Arguments Advanced

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

1. THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF MURDER OF MEHAK AND ARNAV UNDER SECTION 302
READ WITH SECTION 34

It is humbly submitted that the Yogesh and his father (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Accused
1’ and ‘Accused 2’ respectively) are guilty of committing murder under § 302 of the Indian
Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC.’) read with Section 34. It is significant to refer
to § 300 of the IPC, which expounds on the essentials of a murder.

‘A person is guilty of murder if he intentionally causes the death of a person or causes such
bodily injury as he knows, is likely to cause death of that person or causes such bodily injury,
which in the ordinary course of nature results into death or commits an act so dangerous that
it must, in all probability cause death of that person.’1

The submission of on behalf of the prosecution is that-

Firstly, that both the accused have Motive to Murder

Secondly, the accused shared a common intention to murder the deceased.
Thirdly that they acted in furtherance of such common intention.

1.1. THE ACCUSED HAD MOTIVE TO MURDER

Motive is that which moves or induces a person to act in a certain way. 2 It is a fact which
is only within the knowledge of a person doing the act, and which no human being can but
the party himself can divine.3 Motive is the emotion which impels a man to do a particular
act. Such impelling cause need not necessarily be proportionally grave to do grave crimes.4
The evidence regarding existence of motive which operates in the mind of an assassin is
very often than not within the reach of others. The motive may not even be known to the
victim of the crime. The motive may be known to the assassin and no one else may know
what gave birth to the evil thought in the mind of the assassin.5

1
§300, IPC, 1860.
2
Gangaram v. Emp., 22 Cri LJ 529.
3
Hazrat Gul Khan v. E, 29 Cri LJ 546.
4
Nathuni Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1998) 9 SCC 238.
5
Subedar Tewari v.. State of U.P., AIR 1989 SC 733.

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Arguments Advanced

Mehak’s family was dead against his marriage from the beginning. Especially the accused
who just refused to accept their marital alliance. Yogesh suggested his father that they
should teach “these lower caste people” a lesion. This clearly shows that the family believed
that Mehak had shamed them by marrying into a lower caste.6
The family was further shamed by the Local community leader, who asked them to dissolve
the marriage. Accused 2 had to apologise on behalf of his daughter. The stand of the
community leader is pertinent in this matter as his opinion represents the opinion of the
entire village of Maullana. Therefore, the marriage of the deceased was a disgrace for both
the accused. In this backdrop the motive becomes evident. Accused 1 and 2 clearly felt
defamed by the act of the deceased. Accused went as far as to say that he disowned his
daughter and she was dead to him.7
The presence of motive is relevant under § 8 of the Indian Evidence Act as it goes on to
show the mens rea of crime.8 This section further stipulates that any fact is relevant which
shows or constitutes motive or preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact. In the
present matter, the fact that the accused saw the marital union of Mehak to a lower caste
Arnav as a black mark on the family honor constitutes as a sufficient motive for them to
commit the atrocious crime of murder.
It is pertinent to note that if there is motive in doing an act, then the adequacy of that motive
is not in all cases necessary. Heinous offences have been committed for very slight motive.9
Furthermore, relevance of a motive should be tested in the factual background of the case.10
The mere fact that motive alleged by the prosecution is not strong enough for others to
develop such a degree of grudge would not mean that the assailants had no serious reasons
to do this.11 The motive may be considered as a circumstance which is relevant for assessing
the evidence but if the evidence is clear and unambiguous and the circumstances prove the
guilt of the accused, the same is not weakened even if the motive is not a very strong one.12
In this case however, not only can a strong motive be clearly established but it also lays
down the foundation to prove the intention to murder.

6
Moot Proposition.
7
Moot Proposition.
8
Vinayak Datta Durbhatkar v. State, AIR 1970 Goa 96 (101).
9
State v. Dinakar Bandu, (1969) 72 Bom LR 905.
10
Ranganayaki v. State, (2004) 12 SCC 521.
11
Nathuni Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1998) 9 SCC 238.
12
State of U.P. v.. Kishanpal & Ors., (2008) 16 SCC 73.

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Arguments Advanced

1.2. THE ACCUSED SHARED A COMMON INTENTION TO MURDER THE DECEASED.

Section 34 IPC embodies the principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act and
essence of that liability is the existence of common intention. Common intention implies
acting in concert which is to be proved/inferred either from the conduct of the accused
persons or from attendant circumstances.
It is submitted that the common intention can clearly be inferred from the circumstances of
the case.
The Supreme Court in Sudip Kr. Sen @ Biltu vs State Of W.B. & Ors, held that To invoke
Section 34 IPC, it must be established that the criminal act was done by more than one
person in furtherance of common intention of all. It must, therefore, be proved that:-
(i) there was common intention on the part of several persons to commit a particular
crime
(ii) the crime was actually committed by them in furtherance of that common intention.

Under Section 34 IPC, a pre-concert in the sense of a distinct previous plan is not necessary
to be proved. Therefore, merely because there no evidence of prior planning of the murder
does not declare the innocence of accused 2.

The essence of liability under Section 34 IPC is conscious mind of persons participating
in the criminal action to bring about a particular result. The question whether there was
any common intention or not depends upon inference to be drawn from the proved facts
and circumstances of each case. The totality of the circumstances must be taken into
consideration in arriving at the conclusion whether the accused had a common intention to
commit an offence with which they could be convicted.13

The Court held in the above case that “Considering the facts and circumstances of the case
in hand, it is evident that there was prior concert and that the appellants have acted in
furtherance of common intention. As seen from the evidence of PW-6, all the appellants
and another co-accused Sk. Kochi were doing illegal business of extorting money from the
flat owners. On the date of occurrence, all the appellants and another co-accused Sk. Kochi
came together and Sudip Kumar Sen @ Biltu started abusing the deceased and Apu
Chatterjee “

13
Sudip Kr. Sen @ Biltu vs State Of W.B. & Ors, (2016) 3 SCC 26.

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Arguments Advanced

In the instant matter even though only Accused 1 had made threats of causing harm to the
deceased, accused 2 cannot be presumed innocent solely on the basis of that. The place of
murder, nature of injuries to the deceased clearly indicate that accused 1 could not have
pulled it off on his own.14
As a general principle in a case of criminal liability it is the primary responsibility of the
person who actually commits the offence and only that person who has committed the crime
can be held guilty. By introducing Section 34 in the Penal Code the legislature laid down
the principle of joint liability in doing a criminal act. The essence of that liability is to be
found in the existence of a common intention connecting the accused leading to the doing
of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. Thus, if the act is the result of a common
intention then every person who did the criminal act with that common intention would be
responsible for the offence committed irrespective of the share which he had in its
perpetration. ........."15.
Therefore, the prosecution submits, that admittedly there is no proof that accused 2 actually
participated in the attack at the scene of crime, his participation toward the common
intention to murder the two deceased cannot be denied. His share in participation, though
not equivalent to that of accused 1, still brings him under the ambit of Section 34.
The persons who are connected with the preparation of a crime are divided into two
categories: (1) those who actually commit the crime, i.e. principals in the first degree; and
(b) those who aid in the actual commission, i.e. principals in the second degree. Law does
not make any distinction with regard to the punishment of such persons, all being liable to
be punished alike.16
The vicarious or constructive liability under section 34 IPC can arise only when two
conditions stand fulfilled, i.e., the mental element or the intention to commit the criminal
act conjointly with another or others; and the other is the actual participation in one form
or the other in the commission of the crime.
Such a common intention should be anterior in point of time to the commission of the
crime, but may also develop on the spot when such a crime is committed. In most of the
cases it is difficult to procure direct evidence of such intention. In most of the cases, it can
be inferred from the acts or conduct of the accused and other relevant circumstances.
Therefore, in inferring the common intention under section 34 IPC, the evidence and

14
Moot Proposition.
15
Virendra Singh v. State Of M.P, (2010) 8 SCC 407.
16
Ibid,¶ 46.

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Arguments Advanced

documents on record acquire a great significance and they have to be very carefully
scrutinized by the court.
The dominant feature of section 34 is the element of intention and participation in action.
This participation need not in all cases be by physical presence. Common intention implies
acting in concert.17In order that section 34 IPC may apply, it is not necessary that the
prosecution must prove that the act was done by a particular or a specified person. In fact,
the section is intended to cover a case where a number of persons act together and on the
facts of the case it is not possible for the prosecution to prove as to which of the persons
who acted together actually committed the crime. Little or no distinction exists between a
charge for an offence under a particular section and a charge under that section read with
section 34.
Relying on the above interpretation by the supreme Court the prosecution submits, that the
accused 2 cannot be acquitted merely on grounds that there is no evidence of his physical
presence at the crime scene.
Mens rea is considered as guilty intention18, which is proved or inferred from the acts of
the accused.19 The inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts
and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused.20

It is submitted that facts of the present case are incompatible with the innocence of the
accused. The mens rea can be gathered from the nature of injuries themselves.

Yogesh suggested to his father that a lesson must be taught to the lower caste(referring to
Arnav and his family). This indicates the nature of relationship between father Accused 1
and Accused 2. Yogesh was not intending to act independently, he was seeking his fathers
approval to act. 21

Further, the intention to kill is not required in every case, mere knowledge that natural and
probable consequences of an act would be death will suffice for a conviction u/s. 302 of
IPC.22 It can also be inferred from the murder and the nature of injuries caused to the
victim.23 Yogesh said that a lesson has to be taught to the lower caste people. Even thogh

17
Ibid
18
Commissioner of Income Tax v. Patranu Dass Raja Ram Beri, AIR 1982 ¶¶1, 4.
19
State of Maharashtra v Meyer Hans George, AIR 1965 SC 722.
20
Harishchandra Ladaku Thange v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2007 SC 2957.
21
Moot Proposition.
22
Santosh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1975 Cri LJ 602 (SC).
23
Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 1803.

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Arguments Advanced

he does not specifically mention his intention to kill them, it can be implied from the
circumstances. The nature of injuries show that the accused must have known that death
would be caused in all probability.

The postmortem report reveals that the cause of death was shock and hemorrhaging due to
multiple injuries. Therefore, the attack was meant to cause death of the person. The
intention cannot be to merely injure the deceased. In the case of John Pandian v. State24,
the Supreme Court Held that “ the deceased died on the spot where he was assaulted and
suffered as many as 9 cut injuries on the vulnerable parts of his body like shoulder, neck,
right cheek, occipital region, etc. The intention of the assaulters can be gathered from the
nature of injuries.”Furthermore, it is presumed that every sane person intends the result that
his action normally produces and if a person hits another on a vulnerable part of the body,
and death occurs as a result, the intention of the accused can be no other than to take the
life of the victim and the offence committed amounts to murder.25

The decision of Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Magabhai Vankar v State of
Gujarat 26 is relevant to the case at hand. In the abovementioned case the respondent had
attacked deceased with a wooden pestle. The act had caused multiple fractures on the skull
of the deceased leading to almost instantaneous death. The court held that “any reasonable
person with any stretch of imagination can come to the conclusion that such injury on a
vital part of the body would cause death. The injury sustained by the deceased not only
exhibits the intention of the accuse in causing the death of the victim but also the knowledge
of the accused as to the likely consequence of such attack which could be none other than
causing the death of the victim.27

2. THAT THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE POINTS TOWARDS THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED

PERSONS

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Accused is guilty of Murder of the
Deceased under Section- 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the circumstantial evidence
points towards it.

24
John Pandian v. State, (2011) 3 SCC(Cri) 550.
25
(1951) 3 Pepsu LR 635.
26
Ashok Kumar Magabhai Vankar v State of Gujarat ,(2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 397.
27
Ibid.

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Arguments Advanced

Therefore, the submission of the respondent towards this is twofold:-

Firstly, that the behavior of Yogesh on the morning of 30th September was suspicious.

Secondly, both the accused had motive to murder.

Thirdly, O+ blood group was found from blood stains on bodies of deceased which matches
Yogesh’s blood Group.

2.1. ACCUSED 1 SHOWED SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIOR NEAR THE MURDER SITE ON DAY OF THE

MURDER.
It is humbly submitted that an eye witness saw Yogesh lurking near the murder site on
the day of the murder.28 It is evident that his behavior was suspicious enough to catch
the eye of the witness.
Therefore, circumstances show that not only was accused 1 near the the murder sight
but his conduct warranted suspicion. The eye- witness belongs to the village of the
accused only, therefore his testimony cannot be presumed to be biased.
Suresh and Anr v. State of Haryana, the Supreme Court opined that the credibility of
the witnesses, which the prosecution mainly relies on to prove the case on the
basis of the circumstantial evidence is an important aspect. It is pertinent to note that
the witness in the present case is from the village of the accused himself.

2.2. BOTH THE ACCUSED HAD MOTIVE TO MURDER.

As it had been previously content by the prosecution, both accused had motive to
murder the deceased persons. Their family honor, there reputation in their community
was at stake. There conduct shows that marriage in a lower cast community was
considered an unforgivable sin to them.

2.3. YOGESH’S BLOOD GROUP (O+) WAS FOUND ON CLOTHES OF DECEASED WHICH WERE
NOT IDENTIFIED AS BELONGING TO EITHER MEHAK OR ARNAV.

Forensic analysis of blood stained clothes of the deceased showed 3 blood groups. A+
and B+ belonging to the deceased and O+ . O positive had been identified with
Yogesh’s blood group.29

28
Moot Proposition.
29
Moot Proposition.

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Arguments Advanced

It is the humble submission of the prosecution that the circumstantial evidence form a
chain that directly and conclusively determined the guilt of the accused. Both accused
1 and 2 had motive. The nature of relationship between them was such that accused 2
in all probability had acted in consort with accused 2. Their intention was to cause
death as is clear from the nature of injuries inflicted. Even though presence of accused
2 cannot be linked to the murder site, Section 34 sufficiently links him to Section 302.

Conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence must be tested by the touchstone of

law relating to circumstantial evidence laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of
Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P.30 Where a case solely rests on
circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the
incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence
of the accused. The circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the
accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to
be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those
circumstances.31 The principal that the inculpatory fact must be inconsistent with the
innocence of the accused and incapable explanation on any other hypothesis than that
of guilt does not mean that any extravagant hypothesis would be sufficient to sustain
the principle, but that the hypothesis suggested must be reasonable.32

30
1952 SCR 1091; Kedar Nath Bajaria v. State of West Bengal, 1954 Cri 1679
31
Bodhraj v. State of J&K, (2002) 8 SCC 45
32
Sk. Sattar v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 8 SCC 430; Sonu v. State of Haryana, (2017) 8 SCC 570