How Performance on Local Public Good Provision Determine

Incumbent’s Re-election Outcome?

Windhiarso Ponco Adi Putranto1,*, Ari Kuncoro1, Diah Widyawati1, Vid Adrison1

Abstract
This paper analyzes the effect of increased public good provisions (i.e., schools, health
and road infrastructures) on incumbents’ reelection probability in Indonesia at the district
level. The sample consists of all districts election between 2005 and 2015 in which the
incumbent is running for the second term. Using Probit estimation, we found that higher
provision of elementary school, high school and road infrastructure during the whole first
period increases an incumbent’s chance for reelection. We do not find statistical evidence
that increased provision health affects incumbent’s reelection probability. The share of
supporting parties in the local parliament is positive and significantly affects an incumbent
chance of winning in all specifications. We argue that since political parties have the
commitment to support its candidate, higher share in the local parliament implies more
available resources to convince voters, and hence, increase the incumbent’s popularity. Thus,
voters will vote based on the popularity rather than the incumbent’s performance in
providing physical infrastructures.

JEL classification : D72, H11, H41, H73

Keywoards : Incumbent; performance; public goods; voting behavior; reelection; Indonesia

1. Introduction
Do voters reward incumbent for their performance? Or do voter decision reflect other
considerations? There is no simple answer to such a broad question on theory, as voters
decision is influenced by many factors during the elections. Incumbent past performance and

1
University of Indonesia, Faculty of Economics;
* For correspondence with author. Email : winds_luck@yahoo.com

1
characteristics, party identification, or voter's background themselves are some of the
important influences.
A voting decision based on incumbent performance during their term in office is called
Retrospective Voting (Downs, 1957; McKelvey, 1975 and Kramer G., 1977). However, some
performances are not under the direct control of the incumbent, such as economic growth,
inflation, and unemployment (Dubois, 2016). The incumbent has more control over
instruments and some output measures such as the provision of public goods rather than
some outcome performance measures. In this study, we analyze the impact of provision of
health, education and road infrastructures on district head election results in Indonesia. The
sample consists of all districts that held direct district head election between 2005 and 2015
in which the incumbent is running for the second term. We also use other variables such as
incumbents’ characteristics, voters’ characteristics and political parties’ support as control
variables.
Indonesia is categorized as a young democracy as the first district head election began
in 2005 and with a 5-year term, no district had experienced more than two direct elections.
Although local democratization had taken place for more than a decade, to the best of our
knowledge, there is no study which analyzes the effect of incumbent performance on the
election result. We contribute to the literature by providing empirical evidence on the effect
of public goods provision on incumbents’ reelection result. Specifically, we will have
information whether voters’ decision to reward or punish the incumbent based on the
provision of local public goods.
Using probit estimation, we found that higher provision of elementary and high school
infrastructure during the whole first period increases an incumbent’s chance for reelection.
We do not find statistical evidence that increased provision health and road infrastructure
affects incumbent’s reelection probability. The share of supporting parties in the local
parliament is positive and significantly affects an incumbent chance of winning in all
specifications. We argue that since political parties commit to supporting its candidate, a
higher share coalition parties in the local parliament implies more available resources to
convince voters and increase the incumbent’s popularity. Thus, voters will vote based on the
popularity rather than the incumbent’s performance in providing physical infrastructures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide literature review,
in section 3 definition, data and variables used for analysis. In section 4, we present the

2
empirical strategy models and followed by estimation of some specifications to test the
robustness of the finding. Control the effect of some social, political and region characteristics
of the diversity variables to the incumbent electability. We discussed the main findings are in
section 5, followed by some concluding remarks in section 6.

2. Literature Review

In political economy literatures, voters’ decision based on incumbent performance

during their term in office is called Retrospective Voting (Downs, 1957; McKelvey, 1975 and
Kramer G., 1977). Voters reward or punish incumbents by evaluating incumbent’s
performance and paying little attention to what other candidates promise (Key, 1966 and
Fiorina, 1981). This implies that voters will likely to vote for the incumbent if he/she delivered
good economic performances and, on the other hand, punish for poor performance (Lewis-
Beck and Stegmaier, 2000).
According to Ferejohn, 1986 to identify the conditions under which voters hold
incumbents accountable for past performance, voters must be able to match with a relevant
performance outcome. However, there is a type of voters who evaluate a whole term
performance, and another type are voters who only evaluate how the incumbent ended their
term or at least before the election was held. The last type indicates that voters are myopic
(Nordhaus, 1975).2
The economic performance may be objective or subjective to the voters. Some studies
have used both measures such as Nannestad and Paldam (1994) and Lewis-Beck and
Stegmaier (2000). They use inflation, unemployment rate, or economic growth as objective
indicators. For subjective indicators, they use voters’ evaluation of incumbent fortunes in
executive and legislative. They found on the economic voting behavior, that voters will hold
incumbent responsible for economic performance and then reward or punishing them at the
ballot box. Another objective indicator is government financial performance, and has been
used by Brender (2003). Using sample of Israel mayors election, he found that fiscal
performance was not a relevant factor for voter decisions in the 1989 and 1993 but then
substantially affected in 1998 since information availability going better

2
myopia: when evaluating an incumbent, voters consider recent performance more than earlier performance

3
 Since some performance is not under the direct control of the incumbent, some
studies focus more on the instruments, such as favorable fiscal policies. For instance, Rogoff
and Sibert (1988) use taxes, government spending and money growth, Besley and Case (1995)
use tax-expenditure choice, while Sakurai and Menezes-Filho, (2008) use capital spending.
The found that favorable fiscal policy is effective (in-effective) in increasing the chance of
reelection.
However, Dubois, 2016 argue that fiscal allocation is directly under incumbent control,
but not directly observable by voters in asymmetric information assumption. Otherwise, using
outcome variables like local economic growth, inflation, and the unemployment rate could
bring to mislead interpretation, since the outcome are not actually all under the direct control
of the local government. In this context, using different performance measurements could
explain a different result in comparison to the previous result obtained. Public facilities are
observable output indicators, and voters could be evaluated base on their preferences.
One of the references on the effect of public goods provision on election outcome is
the work of Saumik and Denzau, 2006, which pointed out the impact of public facilities
provision to the incumbent reelection outcomes. When incumbent provide more in one
public goods, contrary voters in India concerned about other facilities. This made a negative
coefficient about incumbent performance. In another case when incumbents win because
they are popular, they had neglected about performance for providing particular facilities.
Sakurai and Menezes-Filho, 2008, use different measurement found that in Brazil's
mayoral elections, mayors who spend more capital spending during their terms increase the
probability of reelection. Another statistical evidence founded when term limit not
implemented, the coefficient related to the numbers of years in office is systematically
negative, meaning that Brazilian mayors loss of popularity among voters over the time. On
political variables results, when Brazilian economy severe macroeconomic crises, the chances
of the mayor being reelected decreases when incumbent have same alignment party with the
President. Brender, 2003 found in Israel mayor elections and fiscal performance was not a
relevant factor for the voters in 1989 and 1993, but then substantially affected in 1998. Voter
becomes more care because information availability, and voters focus on local issues and
service quality.
Even though voters not regularly hold incumbents for their performance, for example,
Kaufman (2004) finds that racial politics beat incumbent performance in mayoral elections in

4
major U.S. cities. The democratization mechanisms effectiveness then debatable, when the
political process at the local level has been characterized partly by identity politics, dynasty
patronage and money politics rather than a high standard of politician competencies
(Simandjuntak, 2012).
These examples of studies linking the incumbent’s performance with reelection
prospect in developing countries. While most of economic voting behavior literature
developed in the context of the mature democracies in the developed country, Indonesian
voters tend to put another weight than performances indeed, since Indonesia relatively a
young democracy and developing country. We did not find any empirical literature study in
local Indonesia context, on economic performance and election outcome, specifically for
incumbent reelection probability until recently. Most studies done for Indonesia are in
Political Budget Cycles, Decentralization and Democratization, and also Government
Responsiveness areas (Sjahrir and Kis-Katos, 2011; Chowdhury, Yamauchi and Dewina, 2007;
Kis-Katos and Sjahrir, 2014; Skoufias, Narayan, Dasgupta, and Kaiser, 2011, 2014).

3. Variable specification and Data description

We now turn to a quantitative analysis of the incumbent reelection results. It is a binary
dependent variable taking the value of 1 if incumbent win the reelection for the second term,
and zero if incumbent lose in reelection. We focus on that incumbent who is stand for
reelection only. The outcomes we analyze are from 2005 to 2015 district election result were
taken from Ministry of Home Affairs.4 The data also provide some political variables such as
party coalition supporting the incumbent in the election process, the incumbent
characteristics, time of election and others information to the extent the analysis. To support
parties’ coalition size, we use additional information about local legislative election result
from General Election Commission (KPU).
There is many categories of public goods, public facilities, public services or public
amenities terminology reported. Beyond the poor availability of data, some region does not
provide specific public facilities because of unneeded. We use only mandatory public goods
to measure performance and become a comparable indicators across regions. Such facilities
of a region having a primary school, junior high school, senior high school, public health

4
We are grateful for the data provided by Directorate Kepala Daerah, DPRD dan Hubungan Antar Lembaga at
Direcorate General for Regional Autonomy - Ministry of Home Affairs for comprehensive information.

5
center, medical doctor and paved road. Total number may do not tell us incumbent
performance. Some facilities are past government product. We then standardize it with
facilities consumer before measure the additional growth during incumbent first term.
Standardized public facilities per populations also informed us about the achievement
of a district in Minimum Service Standard (SPM) in public service performance. We use EPPD5
performance indicators to measure incumbent’s performance on education, health and road
sector. The standardization of public goods provision performance is use to made comparison
across region. Standardization is an important issue of redistributive policies in achieving
equality and equity in access. For example we look at the growth of 4 years6 for ratio of
number of primary school (SD) per number of SD age population. The public goods data are
taken from the Statistics Indonesia (BPS). Number of public facilities in districts are available
in local publication of BPS branch in each provinces7. Primary and secondary school facilities,
public health center and district road are under district authority, while senior high school
under provincial authority and medical doctor placement are under the ministry of health of
central government authority.
Incumbent Performances and Characteristics
We next turn to a brief description of the incumbent performance as a key variables
for voting decision and incumbents characteristics that observable and which voters will
consider in the ballot box. We made a performance comparison between winning and the
loose incumbents for public goods provision during the first term. We expect differences as
an early indication that this two group incumbents policies are different for providing facilities
response to voter needs.
Measure incumbent performance in education facilities; we use the growth of
provision of elementary school (SD) buildings per 1000 Primary school-aged population
(hereinafter also for junior and senior high school). Indication shows, regions which

5
referring to the Government Regulation (PP) No. 6 , 2008 on Guidelines for Evaluation of Local Government
Implementation (EPPD), which is described in part of the annex of the PP.
6
The reason use only after 4 years after enter the office was mainly because the availability of the data is
annualy reported. In empirical issue, voters can only observe the availability of the facilities because a lag
information (until a year before election year).
7
Province in Figure (DDA) are annual publication from 33 BPS Province in Indonesia. un-similarity of public
goods nomenclature across region are validate with another data such as Village Potential Census (PODES)
from BPS, Education Database (DAPODIK) from Ministry of Education, Public Health Database (Data Dasar
Puskesmas) from Ministry of Health and Transportation Statistics from Ministry of Transportation. We are
grateful for the access to bank data and local publication collection of central library and Sub-Directorate of
Statistics Service in BPS.

6
incumbent winning the reelection tend to increase trend. Means that incumbent try to
provide more along with growing of school age population in each level. While, in region that
incumbent lose the reelection indicate fall, means the authority does not meet the need.
Next, for health sector performance, we use two basic health service indicator that is
the growth of ratio of Puskesmas per 100000 population and growth of Doctor ratio per
100000 population. In districts which incumbent lose, the Puskesmas provision tends higher
than average of districts when incumbent win. But the growth of provision tend to increase
in winning districts, means incumbents try to pursue the fulfillment of health services,
compared to conditions in the loose districts where it is relatively already better.
For the other mandatory public facilities provision, we use the ratio of the length of
the asphalted district road (in km) to the total length of the district road. With a large variety
topography and landscape, there are no districts that are 100 percent paved. This conditions
generally occurs in the regency administration area, as an opposite in urban areas (cities)
already 100 percent asphalt. The use of district roads due to its management, maintenance
and development are under district authority. Although in one district consists of three level
jurisdiction in road management, National roads and provincial roads beside district roads.
Voter seems to only care about road quality and does not concern about the jurisdiction
management. Road conditions may also be degraded, due to the load or external factors such
as weather or natural disaster. Consequently, voter evaluates the performance of the road
provision ignoring the dynamics of road quality change during the term, and only judging the
last condition. On average, an increase in the ratio of the length of paved roads on district
roads is 19.3 percent per 5 years or less than 4 percent per year.
We found no specific pattern of incumbents’ performance in Primary School provision
measure with standardizing provision or growth of provision during the first term. Table 1
reports, there is not enough statistical evidence that both of win and lose incumbent groups
in reelection have a different performance in primary school provision and the growths,
except in Sumatera and Jawa Bali (Western Area) for growth in provision.
In Appendix 1 until 5, we show the others public goods performances. On the junior
high school provision, we found most of performance indifference between all groups region
for winning and losing incumbent in reelection, except for Jawa Bali area. For High school
growth provision, western area (Sumatera, Jawa Bali) and Sulawesi have a different
performance between two group of incumbent fortune, especially for Kabupaten

7
 administration region. In health facilities, there is not enough statistical evidence show that
between winner and lose incumbent has a different performance, both in level and growth
measurements. However, we found for road infrastructure, mostly in Kabupaten region,
western area of Indonesia (Sumatera and Jawa Bali) and Sulawesi, the performance in this
sector statistically show a different performance between two groups of the incumbent
outcome. Even though, these indications are likely to show a different strategy had applied
for each incumbent. We suggest, incumbent in each regions groups give more attention in
providing High School and Road facilities.

Table 1. Statistical Comparison of Win and Lose Incumbent in Regions Group for
Primary School Provision
Standardize Provision Growth
Group Statistics Incresult Pr(|T| > |t|) Incresult Pr(|T| > |t|)
Total Total
Lose Win Lose Win
Island:
SUMATERA Mean 6.1 6.3 6.1 0.4041 58.7 17.6 51.1 0.0736
Std.Dev. 2.5 2.1 2.4 386.9 95.6 352.0
JAWA_BALI Mean 6.0 5.8 5.9 0.3103 -4.2 -9.8 -5.3 0.0101
Std.Dev. 2.5 1.9 2.4 24.0 16.4 22.8
KALIMANTAN Mean 7.1 7.1 7.1 0.9276 -4.5 9.4 -1.9 0.2281
Std.Dev. 3.7 3.6 3.7 30.1 59.1 37.3
SULAWESI Mean 7.3 7.3 7.3 0.9220 11.0 23.7 13.4 0.6266
Std.Dev. 2.7 2.6 2.7 133.0 158.8 138.0
NT_MALUKU_ Mean 7.0 6.6 6.9 0.3909 1.8 29.5 7.3 0.1529
PAPUA Std.Dev. 3.3 2.9 3.3 60.2 129.0 79.3
Administration
Kabupaten Mean 6.6 6.5 6.6 0.4784 17.9 15.1 17.4 0.7826
Std.Dev. 2.9 2.6 2.9 227.2 108.7 209.9
Kota Mean 6.2 6.2 6.2 0.8567 15.8 -1.4 12.5 0.1859
Std.Dev. 2.7 2.2 2.6 191.4 41.4 172.7
Region
Western Area Mean 6.0 6.0 6.0 0.9518 28.8 3.7 24.1 0.0371
Std.Dev. 2.4 2.0 2.4 281.3 70.2 255.3
Eastern Area Mean 7.1 6.9 7.1 0.5509 2.8 21.2 6.3 0.1159
Std.Dev. 3.2 3.0 3.2 87.4 124.5 95.8
Total Mean 6.5 6.4 6.5 0.5157 17.5 11.4 16.3 0.4772
Std.Dev. 2.9 2.5 2.8 219.3 98.0 201.9

Furthermore, the demographic, socio-economic and cultural conditions of local

communities also take into consideration determining the reelection probability. Voters’
welfare tends to affect decisions. Using various indicator to explain voters’ welfare such as

8
household per capita expenditure, poverty rate, unemployment rate, voters’ education,
Human Development Index, we found a moderate correlation between these indicators.
Some variables explain individual characteristics of voters, while the others represent the
social condition of the district. We test this characteristics is to examine the sociotropic
impact on voter decisions. Whether social conditions in the constituency also influence voter
decisions. For example, although voters are in high-income groups, if the level of poverty rate
in the region is high at the election time will influence its decision. For voters individual
characteristics, we test whether a different behavior between urban and rural voters. As
Banerjee, Kumar, Pande and Su, 2011, found that voters in the urban region is generally hold
incumbent in office, when the performance is not too bad, rather than replacing it with other
candidates who have not seen their track record.
Voters also consider various aspects to decide on the ballot box, such as incumbents’
characteristics and political ideology. For instance, incumbent education level, religion,
ethnicity, popularity, and capability will take into account. As a country with diverse ethnicity,
religion and race issue, these identity characteristics cannot be deconstructed in voter
decisions. In political aspect, the candidate can be supported by one or more political parties
(coalition). However, the size of support represented by the seats share of parties coalition in
the DPRD, not the number of parties in coalition. Political support is not given only at the time
of the nomination, but parties in parliament are expected to be a solid supporter for ruling
government. Moreover, similarity supporter as the governor parties or the president's party
or central government parties will facilitate the development process in the region. This
support will significantly affect an incumbent chance of winning the election.
We argue, voters also partisan naturally and seek for ideology similarity. The ideology
of political parties allegedly also influence the decision. There are two types of Political
Parties, nationalist and Nationalist-Religion. Golongan Karya Party (GOLKAR) have a wide
constituencies in eastern part of Indonesia, especially in Sulawesi. National Awakening Party
(PKB) for example was born from the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest Islamic mass
organization with followers of about 80 million in Indonesia. East Java as the base of NU will
be a magnet for candidates from PKB. Central Jawa and Bali province are PDIP constituent
base regions, so that candidates who carried by PDIP Bali, have a chance to get a bigger vote
than who proposed by the other parties. While the candidates from PAN in West Sumatra and
Yogyakarta have a higher level of electability because these regions is the basis of

9
Muhamadiyah (Haris, 2014). Although in fact, our data show that the claim is not strong
enough. Figure 1 shows that voters’ choice in the election for party is not always in line from
party support to a candidate in Pilkada.

Figure 1. (is about here)

Coalition parties or single party support for the central government and between
provinces or in each district does not have a common pattern, makes this variable very
difficult to analyze. In contrast with the share of supporting parties - measured by share of
number of seats in local parliament (DPRD) - , which the pattern is tends to large seats share
for the incumbents support. We argue that since political parties commit to support its
candidate, higher share in the local parliament implies more available resources to convince
voters, and hence, increase the incumbent’s popularity.

4. Empirical Model and Specification Issues

Voters consider incumbent performance more than challengers promise (McKelvey,
1975). In the election, voters assumed to evaluate incumbent base on past performance, so
there a time lag between performance and voters reaction. An incumbent who is successful
in providing constituencies preferences, has the advantage to increase the probability to win
reelection. The first empirical model specifies a probit model in the form:

Yi = α + γi + Xi ’ β + Z’i δ + εi
where Yi takes value 1 if the incumbent i win the election, 0 otherwise; α is constant, γi is

the region fixed effect and Xi is the incumbent performance variables measured from the

change in standardize public provision Xit-1 – Xit-5 , Zi is the political control variables and
other characteristics associated with election outcomes. We use a set of public goods
provision performance as independent variables that measure the overall years of the
incumbent in the first term. We also propose:

Yit = α + γi + X’it-1 β + Z’it δ + εi

In the second specification, we use information how many public goods provided in a year

10
before election available. If the coefficients from the first specification are insignificant and
the second specification is significant, it means voters do not pay attention to the whole
period performance and only concern on incumbent performance one year prior to the
election. The sign is an indication that voters are myopic. In contrast, we expect the opposite
result when voters are vigilant.
We control the effect of incumbent performance in providing public goods using some
variables that may have a significant role in voter decisions. Voters may consider incumbent
characteristics, such as incumbent education, religion, and ability to manage government
budget in the previous term of. Another factor which may also influence voters decision are
economic growth, poverty rate, unemployment rate and inequality Gini ratio. Other control
variables are political factors to mitigate incumbent ideology position, characterized from
Party behind him/her. We also use the share of incumbent coalition support in parliament,
and number of challenger in the election.
The potential econometric problem is endogeneity issue. It is shown by the possibility
of inconsistent parameter estimation due to endogenous regressors. Moreover, the
regression estimates only measure the magnitude of association, rather than the magnitude
and the direction of causation to the regressant (Baum, 2008). The factors that trigger an
endogeneity is the political support for an incumbent from coalition parties. Political support
reflects the politicians’ response towards an incumbent performance. To deal with the
endogeneity problem, we argue there is a specific performance that will affect the share of
support, but not directly impacts reelection prospect. For instance, we use road
infrastructure performance from the first year until the third year of incumbent’s first term
as the instrumental variables (IV). We argue, this variable is an exogenous to the reelection
outcome. However, it is likely to be an important factor for the political parties support, since
this instrument also uses by coalition parties to gain votes in the legislative election. If an
endogeneity exists, we apply an IV model (IVProbit); otherwise, we use the standard Probit
model.

5. Results and Discussion

We begin with the first specification results. In table 2 we show the effect of public
goods provision performance in the first term on the probability of incumbent win reelection
using Probit estimation. In the specification robustness check from the first until the fifth

11
models we show the estimation result without and with adding control variables of
incumbent characteristics, voters’ characteristics, district economic condition in election year
and political variables covariate. Using robust standard error, we estimate all equations.

Table 2. (is about here)

From the table it is shown in education sector, the coefficient is statistically significant with
mix direction. Positive for elementary and senior high school facilities provision performance,
and negative for junior high school performance. Even though the effect is less robust, we
found statistical evidence to show that the provision of elementary school facility has an
impact on the incumbent reelection prospect. Increase in elementary school provision, bring
a positive response by voters. We argue, that incumbent give a priority in this sector, as about
39 to 74 percent of a school-age population was at elementary school age according to
SUSENAS. Voters’ evaluation has come from the elementary students’ parent as the facilities
consumer. In our observation, commonly found student parents in Indonesia elementary
school environment during study hours. Mani and Mukand, 2007 found that more visible
public goods provide by government, voters is easier to assess incumbent competence. This
explain, how voters in this sector could reward incumbent performance. In contrast, the
finding with provision on a junior high school (SMP) facilities is counterintuitive. We found a
statistically significant negative effect of performance in this subsector.
On the other hand, there also a statistical evidence that increases in performance for
providing high school facilities will response with a vote for the incumbent. The incumbent is
aware that high school building provision is important, since senior high school students are
youth voters. According to BPS, around 15 to 20 percent of voters in elections are categorized
as young voters from 15 to 20 years old. 50 percent from this group is still a high school
student, means that these voters share on the election outcome give a significant impact.
Performance in providing high school facilities could be a potential factor to bring victory in
reelection. Even though, this sector jurisdiction is under provincial government affairs; district
government plays a significant role in the provision such as mitigation on the financial
allocation, location, and other various support in the process of providing the facilities. Voters
will give the credit to the incumbent for the effort of this provision.

12
 Next, using for both variables Puskesmas and Doctor, there are no statistical evidence
that increase the performance in health sector, matter for increase reelected probability.
According to SUSENAS, people who suffered health problems and then utilized Puskesmas
services were only about 4 percent from its population. While the remaining 96 percent use
other medical services such as the private doctors practice, clinics, or hospitals. Since
utilization of Puskesmas is very low, then the addition of provision will not necessarily make
the community switch to Puskesmas. This condition indicates voters concern is not too high,
at least until 2014. We argue after the implementation of Universal Health Coverage
Insurance (BPJS) in the middle of 2015, there a lot change in the way how voter monitor the
performance in health sector. Our result in line with Kis-Katos and Sjahrir, 2011 finding, which
states that after democratization there no significant effects of service coverage levels can be
found in health infrastructure. Meanwhile, for doctor placement, we did not find statistical
evidence for this variable give an effect to incumbent reelection probability, we suggest
voters know the placement of Doctors in the district is from central government authority,
and then not reward neither punish incumbent for this performance.
In road infrastructure, we found there is statistical evidence of performance of first
term effect reelection prospect, at least before we control it with incumbent characteristics
and political variables, means that this variable is less robust. But we did not find it from
second specification, since literature said that politicians who use road instruments to show
performance, give their effort near the elections date, or do it after a certainty of winning
after the elections. Even most of road quality in Indonesia is not durable, because temptation
to produce lower quality roads is high, since district heads extorting higher bribes from the
construction firms for political party funding (Kuncoro, Adrison and Isfandiarni, 2012). With heavy
road loads, weather and natural disasters, the road quality will be easily degraded. This
explanation help us to understand why the first specification give the positive significant
impact, while the second specification give no significances effect.
When voters focus on evaluating incumbent on election-year or last performance,
what can we do about it? Voters want to evaluate incumbent for the whole first period, but
the news media rarely report the last performance. Anecdotal evidence shows that news
media and the government report economic statistics only recent performance. Since voters
fail to receive the information they desire, they substitute recent performance in its place
without realizing it. If the incumbent term ended with strong growth, voters conclude that it

13
went well overall even if it did not. If the incumbent term ended with weak growth, they
conclude that it went poorly overall even if using all term was actually strong. Hard times hurt
incumbents. Voters' retrospections are indicated myopic. Only the most recent year or two
seem too influential. Thus elections tell us how the voters have felt lately, not how they are
thinking about the future. In these models, voters use a year lagged value of competence to
use in their evaluation.
Table 3. (is about here)

In general, our finding that needs to be underlined by these specifications within an

indication of myopic voter frame, only performance on primary school provision give a
different impact compare to the first specification. While others variable substantially
indifference with the first one. Provision of senior high school facilities give more statistical
significance level, this indicates student in this level which becomes beginner voters as a
myopic voters who evaluate incumbent recent performance.
We suggest the incumbent will do another strategy if the incumbent belief that his/her
performance in the political year is not used as a voter decision instrument. Incumbent tend
to manipulate spending allocations to increase prospects for re-election. This manipulation
usually is done near the elections. In the political literature known as political business cycles.
One instrument that is thought to be effective for improving the prospect is by transferring
income from the government to the voters through social assistance spending (Bantuan Sosial
or Bansos). It is effective because it increases welfare in the short term. The effectiveness of
social assistance spending will be tested at the time of the election. We use the amount of
social spending (in real terms). We suggest that amount of Bansos expenditure also reflects
the logistics ability of incumbent face the election. The results show that social assistance
spending in the election year effectively increases the electability. This means that voters who
become the recipients of social assistance will increase their welfare for a moment, so then
they choose to give a reward.

Table 4. (is about here)

In the empirical equation model, we investigate whether voters choose incumbent not
only based on the performance of the provision of public goods during their tenure but also

14
consider other factors. Using voter's characteristics, found statistical evidence that the
greater percentage of the population who educated high school or more in the region, then
the chance of incumbent reelected tend to be lower. This is given that the level of education,
will affect how to evaluate the performance. Although there is insufficient statistical evidence,
however, as the findings (Arvate, Avelino & Tavares, 2009), that development spending
manipulation will have an impact on voting if sophisticated voters are compared to naïve
voters. Meanwhile, statistical evidence shows the level of voter welfare measured by
household expenditure per capita is very influential on election opportunities. The more
prosperous voters in the election year, the chances of voters to hold incumbent in office are
getting bigger.
Incumbent characteristics also important variables considered by voters. A positive
and significant direction indicates that the relationship between the good ability to manage
financial resource (WTP) will be responded by vote, while the high level of education and the
religious equality factor with the majority of the population are positively correlated with the
probability of election though not significant. An increase of the share of the incumbent’s
coalition seats in district parliaments will increase electability. This indicator also shows the
level of incumbent popularity, means political machine working to generate vote from parties
constituent. Although the number of coalition party members and number of candidates,
statistically has no impact on the reelection prospect.
Meanwhile, the existence of major parties such as PDIP and Golkar in incumbent
coalition has a different response by voters. Incumbent that supported by Golkar will increase
electability, while in contrast PDIP support does not give an impact. We argue, since our study
sample mostly are before PDIP rule the government (Jokowi era), then the result was not
significant. Next, coalition with a certain ideology such as Islamic Parties represent by PKB,
PKS, PAN, PPP also give insignificant impact. In contrast with Henderson and Kuncoro, 2011
finding, we argue this conditions due to several corruption cases involving the cadres of these
Islamic parties. So Islamic ideology is not even a guarantee that candidates from Islamic
parties will be anti-corruption, when this issue is important for voters.
We also found, agriculture society preference is indifference with the other sector
society since this variable has no statistical evidence causing incumbent prospect. While the
pattern of incumbent victory is different between western and eastern part of Indonesia,
which western part was hard for incumbent to hold victory without strong robustness. For

15
areas with large numbers of villages, it will increase the probability to reelect. We argue, it is
because of the element of the village head, since village head also elected directly and then
have a real constituent base. In the government structure village head also an incumbent
subordinate, means that it can be a strong bureaucratic machine to gain a votes.
The effect of macroeconomic performance on reelection is mixed up. Voters tend to
unresponsive to local economic growth, but give a punishment to an increase in inflation rate,
indicates our voters are naïve since they were more likely to punish an incumbent for its
mistakes, rather than that reward it for the successes. Voters’ belief that performance on
economic growth does not contribute by incumbent only, but in the other hand increases in
prices is incumbent sin.

6. Concluding Remarks
Some results obtained from this study show some parts consistent with the literature.
Even though the difficulty of finding comparable studies of the same kind using the public
goods provision, we build arguments based on statistical data supporting the regression
results. The phenomenon that emerged in this study is a picture of democracy at the district
level of Indonesia, where Indonesia reflects the developing countries and young democracy.
In contrast to some of the earlier studies that are widely practiced in developed countries and
mature democracies.
We found some empirical evidence, that the performance on provision during the first
term will affect the probability of re-election. The results provided can be logically explained
supported by existing data. The main finding is that when the public goods consumer is a
potential voter, like a high school student voter, then the incumbent performance will help
him to gain votes.
When electorate unable to identify the public goods authority, it will gives a different
impact on the decision. For example, high school management is under the provincial
government, but the district government takes advantage of the good provision. In contrast
with the provision of doctors, tend to be no impact. However, in the case of paved road
provision with three jurisdiction in this provision, it also does not give significant and robust
impact. Voters in Indonesia's are likely to punish incumbents, even when voters are not
directly monitoring the performance, this show by SMP and Puskesmas provision.

16
 In terms of public goods provision in voting decision, we find that voters reward local
incumbent for growing provision when they directly consume or monitoring its facilities.
Using mandatory obligation for district government providing such public goods in education,
health and road infrastructure sectors we found voters take into account to considerate these
performance under voting decision. Meanwhile, they also consider another important
variables before make a decision whether to hold incumbent or replace with fresh candidate.
Identity political characteristics such as incumbent characteristics and ideology is cannot be
deconstructed in voter decisions.
We found Indonesia local voters, also indicates not always evaluate base on individual
benefit (egotropic) but also concern about sociotropic condition - how the community
affected - under incumbent term. We also found a weak evidence of myopic voters’
indication, and a little evidence that our voters are naïve. In contrast, political variable seems
gives more impact on reelection prospect rather that performance.
Finally, as a study on economic voting behavior evidence in Indonesia, it will provide
additional information on political economic literature. Difficulties in data availability, make
our research have a limitation in public goods types. In fact, there is various public facilities
type that more contextual, to evaluate district incumbent performance. Our results should
raise another question about another aspect impact on incumbent prospect face the
reelection. Recently, many incumbents makes an innovation or providing local public goods
needed by constituencies that significantly raise their electability for the second term. We
argue this strategy will contribute to voter decision bigger than political identity. This is left
for another future research.

17
References

Alesina, A. & Rosenthal, H., (1989). Partisan cycles in congressional elections and the
macroeconomy. American Political Science Review 83, 373–398.
Arvate, P.R. George Avelino & José Tavares,(2009). Fiscal conservatism in a new democracy:
“Sophisticated” versus “naïve” voters, Economics Letters 102 125–127
Banerjee, Abhijit, Selvan Kumar, Rohini Pande, & Felix Su, (2011), Do Informed Voters Make
Better Choices? Experimental Evidence from Urban India, Mimeo.
Besley, Timothy & Anne Case, (1995). Does electoral accountability affect economic policy
choices? Evidence from gubernatorial term limits. Q. J. Econ. 110 (3), 769 – 798
Brender, A. (2003). The effect of fiscal performance on local government election results in
Israel: 1989-1998. Journal of Public Economics, 87, 2187 - 2205.
Chowdhury, S., Yamauchi, F., & Dewina, R. (2007). Governance Decentralization and
Infrastructure Provision in Indonesia . JBICI Working Paper.
Downs, A., (1957). An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. Journal of
Politicaly Economy, 135.
Dubois, Eric, (2016). Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus Public Choice,
166:235–259
Ferejohn, J. (1986). Incumbent performance and electoral control. Public Choice, 50, 5-25.
Fiorina, Morris P. (1981). Retrospective Voting in American National Elections, New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press.
Haris, Syamsuddin,(2014), Partai, Pemilu, dan Parlemen Era Reformasi, Yayasan Pustaka
Obor Indonesia, Jakarta
Henderson, J.Vernon & Ari Kuncoro, (2011), Corruption and local democratization in
Indonesia: The role of Islamic parties, Journal of Development Economics, 94, 164–
180.
Kaufman, Karen. (2004). The Urban Voter: Group Conflict and Mayoral Voting Behavior in
American Cities . Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Key, V. O. (1966). The Responsible Electorate . New York: Vintage Books.

18
Kis-Katos, K., & Sjahrir, B. S. (2014). The impact of fiscal and political decentralization on
local public investments in Indonesia. International Economic Policy Discussion Paper
Series .
Kramer, G. (1977). A dynamical model of political equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory,
1977 .
Kuncoro, A., Adrison, V., & Isfandiarni, I. (2012). Varieties of Governance: Effective Public
Service Delivery Decentralization, Local Democracy and the Effectiveness of Public
Service Delivery: The Case of Roads in Indonesia. Global Development Network
Working Paper.
Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and Mary Stegmaier (2000). ‘‘Economic Determinants of Economic
Outcomes.’’Annual Review of Political Science 3: 183–219
Mani, Anandi and Sharun Mukand, (2007), Democracy, visibility and public good provision,
Journal of Development Economics, 83, 506–529.
McKelvey, R. D. (1975). Policy Related Voting and Electoral Equilibrium. Econometrica Vol.
43, No. 5/6 , 815-843 .
Nannestad, P., & Paldam , M. (1994). The VP Function: A Survey of the Literature on Vote
and Popularity Functions After 25 Years. Public Choice, 79, 213-245.
Nordhaus, W.D. (1975). The political business cycle. The Review of Economic Studies 42:
169–190.
Rogoff, K., & Sibert, A. (1988). Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles. The Review of
Economic Studies 55 , no. 1, 1-16.
Sakurai, S. N., & Menezes-Filho, N. A. (2008). Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian
municipalities. Public Choice, 137, 301-314.
Saumik, P., & Denzau, A. (2006). Does Public Good Provision Determine Incumbent’s Fate?
Evidence from India. MPRA Paper No. 11536.
Simandjuntak, D. (2012). Gifts and Promises: Patronage Democracy in a Decentralized
Indonesia” in European Journal of East Asian Studies 11 (1), 99–126.
Sjahrir, B. S., & Kis-Katos, K. (2011). Does local governments’ responsiveness increase with
decentralization and democratization? Evidence from sub-national budget allocation
in Indonesia. International Economic Policy Discussion Paper Series.

19
Skoufias, E., Narayan, A., Dasgupta, B., & Kaiser, K. ( 2011). Electoral Accountability, Fiscal
Decentralization and Service Delivery in Indonesia . Policy Research Working Paper
The World Bank.
Skoufias, E., Narayan, A., Dasgupta, B., & Kaiser, K. (2014). Electoral Accountability and Local
Government Spending in Indonesia. Policy Research Working Paper The World Bank .

20
 Table 2. Effect of Public Goods Provision in Whole 1st Period Performance on Reelection

Dependent Va r. : Reel ect (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

SD per SD a ge 0.00857** 0.00818** 0.00775** 0.00745* 0.0115**

popul a ti on (2.30) (2.21) (2.08) (1.94) (2.22)
SMP per SMP a ge -0.00792*** -0.00786*** -0.00710** -0.00591* -0.0123***
popul a ti on (-2.68) (-2.64) (-2.34) (-1.88) (-2.84)
SMA per SMA a ge 0.00341* 0.00289 0.00289 0.00337 0.00664**
popul a ti on (1.69) (1.39) (1.39) (1.63) (2.04)
Pus kes ma s per 100000 0.00180 0.00170 0.00173 0.00189 0.00304
Popul a ti on (1.15) (1.08) (1.07) (1.12) (1.15)
Dokter per 100000 -0.00001 0.00019 0.00017 -0.00003 -0.00036
Popul a ti on (-0.01) (0.26) (0.24) (-0.05) (-0.43)
Ra ti o of Pa ved Roa ds 0.00247*** 0.00248*** 0.00198 0.00250 0.00162
(2.82) (2.78) (1.28) (1.51) (0.72)
Economi c Growth 0.01350 0.01750 0.01780 -0.00476
(0.59) (0.74) (0.77) (-0.21)
-0.34800 -0.28200 -0.46500 -0.751*
Infl a ti on (l n)
(-1.00) (-0.79) (-1.30) (-1.65)
Fi na nci a l Ma na gi ng 0.14800 0.08870 0.07740
Audi t (Dummy WTP) (0.97) (0.56) (0.36)
Incumbent Educa ti on 0.09290 0.10200 -0.01060
(1.13) (1.22) (-0.10)
Vi l l a ges 0.00044 0.00099 0.00104
(0.37) (0.78) (0.58)
Hous ehol d perca pi ta 0.00000498*** 0.0000010
expendi ture (rea l ) (3.18) (0.52)
Dummy Indones i a Wes t -0.08490 -0.347*
Pa rt (-0.53) (-1.67)
Sha re of Agri cul ture 0.00790 0.00172
Sector i n GDP (%) (1.55) (0.26)
Coa l i ti on Pa rti es s ea ts 1.137**
i n Loca l Pa rl i a ment (%) (2.08)
Number of Coa l i ti on -0.02090
Members (-0.58)
Number of Ca ndi da tes -0.02180
(-0.34)
Coa l i ti on Members
- PDIP 0.0276
(0.14)
- GOLKAR 0.21
(0.96)
- DEMOKRAT 0.02
(0.07)
- Is l a mi c Pa rti es 0.15
(1.46)
Cons ta nt 0.249** 2.07 1.39 1.08 4.15
(1.99) (1.06) (0.68) (0.53) (1.55)

N 364 364 364 364 260

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

21
 Table 3. Effect of Public Goods Provision in a year before Election Performance on Reelection

Dependent Va r. : Reel ect (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

SD per SD a ge -0.00952 -0.02230 -0.04020 -0.00997 -0.01190

popul a ti on (-0.33) (-0.76) (-1.34) (-0.31) (-0.29)
SMP per SMP a ge -0.141** -0.126** -0.104* -0.10300 -0.195**
popul a ti on (-2.35) (-2.07) (-1.69) (-1.63) (-2.24)
SMA per SMA a ge 0.183** 0.153* 0.196** 0.213** 0.274**
popul a ti on (2.26) (1.86) (2.33) (2.44) (2.33)
Pus kes ma s per 100000 0.00154 0.00123 0.00453 0.00296 0.00590
Popul a ti on (0.40) (0.32) (1.10) (0.67) (1.03)
Dokter per 100000 -0.00289 -0.00216 0.00233 -0.00605 -0.00205
Popul a ti on (-0.49) (-0.36) (0.37) (-0.91) (-0.25)
Ra ti o of Pa ved Roa ds 0.11300 0.00991 0.08010 0.19300 -0.17000
(0.42) (0.04) (0.28) (0.65) (-0.44)
Economi c Growth 0.01440 0.02040 0.01650 0.01160
(1.09) (1.51) (1.24) (0.78)
Infl a ti on (l n) -0.33300 -0.18100 -0.33800 -0.579*
(-1.55) (-0.80) (-1.38) (-1.82)
Fi na nci a l Ma na gi ng 0.234* 0.217* 0.12600
Audi t (Dummy WTP) (1.87) (1.70) (0.74)
Incumbent Educa ti on 0.05750 0.04440 -0.02180
(0.87) (0.67) (-0.25)
Vi l l a ges 0.00184*** 0.00239*** 0.00283***
(3.14) (3.65) (3.46)
Hous ehol d perca pi ta 0.00000359*** 0.00000109
expendi ture (rea l ) (2.90) (0.68)
Dummy Indones i a Wes t -0.03600 -0.11700
Pa rt (-0.27) (-0.72)
Sha re of Agri cul ture 0.00008 -0.00315
Sector i n GDP (%) (0.02) (-0.55)
Coa l i ti on Pa rti es s ea ts 1.293***
i n Loca l Pa rl i a ment (%) (3.00)
Number of Coa l i ti on -0.03960
Members (-1.30)
Number of Ca ndi da tes -0.07760
(-1.53)
Coa l i ti on Members
- PDIP 0.09500
(0.57)
- GOLKAR 0.448**
(2.52)
- DEMOKRAT 0.06
(0.30)
- Is l a mi c Pa rti es 0.14
(1.49)
Cons ta nt 0.609** 2.479* 0.87 0.87 3.205*
(2.11) (1.94) (0.64) (0.61) (1.72)

N 587 587 587 583 427

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

22
 Table 4. Effect of Public Goods Provision in a year before Election Performance on Reelection
Dependent Va r. : Reel ect (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

SD per SD a ge 0.00779 -0.00374 -0.01900 -0.00575 -0.00393

popul a ti on (0.24) (-0.11) (-0.54) (-0.16) (-0.08)
SMP per SMP a ge -0.128** -0.115* (0.09) (0.10) -0.214**
popul a ti on (-1.98) (-1.77) (-1.36) (-1.53) (-2.15)
SMA per SMA a ge 0.13300 0.10500 0.13700 0.178** 0.251*
popul a ti on (1.58) (1.22) (1.55) (1.96) (1.93)
Pus kes ma s per 100000 0.00278 0.00283 0.00515 0.00267 0.00816
Popul a ti on (0.65) (0.65) (1.13) (0.58) (1.20)
Dokter per 100000 -0.00598 -0.00472 -0.00233 -0.00875 -0.00072
Popul a ti on (-0.83) (-0.66) (-0.31) (-1.04) (-0.07)
Ra ti o of Pa ved Roa ds 0.25 0.21 0.28 0.45 0.13
(0.85) (0.71) (0.90) (1.42) (0.30)
Soci a l Protecti on 0.00729* 0.00694* 0.00539 0.00570 0.00063
Expendi ture (1.88) (1.82) (1.49) (1.51) (0.12)
Economi c Growth 0.01 0.02 0.01 (0.02)
(0.42) (0.78) (0.70) (-0.57)
Infl a ti on (l n) -0.33800 -0.21300 -0.31100 -0.835**
(-1.17) (-0.72) (-1.02) (-1.99)
Fi na nci a l Ma na gi ng 0.247* 0.22 0.18
Audi t (Dummy WTP) (1.75) (1.52) (0.89)
Incumbent Educa ti on 0.07610 0.08230 -0.01720
(1.02) (1.09) (-0.16)
Vi l l a ges 0.00143** 0.00183** 0.00231**
(2.04) (2.39) (2.30)
Hous ehol d perca pi ta 0.00000396*** 0.0000008
expendi ture (rea l ) (2.76) (0.43)
Dummy Indones i a Wes t -0.11000 -0.29500
(-0.72) (-1.47)
Sha re of Agri cul ture 0.0084 0.0033
(1.62) (0.49)
Coa l i ti on Pa rti es s ea ts 1.080**
(2.15)
Number of Coa l i ti on -0.03930
Members (-1.32)
Number of Ca ndi da tes -0.09070
(-1.58)
Coa l i ti on Members
- PDIP -0.01860
(-0.10)
- GOLKAR 0.400**
(2.09)
- DEMOKRAT 0.08590
(0.43)
- Is l a mi c Pa rti es 0.13900
(1.45)
Cons ta nt 0.34200 2.23600 0.85000 0.26400 4.761*
(1.08) (1.31) (0.48) (0.15) (1.87)

N 454 454 454 453 312

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

23
 (a) Share of PKB seats in Local Parliament (DPRD) from 2014 Legislative Election

(b) Pilkada 2015 (green & white) by incumbent candidate support by PKB (green) in Jawa

(c) Pilkada 2015 result, incumbent from PKB win the reelection (green) in Jawa

Figure 1. Comparison between Party Election and Incumbent support by Party fortune in
Pilkada 2015 (Illustration Case : PKB and Kabupaten/Kota in Jawa )

24
 APPENDIX

A.1. Statistical Comparison of Win and Lose Incumbent in Regions Group for Junior High
School Provision (SMP)
Statistics Standardize Provision T test Growth T test
Group Incresult Ho: diff = 0 Incresult Ho: diff = 0
Total Total
Lose Win Pr(|T| > |t|) Lose Win Pr(|T| > |t|)
Island:
SUMATERA Mean 3.3 3.4 3.3 0.3968 36.2 18.3 32.9 0.1358
Std.Dev. 1.5 1.4 1.5 144.9 83.3 135.8
JAWA_BALI Mean 2.5 2.3 2.5 0.0726 11.3 -7.6 7.7 0.0014
Std.Dev. 1.2 1.0 1.2 38.1 50.9 41.5
KALIMANTAN Mean 3.8 3.9 3.8 0.5128 25.9 35.2 27.6 0.5893
Std.Dev. 1.9 2.0 1.9 51.9 87.8 59.9
SULAWESI Mean 4.4 4.2 4.4 0.3829 30.5 39.9 32.2 0.7233
Std.Dev. 2.0 1.5 1.9 49.0 172.2 86.3
NT_MALUKU_ Mean 4.0 4.6 4.1 0.1091 39.6 80.4 47.5 0.2084
PAPUA Std.Dev. 2.4 2.4 2.4 104.9 210.9 132.6
Administration
Kabupaten Mean 3.5 3.5 3.5 0.9878 28.4 28.7 28.5 0.9781
Std.Dev. 1.9 1.8 1.9 102.9 137.8 110.3
Kota Mean 3.2 3.2 3.2 0.6809 23.3 13.5 21.4 0.2842
Std.Dev. 1.7 1.5 1.6 60.1 66.0 61.3
Region
Western Area Mean 3.0 2.9 3.0 0.6426 24.7 6.3 21.2 0.0079
Std.Dev. 1.4 1.4 1.4 108.7 70.4 102.7
Eastern Area Mean 4.0 4.1 4.0 0.3511 31.0 50.0 34.6 0.2219
Std.Dev. 2.2 2.0 2.2 74.3 169.5 99.6
Total Mean 3.4 3.4 3.4 0.8236 27.5 25.3 27.1 0.7892
Std.Dev. 1.9 1.8 1.9 95.2 125.4 101.6

25
 A.2. Statistical Comparison of Win and Lose Incumbent in Regions Group for Senior High
School Provision (SMA)

Statistics Standardize Provision T test Growth T test

Group Incresult Ho: diff = 0 Incresult Ho: diff = 0
Total Total
Lose Win Pr(|T| > |t|) Lose Win Pr(|T| > |t|)
Island:
SUMATERA Mean 2.0 2.1 2.0 0.6406 36.3 14.1 32.2 0.0177
Std.Dev. 1.0 1.0 1.0 117.7 63.0 109.9
JAWA_BALI Mean 1.6 1.5 1.6 0.3238 22.7 -2.4 17.9 0.0024
Std.Dev. 0.9 1.0 1.0 52.1 71.0 57.0
KALIMANTAN Mean 1.9 1.9 1.9 0.9077 32.7 24.6 31.2 0.6234
Std.Dev. 1.1 1.2 1.1 63.5 82.0 67.1
SULAWESI Mean 2.2 2.2 2.2 0.6222 38.1 18.4 34.4 0.0894
Std.Dev. 1.0 0.9 1.0 61.0 68.6 62.8
NT_MALUKU_ Mean 2.3 2.6 2.3 0.1790 61.2 74.6 63.8 0.6813
PAPUA Std.Dev. 1.7 1.6 1.7 129.5 207.4 147.2
Administration
Kabupaten Mean 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.8219 37.0 20.0 33.8 0.0400
Std.Dev. 1.2 1.2 1.2 99.1 113.0 102.0
Kota Mean 1.8 1.9 1.8 0.3756 31.8 21.6 29.8 0.3440
Std.Dev. 1.0 1.1 1.1 64.4 79.4 67.6
Region
Western Area Mean 1.8 1.8 1.8 0.7521 30.1 7.3 25.8 0.0004
Std.Dev. 1.0 1.0 1.0 92.7 67.8 88.9
Eastern Area Mean 2.1 2.2 2.1 0.5361 43.7 37.3 42.5 0.6267
Std.Dev. 1.3 1.3 1.3 92.1 140.0 102.7
Total Mean 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.8876 36.0 20.3 33.1 0.0215
Std.Dev. 1.2 1.2 1.2 92.6 106.2 95.5

26
 A.3. Statistical Comparison of Win and Lose Incumbent in Regions Group for Public Health
Center Provision (PUSKESMAS)

Standardize Provision T test Growth T test

Group Statistics Incresult Ho: diff = 0 Incresult Ho: diff = 0
Total Total
Lose Win Pr(|T| > |t|) Lose Win Pr(|T| > |t|)
Island:
SUMATERA Mean 26.1 24.5 25.9 0.1882 7.1 19.4 9.4 0.4584
Std.Dev. 14.8 12.6 14.5 146.8 134.1 144.4
JAWA_BALI Mean 10.6 10.0 10.5 0.2045 -6.0 -2.2 -5.3 0.2662
Std.Dev. 5.7 5.3 5.7 20.2 30.7 22.6
KALIMANTAN Mean 36.4 39.7 36.8 0.3674 5.3 1.2 4.5 0.3719
Std.Dev. 21.8 25.8 22.4 42.3 18.0 38.5
SULAWESI Mean 31.0 29.5 30.8 0.5359 18.8 76.7 30.1 0.2943
Std.Dev. 19.6 16.9 19.2 104.5 349.8 181.0
NT_MALUKU_ Mean 43.2 41.2 42.9 0.5783 -2.9 4.2 -1.5 0.1497
PAPUA Std.Dev. 31.6 26.4 31.0 42.2 25.8 39.7
Administration
Kabupaten Mean 27.1 25.2 26.8 0.1159 5.6 22.7 8.9 0.1456
Std.Dev. 23.1 20.7 22.8 102.1 171.1 118.6
Kota Mean 24.8 25.1 24.8 0.8979 -5.4 -5.4 -5.4 0.9927
Std.Dev. 17.6 19.2 17.8 36.9 31.0 35.7
Region
Western Area Mean 18.7 17.2 18.5 0.0757 0.8 7.8 2.2 0.4204
Std.Dev. 13.9 12.2 13.7 106.8 98.2 105.2
Eastern Area Mean 36.5 35.9 36.4 0.7413 5.9 27.4 10.1 0.2250
Std.Dev. 25.8 23.8 25.5 68.3 199.8 107.5
Total Mean 26.7 25.3 26.5 0.1754 3.1 16.6 5.7 0.1442
Std.Dev. 22.0 20.4 21.8 91.9 152.2 106.2

27
 A.4. Statistical Comparison of Win and Lose Incumbent in Regions Group for Doctor
Provision (DOKTER)

Standardize Provision T test Growth T test

Group Statistics Incresult Ho: diff = 0 Incresult Ho: diff = 0
Total Total
Lose Win Pr(|T| > |t|) Lose Win Pr(|T| > |t|)
Island:
SUMATERA Mean 12.2 11.0 12.1 0.1310 37.8 27.5 35.9 0.3298
Std.Dev. 10.0 8.2 9.7 94.0 83.0 92.1
JAWA_BALI Mean 14.8 14.7 14.8 0.9579 29.5 11.0 25.9 0.0287
Std.Dev. 13.3 13.0 13.2 87.5 66.1 84.1
KALIMANTAN Mean 10.0 11.4 10.2 0.2333 33.2 49.6 36.6 0.5555
Std.Dev. 6.2 8.1 6.5 83.1 164.1 104.8
SULAWESI Mean 10.5 10.1 10.4 0.7624 16.8 14.2 16.3 0.7833
Std.Dev. 8.6 9.1 8.7 51.1 55.3 51.8
NT_MALUKU_ Mean 7.0 7.7 7.1 0.3986 57.2 49.1 55.7 0.7462
PAPUA Std.Dev. 5.5 6.9 5.7 125.4 146.3 129.4
Administration
Kabupaten Mean 11.3 11.4 11.3 0.4468 34.7 29.7 33.7 0.0464
Std.Dev. 9.9 9.9 9.9 92.5 108.9 95.8
Kota Mean 13.3 12.4 13.2 0.7525 35.8 15.3 31.7 0.5317
Std.Dev. 11.8 10.8 11.6 89.6 68.9 86.1
Region
Western Area Mean 13.0 12.3 12.9 0.3075 31.7 19.2 29.3 0.0671
Std.Dev. 11.6 10.5 11.4 87.1 76.1 85.2
Eastern Area Mean 9.9 10.7 10.0 0.2514 37.9 35.6 37.4 0.8474
Std.Dev. 8.0 9.4 8.2 97.3 125.7 103.4
Total Mean 11.7 11.6 11.6 0.9440 34.3 26.4 32.8 0.2218
Std.Dev. 10.3 10.1 10.3 91.6 101.2 93.5

28
 A.5. Statistical Comparison of Win and Lose Incumbent in Regions Group for Road Provision

Standardize Provision T test Growth T test

Group Statistics Incresult Ho: diff = 0 Incresult Ho: diff = 0
Total Total
Lose Win Pr(|T| > |t|) Lose Win Pr(|T| > |t|)
Island:
SUMATERA Mean 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9072 3.3 23.0 7.0 0.0046
Std.Dev. 0.2 0.2 0.2 37.1 67.2 45.0
JAWA_BALI Mean 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.0001 12.3 9.6 11.8 0.4070
Std.Dev. 0.2 0.1 0.2 36.4 26.2 34.7
KALIMANTAN Mean 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4923 28.6 41.9 31.4 0.5294
Std.Dev. 0.3 0.3 0.3 123.5 126.6 124.0
SULAWESI Mean 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.0519 5.1 14.0 6.8 0.0856
Std.Dev. 0.2 0.2 0.2 39.8 30.9 38.4
NT_MALUKU_ Mean 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.2473 27.6 55.2 32.8 0.1576
PAPUA Std.Dev. 0.3 0.3 0.3 108.9 130.3 113.5
Administration
Kabupaten Mean 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.0022 13.2 26.7 15.8 0.0139
Std.Dev. 0.3 0.3 0.3 71.3 82.9 73.8
Kota Mean 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7751 11.2 14.5 11.9 0.6912
Std.Dev. 0.3 0.3 0.3 56.5 65.1 58.1
Region
Western Area Mean 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.0300 7.9 17.1 9.7 0.0231
Std.Dev. 0.2 0.2 0.2 37.8 52.7 41.1
Eastern Area Mean 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.0384 18.9 35.6 22.1 0.0700
Std.Dev. 0.3 0.3 0.3 93.5 104.7 95.9
Total Mean 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.0027 12.7 25.3 15.1 0.0071
Std.Dev. 0.3 0.3 0.3 68.1 80.4 70.8

29
A.6. Average Performance in Period 1, by Incumbents Group (t = election year)

Win Lose All

Performance
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Elementary School (SD) per 1000 SD age population
t-5 5.84 3.16 6.87 2.90 6.16 3.12
t-4 5.36 3.62 5.88 3.81 5.52 3.69
t-3 6.72 2.40 7.17 2.62 6.86 2.48
t-2 6.83 2.65 7.20 2.53 6.94 2.62
t-1 6.47 2.53 6.97 2.66 6.62 2.58
t 6.48 2.45 6.77 2.29 6.57 2.40
Junior High School (SMP) per 1000 SMP age population
t-5 2.92 1.70 3.41 1.75 3.07 1.73
t-4 2.78 2.08 3.03 2.22 2.86 2.12
t-3 3.45 1.56 3.73 1.66 3.54 1.60
t-2 3.61 1.72 3.92 1.72 3.70 1.72
t-1 3.30 1.67 3.73 1.88 3.43 1.75
t 3.44 1.74 3.74 1.91 3.53 1.80
Senior High School (SMA) per 1000 SMA age population
t-5 1.72 1.13 1.97 0.99 1.80 1.09
t-4 1.63 1.32 1.70 1.32 1.65 1.32
t-3 2.07 1.09 2.10 1.04 2.08 1.07
t-2 2.18 1.10 2.28 1.16 2.21 1.12
t-1 1.85 1.12 1.91 1.14 1.87 1.13
t 1.96 1.16 2.00 1.12 1.97 1.15
Public Health Center (Puskesmas) per 100000 population
t-5 24.40 18.00 30.00 24.70 26.20 20.60
t-4 25.90 20.60 28.40 24.00 26.70 21.70
t-3 24.90 19.70 27.60 23.80 25.70 21.00
t-2 26.10 21.70 29.90 27.80 27.30 23.70
t-1 25.60 20.90 28.80 25.60 26.60 22.40
t 25.20 20.30 27.40 23.20 25.90 21.20
Doctor per 100000 population
t-5 10.80 8.70 10.00 7.80 10.50 8.40
t-4 12.00 10.90 11.20 10.00 11.70 10.60
t-3 12.60 11.50 11.20 10.00 12.20 11.10
t-2 12.30 11.10 11.30 10.00 12.00 10.80
t-1 12.00 10.90 11.20 9.40 11.80 10.50
t 11.60 10.20 11.30 9.30 11.50 9.90
Paved Road Ratio (in Km)
t-5 60.20 28.70 50.20 28.10 56.80 28.80
t-4 58.30 29.60 53.80 29.10 56.80 29.40
t-3 55.10 29.90 53.60 28.60 54.60 29.40
t-2 53.20 30.80 54.30 28.80 53.60 30.10
t-1 49.70 29.60 54.60 29.10 51.60 29.50
t 54.40 29.40 56.20 27.70 55.00 28.80

30
 A.7. Descriptive Statistics of Socio-Economics Control Variables

Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max

Population 614 495991.4 553119.9 15462.0 4659064.0
GDRP per Capita (Nominal) 614 18971.5 29761.2 887.3 424549.1
Growth GDRP per Capita Nominal 614 12.5 15.5 -37.0 331.4
GDRP per Capita (Riil) 614 8192.1 11655.4 573.2 211987.9
Growth GDRP per Capita Riil 614 4.2 9.5 -42.1 163.9
GDRP (Nominal) 614 9336694.0 21300000.0 215187.6 360000000.0
GDRP (Riil) 614 4021493.0 7909289.0 113363.4 123000000.0
Growth PDRB Riil 614 5.8 8.0 -41.3 173.1
% Mining Sector (Nominal) 614 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0
% Mining Sector (Riil) 608 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.9
Mean Year School Household Head 419 6.8 1.4 1.3 11.4
% Middle Class Income (Q5-Q8) 611 0.6 0.1 0.03 0.9
Unemployment Rate 611 6.3 4.2 0.02 34.8
IPM 611 69.8 4.8 44.3 82.2
Gini 611 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.5
Poverty Rate (P0) 608 15.2 8.7 1.7 48.2
Poverty Gap (P1) 608 2.9 2.3 0.2 18.3
Poverty Severity (P2) 610 0.8 0.9 0.01 9.4
% Agriculture Sector in GDRP 610 30.8 17.9 0.1 78.8
% Manufacture Sector in GDRP 610 27.2 19.3 2.1 98.3
% Services Sectore in GDRP 610 42.0 16.4 1.6 84.6
GDRP Deflator 614 218.8 63.7 109.8 558.4
National GDP Riil Growth 614 5.7 0.5 4.8 6.4
National GDP Deflator 614 261.9 73.3 158.5 358.1

A.8. Descriptive Statistics of Politiocal Variables

Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max

Number of Supporting Parties of 484 3.34 3.84 1 25
Incumbent
Share of Incumbent Coalition Parties seats 533 0.34 0.22 0.00 0.97
in DPRD
Candidates 593 3.93 1.53 1 13
Demokrat in Coalition (Dummy = 1 if yes) 505 0.22 0.42 0 1
Gerindra in Coalition 505 0.13 0.34 0 1
Golkar in Coalition 505 0.36 0.48 0 1
Hanura in Coalition 505 0.12 0.32 0 1
Nasdem in Coalition 505 0.10 0.30 0 1
PAN in Coalition 505 0.26 0.44 0 1
PBB in Coalition 505 0.11 0.31 0 1
PDIP in Coalition 505 0.37 0.48 0 1
PKPI in Coalition 505 0.09 0.29 0 1
PKS in Coalition 505 0.21 0.41 0 1
PPP in Coalition 505 0.20 0.40 0 1

31
 A.9. Incumbent and Local Election Results

Number of Number of Percentage of

Number of
Year Incumbents Incumbents Incumbents
Local Election
Candidate Win Win
2005 206 124 83 66.9
2006 71 55 43 78.2
2007 36 34 21 61.8
2008 136 99 69 69.7
2009 Parliaments & Presidential Election
2010 214 111 64 57.7
2011 61 21 13 61.9
2012 68 29 17 58.6
2013 129 64 39 60.9
2014 Parliaments & Presidential Election
2015 258 149 97 65.1
Total 1179 686 446 65.01

A.10. Incumbent Characteristics

Characterisics Incumbent Group
Win Lose
Education Level (in %)
High School 67.30 32.70
Bachelor 67.90 32.10
Master Degree 73.00 27.00
Doctoral Degree 64.10 35.90
Similarity in Religion (in %)
Same 97.39 95.14
Different 2.61 4.86
Financial Managing Audit by BPK (in %)
WTP 74.16 25.84
Non WTP 65.05 34.95

32
 A.11 . Correlation Matrix of others covariates in election year
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1.Voters Education (%, SMA) 1

2.Household per capita Exp. (Real) 0.603 1

3.Dummy WTP 0.082 0.040 1

4.Incumbent Education Level 0.009 0.052 -0.124 1

5.Dummy Religion Similarity 0.053 -0.050 0.063 0.012 1

6.District Economic Growth 0.068 0.081 -0.085 0.042 -0.005 1

7.District Unemployment Rate 0.339 0.345 0.159 -0.091 0.148 0.050 1

8.District HDI 0.367 0.556 0.013 -0.033 -0.019 0.009 0.316 1

9.District Poverty Rate -0.334 -0.634 0.075 0.014 0.054 0.039 -0.225 -0.562 1

10.District Inflation Rate -0.024 0.174 -0.451 0.148 -0.031 0.084 -0.113 0.083 -0.088 1

11.Number of Sub-District -0.376 -0.327 0.086 0.047 0.087 0.016 -0.060 -0.305 0.335 -0.029 1

12.Number of Villages -0.393 -0.375 0.088 0.002 0.100 -0.030 -0.128 -0.183 0.362 -0.084 0.710 1

13.Dummy Proliferation -0.130 -0.152 0.002 0.055 0.021 -0.082 -0.135 -0.126 0.148 -0.085 0.069 0.082 1

14.Dummy West Region -0.060 -0.006 0.215 -0.023 0.160 -0.083 0.123 0.239 0.039 -0.050 0.193 0.285 -0.124 1

15. Agriculture share on GDP (%) -0.537 -0.598 -0.148 -0.107 -0.045 -0.096 -0.470 -0.377 0.385 -0.016 0.205 0.268 0.095 -0.160 1

16.Dummy Urban -0.009 0.065 -0.013 0.070 0.095 0.088 -0.013 0.105 -0.086 0.003 0.121 0.066 0.073 0.103 -0.056 1

17.Region Wide (KM2) -0.267 -0.035 -0.124 0.087 -0.197 0.181 -0.106 -0.282 0.126 0.047 0.137 0.080 0.127 -0.289 0.086 0.032 1

18.Coalition in Local Parliament -0.050 0.144 0.046 0.062 -0.070 0.016 -0.029 0.079 -0.165 0.023 -0.014 -0.081 -0.056 0.099 -0.101 0.072 0.053 1

19.Number of Supporting Parties -0.051 0.058 -0.203 0.027 -0.029 -0.011 -0.115 -0.066 -0.066 0.321 0.014 -0.060 -0.026 -0.038 0.099 -0.021 0.119 0.460 1

20.Number of Challengers 0.125 -0.033 -0.169 0.000 0.004 -0.035 0.038 0.021 0.063 0.091 -0.054 0.023 0.140 -0.102 0.088 -0.018 -0.051 -0.374 -0.103 1

33