Doctorado en Ciencia Política

ECONOMÍA POLÍTICA (Primer Semestre 2017)

Sebastián Lucas Mazzuca

smazzuca@unsam.edu.ar

Tomás Bril Mascarenhas

tombril@berkeley.edu

Descripción. Este curso ofrece una introduccioó n a los principales conceptos, temas y
enfoques en economíóa políótica, asíó como a las herramientas metodoloó gicas fundamentales
del anaó lisis comparado y de políótica econoó mica. El programa se divide en tres partes. La
primera parte (Semana 1) examina enfoques teoó ricos en competencia (ej., geograó ficos
versus institucionales versus culturales) para entender el crecimiento econoó mico de largo
plazo y las variaciones de ingreso per caó pita entre paíóses. La segunda parte (Semanas 2 y 3)
estudia la relacioó n entre actores colectivos (empresarios y sectores populares) y
variaciones en patrones de políótica puó blica. La tercera parte (Semana 4) considera los
efectos de la economíóa sobre la emergencia y estabilidad de macro-instituciones políóticas,
incluidos el Estado y la democracia. A lo largo de todo el curso, se inventaríóan debates
claó sicos y recientes sobre la relacioó n entre Estado y mercado, y democracia y capitalismo.

El curso se centra en los casos de Ameó rica latina pero no son pocas las referencias a Europa
Occidental, el Sudeste Asiaó tico, los Estados Unidos y AÁ frica.

Objetivos. Capacitar a los estudiantes para hacer anaó lisis de economíóa políótica en general, y
tener en cuenta los rasgos distintivos de las economíóas de Ameó rica latina en particular. Al
final del curso, los estudiantes podraó n entender restricciones y condicionantes geograó ficos,
institucionales, culturales y políóticos sobre los maó rgenes de accioó n en materia de políótica
macroeconomíóa, desarrollar investigacioó n acerca de las causas fundamentales de las
trayectorias de crecimiento econoó mico de largo plazo, asíó como analizar la interaccioó n entre
actores sociales y el Estado y los impactos sobre la forma y el contenido de la políótica
puó blica.

Evaluación. La nota final del curso seraó un promedio ponderado del rendimiento en tres
actividades: 1) participacioó n en clase (25%); 2) plan de trabajo (25%); 3) trabajo escrito
final (50%).

Fechas relevantes. 1ro de agosto: entrega propuesta de trabajo final (una paó gina maó ximo).
1ro de noviembre: entrega trabajo final.
Bibliografía

UÁ nico libro completo requerido es:

Mazzuca, Sebastiaó n (compilador). 2015. Economía Política del Crecimiento. Cadenas

Cadenas Causales y Efectos Institucionales. Buenos Aires: Corporacioó n Andina de Fomento.
[Mazzuca/CAF] http://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/829

Los textos de esta compilacioó n estaó n asignados a lo largo de la Parte I. El libro es de acceso
gratuito y estaó inspirado en ediciones anteriores de este curso.

* Indica texto optativo

PARTE I

1. MOTIVACIÓN Y DEFINICIONES

1.A. Desarrollo Económico

Mazzuca, Sebastiaó n. 2015. “Introduccioó n,” en Mazzuca/CAF.

Jones, Charles. 2013. “Introduction”. En Charles I. Jones y Dietrich Vollrath, Introduction to

Economic Growth (3rd Edition). W. New York : W. W. Norton & Company, pp. 1-16.

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2012. Why Nations Fail: the Origins of Power,
Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Business, Capíótulo 1.

1.B. Causalidad

Acemoglu, Daron. 2003. “Root Causes”. Finance & Development, 40.2: 27-31.
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2003/06/pdf/Acemoglu.pdf

Rodrik, Dani y Arvind Subramanian. 2003. “The Primacy of Institutions”. Finance &
Development, 40.2, pp. 31-34.
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2003/06/pdf/rodrik.pdf

1.C. Desarrollo Institucional

Mazzuca, Sebastian y Gerry Munck. 2011. “Regime”. En George Kurian (ed.), Encyclopedia of
Political Science. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Markoff, John. 1996. Waves of Democracy: Social Movements and Political Change. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press. Capíótulos 1 y 4, y Apeó ndice: 1-11, 71-98, 143-155.

2. DESARROLLO ECONÓMICO: TEORÍA

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2.A. Tecnología y Empresarios

Schumpeter, Joseph A. En Mazzuca/CAF 2015. [Original: 1947. “The Creative Response in

Economic History”, The Journal of Economic History, 7, 2: 149-159.]

* Reamer, Andrew. 2014. “The Impacts of Technological Invention on Economic Growth. A

Review of the Literature”, mimeo, The George Washington Institute of Public Policy.
http://www.gwu.edu/~gwipp/Reamer_The_Impacts_of_Invention_on_Economic_Growth_0
2-28-14.pdf

2.B. Geografía

Sachs, Jeffrey D. 2003. “Institutions Matter, but not for Everything”. Finance & Development,
40.2: 38-41.
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2003/06/pdf/sachs.pdf

* Jared Diamond et al. Guns, Germs, and Still. Episode 1: Out of Eden. PBS Documentary.
http://www.pbs.org/gunsgermssteel/show/episode1.html
Documental disponible en YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QwZ4s8Fsv94

2.C. Mercado

Friedman, Milton, and Rose Friedman. 1990. Free to Choose: A Personal Statement. San
Diego : Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Introduccioó n y Capíótulos 1 y 2.

Rothbard, Murray N. 2008. “Free-market”, en The Concise Encyclopaedia of Economics.

Library of Economics and Liberty. http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/FreeMarket.html

2.D. Cultura

Polanyi, Karl. En Mazzuca/CAF 2015. [Original: 1957. “The Economy as Instituted Process”,
in Polanyi, K., Arensberg, C. M., y Pearson, H. W. (eds.), Trade and Market in the Early
Empires: Economies in History and Theory. Glencoe: Free Press, pp. 243-269.]

* Weber, Max. 1998. La Ética Protestante y el Espíritu del Capitalismo. Madrid: Istmo.

2.E. Instituciones

Lane, Frederic C. En Mazzuca/CAF 2015. [Original: 1958. “Economic Consequences of

Organized Violence”, The Journal of Economic History, 18, 4: 401-417.]

Acemoglu, Daron, y James A. Robinson. 2012. Why Nations Fail: the Origins of Power,
Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Business, Capíótulos 2 y 3.

2.F. Instituciones II

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Olson, Mancur. En Mazzuca/CAF 2015. [Original: 1976. “The Political Economy of
Comparative Growth Rates”, en U.S Congress, US Economic Growth from 1976 to 1986, Vol. 2,
Washington D.C., pp. 25-40.]

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. En Mazzuca/CAF 2015. [Original:
2005. “Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth”, Handbook of Economic
Growth, Vol. 1, pp. 385-472.]

3. DESARROLLO ECONÓMICO: CASOS

3.A. Éxito

North, Douglass C., y Barry R. Weingast. En Mazzuca/CAF 2015. [Original: 1989.

“Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in
Seventeenth-Century England”. The Journal of Economic History, 49, 4: 803-832.]

Gerschenkron, Alexander. En Mazzuca/CAF 2015. [Original: 1962. “Economic

Backwardness in Historical Perspective”, in Economic Backwardness in Historical
Perspective. A Book of Essays. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, pp. 5-30.]

Johnson, Chalmers. En Mazzuca/CAF 2015. [Original: 1987. “Political Institutions and

Economic Performance: the Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan”, in Frederic C. Deyo (ed.), The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 136-164.]

3.B. Fracaso

Bates, Robert. En Mazzuca/CAF 2015. [Original: 1983. “The Nature and Origins of
Agricultural Policies in Africa”, in Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 107-133.]

* Mahdavy, Hossein. En Mazzuca/CAF 2015. [Original: 1970. “The Pattern and Problems of
Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran”, in M.A. Cook (ed.), Studies in the
Economic History of the Middle East. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 428–467.]

3.C. América Latina

Prebisch, Rauó l. En Mazzuca/CAF 2015. [Original: 1962. “El desarrollo econoó mico de la
Ameó rica Latina y algunos de sus principales problemas”, Boletín Económico de América
Latina/CEPAL, 7, 1: 1-24.]

Skidmore, Thomas, Peter Smith y James Green. 2010. “Strategies of Economic

Development”. En Thomas Skidmore, Peter Smith y James Green, Modern Latin America.
New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 351-375.

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Sokoloff, Kenneth L. y Stanley L. Engerman. 2000. “History Lessons: Institutions, Factor
Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World”, The Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 14, 3: 217-232. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2646928

Coatsworth, John H. 2005. “Structures, Endowments, and Institutions in the Economic

History of Latin America”, Latin American Research Review, 40, 3: 126-144.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3662825

* Bulmer Thomas, Victor. 2014. The Economic History of Latin America since Independence.
New York: Cambridge University Press, Capíótulos 1-6.

PARTE II

4. ACTORES COMO ANCLA ANALÍTICA

4.A. Actores del Empresariado: Preferencias

Schneider, Ben Ross. 2014. “Studying Political Economy in Latin America: Gaps and
Methods”. Latin American Politics and Society 56 (1): 20–22.

Hacker, Jacob S., y Paul Pierson. 2002. “Business Power and Social Policy: Employers and
the Formation of the American Welfare State”. Politics & Society 30 (2): 277–325.

Broockman, David E. 2012. “The ‘Problem of Preferences’: Medicare and Business Support
for the Welfare State”. Studies in American Political Development 26 (2): 83–106.

Bril Mascarenhas, Tomaó s y Aldo Madariaga. 2017. “The Political Economy of Residual
Industrial Policy in Chile, 1990-2017”. Artíóculo bajo referato.

Mares, Isabela. 2003. “The Sources of Business Interest in Social Insurance: Sectoral Versus
National Differences”. World Politics 55 (2): 229–258.

4.B. Actores del Empresariado: Poder

Pierson, Paul. 2015. “Power and Path Dependence”. En James Mahoney y Kathleen Thelen
(eds.), Advances in Comparative-Historical Analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Vogel, David. 1987. “Political Science and the Study of Corporate Power: A Dissent from the
New Conventional Wisdom”. British Journal of Political Science 17 (4): 385–408.

Fairfield, Tasha. 2015. Private Wealth and Public Revenue in Latin America: Business Power
and Tax Politics. Capíótulo 2.

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Culpepper, Pepper D. 2010. Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate Control in Europe
and Japan. New York: Cambridge University Press. Conclusioó n.

Culpepper, Pepper D. y Raphael Reinke. 2014. “Structural Power and Bank Bailouts in the
United Kingdom and the United States”. Politics & Society 42 (4): 427–54.

4.C. Actores de Sectores Populares: Preferencias y Poder

Silver, Beverly J. 2003. Forces of Labor: Workers’ Movements and Globalization since 1870.
Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. Introduccioó n.

Collier, Ruth Berins y David Collier. 1979. “Inducements Versus Constraints: Disaggregating
‘Corporatism’”. American Political Science Review 73 (4): 967–86.

Thelen, Kathleen. 1994. “Beyond Corporatism: Toward a New Framework for the Study of
Labor in Advanced Capitalism”. Comparative Politics 27 (1): 107–24.

Korpi, Walter. 2006. “Power Resources and Employer-Centered Approaches in Explanations

of Welfare States and Varieties of Capitalism: Protagonists, Consenters, and Antagonists”.
World Politics 58 (02): 167–206.

Etchemendy, Sebastiaó n. 2004. “Represioó n, exclusioó n e inclusioó n: relaciones gobierno-

sindicatos y modelos de reforma laboral en economíóas liberalizadas”. Revista SAAP 2 (1):
135–64.

Culpepper, Pepper D. 2008. “The Politics of Common Knowledge: Ideas and Institutional
Change in Wage Bargaining”. International Organization 62 (1): 1–33.

4.D. Actores del Empresariado y de Sectores Populares: Organización y Acción

Colectiva

Schneider, Ben Ross. 2004. Business Politics and the State in Twentieth-Century Latin
America. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. Capíótulo 2.

Bull, Benedicte. 2008. “Policy Networks and Business Participation in Free Trade
Negotiations in Chile”. Journal of Latin American Studies 40: 95-224.

Schneider, Ben Ross. 2008. “Economic Liberalization and Corporate Governance: The
Resilience of Business Groups in Latin America”. Comparative Politics 40 (4): 379–397.

Etchemendy, Sebastiaó n, y Ruth Berins Collier. 2008. “Golpeados pero de pie: resurgimiento
sindical y neocorporativismo segmentado en Argentina (2003-2007)”. Postdata 13 (junio):
145–92.

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Garay, Candelaria. 2007. “Social Policy and Collective Action: Unemployed Workers,
Community Associations, and Protest in Argentina”. Politics & Society 35 (2): 301–28.

5. ENFOQUES CENTRADOS EN ACTORES

5.A. Variedades de Capitalismo

Hall, Peter A., y David W. Soskice, eds. 2001. Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional
Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-
44.

Noö lke, Andreas, y Arjan Vliegenthart. 2009. “Enlarging the Varieties of Capitalism: The
Emergence of Dependent Market Economies in East Central Europe”. World Politics 61 (4):
670–702.

Schneider, Ben Ross. 2009. “Hierarchical Market Economies and Varieties of Capitalism in
Latin America”. Journal of Latin American Studies 41 (3): 553–575.

Bril Mascarenhas, Tomaó s. 2015. “In Search of the Latin American Variety of Capitalism”.
Brazilian Political Science Review 9 (1): 159–163.

5.B. Coaliciones

Gourevitch, Peter. 1993. Políticas estratégicas en tiempos difíciles: respuestas comparativas a

las crisis económicas internacionales. Meó xico: Fondo de Cultura Econoó mica, pp. 17-40, 60-
79, 147-213.

Hiscox, Michael J. 2001. “Class Versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility
and the Politics of Trade”. International Organization 55 (1): 1–46.

O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1977. “Estado y alianzas en la Argentina, 1956-1976”. Desarrollo

Económico 16 (64): 523–54.

Richardson, Neal. 2009. “Export-Oriented Populism: Commodities and Coalitions in

Argentina”. Studies in Comparative International Development 44 (3): 228–55.

PARTE III

6. DESARROLLO INSTITUCIONAL: TEORÍA

Weber, Max. 1978. “Political Community”. En Economy and Society. Berkeley: University of
California, pp. 910-950.

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Bean, Richard. 1973. “War and the Birth of the Nation State”. The Journal of Economic
History, 33.01, pp. 203-221.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. “Some social requisites of democracy: Economic

development and political legitimacy”. American Political Science Review 53(1): 69-105.

Mazzuca, Sebastian. 2010. “Macrofoundations of Regime Change: Democracy, State

Formation, and Capitalist Development”. Comparative Politics 43 (1): 1-19.

Tilly, Charles. 1989. “Cities and states in Europe, 1000–1800”. Theory and Society 18 (5):
563-584.

Møller, Jørgen. 2015. “The Medieval Roots of Democracy”. Journal of Democracy 26 (3): 110-
123.

7. DESARROLLO INSTITUCIONAL: CASOS

7.A. Europa

Downing, Brian M. 1988. “Constitutionalism, Warfare, and Political Change in Early Modern
Europe”. Theory and Society 17 (1): 7-56.

Luebbert, Gregory M. 1987. “Social Foundations of Political Order in Interwar Europe”.

World Politics 39 (4): 449-478.

* Moore, Barrington. 1966. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Boston: Beacon
Press, Capíótulos 1, 7-9.

7.B. América Latina

Mainwaring, Scott y Aníóbal Peó rez-Linñ aó n. 2015. “Cross-Currents in Latin America”. Journal of
Democracy 26 (1): 114-127.

Collier, David. 1978. “Industrial Modernization and Political Change: A Latin American
Perspective”. World Politics 30 (4): 593-614.
http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/pdfplus/2009988.pdf

Mahoney, James. 2001. “Path-dependent Explanations of Regime Change: Central America

in Comparative Perspective”. Studies in Comparative International Development 36 (1): 111-
141. Versioó n disponible en castellano:
https://ojs.publius.us.es/ojs/index.php/araucaria/article/view/969

Berins Collier, Ruth y James Mahoney. 1995. “Labor and Democratization: Comparing the
First and Third Waves in Europe and Latin America”. Working Paper Series, Institute for
Research on Labor and Employment, UC Berkeley.
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/0w11c3xd

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8. INTERACCIONES ECONOMÍA Y POLÍTICA

Hirschman, Albert O. 1994. “The On-and-Off Connection between Political and Economic
Progress”. The American Economic Review 84 (2): 343-348.

“Market Failure” y “Public Goods”. En The Economist, Economics A-to-Z,

http://www.economist.com/economics-a-to-z/m#node-21529422
http://www.economist.com/economics-a-to-z/p#node-21529442

Hochschild, Adam. 2010. “Blood and Treasure”. Mother Jones. March/April Issue.
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2010/02/congo-gold-adam-hochschild?page=1

Karl, Terry. 2007. “Oil-Led Development: Social, Political, and Economic Consequences”.
Encyclopaedia of Energy. Elsevier Inc., pp. 661-672.

Przeworski, Adam. 2004. “Democracy and Economic Development”. En Edward D. Mansfield

y Richard Sisson (eds.), The Evolution of Political Knowledge. Columbus: Ohio State
University Press.

Robinson, James A. 2006. “Economic Development and Democracy”. Annual Review of

Political Science 9: 503-527.

Olson, Mancur. 1993. “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development”. American Political

Science Review 87 (3): 567-576.

Goyal, Sanjeev y Klaas Staal. 2004. “The Political Economy of Regionalism”. European
Economic Review 48 (3): 563-593.