Sixto Brillantes, Jr.
vs Haydee Yorac AKBAYAN-Youth vs Commission on Election
192 SCRA 358 – Political Law – Constitutional Law –
Constitutional Commissions – The Commission on Elections
– COMELEC’s Constitutional Independence
In December 1989, a coup attempt occurred prompting the
president to create a fact finding commission which would
be chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently he has to vacate
his chairmanship over the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). Haydee Yorac, an associate commissioner in
the COMELEC, was appointed by then President Corazon
Aquino as a temporary substitute, in short, she was
appointed in an acting capacity. Sixto Brillantes, Jr. then
questioned such appointment urging that under Art 10-C of
the Constitution “in no case shall any member of the
COMELEC be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity”.
Brillantes further argued that the choice of the acting
chairman should not come from the President for such is an
internal matter that should be resolved by the members
themselves and that the intrusion of the president violates
the independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional
commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation made by the
president violates the constitutional independence of the
COMELEC.
HELD: Yes. Yorac’s designation as acting chairman is
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court ruled that although all
constitutional commissions are essentially executive in
nature, they are not under the control of the president in
the discharge of their functions. The designation made by
the president has dubious justification as it was merely
grounded on the quote “administrative expediency” to
present the functions of the COMELEC. Aside from such
justification, it found no basis on existing rules on statutes.
It is the members of the COMELEC who should choose
whom to sit temporarily as acting chairman in the absence
of Davide (they normally do that by choosing the most
senior member).
But even though the president’s appointment of Yorac as
acting president is void, the members of COMELEC can
choose to reinstate Yorac as their acting chairman – the
point here is that, it is the members who should elect their
acting chairman pursuant to the principle that
constitutional commissions are independent bodies.
Political Law – Election Laws – Right of Suffrage – Extension
of Voters Registration
On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with other
youth movements sought the extension of the registration
of voters for the May 2001 elections. The voters registration
has already ended on December 27, 2000. AKBAYAN-Youth
asks that persons aged 18-21 be allowed a special 2-day
registration. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
denied the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth the sued COMELEC
for alleged grave abuse of discretion for denying the
petition. AKBAYAN-Youth alleged that there are about 4
million youth who were not able to register and are now
disenfranchised. COMELEC invoked Section 8 of Republic
Act 8189 which provides that no registration shall be
conducted 120 days before the regular election. AKBAYAN-
Youth however counters that under Section 28 of Republic
Act 8436, the COMELEC in the exercise of its residual and
stand-by powers, can reset the periods of pre-election acts
including voters registration if the original period is not
observed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse
of discretion when it denied the extension of the voters
registration.
HELD: No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so
pursuant to the clear provisions of Section 8, RA 8189
which provides that no voters registration shall be
conducted within 120 days before the regular election. The
right of suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated by measures
like voters registration which is not a mere statutory
requirement. The State, in the exercise of its inherent police
power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the
act of voter’s registration for the ultimate purpose of
conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the
incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-
election activities could be performed by the duly
constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner –
one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the
pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances
of the times. RA 8189 prevails over RA 8436 in that RA
8189’s provision is explicit as to the prohibition. Suffice it to
say that it is a pre-election act that cannot be reset.
Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special
registration, COMELEC has shown in its pleadings that if it is
allowed, it will substantially create a setback in the other
pre-election matters because the additional voters from the
special two day registration will have to be screened,
entered into the book of voters, have to be inspected
again, verified, sealed, then entered into the computerized
voter’s list; and then they will have to reprint the voters
information sheet for the update and distribute it – by that
time, the May 14, 2001 elections would have been overshot
because of the lengthy processes after the special
registration. In short, it will cost more inconvenience than
good. Further still, the allegation that youth voters are
disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYAN-
Youth’s pleading was attached any actual complaint from
an individual youth voter about any inconvenience arising
from the fact that the voters registration has ended on
December 27, 2001. Also, AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted in
their pleading that they are asking an extension because
they failed to register on time for some reasons, which is
not appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant and not
those who slumber on their rights.
MACALINTAL, petitioner VS. COMELEC, ROMULO, and
BONCODIN, respondents
FACTS:
Petitioner Macalintal files a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of
R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)
are unconstitutional. The Court upholds petitioner’s right to
file the instant petition, stating in essence that the
petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented an issue
of transcendental significance to the Filipino people,
considering that public funds are to be used and
appropriated for the implementation of said law.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioner raises three principal questions for contention:
(1) That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the
registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent
residents in other countries, by their mere act of executing
an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the
Philippines, violates the residency requirement in Art. V,
Sec. 1 of the Constitution;
(2) That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the
COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national
offices and party list representatives, including the
President and the Vice-President, violates the constitutional
mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution that the
winning candidates for President and Vice-President shall
be proclaimed as winners only by Congress; and
(3) That Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress
(through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created in the same section) to exercise the power to
review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) that the COMELEC shall
promulgate, violates the independence of the COMELEC
under Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is
violative of Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is
violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.
3) Whether or not Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 is violative
of Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
HELD:
1) NO. Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is not violative of Art.
V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
2) YES. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189, with respect only to
the votes of the President and Vice-President, and not to
the votes of the Senators and party-list representatives, is
violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.
3) YES. Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189, with respect only to
the second sentence in its second paragraph allowing
Congress to exercise the power to review, revise, amend,
and approve the IRR that the COMELEC shall promulgate, is
violative of Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
REASONS:
1) Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, entitled “An Act Providing
for a System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified
Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds
Therefor, and for Other Purposes,” provides:
Sec. 5. Disqualifications.—The following shall be disqualified
from voting under this Act:
xxx xxx xxx
d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized
as such in the host country, unless he/she executes, upon
registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the
Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three
(3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act.
Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for
citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause
for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent
resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and
his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional in that
it violates the requirement that the voter must be a
resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place where he proposes to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election, as provided under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution which reads: “Sec. 1.
Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines
not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen
years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for
at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to
vote for at least six months immediately preceding the
election.”
For the resolution of this instant issue, the Court has relied
on, among others, the discussions of the members of the
Constitutional Commission on the topics of absentee voting
and absentee voter qualification, in connection with Sec. 2,
Art. V of the Constitution, which reads: “Sec. 2. The Congress
shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of
the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad.” It was clearly shown from the said
discussions that the Constitutional Commission intended to
enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad
who have not abandoned their domicile of origin, which is
in the Philippines. The Commission even intended to extend
to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose
parents’ domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider
them qualified as voters for the first time.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission
provided for Section 2 immediately after the residency
requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary
implication in statutory construction, which may be applied
in construing constitutional provisions, the strategic
location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional
Commission provided for an exception to the actual
residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified
Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect
declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the
Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do
not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V
of the Constitution.
That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an
exception to the residency requirement found in Section 1
of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate when
Senate Bill No. 2104, which later became R.A. No. 9189, was
deliberated upon on the Senate floor, further weakening
petitioner’s claim on the unconstitutionality of Section 5(d)
of R.A. No. 9189.
2)Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas
absentee voter may vote for president, vice-president,
senators, and party-list representatives.
Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:
Sec. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing.—
xxx xxx xxx
18.5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the
proclamation of a winning candidate if the outcome of the
election will not be affected by the results thereof.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is
empowered to order the proclamation of winning candidates
despite the fact that the scheduled election has not taken
place in a particular country or countries, if the holding of
elections therein has been rendered impossible by events,
factors and circumstances peculiar to such country or
countries, in which events, factors and circumstances are
beyond the control or influence of the Commission.
Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A.
No. 9189 empowering the COMELEC to order the
proclamation of winning candidates for President and Vice-
President is unconstitutional and violative of the following
provisions of Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution:
Sec. 4.
xxx xxx xxx
The returns of every election for President and Vice-
President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each
province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress,
directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the
certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not
later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all
the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House
of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress,
upon determination of the authenticity and due execution
thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be
proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an
equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall
forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the
Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of
the certificates.
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in
Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too sweeping that it
necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning
candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency,
granting merit to petitioner’s contention that said Section
appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded
the authority given to Congress by the Constitution to
proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of
President and Vice-President.
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a
power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated
by petitioner, to encroach “on the power of Congress to
canvass the votes for President and Vice-President and the
power to proclaim the winners for the said positions.”
3) Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 created the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC), as follows:
Sec. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.—a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee is hereby created,
composed of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws, and
seven (7) other Senators designated by the Senate President,
and the Chairman of the House Committee on Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms, and seven (7) other Members of the House
of Representatives designated by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives: Provided, that of the seven (7) members to
be designated by each House of Congress, four (4) should
come from the majority and the remaining three (3) from the
minority.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the
power to monitor and evaluate the implementation of this
Act. It shall review, revise, amend and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission.
All the parties, petitioner and respondents alike, are
unanimous in claiming that Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 is
unconstitutional. Thus, there is no actual issue forged on
this question raised by petitioner. However, the Court finds
it expedient to expound on the role of Congress through
the JCOC vis-à-vis the independence of the COMELEC as a
constitutional body, as aptly provided for under Art. IX-A,
Sec. 1, which reads “Section 1. The Constitutional
Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the
Commission on Audit.”
The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the
Constitution is circumscribed by other constitutional
provisions, one of which is the aforementioned provision
on the independence of constitutional commissions. The
Court has held that “whatever may be the nature of the
functions of the Commission on Elections, the fact is that the
framers of the Constitution wanted it to be independent
from the other departments of the Government.”
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is
intended to play a distinct and important part in our
scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it
should not be hampered with restrictions that would be
fully warranted in the case of a less responsible
organization. The Commission may err, so may this court
also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising
means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of
the great objective for which it was created — free, orderly
and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice
of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute
gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere.
Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be
dealt with realistically – not from the standpoint of pure
theory. The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-
finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and
its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing
with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous
position to decide complex political questions.
The Court has no general powers of supervision over
COMELEC which is an independent body “except those
specifically granted by the Constitution,” that is, to review
its decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not
correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive
legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may
intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by
exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making
authority. In line with this, this Court holds that Section 25
of R.A. 9189 is unconstitutional and must therefore be
stricken off from the said law.
Kabataan Party-list vs. COMELEC Case DIgest (G.R. No.
189868, December 15, 2009)
FACTS:In the instant case, the petitioners, Kabataan Party-
List, seeks to extend the voters registration for the May 10,
2010 national and local elections from October 31, 2009, as
fixed by COMELEC Resolution No. 8514, to January 9, 2010
which is the day before the 120-day prohibitive period
starting on January 10, 2010.
The petitioners anchor its ground on the provision of
Section 8 of R.A. 8189 which reads: "The personal filing of
application of registration of voters shall be conducted
daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular
office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted
during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days
before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a
special election."
On the other hand, COMELEC maintains that the
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code confer upon it
the power to promulgate rules and regulations in order to
ensure free, orderly and honest elections; that Section 29
of R.A. 6646 and Section 28 of R.A. 8436 authorize it to fix
other dates for pre-election acts which include voters
registration; and that the October 31, 2009 deadline was
impelled by operational and pragmatic considerations,
citing Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC has the authority to
fix the voter's registration beyond the prohibitive period
set forth by R.A. 8189.
RULING: The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners.
It held that the right of every Filipino to choose its leaders
and participate to the fullest extent in every national or
local election is so zealously guarded by Article V of the
1987 Constitution.
The Court explained that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 decrees
that voters be allowed to register daily during office hours,
except during the period starting 120 days before a regular
election and 90 days before a special election. The Court is
bound to respect the determination of Congress that the
120 day or 90 day period, as the case may be, was enough
to make the necessary preparations with respect to the
coming elections and COMELEC's rule making power should
be exercised in accordance with the prevailing law.
R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436 is not in conflict with the mandate
of continuing voter's registration under R.A. 8189. R.A.
6646 and R.A. 8436 both grant COMELEC the power to fix
other period for pre-election activities only if the same
cannot be reasonable held within the period provided by COMELEC issued resolution denying petitioners Atienza et
law. However, this grant of power, is for the purpose of al.’s petition. As forthe validity of petitioners Atienza, et
enabling the people to exercise the right of suffrage -- the al.’s expulsion as LP members, the COMELEC observedthat
common underlying policy under R.A. 8189, R.A. 6646 and this was a membership issue that related to disciplinary
R.A. 8436. action within the political party. TheCOMELEC treated it as
an internal party matter that was beyond its jurisdiction to
In the case at bar, the Court did not find any ground to hold resolve.
that continuing voter's registration cannot be reasonably
held within the period provided by R.A. 8189. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over
intra-party dispute
With regard to the Court's ruling in Akbayan-Youth v.
COMELEC, The court explained that if the petitioners had Ruling:The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party disputes
only filed their petition, and sought extension, before the is limited. It does not have blanketauthority to resolve any
120 day prohibitive period, the prayer would have been and all controversies involving political parties. Political
granted pursuant to the mandate of R.A. 8189. parties aregenerally free to conduct their activities without
interference from the state. The COMELECmay intervene in
As a result, the petition was granted and the COMELEC disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the
resolution fixing voters registration for the May 10, 2010 discharge of itsconstitutional functions.The Court ruled in
national and local elections on October 31, 2009 was Kalaw v. Commission on Electionsthat the COMELEC’s
declared null and void. powers andfunctions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, “include the ascertainment of theidentity of
Atienza vs COMELEC
the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for
[G.R. No. 188920. February 16, 2006] its acts.” Moreover, theCOMELEC’s power to register
political parties necessarily involved the determination of
Facts: Drilon, the former president of the Liberal Party (LP) thepersons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC
announced that his party withdrew supportfor the may resolve an intra-party leadershipdispute, in a proper
administration of former Pres. Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo. case brought before it, as an incident of its power to
However, Atienza, LPChairman, alleged that Drilon made register political parties.
the announcement without consulting first the party.
Atienza hosted a party conference which resulted to the The COMELEC did not err when it upheld Roxas’ election
election of new officers, with Atienza asLP president. Drilon but refused to rule on the validity ofAtienza’s expulsion.
immediately filed a petition with the COMELEC to nullify the
said electionclaiming that it was illegal considering that the
party’s electing bodies, NECO and NAPOLCO,were not
properly convened. Moreover, Drilon claimed that under
the LP Constitution, there is athree-year term. Meaning, his
term has not yet ended. However, Atienza contested that
theelection of new officers could be likened to people
power removing Drilon as president by directaction. Also,
Atienza alleged that the amendment to the LP Constituion
providing the three-termhad not been properly ratified. The
COMELEC held that the election of Atienza and others was
invalid since the electingassembly did not convene in
accordance with the LP Constitution. Moreover, the
COMELECruled that since the said Constitution was not
ratified, Drilon was only sitting in a hold-overcapacity since
his term has been ended already.Subsequently, the LP held
a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before
respondent Drilon’sterm expired which resulted to the
election of Roxas as the new LP president. Atienza et
al.sought to enjoin Roxas from assuming the presidency of
the LP questioning the validity of thequorum. The