22.

No. L-27631. April 30, 1971.

CIRILO D. DOLAR and LUIS B. TUPAS, petitioners, vs. CARLOS L. SUNDIAM,GREGORIO LIRA and REMEGIO
LUMAMPAO, respondents.

Civil law; Property; Receivership; When relief by way of receivership is essentially equitable in nature.—
Ordinarily, a receiver cannot be put on property which is already in custody, of the law under process
from another court of competent jurisdiction; and there cannot be more than one receiver over the
same property. . . A court of equity has power to appoint a receiver of property which is already in the
hand of an executor or administrator, but such power should be exercised with caution, and a receiver
should not be appointed to take assets out of the hands of legally appointed representatives except in
cases of manifest danger of loss or destruction of, or material injury to, assets. . . Also, a receiver will be
appointed when the executor or administrator has been guilty of misconduct, waste, or misuse of
assets, and there is real danger of loss; and conversely, a receiver will not be appointed to take assets
from the custody of an executor or administrator unless there is manifest danger of loss or destruction
of, or material injury to, the assets and a receivership is clearly necessary to protect and preserve the
property.

Same; Administrator; Duty of person dealing with administrator of an estate subject to settlement and
liquidation to inquire about the existence of claims.—It is essentially the duty of every person dealing at
arm’s length with the administrator of an estate subject to settlement and liquidation to inquire about
the existence of claims against, or of persons having interests in, the estate subject of probate and
settlement proceedings, for such proceedings are, by their nature and purpose, open notice to all the
sundry once put into motion. Every diligent person ought to know that such proceedings require not just
the collection, identification, division and distribution of assets; they not infrequently involve matters
more complicated than these.

Same; When a piece of property is considered part of deceased’s estate subject to settlement.—Where
a piece of property which originally is a part of the estate of a deceased person is sold by an heir of the
deceased having a valid claim thereto, and said piece of property is, by mistake, subsequently
inventoried or considered part of the deceased’s estate subject to settlement, and, thereafter, with the
authority and approval of the probate court, is sold once more to another person, a receiver of the
property so sold may, during the pendency of a motion to set aside the second sale, be appointed by the
court when in its
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VOL. 38, APRIL 30, 1971

617

Dolar vs. Sundiam

sound judgment the grant of such temporary relief is reasonably necessary to secure and protect the
rights of its real owner against any danger of loss or material injury to him arising from the use and
enjoyment thereof by another who manifestly cannot acquire any right of dominion thereon because
the approving surrogate court had already lost jurisdiction to authorize the further sale of such property
to another person. Dolar vs. Sundiam, 38 SCRA 616, No. L-27631 April 30, 1971
23.

VOL. 300, DECEMBER 21, 1998

345

Heirs of Ignacio Conti vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 118464. December 21, 1998.*

HEIRS OF IGNACIO CONTI AND ROSARIO CUARIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND LYDIA S.
REYES as Attorney-in-Fact of JOSEFINA S. REYES, BERNARDITA S. PALILIO, HERMINIA S. PALILIO,
REMEDIOS A. SAMPAYO, ILLUMINADA A. SAMPAYO, ENRICO A. SAMPAYO, CARLOS A. SAMPAYO,
GENEROSO C. SAMPAYO, MYRNA C. SAMPAYO, ROSALINO C. SAMPAYO, MANUEL C. SAMPAYO, DELIA A.
SAMPAYO, CORAZON C. SAMPAYO, NILO C. SAMPAYO, and LOLITA A. SAMPAYO in her own behalf and
as Attorney-in-Fact of NORMA A. SAMPAYO, respondents.

Actions; Partition; Succession; Settlement of Estates; A prior settlement of the estate is not essential
before the heirs can commence any action originally pertaining to the deceased.—A prior settlement of
the estate is not essential before the heirs can commence any action originally pertaining to the
deceased as we explained in Quison v. Salud—Claro Quison died in 1902. It was proven at the trial that
the present plaintiffs are next of kin and heirs, but it is said by the appellants that they are not entitled
to maintain this action because there is no evidence that any proceedings have been taken in court for
the settlement of the estate of Claro Quison, and that without such settlement, the heirs cannot
maintain this action. There is nothing in this point. As well by the Civil Code as by the Code of Civil
Procedure, the title to the property owned by a person who dies intestate passes at once to his heirs.
Such transmission is, under the present law, subject to the claims of administration and the property
may be taken from the heirs for the purpose of paying debts and expenses, but this does not prevent an
immediate passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs. Without some
showing that a judicial administrator had been appointed in proceedings to settle the estate of Claro
Quison, the right of the plaintiffs to maintain this action is established.

Same; Same; Same; From the death of the co-owner, her rights as such, incidental to which is the right
to ask for partition at any time or to terminate the co-ownership, are transmitted to her rightful
____________

* SECOND DIVISION.

346

346

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Ignacio Conti vs. Court of Appeals

heirs.—Conformably with the foregoing and taken in conjunction with Arts. 777 and 494 of the Civil
Code, from the death of Lourdes Sampayo her rights as a co-owner, incidental to which is the right to
ask for partition at any time or to terminate the co-ownership, were transmitted to her rightful heirs. In
so demanding partition private respondents merely exercised the right originally pertaining to the
decedent, their predecessor-in-interest.

Same; Same; There is no need for publication in a simple case of ordinary partition between co-
owners.—Petitioners’ theory as to the requirement of publication would have been correct had the
action been for the partition of the estate of Lourdes Sampayo, or if we were dealing with extrajudicial
settlement by agreement between heirs and the summary settlement of estates of small value. But
what private respondents are pursuing is the mere segregation of Lourdes’ one-half share which they
inherited from her through intestate succession. This is a simple case of ordinary partition between co-
owners. The applicable law in point is Sec. 1 of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.

Same; Same; There are two (2) simultaneous issues in an action for partition—first, whether the plaintiff
is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned, and second, if answered in the
affirmative, the manner of the division of the property.—There are two (2) simultaneous issues in an
action for partition. First, whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be
partitioned, and second, if answered in the affirmative, the manner of the division of the property, i.e.,
what portion should go to which co-owner. Thus, in this case, we must determine whether private
respondents, by preponderance of evidence, have been able to establish that they are co-owners by
way of succession as collateral heirs of the late Lourdes Sampayo as they claim to be, either a sister, a
nephew or a niece. These, private respondents were able to prove in the trial court as well as before
respondent Court of Appeals.

Succession; Words and Phrases; “Succession,” Explained.—Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue

of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law. Legal or
intestate succession takes place if a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has
subsequently lost its validity. If there are no descen-

347

VOL. 300, DECEMBER 21, 1998

347

Heirs of Ignacio Conti vs. Court of Appeals

dants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to
the entire estate of the decedent. It was established during the trial that Lourdes died intestate and
without issue. Private respondents as sister, nephews and nieces now claim to be the collateral relatives
of Lourdes.

Same; Parent and Child; Filiation; By analogy, the method of proving filiation of legitimate children may
also be utilized to prove fact of being collateral heirs of a deceased.—Under Art. 172 of the Family Code,
the filiation of legitimate children shall be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws, in the absence of a record of birth or a parent’s admission of such legitimate filiation in a
public or private document duly signed by the parent. Such other proof of one’s filiation may be a
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses and other kinds of
proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. By analogy, this method of proving filiation may
also be utilized in the instant case.

Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Baptismal Certificates; Words and Phrases; Public documents are the
written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country; Baptismal certificates
are public documents.—Public documents are the written official acts, or records of the official acts of
the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or
of a foreign country. The baptismal certificates presented in evidence by private respondents are public
documents. Parish priests continue to be the legal custodians of the parish records and are authorized
to issue true copies, in the form of certificates, of the entries contained therein.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Hearsay Rule; Baptismal certificates may be admitted even in the
absence of the testimony of the officiating priest or the official recorder, the entries made in the
Registry Book being considered as entries made in the course of the business, which is an exception to
the hearsay rule.—The admissibility of baptismal certificates offered by Lydia S. Reyes, absent the
testimony of the officiating priest or the official recorder, was settled in People v. Ritter, citing U.S. v. de
Vera (28 Phil. 105 [1914]), thus—x x x the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as

348

348

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Ignacio Conti vs. Court of Appeals

entries made in the course of the business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the
hearsay rule. The baptisms administered by the church are one of its transactions in the exercise of
ecclesiastical duties and recorded in the book of the church during the course of its business.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Secondary Evidence; When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself except when the
original has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the
offeror.—Petitioners’ objection to the photocopy of the certificate of birth of Manuel Sampayo was
properly discarded by the court a quo and respondent Court of Appeals. According to Sec. 3, par. (1),
Rule 130, of the Rules of Court, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself except when the original has been lost or
destroyed or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror. The loss or
destruction of the original certificate of birth of Manuel J. Sampayo was duly established by the
certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Lucena City to the effect that its office was
completely destroyed by fire on 27 November 1974 and 30 August 1983, respectively, and as a
consequence thereof, all civil registration records were totally burned. Heirs of Ignacio Conti vs. Court of
Appeals, 300 SCRA 345, G.R. No. 118464 December 21, 1998

24.

[No. L-7644. November 27, 1956]

HENRY LITAM, ETC., ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants, vs. REMEDIOS R. ESPIRITU, as guardian of the
incompetent MARCOSA RIVERA, and ARMINIO RIVERA, defendants and appellees.

[No. L-7645. November 27, 1956]

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE OF THE DECEASED RAFAEL LITAM. GREGORIO DY TAM, petitioner
and appellant, vs. REMEDIOS R. ESPIRITU, in her capacity as judicial guardian of the incompetent
MARCOSA RIVERA, counter-petitioner, ARMINIO RIVERA, administrator and appellee.

1.PATERNITY AND FILIATION; FAILURE TO ESTABLISH STATUS OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN BARS CLAIM TO
SHARE IN THE ESTATE.—Appellants claims that they are the children of the decedent by a marriage
celebrated in China in 1911 with S.K.; that during the subsistence of the marriage, the decedent had
contracted in 1922 another marriage with M.R.; that as heirs, they are entitled to the decedent’s one-
half share in the properties acquired during the second marriage. Held: The various official and public
documents executed by the decedent himself convincingly shows that he had not contracted marriage
with any person other than M.R., and that he had no child.
365

VOL. 100, NOVEMBER 27, 1956

365

Litam, etc., et al. vs. Rivera

Thus, in the marriage certificate it was clearly stated that he was single when he married M.R. in 1922;
in the sworn application for alien certificate of registration dated July 7, 1950, he declared under oath
that no child; and in several other documents executed by him and presented in evidence he had
consistently referred to M.R. alone his wife; he had never mentioned S.K. as his wife, or their alleged
children. On the other hand, appellants did not present in evidence the marriage certificate of the
decedent and their mother, which is the best evidence of the alleged marriage; or gave any explanation
for the non-presentation thereof or of its loss neither have they presented any competent secondary
evidence of the supposed marriage. The finding, therefore, of the lower court that the appellants are
not heirs of the decedent is correct.

2.HUSBAND AND WlFE; PROPERTIES ACQUIRED DURING MARRIAGE PRESUMED CONJUGAL;

PRESUMPTION, HOW OVERCOME.—The evidence shows that the properties in questions were bought
by the wife with her separate and exclusive money, although during her marriage with the decedents;
that the spouse had adopted a system of separation of properties; that the wife had been administering
said properties, to the exclusion of her husband; and that said properties were registered in her name.
Thus, the disputable presumption of law that properties acquired during marriage are conjugal
properties has been overcome.

3.EVIDENCE; DECLARATION AND ADMISSION AGAINST OWN INTEREST; PERSON BOUND THEREBY.—The
decedent had acknowledged the fact that he had obtained from his wife sums of money which belongs
exclusively to the latter and had not been paid to her up to the present. He also acknowledged that he
had not given any money to his wife and that they have actually adopted a system of separation of
property, each of them not having any interest or participation whatsoever in the property of the other.
These declarations and admission of fact made by the decedent against his interest are binding upon
him, his heirs and successors in interests and third persons as well.

4.DAMAGES; WHEN PLAINTIFF MAY NOT BE SENTENCED TO PAY.—The complaint in question contains
nothing derogatory to the good name or reputation of the defendants-appellees. On the contrary, it
may be surmised from said pleading that the defendant spouse had no knowledge of the alleged
previous marriage of the decedent. Moreover, there was no showing that the plaintiffs acted in bad
faith. Hence, the latter should not be sentenced to pay damages.

366

366

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Litam, etc., et al. vs. Rivera

5.SUCCESSION; DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP; NOT PROPER IN CIVIL CASE.—The declaration of heirship is

improper in a civil case it being within the exclusive competence of the court in a Special proceedings.
Litam, etc., et al. vs. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, No. L-7644, No. L-7645 November 27, 1956