grant protestant's motion;
3. Public interest and the will of the electorate must be respected and given meaning;
4. In the case of Navarosa v. Comelec, the Supreme Court held that "In the Gahol case, the Court gave an additional
justification for allowing execution pending appeal of decisions of trial courts, thus: Public policy underlies it, x x x
[S]omething had to be done to strike the death blow at the pernicious grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest
technique often, if not invariably, resorted to by unscrupulous politicians who would render nugatory the people's
verdict against them and persist in continuing in an office they very well know they have no legitimate right to hold.
x x x." A primordial public interest is served by the grant of the protestant's motion, i.e., to obviate a hollow victory
for the duly elected candidate. In the words of Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, "The well known delay in the
adjudication of election protests often gave the successful contestant a mere pyrrhic victory, i.e., a vindication when
the term of office is about to expire or has expired."
Expectedly, Cunanan moved to reconsider the Order, arguing that the RTC gravely abused its discretion: (1) in ruling that there
were good reasons to issue a writ of execution pending appeal; and (2) in entertaining and subsequently granting the motion for
execution pending appeal despite the issuance of an order transmitting the records of the case.
Thereupon, Cunanan filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Application of Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for Status Quo
Ante Order/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) with Prayer for Immediate Raffle. He argued in his petition that: (1) the RTC
Decision did not clearly establish Pecson's victory or his (Cunanan's) defeat - a requirement of Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules;
among other reasons, the number of votes the RTC tallied and tabulated exceeded the number of those who actually voted and
the votes cast for the position of Mayor, and (2) the RTC had constructively relinquished its jurisdiction by the issuance of the
Order dated November 27, 2007 directing the transmittal of the records of the case.
The Second Division of the COMELEC issued on January 4, 2008 a 60-day TRO directing: (1) the RTC to cease and desist from
issuing or causing the issuance of a writ of execution or implementing the Special Order; and (2) Cunanan to continue
performing the functions of Mayor of Magalang.
In his Answer and/or Opposition, with Prayer for Immediate Lifting of TRO, Pecson argued that: (1) preliminary injunction
cannot exist except as part or incident of an independent action, being a mere ancillary remedy that exists only as an incident of
the main proceeding; (2) the "petition for application of preliminary injunction," as an original action, should be dismissed
outright; and (3) Cunanan is guilty of forum shopping, as he filed a motion for reconsideration of the Special Order
simultaneously with the petition filed with the COMELEC.
The COMELEC's Second Division denied Cunanan's petition in a Resolution dated March 6, 2008. It ruled that: (1) the
resolution of the motion for execution pending appeal is part of the residual jurisdiction of the RTC to settle pending incidents;
the motion was filed prior to the expiration of the period to appeal and while the RTC was still in possession of the original
record; and (2) there is good reason to justify the execution of the Decision pending appeal, as Pecson's victory was clearly and
manifestly established. Ruling on the alleged defect in the RTC count, the Second Division ruled:
[A]fter a careful scrutiny of the Decision, We found that the error lies in the trial court's computation of the results. In
its Decision, the trial court, to the votes obtained by the party (as per proclamation of the MBOC), deducted the votes
per physical count after revision and deducted further the invalid/nullified ballots per the trial court's appreciation and
thereafter added the valid claimed ballots per the trial court's appreciation, thus:
Votes obtained per proclamation of the MBOC (-) Votes per physical count (-) Invalid or nullified ballots (+) Valid
claimed ballots = Total Votes Obtained
The formula used by the trial court is erroneous as it used as its reference the votes obtained by the parties as per the
proclamation of the MBOC. It complicated an otherwise simple and straightforward computation, thus leading to the
error. The correct formula should have been as follows:
Total Number of Uncontested Ballots (+) Valid Contested Ballots (+) Valid Claimed Ballots = Total Votes Obtained (4) Public policy underlies it, as something had to be done to strike the death blow at the pernicious grab-
the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest technique often, if not invariably resorted to by unscrupulous
politicians.
Using this formula and applying the figures in pages 744 and 745 of the trial court's Decision, the results will be as
follows:
Such reasons to Our mind constitute superior circumstances as to warrant the execution of the trial court's decision
pending appeal.
For the Petitioner Cunanan

Pecson thus asked for the issuance of a writ of execution via an Ex-Parte Motion. Despite Cunanan's opposition, the RTC
Total Number of Uncontested Ballots 9,656 granted Pecson's motion and issued the writ of execution on March 11, 2008. Pecson thereafter assumed the duties and functions
of Mayor of Magalang.
Add: Valid Contested Ballots 2,058
The Assailed Resolution
Add: Valid Claimed Ballots 36
On Cunanan's motion, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution dated May 21, 2008 reversing the ruling of the Second
Total Votes of Petitioner 11,750
Division insofar as it affirmed the RTC's findings of good reasons to execute the decision pending appeal. It affirmed the
authority of the RTC to order execution pending appeal; it however nullified the March 11, 2008 writ of execution on the ground
that the RTC could no longer issue the writ because it had lost jurisdiction over the case after transmittal of the records and the
For the Private Respondent (Pecson)
perfection of the appeals of both Cunanan and Pecson (to be accurate, the lapse of Pecson's period to appeal).

Total Number of Uncontested Ballots 9,271 On the propriety of executing the RTC Decision pending appeal, the COMELEC en banc ruled that it was not convinced of the
good reasons stated by the RTC in its Special Order. It ruled that recognition of the worth of a trial judge's decision, on the one
Add: Valid Contested Ballots 2,827 hand, and the right to appeal, including the Commission's authority to review the decision of the trial court, on the
other, requires a balancing act; and not every invocation of public interest will suffice to justify an execution pending appeal. It
Add: Valid Claimed Ballots 39 added that at a stage when the decision of the trial court has yet to attain finality, both the protestee and the protestant are to be
considered "presumptive winners." It noted too that the Second Division already cast a doubt on the correctness of the number of
votes obtained by the parties after the trial court's revision; thus, the resolution of the pending appeal becomes all the more
Total Votes of Petitioner 12,134 important. Between two presumptive winners, considering the pending appeal of the election protest to the Commission and
public service being the prime consideration, the balance should tilt in favor of non-disruption of government service. The
execution of the RTC Decision pending appeal would necessarily entail the unseating of the protestee, resulting not only in the
Using the correct formula, private respondent still obtained a plurality of the votes cast and enjoys a margin of 384 disruption of public service, but also in confusion in running the affairs of the government; a subsequent reversal too of the RTC
votes over the petitioner. Although not as wide as the margin found by the trial court, We are nevertheless convinced Decision also results in the unseating of the protestant. This situation (i.e., the series of turn-over of the seat of power from one
that the victory of private respondent has been clearly established in the trial court's decision for the following presumptive winner to another) cannot but cause irreparable damage to the people of Magalang, and overweighs the reasons
reasons: asserted by the RTC in its Special Order. In the end, according to the COMELEC, public interest is best served when he who
was really voted for the position is proclaimed and adjudged as winner with finality.
First, the error lies merely in the computation and does not put in issue the appreciation and tabulation of
votes. The error is purely mathematical which will not involve the opening of ballot boxes or an examination The Petition and the Prayer for the issuance of a Status Quo Order
and appreciation of ballots. It is a matter of arithmetic which calls for the mere clerical act of reflecting the
true and correct votes of the candidates.
In imputing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC en banc, Pecson argues that: (1) the RTC Decision clearly showed
Pecson's victory; (2) the reasons for the reversal of the RTC Decision practically render impossible a grant of an execution
Second, the error did not affect the final outcome of the election protest as to which candidate obtained the pending appeal; and (3) the RTC correctly found the presence of the requisites for execution pending appeal.
plurality of the votes cast.

We are likewise convinced that the assailed order states good or special reasons justifying the execution pending
appeal, to wit:
(1) The victory of the protestant was clearly and manifestly established;
(2) Execution pending appeal in election cases should be granted to give as much recognition to the worth
of a trial judge's decision as that which is initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation by the board of
canvassers;
Threatened to be unseated, Pecson asked, as interim relief, for the issuance of a Status Quo Order. He claimed that: (1) the
Department of Interior and Local Government already recognized (based on the issuance of the assailed Resolution) Cunanan's
assumption of office even if the assailed Resolution had not attained finality; and (2) in order to prevent grave and irreparable
injury to Pecson and the perpetuation of a travesty of justice, a Status Quo Order must immediately issue.
THE COURT'S RULING
We find the petition meritorious.

The remedy of executing court decisions pending appeal in election contests is provided under the Rules as follows:
(3) Public interest and the will of the electorate must be respected and given meaning; and
 SEC. 11. Execution pending appeal. - On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, the court,
while still in possession of the original records, may, at its discretion, order the execution of the decision in an
election contest before the expiration of the period to appeal, subject to the following rules:
(a) There must be a motion by the prevailing party with three-day notice to the adverse party. Execution pending
appeal shall not issue without prior notice and hearing. There must be good reasons for the execution pending appeal.
The court, in a special order, must state the good or special reasons justifying the execution pending appeal. Such
reasons must:
(1) constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that will outweigh the injury or damage should
the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal; and
(2) be manifest, in the decision sought to be executed, that the defeat of the protestee or the victory of the
protestant has been clearly established.
(b) If the court grants execution pending appeal, an aggrieved party shall have twenty working days from notice of
the special order within which to secure a restraining order or status quo order from the Supreme Court of the
Commission on Elections. The corresponding writ of execution shall issue after twenty days, if no restraining order
or status quo order is issued. During such period, the writ of execution pending appeal shall be stayed. 3
This remedy is not new. Under prevailing jurisprudence,4 the remedy may be resorted to pursuant to the suppletory application
of the Rules of Court, specifically its Section 2, Rule 39.5 What the Rules (A.M. No. 07-4-15-C) has done is to give the
availability of the remedy the element of certainty. Significantly, the Rules similarly apply the good reason standard (in fact, the
even greater superior circumstances standard) for execution pending appeal under the Rules of Court, making the remedy an
exception rather than the rule.
At the heart of the present controversy is the question of whether there has been compliance with the standards required for an
execution pending appeal in an election contest. As heretofore cited, the RTC found all these requisites present. The Second
Division of the COMELEC supported the RTC's ruling, but the COMELEC en bancheld a contrary view and nullified the
execution pending appeal. This en banc ruling is now before us.
Our review of a COMELEC ruling or decision is via a petition for certiorari. This is a limited review on jurisdictional grounds,
specifically of the question on whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction, or whether the assailed order or resolution is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Correctly understood, grave abuse of discretion is such
"capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or [an] exercise of power in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or an exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act in a manner not at all in contemplation of
law."6
Because this case is essentially about the implementation of an RTC decision pending appeal, we must first dwell on the writ the
RTC issued. The COMELEC ruled in this regard that the writ of execution the RTC issued on March 11, 2008 was void; the
RTC could no longer issue the writ because of the lapse of the period for appeal, and because the RTC no longer held the records
of the election contest which had then been transmitted to the ECAD-COMELEC.
Cunanan argues in his Comment that this ruling has become final and executory because Pecson did not question it in the present
petition. In Cunanan's view, the finality of this aspect of the COMELEC ruling renders the issue of the nullification of the
Special Order moot and academic, as any ruling we shall render would serve no practical purpose; it can no longer be
implemented since the means (obviously referring to the writ the RTC issued on March 11, 2008) of executing the RTC decision
(i.e., seating Pecson as Mayor of Magalang) has, to all intents and purposes, been nullified and rendered ineffective.
We see no merit in Cunanan's argument. The writ of execution issued by the RTC is a mere administrative enforcement medium
of the Special Order - the main order supporting Pecson's motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. The writ itself cannot
and does not assume a life of its own independent from the Special Order on which it is based. Certainly, its nullification does
not carry with it the nullification of the Special Order. This consequence does not of course hold true in the reverse situation -
the nullification of the Special Order effectively carries with it the nullification of its implementing writ and removes the basis
for the issuance of another implementing writ. In the present case, the reality is that if and when we ultimately affirm the validity
of the Special Order, nothing will thereafter prevent the RTC from issuing another writ.
Another legal reality is that the COMELEC is wrong in its ruling that the RTC could no longer actually issue the writ on March
11, 2008 because it no longer had jurisdiction to do so after the appeal period lapsed and after the records were transmitted to the
ECAD-COMELEC. That the RTC is still in possession of the records and that the period to appeal (of both contending parties)
must have not lapsed are important for jurisdictional purposes if the issue is the authority of the RTC to grant a Special
Order allowing execution pending appeal; they are requisite elements for the exercise by the RTC of its residual jurisdiction to
validly order an execution pending appeal, not for the issuance of the writ itself. This is clearly evident from the cited provision
of the Rules which does not require the issuance of the implementing writ within the above limited jurisdictional period. The
RTC cannot legally issue the implementing writ within this limited period for two reasons: (1) the cited twenty-day waiting
period under Section 11(b); and (2) the mandatory immediate transmittal of the records to the ECAD of the COMELEC under
Section 10 of the Rules.7
On the substantive issue of whether a writ of execution pending appeal should issue, we do not agree with the COMELEC's view
that there are "two presumptive winners" prior to its ruling on the protest case. We likewise cannot support its "balancing act"
view that essentially posits that given the pendency of the appeal and the lack of finality of a decision in the election protest, the
unseating of the protestee, and the need for continuity of public service, the balance should tilt in favor of continuity or non-
disruption of public service; hence, the execution pending appeal should be denied.
As Pecson correctly argued, this reasoning effectively prevents a winner (at the level of the courts) of an election protest from
ever availing of an execution pending appeal; it gives too much emphasis to the COMELEC's authority to decide the election
contest and the losing party's right to appeal. What is there to execute pending appeal if, as the COMELEC suggested, a party
should await a COMELEC final ruling on the protest case? Effectively, the "two presumptive winners" and the "balancing act"
views negate the execution pending appeal that we have categorically and unequivocally recognized in our rulings and in the
Rules we issued. To be sure, the COMELEC cannot, on its own, render ineffective a rule of procedure we established by
formulating its own ruling requiring a final determination at its level before an RTC decision in a protest case can be
implemented.
We additionally note that "disruption of public service" necessarily results from any order allowing execution pending appeal
and is a concern that this Court was aware of when it expressly provided the remedy under the Rules. Such disruption is
therefore an element that has been weighed and factored in and cannot be per se a basis to deny execution pending appeal.
What comes out clearly from this examination of the COMELEC ruling is that it looked at the wrong material considerations
when it nullified the RTC's Special Order. They are the wrong considerations because they are not the standards outlined under
Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules against which the validity of a Special Order must be tested. Significantly, the use of wrong
considerations in arriving at a decision constitutes grave abuse of discretion. 8
The proper consideration that the COMELEC made relates to the correctness of the RTC's Decision in light of the Rules'
requirement that the victory of the protestant and the defeat of the protestee be clearly established for execution pending appeal
to issue. According to the COMELEC, no less than the Second Division cast a doubt on the correctness of the number of votes
obtained by the parties after the revision of ballots when the Second Division proposed a mathematical formula to correct the
RTC count. At the same time, the COMELEC noted that the Second Division could not have corrected the RTC count, as the
petition before it was one for certiorari while the correction of errors in computation properly pertained to the resolution of
Cunanan's pending appeal. To the COMELEC, all these showed that the correctness of the RTC Decision in favor of Pecson was
far from clear and cannot support an execution pending appeal.
We disagree once more with the COMELEC en banc in this conclusion, as it failed to accurately and completely appreciate the
Second Division's findings. The RTC Decision, on its face, shows that Pecson garnered more valid votes than Cunanan after the
revision of ballots. The Second Division properly recognized, however, that the RTC computation suffered from a facial defect
that did not affect the final results; as Cunanan pointed out, the votes for Pecson and Cunanan, if totally summed up, exceeded
the total number of valid votes for mayor.
Duly alerted, the Second Division looked into the purported error, analyzed it, and found the error to be merely mathematical;
the RTC formula would necessarily exceed the total number of votes cast for mayor because it counted some votes twice. In
making this finding, the Second Division was guided by the rule that one of the requisites for an execution pending appeal is a
clear showing in the decision of the protestant's victory and the protestee's defeat. Its examination of the RTC Decision was only
for this limited purpose and this was what it did, no more no less. Specifically, it did not review the RTC's appreciation of the
ballots on revision; it did not review the intrinsic merits of the RTC Decision - issues that properly belong to the appeal that is
currently pending. It merely found that the defect Cunanan noted was actually inconsequential with respect to the results, thus
showing Pecson's clear victory under the RTC Decision. In other words, the Second Division's corrected view of the RTC count
confirmed, rather than contradicted or placed in doubt, the conclusion that Pecson won.

Other than the clarity of Pecson's victory under the RTC Decision, the Special Order cited good and special reasons that justified
an execution pending appeal, specifically: (1) the need to give as much recognition to the worth of a trial judge's decision as that
which is initially given by the law to the proclamation by the board of canvassers; (2) public interest and/or respect for and
giving meaning to the will of the electorate; and (3) public policy - something had to be done to deal a death blow to the
pernicious grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest technique often, if not invariably, resorted to by unscrupulous politicians
who would render nugatory the people's verdict against them.

Unfortunately, the COMELEC en banc simply glossed over the RTC's cited reasons and did not fully discuss why these reasons
were not sufficient to justify execution pending appeal. A combination, however, of the reasons the RTC cited, to our mind,
justifies execution of the RTC Decision pending appeal.

A striking feature of the present case is the time element involved. We have time and again noted the well known delay in the
adjudication of election contests that, more often than not, gives the protestant an empty or hollow victory in a long drawn-out
legal battle.9 Some petitions before us involving election contests have been in fact dismissed for being moot, the term for the
contested position having long expired before the final ruling on the merits came.10 In the present case, the term for mayor
consists of only three (3) years. One year and six months has lapsed since the May 2007 election; thus, less than two years are
left of the elected mayor's term. The election protest, while already decided at the RTC level, is still at the execution-pending-
appeal stage and is still far from the finality of any decision on the merits, given the available appellate remedies and the
recourses available through special civil actions. To be sure, there is nothing definite in the horizon on who will finally be
declared the lawfully elected mayor.

Also, we reiterate here our consistent ruling that decisions of the courts in election protest cases, resulting as they do from a
judicial evaluation of the ballots and after full-blown adversarial proceedings, should at least be given similar worth and
recognition as decisions of the board of canvassers.11 This is especially true when attended by other equally weighty
circumstances of the case, such as the shortness of the term of the contested elective office, of the case.

In light of all these considerations, we conclude that the COMELEC erred in nullifying the RTC's Special Order in a manner
sufficiently gross to affect its exercise of jurisdiction. Specifically, it committed grave abuse of discretion when it looked at
wrong considerations and when it acted outside of the contemplation of the law in nullifying the Special Order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly ANNUL the assailed COMELEC Resolution.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190156 February 12, 2010 On March 5, 2008, Corral filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order, but the motion was denied. Thus, Corral filed on
March 12, 2008 a petition for certiorari before the Comelec imputing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC for granting
Fernandez’s motion for execution pending appeal despite the absence of good and special reasons or superior circumstances as
LEONOR DANGAN-CORRAL, Petitioner,
expressly required by existing rules.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO ENERO FERNANDEZ, Respondents.
Ruling of the Comelec First Division
DECISION
The Comelec First Division issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on March 26, 2008 enjoining the enforcement
and implementation of the February 27, 2008 Order of the RTC. Thereafter, as the TRO was about to expire, it issued an order
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
dated May 22, 2008 granting the preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner. Then on December 17, 2008, it resolved the
petition and issued the assailed Resolution, the dispositive portion of which states:
Does the allowance of execution pending appeal of a Decision of a Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an election protest case
constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the said RTC Decision does not contain the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The orders of the respondent
specific matters required by the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests? This is the question directly involved in the present
court dated February 27, 2008 and March 7, 2008 are consequently affirmed.
case.

SO ORDERED.5
In the present Petition for Certiorari, petitioner assails the December 17, 2008 and November 10, 2009 Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) in Comelec Special Relief Case, SPR No. 51-2008 dismissing petitioner's petition
for certiorari and denying her motion for reconsideration, respectively. The Comelec found that the RTC substantially complied Ruling of the Comelec En Banc
with the rules on execution pending appeal and did not gravely abuse its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration before the Comelec En Banc which resolved the matter on November 10, 2009 as
Antecedents follows:

Petitioner Leonor Dangan-Corral (Corral) and private respondent Ernesto Enero Fernandez (Fernandez) were candidates for the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission en banc RESOVLED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to:
position of mayor of the Municipality of El Nido, Palawan during the May 14, 2007 elections. Corral was eventually proclaimed
the winner with 5,113 votes as against Fernandez's 3,807. The latter, thereafter, filed an election protest docketed as Special
1. DISMISS petitioner LEONOR DANGAN-CORRAL'S Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit;
Proceedings Case No. 1870 which was raffled to Branch 95 of the RTC of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On February 22, 2008, the RTC promulgated its Decision,1 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court rules that, in view of the invalidation of the ballots judicially declared as written
by one (1) or two (2) persons, the Protestant is hereby declared the duly elected Mayor of El Nido, Palawan by a vote of 1,701, x
x x winning over protestee whose final tally of votes after above deduction is 1,236 votes, the Protestant winning by a margin of
465 votes.2
2. AFFIRM the dismissal of the herein Petition by the First Division of this Commission, hereby giving way to the
implementation of the execution pending appeal issued by the court a quo in favor of private respondent Ernesto
Enero Fernandez, and hereby ordering petitioner Leonor Dangan-Corral to vacate the position of Municipal Mayor of
El Nido, Province of Palawan; and the Electoral Contests Adjudication Department is hereby directed to furnish the
Department of Interior and Local Government a copy of this Resolution for proper implementation;
3. DENY public respondent RTC Judge Bienvenido Blancaflor's motion to dismiss (addressed to his own court) the
charge of contempt filed against him, and instead, he is hereby found GUILTY of CONTEMPT OF THIS
COMMISSION and sentenced to pay a fine in the amount of ONE THOUSAND (₱1,000.00) PESOS;

On the same day that the decision was promulgated, Corral filed her formal Notice of Appeal simultaneously paying the required 4. DIRECT private respondent Ernesto Enero Fernandez to explain within ten (10) days from receipt of this
amount of docket/appeal fees. Fernandez, on the other hand, filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal and set the same for Resolution why he should not be cited for contempt of this Commission for assuming the herein controverted position
hearing on February 27, 2008. of Municipal Mayor of El Nido, Province of Palawan, while the Writ of Preliminary Injunction earlier issued was still
in full force and effect.
On the said date of hearing, Corral filed her written opposition to the motion; nevertheless, the hearing was held. After the
hearing, the RTC judge issued the Order3 granting the motion for execution of his Decision pending its appeal. The dispositive SO ORDERED.6
part of the Order states:
Issues
WHEREFORE, premises considered, in view of the circumstances cited above surrounding the execution of the above
questioned ballots, there exists a cloud of doubt on the earlier pronouncement of the Board of Election Canvassers declaring
Hence, this petition, which alleges palpable grave abuse of discretion, to wit:
Protestee as winner of the election contest and should not continue in office as Protestee has no mandate of the people of El Nido
at this point in time and in lieu thereof, the Court hereby GRANTS the execution pending appeal of its Decision dated February
22, 2008. The respondent Comelec committed not only a reversible error but gravely abused its discretion when it ignored the mandatory
requirements of the SUPREME COURT duly promulgated Rule on the matter of FORM of Decision of trial court in protest
cases.
IT IS SO ORDERED.4
The respondent Comelec likewise committed grave abuse of discretion when it disregarded the mandatory requirements of the
SUPREME COURT duly promulgated Rule, specifically Rule 14, Section 11 of the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests
Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials by simplistically relying on the dispositive portion of the
decision of the trial court and refusing to examine the substantial portion of the said grossly defective trial court decision so as to
determine whether the victory of the protestant and the defeat of protestee was clearly established.
The respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it sustained the validity of the Special Order granting private
respondent's Motion for Execution Pending Appeal notwithstanding the clear absence of the requisite two [2] good reasons to
support such grant.
The respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it stubbornly insisted on merely applying in this case the
general principles of Certiorari Petitions and refused to apply and correlate therewith the provisions of the New Rules on Protest
Cases Applicable to the Trial Courts most especially on the subject of Execution Pending Appeal.
In sum, the issue is whether the Comelec gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming
the execution pending appeal of the decision of the RTC.
Petitioner's Arguments
Petitioner contends that the RTC Decision sought to be executed pending appeal violates the mandatory required form of
decisions in election cases and thus should not be executed. She further contends that the determination of whether the victory of
the protestant was clearly established should be made from the entire decision and not, as what the Comelec did, merely from the
dispositive portion. She insists that the RTC Decision readily shows the inconclusive, defective and infirmed nature of
protestant's alleged victory. Petitioner also posits that there was no valid or good reason given for granting the execution pending
appeal.lawphil.net She also contends that the Comelec refused to apply the new rules on protest cases and is thus guilty of grave
abuse of discretion.
Private Respondent's Arguments
On the other hand, Fernandez contends that the Decision of the RTC is well grounded based on the evidence presented and it
clearly establishes his victory over Corral by a margin of 465 votes. Fernandez also contends that there are good reasons to allow
execution pending appeal, like giving substance to the voice of the people of El Nido. Hence, he maintains that the decision may
properly be the subject of a writ of execution pending appeal.
Our Ruling
There are clear cut requirements on when RTC decisions may be executed pending appeal. Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in
Election Contests states:
Sec. 11. Execution pending appeal. - On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, the court, while still in
possession of the original records, may, at its discretion, order the execution of the decision in an election contest before the
expiration of the period to appeal, subject to the following rules:
(a) There must be a motion by the prevailing party with three-day notice to the adverse party. Execution pending
appeal shall not issue without prior notice and hearing. There must be good reasons for the execution pending appeal.
The court, in a special order, must state the good or special reasons justifying the execution pending appeal. Such
reasons must:
(1) constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that will outweigh the injury or damage should
the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal; and
(2) be manifest, in the decision sought to be executed, that the defeat of the protestee or the victory
of the protestant has been clearly established.
(b) If the court grants an execution pending appeal, an aggrieved party shall have twenty working days from notice of
the special order within which to secure a restraining order or status quo order from the Supreme Court or the
Commission on Elections. The corresponding writ of execution shall issue after twenty days, if no restraining order or
status quo order is issued. During such period, the writ of execution pending appeal shall be stayed. (Emphasis
supplied)
A valid exercise of discretion to allow execution pending appeal requires that it must be manifest in the decision sought to be
executed that the defeat of the protestee and the victory of the protestant have been clearly established.7 The Rules of Procedure
in Election Contests now embody this doctrine, which the Comelec has in the past 8 given value to and used in resolving cases
before it, and which has formed part of our jurisprudence.
We have taken to heart the need to decide election contests with dispatch; hence, we promulgated A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC9 to
address the matter. Noteworthy is the fact that particular attention has been given to the decision itself in election contests. For
comparison, in the Rules of Court, Section 1 of Rule 36 merely states: "A judgment or final order determining the merits of the
case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of court." In the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests, however,
Section 2 of Rule 14 states:
Section 2. Form of decision in election protests.-After termination of the revision of ballots and before rendering its decision in
an election protest that involved such revision, the court shall examine and appreciate the original ballots. The court, in its
appreciation of the ballots and in rendering rulings on objections and claims to ballots of the parties, shall observe the following
rules:
(a) On Marked Ballots- The court must specify the entries in the ballots that clearly indicate that the intention of the
voter is to identify the ballot. The specific markings in the ballots must be illustrated or indicated;
(b) On Fake or Spurious Ballots- The court must specify the COMELEC security markings that are not found in the
ballots that are considered fake or spurious;
(c) On Stray Ballots- The court must specify and state in detail why the ballots are considered stray;
(d) On Pair or Group of Ballots Written by One or Individual Ballots Written by Two- When ballots are invalidated
on the ground of written by one person, the court must clearly and distinctly specify why the pair or group of ballots
has been written by only one person. The specific strokes, figures or letters indicating that the ballots have been
written by one person must be specified. A simple ruling that a pair or group of ballots has been written by one
person would not suffice. The same is true when ballots are excluded on the ground of having been written by
two persons. The court must likewise take into consideration the entries of the Minutes of Voting and Counting
relative to illiterate or disabled voters, if any, who cast their votes through assistors, in determining the validity of the
ballots found to be written by one person, whether the ballots are in pairs or in groups; and
(e) On Claimed Ballots- The court must specify the exact basis for admitting or crediting claimed votes to either
party. (Emphasis supplied)
Notably, the word "must" is used in the above-quoted rule, thus, clearly indicating the mandatory -- not merely directory --
nature of the requirement of what the decision should contain. The specific rules on the contents of decisions in election contests
were formulated so that the decision could, by itself, be taken as a valuable aid in expeditiously deciding on appeal incidents
peripheral to the main case. In the present case, the contents of the decision become particularly relevant and useful in light of
the need to decide the case before us with utmost dispatch, based only on the documents submitted before us, considering that
the records and election materials are with another tribunal, as a matter of course.1avvphi1
For the limited purpose of determining whether the essential requisite of a clear showing in the decision of the protestant’s
victory and the protestee’s defeat is present, we have examined the RTC Decision subject of the present case. It is glaring and
unmistakable that the said Decision does not conform to the requirements set forth in Section 2 of the Rules. It does not give the
specifics of its findings. The general statement invalidating 67% of the total votes cast on the ground that the ballots were written
by one person or written by two persons is grossly infirm. The Decision does not specify why the court considered particular
groups of ballots to have been written by one person, and other invalidated ballots to have been written by two persons. Worse,
the Decision does not state which and how many ballots were written by one person; and which and how many ballots were
written by two persons. The entire Decision, even the lengthy part enumerating the exhibits offered by each party, fails to yield
the exact number of and which ballots were written by one person, and the exact number of and which ballots were written by
two persons. There is also no mention in the decision of whether or not the RTC took into consideration the entries of the
Minutes of Voting and Counting relative to illiterate or disabled voters, if any, who cast their votes through assistors. The
Decision merely states that "[a] careful and cursory examination of these ballots indubitably shows that these ballots are written
either by one (1) or two (2) persons, given the palpable similarity in the handwritings indicated in these ballots earlier declared
by Protestant's revisors as written by one (1) and two (2) persons."10 It utterly violates the mandatory requirement that "the court
must clearly and distinctly specify why the pair or group of ballots has been written by only one person. The specific figures or
letters indicating that the ballots have been written by one person must be specified."

In the present case, the victory of the protestant and the defeat of the protestee were not clearly established in the Decision
because of the RTC’s failure to conform to the prescribed form of the Decision. Because of said infirmity, there is no certainty, it
not being mentioned in the Decision, on whether the ballots of those who voted through assistors were also invalidated or not, in
conjunction with the lack of a specific number of ballots invalidated for being written by one person. The ballots of those who
voted through assistors, if any, could validly be written by one person. It being unclear from the Decision whether these ballots,
if any, were invalidated, it follows that the victory of the protestant and defeat of the protestee are unclear and not manifest
therein.

Consequently, to allow the execution of such a grossly infirm RTC Decision in disregard of established jurisprudence and clear
and straightforward rules is arbitrary and whimsical and constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.11

Considering that the execution pending appeal cannot be validly allowed without the above discussed requisite, and having
already found the presence of grave abuse of discretion, we find no necessity of addressing the other matters raised by the
petitioner and of still determining the presence or absence of the other requisites for execution pending appeal.

WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. The December 17, 2008 Resolution of the First Division of the Commission on
Elections and November 10, 2009 Resolution of the Commission on Elections En Banc in Special Relief Case, SPR No. 51-2008
are declared NULL and VOID.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 135150 July 28, 1999
ROMEO LONZANIDA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTION and EUFEMIO MULI, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the resolutions issued by the COMELEC First
Division dated May 21, 1998 and by the COMELEC En Banc dated August 11, 1998 in SPA 98-190 entitled, In the matter of the
Petition to Disqualify Mayoralty Candidate Romeo Lonzanida of San Antonio, Zambales, Eufemio Muli, petitioner, vs. Romeo
Lonzanida, respondent. The assailed resolutions declared herein petitioner Romeo Lonzanida disqualified to run for Mayor in the
municipality of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 1998 elections and that all votes cast in his favor shall not be counted and if
he has been proclaimed winner the said proclamation is declared null and void.1âwphi1.nêt
Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again
proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was however contested by
his then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Zambales, which in a decision
dated January 9, 1997 declared a failure of elections. The court ruled:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this court hereby renders judgment declaring the results of the election for
the office of the mayor in San Antonio, Zambales last May 8, 1995 as null and void on the ground that
there was a failure of election.
Accordingly, the office of the mayor of the Municipality of San Antonio, Zambales is hereby declared
vacant.
Both parties appealed to the COMELEC. On November 13, 1997 the COMELEC resolved the election protest filed by Alvez
and after a revision and re-appreciation of the contested ballots declared Alvez the duly elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
by plurality of votes cast in his favor totaling P1,720 votes as against 1,488 votes for Lonzanida. On February 27, 1998 the
COMELEC issued a writ of execution ordering Lonzanida to vacate the post, which he obeyed, and Alvez assumed office for the
remainder of the term.
In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio. On April 21, 1998
his opponent Eufemio Muli timely filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida from running for mayor of San Antonio in the 1998
elections on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was
proclaimed winner. On May 21, 1998 the First Division of the COMELEC issued the questioned resolution granting the petition
for disqualification upon a finding that Lonzanida had served three consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and he
is therefore disqualified to run for the same post for the fourth time. The COMELEC found that Lonzanida's assumption of office
by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before the expiration of the term, should be counted
as service for one full term in computing the three term limit under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. The
finding of the COMELEC First Division was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc in a resolution dated August 11, 1998.
Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions finding him disqualified to run for mayor of San
Antonio Zambales in the 1998 elections. He maintains that he was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that
his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local
government officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections as evidenced by the
COMELEC decision dated November 13, 1997 in EAC No. 6-97 entitled Juan Alvez, Protestant-Appellee vs. Romeo Lonzanida,
Protestee-Appellant; wherein the COMELEC declared Juan Alvez as the duly elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
Petitioner also argues that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after he was
proclaimed winner in the 1998 mayoral elections; as the proper remedy is a petition for quo warranto with the appropriate
regional trial court under Rule 36 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Private respondent Eufemio Muli filed comment to the petition asking this court to sustain the questioned resolutions of the
COMELEC and to uphold its jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification. The private respondent states that the petition for
disqualification was filed on April 21, 1998 or before the May 1998 mayoral elections. Under section 6, RA 6646 and Rule 25 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure petitions for disqualification filed with the COMELEC before the elections and/or
proclamation of the party sought to be disqualified may still be heard and decided by the COMELEC after the election and
proclamation of the said party without distinction as to the alleged ground for disqualification, whether for acts constituting an
election offense or for ineligibility. Accordingly, it is argued that the resolutions of the COMELEC on the merits of the petition
for disqualification were issued within the commission's jurisdiction. As regards the merits of the case, the private respondent
maintains that the petitioner's assumption of office in 1995 should be considered as service of one full term because he
discharged the duties of mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral
elections.
The Solicitor-General filed comment to the petition for the respondent COMELEC praying for the dismissal of the petition. The
Solicitor-General stressed that section 8, Art. X of the Constitution and section 43 (b), Chapter 1 of the Local Government Code
which bar a local government official from serving more than three consecutive terms in the same position speaks of "service of
a term" and so the rule should be examined in this light. The public respondent contends that petitioner Lonzanida discharged the
rights and duties of mayor from 1995 to 1998 which should be counted as service of one full term, albeit he was later unseated,
because he served as mayor for the greater part of the term. The issue of whether or not Lonzanida served as a de jure or de
facto mayor for the 1995-1998 term is inconsequential in the application of the three term limit because the prohibition speaks or
"service of a term" which was intended by the framers of the Constitution to foil any attempt to monopolize political power. It is
likewise argued by the respondent that a petition for quo warranto with the regional trial court is proper when the petition for
disqualification is filed after the elections and so the instant petition for disqualification which was filed before the elections may
be resolved by the COMELEC thereafter regardless of the imputed basis of disqualification.
The petitioner filed Reply to the comment. It is maintained that the petitioner could not have served a valid term from 1995 to
1998 although he assumed office as mayor for that period because he was not lawfully elected to the said office. Moreover, the
petitioner was unseated before the expiration of the term and so his service for the period cannot be considered as one full term.
As regards the issue of jurisdiction, the petitioner reiterated in his Reply that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction to hear
the election protest after the petitioner's proclamation.
The petition has merit.
Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Sec. 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule:
Sec. 43. Term of Office.
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
The issue before us is whether petitioner Lonzanida's assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to
March 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local
government officials.
The records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the three-term limit which is now embodied in section 8, Art. X of
the Constitution was initially proposed to be an absolute bar to any elective local government official from running for the same
position after serving three consecutive terms. The said disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the accumulation of
massive political power by an elective local government official in a given locality in order to perpetuate his tenure in office.
The delegates also considered the need to broaden the choices of the electorate of the candidates who will run for office, and to
infuse new blood in the political arena by disqualifying officials from running for the same office after a term of nine years. The
mayor was compared by some delegates to the President of the Republic as he is a powerful chief executive of his political
territory and is most likely to form a political dynasty. 1 The drafters however, recognized and took note of the fact that some
local government officials run for office before they reach forty years of age; thus to perpetually bar them from running for the
same office after serving nine consecutive years may deprive the people of qualified candidates to choose from. As finally voted
upon, it was agreed that an elective local government official should be barred from running for the same post after three
consecutive terms. After a hiatus of at least one term, he may again run for the same office.2
The scope of the constitutional provision barring elective local officials with the exception of barangay officials from serving
more than three consecutive terms was discussed at length in the case of Benjamin Borja, Jr.; vs. COMELEC and Jose
Capco, Jr.3 where the issue raised was whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of the mayor by operation of law upon
the death of the incumbent mayor and served the remainder of the term should be considered to have served a term in that office
for the purpose of computing the three term limit. This court pointed out that from the discussions of the Constitutional
Convention it is evident that the delegates proceeded from the premise that the official's assumption of office is by reason of
election. This Court stated:4
Two ideas emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The first is
the notion of service of term, derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of a
prolonged stay in office. The second is the idea of election, derived from the concern that the right of the
people to choose those whom they wish to govern them be preserved.
It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the
assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of election. This is clear from the
following exchange in the Constitutional Commission concerning term limits, now embodied in Art. VI
sections 4 and 7 of the Constitution, for members of Congress:
MR. GASCON. I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the
second term. We will allow the Senator to rest for a period of time before he
can run again?
MR. DAVIDE. That is correct.
MR. GASCON. And the question that we left behind before — if the Gentlemen
will remember-was: How long will that period of rest be? Will it be one election
which is three years or one term which is six years?
MR. DAVIDE. If the Gentlemen will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed
the view that during the election following the expiration of the first 12 years,
whether such election will be on the third year or on the sixth year thereafter, this
particular member of the Senate can run. So it is not really a period of hibernation
for six years. That was the Committees' stand.
xxx xxx xxx
Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the ruling of the COMELEC
that Art X, section 8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of
election. The first sentence speaks of "the-term of office of elective local officials" and bars "such
officials" from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an
elective official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that "voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected." The term served must therefore be one "for which the
official concerned was elected." The purpose of the provision is to prevent a circumvention of the
limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve."
This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive
terms. It stated:
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as
well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual
has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same
position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
It is not disputed that the petitioner was previously elected and served two consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio Zambales
prior to the May 1995 mayoral elections. In the May 1995 elections he again ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was
proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the rights and duties of mayor until March 1998 when he was ordered to
vacate the post by reason of the COMELEC decision dated November 13, 1997 on the election protest against the petitioner
which declared his opponent Juan Alvez, the duly elected mayor of San Antonio. Alvez served the remaining portion of the
1995-1998 mayoral term.
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as having been
duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by
reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself
declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as
winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid
election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared
void is no proclamation at all 5 and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the
Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election
protest.6 Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because
he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned by
the COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.
Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post
before the expiration of the term. The respondents' contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term
from May 1995-1998 because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second
requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive terms. The second sentence of
the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, "Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. "The clear intent of the framers of the
constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time
respect the people's choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in
compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from
office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office for the full term; hence, his assumption of
office from 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three term limit. The Resolution of
the COMELEC finding him disqualified on this ground to run in the May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be set aside.
The respondents harp on the delay in resolving the election protest between petitioner and his then opponent Alvez which took
roughly about three years and resultantly extended the petitioners incumbency in an office to which he was not lawfully elected.
We note that such delay cannot be imputed to the petitioner. There is no specific allegation nor proof that the delay was due to
any political maneuvering on his part to prolong his stay in office. Moreover, protestant Alvez, was not without legal recourse to
move for the early resolution of the election protest while it was pending before the regional trial court or to file a motion for the
execution of the regional trial court's decision declaring the position of mayor vacant and ordering the vice-mayor to assume
office while the appeal was pending with the COMELEC. Such delay which is not here shown to have intentionally sought by
the petitioner to prolong his stay in office cannot serve as basis to bar his right to be elected and to serve his chosen local
government post in the succeeding mayoral election.
The petitioner's contention that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after he was
proclaimed winner is without merit. The instant petition for disqualification was filed on April 21, 1998 or before the May 1998
elections and was resolved on May 21, 1998 or after the petitioner's proclamation. It was held in the case of Sunga
vs. COMELEC and Trinidad7 that the proclamation nor the assumption of office of a candidate against whom a petition for
disqualification is pending before the COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and
to resolve it on the merits.
Sec. 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that:
The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and had assumed the position of mayor did not divest the
COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to continue the hearing and eventually decide the disqualification
case. In Aguam v. COMELEC this Court held —
Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC
is with authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made.
The fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to
the exercise of such power. It of course may not be availed of where there has been
a valid proclamation. Since private respondent's petition before the COMELEC is
precisely directed at the annulment of the canvass and proclamation, we perceive
that inquiry into this issue is within the area allocated by the Constitution and law to
COMELEC . . . Really, were a victim of a proclamation to be precluded from
challenging the validity thereof after that proclamation and the assumption of office
thereunder, baneful effects may easily supervene.

It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from
Sec. 6. Effects of disqualification Case. — any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
running or, if elected. From serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. Obviously, the
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification is deemed
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate investigation .
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the court or commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the Accordingly, the petition is granted. The assailed resolutions of the COMELEC declaring petitioner Lonzanida disqualified to
evidence of his guilt is strong. run for mayor in the 1998 mayoral elections are hereby set aside.1âwphi1.nêt

This court held that the clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification SO ORDERED.
case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered. The outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before the
election but which remained unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward the
said candidate and may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the petition until after he has been
proclaimed.

The court stated:

Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the
disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. The word "shall" signified
that this requirement of the law is mandatory, operating to impose a positive duty which must be enforced.
The implication is that the COMELEC is left with no discretion but to proceed with the disqualification
case even after the election. Thus, in providing for the outright dismissal of the disqualification case which
remains unresolved after the election, Silvestre vs. Duavit in effect disallows what R.A. No. 6646
imperatively requires. This amounts to a quasi-judicial legislation by the COMELEC which cannot be
countenanced and is invalid for having been issued beyond the scope of its authority. Interpretative rulings
of quasi-judicial bodies or administrative agencies must always be in perfect harmony with statutes and
should be for the sole purpose of carrying their general provisions into effect. By such interpretative or
administrative rulings, of course, the scope of the law itself cannot be limited. Indeed, a quasi-
judicial body or an administrative agency for that matter cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case
of a discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law
prevails.

Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is not difficult to foresee. A candidate guilty of
election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of punished, by the dismissal of the
disqualification case against him simply because the investigating body was unable, for any reason caused
upon it, to determine before the election if the offenses were indeed committed by the candidate sought to
be disqualified. All that the erring aspirant would need to do is to employ delaying tactics so that the
disqualification case based on the commission of election offenses would not be decided before the
election. This scenario is productive of more fraud which certainly is not the main intent and purpose of
the law.
G.R. No. 182867 November 25, 2008
ROBERTO LACEDA, SR., petitioner,
vs.
RANDY L. LIMENA and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
From this Court's June 10, 2008 Resolution1 dismissing his petition for certiorari, petitioner Roberto Laceda, Sr. filed the instant
motion for reconsideration,2 insisting that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the Resolutions dated January 15, 20083 and May 7, 20084 in SPA No. 07-028 (BRGY).
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Roberto Laceda, Sr., and private respondent Randy L. Limena were candidates for Punong Barangay of Barangay
Panlayaan, West District, Sorsogon City, during the October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. On
October 23, 2007, Limena filed a petition for disqualification and/or declaration as an ineligible candidate 5 against Laceda before
the COMELEC, contending that Laceda had already served as Punong Barangay for Brgy. Panlayaan for three consecutive terms
since 1994, and was thus prohibited from running for the fourth time under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 91646 which provides:
SEC. 2. Term of Office.-The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of
this Act shall be three (3) years.
No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position: Provided,
however, That the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official was elected.
Limena likewise attached the following certification from the Department of the Interior and Local Government:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that per records in this office HON. ROBERTO LACEDA, SR., incumbent Punong
Barangay of Panlayaan, West District, Sorsogon City. …was elected as Punong Barangay during the May 9, 1994,
May 12, 1997 and July 15, 2002 Barangay Elections. He resigned from office on March 20, 1995 to run as Municipal
Councilor. Hence, he is covered by the three-term rule of paragraph 2, Section 2 of RA 9164 which provides that:
"No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position: Provided,
however, that the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of office
[for] any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official was elected."7x x x x
In his Answer,8 Laceda admitted having served as Punong Barangay of Panlayaan for three consecutive terms. However, he
asserted that when he was elected for his first two terms, Sorsogon was still a municipality, and that when he served his third
term, the Municipality of Sorsogon had already been merged with the Municipality of Bacon to form a new political unit, the
City of Sorsogon, pursuant to Republic Act No. 8806.9 Thus, he argued that his third term was actually just his first in the new
political unit and that he was accordingly entitled to run for two more terms.
Laceda likewise argued that assuming he had already served three consecutive terms, Rep. Act No. 9164 which imposes the
three-term limit, cannot be made to apply to him as it would violate his vested right to office. He alleged that when he was
elected in 1994 the prohibition did not exist. Had he known that there will be a law preventing him to run for the fourth time, he
would not have run for office in 1994 as he was looking forward to the election in 2007. 10
On January 15, 2008, the COMELEC declared Laceda disqualified and cancelled his certificate of candidacy:
WHEREFORE, this Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVED, to declare Respondent Roberto Laceda,
Sr. DISQUALIFIED from running as Punong Barangay of Panlayaan, West District, Sorsogon City and
consequently denies due course and cancels his Certificate of Candidacy.SO ORDERED. 11
Laceda moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the COMELEC in a Resolution dated May 7, 2008. Aggrieved,
Laceda filed a petition for certiorari before this Court.
On June 10, 2008, this Court dismissed the petition for failure to sufficiently show that any grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the COMELEC in rendering the assailed Resolutions of January 15, 2008 and May 7, 2008. Hence, this motion for
reconsideration.
Laceda insists that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in basing its decision on the requisites enunciated
in Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections12 for the application of the three-term prohibition in Section 4313 of the Local
Government Code.14 Laceda argues that said case is inapplicable since it involved the position of municipal mayor while the
instant case concerned the position of Punong Barangay. He likewise insists that he served his third term in a new political unit
and therefore he should not be deemed already to have served a third term as Punong Barangay for purposes of applying the
three-term limit.15
For reasons hereafter discussed, the motion for reconsideration cannot prosper.
Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 9164, like Section 43 of the Local Government Code from which it was taken, is primarily intended to
broaden the choices of the electorate of the candidates who will run for office, and to infuse new blood in the political arena by
disqualifying officials from running for the same office after a term of nine years. This Court has held that for the prohibition to
apply, two requisites must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post and (2) that he or she has fully served three consecutive terms.16
In this case, while it is true that under Rep. Act No. 8806 the municipalities of Sorsogon and Bacon were merged and converted
into a city thereby abolishing the former and creating Sorsogon City as a new political unit, it cannot be said that for the purpose
of applying the prohibition in Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 9164, the office of Punong Barangay of Barangay
Panlayaan, Municipality of Sorsogon, would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office of
Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan, Sorsogon City. The territorial jurisdiction of Barangay Panlayaan, Sorsogon City, is
the same as before the conversion. Consequently, the inhabitants of the barangay are the same. They are the same group of
voters who elected Laceda to be their Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms and over whom Laceda held power and
authority as their Punong Barangay. Moreover, Rep. Act No. 8806 did not interrupt Laceda's term.
In Latasa v. Commission on Elections,17 which involved a similar question, this Court held that where a person has been elected
for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor and prior to the end or termination of such three-year term the municipality has
been converted by law into a city, without the city charter interrupting his term until the end of the three-year term, the
prohibition applies to prevent him from running for the fourth time as city mayor thereof, there being no break in the continuity
of the terms.
Thus, conformably with the democratic intent of Rep. Act No. 9164 and this Court's ruling in Latasa v. Commission on
Elections, we hold that the prohibition in Section 2 of said statute applies to Laceda. The COMELEC did not err nor commit any
abuse of discretion when it declared him disqualified and cancelled his certificate of candidacy.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Roberto Laceda, Sr.'s Motion for Reconsideration 18 dated July 25, 2008 assailing this Court's
Resolution dated June 10, 2008 is DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167591 May 9, 2007
ATTY. VENANCIO Q. RIVERA III and ATTY. NORMANDICK DE GUZMAN, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC and MARINO "BOKING" MORALES, Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 170577 May 9, 2007
ANTHONY D. DEE, Petitioner,
vs.
COMELEC and MARINO "BOKING" MORALES, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution are two consolidated petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
assailing the Resolutions dated March 14, 2005 and November 8, 2005 of the COMELEC En Banc.
G.R. No. 167591
ATTY. VENANCIO Q. RIVERA III and ATTY. NORMANDICK DE GUZMAN v. COMELEC and MARINO "BOKING"
MORALES
In the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections, respondent Marino "Boking" Morales ran as candidate for mayor
of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. Prior thereto or on January 5, 2004, he filed his
Certificate of Candidacy.
On January 10, 2004, Attys. Venancio Q. Rivera and Normandick De Guzman, petitioners, filed with the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to cancel respondent Morales’ Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that he
was elected and had served three previous consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat. They alleged that his candidacy violated
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, also known as the Local
Government Code.
In his answer to the petition, respondent Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term commencing July
1, 1995 to June 30, 1998 (first term) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (third term), but he served the second term from July 1,
1998 to June 30, 2001 only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto officer" because of the following reasons:
a. He was not validly elected for the second term 1998 to 2001 since his proclamation as mayor was declared void by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57, Angeles City in its Decision dated April 2, 2001 in Election Protest Case
(EPC) No. 98-131. The Decision became final and executory on August 6, 2001; and
b. He was preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti-graft case from January 16, 1999 to July 15, 1999.
On May 6, 2004, the COMELEC Second Division rendered its Resolution finding respondent Morales disqualified to run for the
position of municipal mayor on the ground that he had already served three (3) consecutive terms. Accordingly, his Certificate of
Candidacy was cancelled. On May 7, 2004, he filed with the COMELEC En Banc a motion for reconsideration.
On March 14, 2005, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution granting respondent Morales’ motion for reconsideration and
setting aside that of the Second Division. The COMELEC En Banc held that since the Decision in EPC No. 98-131 of the RTC,
Branch 57, Angeles City declared respondent Morales’ proclamation void, his discharge of the duties in the Office of the Mayor
in Mabalacat is that of a de facto officer or a de facto mayor. Therefore, his continuous service for three consecutive terms has
been severed.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
G.R. No. 170577
ANTHONY DEE v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MARIO "BOKING" MORALES
On May 24, 2004, after respondent Morales was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term commencing July
1, 2004 to June 30, 2007, petitioner Anthony Dee, also a candidate for mayor, filed with the RTC, Branch 61, Angeles City a
petition for quo warranto against the said respondent. Petitioner alleged that respondent Morales, having served as mayor for
three consecutive terms, is ineligible to run for another term or fourth term. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 11503.
In his answer, respondent Morales raised the following defenses:
a. He was not validly elected for the term 1998 to 2001 since the RTC, Branch 57, Angeles City declared in its
Decision that his proclamation as mayor of Mabalacat was void. Petitioner Dee was then proclaimed the duly elected
mayor; and
b. He was preventively suspended for six months by the Ombudsman, during the same term in an anti-graft case, an
interruption in the continuity of his service as municipal mayor of Mabalacat.1
In its Decision dated November 22, 2004, the RTC dismissed petitioner Dee’s petition for quo warranto on the ground that
respondent Morales did not serve the three-term limit since he was not the duly elected mayor of Mabalacat, but petitioner Dee
in the May 1998 elections for the term 1998 to 2001, thus:
Respondent, Marino Morales, was not the duly elected mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga in the May 1998 elections for the term
1998 to 2001 because although he was proclaimed as the elected mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers, had assumed office and discharged the duties of mayor, his close rival, the herein petitioner, Anthony D. Dee, was
declared the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga in the Decision promulgated on April 2, 2001 in Election Protest EPC
No. 98-131 filed by Anthony Dee against herein respondent, Marino Morales, and decided by RTC, Br. 57, Angeles City. x x x.
Petitioner Dee interposed an appeal to the COMELEC First Division, alleging that respondent Morales violated the three-term
limit rule when he ran for re-election (fourth time) as mayor in the 2004 elections. Consequently, his proclamation as such
should be set aside. In a Resolution dated July 29, 2005 the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal.
It held that respondent Morales cannot be deemed to have served as mayor of Mabalacat during the term 1998 to 2001 because
his proclamation was declared void by the RTC, Branch 57 of Angeles City. He only served as a caretaker, thus, his service
during that term should not be counted.
On August 12, 2005, petitioner Dee filed with the COMELEC En Banc a motion for reconsideration. In a Resolution dated
November 8, 2005, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the questioned Resolution of the Second Division.
Hence, petitioner Dee’s instant petition for certiorari.
Both cases may be decided based on the same facts and issues.
It is undisputed that respondent Morales was elected to the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following consecutive terms:
 a) July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998
b) July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001
c) July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004
d) July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007
THE PRINCIPAL ISSUE. –
Respondent Morales argued and the Comelec held that the July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2007 term is not his fourth because his
second term, July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 to which he was elected and which he served, may not be counted since his
proclamation was declared void by the RTC, Branch 57 of Angeles City.
Respondent Morales is wrong. This Court, through Mr. Justice Cancio C. Garcia, resolved the same issue in Ong v. Alegre 2 with
identical facts, thus:
To digress a bit, the May 1998 elections saw both Alegre and Francis opposing each other for the office of mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte, with the latter being subsequently proclaimed by the COMELEC winner in the contest. Alegre
subsequently filed an election protest, docketed as Election Case No. 6850 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Daet,
Camarines Norte. In it, the RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in that 1998 mayoralty contest, albeit the decision
came out only on July 4, 2001, when Francis had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to
serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elected for the municipality of San Vicente.
xxx
A resolution of the issues thus formulated hinges on the question of whether or not petitioner Francis’ assumption of office as
mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be considered as full service for the purpose
of the three-term limit rule.
Respondent COMELEC resolved the question in the affirmative. Petitioner Francis, on the other hand, disagrees. He argues that,
while he indeed assumed office and discharged the duties as Mayor of San Vicente for three consecutive terms, his proclamation
as mayor-elected in the May 1998 election was contested and eventually nullified per the Decision of the RTC of Daet,
Camarines Norte dated July 4, 2001. Pressing the point, petitioner argues, citing Lonzanida v. Comelec, that a proclamation
subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and one assuming office on the strength of a protested proclamation does so
as a presumptive winner and subject to the final outcome of the election protest.
xxx
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that
the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has
fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
With the view we take of the case, the disqualifying requisites are present herein, thus effectively barring petitioner Francis from
running for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. There can be no dispute about petitioner
Francis Ong having been duly elected mayor of that municipality in the May 1995 and again in the May 2001 elections and
serving the July 1, 1995-June 30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in full. The herein controversy revolves around
the 1998-2001 mayoral term, albeit there can also be no quibbling that Francis ran for mayor of the same municipality in the
May 1998 elections and actually served the 1998-2001 mayoral term by virtue of a proclamation initially declaring him mayor-
elect of the municipality of San Vicente. The question that begs to be addressed, therefore, is whether or not Francis’ assumption
of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be considered as one full term
service in the context of the consecutive three-term limit rule.
We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, "service for the full term," and should be counted as a full term
served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, supra, barring local
elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position.
It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in Election Protest Case No. 6850, that it was Francis’ opponent (Alegre)
who "won" in the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente. However, that disposition, it
must be stressed, was without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested office
has expired. Petitioner Francis’ contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his
proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his
continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in
contemplation of the three-term rule.
The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre
would-under the three-term rule-be considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest
ruling, when another actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election.
Petitioner cites, but, to our mind, cannot seek refuge from the Court’s ruling in Lonzanida v. Comelec, citing Borja v. Comelec.
In Lonzanida, petitioner Lonzanida was elected and served for two consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior
to the May 8, 1995 elections. He then ran again for the same position in the May 1995 elections, won and discharged his duties
as Mayor. However, his opponent contested his proclamation and filed an election protest before the RTC of Zambales, which,
in a decision dated January 8, 1997, ruled that there was a failure of elections and declared the position vacant. The COMELEC
affirmed this ruling and petitioner Lonzanida acceded to the order to vacate the post. Lonzanida assumed the office and
performed his duties up to March 1998 only. Now, during the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again ran for mayor of the same
town. A petition to disqualify, under the three-term rule, was filed and was eventually granted. There, the Court held that
Lonzanida cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 election, and that he did not fully
serve the 1995-1998 mayoralty term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. As the Court pointedly observed,
Lonzanida "cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate [and in fact vacated]
his post before the expiration of the term."
The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one, in Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty
elections was declared a nullity for the stated reason of "failure of election," and, as a consequence thereof, the proclamation of
Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the office of the mayor. For another, Lonzanida
did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from office as a result of legal processes.
In fine, there was an effective interruption of the continuity of service.
On the other hand, the failure-of-election factor does not obtain in the present case. But more importantly, here, there was
actually no interruption or break in the continuity of Francis’ service respecting the 1998-2001 term. Unlike Lonzanida, Francis
was never unseated during the term in question; he never ceased discharging his duties and responsibilities as mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte for the entire period covering the 1998-2001 term.
It bears stressing that in Ong v. Alegre cited above, Francis Ong was elected and assumed the duties of the mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte for three consecutive terms. But his proclamation as mayor in the May 1998 election was declared
void by the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte in its Decision dated July 4, 2001. As ruled by this Court, his service for the term
1998 to 2001 is for the full term. Clearly, the three-term limit rule applies to him. Indeed, there is no reason why this ruling
should not also apply to respondent Morales who is similarly situated.
Here, respondent Morales invoked not only Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 3 but also Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections4 which is
likewise inapplicable. The facts in Borja are:
Private respondent Jose T. Capco was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1998 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On
September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he
ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for
another term of three years ending June 30, 1998.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998
elections, Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the theory
that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be
ineligible to serve for another term after that.
On April 30, 1998, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private
respondent Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros. However, on motion of private respondent, the
COMELEC en banc, voting 5-2, reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor in the May 11, 1998
elections. x x x
This Court held that Capco’s assumption of the office of mayor upon the death of the incumbent may not be regarded as a "term"
under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code). He held the
position from September 2, 1989 to June 30, 1992, a period of less than three years. Moreover, he was not elected to that
position.
Similarly, in Adormeo v. COMELEC,5 this Court ruled that assumption of the office of mayor in a recall election for the
remaining term is not the "term" contemplated under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of R.A. No.
7160 (the Local Government Code). As the Court observed, there was a "break" in the service of private respondent Ramon T.
Talanga as mayor. He was a "private citizen" for a time before running for mayor in the recall elections.
Here, respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as mayor
until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case
filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. To reiterate, as held in Ong v. Alegre, 6 such circumstance does not
constitute an interruption in serving the full term.
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution can not be more clear and explicit –
The term of the office of elected local officials x x x, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. x x x
Upon the other hand, Section 43 (b) of R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code) clearly provides:
No local official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position. x x x
Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since July
1, 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years.
In Latasa v. Comelec,7 the Court explained the reason for the maximum term limit, thus:
The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to establish some safeguards against the excessive
accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms. As Commissioner Blas Ople stated during the deliberations:
x x x I think we want to prevent future situations where, as a result of continuous service and frequent re-elections, officials from
the President down to the municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in their positions and to accumulate these
powers and prerequisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts to members of their families in a
subsequent election. x x x
xxx
It is evident that in the abovementioned cases, there exists a rest period or a break in the service of local elective official. In
Lonzanida, petitioner therein was a private citizen a few months before the next mayoral elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and
Socrates, the private respondents therein lived as private citizens for two years and fifteen months respectively. Indeed, the law
contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or
authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the people’s freedom to choose
those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular
territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city
mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers
when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive term as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner
would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of
eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
This is the very situation in the instant case. Respondent Morales maintains that he served his second term (1998 to 2001) only
as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto officer." Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated and its purpose
defeated when an official serves in the same position for three consecutive terms. Whether as "caretaker" or "de facto" officer, he
exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables him "to stay on indefinitely".
Respondent Morales should be promptly ousted from the position of mayor of Mabalacat.
G.R. No. 167591 –
Having found respondent Morales ineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 should be cancelled. The
effect of the cancellation of a Certificate of Candidacy is provided under Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. No. 6646, thus:
SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. – Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong.
SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. – The procedure hereinabove provided shall
apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881.
in relation to Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides:
SEC. 211. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. – In the reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be
valid unless there is clear and good reason to justify its rejection. The board of election inspectors shall observe the following
rules, bearing in mind that the object of the election is to obtain the expression of the voter’s will:
xxx
19. Any vote in favor of a person who has not filed a certificate of candidacy or in favor of a candidate for an office for which he
did not present himself shall be considered as a stray vote but it shall not invalidate the whole ballot.
xxx
In the light of the foregoing, respondent Morales can not be considered a candidate in the May 2004 elections. Not being a
candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be considered stray votes.

G.R. No. 170577 –

Since respondent Morales is DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as mayor of Mabalacat, the instant petition for quo
warranto has become moot.

Going back to G.R. No. 167591, the question now is whether it is the vice-mayor or petitioner Dee who shall serve for the
remaining portion of the 2004 to 2007 term.

In Labo v. Comelec,8 this Court has ruled that a second place candidate cannot be proclaimed as a substitute winner, thus:

The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the
next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.

xxx

It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been disqualified, the votes intended for the disqualified candidate
should, in effect, be considered null and void. This would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty
resides. At the risk of being repetitious, the people of Baguio City opted to elect petitioner Labo bona fide, without any intention
to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that Labo was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the
exercise of the powers of the government. Unfortunately, petitioner Labo turned out to be disqualified and cannot assume the
office.

Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or cannot be installed, under no circumstances can minority or
defeated candidate be deemed elected to the office. Surely, the 12,602 votes cast for petitioner Ortega is not a larger number than
the 27,471 votes cast for petitioner Labo (as certified by the Election Registrar of Baguio City; rollo, p. 109; GR No. 105111).

xxx

As a consequence of petitioner’s ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred. This should now be
filled by the vice-mayor in accordance with Section 44 of the Local Government Code, to wit:

Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor and Vice-Mayor. – (a) If a permanent
vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or the vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor
or mayor. x x x

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 167591 is GRANTED. Respondent Morales’ Certificate of Candidacy dated December
30, 2003 is cancelled. In view of the vacancy in the Office of the Mayor in Mabalacat, Pampanga, the vice-mayor elect of the
said municipality in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections is hereby declared mayor and shall serve as
such for the remaining duration of the term July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. The petition in G.R. No. 170577 is DISMISSED for
being moot.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 185740 July 23, 2013 In a letter12 dated February 17, 2005, Gonzales wrote the CSC alleging that Governor Jesus O. Typoco, Jr., Camarines Norte’s
incumbent governor, refused to reinstate her. The CSC responded with Resolution No. 061988, 13 which ordered Gonzales’
reinstatement to the provincial administrator position, or to an equivalent position.Thus, the petitioner, through Governor
THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMARINES NORTE, represented by GOVERNOR JESUS O. TYPOCO,
Typoco, filed a petition for review before the CA, seeking to nullify the CSC’s Resolution No. 030008 and Resolution No.
JR., Petitioner,
061988.
vs.
BEATRIZ O. GONZALES, Respondent.
The Appellate Court’s Ruling
DECISION
The CA supported the CSC’s ruling that reinstated Gonzales as provincial administrator or to an equivalent position. 14
BRION, J.:
Citing Aquino v. Civil Service Commission,15 the CA emphasized that an appointee acquires a legal right to his position once he
assumes a position in the civil service under a completed appointment. This legal right is protected both by statute and the
We resolve the Provincial Government of Camarines Norte's (petitioner) petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the
Constitution, and he cannot be removed from office without cause and previous notice and hearing. Appointees cannot be
Decision2 dated June 25, 2008 and the Resolution3 dated December 2, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
removed at the mere will of those vested with the power of removal, or without any cause.
97425, reinstating respondent Beatriz O. Gonzales as the Province of Camarines Norte’s provincial administrator, or to an
equivalent position.
The CA then enumerated the list of valid causes for a public officer’s removal under Section 46, 16 Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of
the Revised Administrative Code (Administrative Code), and noted that lack of confidence was not in the list. Thus, the CA
Factual Antecedents
concluded that Gonzales’ dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence violated her security of tenure, and that she has the right
to be reinstated with payment of backwages.
Gonzales was appointed as the provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines Norte by then Governor Roy A. Padilla, Jr.
on April 1, 1991. Her appointment was on a permanent capacity. On March 8, 1999, Governor Jess B. Pimentel sent Gonzales a
The CA further held that Gonzales’ dismissal was illegal because it was done without due process. The proceedings under
memorandum directing her to explain in writing why no administrative charges should be filed against her for gross
Administrative Case No. 001 cannot be the basis for complying with the requirements of due process because they are separate
insubordination/gross discourtesy in the course of official duties, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the
and distinct from the proceedings in the present controversy. Thus, Gonzales was illegally terminated when she was dismissed
service; this was later on captioned as Administrative Case No. 001. After Gonzales submitted her comment, an Ad Hoc
for lack of confidence, without any hearing, the day after she was reinstated.
Investigation Committee found her guilty of the charges against her, and recommended to Governor Pimentel that she be held
administratively liable.4 On September 30, 1999, Governor Pimentel adopted the Ad Hoc Investigation Committee’s
recommendation and dismissed Gonzales.5 Lastly, the CA noted that Resolution No. 002245, which modified Governor Pimentel’s decision, has long been final and
executory. The petitioner did not file any petition for reconsideration against Resolution No. 002245, and hence, it is no longer
alterable.
Proceedings before the Civil Service Commission

The petitioner sought a reconsideration17 of the CA’s Decision, which the CA denied in a Resolution 18 dated December 2, 2008.
Gonzales appealed Governor Pimentel’s decision to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC issued Resolution No.
0014186 modifying Governor Pimentel’s decision, finding Gonzales guilty of insubordination and suspending her for six months.
This decision was appealed by Governor Pimentel, which the CSC denied in its Resolution No. 001952. 7 The Present Petition

Gonzales then filed a motion for execution and clarification of Resolution No. 001418, in which she claimed that she had already In its present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner argues that the provincial administrator position has been converted
served her six-month suspension and asked to be reinstated. The CSC issued Resolution No. 002245, 8which directed Gonzales’ into a highly confidential, coterminous position by RA 7160. Hence, Gonzales no longer enjoyed security of tenure to the
reinstatement. position she held prior to RA 7160’s enactment.

Governor Pimentel reinstated Gonzales as provincial administrator on October 12, 2000, but terminated her services the next day
for lack of confidence. He then wrote a letter9 to the CSC reporting his compliance with its order, and Gonzales’ subsequent
dismissal as a confidential employee. In his letter, Governor Pimentel cited Resolution No. 0001158,10 where the CSC ruled that
the provincial administrator position is highly confidential and is coterminous in nature.
The CSC responded through Resolution No. 030008,11 which again directed Gonzales’ reinstatement as provincial administrator.
It clarified that while the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. RA 7160) made the provincial administrator
position coterminous and highly confidential in nature, this conversion cannot operate to prejudice officials who were already
issued permanent appointments as administrators prior to the new law’s effectivity. According to the CSC, Gonzales has
acquired a vested right to her permanent appointment as provincial administrator and is entitled to continue holding this office
despite its subsequent classification as a coterminous position. The conversion of the provincial administrator position from a
career to a non-career service should not jeopardize Gonzales’ security of tenure guaranteed to her by the Constitution. As a
permanent appointee, Gonzales may only be removed for cause, after due notice and hearing. Loss of trust and confidence is not
among the grounds for a permanent appointee’s dismissal or discipline under existing laws.
In her Comment19 and Memorandum,20 Gonzales maintained that the provincial administrator remained a career service position.
Section 721 of Presidential Decree No. 807, which was one of the bases of the Court in Laurel V v. Civil Service
Commission22 to declare the provincial administrator as a career service position, is a verbatim copy of Section 7, 23 Chapter 2 of
the Administrative Code. This classification, established by law and jurisprudence, cannot be altered by the mere implementing
rules and regulations of RA 7160. And assuming arguendo that the provincial administrator position has indeed become a
primarily confidential position, this reclassification should not apply retroactively to Gonzales’ appointment on a permanent
capacity prior to RA 7160’s effectivity.
Issues
The parties’ arguments, properly joined, present to us the following issues:
1) Whether Congress has re-classified the provincial administrator position from a career service to a primarily
confidential, non-career service position; and
 2) Whether Gonzales has security of tenure over her position as provincial administrator of the Province of
Camarines Norte.
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition meritorious.
Congress has reclassified the provincial administrator position as a primarily confidential, non-career position
We support the CSC’s conclusion that the provincial administrator position has been classified into a primarily confidential, non-
career position when Congress, through RA 7160, made substantial changes to it. First, prior to RA 7160, Batas Pambansa Blg.
337, the old Local Government Code (LGC), did not include a provincial administrator position among the listing of mandatory
provincial officials,24 but empowered the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to create such other offices as might then be necessary to
carry out the purposes of the provincial government.25 RA 7160 made the position mandatory for every province.26 Thus, the
creation of the provincial administrator position under the old LGC used to be a prerogative of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Second, in introducing the mandatory provincial administrator position, RA 7160 also amended the qualifications for the
provincial administrator position. While Section 48027 of RA 7160 retained the requirement of civil service eligibility for a
provincial administrator, together with the educational requirements, it shortened the six-year work experience requirement to
five years.28 It also mandated the additional requirements of residence in the local government concerned, and imposed a good
moral character requirement.
Third, RA 7160 made the provincial administrator position coterminous with its appointing authority, reclassifying it as a non-
career service position that is primarily confidential.
Before RA 7160 took effect, Laurel classified the provincial administrator position as an open career position which required
qualification in an appropriate examination prior to appointment. Laurel placed the provincial administrator position under the
second major level of positions in the career service under Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 807. This provision reads:
Section 7. Classes of Positions in the Career Service.
(a) Classes of positions in the career service appointment to which requires examinations shall be grouped into three major levels
as follows:
xxxx
2. The second level shall include professional, technical, and scientific positions which involve professional, technical, or
scientific work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at least four years of college work up to Division Chief
level.
Section 480 of RA 7160 made the provincial administrator’s functions closely related to the prevailing provincial administration
by identifying the incumbent with the provincial governor to ensure the alignment of the governor’s direction for the province
with what the provincial administrator would implement. In contrast with the general direction provided by the provincial
governor under the Manual of Position Descriptions cited in Laurel, Section 480(b) of RA 7160 now mandates constant
interaction between the provincial administrator and the provincial governor, to wit:
(b) The administrator shall take charge of the office of the administrator and shall:
(1) Develop plans and strategies and upon approval thereof by the governor or mayor, as the case may be, implement
the same particularly those which have to do with the management and administration-related programs and projects
which the governor or mayor is empowered to implement and which the sanggunian is empowered to provide for
under this Code;
(2) In addition to the foregoing duties and functions, the administrator shall:
(i) Assist in the coordination of the work of all the officials of the local government unit, under the supervision, direction, and
control of the governor or mayor, and for this purpose, he may convene the chiefs of offices and other officials of the local
government unit;
xxxx
(4) Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the governor and mayor, as the case may be, on all other matters relative to the
management and administration of the local government unit. [emphases and italics ours]
As the CSC correctly noted in Resolution No. 0001158,29 the administrator position demands a close intimate relationship with
the office of the governor (its appointing authority) to effectively develop, implement and administer the different programs of
the province. The administrator’s functions are to recommend to the Sanggunian and to advise the governor on all matters
regarding the management and administration of the province, thus requiring that its occupant enjoy the governor’s full trust and
confidence.
To emphasize the close relations that the provincial administrators’ functions have with the office of the governor, RA 7160
even made the provincial administrator position coterminous with its appointing authority.30 This provision, along with the
interrelations between the provincial administrator and governor under Section 480, renders clear the intent of Congress to make
the provincial administrator position primarily confidential under the non-career service category of the civil service.
Congress’ reclassification of the provincial administrator position in RA 7160 is a valid exercise of legislative power that does
not violate Gonzales’ security of tenure
Having established that Congress has changed the nature of the provincial administrator position to a primarily confidential
employee, the next question to address would be its impact on Gonzales’ security of tenure. According to the petitioner,
Gonzales lost her security of tenure when the provincial administrator position became a primarily confidential position.
Gonzales, on the other hand, retorted that the conversion of the position should not be retroactively applied to her, as she is a
permanent appointee. Both the CA and the CSC ruled in favor of the latter, and gave premium to Gonzales’ original permanent
appointment under the old LGC. They posit that Gonzales acquired a vested legal right over her position from the moment she
assumed her duties as provincial administrator. Thus, she cannot be removed from office except for cause and after due hearing;
otherwise such removal would amount to a violation of her security of tenure.
The arguments presented by the parties and ruled upon by the CA reflect a conceptual entanglement between the nature of the
position and an employee’s right to hold a position. These two concepts are different. The nature of a position may change by
law according to the dictates of Congress. The right to hold a position, on the other hand, is a right that enjoys constitutional and
statutory guarantee, but may itself change according to the nature of the position.
Congress has the power and prerogative to introduce substantial changes in the provincial administrator position and to reclassify
it as a primarily confidential, non-career service position. Flowing from the legislative power to create public offices is the
power to abolish and modify them to meet the demands of society;31 Congress can change the qualifications for and shorten the
term of existing statutory offices. When done in good faith, these acts would not violate a public officer’s security of tenure,
even if they result in his removal from office or the shortening of his term. 32 Modifications in public office, such as changes in
qualifications or shortening of its tenure, are made in good faith so long as they are aimed at the office and not at the
incumbent.33
In Salcedo and Ignacio v. Carpio and Carreon,34 for instance, Congress enacted a law modifying the offices in the Board of
Dental Examiners. The new law, RA 546, raised the qualifications for the board members, and provided for a different
appointment process. Dr. Alfonso C. Salcedo and Dr. Pascual Ignacio, who were incumbent board members at the time RA 546
took effect, filed a special civil action for quo warranto against their replacements, arguing that their term of office under the old
law had not yet expired, and neither had they abandoned or been removed from office for cause. We dismissed their petition, and
held that Congress may, by law, terminate the term of a public office at any time and even while it is occupied by the incumbent.
Thus, whether Dr. Salcedo and Dr. Ignacio were removed for cause or had abandoned their office is immaterial.
More recently, in Dimayuga v. Benedicto II,35 we upheld the removal of Chona M. Dimayuga, a permanent appointee to the
Executive Director II position, which was not part of the career executive service at the time of her appointment. During her
incumbency, the CSC, by authority granted under Presidential Decree No. 1, classified the Executive Director II position to be
within the career executive service. Since Dimayuga was not a career executive service officer, her initially permanent
appointment to the position became temporary; thus, she could be removed from office at any time.
In the current case, Congress, through RA 7160, did not abolish the provincial administrator position but significantly modified
many of its aspects. It is now a primarily confidential position under the non-career service tranche of the civil service. This
change could not have been aimed at prejudicing Gonzales, as she was not the only provincial administrator incumbent at the
time RA 7160 was enacted. Rather, this change was part of the reform measures that RA 7160 introduced to further empower
local governments and decentralize the delivery of public service. Section 3(b) of RA 7160 provides as one of its operative
principles that:
(b) There shall be established in every local government unit an accountable, efficient, and dynamic organizational structure and
operating mechanism that will meet the priority needs and service requirements of its communities.
Thus, Gonzales’ permanent appointment as provincial administrator prior to the enactment of RA 7160 is immaterial to her
removal as provincial administrator. For purposes of determining whether Gonzales’ termination violated her right to security of
tenure, the nature of the position she occupied at the time of her removal should be considered, and not merely the nature of her
appointment at the time she entered government service.
The Court is aware that this decision has repercussions on the tenure of other corporate secretaries in various GOCCs. The
officers likely assumed their positions on permanent career status, expecting protection for their tenure and appointments, but are
now re-classified as primarily confidential appointees. Such concern is unfounded, however, since the statutes themselves do not
classify the position of corporate secretary as permanent and career in nature. Moreover, there is no absolute guarantee that it
will not be classified as confidential when a dispute arises. As earlier stated, the Court, by legal tradition, has the power to make
a final determination as to which positions in government are primarily confidential or otherwise. In the light of the instant
controversy, the Court's view is that the greater public interest is served if the position of a corporate secretary is classified as
primarily confidential in nature.38
The quoted portion, however, even bolsters our theory. Read together with its succeeding paragraph, the quoted portion in Civil
Service Commission v. Javier39 actually stands for the proposition that other corporate secretaries in government-owned and –
controlled corporations cannot expect protection for their tenure and appointments upon the reclassification of their position to a
primarily confidential position. There, the Court emphasized that these officers cannot rely on the statutes providing for their
permanent appointments, if and when the Court determines these to be primarily confidential. In the succeeding paragraph after
the portion quoted by the dissent, we even pointed out that there is no vested right to public office, nor is public service a
property right. Thus:
Moreover, it is a basic tenet in the country's constitutional system that "public office is a public trust," and that there is no vested
right in public office, nor an absolute right to hold office. No proprietary title attaches to a public office, as public service is not a
property right. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be
said to have any vested right in an office. The rule is that offices in government, except those created by the constitution, may be
abolished, altered, or created anytime by statute. And any issues on the classification for a position in government may be
brought to and determined by the courts.40(emphases and italics ours)
Executive Order No. 503 does not grant Gonzales security of tenure in the provincial administrator position on a permanent
capacity

In extending security of tenure to Gonzales’ permanent appointment as provincial administrator, the dissenting opinion cites as
In echoing the CSC and the CA’s conclusion, the dissenting opinion posits the view that security of tenure protects the
authority Executive Order No. (EO) 503 which provided certain safeguards against the termination of government employees
permanent appointment of a public officer, despite subsequent changes in the nature of his position.
affected by the implementation of RA 7160. According to the dissenting opinion, EO 503 is an obvious indication of the
executive department’s intent to protect and uphold both the national government and the local government employees’ security
Citing Gabriel v. Domingo,36 the dissenting opinion quotes our categorical declaration that "a permanent employee remains a of tenure. It cites Section 2(a), paragraph 8 (providing for the tenure of an administrator) to prove its point:
permanent employee unless he is validly terminated," and from there attempts to draw an analogy between Gabriel and the case
at hand.
8. Incumbents of positions, namely administrator, legal officer, and information officer declared by the Code as coterminous,
who hold permanent appointments, shall continue to enjoy their permanent status until they vacate their positions.
The very first sentence of Gabriel spells out its vast difference from the present case. The sole and main issue in Gabriel is
whether backwages and other monetary benefits could be awarded to an illegally dismissed government employee, who was
At first glance, EO 503 does seem to extend the provincial administrators’ security of tenure in their permanent appointments
later ordered reinstated. From this sentence alone can be discerned that the issues involved related to the consequences of illegal
even beyond the effectivity of RA 7160. EO 503, however, does not apply to employees of the local government affected by RA
dismissal rather than to the dismissal itself. Nowhere in Gabrielwas there any mention of a change in the nature of the position
7160’s enactment. The title of EO 503 clearly provides for its scope of application, to wit:
held by the public officer involved.

Executive Order No. 503. Providing for the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Transfer of Personnel and Assets,
Further, key factual differences make Gabriel inapplicable to the present case, even if only by analogy: first, the public officer in
Liabilities and Records of National Government Agencies whose Functions are to be Devolved to the Local Government Units
Gabriel received a Memorandum stating that he would be appointed as Transportation District Supervisor III under their office
and for other Related Purposes. [underscore, italics and emphases ours]
reorganization. Second, the Court in Gabriel clearly pointed out that the reason for his eventual appointment as a casual
employee, which led to his termination from service, was due to a pending protest he filed before the CSC – indicating that there
was no ground for him to not receive the appointment earlier promised. In contrast, the issue of Gonzales is whether the A reading of EO 503’s whereas clauses confirms that it applies only to national government employees whose functions are to
appointing authority’s lack of trust and confidence in the appointee was sufficient cause for the termination of employment of a be devolved to local governments:
primarily confidential employee. And third, there was a change in the position held by the public officer in Gabriel. He was a
permanent employee who was extended a different appointment, which was casual in nature, because of a protest that he earlier
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, hereinafter referred to as the
filed. In contrast, the current case involves a public officer who held the same position whose nature changed because of the
Code, transfers the responsibility for the delivery of basic services and facilities from the national government agencies (NGAs)
passage of RA 7160.
concerned to the local government units (LGUs);

The dissent also quotes the penultimate paragraph of Civil Service Commission v. Javier37 to support its contention that
WHEREAS, the Code stipulated that the transfer of basic services and facilities shall be accompanied by the transfer of the
permanent appointees could expect protection for their tenure and appointments in the event that the Court determines that the
national personnel concerned and assets to ensure continuity in the delivery of such services and facilities;
position is actually confidential in nature:
WHEREAS, responsive rules and regulations are needed to affect the required transfer of national personnel concerned and
assets to the LGUs. [underscores, italics and emphases ours]
Thus, paragraph 8, section 2(a) of EO 503 cannot apply to Gonzales, a provincial administrator. As explained earlier, the
existence of the provincial administrator position was a prerogative of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan, and was not even a
mandatory public office under the old LGC. It is clearly not a national government position whose functions are to be devolved
to the local governments.
The dissenting opinion, on the other hand, argues that EO 503 does not apply to national government employees only. According
to the dissent, the phrase "and for related purposes" in EO 503’s title could encompass personnel not necessarily employed by
national government agencies but by local government units such as the administrator, the legal officer and the information
officer, as enumerated in Section 2(a), paragraph 8 thereof. This provision, according to the dissent, fills the crucial gap left by
RA 7160 which did not provide whether the term of an incumbent provincial administrator would automatically become
coterminous with that of the appointing authority upon RA 7160’s effectivity.
not "removed" or "dismissed" from office; his term merely "expires"46 and the loss of trust and confidence is the "just cause"
provided by law that results in the termination of employment. In the present case where the trust and confidence has been
irretrievably eroded, we cannot fault Governor Pimentel’s exercise of discretion when he decided that he could no longer entrust
his confidence in Gonzales.
Security of tenure in public office simply means that a public officer or employee shall not be suspended or dismissed except for
cause, as provided by law and after due process. It cannot be expanded to grant a right to public office despite a change in the
nature of the office held. In other words, the CSC might have been legally correct when it ruled that the petitioner violated
Gonzales’ right to security of tenure when she was removed without sufficient just cause from her position, but the situation had
since then been changed. In fact, Gonzales was reinstated as ordered, but her services were subsequently terminated under the
law prevailing at the time of the termination of her service; i.e., she was then already occupying a position that was primarily
confidential and had to be dismissed because she no longer enjoyed the trust and confidence of the appointing authority. Thus,
Gonzales’ termination for lack of confidence was lawful. She could no longer be reinstated as provincial administrator of
Camarines Norte or to any other comparable position. This conclusion, however, is without prejudice to Gonzales’ entitlement to
retirement benefits, leave credits, and future employment in government service.

This kind of construction effectively adds to EO 503’s object matters that it did not explicitly provide for. The phrase "and for
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition, and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision dated
other related purposes" can only add to EO 503 matters related to the devolution of personnel, basic services and facilities to
June 25, 2008 and the Resolution dated December 2, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 97425.
local government units. The impact of the change in a local government position’s nature is clearly different from the
implementation of devolution and its ancillary effects: the former involves a change in a local government position’s functions
and concept of tenure, while the latter involves (among other things) the transfer of national government employees to local SO ORDERED.
government units. This difference is highlighted by the fact that EO 503, as reflected by its whereas clauses, was issued to
implement Section 17 of RA 7160. In contrast, the change in the nature of the provincial administrator position may be gleaned
from Section 480 of RA 7160. Hence, by no stretch of reasonable construction can the phrase "and for other related purposes" in
EO 503’s title be understood to encompass the consequences of the change in the local government position’s nature.

Furthermore, construing that the administrator position in Section 2(a), paragraph 8 pertains to city, municipal and/or provincial
administrators would result in a legal infirmity. EO 503 was issued pursuant to the President’s ordinance powers to provide for
rules that are general or permanent in character for the purpose of implementing the President’s constitutional or statutory
powers.41 Exercising her constitutional duty to ensure that all laws are faithfully executed, then President Corazon Aquino issued
EO 503 to ensure the executive’s compliance with paragraph (i), Section 17 of RA 7160, which requires local government units
to absorb the personnel of national agencies whose functions shall be devolved to them. 42 This is reflected in EO 503’s title and
whereas clauses, and its limited application as discussed earlier.

Thus, the dissenting opinion’s interpretation would result in the judicial recognition of an act of the Executive usurping a
legislative power. The grant of permanent status to incumbent provincial administrators, despite the clear language and intent of
RA 7160 to make the position coterminous, is an act outside the President’s legitimate powers. The power to create, abolish and
modify public offices is lodged with Congress.43 The President cannot, through an Executive Order, grant permanent status to
incumbents, when Congress by law has declared that the positions they occupy are now confidential. Such act would amount to
the President’s amendment of an act of Congress – an act that the Constitution prohibits. Allowing this kind of interpretation
violates the separation of powers, a constitutionally enshrined principle that the Court has the duty to uphold.44

The dissent counters this argument by pointing out that Section 2(a), paragraph 8 of EO 503 enjoys the legal presumption of
validity. Unless the law or rule is annulled in a direct proceeding, the legal presumption of its validity stands. The EO’s validity,
however, is not in question in the present case. What is at issue is a proper interpretation of its application giving due respect to
the principle of separation of powers, and the dissenting opinion’s interpretation does violence to this principle.

Gonzales has security of tenure, but only as a primarily confidential employee

To be sure, both career and non-career service employees have a right to security of tenure.1âwphi1 All permanent officers and
employees in the civil service, regardless of whether they belong to the career or non-career service category, are entitled to this
guaranty; they cannot be removed from office except for cause provided by law and after procedural due process.45 The concept
of security of tenure, however, labors under a variation for primarily confidential employees due to the basic concept of a
"primarily confidential" position. Serving at the confidence of the appointing authority, the primarily confidential employee’s
term of office expires when the appointing authority loses trust in the employee. When this happens, the confidential employee is
G.R. No. 207851 July 8, 2014
District Before the Enactment of After the Enactment of

ANGEL G. NAVAL, Petitioner,

vs. R.A. No. 9716 R.A. No. 9716
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NELSON B. JULIA, Respondents.
1st Libmanan, Minalabac, Del Gallego, Ragay, Lupi,
DECISION
Pamplona, Pasacao, San Sipocot, Cabusao
REYES, J.:
Fernando, Del Gallego,
A politician thinks of the next election –
Ragay, Lupi, Sipocot,
a statesman of the next generation.
Cabusao
- James Freeman Clarke, American preacher and author
2nd Naga City, Pili, Ocampo, Libmanan, Minalabac,

The Case
Camaligan, Canaman, Pamplona, Pasacao, San

A provincial board member cannot be elected and serve for more than three consecutive terms. But then, the Court is now called
Magarao, Bombon, Fernando, Gainza, Milaor
upon to resolve the following questions. First.What are the consequences to the provincial board member’s eligibility to run for
the same elective position if the legislative district, which brought him orher to office to serve the first two consecutive terms, be
reapportioned in such a way that 8 out of its 10 town constituencies are carved out and renamed as another district? Second. Is Calabanga,9 Gainza,
the provincial board member’s election to the same position for the third and fourth time, but now in representation ofthe
renamed district, a violation of the three-term limit rule?
Milaor

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorariwith an Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ 3rd Caramoan, Garchitorena, Naga City, Pili, Ocampo,
of Preliminary Injunction1 filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court to assail the following resolutions of the public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC):
Goa, Lagonoy, Presentacion, Camaligan, Canaman,
2
(a) Resolution (first assailed resolution) issued by the Second Division on March 5, 2013, in SPA No. 13-166 (DC), granting the
petition filed by Nelson B. Julia (Julia), seeking to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy3 (COC) as Member of the Sangguniang Sangay, San Jose, Tigaon, Magarao, Bombon,
Panlalawiganof Camarines Sur (Sanggunian) of Angel G. Naval (Naval), who is allegedly violating the three-term limit imposed
upon elective local officials as provided for in Article X, Section 8 4 of the 1987 Constitution, and Section 43(b)5 of the Local Tinambac, Siruma Calabanga
Government Code (LGC); and
4th Iriga City, Baao, Balatan, Caramoan, Garchitorena,
(b) En BancResolution6 (second assailed resolution) issued on June 5, 2013, denying Naval’s Motion for Reconsideration 7 to the
Resolution dated March 5, 2013.
Bato, Buhi, Bula, Nabua Goa, Lagonoy,

Antecedents
Presentacion, Sangay, San

From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected and had served as a member of the Sanggunian, Second District,
Jose, Tigaon, Tinambac,
Province of Camarines Sur.

On October 12, 2009, the President approved Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9716,8 which reapportioned the legislative districts in Siruma
Camarines Sur in the following manner:
5th Iriga City, Baao, Balatan, Bato, Buhi, Bula,
Nabua
[[reference - http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/july2014/207851.pdf]]

Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old Second District to form the present Third District. The present Second
District is composed of the two remaining towns, Gainza and Milaor, merged with five towns from the old First District.
In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the Sanggunian, Third District. He served until 2013.
In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anewand was re-elected as Member of the Sanggunian, Third District.
Julia was likewise a SanggunianMember candidate from the Third District in the 2013 elections. On October 29, 2012, he
invoked Section 7810 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and filed beforethe COMELEC a Verified Petition to Deny Due
Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy11 of Naval. Julia posited that Naval had fully served the entire Province of
Camarines Sur for three consecutive terms as a member of the Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been elected from.
The three-term limit rule’s application is more with reference to the same local elective post, and not necessarily in connection
with an identical territorial jurisdiction. Allowing Naval to run as a Sanggunianmember for the fourth time is violative of the
inflexible three-term limit rule enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC, which must be strictly construed.12
The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division
In the first assailed resolution issued on March 5, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division cancelled Naval’s COC on grounds
stated below:
[W]hen a candidate for public office swears in his COC that he is eligible for the elective posts he seeks, while, in reality, he
knowingly lacks the necessary requirements for eligibility, he commits a false material misrepresentation cognizable under
Section 78 of the [OEC].
xxxx
The Supreme Court[,] in the case of Lonzanida v. [COMELEC][,] detailed the important components of[Article X, Section 8 of
the Constitution]:
This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive
terms.It stated:
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to
serve in the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has servedthree consecutive terms in an elective local office[;] he must also
have been electedto the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. x x x
x x x The first requisite does not only describe a candidate who has been elected for public office for three consecutive terms.
The candidate must have been elected in the samelocal government post. This connotes that the candidate must have been inthe
same elective position serving the same constituency who elected him to office for three consecutive terms.
xxxx
The three-term limit rule was designed by the framers of the Constitution to prevent the monopoly of power centered only on a
chosen few. The said disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the accumulation of massive political power by an
elective local government official in a given locality in order to perpetuate his tenure in office. The framers also considered the
necessityof the enhancement of the freedom of choice of the electorate by broadening the selection of would-be elective public
officers. By rendering ineligible for public office those who have been elected and served for three consecutive terms in the same
public elective post, the prohibition seeks to infuse new blood in the political arena.
xxxx
x x x [T]he new Third District where [Naval] was elected and has served is composed of the same municipalities comprising the
previous Second District, absent the towns Gainza and [Milaor]. The territorial jurisdiction [Naval] seeks to serve for the term
2013-2016 is the same as the territorial jurisdiction he previously served. The electorate who voted for him in 2004, 2007 and
2010 isthe same electorate who shall vote for him come May 13, 2013 Elections. They are the same group of voters who elected
him into office for three consecutive terms.
The resolution of this Commission in the case of Bandillo, et al[.] v. Hernandez (SPA No. 10-078)13 cannot be applied inthe case
at bar. Hernandez who then hailed from Libmanan belonged to the First District of Camarines Sur. With RepublicAct 9716,
Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao and San Fernando, all originally belonging to the First District, were merged with
Gainza and Milaor to form the Second District. With the addition of the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor, it cannot be said
that the previous First District became the Second District only by name. The voters of Gainza and Milaoradded to the electorate
of the new Second District formed a different electorate, different from the one which voted for Hernandez in the 2001, 2004 and
2007 elections. In the case at bar, the municipalities comprising the new Third District are the same municipalities that consisted
of the previous Second [District], absent Milaor and Gainza.
The Supreme Court, in Latasav. [COMELEC], ruled that the conversion of the municipality into a city did not convert the office
of the municipal mayor into a local government post different from the office of the city mayor[.]
x x x x14 (Citations omitted)
The Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc
In the second assailed resolution issued on June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en bancdenied Naval’s Motion for Reconsideration to
the above. The COMELEC pointed out thatabsent the verification required under Section 3, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, Naval’s motion was instantly dismissible. Nonetheless, the COMELEC proceeded to discuss the demerits of Naval’s
motion, viz:
The conditions for the application of the three-term limit rule are present in the instant case as the records clearly establish that
[Naval] is running for the 4th time for the same government post. To put things in a proper perspective, it is imperative to review
and discuss the salient points in the case of Latasa v. [COMELEC]. The case involves the question of whether or not a municipal
mayor, having been elected and had already served for three (3) consecutive terms, canrun as city mayor in light of the
conversion of the municipality to a city. In applying the three-term limit rule, the Court pointed out that the conversion of the
municipality into a city did not convert the office of the municipal mayor into a local government post different from the office
of the city mayor. The Court took into account the following circumstances: (1) That the territorial jurisdiction of [the] city was
the same as that of the municipality; (2) That the inhabitants were the same group of voters who elected the municipal mayor for
three (3) consecutive terms; and (3) That the inhabitants were the same group of voters [over] whom he held power and authority
as their chief executive for nine years.
Anchoring from the said case, it is therefore clear that the position to which [Naval] has filed his candidacy for the 13 May 2013
x x x Elections is the same position for which he had been elected and had served for the past nine (9) years.
xxxx
x x x The following circumstances establish that the subject posts are one and the same: First, the territorial jurisdictions of the
two (2) districts are the same except for the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor which were excluded by R.A. No. 9716;
Second, the inhabitants of the 3rd District of Camarines Sur, where [Naval] is presently running as member of the [Sanggunian],
are the same voters who elected him for the past three (3) consecutive terms; and Lastly, the inhabitants of the [3rd ] District are
the same group of voters whom [Naval] had served as member of the [Sanggunian] representing the 2nd District.
x x x The enactment of R.A. No. 9716 did not convert [Naval’s] post [into one] different from [w]hat he [previously had]. As
correctly ruled by the Commission (Second Division), [Naval] ha[d] already been elected and ha[d] already served inthe same
government post for three consecutive terms, x x x[.]
x x x x.15 (Citations omitted)
Unperturbed, Naval is now before the Court raising the issues of whether or not the COMELEC gravely erred and ruled contrary
to law and jurisprudence:
I. IN FINDING THAT NAVAL HAD ALREADY SERVED FOR THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS IN THE SAME
GOVERNMENT POST;16
II. IN IGNORING THE FACT THAT SANGGUNIAN MEMBERS ARE ELECTED BY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS; 17and
III. WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PROHIBITION CONTEMPLATED BY SECTION 8, ARTICLE X OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 43(B) OF THE LGC APPLIES TO NAVAL. 18
The Arguments of the Contending Parties
In support of the instant petition, Naval alleges that the First, Second and Third Legislative Districts of Camarines Sur are not
merely renamed but are composed of new sets of municipalities. With the separation of Gainza and Milaor from the other eight
towns which used to comprise the Second District, the voters from the Third Legislative District are no longer the same ones as
those who had elected him to office in the 2004 and 2007 elections.
Naval further invokes Article 9419 of Administrative Order No. 270 prescribing the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
LGC to argue that Sanggunianmembers are elected by districts. Thus, the right to choose representatives in the
Sanggunianpertains to each of the districts. Naval was elected as Sanggunian member in 2004 and 2007 by the Second District.
In 2010 and 2013, it was the Third District, which brought him to office. Essentially then, Naval’s election in 2013 is merely his
second term as Sanggunianmember for the Third District.
Naval likewise cites Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC20 to point out that for the disqualification on the ground of the three-term limit to
apply, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, but it is also required that
he or she had been elected to the same position for the same number of times.21
Naval also assails as erroneous the COMELEC’s interpretations of the rulings in Latasa v. COMELEC 22 and Bandillo, et al. v.
Hernandez.23 In Latasa, the Court applied the three-term prohibition only because notwithstanding the conversion of the
Municipality of Digos into a city, the mayor was to serve the same territorialjurisdiction and constituents. Naval asserts that the
same does not hold true in his case. Naval further avers that in Bandillo, which finds more application in the instant petition, the
COMELEC ruled that the three-term limit cannot be invoked in a situation where the legislative districts have been altered. An
extraction or an addition both yields a change inthe composition of the voters.
Naval further emphasizes that he garnered the majority of the votes from his constituents, whose will and mandate should be
upheld. Besides, Julia’s counsel already withdrew his appearance, indicating no less than his client’s lack of interest in still
pursuing Naval’s ouster from office.24
In its Comment,25 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeks the denial of the instant petition. The OSG contends that
Naval had been elected and had fully served the same local elective post for three consecutive terms. Naval thus violatedSection
78 of the OEC when he filed his COC despite knowledge of his ineligibility. Naval’s reliance on Bandillo is also misplaced since
in the said case, two towns were instead added to form a new district. Apparently then, in Bandillo, there was a new set of voters.
The OSG also alleges that Naval is not entitled to the issuance of injunctive reliefs by this Court. No clear and unmistakable
right pertains to Naval and it is his eligibility to be elected as Sanggunianmember for the Third District which is the issue at
hand.
Ruling of the Court
The Court denies the petition.
As the issues are interrelated, they shall be discussed jointly.
The case before this Court is one of first impression. While the contending parties cite Latasa, Lonzanida v.
COMELEC,26 Borja,Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC,27 and Bandillo, which all involve the application of the three-term limit rule,
the factual and legal circumstances in those cases are different and the doctrinal values therein do not directly address the issues
now at hand.
In Latasa, the issue arose as a result of the conversion of a municipality into a city. The then municipal mayor attempted to evade
the application upon him of the three-term limit rule by arguing that the position of a city mayor was not the same as the one he
previously held. The Court was not convinced and, thus, declared that there was no interruption of the incumbent mayor’s
continuity of service.
In Lonzanida, a candidate ran for the mayoralty post and won in three consecutive elections. While serving his third term, his
opponent filed an election protest. Months before the expiration of the mayor’s third term, he was ousted from office. He ran
again for the same post in the immediately succeeding election. A petition was thereafter filed assailing his eligibility to run as
mayor on the ground of violation of the three-term limit rule. The Court ruled that the mayor could not beconsidered as having
served a full third term. An interruption for any length of time, if due to an involuntary cause, is enough to break the elected
official’s continuity of service.
In Borja, the mayor of Pateros died and was succeeded in office by the vice mayor. In the two immediately succeeding elections,
the latter vied for and won the mayoralty post. When he ran for the same position for the third time, his disqualification was
sought for alleged violation of the three-term limit rule. The Court ruled that whenhe assumed the position of mayor by virtue of
succession, his service should not be treated as one full term. For the disqualification to apply, the candidate should have been
thrice elected for and had served the same post consecutively. In Aldovino, preventive suspension was imposed upon an elected
municipal councilor. The Court ruled that the said suspension did not interrupt the elective official’s term. Although hewas
barred from exercising the functions of the position during the period of suspension, his continued stay and entitlement tothe
office remain unaffected.
In Bandillo, a case decided by the COMELEC, Gainza and Milaor were added to five of the ten towns, which used to comprise
Camarines Sur’s old First District, to form the new Second District. The COMELEC declined to apply the three-term limit rule
against the elected Provincial Board member on the ground that the addition of Gainza and Milaor distinctively created a new
district, with an altered territory and constituency.
In the case before this Court, the task is to determine the application of the three-term limit rule upon local elective officials in
renamed and/or reapportioned districts. In the process of doing so, it is inevitable to discuss the role of elections and the nature
of public office in a democratic and republican state like ours.
The Role of Elections in our
Democratic and Republican State,
and the Restraints Imposed Upon
Those Who Hold Public Office
The Court begins with general and undeniable principles.
The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them.28
Then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno explained the character of a republican state and a public office, viz: A republic is a
representative government, a government run by and for the people. It is not a pure democracy where the people govern
themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of
public functionaries who derive their mandate from the people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after
which they are replaced or retained, at the option of their principal. Obviously, a republican government is a
responsiblegovernment whose officials hold and discharge their position as a public trust and shall, according to the
Constitution, ‘at all times be accountable to the people’ they are sworn to serve. The purpose of a republican government it is
almost needless to state, is the promotion of the common welfare according to the will of the people themselves. 29 (Emphasis
ours and italics in the original)
In Tolentino v. COMELEC,30 Justice Puno likewise characterized the role of the electoral process in the following wise:
The electoral process is one of the linchpins of a democratic and republican framework because it isthrough the act of voting that
government by consent is secured. Through the ballot, people express their will on the defining issues of the day and they are
able to choose their leaders in accordance with the fundamental principle of representative democracy that the people should
elect whom they please to govern them. Voting has an important instrumental value in preserving the viability of constitutional
democracy. It has traditionally been taken as a prime indicator of democratic participation. 31 (Citations omitted and italics ours)
The importance of elections cannottherefore be over emphasized. Thus,
True, election is the expression ofthe sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve
the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights
arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. x x x. 32(Italics ours)
Hence, while it is settled that in elections, the first consideration of every democratic polity is to give effect to the expressed will
of the majority, there are limitations tobeing elected to a public office.33 Our Constitution and statutes are explicit anent the
existence of term limits, the nature of public office, and the guarantee from the State that citizens shall have equal access to
public service.34 Section 8, Article X of our Constitution, on term limits, is significantly reiterated by Section 43(b) of the LGC.
Moreover, the Court has time and again declared that a public office is a public trust and not a vested property right. 35
The Deliberations of the Members
of the Constitutional Commission
on the Three-Term Limit’s
Application to Local Elective
Officials
Following are entries in the Journal of the Constitutional Commission regarding the exchanges of the members on the subject of
the three-term limit rule imposed on local elective officials: VOTING ON THE TERMS OF LOCAL OFFICIALS
With respect to local officials, Mr. Nolledo, informed that the Committee on Local Governments had not decided on the term of
office for local officials and suggested that the Body decide on the matter.
xxxx
On Mr. Bacani’s inquiry regarding localofficials, Mr. Davide explained that local officials would includethe governor, vice-
governor and the members of the provincial board; the city mayor, city vice-mayor and members of the city board; and the
municipal mayor, municipal vice mayor and members of the municipal council. He stated that barangay officials would be
governed by speciallaw, to which Mr. Nolledo agreed.
xxxx
MOTION TO VOTE ON THE PROPOSALS RELATIVE TO ALTERNATIVE NO. 3
In reply to Mr. Guingona’s query onwhether the Committee had decided on the interpretation of "two reelections", Mr. Davide
suggested that the matter be submitted to a vote.
Thereupon, Mr. Romulo moved for a vote on whether Alternative No. 3 as proposed by Mr. Garcia, would allow a local official
three terms, after which he would not be allowed to seek any reelection; or whether, as interpreted by Mr. Davide, it would mean
that after two successive reelections or a consecutive periodof nine years, he could run for reelection after the lapse of three
years.
xxxx
RESTATEMENT OF THE PROPOSALS
Mr. Garcia reiterated that the local officials could be reelected twice, after which, they would be barred from ever runningfor
reelection.
On the other proposal, Mr. Davide, on behalf ofthe Committee, stated that local officials after two reelections would be allowed
to run for reelection after the lapse of three years.
xxxx
MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO
Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulomanifested that the Body would proceed to the consideration of two issues on the term
of Representatives and local officials, namely: 1) Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection after a total of three terms), and 2)
Alternative No. 2 (no immediate reelection after three successive terms).
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. GARCIA ON ALTERNATIVE NO. 1
Mr. Garcia stated that he was advocating Alternative No. 1 on four grounds: 1) to prevent monopoly of political power because
the country’s history showed that prolonged stay in public office could lead to the creation of entrenched preservesof political
dynasties; 2) to broaden the choiceso that more people could be enlisted to the cause of public service; 3) no one is indispensable
in running the affairs of the countryand that reliance on personalities would be avoided; and 4) the disqualification from running
for reelection after three terms would create a reserve of statesmen both in the local and national levels.
He added that the turnover in public office after nine years would ensure the introduction of new ideas and approaches. He
stressed that public office would no longer be a preserve of conservatism and tradition, and that public service would no longer
be limited to those directly holding public office, but would also include consultative bodiesorganized by the people. INQUIRY
OF MR. REGALADO
In reply to Mr. Regalado’s query whether the three terms need not be served consecutively, Mr. Garcia answered in the
affirmative.
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. MONSOD ON ALTERNATIVE NO. 2
Mr. Monsod stated that while the new Constitution would recognize people power because of a new awareness, a new kind of
voter and a new kind of Filipino, at the same time, it pre-screens the candidates among whom the people would choose by
barring those who would have served for nine years from being reelected. He opined that this would actually require an
additional qualification for office to a certain number of people.
He stressed that, while the stand of the Commission is to create a reserve of statesmen, their future participation is actually
limited to some areas and only for a certain periodof time. He added thatit is not for the Commission to decide on the future of
our countrymen who may have more years ahead of them to serve the country.
xxxx
INQUIRY OF MR. OPLE
xxxx
Thereupon, speaking in support of Mr. Monsod’s manifestation, Mr. Ople expressed apprehension over the Body’s exercise of
some sort of omnipotent power in disqualifying those who will have served their tasks. He opined that the Commission had
already taken steps to prevent the accumulation of powers and prequisites that would permit officials to stay on indefinitely and
to transfer them to members of their families. He opined, however, that perpetual disqualification would deprive the people of
their freedom of choice.He stated that the Body had already succeeded in striking a balance onpolicies which could ensure a
redistribution of opportunities to the people both in terms of political and economic power. He stated that Philippine politics had
been unshackled from the two-party system, which he said was the most critical support for the perpetuation of political
dynasties. Considering that such achievement is already a victory, Mr. Ople stated that the role of political parties should not be
despised because the strength of democracy depends on how strong political parties are, that a splintering thereof will mean a
great loss to the vitality and resiliency of democracy.
Mr. Ople reiterated that he was against perpetual disqualification from office.
x x x x.
MR. GARCIA’S RESPONSE TOMR. OPLE’S STATEMENTS
Mr. Garcia stated that there are two principles involved in Alternative No. 1: 1) the recognition of the ambivalent nature of
political power, and 2) the recognition of alternative forms of public service. He stated that it is important to remember the
lessons learned from the recent past; that public service is service to the people and not an opportunity to accumulate political
power, and that a prolonged stay in public office brings about political dynasties or vested interests. Regarding political parties,
he stated that it will encourage the constant renewal of blood in party leadership, approach, style and ideas. He opined that this is
very healthy for a pluralist and multi-party democracy.
On the recognition of alternative forms of public service, Mr. Garcia stressed that public service could be limited to public office
since many good leaders who were in the streets and in jail fought against the dictatorship. He stressed that public service would
also mean belonging to consultative bodies or people’s councils which brought about new forms of service and leadership.
REMARKS OF MR. ABUBAKAR
Mr. Abubakar stated that in any democracy the voice of the people is the voice of God.He stated that if the people want to elect a
representative to serve them continuously, the Commission should not arrogate unto itself the right to decide what the people
want. He stated that in the United States, a Senator had served for 30 years.
xxxx
REMARKS OF MS. AQUINO
Ms. Aquino stated that she differs from the views advanced by Mr. Garcia and Ms. Tan, although she stated that they spoke of
the same premises. She stated that she agrees with them that leaders need not be projected and developed publicly in an election
as leaders are better tempered and tested in the various forms of mass struggles and organized work. She stated that if the people
are to be encouraged to have their own sense of responsibility in national leadership, what ultimately matters is the political
determination of the citizenry to chart their own national destiny. She opined that the Body should allow the people to exercise
their own sense of proportion and imbibe the salutary effects of their own strength to curtail power when it overreaches itself.
She stressed that in the final analysis,the Commission cannot legislate into the Constitution the essence of new politics as it is a
chastening experience of learning and unlearning. Adverting to Mr. Garcia’s statement that politics is an imperfect art, she stated
that the Commission could correct politics with all its imperfections and flaws by a constitutional provision. She opined that
perpetual disqualification cannot provide the cure. She maintained that perpetual disqualification is, at best, a palliative which
could also be counter-productive, in the sense that it could effectively foil the possibilities of realpublic service.
REMARKS OF MR. BACANI
Mr. Bacani stated that when the Body granted the illiterates the right to vote and that proposals were made to empower the
people to engage in the legislative process,the Body presupposed the political maturity of the people. He observed that in this
instance, political maturity is denied with the constitutional bar for reelection.He opined that the Body should stick to the
premise that the people are politically mature.
REJOINDER OF MR. GARCIA
By way of rejoinder to Mr. Bacani’s statements,Mr. Garcia stated that the proposal was basically premisedon the undue
advantage of the incumbent in accumulating power, money, party machine and patronage and not on lack of trust in the people.
Mr. Garcia stated that politics isnot won by ideals alone but by solid organized work by organizations. He stated that with three
terms, an official would have served the people long enough.
xxxx
VOTING ON THE TWO ALTERNATIVES
Thereafter, the Body proceeded to vote by ballot on the two alternatives.
xxxx
RESULT OF THE VOTING
The result of the voting was as follows:
Alternative No. 1 (no further election after three successive terms) — 17 votes
Alternative No. 2 (no immediate reelection after three successive terms) — 26 votes
With 17 votes in favor of Alternative No. 1 and 26 in favor of Alternative No. 2, the Chair declared Alternative No. 2 approved
by the Body.36 (Emphasis and italics ours)
The Constitution mandates the
strict implementation of the
three-term limit rule.
The Court notes that in the process of drafting the Constitution, the framers thereof had not discussed with specifity the subject
of the three-term limit rule’s application on reapportioned districts.
From the above-cited deliberations, however, the divergent stances of the members of the Constitutional Commission on the
general application of the three-term limit rule show. On one side were those who espoused the stern view that perpetual
disqualification to hold public office after three consecutive terms would ensure that new blood would be infused into our
political system. More choices for the voters would give fuller meaning to our democratic institutions. On the other side of the
fence were those who believed that the imposition of termlimits would be tantamount to squandering the experience of seasoned
public servants and a curtailment of the power of the citizens to elect whoever they want to remain in office.
In the end, 26 members of the Commission cast their votes in favor of the proposal that no immediate re-election after three
successive terms shall be allowed. On the other hand, 17 members stood pat on their view that there should be no further
reelection after three successive terms.
Clearly, the drafters of our Constitution are in agreement about the possible attendant evils if there would be no limit to re-
election. Notwithstanding their conflicting preferences on whether the term limit would disqualify the elected official perpetually
or temporarily, they decided that only three consecutive elections tothe same position would be allowed. Thereafter, the public
official can once again vie for the same post provided there be a gap of at least one term from his or her last election. The rule
answers the need to prevent the consolidation of political power in the hands of the few, while at the same time giving to the
people the freedom to call back to public service those who are worthy to be called statesmen.
The compromise agreed upon by the drafters of our Constitution was a result of exhaustive deliberations. The required gap after
three consecutive elections is significant. Thus, the rulecannot be taken with a grain of salt. Nothing less than its strict
application is called for.
Ratio legis est anima.37
"A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration.Thus, it has
been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption,
and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the
times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in
order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose."38 In Aldovino,
the Court describes the three-term limit rule as inflexible.
In Aldovino, a local elective official pleaded exemption from the application of the three-term limit on the ground that there was
an interruption in his service after the penalty of suspension was imposed upon him. Although not in all four withNaval’s case,
there are principles enunciated therein which undeniably hold true, viz:
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective official’s stay in office to
no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time – three years– during which an official has title to office and
can serve. x x x[.]
xxxx
The "limitation" under this first branch of the provision is expressed in the negative—"no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms." This formulation—no more than three consecutive terms—is a clear command suggesting the
existence of an inflexible rule. x x x.
xxxx
This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and of the circumstances surrounding its formulation impresses
upon us the clear intent to make term limitation a high priority constitutional objective whose terms must be strictly construed
and which cannot be defeated by, nor sacrificed for, values of less than equal constitutional worth. x x x.
xxxx
x x x [T]he Court signalled how zealously it guards the three-term limit rule. Effectively, these cases teach usto strictly interpret
the term limitation rule in favor of limitation rather than its exception.
xxxx
[In] Latasa v. Commission on Electionsx x x[,] [t]he Court said:
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the people’s freedom to choose
those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular
territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. x x x.
xxxx
To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X—both by structure and substance—fixes an elective
official’s term of office and limits his stay in office to three consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by
citing voluntary renunciation as an example of a circumvention. x x x.39 (Citations omitted, italics and emphasis in the original
and underscoring ours)
Reapportionment and its Basis
Reapportionment is "the realignment orchange in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by
the constitutional requirement of equality of representation."40 The aim of legislative apportionment is to equalize population and
voting power among districts.41 The basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province and not the
number of registered voters therein.42
R.A. No. 9716 and the Reappor-
tioned Districts of Camarines Sur
Sections 1 to 3 of R.A. No. 9716 provide:
Section 1. The composition of the current First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur is
hereby reapportioned in order to create an additional legislative districtto commence in the next national elections after the
effectivity of this Act.
Section 2. In furtherance of the reapportionment mandated by this Act, the municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona,
Pasacao and San Fernando of the current First (1st) Legislative District are hereby consolidated with the municipalities of
Gainza and Milaor of the current Second (2nd) Legislative District, to comprise the new legislative district authorized under this
Act. Ocampo Bombon

Section 3. The result of the reapportionment described in this Act are summarized as follows: Canaman Calabanga

a) First District – The remaining municipalities in the current First (1st) Legislative District shall continue to be designated as the Camaligan
First (1st) Legislative District, composed of the following municipalities: Del Gallego, Ragay, Lupi, Sipicot and Cabusao;
Magarao
b) Second District – This new legislative districtshall be composed of the municipalities enumerated in Section 2 hereof;
Bombon
c) Third District – The current Second (2nd) Legislative District shall be renamedas the Third (3rd) Legislative District,
composed of the following: Naga City and the municipalities of Pili, Ocampo, Camaligan, Canaman, Magarao, Bombon and Calabanga
Calabanga;

d) Fourth District – The current Third (3rd) Legislative District, without any change in its composition, shall be renamedas the R.A. No. 9716 created a new Second
Fourth (4th) Legislative District, composed of the following municipalities: Caramoan, Garchitorena, Goa, Lagonoy,
Presentacion, Sangay, San Jose, Tigaon, Tinambac and Siruma; and District, but it merely renamed the

e) Fifth District – The current Fourth (4th) Legislative District, without any change inits composition, shall be renamedas the
Fifth (5th) Legislative District, composed of the following: Iriga City and the municipalities of Baao, Balatan, Bato, Buhi, Bula
and Nabua. (Italics and emphasis ours)
As a result of the reapportionment made by R.A. No. 9716, the old Second District of Camarines Sur, minus only the two towns
of Gainza and Milaor, is renamed as the Third District and now configured as follows:43
[[reference - http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/july2014/207851.pdf]]
other four.
The Court notes that after the reapportionment of the districts in Camarines Sur, the current Third District, which brought Naval
to office in 2010 and 2013, has a population of 35,856 less than that of the old Second District, which elected him in 2004 and
2007. However, the wordings of R.A. No. 9716 indicate the intent of the lawmakers to create a single new Second District from
the merger of the towns from the old First District with Gainza and Milaor. As to the current Third District, Section 3(c) of R.A.
No. 9716 used the word "rename." Although the qualifier "without a change in its composition" was not found in Section 3(c),
unlike in Sections 3(d) and (e), still, what is pervasive isthe clear intent to create a sole new district in that of the Second, while
merely renaming the rest.

Before the Enactment of After the Enactment of The following statutory construction rules surface:

RA 9716 RA 9716 First, the general rule in construing words and phrases used in a statute is that, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary,
they should be given their plain, ordinary and common usage meaning; the words should be read and considered intheir natural,
2 3rd District ordinary, commonly accepted usage, and without resorting to forced or subtle construction. Words are presumed to have been
employed by the lawmaker in their ordinary and common use and acceptation. Second, a word of general significance ina statute
is to be taken in its ordinary and comprehensive sense, unless it is shown that the word is intended to be given a different or
nd Population: 439,043 restricted meaning; what is generally spoken shall be generally understood and general words shall be understood in a general
sense.44 (Citations omitted)
District Naga
The Court looks to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. 45
Population: 474,899 Pili
In Naval’s case, the words of R.A.No. 9716 plainly state that the new Second Districtis to be created, but the Third Districtis to
Gainza Ocampo be renamed. Verba legis non est recedendum. The terms used in a legal provision to be construed compels acceptanceand
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers mean what they say. 46
Milaor Canaman
The verb createmeans to "make or produce something new."47 On the other hand, the verb renamemeans to "give a new name to
someone or something."48 A complete reading of R.A. No. 9716 yields no logical conclusion other than that the lawmakers
Naga Camaligan intended the old Second District to be merely renamed as the current Third District.

Pili Magarao It likewise bears noting that the actual difference in the population of the old Second District from that of the current Third
District amounts to less than 10% of the population of the latter. This numericalfact renders the new Third District as essentially,
although not literally, the same as the old Second District. Hence, while Naval is correct in his argument that
Sanggunianmembers are elected by district, it does not alter the fact that the district which elected him for the third and fourth Certainly, the Court accords primacy to upholding the will of the voting public, the real sovereign, soto speak. However, let all
time is the same one which brought him to office in 2004 and 2007. the candidates for public office be reminded that as citizens, we have a commitment to be bound by our Constitution and laws.
Side by side our privileges as citizens are restrictions too.
The application upon Naval of the
Einer Elhauge, a faculty member from Harvard Law School, wrote an article entitled "What Term Limits Do That Ordinary
Voting Cannot."53 In the article, Greek mythology was tapped to make a tempting analogy. The gist of the story follows.
three-term limit rule does not

In Odyssey Book XII, the goddess Circe warned Odysseus of the Sirens who seduce all men approaching them with their voices.
undermine the constitutional
Those who fell into the Sirens’ trap never returnedhome to their wives and children. A clever strategy was thus hatched to secure
safe passage for Odysseus and his men. The men were to plug their ears with wax to muffle the songs of the Sirens. Odysseus,
requirement to achieve equality of on the other hand, was to be tied to the mast of the ship so he could still listen to the songs, which may contain clues on how they
can get home. When the wind died down,Odysseus heard beautiful voices calling out to them. The voices were incomparable to
anything he had ever heard before. Even whenOdysseus knew that the irresistible voices were coming from the Sirens, he
representation among districts.
struggled with all his strength to free himself from the ropes, but was unable to do so. The voices became fainter as the men
continued to row. When the voices can no longer be heard, Odysseus realized how he had nearly been beguiled. They had made
The rationale behind reapportionment is the constitutional requirement to achieve equality ofrepresentation among the it through safely and Odysseus was untied. It was their clever plan which kept them all alive. 54
districts.49 It is with this mindset that the Court should consider Naval’s argument anent having a new set of constituents electing
him into office in 2010 and 2013. The same lesson holds true in the case before this Court. The drafters of the Constitution recognized the propensity of public
officers to perpetuate themselves in power, hence, the adoption of term limits and a guarantee of every citizen's equal access to
Naval’s ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-term limit rule, does not undermine the right toequal public service. These are the restrictions statesmen should observe for they are intended to help ensure the continued vitality of
representation of any of the districts in Camarines Sur. With or without him, the renamed Third District, which he labels as a our republican institutions.
new set of constituents, would still be represented, albeit by another eligible person.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated March 5, 2013 and June 5,
The presumed competence of the 2013 of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 13-166 (DC) are AFFIRMED.

COMELEC to resolve matters SO ORDERED.

falling within its jurisdiction is

upheld.

"Time and again, the Court has held that a petition for certiorariagainst actions of the COMELEC is confined only to instances of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process, because the COMELEC is presumed to be
most competent in matters falling within its domain."50

"In a special civil action for certiorari, the burden rests on the petitioner to prove not merelyreversible error, but grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent issuing the impugned order, decision
or resolution."51 "Grave abuse of discretion arises when a court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence."52

In the case at bar, the Court finds the COMELEC’s disquisitions to be amply supported by the Constitution,law and
jurisprudence.

Conclusion

In sum, the Court finds no compelling reason to grant the reliefs prayed for by Naval. For the Court to declare otherwise would
be to create a dangerous precedent unintended by the drafters of our Constitution and of R.A. No. 9716. Considering that the
one-term gap or rest after three consecutive elections is a result of a compromise among the members of the Constitutional
Commission, no cavalier exemptions or exceptions to its application is to be allowed. Aldovinoaffirms this interpretation.
Further, sustaining Naval’s arguments would practically allow him to hold the same office for 15 years. These are the
circumstances the Constitution explicitly intends to avert.