2018 Bar Reviewer in Admin Public Officers Election Local Govt

2018 Bar Reviewer in Administrative Law,
Law on Public Officers, Election Law, &

Local Government
2018 BAR REVIEWER IN

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
PUBLIC OFFICERS,
ELECTION LAW, &
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
By: Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr.
• Is the Boy Scouts of the Philippines a Quasi-Public IS MIAA A GOCC OR INSTRUMENTALITY?

Corporation?
• MIAA is not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. MIAA
is not a stock corporation because it has no capital stock divided
• A: NO. The BSP is a public corporation or a government into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares.
agency or instrumentality with juridical personality, which • Under its Charter, MIAA does not have capital stock that is
falls within the audit jurisdiction of the COA. divided into shares. MIAA has capital but it is not divided into
• Not all corporations, which are not government owned or shares of stock. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares.
controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private Hence, MIAA is not a stock corporation. MIAA is also not a non-
corporations as there exists another distinct class of stock corporation because it has no members.”
corporations or chartered institutions which are otherwise • What then is the legal status of MIAA within the National
known as "public corporations." Government? MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with
corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental
• These corporations are treated by law as agencies or
functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the
instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers.
the tests of ownership or control and economic viability but
• MIAA vs. CA, 495 SCRA 591 (2006); Mactan-Cebu
to different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests.
International Airport Authority (MCIAA) v. City of Lapu-
[BSP v. COA, G.R. No. 177131. June 7, 2011].
Lapu, 757 SCRA 323 (2015)
Is the MIAA subject to real property tax? Is the GSIS a GOCC, therefore subject to real property tax?
• NO. MIAA is not a GOCC but an “instrumentality” of the National
• NO. GSIS is not a GOCC but an “instrumentality” of the
Government, and, (b) the real properties of MIAA are owned by
National Government. GSIS’ capital is not divided into unit
the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate
shares. Also, GSIS has no members to speak of.
tax.
• What about the collection of terminal fees and other charges? • The real properties under GSIS’s name are likewise owned
(Mactan Cebu vs. Judge Marcos, 1996) by the Republic. The GSIS is but a mere trustee of the
subject properties which have either been ceded to it by the
• “The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges
Government or acquired for the enhancement of the system.
from the public does not remove the character of the Airport
Lands and Buildings as properties for public use. • This particular property arrangement is clearly shown by the
• “The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are devoted to public fact that the disposal or conveyance of said subject
use and thus are properties of public dominion. As properties of properties are either done by or through the authority of the
public dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are outside the President of the Philippines.
commerce of man.” • GSIS v. City Treasurer, 23 December 2009
• MIAA vs. CA, 495 SCRA 591 (2006); Mactan-Cebu • NOTE. This overturns the ruling in City of Davao v. RTC,
International Airport Authority (MCIAA) v. City of Lapu- 467 SCRA 280 (2005), wher the SC declared the GSIS
Lapu, 757 SCRA 323 (2015) liable for real property taxes.
Copyright@ Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 1

Local Government
May the DOJ issue an administrative order consolidating When the DOJ reviews the finding of probable cause of
all pending cases against the same respondents? fiscals, is it exercising quasi-judicial powers?
• YES. The consolidation of the cases against Delos • NO. The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not
Angeles, Jr., et al. from various venues was ordered determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not
obviously to obtain expeditious justice for the parties exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions.
with the least cost and vexation to them. • Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the
only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably
• Inasmuch as the cases filed involved similar or related charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his
questions to be dealt with during the preliminary complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the
investigation, the Secretary of Justice rightly found the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether
consolidation of the cases to be the most feasible a crime has been committed and whether there is probable
means of promoting the efficient use of public cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof.
resources and of having a comprehensive investigation • While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to
of the cases. be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that
pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
• Spouses Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
• SANTOS, et al. v. WILSON GO, G.R. No. 156081, 19 October 2005,
188056, January 08, 2013
When the DOJ reviews the finding of probable cause of

When the Office of the Mayor issues notices /demolition
fiscals, is it exercising quasi-judicial powers?
orders, is it exercising quasi-judicial powers?
• NO. A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding
• YES. Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not
since the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not
only relative to its function as the executive official of the town. It has
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
also been endowed with authority to hear issues involving property
• A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such that rights of individuals and to come out with an effective order or resolution
its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their decisions thereon. In this manner, it exercises quasi-judicial functions.
have the same effect as judgments of a court. • This power is obviously a truism in the matter of issuing demolition
• Such is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a notices and/or orders against squatters and illegal occupants through
preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an some of its agencies or authorized committees within its respective
information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or municipalities or cities.
when the Secretary of Justice is reviewing the former’s order or • It cannot be denied as well that in determining whether or not a
resolutions. structure is illegal or it should be demolished, property rights are
involved thereby needing notices and opportunity to be heard as
• A preliminary investigation thus partakes of an investigative or provided for in the constitutionally guaranteed right of due
inquisitorial power for the sole purpose of obtaining information on process. In pursuit of these functions, the city mayor has to exercise
what action of a judicial nature may be taken. (Atty. Alice quasi-judicial powers.
Odchigue-Bondoc v. Tan Tiong Bio, G.R. No. 186652, 06 October • City Engineer of Baguio vs. Hon. Domogan, G.R. No. 150270, 26
2010) November 2008
Can a PMA cadet under investigation for Honor What is the Doctrine of Operative Fact?
Code Violation invoke the right to counsel?
• The general rule is that a void law or administrative act cannot
• NO. There is nothing in the 1987 Constitution stating that a be the source of legal rights or duties.
party in a non-litigation proceeding is entitled to be • Article 7 of the Civil Code: "Laws are repealed only by
represented by counsel. The assistance of a lawyer, while subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall
desirable, is not indispensable. not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
• A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be contrary. When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent
assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter
charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and
himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to
person being investigated with counsel. the laws or the Constitution."
• Hence, the PMA as an administrative body is under no duty • The doctrine of operative fact is an exception to the
to provide the person with counsel because assistance of general rule, such that a judicial declaration of invalidity
counsel is not an absolute requirement. [First Class Cadet may not necessarily obliterate all the effects and
Aldrin Jeff Cudia vs. The Superintendent of the PMA, consequences of a void act prior to such declaration.
G.R. No. 211362, 25 February 2015. ] • [CIR v. San Roque Power Corp., October 8, 2013]

Local Government
Can an “administrative practice” be considered for Can an “administrative practice” be considered for
the application of the Doctrine of Operative Fact? the application of the Doctrine of Operative Fact?
• NO. For the operative fact doctrine to apply, there must • Under Section 246, taxpayers may rely upon a rule or ruling
be a "legislative or executive measure," meaning a law issued by the Commissioner from the time the rule or ruling is
or executive issuance, that is invalidated by the court. issued up to its reversal by the Commissioner or this Court.
• From the passage of such law or promulgation of such The reversal is not given retroactive effect.
executive issuance until its invalidation by the court, the • This, in essence, is the doctrine of operative fact.
effects of the law or executive issuance, when relied upon • There must, however, be a rule or ruling issued by the
by the public in good faith, may have to be recognized as Commissioner that is relied upon by the taxpayer in good
valid. faith.
• The supposed administrative practice of the BIR and the • A mere administrative practice, not formalized into a rule or
CTA --- of not requiring refund seekers to comply with the ruling, will not suffice because such a mere administrative
120+30 day periods --- is of no moment because an practice may not be uniformly and consistently applied.
administrative practice is neither a law nor an executive • An administrative practice, if not formalized as a rule or ruling,
issuance. will not be known to the general public and can be availed of
only by those with informal contacts with the government
• [CIR v. San Roque Power Corp., October 8, 2013]
agency. [CIR v. San Roque Power Corp., October 8, 2013]
Will “res judicata” apply to cases involving Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
exercise of administrative power? • Q: The Secretary of National Defense issued a memorandum
• NO. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or directing the AFP Chief of Staff to facilitate the interment of
quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of Former President Ferdinand Marcos at the LNMB.
administrative powers. • Several petitioners filed a petition directly with the Supreme
• Administrative powers refer to those purely administrative in Court seeking to enjoin the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.
nature, as opposed to administrative proceedings that take on • Did the petitioners violate the doctrine of exhaustion of
a quasi-judicial character [adjudication]. administrative remedies?
• When the proceedings were merely investigative, aimed at • A: YES.
determining the existence of facts for the purpose of deciding • Contrary to their claim of lack of plain, speedy, adequate
whether to proceed with an administrative action -- then there remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitioners should be
is no res judicata. The case can be re-filed. faulted for failing to seek reconsideration of the assailed
• This process can be likened to a public prosecutor's memorandum and directive before the Secretary of National
preliminary investigation, which entails a determination of Defense.
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is • The Secretary of National Defense should be given opportunity
guilty, and whether a crime has been committed. [Encinas v. to correct himself. [Ocampo v. Enriquez, November 8, 2016]
Agustin, April 11, 2013]
Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

• Questions on the implementation and interpretation thereof
demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion,
requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of
his office to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
• If petitioners would still be dissatisfied with the decision of
the Secretary, they could elevate the matter before the Office
of the President which has control and supervision over the
Department of National Defense (DND).
PUBLIC
• Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court,
OFFICERS
one should have availed first of all the means of
administrative processes available.
• While there are exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, petitioners failed to prove the
presence of any of those exceptions. [Ocampo v. Enriquez,
November 8, 2016]

Local Government
INCOMPATIBLE OFFICE INCOMPATIBLE OFFICE

Sec. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of 1. The first part of this section refers to what are known
Representatives may hold any other office or as incompatible offices, which may not be held by the
employment in the Government, or any legislator during his tenure in Congress.
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality The purpose is to prevent him from owing loyalty to
thereof, including government-owned or another branch of the government, to the detriment of
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, the independence of the legislature and the doctrine of
during his term without forfeiting his seat. separation of powers.
Neither shall he be appointed to any office which The prohibition against the holding of an incompatible
may have been created or the emoluments office is not absolute; what is not allowed is the
thereof increased during the term for which simultaneous holding of that office and the seat in
he was elected. [Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Congress. If he does, he forfeits, as a result, his
Constitution] position in Congress.
FORBIDDEN OFFICE 2. Forbidden Office - “Neither shall he be

But even if a member of Congress is willing to forfeit his appointed to any office which may have
seat therein, he may not be appointed to any civil office been created or the emoluments thereof
in the government that has been created or the
emoluments thereof have been increased while he was
increased during the term for which he
incumbent in the legislature. Such a position is a was elected”. (Sec. 13, Art. VI ).
forbidden office.
The purpose is to prevent trafficking in public office. Note: The ban against appointment to the
Were the rule otherwise, certain legislators, especially office created or the emoluments thereof
those not sure of reelection, might be able to work for the increased shall, however, last only for the
creation or improvement of lucrative positions and, in duration of the term for which the member
combination with the President, arrange for their of Congress was elected.
appointment thereto in order to provide for their future
security at the expense of the public service.
Q: Richard Gordon was elected as Senator. During his A: NO. The government does not control the PNRC. Under
term, he was also elected as Chairman of the Philippine the PNRC Charter, as amended, only 6 of the 30
National Red Cross (PNRC) by the Board of Governors. members of the PNRC Board of Governors are
appointed by the President of the Philippines, while the
Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of other 24 members, or 4/5, are elected or chosen by the
the PNRC Board of Governors, Sen. Gordon has ceased private sector members of the PNRC. The vast majority
to be a member of the Senate as provided in Sec. 13, Art. of the thousands of PNRC members are private
VI of the Constitution, prohibiting a Senator or Member of individuals, including students. Hence, the PNRC is
the HOR to hold any other office or employment in the controlled by private sector individuals.
Government, or any subdivision, agency, instrumentality Also, it is the PNRC Board that can review, reverse, or
thereof, including GOCC’s or their subsidiaries during his modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman,
term without forfeiting his seat. and not the President. Thus, the PNRC is not
government-owned or controlled corporation but privately
Is the office of the PNRC Chairman a government office owned, privately funded, and privately run charitable
or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in organization. (Liban et al. v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352,
Section 13, Art. VI of the Constitution. January 18, 2011).

Local Government
Is the PNRC (Red Cross) a GOCC, therefore its employees

are within the jurisdiction of the CSC? INCOMPATIBLE OFFICE
• Yes. As ruled by this Court in Liban, et al. v. Gordon, the
PNRC, although not a GOCC, is sui generis in character, Unless otherwise allowed by law or
thus, requiring this Court to approach controversies the primary functions of his position,
involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis. no appointive official shall hold any
• In this particular case, the CA did not err in ruling that the
CSC has jurisdiction over the PNRC because the issue at
other office or employment in the
hand is the enforcement of labor laws and penal statutes, Government or any subdivision,
thus, in this particular matter, the PNRC can be treated as a agency or instrumentality thereof,
GOCC, and as such, it is within the ambit of Rule I, Section
1 of the Implementing Rules of Republic Act 6713.
including government-owned or
• Thus, having jurisdiction over the PNRC, the CSC had controlled corporations or their
authority to modify the penalty and order the dismissal of subsidiaries. [Section 7, paragraph
petitioner from the service. [Torres v. De Leon, G.R. No. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987
199440. January 18, 2016]
Constitution]
• Q: Can the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently

Holding Two Concurrent Positions serve as Acting Solicitor General?
• Elena bautista was DOTC Usec. She was designated
as OIC of MARINA in a temporary capacity. Is this • NO. That is a clear violation of the constitutional
valid? prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
• No. The Constitutional ban on dual or multiple Constitution.
positions refers to the holding of the office, and not to • The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being
the nature of the appointment or designation, words
which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII held by one official must be construed as to apply to
nor in section 7, Article IX-B. all appointments or designations, whether
• To “hold” an office means to “possess or occupy” the permanent or temporary, for it is without question
same, or to be “in possession and administration”, that the avowed objective of Section 13, is to
which implies nothing less than the actual discharge prevent the concentration of powers in the
of the functions and duties of the office. Executive Department.
• FUNA vs. ERMITA, G.R. No. 184740, February 11,
2010, 612 SCRA 308. • Funa vs. Agra, G.R. NO. 191644, FEBRUARY 19, 2013.
• Q: State the exceptions to the ban against the • Q: Before the nullification of his designation, what is the
holding of 2 or more positions. status of Sec. Agra – de jure or de facto?
• A: Agra did not validly hold the position of Acting Secretary
• The only two exceptions against the holding of of Justice concurrently with his holding of the position of
multiple offices are: (1) those provided for under Acting Solicitor General. Accordingly, he was not to be
the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, considered as a de jure officer for the entire period of
his tenure as the Acting Secretary of Justice.
authorizing the Vice President to become a member
• A de jure officer is one who is deemed, in all respects,
of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by
legally appointed and qualified and whose term of office has
Executive officials specified in Section 13, not expired.
Article VII without additional compensation in ex • That notwithstanding, Agra was a de facto officer during
officio capacities as provided by law and as his tenure as Acting Secretary of Justice. During their
required by the primary functions of the officials’ tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be
offices. considered de facto officers and as such entitled to
emoluments for actual services rendered.
• Funa vs. Agra, G.R. NO. 191644, FEBRUARY 19, 2013.
• Funa vs. Agra, FEBRUARY 19, 2013 [J. BERSAMIN].

Local Government
• Q: Who is de facto officer? Q: Under Civil Service Law, when can preventive
• A: suspension be imposed on a government employee?
• A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from A: Section 19 of Rule II of the CSC Rules provides:
one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an (1) that the proper disciplining authority has served a formal
appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its charge to the affected officer or employee; and
face. (2) that the charge involves either dishonesty, oppression,
• He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and grave misconduct, neglect in the performance of duty, or if
is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty
is meant authority derived from an appointment, however of the charges which would warrant her removal from the
irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere service.
volunteer. Proof must also be shown that the said employee may unduly
• Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as influence the witnesses against her or may tamper the
valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far documentary evidence on file in her office is not among the
as the public or third persons who are interested therein prerequisites. [Trade & Investment Development Corp., v.
are concerned. Funa vs. Agra, FEBRUARY 19, 2013 [J. Ma. Rosario Demegillo, September 18, 2012 (BERSAMIN)]
BERSAMIN].
Q: Can the period of preventive suspension be Q: What is the maximum period for preventive suspension?
credited to the imposed penalty of suspension? A:
A: NO. We have to point out that preventive suspension is of two kinds.
The first is the preventive suspension pending investigation,
Preventive suspension is merely a preventive and 2nd is preventive suspension pending appeal.
measure, a preliminary step in an administrative If the proper disciplinary authority does not finally decide the
investigation. It is not a penalty. administrative case within a period of 90 days from the start of
preventive suspension pending investigation, and the
Thus, the period within which one is under respondent is not a presidential appointee, the preventive
preventive suspension is not considered part of suspension is lifted and the respondent is "automatically
reinstated in the service."
the actual penalty of suspension—service of
In the case of presidential appointees, the preventive
the preventive suspension cannot be suspension pending investigation shall be "for a reasonable
credited as service of the penalty. [QUIMBO v. time as the circumstances of the case may warrant."
GERACIO G.R. No. 155620, 9 August 2005] [FRANCISO T. BACULI v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R.
Nos. 188681 and 201130, 8 March 2017]
Preventive Suspension under the LGC Salary During Preventive Suspension (LGC)
• This may be imposed by the mayor / • An elected official preventively

governor upon recommendation by suspended from office shall
the Sanggunian;
receive no salary during such
• Maximum of 60 days per case but
not exceeding 90 days suspension in suspension;
one year; • But upon reinstatement, he shall
• The suspended official is deemed be paid full salary including all
automatically reinstated after the emoluments accruing during
period of suspension (Section 63,
LGC) such suspension. (Section 64,
LGC)

Local Government
Penalty of Suspension (LGC) Q: Under Civil Service Law, what is NEPOTISM?

A: Sec. 59. Nepotism. (1) All appointments to the
• An elected official may be suspended by national, provincial, city and municipal governments or
the Sanggunian for a period of not more in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including
than six (6) months; government owned or controlled corporations, made in
• This can only be imposed after due notice favor of a relative within the third degree either of
and hearing; consanguinity or of affinity of the appointing or
recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau
• The investigation must be terminated or office, or of the persons exercising immediate
within 90 days from the start of the supervision over him, are hereby prohibited.
proceedings.
(2) The following are exempted from the operations of
• The sanggunian must decide the case the rules on nepotism: (a) persons employed in a
within 30 days after the case is submitted confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and
for decision. (Section 66, LGC) (d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Q: Who can file a complaint for NEPOTISM? Q: Will it constitute NEPOTISM if the two sons of
A: A taxpayer has the standing to bring suit to the school president were appointed by the Head
void nepotic acts for he has an interest that of Voc Tech as career employees (driver and utility
"appointments in the civil service shall be made worker) of the school?
only according to merit and fitness . . . ." A: YES.
The Civil Service Law (Section 37) allows any To constitute a violation of the law on nepotism, it
is immaterial who the appointing or recommending
private citizen to file a complaint against a
authority is. It suffices that an appointment is
government official or employee directly with the
extended or issued in favor of a relative within the
Commission. third degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief
Section 38 also recognizes that "administrative of the bureau or office, or the person exercising
proceedings may be commenced upon sworn immediate supervision over the appointee. [CIVIL
written complaint of any other persons." [CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. PEDRO O. DACOYCOY G.R. No.
SERVICE COMMISSION v. PEDRO O. DACOYCOY G.R. No. 135805, 29 April 1999].
135805, 29 April 1999].
Q: The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of • What are the prohibitions imposed on public officers?
the Civil Service Commission and held respondent • 1. Prohibition against solicitation of gifts (Sec. 7(d), R.A. No.
not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the 6713)
decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme • 2. Prohibition against partisan political activities (Sec. 2(4), Art.
IX(B), Constitution)
Court?
• 3. Prohibition against engaging in strike (Social Security
A: The Civil Service Commission has System Employees Assn. v. CA, G.R No. 85279, Jul 28,1989).
become the party adversely affected by such • 4. Restriction against engaging in the practice of law (Sec. 90,
R.A. No. 7160)
ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil • Prohibition against practice of other professions (Sec. 90, R.A.
service system. No. 7160)
Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal • Restriction against engaging in private business (Abeto v.
Garces, A.M. No. P‐88‐269, Dec. 29, 1995)
the decision of the Court of Appeals to the • Restriction against accepting certain employment (Sec. 7(b),
Supreme Court. [CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. R.A. No. 6713)
PEDRO O. DACOYCOY G.R. No. 135805, 29 April 1999].

Local Government
• Q: What is the Doctrine of Administrative • Q: Why was the Doctrine of Administrative Condonation
Condonation? Is this still applicable? abandoned?
• A: To begin with, the concept of public office is a public
• A:
trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to
• The rule that public official cannot be removed for the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987
administrative misconduct committed during a prior Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an
term, since his re-election to office operates as a elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct
condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact
that he was elected to a second term of office, or even
the extent of cutting off the right to remove him another elective post.
therefore. Note that this has no application to • Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative
pending criminal cases. (Aguinaldo v. Santos, G.R. offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory
No. 94115, Aug. 21, 1992) basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official
• This Doctrine was already abandoned by the elected for a different term is fully absolved of any
administrative liability arising from an offense done during a
Supreme Court in the case of Mayor Junjun Binay
prior term.[Carpio-Morales, vs. CA, November 10, 2015]
[Carpio-Morales, vs. CA, November 10, 2015]
• NOTE: • QUESTION:
• The abandonment of the doctrine of condonation is • Judge Moslemen Macarambon was an RTC Judge
prospective in application, hence, the same doctrine for a period of 18 years, 1 month and 16 days.
is still applicable in cases that transpired prior to the Before reaching the optional retirement age of 60,
ruling of the SC in Carpio-Morales v. CA and BinayJr.
he was appointed as COMELEC Commissioner by
• The most important consideration in the doctrine of then President GMA.
condonation is the fact that the misconduct was done
on a prior term and that the subject public official was • Judge Macarambon served as COMELEC
eventually re-elected by the same body politic. Commissioner for less than a year and was
• It is inconsequential whether the said re-election be on
subsequently appointed by President Arroyo as
another public office or on an election year that is not President/CEO of the National Transmission
immediately succeeding the last, as long as the Corporation. Thereafter, he resigned when PNOY
electorate that re-elected the public official be the became president.
same.[OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v MAYOR JULIUS • Can he be allowed to enjoy the retirement benefits
CESAR VERGARA G.R. No. 216871. December 6, 2017] of an RTC Judge?
• QUESTION: • ANSWER: NO.

• Judge Macarambon asserts that Section 1 of RA 910 allows the • In case of retirement, a justice or judge must show compliance
payment of retirement benefits to a judge of the RTC who with the age and service requirements under RA No. 910:
resigns by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of his • (a) must have attained the age of sixty (60) years old; and
office. • (b) must have rendered at least fifteen (15) years service in
• He posits that his appointment as COMELEC Commissioner the Government, the last three (3) of which shall have been
incapacitated him to discharge his duties as an RTC judge on continuously rendered in the Judiciary.
account of his "submission to the will of the political authority • On the other hand, resignation under RA No. 910, must be
and appointing power." "by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the
• As an alternative, he appeals that he be allowed to retire under office." The resignation contemplated under RA No. 910 must
the second sentence of Section 1 considering that he has have the element of involuntariness on the part of the justice or
rendered a total of 18 years, 1 month and 16 days of judicial judge.
service and a total of 35 years of government service. • In either of the two instances above-mentioned, Judge
• Can a judge who voluntarily resigned from his judicial office Macarambon's case does not render him eligible to retire under
before reaching the optional retirement age be allowed to RA No. 910. [RE: APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT OF
receive retirement benefits under RA No. 910? JUDGE MOSLEMEN T. MACARAMBON A.M. No. 14061-RET,
19 June 2012, EN BANC]

Local Government
• Q: DISTINGUISH RESIGNATION FROM RETIREMENT. • Q: Can a public officer or employee be dropped from the
• A: rolls for absence without official leave (AWOL) without
prior notice?
• While an employee can resign at any time, retirement
• A:YES. Under any of the following circumstances:
entails the compliance with certain age and service
requirements specified by law and jurisprudence. • (1) the public officer or employee was continuously absent
without approved leave for at least 30 working days; or
• Resignation stems from the employee's own intent
• (2) the public officer or employee had established a scheme
and volition to resign and relinquish his/her post. to circumvent the rule by incurring substantial absences,
• Retirement takes effect by operation of law. In terms though less than 30 working days, three times in a semester,
of severance to one's employment, resignation such that a pattern was readily apparent.
absolutely cuts-off the employment relationship in • Dropping from the rolls is not disciplinary in nature, as
general; in retirement, the employment relationship the concerned public official or employee need not be
endures for the purpose of the grant of retirement notified or be heard, and it shall not result in the forfeiture of
any benefit nor in disqualification from reemployment in the
benefits.[RE: APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT OF JUDGE
government. [CSC v. CRISOSTOMO M. PLOPINIO G.R. No.
MOSLEMEN T. MACARAMBON A.M. No. 14061-RET, 19 June
2012, EN BANC] 197571, 3April 2017]
May the President discipline a deputy ombudsman? May the President discipline the Chairman and other
officers of the Commission on Human Rights?
A: NO. Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and
removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in • No. As the term of office of the Chairman (and Members) of
the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman's the Commission on Human Rights, is seven (7) years,
disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the without re-appointment, --- their tenure cannot be made
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. dependent on the pleasure of the President.
The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional • It is extremely difficult to conceptualize how an office
mandate, includes its key officials, all of them tasked to support conceived and created by the Constitution to be
the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate.
independent — as the Commission on Human Rights —
and vested with the delicate and vital functions of
What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and
necessarily true for her Deputies who act as agents of the investigating violations of human rights, pinpointing
Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The responsibility and recommending sanctions as well as
Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete remedial measures therefor, can truly function with
trust in her subordinate officials who are not as independent as independence and effectiveness, when the tenure in office
she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and
controls external to her Office. [Emilio Gonzales III vs. Office of its Chairman and Members is made dependent on the
of the President, G.R. No. 196232. January 28, 2014]. pleasure of the President. [Bautista v. Salonga, G.R. No.
86439. April 13, 1989].
Q. Is the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) considered Q. What is the three-fold liability rule?
as a Constitutional Body enjoying fiscal autonomy? ANSWER:
Explain. The "threefold liability rule" holds that the wrongful acts or
ANSWER: NO. From the 1987 Constitution and the omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and
Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR is not administrative liability.
among the class of Constitutional Commissions. The action that may result for each liability under the "threefold
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the liability rule" may proceed independently of one another, as in
CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal autonomy fact, the quantum of evidence required in each case is
entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other than different.
those provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and utilize The right of the government to exercise administrative
funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and pursuant to supervision over erring public officials is lost when they cease
the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require from time to their functions in office. Consequently, the government must
time. Only the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the commence an administrative case while they are in office;
Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the otherwise, the disciplining body would no longer have any
Office of the Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy. jurisdiction over them. [JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., v.
[CHREA vs. CHR, G.R. No. 155336. November 25, 2004] COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 213716, 10 October 2017]

Local Government
Q. Can the COA institute an administrative complaint or Q. Is appeal available in administrative disciplinary cases?
proceedings against a civil service employee who had
already resigned? A: It depends on the penalty imposed:
ANSWER: YES. Appeal is available if the penalty is:
The audit proceedings before the COA is not an exercise of Demotion, Dismissal, or Suspension for more than 30 days or
the government's administrative supervision over petitioner fine equivalent to more than 30 day salary (P.D. 807, Sec.37
where he may be meted out with a penalty of suspension or par [a]).
dismissal from office, with an order of restitution a mere
accessory penalty.
What was being determined through the COA audit Appeal is not available if the penalty is:
proceedings was his civil liability and accountability over the Suspension for not more than 30 days
excess in the disbursement of public funds and the underpaid Fine not more than 30 day salary
taxes. The audit proceedings not being an administrative case Censure; Reprimand; or Admonition
against him, petitioner's resignation in 1998 does not serve to
bar the present case. [JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., v.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 213716, 10 October 2017] Note: In the second case, the decision becomes final and
executory by express provision of law.
Q. Will the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration or an Q. If a government official is convicted by a

appeal stay the execution of a decision of the regional trial court in a criminal case in relation
Ombudsman in an administrative case?
to his office, where should he file his appeal?
Answer: No. Pending MR or Appeals from
decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases
do not stay the execution of the penalty imposed. Answer: He should file his appeal with the
Sandiganbayan. Pursuant to RA 8249, the
This is pursuant to Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
Procedure of the Ombudsman which explicitly states that
appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
an appeal shall not stop the decision from being
executory.
resolutions or orders of RTC’s in criminal cases
involving government officials whether in the
No vested right is violated because pending appeal the
appellant is considered as preventively suspended and exercise of their own original jurisdiction or
will be paid backwages in case he wins in his appeal. appellate jurisdiction. (Filomena v. People, GR
(Facura, et al., v. CA, GR No. 166495, Feb. 16, 2011) No. 188630, Feb. 23, 2011)
• Q: Is registration a qualification to vote?

• A: No. The act of registration is an indispensable
precondition to the right of suffrage. For
registration is part and parcel of the right to vote
and an indispensable element in the election
process.
• Proceeding from the significance of registration as a
ELECTION LAW necessary requisite to the right to voter, the State
undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police
power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate
the act of voter's registration for the ultimate purpose
of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election.
• Registration is a regulation, not a qualification.
(Akbayan Youth vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147066,
26 March 2001)

Local Government
• Q: Is the “No Bio, No Boto” or Biometrics requirement

of the COMELEC Constitutional? PETITION FOR INCLUSION
• A: YES. This requirement is not a "qualification" to the
exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the Any person whose application for
registration procedure, of which the State has the right to registration has been disapproved by the
reasonably regulate. Board or whose name has been stricken
• It was institutionalized conformant to the limitations of the out from the list may file with the court a
1987 Constitution and is a mere complement to the existing petition to include his name in the
Voter's Registration Act of 1996.
permanent list of voters in his precinct at
• Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises
any time EXCEPT 105 days prior to a
to the level of a literacy, property or other substantive
requirement as contemplated by the Framers of the regular election or 75 days prior to a
Constitution — the same cannot be struck down as special election. The petition shall be
unconstitutional, as in this case. decided within 15 days after its filing. (Sec.
• (Kabataan Party-List v. Commission on Elections, G.R. 34, RA 8189)
No. 221318, December 16, 2015)
PETITION FOR EXCLUSION • Q: Who may file a petition in an inclusion or exclusion

proceedings?
Any registered voter, representative of a • A:
political party or the Election Officer, may – Inclusion
file with the court a sworn petition for the • Any private person whose application was disapproved by
exclusion of a voter from the the Election Registration Board or whose name was
permanent list of voters giving the name, stricken out from the list of voters
address and the precinct of the • COMELEC
challenged voter at any time EXCEPT
100 days prior to a regular election or – Exclusion
65 days prior to a special election. • Any registered voter in the city or municipality
The petition shall be decided within 10 • Representative of political party
days from its filing. (Sec. 35, RA 8189) • Election officer
• COMELEC (BP 881 Omnibus Election Code)
• Q: Do decisions in an inclusion or exclusion • Q: Can a voter be excluded for stating a fake

proceedings acquire the nature of res judicata?
address?
• A: No. The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of
• A: That Asistio allegedly indicated in his Certificate of
voters in the list of voters are summary in character.
Candidacy for Mayor, both for the 2007 and 2010 elections,
• Except for the right to remain in the list of voters or for being a non-existent or false address, or that he could not be
excluded therefrom for the particular election in relation to physically found in the address he indicated when he
which the proceedings had been held, a decision in an registered as a voter, should not operate to exclude him as
exclusion or inclusion proceeding, even if final and a voter of Caloocan City.
unappealable, does not acquire the nature of res judicata.
• These purported misrepresentations in Asistio’s COC might
• In this sense, it does not operate as a bar to any further serve as basis for an election offense under the Omnibus
action that a party may take concerning the subject passed Election Code (OEC), or an action to deny due course to
upon in the proceeding. Thus, a decision in an exclusion the COC. They do not serve as proof that Asistio has
proceeding would neither be conclusive on the voter’s abandoned his domicile in Caloocan City, or that he has
political status, nor bar subsequent proceedings on his right established residence outside of Caloocan City. (Asistio v.
to be registered as a voter in any other election. (Domino Aguirre, G.R. No. 191124, April 27, 2010)
vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999)

Local Government
• Q: What is the effect of transfer of • Q: AGE QUALIFICATION

residence? • Age requirement: (Sec. 39, LGC)
• 23 – gov; vice gov; mayor; vice mayor;
• A: Any person, who transfers residence councilor (highly urbanized cities);
solely by reason of his occupation, • 21 – mayor; vice mayor (component
profession or employment in private or cities / municipalities);
public service, education, etc., shall not • 18 – sanggunian brgy. members and
be deemed to have lost his original punong barangay
residence. (Asistio v. Aguirre, G.R.
No. 191124, April 27, 2010) • 15 to 30 – can vote in SK elections
• 18 to 24 – can run as SK official
• Q: When should the citizenship requirement be • Q: The Case of Sen. Grace Poe
possessed? • A: As stated in her Certificate of Live Birth, she was
• A: The citizenship requirement in the LGC is to be found abandoned in the Parish of Jaro in Iloilo City,
possessed by the elective official, at the latest, as Philippines on 3 September 1968 by a certain Mr.
Edgardo Militar.
of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the
term of office to which he has been elected. • On 13 May 1974, she was adopted by the spouses
Ronald Allan Kelly Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.) and
• The LGC does not specify any particular date or Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces).
time when the candidate must possess citizenship, • On 27 July 1991, she married Teodoro Misael Daniel
unlike the requirements for residence and age. V. Llamanzares. She then renounced Philippine
• Repatriation under PD 825 is valid and effective citizenship and became a naturalized American
and retroacts to the date of the application. following her husband’s nationality on 18 October
(Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120295, June 2001.
28, 1996) • On 24 May 2005, she returned to the Philippines.
• Q: The undisputed facts • Q: Is Sen. Grace Poe a natural born Filipino?

• A: On 10 July 2006, she applied for repatriation. • A: YES
• On 18 July 2006, the BI issued an Opinion that she is • First, there is a high probability that Grace Poe’s parents
“presumed to be a natural-born Filipino citizen”. are Filipinos. Her physical features are typical of Filipinos.
• On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III, • The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a
appointed her as Chairperson of the MTRCB. municipality where the population of the Philippines is
• on 20 October 2010, She executed an “Affidavit of overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America than 99% chance that a child born in such province is a
and Renunciation of American Citizenship.” Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her parents’
• On 9 December 2011, the U.S.A. Vice Consul issued to her nationality.
a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States. Said • That probability and the evidence on which it is based are
Certificate attests that under U.S.A. laws, she lost her admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules
U.S.A. citizenship effective 21 October 2010. on Evidence.
• On 12 July 2011, she surrendered her US passport and • To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the
executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality virtually impossible, as the norm. (Grace Poe v.
of the United States. COMELEC, GR 221697, GR 221698-700 March 8, 2016)

Local Government
• Q: Is Sen. Grace Poe a natural born Filipino? • Q: Is Sen. Grace Poe a natural born Filipino?
• A: YES • A: YES
• Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that • Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with
foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. natural-born citizenship is supported by treaties and the
• This is based on the finding that the deliberations of the general principles of international law.
1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers • The 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating
intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. to the Conflict of Nationality Laws (“1930 Hague
• While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to Convention”) states that:
foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would • Article 14: A child whose parents are both unknown
definitely exclude foundlings either. shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the
• Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with child's parentage is established, its nationality shall be
respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine the determined by the rules applicable in cases where the
intent of the framers. parentage is known. A foundling is, until the contrary is
• (Grace Poe v. COMELEC, GR 221697, GR 221698-700 proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of
March 8, 2016) the State in which it was found. (Grace Poe v.
COMELEC, GR 221697, GR 221698-700 March 8, 2016)
• Q: What is the effect if a former dual citizen resumes • Q: What is the effect if a former dual citizen
using his foreign passport? resumes using his foreign passport?
• A: This will effectively negate his Affidavit of
• A: He is deemed to have thereby effectively
Renunciation of foreign citizenship. He will be deemed
a foreign national. Citizenship is not a matter of repudiated his oath of renunciation.
convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with • Consequently, his continued exercise of his rights
attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to as a citizen of the USA through using his USA
its citizens. passport after the renunciation of his USA
• It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain citizenship reverted him to his earlier status as a
allegiance to one's flag and country. While those who
acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of
dual citizen.
suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public • Such reversion disqualified him from being elected
office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to to public office in the Philippines pursuant to
be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and
to no other. (Maquiling v. COMELEC, April 16, 2013) • (Agustin v. COMELEC, November 10, 2015) (J.
(Arnado v. COMELEC, August 18, 2015) Bersamin)
• Q: Distinguish the two kinds of dual citizens • QUESTION:

• A:
• “A” is a naturalized citizen of
• Dual citizens by virtue of birth (Born Dual), are not
required by law to take the oath of renunciation as another country who reacquires
the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy Filipino citizenship. On the other
already carries with it an implied renunciation of hand, “B” possesses dual
foreign citizenship.
citizenship by birth.
• Dual citizens by naturalization (Acquired Dual), on
the other hand, are required to take not only the • If they desire to run for elective
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the public office, what requirement must
Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign
they comply with as regards their
citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for
public office. (Maquiling v. COMELEC, G.R. No. citizenship?
195649. April 16, 2013)

Local Government
• Answer: • Answer:
• “A” must comply with the requirements set in • “B” need not comply with the twin requirements of
R.A 9225. Sec 5(3) of R.A. 9225 states that swearing an oath of allegiance and executing a
renunciation of foreign citizenship because he is a
naturalized citizens who reacquire Filipino
natural-born Filipino who did not subsequently
citizenship and desire to run for public office become a naturalized citizen of another country.
shall “…make a personal and sworn • It is sufficed, if upon the filing of his certificate of
renunciation of any and all foreign candidacy, he elects Philippine citizenship to
citizenship before any public officer terminate his status as person with dual citizenship
authorized to administer an oath” aside from considering that his condition in the unavoidable
the oath of allegiance prescribed in Section consequence of conflicting laws of different States.
3 of R.A. 9225. (Cordora v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176947,
February 19, 2009).
• Q: Distinguish between RETENTION and RE- • Q: Distinguish between RETENTION and RE-
ACQUISITION of Philippine Citizenship under RA 9225: ACQUISITION of Philippine Citizenship under RA 9225:
• A: The law makes a distinction between those natural- • A: The reacquisition will apply to those who lost their
born Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and Philippine citizenship by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63 or
after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. before the effectivity of RA 9225. -- the Filipinos who lost
• Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos their citizenship is deemed to have reacquired their
who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign Philippine citizenship upon the effectivity of the act. Hence
country before RA 9225 - who shall re-acquire their they are not deemed Natural Born but only naturalized.
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines. [Citizenship was lost] • The second aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship
• The second paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos applying to future instances. For these citizens, who lost
who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, their citizenship after the effectivity of RA 9225 -- they are
who shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the deemed NEVER to have LOST their Filipino citizenship.
same oath. [Citizenship was NEVER LOST]. Does, upon taking their oath they are deemed to have
• [David vs. Agbay, 753 SCRA 526 (2015)] retained their NATURAL BORN status.
• [David vs. Agbay, 753 SCRA 526 (2015)]
• Question: • ANSWER:
• X was a natural-born Filipino who went to the • X’s reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under
USA to work and subsequently became a R.A. No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on
naturalized American citizen. his residence/domicile.
• On 28 March 2007, he applied for • The length of his residence therein shall be
determined only from the time he renounced his
reacquisition of his Philippine Citizenship.
foreign citizenship and made the Municipality of
• He then filed a Certificate of Candidacy for General Macarthur, Eastern Samar as his domicile
Mayor of the Municipality of General of choice.
Macarthur, Eastern Samar for the May 2007 • His residence shall not retroact to the time of his
election. birth. It is the fact of residence that is the decisive
• When should his residence be reckoned? factor in determining whether or not an individual
Since birth or only at the time he renounced has satisfied the residency qualification requirement.
his foreign citizenship? (Japzon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180088, Jan.19, 2009)

Local Government
• QUESTION: • ANSWER:
• Dan Fernandez ran for congressman of the First • Yes. There is nothing in the Constitution or our election
District of Laguna. In his CoC, he indicated that his laws which require a congressional candidate to sell a
complete/exact address is in Sta. Rosa City, previously acquired home in one district and buy a new
Laguna. one in the place where he seeks to run in order to
qualify for a congressional seat in that other district.
• During past elections (when he was vice governor),
• Neither do we see the fact that Fernandez was only
he had declared Pagsanjan, Laguna as his address,
leasing a residence in Sta. Rosa at the time of his
and Pagsanjan was located in the Fourth District of
candidacy as a barrier for him to run in that district.
Laguna. Also, Dan Fernadez does not own a house
in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. He is merely leasing a • Certainly, the Constitution does not require a
congressional candidate to be a property owner in the
property in his alleged Sta. Rosa residence.
district where he seeks to run but only that he resides
• Is Dan Fernandez qualified to run for in that district for at least a year prior to Election Day.
Congressman in the district even if he does not • (Fernandez v. HRET, G.R. No. 187478, Dec. 29,
own a house thereat? 2009)
Q: What is the effect of filing a certificate of candidacy on Q: When can a person be considered a candidate?
the tenure of incumbent government officials?
A:
A:
“Any person who files his certificate of candidacy
Any person holding a public appointive office or
within the filing period shall only be considered a
position, including active members of the Armed
candidate at the start of the campaign period for
Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and
employees in government-owned or -controlled which he filed his certificate of candidacy."
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned Any person may thus file a certificate of candidacy on
from the office and must vacate the same at the start any day within the prescribed period for filing a
of the day of the filing of COC. certificate of candidacy yet that person shall be
Any person holding an elective office or position considered a candidate, for purposes of determining
shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of a one’s possible violations of election laws, only during
COC whether for the same or any other elective office or the campaign period. (Penera v. COMELEC, G.R.
position. (Section 10, Rule II, COMELEC Res. No. 9984, August 18, No. 181613, Nov. 25, 2009)
2015) (Quinto v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010)
Q: A Mayor ran for his 4th consecutive term but was later Q: Since the substitution is invalid, can the second
disqualified by final judgment before election day due to a placer be proclaimed winner?
petition for cancellation of COC under Sec 78 of the OEC.
Can he be substituted? A: No. Since the cancellation of the CoC came
A: No. He was absolutely precluded from asserting an after he was already proclaimed, his failure to
eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena City for the fourth qualify and assume the position created a permanent
consecutive term. Resultantly, his CoC was invalid and vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City.
ineffectual ab initio for containing the incurable defect
consisting in his false declaration of his eligibility to run. Such vacancy should be filled pursuant to the
Since his COC was cancelled, for all intents and purposes the law on succession defined in Section 44 of the
COMELEC’s declaration of his disqualification had the effect LGC.
of announcing that he was no candidate at all. Consequently, the Elected Vice Mayor must succeed
We stress that a non-candidate had no right to pass on to his and assume the position of Mayor due to a
substitute. (Talaga v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 196804 and permanent vacancy in the office.
197015, October 09, 2012)
(Talaga v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 196804 and
197015, October 09, 2012)

Local Government
Petition to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy Q: What are the requisites for the grant of a
petition to deny due course to or cancel a
A petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy may
certificate of candidacy?
be filed by any person exclusively on the ground
that any material representation contained in A:Material misrepresentation in the qualifications for
elective office, which includes age, residency,
certificate of candidacy as required by law is
citizenship, and any other legal qualifications
false.
necessary to run for an elective office;
The petition should be filed not later than 25 days Deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform or hide a
from the filing of the certificate of candidacy. fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible.
It should be decided not later than 15 days
before the election, after due notice and hearing. Note: These two requirements must concur to
(Section 78, OEC, Rule 23, Section 1, COMELEC warrant the cancellation of the certificate of
Resolution No. 9523, Sept 25, 2012) candidacy.
QUESTION: ANSWER: NO.

On October 25, 2012, Luis Villafuerte (LV) filed No. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that the
with the COMELEC a Verified Petition to deny false representation in the contents of the Certificate of
due course to or cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) must refer to material matters in order to
Candidacy (COC) of his grandson Miguel, Jr. on justify the cancellation of the COC.
the ground of intentional and material Material misrepresentation under the Omnibus Election
misrepresentation of a false and deceptive name Code refers to “qualifications for elective office”
or nickname that would mislead the voters. (residency, age, citizenship, or any other legal
LV alleged that Miguel deliberately omitted his qualifications necessary to run for local elective office as
first name “Miguel”, which was recorded in provided in the Local Government Code) coupled with a
his Birth Certificate, and instead used showing that there was an intent to deceive the electorate.
“MigzBaby” as nickname. The nickname written in the COC cannot be considered a
This is also the nick name of his father material fact, which pertains to his eligibility and thus
Miguel, Sr. who is the incumbent Governor of qualification to run for public office. (LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE
the province. v. COMELEC and MIGUEL VILLAFUERTE, G.R. No.
206698. February 25, 2014)
Should the COC of Miguel, Jr. be canceled?
Q: In proceedings for cancellation of COC under Sec. 78, Q: Was the COMELEC correct in cancelling the COC of Sen.
does the COMELEC have jurisdiction to determine the Grace Poe for President on account of her supposed
qualification of a candidate? ineligibility?
A: NO. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the A: NO. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground
powers and functions of the COMELEC, and deciding on the that she misrepresented facts as to her citizenship and
qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is not one among residency because such facts refer to grounds for ineligibility in
them.
which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide upon.
In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and
HRET tribunals have sole jurisdiction over the election Only when there is a prior authority finding that a candidate
contests, returns, and qualifications of their respective is suffering from a disqualification provided by law or the
members, whereas over the President and Vice President, only Constitution that the COMELEC may deny due course or
the SC en banc has sole jurisdiction. cancel her candidacy on ground of false representations
regarding her qualifications.
There is simply no authorized proceeding in determining
the ineligibility of candidates before elections. Such lack of In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is
provision cannot be supplied by a mere rule of the COMELEC. now pronounced qualified as a candidate for the
presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false representations in
(Grace Poe v. COMELEC, GR 221697, GR 221698-700 her COC regarding her citizenship and residency.(Grace Poe v.
March 8, 2016) COMELEC, GR 221697, GR 221698-700 March 8, 2016)

Local Government
Q: What will be the result if a petition to cancel COC was Q: Why should the losing candidate be proclaimed winner?
decided after the subject candidate was already proclaimed
winner? A: As held in Aratea v. COMELEC, [G.R. No. 195229, October
A: He will be unseated and the candidate who received the 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 105, 145] which is a case for cancellation of
second-highest number of votes will be proclaimed winner. CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, a
cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give
A CoC cancellation proceeding essentially partakes of the rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.
nature of a disqualification case. Since he has not yet been proclaimed, the cancellation on such
The cancellation of a CoC essentially renders the votes cast ground means he was never a candidate from the very
for the candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio.
cancelled as stray votes. Since the winning mayoralty candidate's certificate
of candidacy was void ab initio, he was never a
If the disqualification or CoC cancellation or denial case is not candidate at all and all his votes were considered
resolved before the election day, the proceedings shall continue stray votes.
even after the election and the proclamation of the winner.
Thus, the second placer should be proclaimed
Meanwhile, the candidate may be voted for and even be winner, since he is the only qualified candidate,
proclaimed as the winner, but the COMELEC's jurisdiction to who actually garnered the highest number of votes,
deny due course and cancel his or her CoC continues. for the position of Mayor.
[Hayudini v. COMELEC, April 22, 2014] [Hayudini v. COMELEC, April 22, 2014]
Petition to Declare a Nuisance Candidate Section 2. Who May File Petition to Declare a
Candidate as Nuisance Candidate. — The COMELEC
motu propio or any registered candidate for the same
Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: position may file a verified Petition to declare a candidate
as a nuisance candidate.
"Section 69. Nuisance candidates. -- The Commission may
motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested Section 3. Period to File the Petition. — The Petition
party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of shall be filed personally or through an authorized
representative, within five (5) days from the last day for
candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has been filed to the filing of certificates of candidacy. In case of a
put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to substitute candidate, the Petition must be filed within five
cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the (5) days from the time the substitute candidate filed his
names of the registered candidates or by other certificate of candidacy.
circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the
candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office Section 4. Motu Proprio Cases. — The Commission
for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus may, at any time before the election, motu proprio,
prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate subject to
an opportunity to be heard. (Rule 24, COMELEC
electorate."
Resolution No. 9523, Sept 25, 2012)
Q: If the name of a nuisance candidate whose Q: Why can we not just consider the votes cast
certificate of candidacy had been cancelled by the for such nuisance candidate be considered stray?
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) was still included
or printed in the official ballots on election day, should the
votes cast for such nuisance candidate be considered A: The possibility of confusion in names of
stray or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate? candidates if the names of nuisance candidates
A: The votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as
remained on the ballots on election day, cannot be
such in a final judgment, particularly where such nuisance discounted or eliminated, even under the automated
candidate has the same surname as that of the legitimate voting system especially considering that voters who
candidate, are not stray but must be counted in favor of the mistakenly shaded the oval beside the name of the
latter. nuisance candidate instead of the bona
The voters’ constructive knowledge of such cancelled fide candidate they intended to vote for could no
candidacy made their will more determinable, as it is then longer ask for replacement ballots to correct the
more logical to conclude that the votes cast for the nuisance same.
could have been intended only for the legitimate candidate.
(Dela Cruz v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192221,
(Martinez vs. HRET, G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010 ) November 13, 2012 )

Local Government
QUESTION: What is a petition for disqualification?

The COMELEC motu propio declared a candidate as
“nuisance” without any hearing. Is this valid?
It is the remedy against any candidate who does not possess
ANSWER: all the qualifications required by the Constitution or law, or
No. Under the OEC, to minimize the logistical confusion who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for
caused by nuisance candidates, the COMELEC may cancel disqualification.
their certificates of candidacy or deny them due course. Note: A petition for disqualification must be filed any day
This denial or cancellation may be “motu proprio or upon after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy
a verified petition of an interested party,” “subject to an BUT not later than the date of proclamation.
opportunity to be heard.” The petition is heard summarily.
Respondent in this case declared petitioner a nuisance However, the COMELEC cannot disqualify a candidate
candidate without giving him a chance to explain his bona without hearing and affording him opportunity to adduce
fide intention to run for office. This was a violation of his right evidence to support his side and taking into account such
to be heard. [JOSEPH B. TIMBOL vs. COMMISSION ON evidence
ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015]
What are the grounds for a petition for What are the grounds for a petition for
disqualification? disqualification?
OEC, SEC. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in OEC, SEC. 68. Disqualifications. —
an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final
decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Any person who is a permanent
Commission of having:
(a) given money or other material consideration to influence, resident of or an immigrant to a
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing foreign country shall not be qualified
electoral functions;
(b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;
to run for any elective office under this
(c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that Code, unless said person has waived his
allowed by this Code; status as a permanent resident or
(d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited immigrant of a foreign country in
under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or
(e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, accordance with the residence
paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be requirement provided for in the election
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has
been elected, from holding the office. laws.
What are the grounds for a petition for What are the grounds for a petition for disqualification?
disqualification? Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC) provides:
OEC, SEC. 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who The following persons are disqualified from running for any
has been declared by competent authority insane elective local position:
or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final (a) Those sentence by final judgment for an offense
judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by
one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years
or for any offense for which he has been after serving sentence;
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen (b) Those removed from office as a result of an
months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, administrative case;
shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold (c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath
any office, unless he has been given plenary of allegiance to the Republic;
pardon or granted amnesty. (d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall here or abroad;
be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent (f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who
authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail
or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
or sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes (g) The insane or feeble-minded.
disqualified.

Local Government
What are the grounds for a petition for Q: Is a person convicted of Libel by final
disqualification? judgment --- disqualified from running for public
Omnibus Election Code Sec. 12. Disqualifications. office?
— Any person who has been declared by competent A: YES. Having been convicted of the crime of libel,
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced Pichay is disqualified under Section 12 of the Omnibus
by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion Election Code for his conviction for a crime involving
or for any offense for which he was sentenced to a moral turpitude.
penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime A crime still involves moral turpitude even if the
involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be penalty of imprisonment imposed is reduced to a
a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. fine. Thus, Pichay made a false material
representation as to his eligibility when he filed his
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein certificate of candidacy.
provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or Since Pichay's ineligibility existed on the day he filed
incompetence had been removed or after the his certificate of candidacy and he was never a valid
expiration of a period of five years from his service candidate for the position of Member of the House of
of sentence, unless within the same period he again Representatives, the votes cast for him were
becomes disqualified. (Emphasis supplied) considered stray votes. [Ty-Delgado v. HRET, G.R.
No. 207851 July 8, 2014]
Q: What is the distinction between a petition under Section

78 and Section 68 of the OEC? (2015 Bar Exam) Moreno vs. COMELEC,
A: 498 SCRA 547
(1) a Section 78 petition is proper when a statement of a
material representation in a certificate of candidacy is false; and • The legal effect of probation is only to suspend
(2) a Section 68 petition is proper when disqualification is
sought on account of having committed electoral offenses the execution of the sentence.
and/or possession of status as a permanent resident in a • In fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal
foreign country.
(3) The pivotal consideration in a Section 78 petition is material case ipso facto attains finality when the accused
misrepresentation relating to qualifications for elective public applies for probation, although it is not
office. A Section 78 petition thus, squarely applies to instances executory pending resolution of the application
in which a candidate is fully aware of a matter of fact that
disqualifies him or her but conceals or otherwise falsely depicts for probation.
that fact as to make it appear that he or she is qualified.
• If the candidate for elective office was convicted
(4) A petition for disqualification, on the other hand, may apply
in cases where a disqualification exists but, because of an but was granted probation, he may run,
attendant ambiguity (such as an unsettled legal question), a because he did not serve his sentence.
candidate acts in good faith and without any deliberate attempt
to conceal or mislead. [Fermin v. COMELEC, 595 Phil. 449
(2008)]
What are the limits of campaign spending? QUESTION:

Salvador, who belonged to a local political party, was a
The aggregate amount that a candidate or party may spend mayoralty candidate in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija in 2010.
for election campaign shall be as follows:
Belena complained of Salvador’s overspending as punished
For candidates. - Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and under the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). Citing Salvador's
Vice-President; and for other candidates Three Pesos Statement of Election Contribution and Expenditure (SOCE),
Belena averred that Salvador spent a total of P449,000.00 in
(P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the
the 2010 election, when the maximum expenditure allowed by
constituency where he filed his certificate of candidacy: law is P275,667.00.
Provided, That a candidate without any political party
COMELEC En Banc held that since Salvador belonged to a
and without support from any political party may be
political party, he was only allowed to spend P3.00 per voter.
allowed to spend Five Pesos (P5.00) for every such
Salvador now argues that under R.A. 7166, he was allowed to
voter; and For political parties. - Five pesos (P5.00) for
spend P5.00 per voter (instead of P3.00 per voter) since he
every voter currently registered in the constituency or received no support from his party although he was a member
constituencies where it has official candidates. (Section thereof.
13, RA 7166) (Ejercito v. COMELEC, November 25,
Is Salvador guilty of overspending?
2014]

Local Government
ANSWER: YES.
QUESTION:
The law is clear — the candidate must both be In 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution 9615
without a political party and without support from providing rules that would implement Sec 9 of RA 9006 or the
any political party for the P5.00 cap to apply. Fair Elections Act.
In the absence of one, the exception does not One of the provisions of the Resolution provide that the
posting of any election propaganda or materials during the
apply. Thus, there is NO room for different
campaign period shall be prohibited in public utility vehicles
interpretation in terms of constructing the provision of (PUV) and within the premises of public transport terminals.
Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166, as amended. 1 UTAK, a party-list organization, questioned the prohibition
To allow Salvador’s contention is to deviate from the as it impedes the right to free speech of the private owners of
intention of the legislature in enacting the law, as the PUVs and transport terminals.
same would find all candidates on equal footing, Issue: W/N the COMELEC may impose the prohibition on
whether member of a political party or not. [MARIO PUVs and public transport terminals during the election
SALVADOR v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND pursuant to its regulatory powers delegated under Art IX-C,
ALEXANDER BELENA G.R. No. 230744,September 26, 2017] Sec 4 of the Constitution?
ANSWER: QUESTION:
No. The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or On February 21, 2013, the Diocese of Bacolod City posted
permit to operate and not the ownership per se of PUVs two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San
and transport terminals. Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
The posting of election campaign material on vehicles approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They were
used for public transport or on transport terminals is not posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view.
only a form of political expression, but also an act of
ownership – it has nothing to do with the franchise or The first tarpaulin contains the message "IBASURA RH Law"
permit to operate the PUV or transport terminal. referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic
It unduly infringes on the fundamental right of the people to Act No. 10354.
freedom of speech.
Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals such as The second tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience Vote"
the owners of PUVs and private transport terminals to express and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a
their preference, through the posting of election campaign check mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an "X" mark. The
material in their property, and convince others to agree with electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on
them. [1-United Transport Koalisyon v. Commission on the adoption of the RH Law.
Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015]
QUESTION: QUESTION:
Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by On February 22, 2013, the Election Officer of Bacolod City
petitioners as comprising "Team Patay," while those who issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials addressed to
voted against it form "Team Buhay". the Bishop of the Diocese of Bacolod City. The election officer
ordered the tarpaulin's removal within three (3) days from
receipt for being oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615
provides for the size requirement of tarpulins or campaign
posters of NOT MORE than two feet (2') by three feet (3').
The Diocese of Bacolod City replied that it is not a candidate

for the election, and that the tarpaulin/poster of Team Buhay
and Team Patay is not an election propaganda. It argued that
the poster/tarpaulin is an exercise of free speech and free
expression and forms part of its private property. Thus, it
cannot be regulated by the COMELEC. Decide.

Local Government
ANSWER: Can you enforce a warrantless arrest on those

The Diocese of Bacolod City is not a candidate. Neither does
caught in the act of violating election laws?
it belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the ANSWER: NO.
authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to
OEC, Art. 266: Arrest in connection with the election
freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this
case. campaign. No person shall be arrested and/or
The law and COMELEC Rules regulating the posting of detained at any time for any alleged election
campaign materials only apply to candidates and political offense committed during and in connection with any
parties, and the Diocese of Bacolod City is neither of the two. election through any act or language tending to
support or oppose any candidate, political party or
Regulation of speech in the context of electoral
campaigns made by persons who are not candidates or coalition of political parties under or pursuant to any
who do not speak as members of a political party is order of whatever name or nature and by
unconstitutional. whomsoever issued EXCEPT ONLY upon a warrant
Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. of arrest issued by a competent judge after all the
205728, January 21, 2015. requirements of the Constitution shall have been
strictly complied with.
Q: In an election protest, what should be used in Q: When the protestant dies during the pendency of
the recount – the actual ballots or the picture his/her election protest, may his/her spouse substitute in
his/her stead to avoid dismissal of the protest?
images of its scanned copies stored in cf cards?
A: Picture images of the ballots, as scanned and A: No right of substitution can inure in favor of a surviving
recorded by the PCOS, are likewise “official ballots” spouse, for the right to hold the disputed public office is a
that faithfully captures in electronic form the votes cast personal right which cannot be transmitted to the latter’s legal
heirs.
by the voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of R.A. No.
The rule on substitution as applied to election contest must only
9369.
be in favor of a person who is a real party in interest, e.g. the
As such, the printouts thereof are the functional party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and
equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters the party who is entitled to avail of the suit. A wife cannot
and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of substitute for her deceased husband’s protest, for she will not,
votes in an electoral protest. in any way, be directly or substantially affected by the possible
resolution of the protest. (Poe v. Macapagal-Arroyo, PET Case
(Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 199149, 002, Mar. 29, 2005)
201350, January 22, 2013)
Q: What is the prescriptive period of election offenses?

What are the two conditions that must concur before
the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to
declare a afailure of election? A: 5 years from the date of their commission. (Sec. 267, B.P.
881 Omnibus Election Code)
Held: Before the COMELEC can act on a verified
petition seeking to declare a failure of election two
conditions must concur, namely: (1) no voting took Q: Which court has jurisdiction to hear and decide
place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by election offenses?
law, or even if there was voting, the election resulted in
a failure to elect; and A:
(2) the votes not cast would have affected the result of GR: The RTC has the exclusive and original jurisdiction to
the election. Note that the cause of such failure of hear and decide any criminal action or proceedings for
election could only be any of the following: force violation of the OEC.
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes. Banaga, Jr. v. COMELEC (336 SCRA 701) XPN: The MTC has jurisdiction over offenses relating to failure
to register or failure to vote.

Local Government
• Q: What are the requisites or limitations

imposed on the creation or conversion of
municipal corporations?
• A:
• Plebiscite requirement – must be approved by
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for
LOCAL GOVERNMENT such purpose in the political unit or units directly
affected.
• Note: The plebiscite must be participated in by the

residents of the mother UNIT in order to conform to
the constitutional requirement.
• 2016 BAR QUESTION: • 2016 BAR QUESTION (ANSWER)

• A law converted the component city of Malumanay, Laguna • Governor Yuri is correct. The registered voters of the entire
into a highly urbanized city. The LGC provides that the province of Laguna should participate in the plebiscite.
conversion “shall take effect only after it is approved by the • In identifying the LGUs that should be allowed to take
majority of votes cast in a plebiscite to be held in the political part in the plebiscite, what should primarily be
units directly affected.” determined is whether or not the unit or units that desire
• Mayor Xenon of Malumanay City insists that only the to participate will be “directly affected” by the change.
registered voters of the city should vote in the plebiscite (Padilla v. Comelec, October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 735)
because the city is the only political unit directly affected by • In view of the changes in the economic and political rights
the conversion. (i.e., the right to be outside the general supervision of the
• Governor Yuri asserts that all the registered voters of the province and be under the direct supervision of the
entire province of Laguna should participate in the plebiscite, president; it shall no longer be subject to provincial oversight
because all the voters of the entire province will be affected. because the complex and varied problems in a highly
• He argues that the income, population and area of Laguna urbanized city due to a bigger population and greater
will reduced. Who, between Mayor Xenon and Governor economic activity require greater autonomy.
Yuri, is Correct? Explain your answer. (5%)
• 2016 BAR QUESTION (ANSWER) CREATION OR CONVERSION OF LGU’S

• The provincial government will also be divested of
jurisdiction over disciplinary cases concerning the elected • Income requirement – must be sufficient on
city officials of the new highly urbanized city; acceptable standards to provide for all essential
• the appeal process for administrative case decisions against government facilities and services and special
barangay official of the city will also be modified accordingly; functions commensurate with the size of its
• the registered voters of the city will no longer be entitled to population as expected of the local government unit
vote for and be voted upon as provincial officials) of the concerned.
province of Laguna and its residents, the entire province
certainly stands to be directly affected by the conversion of • Average annual income for the last two (2)
Malumanay city of Laguna into an urbanized city. consecutive years should be at least:
• Thus, all the qualified registered voters of Laguna should • Province – P 20M
then be allowed to participate in the plebiscite called for that • Highly Urbanized City – P 50M
purpose. (Umali v. Commission of Elections, G.R. No.
203974, April 22, 2014). • City – P 100M (as amended by RA 9009)
• Municipality – P 2.5M

Local Government
• Q: In determining the total INCOME of an LGU, for • Q: Section 6, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution mentions
purposes of conversion to a higher LGU, should the IRA national taxes as the source of the just share of the
be included? LGUs while Section 284 of the LGC states that the LGUs
• A: YES. share should be taken from national internal revenue
• The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the taxes instead. Is this constitutional?
gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. • A: NO.
• The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local • The exclusion of other national taxes like customs
treasury without need of any further action on the part of the duties from the base for determining the just share of
local government unit. They thus constitute income which the the LGUs contravened the express constitutional edict
local government can invariably rely upon as the source of in Section 6, Article X the 1987 Constitution.
much needed funds.
• Congress can validly exclude taxes that will constitute the
• Department of Finance Order No. 35-93 defined ANNUAL base amount for the computation of the IRA only if a
INCOME to be "revenues and receipts realized by provinces, Constitutional provision allows such exclusion.
cities and municipalities from regular sources of the Local
General Fund including the internal revenue allotment and • [Gov. Mandanas v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 199802,
other shares provided for in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the July 3, 2018]
Code. [Alvarez v. Guingona, 252 SCRA 695 (1996)].
• QUESTION: LEAGUE OF CITIES v. COMELEC

• At the end of the 11th Congress, several bills aiming to
• On November 18, 2008, the SC ruled the cityhood laws
convert certain municipalities into cities were pending.
unconstitutional. The Comelec filed the first motion for
The same were not entered into law. reconsideration, which was denied on March 31, 2009.
• The 12th Congress enacted R.A. No. 9009, amending the • On April 28, 2009, the SC en banc, by a split vote, denied a
Local Government Code (LGC) by increasing to P100 second motion for reconsideration. The decision then became
MILLION the income requirement for conversion of final and executory.
municipalities into cities. • However, on Dec. 21, 2009, the SC ruled on a 3rd MR and
• The municipalities filed, through their respective reversed its own final judgment. The 16 cities were allowed to hold
elections in 2010.
sponsors, individual cityhood bills containing a common
• Then again, on a 4th, MR the SC in a decision dated August 24,
proviso exempting them from the new income
2010, reversed its decision and ruled that the 16 cityhool laws
requirement. Congress and the President approved the were unconstitutional. The decision then became final and
same. executory (again).
• The League of Cities of the Philippines challenged the • Surprisingly, on a 5th MR, last April 12, 2011 the SC again
constitutionality of such laws for violating the equal reversed itself and upheld the constitutionality of the creation of
protection clause and the LGC. the 16 new cities.
• THE SUPREME COURT JUSTIFIED IT BY SAYING: CREATION OR CONVERSION OF LGU’S

• The 16 municipalities not only had conversion bills pending
during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the • Population requirement – to be determined as the total
requirements of the LGC prescribed prior to its amendment number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of the
by R.A. No. 9009. local government unit concerned. The required minimum
population shall be:
• Congress undeniably gave these cities a special
consideration by exempting them from the P100 Million
income requirement under RA 9009. The exemption clauses • Barangay – 2K
found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the express • But 5K in:
articulation of the intent of Congress to exempt these 16 – Metro Manila
municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.
– Highly urbanized cities
• Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its
• Municipality – 25K
imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent
and by duly recognizing the collective wisdom of Congress. • City – 150K
(League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) v. COMELEC, • Province – 250K
G.R. No. 176951, April 12, 2011)

Local Government
• Q: Congress enacted a law creating the legislative • Q: Congress enacted a law reapportioning the
district of Malolos based on a certification of the composition of the Province of Camarines Sur and created
demographic projection from NSO stating that by 2010, a new legislative district with only 180,000 population from
Malolos is expected to reach the population of 250,000, non-adjacent municipalities. Comelec argued that the
hence entitling it to one legislative district. Is the law 250,000 population standard requirement does not apply
valid? to provinces. Is COMELEC correct?
• A: No. Congress cannot establish a new legislative district • A: Yes. Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
based on a projected population of the National statistics requires 250,000 minimum population requirement apply only
Office (NSO) to meet the population requirement of the for a city to be entitled to a representative but not for a
province.
Constitution in the reapportionment of legislative districts.
• The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the
• A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to
entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the
a legislative district only in the “immediately following
entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a
election.” In short, a city must first attain the 250,000 province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing
population, and thereafter, in the immediately following mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population
election, such city shall have a district representative. minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly situated. (Aquino
(Aldaba v. Comelec, G.R. No. 188078, Jan. 25, 2010) and Robredo v. Comelec, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010)
• Q: Congress passed a law providing for the CREATION OR CONVERSION OF LGU’S

apportionment of a new legislative district in CDO
City. The COMELEC implemented said law but • Land requirement – must be contiguous, unless it
without any plebiscite. This was challenged as comprises two or more islands or is separated by a
unconstitutional. Is a plebiscite required in the local government unit; properly identified by metes
creation of a new district? and bounds; and sufficient to provide for such basic
• A: NO. The apportionment of a new district is NOT a services and facilities.
conversion and division of CDO City, falling under • Area requirements are:
Section 10 Art X of the Constitution. There is no need
• Municipality – 50 sq. km.
for a plebiscite. CDO City politically remains a single
unit and its administration is not divided along territorial • City – 100 sq. km.
lines. Its territory remains whole and intact. Thus, • Province – 2,000 sq.km.
Section 10 Art. X of the Constitution does not come into • The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
play. (Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
two (2) or more islands;
17690, Dec. 8 2008)
NAVARRO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY • Q: Can the Mayor order the demolition of a hotel for lack
of a business permit?
• Congress passed a law on December 3, 2006 proclaiming the • A: YES.
Dinagat Islands as a new province. It had an approximate land
area of 802.12 square kilometers. • In the exercise of police power and the general welfare
clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected
• This was challenged as unconstitutional because the law
to restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the objectives
requires at least 2,000 sq. km. more or less in land area for
of the government.
provinces.
• On 12 May 2010, the SC held that the law is void because • The LGC authorizes LGU’s, acting through their local chief
Section 461 of the LGC states that the only exemption granted executives, to issue demolition orders. Sec. 444 (b) (3) (vi)
to islands is on territorial contiguity and not on land area. of the LGC, which empowered the mayor to order the
closure and removal of illegally constructed establishments
• However, in a decision dated 20 May 2011, the SC reversed
itself and ruled that the creation of Dinagat Island Province is for failing to secure the necessary permits.
constitutional because a province, which is composed of • Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that
more than one island, is exempted from the land area may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful
requirement pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 9 of the IRR of businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare.
the LGC. (Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan, G.R. No.
211356, September 29, 2014)

Local Government
• Q: Can the Mayor order the demolition of • Q: Can the Mayor be compelled by writ of Mandamus
illegal structures without any court order? to issue a business permit?
• A: NO.
• A: YES.
• A mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a
• But this is true only for illegal structures business permit since the exercise of the same is a
built on government land. The LGC delegated police power hence, discretionary in nature.
authorizes local chief executives to issue • Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of
demolition orders. Sec. 444(b)(3)(vi) of the LGC 1991, grants the power of the mayor to issue license and
permits and correspondingly the power NOT to ISSUE or
empowers the mayor to order the closure and
to REVOKE one already granted.
removal of illegally constructed establishments
• Necessarily, the exercise thereof cannot be deemed
built on government property for failing to ministerial. As to the question of whether the power is
secure the necessary permits. validly exercised, the matter is not within the province of a
• CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO vs. MUNICIPALITY OF writ of mandamus. RIMANDO V. NAGUILAN EMISSION
MALAY, AKLAN, G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014, TESTING CENTER, G.R. NO. 198860. JULY 23, 2012
J. Velasco, Jr.
• Q: The City of Marikina enacted an ordinance that • Q: Do LGU’s have an inherent power to tax?
requires property owners to lower fences, re-build it • A: LGUs have no inherent power to tax except to the extent
with 6 meters setback and make it 80% see through. Is that such power might be delegated to them either by the
this ordinance valid? basic law or by the statute.
• A: NO. The State may not, under the guise of police power, • Under the 1987 Constitution, where there is neither a
permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their grant nor a prohibition by statute, the tax power must
property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic be deemed to exist although Congress may provide
appearance of the community. The SC ruled that the statutory limitations and guidelines.
ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it will • Every LGU is now empowered and authorized to create
substantially divest the property owner of the beneficial use its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and
of their property solely for aesthetic purposes. charges which shall accrue exclusively to the local
• The real intent of the setback requirement was to make the government unit as well as to apply its resources and assets
parking space free for use by the public, considering that it for productive, developmental, or welfare purposes, in the
would no longer be for the exclusive use of SSC. exercise or furtherance of their governmental or proprietary
• Section 9 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, provides that powers and functions.(Ferrer v. Bautista, G.R. No. 210551,
private property shall not be taken for public use without just June 30, 2015)
compensation. [Fernando v. SSC, March 12, 2013]
• Q: Do LGU’s have an inherent power to tax? • Q: Who determines the legality or propriety of a
• A: NO. local tax ordinance or revenue measure?
• For sure, fiscal decentralization does not signify the • A: It is the Secretary of Justice who shall determine
absolute freedom of the LGUs to create their own questions on the legality and constitutionality of
sources of revenue and to spend their revenues
ordinances or revenue measures.
unrestrictedly or upon their individual whims and caprices.
• Congress has subjected the LGUs’ power to tax to the • The appeal must be filed within thirty (30) days
guidelines set in Section 130 of the LGC and to the from the effectivity of the tax ordinance.
limitations stated in Section 133 of the LGC. • The Secretary of Justice has sixty (60) days from the
• The concept of local fiscal autonomy does not exclude date of receipt of the appeal to issue a ruling;
any manner of intervention by the National Government in otherwise, the aggrieved party may file appropriate
the form of supervision if only to ensure that the local proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction
programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with the (RTC).
national goals. • The appeal shall not have the effect of
• [Gov. Mandanas v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 199802, suspending the effectivity of the ordinance. (Sec.
July 3, 2018]
187 R.A. 7160)

Local Government
• Q: What is the effect if the tax May LGU’s hire private counsel?
ordinance was not published in full In the case of Ramos vs. CA (108 SCRA 728), the
(only excerpts / summary)? Supreme Court declared that a private lawyer cannot
represent a local government unit even if the services
rendered was gratis.
• A: The requirement of publication in full
Moreover, in the case of Edgar Mancenido, et. al., vs.
for 3 consecutive days is mandatory for Court of Appeals (330 SCRA 419), the Supreme Court
stated that an LGU may only hire a private attorney
a tax ordinance to be valid. when the provincial fiscal is disqualified.
• The tax ordinance will be null and However, the LGU may hire a private lawyer as a legal
officer under a consultancy agreement, duly
void if it fails to comply with such approved by the local sanggunian. Such
publication requirement. (Coca-Cola v. sanggunian resolution will clothe him with the
authority to act as the legal officer of the LGU.
City of Manila, G.R. No. 161893 June (DILG Opinion No. 26 s. 2004 dated 03 February 2004)
27, 2006)
• Q: Can the Annual Budget be used as continuing

authority for the LCE to enter into contracts without
Latasa v. Comelec,
GR 154829, 12.10.2003
prior authorization from the Sanggunian?
• A: NO. A mayor of a municipality converted into
• Sec. 22 of the LGC states: “Unless otherwise provided in a city during the 3rd term of the mayor
this Code, no contract may be entered into by the local
chief executive in behalf of the local government unit cannot seek office as city mayor in the
without prior authorization by the sanggunian 1st elections of city officials.
concerned.”
• Should the appropriation ordinance, however, already
contain in sufficient detail the project and cost of a capital Because the area and inhabitants of the
outlay such that all that the local chief executive needs to do locality are the same and the municipal
after undergoing the requisite public bidding is to execute
the contract, no further authorization is required, the mayor continued to hold office until such
appropriation ordinance already being sufficient. time as city elections are held.
• Quisumbing vs. Gov. Garcia, G.R. No. 175527. Dec. 8, 2008.
Socrates v. Comelec, Lonzanida v. Comelec,

GR 154512, 11.12.2002 GR 135150, 07.28.99
The 3-term limit for local elected officials is Lonzanida vacated his post a few months before
the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary
not violated when a local official wins in a renunciation but by the COMELEC’s writ of
recall election for mayor after serving three execution.
full terms as mayor since the recall Such involuntary severance from office is an
election is not considered an immediate interruption of continuity of service and thus, the
re-election. petitioner did not fully serve the mayoral term.
A local government official must have been elected
Term limits should be construed strictly to to the office/position and must have served the
give the fullest possible effect to the right full term in order to be considered as a term in
of the electorate to choose their leaders. applying the 3-term limit rule.

Local Government
Montebon v. COMELEC
Borja, Jr. v. Comelec
295 SCRA 157 April 9, 2008; 551 SCRA 50
The highest-ranking municipal councilor succeeded
Borja assumed the post of Mayor by to the position of vice-mayor by operation of
succession, will that term be considered law. Will his assumption as vice-mayor be
in the application of the three-term rule? considered an interruption of his term as
councilor under the 3-term limit rule?
No. It is not enough that an individual has Yes. An interruption had intervened so that he could
served 3 consecutive terms in an again run as councilor.
elective local office, he/she must also He vacated the office of councilor and assumed the
have been elected to the same position higher post of vice-mayor by operation of law.
for the same number of times before the Thus, for a time he ceased to be councilor – an
interruption that effectively placed him
disqualification can apply. outside the ambit of the three-term limit rule.
Ong v. Alegre DIZON v. COMELEC, 2009

295 SCRA 157
• X occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the
The final judgment in the electoral contest came
following periods: 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998, 1
after the term of the contested office had
July 1998 to 30 June 2001, 1 July 2001 to 30 June
expired so that the elective official was never 2004, and 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007.
effectively unseated. Will the 3-term limit rule
• However, the SC ruled in a previous case that X was
apply?
not the duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007 term.
Yes. (1) the final decision that the third-termer lost • Eventually, X also won the elections and assumed
the election was without practical and legal use the mayoralty position for the 2007-2010 term.
and value, having been promulgated after the
• Y filed a petition to disqualify X as mayor on the
term of the contested office had expired; and
ground that X’s assumption of the mayoralty position
(2) the official assumed and continuously exercised on 1 July 2007 makes the 2007-2010 term his fifth
the functions of the office from the start to the term in office, which violates the three-term limit rule.
end of the term. Is Y correct?
Answer Answer
• No. For purposes of determining the resulting • X cannot be deemed to have served the full term of
disqualification brought about by the three-term 2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate his
limit, it is not enough that an individual has post before the expiration of the term.
served three consecutive terms in an elective • X’s occupancy of the position of mayor of Mabalacat
local office, he must also have been elected to from 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007 cannot be counted
the same position for the same number of times. as a term for purposes of computing the three-term
limit.
• There should be a concurrence of two conditions
for the application of the disqualification: (1) that • Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June
2007 served as a gap for purposes of the three-term
the official concerned has been elected for three
limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June
consecutive terms in the same local government 2010 term is effectively X’s first term for purposes of
post and (2) that he has fully served three the three-term limit rule. (Dizon v. COMELEC GR
consecutive terms. 182088 Jan.30, 2009)

Local Government
BOLOS v. COMELEC, 2009 • Is the preventive suspension of an elected

public official an interruption of his term of
• How about if a Punong Barangay, during his third term, runs office for purposes of the three-term limit
for and gets to sit in the Sangguniang Bayan, and serves out rule?
such term, is he entitled to run again during the next election • No. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a
for Punong Barangay? term interruption because the suspended official
• The SC ruled that in this case there was voluntary continues to stay in office although he is barred
renunciation. Bolos was serving his third term as Punong from exercising the functions and prerogatives of
Barangay when he ran for Sangguniang Bayan member and, the office within the suspension period.
upon winning, assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan • The best indicator of the suspended official’s
member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his office as Punong continuity in office is the absence of a
Barangay. Accordingly, he cannot run. permanent replacement and the lack of the
authority to appoint one since no vacancy
• Voluntary Renunciation does not interrupt the running of the
exists. (Aldovino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 184836, 23
3-term limit rule. December 2009)
• Bolos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 581
SCRA 786 (2009)
Aldovino v. COMELEC Aldovino v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 184836, 23 December 2009
G.R. No. 184836, 23 December 2009
Term limitation is triggered after an elective A serious extended illness, inability through force
official has served his three terms in office majeure, or the enforcement of a suspension
without any break. as a penalty, may prevent an office holder from
Preventive suspension, by its nature, is a exercising the functions of his office for a time
temporary incapacity to render service without forfeiting title to office.
during an unbroken term; in the context Preventive suspension is no different because it
disrupts actual delivery of service for a time
of term limitation, interruption of service
within a term.
occurs after there has been a break in the
All these instances will not interrupt the term for
term. purposes of applying the 3-term limit rule.
• 2016 Bar Exam Question • ANSWER:

• Rule and explain briefly the reason if the official is • (a) The three term limit rule is inapplicable to the Vice-Mayor
prohibited to run for another term in each of the following because the interruption in his term when he assumed the
situations: position of Mayor would be involuntary, (Montebon v.
• (a) if the official is a Vice-Mayor who assumed the position Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180444, April 8, 2004,
of Mayor for the unexpired term under the Local 551 SCRA 50)
Government who assumed the position of Mayor for the
unexpired term under the Local Government Code, • (b) The three termer limit rule is likewise inapplicable to the
• (b) if the officials has served for three consecutive terms official who has served for three consecutive terms and did
and did not seek a 4th term but who won in a recall election; not seek a 4th term but won in a recall election because there
• (c) if the position of Mayor of a town is abolished due to would have been an involuntary interruption in his terms after
his third term (Socrates v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
conversion of the town to a city;
No. 154512, November 12, 2002, 391 SCRA 457), and a
• (d) if the official is preventively suspended during his term recall term is not a full term (Mendoza v. COMELEC, G.R.
but was exonerated; and if the official proclaimed as winner No. 149736, December 17, 2002).
and assumes office but loses in an election protest. (5%)

Local Government
• ANSWER: • ANSWER:
• (c) The three termer limit rule would be applicable • (e) The three term limit rule is finally
against the Mayor of a town which is abolished due to
inapplicable to the official who is proclaimed
the conversion of the town to a city because the
abolition of an elective office due to the conversion of a as winner and assumes office but loses in an
municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt election contest because his term is
the incumbent official’s continuity of service (Latasa v. interrupted when he loses said election
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 154829, December protest and is ousted from office, thus
10, 2003, 417 SCRA 601)
disenabling him from serving what would
• (d) The three term limit rule is also inapplicable to the otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term
official who has been placed under preventive
had the protest been dismissed. (Lonzanida
suspension during his term because a preventive
suspension is not an interruption. (Aldovino v. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009, 603 135150, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 602).
SCRA 234).

2018 Bar Reviewer in Admin Public Officers Election Local Govt

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2018 Bar Reviewer in Administrative Law,

Law on Public Officers, Election Law, &

2018 BAR REVIEWER IN

By: Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr.

• Is the Boy Scouts of the Philippines a Quasi-Public IS MIAA A GOCC OR INSTRUMENTALITY?

Copyright@ Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 1

When the DOJ reviews the finding of probable cause of

Copyright@ Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 2

Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Copyright@ Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 3

INCOMPATIBLE OFFICE INCOMPATIBLE OFFICE

FORBIDDEN OFFICE 2. Forbidden Office - “Neither shall he be

Copyright@ Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 4

Is the PNRC (Red Cross) a GOCC, therefore its employees

• Q: Can the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently

Copyright@ Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 5

• This may be imposed by the mayor / • An elected official preventively

Copyright@ Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 6

Penalty of Suspension (LGC) Q: Under Civil Service Law, what is NEPOTISM?

Copyright@ Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 7

• QUESTION: • ANSWER: NO.

Copyright@ Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 8

Copyright@ Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 9

Q. Will the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration or an Q. If a government official is convicted by a

• Q: Is registration a qualification to vote?

Copyright@ Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 10

• Q: Is the “No Bio, No Boto” or Biometrics requirement

PETITION FOR EXCLUSION • Q: Who may file a petition in an inclusion or exclusion

• Q: Do decisions in an inclusion or exclusion • Q: Can a voter be excluded for stating a fake

Copyright@ Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 11

• Q: What is the effect of transfer of • Q: AGE QUALIFICATION

• Q: The undisputed facts • Q: Is Sen. Grace Poe a natural born Filipino?

Copyright@ Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 12

• Q: Distinguish the two kinds of dual citizens • QUESTION:

Copyright@ Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 13

Copyright@ Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 14

Copyright@ Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 15

QUESTION: ANSWER: NO.

Copyright@ Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 16

Copyright@ Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 17

QUESTION: What is a petition for disqualification?

Copyright@ Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 18

Q: What is the distinction between a petition under Section

What are the limits of campaign spending? QUESTION:

Copyright@ Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 19

The Diocese of Bacolod City replied that it is not a candidate

Copyright@ Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 20

ANSWER: Can you enforce a warrantless arrest on those

Q: What is the prescriptive period of election offenses?

Copyright@ Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 21

• Q: What are the requisites or limitations

• Note: The plebiscite must be participated in by the

• 2016 BAR QUESTION: • 2016 BAR QUESTION (ANSWER)

• 2016 BAR QUESTION (ANSWER) CREATION OR CONVERSION OF LGU’S

Copyright@ Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 22

• QUESTION: LEAGUE OF CITIES v. COMELEC

• THE SUPREME COURT JUSTIFIED IT BY SAYING: CREATION OR CONVERSION OF LGU’S

Copyright@ Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 23

• Q: Congress passed a law providing for the CREATION OR CONVERSION OF LGU’S

Copyright@ Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 24

Copyright@ Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 25

• Q: Can the Annual Budget be used as continuing

Socrates v. Comelec, Lonzanida v. Comelec,