SUMMARY OF DOCTRINES

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Sec. 1:

Santiago vs Bautista
- The courts may not exercise judicial power when there is no applicable law.
- Case at bar: An award of honors to a student by a board of teachers may not be reversed
by a court where the awards are governed by no applicable law.

Daza v Singson
- Even if the issue presented was political in nature, the Court is still not be precluded from
resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon it that now covers, in proper
cases, even the political question.
- That where serious constitutional questions are involved, "the transcendental importance to
the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely brushing
aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure."

Mantruste Systems v Court of Appeals

- There can be no justification for judicial interference in the business of an administrative

agency, except when it violates a citizen's constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse of
discretion, or acts in excess of, or without jurisdiction.

- Courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the Asset Privatization Trust
(administrative body), nor block, by an injunction, the discharge of its functions and the
implementation of its decisions in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of
assets transferred to it.

Malaga v Penachos, Jr.

- It was previously declared the prohibition pertained to the issuance of injunctions or

restraining orders by courts against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the
exercise of discretion in technical cases. The Court observed that to allow the courts to judge
these matters would disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery. On
issues definitely outside of this dimension and involving questions of law, courts could not be
prevented by any law (in this case, P.D. No. 605) from exercising their power to restrain or
prohibit administrative acts.

PACU v Secretary of Education

- Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies.

(Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit
of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy.)

- Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein
however intellectually solid the problem may be. This is especially true where the issues
"reach constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for the court's duty to
avoid decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion.

Mariano, Jr. v COMELEC

 - Considering that those contingencies mentioned by the petitioners may or may not happen,
petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the
proper parties to raise this abstract issue (city of Makati is involved). Worse, they raise this
futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

Macasiano v National Housing Authority

-It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the
legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and
presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case.

J. Joya v PCGG

- The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the
legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper
party; that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. But the most important are the first
two (2) requisites.

- Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done
by the government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being
questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of
public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a
taxpayer.

Legaspi v Civil Service Commission

- It becomes apparent that when a Mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a
citizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which possesses the right.

-"Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Properly construed, it embraces every

person.

Dumlao v COMELEC

- For one, there is a misjoinder of parties and actions. One petitioner does not join other
petitioners in the burden of their complaint, nor do the latter join the former in his. They,
respectively, contest completely different statutory provisions.

- For another, there are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of
judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and
substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be
exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be
passed upon in order to decide the case.

Bugnay Const. and Dev’t. Corp. v Laron

 - The doctrine holds that only when the act complained of directly involves an illegal
disbursement of public funds raised by taxation will the taxpayer's suit be allowed. The
essence of a taxpayer's right to institute such an action hinges on the existence of that
requisite pecuniary or monetary interest.

- It is not enough that the taxpayer-plaintiff sufficiently show that he would be benefited or
injured by the judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit as a real party in interest.

Kilosbayan v Guingona, Jr.

- A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise
of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised.

- In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of
Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed
to initiate and prosecute actions before this Court to question the constitutionality or validity
of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or
instrumentalities.

PHILCONSA v Enriquez

- The Senators have legal standing to question the validity of the veto. When a veto was
made in excess of the authority of the President, it impermissibily intrudes into the domain of
the Legislature. A member of Congress can question an act of the Executive which injures
Congress as an institution.

Tatad v Garcia, Jr.

-The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow taxpayers to question contracts
entered into by the national government or government-owned or controlled corporations
allegedly in contravention of the law and to disallow the same when only municipal contracts
are involved (just like in Bugnay case since no public money was involved).

Oposa v Factoran, Jr.

- CLASS SUIT: The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not
just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so
numerous, it becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the
court.

- Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned.

- Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors` assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.

Lozada v COMELEC
 - As taxpayers, petitioners may not file the instant petition, for nowhere therein is it alleged
that tax money is being illegally spent. It is only when an act complained of, which may
include a legislative enactment or statute, involves the illegal expenditure of public money
that the so-called taxpayer suit may be allowed.
- The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is
that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally
capable of judicial resolution. When the asserted harm is a "generalized grievance" shared
in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally
does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction.

Kilosbayan v Morato

- The voting on petitioners' standing in the previous case was a narrow one, seven (7)
members sustaining petitioners' standing and six (6) denying petitioners' right to bring the
suit. The majority was thus a tenuous one that is not likely to be maintained in any
subsequent litigation. In addition, there have been charges in the membership of the Court,
with the retirement of Justice Cruz and Bidin and the appointment of the writer of this opinion
and Justice Francisco. Given this fact it is hardly tenable to insist on the maintenance of the
ruling as to petitioners' standing.

SECTION 3

Bengzon v Lim

- What is fiscal autonomy? It contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize
their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the
power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding
the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and play plans of the government and
allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the
course of the discharge of their functions. Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside
control.

- The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The
imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional
offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal
autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as
regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the
entire fabric of our constitutional system is based

SECTION 4

Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v Court of Appeals, et.al.

- Reorganization is purely an internal matter of the Court to which petitioner certainly has no
business at all.

- The Court with its new membership is not obliged to follow blindly a decision upholding a
party's case when, after its re-examination, the same calls for a rectification.
SECTION 5

Drilon v Lim

- The Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and
orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

- In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost
circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality
upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the
questioned act is usually the handiwork of the legislative or the executive departments, or
both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the
higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined
after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of
those who participated in its discussion.

Larranaga v Court of Appeals

(Transfer the venue of the preliminary investigation from Cebu City to Manila because of the
extensive coverage of the proceedings by the Cebu media which allegedly influenced the
people's perception of petitioner's character and guilt.)

- The Court recognizes that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances
can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. It was previously held that to
warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges
have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage in publicity.
- In the case at bar, nothing in the records shows that the tone and content of the publicity
that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of
the DOJ Panel.

First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v Court of Appeals

- It is intended to give the Supreme Court a measure of control over cases paced under its
appellate jurisdiction. For the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction. For the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction
can unnecessarily burden the Court and thereby undermine its essential function of
expounding the law in its most profound national aspects.

Aruelo v Court of Appeals

- Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC can not adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of
certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings,
practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court.

Javellana v DILG

(Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-
81 does not violate Article VIII. Section 5 of the Constitution. Neither the statute nor the
circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the
practice of law.)
 - The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe
rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their
public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law
allows it.

SECTION 6

Maceda v Vasquez

- In the absence of any administrative action taken against a person by the Court with regard
to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman
encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

- Where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the
same to the Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within
the scope of their administrative duties.

Raquiza v Judge Castaneda, Jr.

- The rules even in an administrative case demands that if the respondent Judge should be
disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence presented against him
should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. The judiciary, to which respondent
belongs, no less demands that before its member could be faulted, it should be only after
due investigation and based on competent proofs, no less. This is all the more so when as in
this case the charges are penal in nature.

('Misconduct' also implies 'a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. It results
that even if respondent were not correct in his legal conclusions, his judicial actuations
cannot be regarded as grave misconduct, unless the contrary sufficiently appears.)

SECTION 10

Nitafan v Commissioner of Internal Revenue

- The clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed express grant
of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to "give
substance to equality among the three branches of Government.”

SECTION 11

De La Llana v Alba

-Judiciary Act does not violate judicial security of tenure. This Court is empowered "to
discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their
dismissal." Thus, it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it
was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be
distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure
to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal,
there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that
from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does
 not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of
separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the
office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary.

People v Gacott, Jr.

- To require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters or
cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket
and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative
matters, since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the
Court en banc.

- Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower
courts are specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc, in cognizance of the
need for a thorough and judicious evaluation of serious charges against members of the
judiciary, it is only when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one
year or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that the administrative matter may be decided in
division.

SECTION 12

In Re: Manzano

- As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity
and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As
public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of
Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said
Committees to help promote the landable purposes for which they exist, but only when such
assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.

SECTION 14

Nicos Industrial Corp v Court of Appeals

- The Court is not duty bound to render signed decisions all the time. It has ample discretion
to formulate decisions and/or minute resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending
on its evaluation of a case.

- As it is settled that an order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a judgment on the
merits, it is imperative that it be a reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein the
facts and the law on which it is based.

Mendoza v CFI

- What is expected of the judiciary "is that the decision rendered makes clear why either
party prevailed under the applicable law to the facts as established. Nor is there any regid
formula as to the language to be employed to satisfy the requirement of clarity and
distinctness. The discretion of the particular judge in this respect, while not unlimited, is
necessarily broad. There is no sacramental form of words which he must use upon pain of
being considered as having failed to abide by what the Constitution directs."

- The provision has been held to refer only to decisions of the merits and not to orders of the
trial court resolving incidental matters such as the one at bar. (content of the resolution:
 incident in the prosecution of petitioner)

Borromeo v Court of Appeals

- The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the bulk of its
cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is
patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision
appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the
case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed
merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules.
The resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition always gives the legal basis.

- When the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings,
manifestations, comments, or motions decides to deny due course to the petition and states
that the questions raised are factual or no reversible error in the respondent court's decision
is shown or for some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance
with the constitutional requirement.

- Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who took part in the
deliberations of a case nor do they require the certification of the Chief Justice.

Komatsu Industries (Phils.) Inc v Court of Appeals

- It has long been settled that this Court has discretion to decide whether a "minute
resolution" should be used in lieu of a full-blown decision in any particular case and that a
minute Resolution of dismissal of a Petition for Review on Certiorari constitutes an
adjudication on the merits of the controversy or subject matter of the Petition. It has been
stressed by the Court that the grant of due course to a Petition for Review is "not a matter of
right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the Court's
denial. For one thing, the facts and law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals'
opinion."

Prudential Bank v Castro

- The Constitutional mandate that "no . . . motion for reconsideration of a decision of the
court shall be . . . denied without stating the legal basis therefor" is inapplicable in
administrative cases. And even if it were, said Resolution stated the legal basis for the denial
and, therefore, adhered faithfully to the Constitutional requirement. "Lack of merit," which
was one of the grounds for denial, is a legal basis.

-(certification issue) The requirement of a certification refers to decisions to judicial cases

and not to administrative cases. Besides, since the decision was a per curiam decision, a
formal certification is not required.

Oil and Natural Gas Commission v Court of Appeals

- The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not
preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of
fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.
SECTION 14 (not 16)

Valdez v Court of Appeals

- The (lower) court statement in the decision that a party has proven his case while the other
has not, is not the findings of facts contemplated by the Constitution and the rules to be
clearly and distinctly stated.
- This Court has said again and again that it is not a trier of facts and that it relies, on the
factual findings of the lower court and the appellate court which are conclusive.