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I.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

GARCHITORENA vs. CRESCINI


G.R. No. L-14514, December 18, 1918
FACTS:
Andres Garchitorena – filed a protest against the proclamation of Manuel Crescini
as the Elected Provincial Governor of Ambos Camarines.
He alleged that many frauds and irregularities had been committed in various
municipalities of said province, and that he had, in fact, received a majority of all
legal votes cast.
Evidence shows an unmistakable intention and design on the part not only of the
election inspectors but of many of the voters, to defeat, by the methods adopted, the
true expression of opinion, through the ballot, of the people of said municipalities.
HELD:
a) The presumption is that an election is honestly conducted, and the burden of proof
to show it otherwise is on the party assailing the return. But when the return is clearly
shown to be willfully, and corruptly false, the whole of it becomes worthless as
proof.
b) In democracies the people, combined, represent the sovereign power of the State.
Their sovereign authority is exercise through the ballot, of the qualified voters, in
duly appointed elections held from time to time, by means of which they choose
their officials for definite and fixed periods, and to whom they entrust, for the time
being, as their representatives, the exercise of the powers of government.

MAQUERA vs. BORRA


G.R. No. L-24761, September 7, 1965
FACTS:
Leon Maquera, Felipe Aurea, and Melencio Malabanan – questions the
constitutionality of RA 4421 which requires all candidates to post a surety bond
equivalent to the one-year salary of the position to which he is a candidate; that for
such filing, they have to pay the premium and offer properties by way of counter-
bond.
Petitioners alleged that RA 4421 had the effect of imposing property qualifications
in order for a person to run for public office, as it disqualifies for provincial, city or
municipal elective offices, persons who, although possessing the qualifications
prescribed by law therefor, cannot pay said premium and/or do not have the property
essential for said counter-bond.
HELD:
a) RA 4421 is unconstitutional and hence, null and void. The nature of the
Republican system implies that the right to vote and to be voted for shall not be
dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned, whereas social justice
presupposes equal opportunity for all, and that, accordingly, no person shall, by
reason of poverty, be denied the chance to be elected to public office.
b) The surety bond is arbitrary and oppressive. The bond required in Republic Act
No. 4421 and the confiscation of said bond are not predicated upon the necessity of
defraying certain expenses or of compensating services given in connection with
elections, and is, therefore, arbitrary and oppressive.
Republic Act No. 4421 requires "all candidates for national, provincial, city and
municipal offices" to "post a surety bond equivalent to the one-year salary or
emoluments of the position to which he is a candidate, which bond shall be forfeited
in favor of the national, provincial, city or municipal government concerned if the
candidate, except when declared winner, fails to obtain at least 10% of the votes cast
for the office to which he has filed his certificate of candidacy, there being not more
than four (4) candidates for the same office;"
Republic Act No. 4421 requires "all candidates for national, provincial, city and
municipal offices" to "post a surety bond equivalent to the one-year salary or
emoluments of the position to which he is a candidate, which bond shall be forfeited
in favor of the national, provincial, city or municipal government concerned if the
candidate, except when declared winner, fails to obtain at least 10% of the votes cast
for the office to which he has filed his certificate of candidacy, there being not more
than four (4) candidates for the same office;"
Every candidate has to:
- pay the premium charged by bonding companies, and,
- to offer thereto, either his own properties, worth, at least, the amount of the surety
bond, or properties, of the same worth, belonging to other persons willing to
accommodate him, by way of counter-bond in favor of said bonding companies
The property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and essence of the
Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the principle of social justice
underlying the same, for said political system is premised upon the tenet that
sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them,
and this, in turn, implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be voted for shall
not be dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned, whereas social justice
presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and that, accordingly, no
person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied the chance to be elected to public office;
and The bond required in Republic Act No. 4421 and the confiscation of said bond
are not predicated upon the necessity of defraying certain expenses or of
compensating services given in connection with elections, and is, therefore, arbitrary
and oppressive.

II. REGISTRATION OF VOTERS


3. YRA vs. ABANO
FACTS:
Maximo Abano – a native of Meycauyan, Bulacan. He registered as a voter in Manila
while he was a student there. When he became a lawyer, he returned to Bulacan and
before 1928 elections, he applied for the cancellation of registration in Manila but it
was rejected. He ran for municipal president of Meycauyan in 1928 elections and
subsequently won.
Marcos Yra – he was the vice president elect of Meycauyan. He filed a quo warranto
proceeding before CFI-Bulacan against Abano on the ground that the latter is
ineligible since he was not a qualified voter in the Municipality. Therefore, not
qualified elector there.
Court of First Instance ruled in favor of Abano and declared the complaint without
merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abano is qualified elector in the municipality.
HELD:
The act of registering is only one step towards voting, and it is not one of the
elements that makes the citizen a qualified voter. One may be a qualified voter
without exercising the right to vote.
Registering does not confer the right. It is a condition precedent to the exercise of
the right.
The people of Meycauyan have spoken and their choice to be the local chief
executive is respondent Albano and therefore it must be respected.

4. MACALINTAL vs COMELEC
FACTS:
Romulo Macalintal – as a taxpayer and a lawyer, questions the validity of the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 on the ground that:
a. the provisions that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can
be allowed to participate in the absentee voting provided he executes and affidavit
stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the
requirement of residency under Sec. 1, Art. V of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
a. Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 was enacted in respect to the
instruction of the 1987 Constitution that Congress shall provide a system for
voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. Such Section does not provide for any
parameters to the exercise of the legislative department in enacting laws.
Therefore, in the absence of restrictions, the Congress in exercising its
functions is presumed to have acted within its powers as defined in the 1987
Constitution.
b. On the execution of affidavits, the same is not the enabling or enfranchising
act, the affidavit required by Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of
the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume his residency in
the Philippines, but more importantly, it serves as an explicit expression that
he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Hence, it cannot be said
that such execution of affidavit transgresses the residency requirement of the
1987 Constitution, but it is only a confirmatory act of not abandoning his
mother country.

5. NICOLAS-LEWIS vs COMELEC
FACTS:
Loida Nicolas-Lewis, et al. – pray that “dual-citizens” who retained or reacquired
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention
and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), be allowed to avail themselves of the mechanism
provided under R.A. 9189 (Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) and that they be
allowed to vote and register as absentee voters under the aegis of R.A. 9189.
COMELEC - those who have availed of the law (R.A. 9189) cannot exercise the
right of suffrage given under the OAVL for the reason that the OAVL was not
enacted for them. Hence, they are considered regular voters who have to meet the
requirements of residency, among others under Section 1, Article 5 of the
Constitution.
HELD:
a) There is no provision in the RA 9225 requiring duals to actually establish
residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise
their right to vote.
b) R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that duals are most likely non-
residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that
granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
c) Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in another country may be
allowed to vote even though they do not fulfill the residency requirement
of said Sec 1 Art V of the Constitution.
d) "duals" may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee
voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters.

6. APORTADERA vs SOTTO
FACTS:
Abelardo Aportadera asserts that Manuel Sotto is disqualified to vote, and to run for
Vice-Governor of Davao since:
1) Sotto is not a duly registered voter of Davao, because, before being registered
as such, he had failed to apply for the cancellation of his registration as a voter
in the City of Manila
2) Sotto allegedly committed felony when he subscribed to a voter's affidavit
stating that he was "not at present actually registered in any other precinct" in
registering himself as a voter in Davao
Court of First Instance of Davao dismissed the petition since it does not state a cause
of action
ISSUE: Whether or not Sotto is a "qualified voter" of Davao province
HELD:
a) Article V of the Constitution holds that registration is not essential for the
possession of the right of suffrage. Even if Sotto had not been registered in
Davao, it could not decisively affect the question whether or not he is a
"qualified voter," if he meets the conditions prescribed in Article V of the
Constitution, and, he possess the age and residence requirement in Section
2071 of the Revised Administrative Code.
b) In addition, the disqualifications to vote provided in Section 99 of the Revised
Election Code, specifically, subdivisions (a) and (b), are inapplicable to this
case since no final judgment has been rendered against Sotto for the offense
he had allegedly committed.

7. VELASCO vs COMELEC
FACTS:
Nardo Velasco – was born in Sasmuan Pampanga in 1952. He moved to the USA in
1983 where he became a citizen. He applied for a dual citizenship which was
approved on July 31, 2006. On September 14, 2006, he returned to the Philippines
and has not left since. On October 13, 2004, he applied for registration but was
denied by the Election Registration Board. He then filed a petition for Inclusion with
MTC-Sasmuan, which granted Velasco’s petition.
RTC-Guagua – reversed the decision of MTC contending that he lost his domicile
when he became a citizen of the
USA. According to the RTC, Velasco only registered or reacquired his Philippine
residency on July 31, 2006 when he reacquired his Filipino citizenship. Velasco
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for review.
Velasco – filed his COC for Mayor of Sasmuan, stating that he is a registered voter
of Precinct No. 103-A of Sasmuan.
Mozart Panlaqui – who also filed his COC for Mayor of Sasmuan filed a Petition to
Deny Due Course and/or To Cancel Velasco’s COC claiming that, (1) he is not a
registered voter; (2) RTC has denied Velasco’s petition for inclusion as a voter; (3)
Velasco does not possess the requirement of residency; (4) Velasco is not eligible to
run for office since he is not a qualified voter.
HELD:
- Velasco did not only falsely claim that he is a registered voter but he also made a
material representation under oath of his qualifications in his COC. For these
violations, he may suffer the nullification of his election victory.
- He may also be held accountable in a criminal court for making false statements
under oath.

8. ASISTIO vs AGUIRRE
FACTS:
Luis Asistio – was the subject of a Petition for Exclusion of Voter from the List of
Voters of Caloocan City before MeTC – Caloocan City on the ground that Asistio is
not a resident of Caloocan City, specifically not of 123 Interior P.. Zamora St.
Barangay 15, Caloocan City, the address stated on the Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) for Mayor in the 2010 Elections.
Enrico Echiverri – claims that when he was about to furnish Asistio a copy of the
Answer to a Petition to Deny Due Course and/or Cancellation of the Certicate of
Candidacy filed by Asistio against him, he found out that Asistio’s address is non-
existent.
METC, Branch 52, Caloocan Judge Malabaguio – rendered a decision directing the
Election Registration Board, Caloocan City to remove the name of LUIS A.
ASISTIO from the list of permanent voters of Caloocan City.
RTC, Branch 192, Caloocan Judge Aguirre – dismissed appeal of Asistio on the
ground of non-payment of docket fees essential for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction
over the appeal.
HELD:
- Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth or for more than
72 years. His family is known to be among the permanent political families in
Caloocan City. In fact, Asistio served in public office as Caloocan City Second
District representative in the House of Representatives, having been elected as such
in the 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2004 elections. In 2007, he also sought election as City
Mayor.
- In all of these occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the same city. It cannot be denied
that Asistio has qualified, and continues to qualify, as a voter of Caloocan City.
There is no showing that he has established his domicile elsewhere or that he had
consciously and voluntarily abandoned his residence in Caloocan City. He should,
therefore, remain on the list of permanent registered voters of Precinct No. 1811A,
Barangay 15, Caloocan City.
9. UTUTALUM vs COMELEC
FACTS:
Nurhussein Ututalum (congressional candidate in 1987 elections for 2nd District of
Sulu) – objected to the election returns from Siasi which showed the following
results: N. Ututalum = 482 votes; Arden Anni = 35,581 votes out of the 39,801
registered voters. If the returns of Siasi were excluded, Ututalum would have a lead
of 5,301 votes.
Ututalum – filed written objections to the said returns on the ground that they
“appear to be tampered with or falsified” owing to the
“great excess of votes”
Provincial Board of Canvassers – dismissed his objection for being “filed out of
time” and because the grounds for the objections were not one of those enumerated
in Sec. 243 of the Election Code.” Anni was thereafter proclaimed by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers as the winner.
Ututalum – filed petition for declaration of failure of election and thereafter, petition
to annul Anni’s proclamation. While those two petitions were pending:
Lupay Loong – candidate for Governor of Sulu, filed Petition with Comelec to annul
the List of Voters of Siasi, for purposes of the election of local government officials,
which was opposed by Anni. Ututalum was not a party to this proceeding.
Comelec – issued on Jan. 16, 1988 Resolution annulling the Siasi List of Voters “on
the ground of massive irregularities committed in the preparation thereof and being
statistically improbable” and ordering a new registration of voters for the local
elections of 15 February 1988.
Ututalum – filed a supplemental pleading with Comelec entreating that such
annulment be considered and applied by the Commission in releasing his Petitions
against Anni.
HELD:
“The subsequent annulment of voting list can not retroactively and without due
process result in nullifying accepted election returns in a previous election simply
because such returns come from municipalities where the precinct books of voters
were ordered annulled due to irregularities in their preparation.”
The annulment of the list of voters shall not constitute a ground for pre-proclamation
contest.

10. FRIVALDO vs COMELEC


FACTS: Juan Frivaldo – a candidate who was a former naturalized citizen of the
United States of America and who obtained the highest number of votes (73,440)
for the office of governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections and contended
that he was a citizen of the Philippines since he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen
of the Philippines after his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed in
Sept. 1994 with the Special Committee on Naturalization had been granted
Raul Lee – another candidate, who obtained the second highest number of votes
(53,304), filed a petition with the Comelec and prayed that Frivaldo be disqualified
from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a
citizen of the Philippines
Comelec – Resolution on May 1, 1995 granted Lee’s petition and declared Frivaldo
to be disqualified to run for the Office of Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that
he was not a citizen of the Philippines.
Resolution on Dec. 19, 1995 promulgated that Lee, not having garnered the highest
number of votes, was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly elected governor
and that Frivaldo having garnered the highest number of votes and having reacquired
his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 is qualified to hold the
Office of Governor of Sorsogon.
HELD:
• The repatriation of Frivaldo retroacted to the date of the filing of his
application on August 17, 1994. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive
effect, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldo --- having
already renounced his American citizenship --- may be prejudiced for causes
outside his control.
• The citizenship requirement in Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code is to be
possessed by an elective official as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start
of the term of office. Thus, Frivaldo possessed the vital requirement of
Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor and should
have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of
citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of
Sorsogon is deemed have been validated as well.
• Qualifications prescribed by law are continuing requirements and must be
possessed for the duration of the officer’s active tenure. Once any of the
required qualifications is lost, his title to the office may be seasonably
challenged.

11. ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs COMELEC


Imelda Romualdez-Marcos – filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte on March 8, 1995 and stated that her
“residence in the constituency where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the
election was seven months”.
On March 31, 1995 she filed her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with
the Comelec and contended that the entry of the word “seven” in her original COC
was the result of an honest misinterpretation which she sought to rectify by adding
the words “since childhood” in her Amended/Corrected COC and that she always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence
Cirilo Montejo – the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a
candidate for the same position, on March 25, 1995 filed a petition for cancellation
and disqualification and argued that Romualdez-Marcos did not meet the
constitutional one-year residency requirement.
Comelec – on April 24, 1995, found Montejo’s petition meritorious and cancelled
Romualdez-Marcos’ Certificate of Candidacy and argued that when she returned to
the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan,
Metro Manila and that her animus revertendi was pointed to Metro Manila, and not
Tacloban. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have
abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other different places.
HELD:
• Residence, in its ordinary conception, is the physical presence of a person in
a given area, community, or country. Domicile is the place where a person
intends to remain. When the Constitution speaks of residence in election law,
it actually means only domicile.
• The honest mistake in the certificate of candidacy regarding the period of
residency does not negate the fact of residence in a congressional district if
such fact is established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a
piece of paper.
• Romualdez-Marcos’ choice of domicile was expressed in her letters to the
PCGG when she sought permission to rehabilitate her ancestral house in
Tacloban and when she obtained her residence certificate in Tacloban. The
S.C. concluded that she possessed the necessary residence qualifications to
run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte.
Thus, the S.C. ordered the Board of Canvassers to proclaim Romualdez
Marcos as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

12. AQUINO vs COMELEC


Agapito Aquino – on March 20, 1995, filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City
which stated that he was a resident for only ten (10) months.
On April 25, 1995, he filed another COC amending the original COC which stated
that he had resided in the constituency where he sought to be elected for one (1) year
and thirteen (13) days and presented a lease contract for a Makati condominium unit
dated April 1, 1994.
Mateo Bedon – on April 24, 1995, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground
that he lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which,
under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period of not less than
one (1) year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections.
Comelec – on June 2, 1995, issued a Resolution declaring Aquino ineligible and thus
disqualified as a candidate for the Office of Representative of the Second Legislative
District of Makati City in the May 8, 1995 elections, for lack of the constitutional
qualification of residence.
HELD:
• In order for a person to qualify as a candidate for a district, he must prove that
he has established not just residence but also domicile of choice. Clearly, the
place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, i.e.
his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of
residence for the purposes of election law.
• The absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of
domicile under the conditions in the instant case – sentimental, actual or
otherwise – with the area, and the suspicious circumstances under which a
lease agreement for a condominium unit in Makati was effected all belie
Aquino’s claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution.
• Aquino’s contention that he transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is
a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts.
• Thus, the S.C. affirmed the Comelec’s conclusion that Aquino was ineligible
for the elective position of Representative of Makati City’s Second District on
the basis that Aquino lacked the one year residence in the district mandated
by the 1987 Constitution.

13. GONZALES vs COMELEC


• Fernando V. Gonzalez - filed certificates of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the 3rd congressional district of the Province of Alba.
• Stephen Bichara – filed a Petition for Disqualification and Cancellation of
Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that Gonzalez is a Spanish national,
and that he failed to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625.
HELD:
• Fernando V. Gonzalez - filed certificates of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the 3rd congressional district of the Province of Alba.
• Stephen Bichara – filed a Petition for Disqualification and Cancellation of
Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that Gonzalez is a Spanish national,
and that he failed to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625.

14. LABO vs COMELEC


• FACTS: Luis Lardizabal (respondent) – filed a quo warranto petition against
Ramon L. Labo, after winning the election for Mayor of Baguio City,
asserting that Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified.
• COMELEC en banc (respondent) - questions the validity of his election as
Mayor in relation to his citizenship pursuant to his Australian naturalization.
• Ramon L. Labo, Jr (petitioner) – he, being elected as mayor of Baguio City,
prays to restrain the Commission on Elections from looking into the question
of his citizenship as a qualification for his office as Mayor
HELD:
a) One of the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost is subscribing
to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign
country. Article IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution, "Dual allegiance
of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.“
b) He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through
a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he was married
to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally
took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance
c) These qualifications are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost
during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited.

LOONG vs. COMELEC


FACTS:
• BENJAMIN T. LOONG - filed with respondent Commission his certificate
of candidacy for the position of Vice-Governor of the Mindanao Autonomous
Region.
• NURSHUSSEIN UTUTALUM - filed before the respondent Commission a
petition seeking to disqualify petitioner for the office of Regional Vice-
Governor, on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his
certificate of candidacy as to his age.

HELD:
a) The petition filed to disqualify petitioner Loong does not fall under the
grounds of disqualification as provided for in Rule 25 but is expressly covered
by Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure governing petitions to cancel
certificate of candidacy.
b) Section 3, Rule 25 allows the filing of the petition at any time after the last
day for the filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation, is merely a procedural rule issued by respondent Commission
which, although a constitutional body, has no legislative powers.
AGUSTIN vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
• Arsenio A. Agustin (petitioner) – naturalized as a citizen of the USA, filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of
Marcos on October 5, 2012 to be contested in the May 13, 2013 local elections
• COMELEC En Banc (respondent) – cancelled Arsenio Agustin’s CoC on
August 23, 2012
• Salvador S. Pillos (respondent) - a rival mayoralty candidate, filed in the
COMELEC a Petition To Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Arsenio A.
Agustin alleging that the petitioner had made a material misrepresentation in
his CoC by stating that he had been a resident of the Municipality of Marcos
for 25 years.
HELD:
a) It is not disputed that on October 6, 2012, after having renounced his USA
citizenship and having already filed his CoC, he travelled abroad using his
USA passport, thereby representing himself as a citizen of the USA.
b) The petitioner's continued exercise of his rights as a citizen of the USA
through using his USA passport after the renunciation of his USA citizenship
reverted him to his earlier status as a dual citizen.
c) Such reversion disqualified him from being elected to public office in the
Philippines pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons arc disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
xxxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship;

VILLABER vs COMELEC
FACTS:
• PABLO C. VILLABER and DOUGLAS R. CAGAS - were rival candidates
for a congressional seat in the First District of Davao del Sur during the May
14, 2001 elections.
• Douglas Cagas - filed with the COMELEC, a consolidated petition to
disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latter’s certificate of candidacy, alleging
that Villaber was convicted for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
• COMELEC - issued the resolution declaring Villaber disqualified as a
candidate. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.

HELD:
COMELEC believed it is, applying Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code that
any person who has been sentenced by final judgment for any offense for which he
has been sentenced for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be
a candidate and to hold any office.

MORENO vs COMELEC
• Norma L. Mejes (respondent) - filed a petition to disqualify petitioner Moreno
from running for Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted
by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention, thus falling under the
scope of Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code
• Urbano M . Moreno (petitioner) - filed an answer averring that the petition
states no cause of action because he was already granted probation.
• Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc (respondent) - disqualified him
from running for the elective office of Punong Barangay in the July 15, 2002
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
HELD:
a) Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that "[t]he final discharge of the
probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as
a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine
imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted.“
b) Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the Local Government
Code. While the Local Government Code is a later law which sets forth the
qualifications and disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation
Law is a special legislation which applies only to probationers.

GREGO vs. COMELEC


• FACTS: Humberto Basco (respondent) - On October 31, 1981, before the
effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991, was removed from his
position as Deputy Sheriff by no less than the Supreme Court upon a finding
of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint.
• Wilmer Grego (petitioner) - On May 13, 1995, filed with the COMELEC a
petition for disqualification, praying for Basco's disqualification pursuant to
Section 40(b) of R.A. No. 7160
• Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified
from running for any elective local position:
• xxx
• (b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
• COMELEC en banc (respondent) - dismissed the petition for disqualification

RULING:
a) “Lex prospicit, non respicit.” - The law looks forward, not backward.
b) The basic tenet in legal hermeneutics that laws operate only prospectively and
not retroactively provides the qualification sought by petitioner. A statute,
despite the generality in its language, must not be so construed as to overreach
acts, events or matters which transpired before its passage.
c) It, therefore, follows that [Section] 40 (b) of the Local Government Code is
not applicable to the present case.

REYES vs. COMELEC


• FACTS: Renato U. Reyes - He was the incumbent mayor of municipality of
Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, having been elected to that office on May 11,
1992. In February 6, 1995, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan found petitioner
guilty of the charges in an administrative complaint and ordered his removal
from office. He filed a petition for certiorari,prohibition and injunction.
• A temporary restraining order was issued by the court on February 7,
1995, enjoining the Sangguniang Panlalawigan from proceeding with
the case.
• March 20, 1995, petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy with the
Office of the Election Officer of the COMELEC in Bongabong. A
petition for disqualification of petitioner as candidate for mayor was
filed, citing the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160).
Because of the absence of any contrary order from the COMELEC,
petitioner Reyes was voted for in the elections held on May 8, 1995.
• COMELEC Second Division - issued a resolution disqualifying the
petitioner on May 9,1995.
• On May 10, 1995, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong,
apparently unaware of the disqualification of Reyes by the COMELEC,
proclaimed him the duly-elected mayor.
• COMELEC en banc declared him to have been validly disqualified as
candidate and, consequently, set aside his proclamation as municipal
mayor of Bongabong.

HELD:
a) Aguinaldo v. COMELEC,- It was held that a public official could not be
removed for misconduct committed during a prior term and that his reelection
operated as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove him therefor.
b) The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here, although petitioner
Reyes brought an action to question the decision in the administrative case,
the temporary restraining order issued in the action he brought lapsed, with
the result that the decision was served on petitioner and it thereafter became
final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the
President. He was thus validly removed from office and, pursuant to 40 (b) of
the Local Government Code, he was disqualified from running for reelection.

MERCADO vs MANZANO
• Eduardo Manzano - Proclamation as a vice-mayor of Makati was suspended
due to a pending petition for disqualification which alleged that he was not a
citizen of the Philippine but of United States.
• 2nd Division of the COMELEC - ordered the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy of Manzano on the ground that he is a dual citizen and Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective position.
• Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code- “Disqualifications: XXX d.
Those with dual citizenship..”
• COMELEC en banc - With the voting of 4 to 1, the decision of the 2nd
division was reversed and declared private respondent qualified to run for
vice-mayor of Makati City.
HELD:
• Eduardo Manzano - Proclamation as a vice-mayor of Makati was suspended
due to a pending petition for disqualification which alleged that he was not a
citizen of the Philippine but of United States.
• 2nd Division of the COMELEC - ordered the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy of Manzano on the ground that he is a dual citizen and Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective position.
• Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code- “Disqualifications: XXX d.
Those with dual citizenship..”
• COMELEC en banc - With the voting of 4 to 1, the decision of the 2nd
division was reversed and declared private respondent qualified to run for
vice-mayor of Makati City.

LOPEZ vs COMELEC
• Eduardo Manzano - Proclamation as a vice-mayor of Makati was suspended
due to a pending petition for disqualification which alleged that he was not a
citizen of the Philippine but of United States.
• 2nd Division of the COMELEC - ordered the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy of Manzano on the ground that he is a dual citizen and Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective position.
• Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code- “Disqualifications: XXX d.
Those with dual citizenship..”
• COMELEC en banc - With the voting of 4 to 1, the decision of the 2nd
division was reversed and declared private respondent qualified to run for
vice-mayor of Makati City.
HELD:
a) R.A. No. 9225, Section 5 expressly provides, “Section 5. Civil and Political
Rights and Liabilities- xxx (2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines
shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;”
b) There is no evidence that will show that the respondent complied with the
provision of R.A. 9225. For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained
in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of law who is authorized to
administer an oath. The affiant must state in clear unequivocal terms that he
is renouncing all foreign citizenship for it to be effective.

RODRIGQUEZ vs COMELEC
• Eduardo Rodriguez - Won and was proclaimed duly-elected governor in 1992.
Marquez challenged the victory via a petition for quo warranto and revealed
that Rodriguez left the US where a charge is pending against him for
fraudulent insurance claims,grand theft and attempted grand theft or personal
property, and is therefore a “fugitive from justice” which is a ground for
disqualification under the Local Government Code.
• COMELEC - dismissed the case. Upon certiorari to the Supreme Court, it
was held that: Fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment, but also those who after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The case was remanded to the
COMELEC to determine Whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice.
• Rodriguez and Marquez again ran for Governor in 1995. Marquez filed a
Petition for Disqualification against Rodriquez on the same ground that he is
a fugitive from justice.
• COMELEC - Consolidated both cases and found Rodriguez guilty based on
the authenticated copy of the warrant of arrest at LA Court and of the felony
complaint.
HELD:
a) To reiterate, a "fugitive from justice”: "x x x includes not only those who flee
after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged,
flee to avoid prosecution.” The definition thus indicates that the intent to
evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular
jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution
or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already
instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.
b) To reiterate, a "fugitive from justice”: "x x x includes not only those who flee
after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged,
flee to avoid prosecution.” The definition thus indicates that the intent to
evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular
jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution
or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already
instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.

CAASI vs CA
a) To reiterate, a "fugitive from justice”: "x x x includes not only those who flee
after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged,
flee to avoid prosecution.” The definition thus indicates that the intent to
evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular
jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution
or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already
instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.
HELD:
a) To reiterate, a "fugitive from justice”: "x x x includes not only those who flee
after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged,
flee to avoid prosecution.” The definition thus indicates that the intent to
evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular
jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution
or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already
instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.

JALOSJOS, JR. vs COMELEC


FACTS:
a) To reiterate, a "fugitive from justice”: "x x x includes not only those who flee
after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged,
flee to avoid prosecution.” The definition thus indicates that the intent to
evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular
jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution
or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already
instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.
HELD:
a) To reiterate, a "fugitive from justice”: "x x x includes not only those who flee
after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged,
flee to avoid prosecution.” The definition thus indicates that the intent to
evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular
jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution
or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already
instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.

CAYAT vs. COMELEC


FACTS:
a) To reiterate, a "fugitive from justice”: "x x x includes not only those who flee
after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged,
flee to avoid prosecution.” The definition thus indicates that the intent to
evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular
jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution
or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already
instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.
HELD:
a) To reiterate, a "fugitive from justice”: "x x x includes not only those who flee
after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged,
flee to avoid prosecution.” The definition thus indicates that the intent to
evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular
jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution
or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already
instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.

DE GUZMAN vs. BOARD OF CANVASSERS


 FACTS:
 Tomas De Guzman filed a petition for mandamus before the Supreme
Court seeking to compel the Board of Canvassers of La Union to annul
the votes counted in favor of Juan Lucero and to declare him as the
elected Governor of La Union.
 Based on the fact that the COC filed by Lucero was not made under
oath and in violation of Sec 404 of the Election Law.
 RULING:
 The seeming irregularity in the filing of Lucero’s COC does not
invalidate his election for the fundamental reason that after it was
proven by the count of the votes that Lucero had obtained the majority
of the legal votes, the will of the people cannot be frustrated by a
technicality consisting that his COC had not properly sworn to.
 “the COC is required to be under oath, the election of the candidate
cannot be annulled on the sole ground of formal defects in the
certificate, such as lack of the required oath.”

JURILLA vs. COMELEC


 FACTS:
 Eugenio Jurilla, Marciano Medalla, Bernardo Nazal, Rey Medina,
Melencio Castelo, Godofredo Liban, and private respondent, Antonio
Hernandez were among the candidates in the elections for the six
positions of councilor for the Second District of Quezon City.
 On March 23, 1992 Hernandez filed with COMELEC his certificate of
candidacy. In item No. 6 thereof, he gave his address, however, he did
not indicate his precinct number and the particular barangay where he
was a registered voter. In other words, his COC did not expressly state
that he was a voter of Quezon City or that he was a resident of the 2 nd
District.
RULING:
a) It may be gleaned from the provision of Sec 39 par. A of the local government
code of 1991 that the law does not specifically require that the candidate must
state in his COC his Precinct number and the barangay where he is registred.
But it is enough that he is actually a voter in the precinct where he intends to
vote which should be within the district where he is running for office.

PNOC-EDC vs. NLRC


 FACTS:
 Manuel S. Pineda while being the Geothermal Construction Secretary
filed a certificate of candidacy for councilor in Kanaga, Leyte. He was
eventually proclaimed elected to such position.
 He was subsequently terminated by PNOC-EDC.
 Basis: Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code
 Pineda’s contended that PNOC is not a corporation embraced within
the Civil Service, therefore not covered by Sec. 66.
 RULING:
 What all this imports is that Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code applies to officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, even those
organized under the general laws on incorporation and
therefore not having an original or legislative charter, and
even if they do not fall under the Civil Service Law but
under the Labor Code. In other words, Section 66
constitutes just cause for termination of employment in
addition to those set forth in the Labor Code, as amended.

QUINTO vs. COMELEC


 FACTS:
Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive
positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the
instant petition for prohibition and certiorari seeking the declaration of Sec 4,
Resolution 8678 as null and void on the ground that they violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution and suffer from overbreadth
 The Supreme Court granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
filed by Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. and declared as
unconstitutional the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13
of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code
and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678.
 Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) filed a motion for
reconsideration.
 RULING:
 Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a faithful reflection of
the present state of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, viz.:
Incumbent Appointive Official. - Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a public appointive
office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall
be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy
Incumbent Elected Official. Upon the other hand, pursuant to Section 14 of
RA 9006 or the Fair Election Act, which repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code and rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it
considered an elected official as resigned only upon the start of the campaign period
corresponding to the positions for which they are running, an elected official is not
deemed to have resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy for the same or any other elected office or position. In fine, an elected
official may run for another position without forfeiting his seat.

LORETO-GO vs. COMELEC


 FACTS:
 Rep Ma. Catalina Go - seeks to nullify the resolution of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) en banc declaring her disqualified to run for
the office of governor of Leyte and mayor of Baybay, Leyte, because
she filed certificates of candidacy for both positions and the withdrawal
of her certificate of candidacy for mayor was filed late by twenty eight
minutes from the deadline.
 Petitioner was the incumbent representative of the Fifth District,
province of Leyte when she filed on February 27, 2001 with the
municipal election officer of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte, a
certificate of candidacy for mayor of the said municipality.
 On February 28, 2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner filed with the provincial
election supervisor of Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, another
certificate of candidacy for governor.
 Simultaneously therewith, she attempted to file with the provincial
election supervisor an affidavit of withdrawal of her candidacy for
mayor. However, the provincial election supervisor refused to accept
the affidavit of withdrawal and suggested that, pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 3253-A, she should file it with the municipal election
officer of Baybay, Leyte where she filed her certificate of candidacy for
mayor.
 Private respondents filed similar petitions to disqualify petitioner on the
ground that petitioner filed certificates of candidacy for two positions,
namely, that for mayor, and that for governor, thus, making her
ineligible for both.
 The COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified the petitioner
from running for both position.
 RULING:
 The SC held that petitioner's withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy
for mayor of Baybay, Leyte was effective for all legal purposes, and
left in full force her certificate of candidacy for governor.
 Section 73, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code, provides that:
 "SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy.- No person shall be eligible for any
elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy
within the period fixed herein.
 "A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the
election, withdraw the same by submitting to the office concerned a
written declaration under oath.
 "No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the
same election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than
one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the
expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the
person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may
declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and
cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices."
 There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the affidavit of
withdrawal must be filed with the same office where the certificate of
candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed directly with
the main office of the COMELEC, the office of the regional election
director concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of
the province to which the municipality involved belongs, or the office
of the municipal election officer of the said municipality.
 While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No.
3253-A, adopted on 20 November 2000, requires that the withdrawal
be filed before the election officer of the place where the certificate of
candidacy was filed, such requirement is merely directory, and is
intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or jurisdictional. Hence,
the filing of petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy for mayor
of Baybay with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte sufficed to
effectively withdraw such candidacy. The COMELEC thus acted with
grave abuse of discretion when it declared petitioner ineligible for both
positions for which she filed certificates of candidacy.

PONTAWE vs. COMELEC


 FACTS:
 Federico Pontawe and Wilfredo Lopez were the candidates for the
positions of Mayor and Member of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respectively, of the Nacionalista Party (NP) during the elections of
January 30, 1980 in Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan.
 On the other hand, Rosario T. Cabangon and Alfredo Flores were the
candidates for Mayor and Member of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respectively, of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL).
 The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualified Federico
Pontawe and Wilfredo Lopez on the ground of turncoatism.
 Carlos Pontawe and Louie Lopez were nominated as substitute, by the
NP. And were proclaimed as the duly elected Municipal Mayor and
Member of the Sangguniang Bayan, respectively.
 As a consequence, Rosario Cabangon and three other KBL candidates
filed an election protest against Carlos Pontawe, Louie Lopez and two
others
 The RTC: declared the election of Carlos Pontawe and Louie Lopez as
null and void and proclaimed Rosario Cabangon and Alfredo Flores as
duly elected Mayor and Member of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respectively.
 COMELEC affirmed the decision of the trial court, on November
3,1981.
 RULING:
 The fact that Federico Pontawe and Wilfredo Lopez filed a Petition for
certiorari with this Court questioning their disqualification by the
COMELEC does not mean that the COMELEC ruling was not
immediately executory.
 Election Code allows the substitution of candidates who may have been
disqualified after the last day for filing the certificates of candidacy.
The substitution may be on or before mid-day of the day of the election.
And, if the disqualification is not immediately executory, there would
be no need of nominating a substitute. Having been disqualified before
election day the votes "Pontawe" and "Lopez" could not be counted for
Federico and Wilfredo, but should be credited as they were by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers in favor of Carlos and Louie
 ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the COMELEC sustaining the
election of Rosario Cabangon and Alfredo Flores for the positions of
Mayor and Member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Sta. Barbara,
Pangasinan, respectively, is hereby SET ASIDE and another one
rendered declaring CARLOS PONTAWE and LOUIE LOPEZ as
having been duly elected to the said positions. With this decision the
issue raised in G. R. No. L-61497 has become moot and academic.

LUNA vs. COMELEC


 FACTS:
 On 15 January 2004, Petitioner Luna filed her certificate of candidacy
for the position of vice-mayor of Lagayan, Abra as a substitute for Hans
Roger, who withdrew his certificate of candidacy on the same date.
Ruperto Blanco, Election Officer of Lagayan, Abra removed the name
of Hans Roger from the list of candidates and placed the name of Luna.
 On 20 April 2004, private respondents Tomas Layao, et al, filed a
petition for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy or
disqualification of Luna. Alleged that Luna made a false material
representation in her certificate of candidacy because she is not a
registered voter of Lagayan, Abra. Private respondents alleged that
Hans Roger was only 20 years old on election day and, therefore, he
was disqualified to run for vice-mayor and cannot be substituted by
Luna
 The COMELEC’s Ruling
 In the 4 June 2004 Resolution, the COMELEC First Division granted
the petition and denied due course to the substitution of Luna for Hans
Roger.
 The COMELEC First Division also ruled that Luna was not a registered
voter of Lagayan, Abra and that this was sufficient to disqualify Luna
from running as vice-mayor.
 On 28 June 2004, Luna filed a motion for reconsideration with the
COMELEC En Banc. Alleging her right to due process was violated.
 Motion denied.
 RULING:
 Provincial Election Supervisor tried to personally serve a copy of the
petition to Luna. But Luna refused to formally receive the petition. The
Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor sent the notice via
registered mail and still Luna did not file an answer.
 The Court finds that Luna’s right to due process was not violated. The
COMELEC notified Luna of the petition filed against her and Luna was
given the opportunity to present evidence on her behalf. This constitutes
compliance with the requirements of due process, Under Rule 23 of the
1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
 On the same date, Luna filed her certificate of candidacy as substitute
for Hans Roger. Section 77 of the Election Code prescribes the rules on
substitution of an official candidate of a registered political party who
dies, withdraws, or is disqualified for any cause after the last day for
the filing of certificate of candidacy
 Since Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy and the
COMELEC found that Luna complied with all the procedural
requirements for a valid substitution, Luna can validly substitute for
Hans Roger.
 The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in declaring that Hans Roger, being under age,
could not be considered to have filed a valid certificate of candidacy
and, thus, could not be validly substituted by Luna. The COMELEC
may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to
or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form

 Moreover, Hans Roger already withdrew his certificate of candidacy


before the COMELEC declared that he was not a valid candidate.
Therefore, unless Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy was denied due
course or cancelled in accordance with Section 78 of the Election Code,
Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy was valid and he may be validly
substituted by Luna.

MONSALE vs. NICO


 FACTS:
 Jose F. Monsale withdrew his certificate of candidacy on October 10,
1947, but, on November 7, attempted to revive it by withdrawing his
withdrawal.
 The Commission on Elections, however, ruled on November 8 that the
protestant could no longer be a candidate in spite of his desire to
withdraw his withdrawal.
 A canvass of the election returns showed that the protestee Paulino M.
Nico received 2,291 votes; another candidate, Gregorio Fagutao, 126,
votes; and the protestant Jose F. Monsale, none, evidently because the
votes cast in his favor had not been counted for the reason that he was
not a registered candidate.
 Consequently, Nico was proclaimed elected.
 RULING:
 There is no question as to the right of a candidate to withdraw or annul
his own certificate of candidacy, there being no legal prohibition
against such withdrawal.
 Therefore, on October 10, or thirty-one days before the election, the
protestant ceased to be a candidate by his own voluntary act, and as a
matter of fact the boards of election inspectors of the municipality of
Miagao were duly notified of his withdrawal.
 His letter to the Commission on Elections dated November 6, 1947,
which the subscribed and swore to before a notary public on November
7, whereby he withdrew his withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy,
can only be considered as a new certificate of candidacy which, having
been filed only four days before the election, could not legally be
accepted under the law, which expressly provides that such certificate
should be filed at least sixty days before the election.

CERAFICA vs. COMELEC


 FACTS:
 Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica filed her COC for Councilor, City of
Taguig, for the 2013 Elections. Said COC stated that she was born on
October 29, 1992, or that she will be 20 on the day of the elections, in
contravention of the minimum age requirement of 23.
 She was summoned to a clarificatory hearing, but instead of attending,
Kimberly opted to file a Sworn Statement of Withdrawal of COC.
Simultaneously Olivia filed her own COC as a substitute for Kimberly.

 COMELEC resolved to cancel Kimberly’s COC and denied the


substitution on the ground that the initial COC was void and thus cannot
be used for substitution.
 COMELEC argues:
 Olivia cannot substitute Kimberly as the latter was never an official
candidate because she was not eligible for the post by reason of her age,
and that, moreover, the COC that Kimberly filed was invalid because it
contained a material misrepresentation relating to her eligibility for the
office she seeks to be elected to.
 It can cancel Kimberly’s COC motu proprio as it may look into patent
defects in the COCs, such as Kimberly’s failure to comply with the age
requirement.
 Olivia argues:
 Although Kimberly may not be qualified to run for election because of
her age, it cannot be denied that she still filed a valid COC and was,
thus, an official candidate who may be substituted.
 Olivia also claimed that there was no ground to cancel or deny
Kimberly’s COC on the ground of lack of qualification and material
misrepresentation because she did not misrepresent her birth dateto
qualify for the position of councilor, and as there was no deliberate
attempt to mislead the electorate, which is precisely why she withdrew
her COC upon learning that she was not qualified.
 RULING:
 The Court ruled that the COMELEC has no discretion to give or not
give due course to COCs. The duty of the COMELEC to give due
course to COCs filed in due form is ministerial in character, and while
the COMELEC may look into patent defects in the COCs, it may not
go into matters not appearing on its face.
 The question of eligibility and ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond
the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC.
 Under the express provision of Sec. 77 of B.P. Blg. 881, not just any
person, but only “an official candidate of a registered or accredited
political party” may be substituted. In the case at bar, Kimberly was an
official nominee of the Liberal Party; thus, she can validly substituted.
VILLANUEVA vs. COMELEC
 FACTS:
 Petitioner Crisologo Villanueva, upon learning of his companion
Mendoza's withdrawal, filed his own sworn "Certificate of Candidacy
in substitution" of Mendoza's for the said office of vice mayor.
 Petitioner won against his opponent respondent Lirio but the Municipal
Board of Canvassers disregarded all votes cast in favor of petitioner as
stray votes.
 Lirio was declared winner.
 Respondent Comelec issued its questioned resolution on February 21, 1980
denying the petition on two grounds after citing the pertinent legal provisions,
as follows:
 The 1978 Election Code provides:
“SEC. 27. ... No certificate of candidacy duly filed shall be
considered withdraw ... unless the candidate files with the office
which received the certificate ... or with the Commission a sworn
statement of withdrawal ...
SEC. 28. ... If, after last day for filing certificates of candidacy, a
candidate with a certificate of candidacy duly filed should ... withdraw
... any voter qualified for the office may file his certificate of candidacy
for the office for which ... the candidate who has withdrawn ... was a
candidate on or before midday of election ... “
 RULING:
 The Court finds merit in the reconsideration prayed for, which would
respect the will of the electorate instead of defeating the same through
the invocation of formal or technical defects.
 The Court holds that the Comelec's first ground for denying due course
to petitioner's substitute certificate of candidacy, i.e. that Mendoza's
withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy was not "under oath," should
be rejected.
 It is not seriously contended by respondent nor by the Comelec that
Mendoza's withdrawal was not an actual fact and a reality, so much so
that no votes were cast for him at all, In fact, Mendoza's name, even
though his candidacy was filed on the last day within the deadline, was
not in the Comelec's certified list of candidates. His unsworn
withdrawal filed later on the same day had been accepted by the
election registrar without protest nor objection.
 The fact that Mendoza's withdrawal was not sworn is but a technicality which
should not be used to frustrate the people's will in favor of petitioner as the
substitute candidate.
 Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code provides for such substitute candidates
in case of death, withdrawal or disqualification up to mid-day of the very day
of the elections.

MIRANDA vs. COMELEC


 FACTS:
 Jose Pempe Miranda - then incumbent mayor of Santiago City, Isabela,
filed his certificate of candidacy for the same mayoralty post for the
synchronized May 11, 1998 elections.
 On March 27, 1998, private respondent Antonio M. Abaya filed a
Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy
(pp. 26-33, Rollo), which was docketed as SPA No. 98-019. The
petition was GRANTED by the Comelec
 The Comelec further ruled to DISQUALIFY Jose Pempe Miranda.
 On May 6, 1998, way beyond the deadline for filing a certificate of
candidacy, petitioner Joel G. Miranda filed his certificate of candidacy
for the mayoralty post, supposedly as a substitute for his father, Jose
Pempe During the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner and private
respondent vied for the mayoralty seat, with petitioner garnering 22,002
votes, 1,666 more votes than private respondent who got only 20, 336
votes. On May 13, 1998, private respondent filed a Petition to Declare
Null and Void Substitution with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, which
was docketed as SPA No. 98-288.
 He prayed for the nullification of petitioners certificate of candidacy for
being void ab initio because the certificate of candidacy of Jose Pempe
Miranda, whom petitioner was supposed to substitute, had already been
cancelled and denied due course. On May 16, 1998, Comelecs First
Division dismissed SPA No. 98-288 motu proprio (pp. 57-61, Rollo).
 Private respondent moved for reconsideration (pp. 62-72, Rollo). On
December 8, 1998, the Comelec En Banc rendered the assailed decision
aforequoted, resolving to GRANT the motion for reconsideration, thus
nullifying the substitution by petitioner Joel G. Miranda of his father as
candidate for the mayoralty post of Santiago City. On December 9,
1998, petitioner sought this Courts intercession via a petition for
certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
 RULING:
 There is neither lack of jurisdiction nor grave abuse of discretion
attended the annulment of the substitution and proclamation of
petitioner. On the matter of jurisdiction, there is no question that the
case at hand is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Comelec.
 A disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid
certificate of candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified
candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of
candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a
candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code.
Besides, if we were to allow the so-called substitute to file a new and
original certificate of candidacy beyond the period for the filing thereof,
it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection of the law, an act
abhorred by our Constitution.

TAGOLINO vs. HRET


 FACTS:
 Richard Gomez - filed his Certificate of Candidacy seeking the
congressional office of the House of Representatives for the 4h District
of Leyte. In his CoC, he indicated that he resided in 910 Carlota Hills,
Cadieng, Ormoc City.
 Bueneventura Juntilla, one of the opposing candidates, questioned the
residence indicated in his CoC. Juntilla argued that, Richard is a
resident of Coldate St. East Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro Manila
and not of Canadieng, Ormoc City
 Comelec granted Juntilla’s petition without any qualification
 Lucy Torres-Gomez then filed her CoC together with a Certificate of
Nomination and Acceptance from the Liberal Party endorsing her as
the party’s official substitute candidate of her husband Richard wherein
the Comelec En Banc approved such substitution.
 Juntilla filed a motion for reconsideration from the ruling of the
Comelec En Banc. Pending the resolution, the elections were held and
the name of Richard Gomez remained in the ballots which garnered
majority of the votes. Due to the approved substitution by the
COMELEC, votes for Richard were credited in favor of Lucy Torres
and she was proclaimed the Representative of the 4th District of Leyte.
 Juntilla opposed and filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET
alleging that the substitution is not valid because Richard’s CoC is void
ab initio.
 HRET dismissed Juntilla’s petition and declared the substitution valid
 Juntilla filed for Certiorari and prohibition before the SC.
 RULING:
 A valid CoC as a condition sine qua non for the substitution of
candidate.
 Sec 77 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that, if an official
candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws,
or is disqualified for any cause, a person belonging to and certified by
the same political party may file a CoC to replace the candidate who
died, withrew, or disqualified.
 A person whose CoC has been denied due course to and/or cancelled
under sec 78 cannot be substituted because he is not considered a
candidate. Hence, being a cancelled CoC it is considered void ab initio
and thus cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and valid votes.

PAPANDAYAN vs. COMELEC


 FACTS:
 In the May 14, 2001 elections, 3 candidates ran for the position of
mayor of Tubaran, Lanao del Sur.
 Petitioner Papandayan Jr. and the respondent was Fahida P. Balt
incumbent mayor seeking reelection.
 Respondent Balt sought the disqualification of petitioner alleging that
petitioner was not a resident of Barangay Tangcal in Tubaran, Lanao
del Sur but a permanent resident of Bayang, Lanao Del Sur.
 Papandayan Jr. claimed that he was a resident of No. 13 Barangay
Tangcal in Tubaran; that he was the son of the late Mauyag Capal
Papandayan, Sr., a former school superintendent, that in 1990, he
transferred his domicile from Bayang to Tangcal and stayed there with
his wife Raina Guina Dimaporo, whose family and relatives were
residents and natives of Tangcal, Tubaran; that he managed an
agricultural land in Tubaran which he co-owned with his family; and
that he filed in 1998 his certificate of candidacy for the position of
municipal mayor of Tubaran, which he later withdrew.
 RULING:
 Petitioner has duly proven that although he was formerly a resident of
Bayang , he later transferred residence to Tangcal, Tubaran as shown
by his actual and physical presence therein for 10 years prior to May
14, 2001 elections.
 Requisites in order to acquire a new domicile by choice: (1) Residence
or bodily presence in the new locality. (2) An intention to remain there
and (3) An intention to abandon the old Domicile.

CIPRIANO vs. COMELEC


 FACTS:
 On June 7, 2002, petitioner filed with COMELEC her certificate of
candidacy as Chairman of the Sanguniang Kabataan(SK) for the SK
elections held on July 15, 2002. On the date of the elections, July 15,
2002, the COMELEC issued resolution No. 5363 adopting the
recommendation of the Commissions Law Department to deny due
course to or cancel the certificates of candidacy of several candidates
for the SK elections, including petitioners. The ruling was based on the
findings of the law Department that petitioner and all the other
candidates affected by said resolution were not registered voters in the
barangay where they intended to run.
 Cipriano argued that a certificate of candidacy may only be denied due
course or cancelled via an appropriate petition filed by any registered
candidate for the same position under Section 78 of the omnibus
election code and the COMELEC cannot by itself deny due course to
or cancel ones certificate of candidacy. Petitioner also claimed that she
was denied due process when her certificate of candidacy was cancelled
by the Commission without notice and hearing. Finally, she contended
that she may only be removed by petition for qou warranto after her
proclamation as duly-elected SK Chairman.
 RULING:
 As an independent constitutional commssion, COMELEC is clothed
with 3 powers of government-Executive, Legislative and Quasi-judicial
powers
 Aside from the powers vested by the constitution, it also exercises other
powers vested by the constitution , it also exercises other powers
expressly provided in the Omnibus Election Code, one of which is the
authority to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy.
The COMELEC asserts that it is authorized to motu proprio deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy based on its broad administrative power to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections

ABCEDE vs. IMPERIAL


 FACTS:
 Prior to September 7, 1957, petitioner Alfredo Abcede filed, with the
Commission on Elections, his certificate of candidacy for the Office of
the President of the Philippines, in connection with the elections to be
held on November 12 of the same year.
 On or about said date, Abcede and other candidates were summoned by
the Commission on Elections to appear before the same on September
23, 1957, "to show cause why their certificates of candidacy should be
considered as filed in good faith and to be given due course,".
 A reconsideration of such resolution having been denied. Abcede filed
petition before the Supreme Court
 RULING:
 While the Constitution has given the Commission on Elections the
exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections, the power of decision of the
Commssion is limited to purely administrative questions.
 It cannot determine who among those possessing the qualifications
prescribed by the Constitution, who have complied with the procedural
requirements relative to the filing of certificates of candidacy.
 This is a matter of policy , not of administration and enforcement of the
law, which policy must be determing by Congress in the exercise of its
legislative function

GARDIVA vs. SALES, JR.


 FACTS:
 The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections nationwide was scheduled
to be held on May 6, 1996
 LYNETTE GARVIDA: On April 23, 1996, she filed her certificate of
candidacy for the position of Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan,
Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos
Norte. Her application got denied on the ground that she was then
twenty-one years and ten months old which exceeded the age limit for
membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan.
 FLORENCIO SALES JR.: a rival candidate for Chairman of the
Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the COMELEC en banc a "Petition
of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy" against
petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in her
certificate of candidacy.
 COMELEC en BANC: issued an order directing the Board of Election Tellers
and Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the
proclamation of petitioner in the event she won in the election.
 “That the said Gardiva is disqualified to become a voter and a candidate
for the SK for the reason that she will be more than twenty-one (21)
years of age on May 6, 1996
 she made material representation which is false and as such, she is
disqualified”
 On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private
respondent's votes of 76 and based on the order of COMELEC, the Board of
Election Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the winner.
 RULING:
 The Omnibus Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs the
procedure to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy,
viz:
 "Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-
five days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy
and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before election.”
 Jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with
the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Only motions to
reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC
in Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc. COMELEC en
Banc therefore acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion when it entertained the petition and issued the order of May
2, 1996
 The general rule (under Section 428 of the Local Government Code) is that
an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must not be more than 21
years of age on the day of his election. The only exception is when the official
reaches the age of 21 years during his incumbency.
 In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On the day of the
elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and 5 days old.
 Petitioner Lynette G. Garvida is declared ineligible for being over the age
qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the Sangguniang
Kabataan, and is ordered to vacate her position as Chairman of the
Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte.

LOONG vs. COMELEC


 FACTS:
 BENJAMIN LOONG: On 15 January 1990 (the last day for filing said
certificate), he filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Vice-
Governor of the Mindanao Autonomous Region in the election held on
17 February 1990. He contends that SPA No. 90-006 was filed out of
time because it was filed beyond the 25-day period prescribed by
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
 Respondent NURSHUSSEIN UTUTALUM: a candidate for the same
position.
 On 5 March 1990 (or 16 days after the election), he filed a petition
(docketed as SPA Case No. 90-006) seeking to disqualify petitioner for
the office of Regional Vice-Governor, on the ground that the latter
made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age.
 He alleges that SPA No. 90-006, though filed only on 5 March 1990,
was filed when no proclamation of winner had as yet been made and
that the petition is deemed filed on time as Section 3, Rule 25 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure states that the petition to disqualify a
candidate on grounds of ineligibility "shall be filed any day after the
last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date
of proclamation."
 RULING:
 Private respondent Ututalum filed the petition (SPA 90-006) to
disqualify candidate Loong only on 5 March 1990, or forty-nine (49)
days from the date Loong's certificate of candidacy was filed and
sixteen (16) days after the election itself.
 Clearly, SPA No. 90-006 was filed beyond the 25-day period prescribed
by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
 Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate,
fails to file the petition within the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of
the Code for whatever reasons, the election laws do not leave him completely
helpless as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate
by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the
proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of
the Code.
 “Section 253 (Omnibus Election Code). Petition for quo warranto. -
Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of
ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file
a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days
after the proclamation of the results of the election.”
 SPA NO. 90-006 cannot be considered as a petition for quo warranto (Section
253 of the Code) for when it was filed with the respondent Commission, no
proclamation of election results had as yet been made, it was premature.
 It was only on 3 July 1990 in which petitioner was proclaimed as the duly
elected Vice-Governor of the Mindanao Autonomous Region
LANOT vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
Henry Lanot- filed petition to disqualify his opponent, Vicente Eusebio for engaging
in an election campaign outside of the designated campaign period. Eusebio
allegedly committed the acts before the start of the campaign period commencing
on March 24, 2004. RA 8436- under Section 11 thereof, moved the deadline for
filing of COCs from March 23, 2004, January 2, 2004 or 81 days earlier to give
ample time for the printing of the official ballots.
Vicente Eusebio- filed his COC on December 29, 2003.
ISSUE: Whether or not Eusebio actually committed the acts subject of the petition
for disqualification.
RULING: NO.
Acts committed by Eusebio prior to his being a "candidate" on 23
March 2004, even if constituting election campaigning or partisan political activities,
are not punishable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Acts committed by Eusebio on or after 24 March 2004, or during the
campaign period, are not covered by Section 80 which punishes only acts outside
the campaign period.
Thus, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code are: a) A person engages in an election campaign or partisan political
activity; b) The act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular
candidate or candidates; c) The act is done outside the campaign period.

PANGKAT LAGUNA vs. COMELEC


FACTS:
Gov. Teresita Lazaro- publicly declared her “intention to run for Governor” in the
coming May 2001 elections. She ordered the purchase of trophies, basketballs,
volleyballs, and other sports materials worth P4.5 millions. Gov. Lazaro also bidded
79 public works projects on March 28, 2001.
Pangkat Laguna- sought the disqualification of gubernatorial candidate Teresita
Lazaro and alleged that the latter committed acts violative of Section 80 (Election
campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period) and Section
261(v) (Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds) of
the Omnibus Election Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of Lazaro are violative of Section 80 and Section
261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code?
RULING:
1. NO. The act of Lazaro in “ordering the purchase of various items and the
consequent distribution thereof in Laguna, in line with the local government
unit’s sports and education program” is not election campaigning or partisan
political activity contemplated and explicitly prescribed under the pertinent
provisions of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
2. NO. Lazaro did not transgress the provisions of Section 261 (v) as to the
charge of violation of the 45-Day Public Works Ban, when the latter caused
or directed the bidding of 79 public works projects on 28 March 2001.
Evidence is wanting to sufficiently establish the allegation that public funds
were released, disbursed, or expended during the 45-day prohibitive period
provided under the law and implementing rules.

ADIONG vs. COMELEC


FACTS:
Blo Umpar Adiong – a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the
COMELEC Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers In
“mobile” places like cars and other moving vehicles. Such prohibition is violative of
Sec 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 11(a) of RA 6646. That being a
neophyte in the field of politics, he stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with
this prohibition.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2347 – it provides for the lawful forms of election
propaganda and prohibited forms of the same. It has been deemed unlawful “To
draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in
any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary…”
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that such prohibition is null and void.
a) It unduly infringes on the citizen’s fundamental right of free speech enshrined
in the Constitution.
b) The questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the
resolution is void for overbreadth.
c) The constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate
equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies,
mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to
Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals
and stickers on cars and other private vehicles.

ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORP. vs. COMELEC


FACTS:
COMELEC Resolution No. 98-1419 – restrained ABS-CBN or any other groups, its
agents, representatives from conducting such exit survey on the following
justifications:
1. Exit polls conducted by ABS-CBN might conflict with the official
COMELEC count, as well as the unofficial quick count of NAMFREL.
2. COMELEC had not authorized or deputized ABS-CBN to undertake the exit
survey.
NOTE: Exit poll - is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified
individuals for the purpose of determining the probable result of an election by
confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted for,
immediately after they have officially cast their ballots.
RULING: Petition granted.
a. The holding of exit polls an the dissemination of their results trhough mass
media constituted an essential part of the freedoms of speech and of the press
as provided for by Article 3, Section 4 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
b. COMELEC cannot ban the media totally in the guise of promoting clean,
honest, orderly and credible elections. Exit polls which are properly
conducted and publicized can be vital tools in eliminating the evils of election-
fixing and fraud.

SWS INC. vs. COMELEC


FACTS:
SEC. 5.4 OF RA 9006 – provides that ”surveys affecting national candidates shall
not be published 15 days before and election and surveys affecting local candidates
shall not be published 7 days before an election”.
COMELEC RESOLUTION 3636 – implements the provisions of RA 9006
SWS – argues that the restriction on the publication of election survey results
constituted prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and
present danger to justify such restraint.
RULING:
a. SEC. 5.4 OF RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom
of speech, of expression and the press.
b. It lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression and the press by
prohibiting publication of election survey results affecting candidates within
the prescribed period before the local election.

CHAVEZ vs. COMELEC


FACTS:
Francisco Chavez – in 2003 entered into agreements with certain establishments to
endorse his products. On December 30, 2003 however, he filed his certificate for
candidacy for Senator.
COMELEC RESOLUTION 6520 (issued on January 06, 2004) – provides under
Sec. 32 that “advertisements…showing the image or mentioning the name of a
person, who subsequent to product placement or display thereof becomes a candidate
for public office shall be immediately removed within 3 days after the effectivity of
these implementing rules
CHAVEZ – the billboards are merely product endorsements and not election
propaganda.
RULING:
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of COMELEC Resolution 6520 that all
propaganda materials including advertisements on print, in radio, or on television,
showing the image or mentioning the name of a person who, subsequent to the
placement or display thereof, becomes a candidate for public office, be immediately
removed, otherwise this shall be presumed as premature campaigning in violation of
the provisions of BP 881.
Upon filing of COC, billboards featuring candidate’s name and image assumed
partisan political character because the same indirectly promotes his candidacy.

PILAR vs. COMELEC


FACTS:
Juanito Pilar – filed on March 22, 1992 his Certificate of Candidacy for the position
of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Three days later, he withdrew the
same.
A fine of P10,000 was imposed upon him for failure to file his statement of
contributions and expenditures, but he argues he cannot be held liable because he
was a “non-candidate,” having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy.
COMELEC – issued a resolution imposing a fine upon Petitioner pursuant to its
Resolution No. 2348 dated January 13, 1992.
HELD:
 Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts
should not distinguish, ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
 In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to
whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term
"every candidate" must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who
pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.”
 The requirement to file the statement covers even those who withdrew as
candidates after having filed their certificates, because, Sec. 14, RA 7166 does
not make any distinction.