AQUINO v ENRILE
Commander-in-Chief
FACTS:
The cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners
having been arrested and detained by the military by virtue of
Proclamation 1081. The petitioners were arrested and held
pursuant to General Order No.2 of the President “for being
participants or for having given aid and comfort in the
conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country
and to take over the Government by force…” General Order
No. 2 was issued by the President in the exercise of the power
he assumed by virtue of Proclamation 1081 placing the entire
country under martial law.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the existence of conditions claimed to
justify the exercise of the power to declare martial law subject
to judicial inquiry; and
2) Whether or not the detention of the petitioners legal in
accordance with the declaration of martial law?
HELD:
5 Justices held that the issue is a political question, hence, not
subject to judicial inquiry, while 4 Justices held that the issue
is a justiciable one. However, any inquiry by this Court in the
present cases into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual
bases for the proclamation of martial law has become moot
and academic. Implicit in the state of martial law is the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus with
respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the
basic objective of the proclamation, which is to suppress
invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or to safeguard public
safety against imminent danger thereof. The preservation of
society and national survival takes precedence. The
proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the
privilege of the writ as to the persons referred to in this case.
OLAGUER v MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34
Commander-in-Chief
FACTS:
In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military
personnel and they were placed in Camp Bagong Diwa.
Logauer and his group are all civilians. They were charged with
(1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices;
(2) conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3)
conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile,
Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to
assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roño and Onofre
Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of
Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals
Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and
proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On
August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to the SC and filed the
instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.
2. The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military
tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil
courts are open and functioning.

HELD:
1. The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and
academic because by the time the case reached the SC
Olaguer and his companions were already released from
military confinement. “When the release of the persons in
whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was
filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ
becomes moot and academic. 18 Inasmuch as the herein
petitioners have been released from their confinement in
military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for
having become moot and academic.” But the military court
created to try the case of Olaguer (and the decision it
rendered) still continues to subsist.
2. The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered
by the military courts or tribunals during the period of martial
law in all cases involving civilian defendants. A military
commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction,
even during the period of martial law, over civilians for
offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil
courts are open and functioning, and that any judgment
rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal
concerned.
FORTUN v MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
Commander-in-Chief
FACTS:
On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by
the ruling Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried under
shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in
Maguindanao.
In response to this, on November 24, 2009 President Arroyo
issued Presidential Proclamation 1946, declaring a “state of
emergency” in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato
City to prevent and suppress similar lawless violence in Central
Mindanao.
On December 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that province except
for identified areas of the MILF.
Two days later, December 6, 2009, President Arroyo
submitted her report to Congress in accordance with sec. 18,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which required her, within
48 hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, to
submit to that body a report in person or in writing of her
action. In her report, President Arroyo said that she acted
based on her finding that lawless men have taken up arms in
Maguindanao and risen against the government. The
President described the scope of the uprising, the nature,
quantity, and quality of the rebels’ weaponry, the movement
of their heavily
armed units in strategic positions, the closure of the
Maguindanao Provincial Capitol, Ampatuan Municipal Hall,
Datu Unsay Municipal Hall, and 14 other municipal halls, and
the use of armored vehicles, tanks, and patrol cars with
unauthorized "PNP/Police" markings.
On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened
pursuant to sec. 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to
review the validity of the President’s action.
But, two days later or on December 12, 2009, before Congress
could act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation
1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
Petitioners’ contention:
Petitioners Fortun and the other petitioners brought the
present actions to challenge the constitutionality of President
Arroyo’s Proclamation 1959 affecting Maguindanao on the
following grounds:
1. For gross insufficiency of the factual basis in proclaiming a
state of martial law and suspending the [writ] in the Province
of Maguindanao.
2. It is patently illegal and unconstitutional for lack of any
factual basis.
3. The validity of Proclamation No. 1959, declaring a state of
martial law in the province of Maguindanao, except for the
identified areas of the MILF, and suspending the writ in the
same area.
Respondents’ contention:
President Arroyo’s issuance of Proclamation No. 1963, lifting
martial law and restoring the writ in the province of
Maguindanao, rendered the issues raised in the present
petitions moot and academic. Respondents maintain that the
petitions have ceased to present an "actual case or
controversy" with the lifting of martiallaw and the restoration
of the writ, the sufficiency of the factual basis of which is the
subject of these petitions. Proclamation No. 1963 is allegedly a
"supervening event" that rendered of no practical use or value
the consolidated petitions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of Proclamation No. 1963, lifting
martial law and restoring the writ in the province of
Maguindanao, rendered the issues raised in the petitions
moot and academic.
HELD:
YES. The court said that Proclamation No. 1963 in the
petitions raised moot and academic because the court has
nothing to review. The Proclamation on Martial Law and Writ
of habeas corpus was already lifted through Proclamation No.
1963 before the Congress could perform its duty to review
and validate.
It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President
and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to
proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially,
but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated
the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can
maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the
situation on the ground, a power that the President does not
have.
LAGMAN v MEDIALDEA
Commander-in-Chief
FACTS:
On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued
Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the
whole of Mindanao. In accordance with the timeline set by
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
Submitted to Congress a written report on the factual basis of
such proclamation. The report stated that Mindanao has been
the hotbed of violent extremism and a brewing of rebellion for
decades. (Zamboanga siege, the Davao bombing, the
Mamasapano carnage, etc.)
The President explained that there was a government
operation on May 23 to capture the two groups prominent
with regard these situations, namely, Abu Sayff Group (ASG)
and the ISIS-back Maute Group. The operation escalated into
open hostility against the government and acts of violence
were directed towards civilians and control of major social,
economic, and political foundation of Marawi City were
undertaken. The Maute and ASG have done the following
among others: assaulted the BJMP and burned the Marawi
Police Station, facilitated the escape of inmates, set up road
blockades and checkpoints, burned churches and schools, cut
the vital lines for transportation and power, prevented
Maranaos from leaving their homes, and forced young male
muslims to join their groups.
Based on these, the President concludes that these acts
clearly showed intent to remove Marawi City, and eventually
the rest of Mindanao, from its allegiance to the Government,
and to deprive the President of his power and authority. The
ASG and Maute Group also brought undue constraints to the
military and government personnel, in the performance if
their duties and functions. The occupation of Marawi City is
considered strategic due to its location, the network and
alliance building activities among terrorist groups, local
criminals, and lawless armed men, for the absolute control
over Mindanao.
After the submission of the report and the briefings conducted
by the Executive Department, the Senate expressed full
support in P.S. Resolution No. 388 saying that Proclamation
No. 216 is constitutional.
LAGMAN PETITION:
 Claims that there is no sufficient factual basis because
there is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or any
part of Mindanao.
 Argues that the acts of terrorism in Mindanao do not
constitute rebellion since there is no proof that its
purpose is to remove Mindanao or ant part thereof
from allegiance to the Philippines.
 Contends that the flying of the ISIS flag is mere
propaganda and that the Maute Group is a mere
 private army latching into the Islamic State brand
theatrically to inflate their capability.
 Armed conflict in Marawi was initiated by the
Government according to General Mison, Jr. to capture
Hapilon.
 There was only a threat of rebellion which is akin to
imminent danger of rebellion which is no longer a valid
ground for the declaration of martial law.
 Claims that the report contained false and hyperbolic
accounts which claimed attacks on a hospital, a bank
and two schools but based on reports on the interview
of the people from those places, the places remained
intact and were not ransacked at all.
 Report mistakenly included the attack in Lanao del
Sur, the Mamasapano carnage, the Davao market
bombing, etc. as additional bases for the proclamation
but these events had long been resolved even before
the conflict in Marawi City.
 Posits that the President acted alone and did not
consult the military establishment or any ranking
official.
 There was absence of any hostile plan by the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front and the number of those allied
with ISIS was undetermined.
CULLAMAT PETITION
 Avers that the supposed rebellion relates to events
happening in Marawi City only and not in the entire
region of Mindanao
 The alleged capability of the Maute group and other
rebel groups to sow terror and cause death and
damage does not rise to the level of rebellion sufficient
to declare martial law in the law whole of Mindanao
 There is no lawless violence in other parts of Mindanao
 The phrase “other rebel groups” is vague since the
Proclamation was unable to identify the groups.
MOHAMAD PETITION
 This is a review of the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the declaration of martial law.
 Posits that martial law is a measure of last resort and
should be invoked by the President only after
exhaustion of less severe remedies which are the
following: (1) the power to call out the armed forces;
(2) the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus; (3) finally, the power to declare martial
law.
 The factual situation in Marawi is not so grave as to
require martial law
 Proposes that the rebellion or invasion must be so
grave and is compelled by the needs of public safety,
which is not yet present in Mindanao.
 The conclusions of the President’s report that the
Maute group intends to establish an Islamic State, and
deprive powers, are conclusions without
substantiation.
 This petition insists that the Court look into the
wisdom of the President’s actions and not just the
presence of arbitrariness and for the Court to compel
the respondents to divulge relevant information to
prove the sufficiency of the factual basis.
RESPONDENT’S COMMENTS
  The OSG posits that Section 18, Article VII did not
specify the vehicle, mode or remedy as the appropriate
proceeding to be resorted to.
 Maintains that the review power is not mandatory, but
merely discretionary, on the part of the Court.
 Contends that the Court should use arbitrariness, not
correctness, as the standard for reviewing the
sufficiency of factual basis.
 The burden lies with the petitioners to prove that the
Proclamation is bereft of actual basis, since
governmental actions are presumed to be valid and
constitutional.
 The sufficiency of the factual basis should be examined
not based on the facts discovered after the decision
but only be based on the information and dare
available to him at the time of determination.
 The President could validly rely on intelligence reports
coming from the AFP, and that he cannot personally
determine the veracity of the reports and that the
President, as the sole Commander-in-Chief, there is no
need for recommendation from the Defense Secretary.
 With regard the false reports cited in the report, OSG
opines that the petitioners failed to refute the facts
since they merely asserted using other news articles
which are “hearsay evidence, twice removed” and thus
inadmissible and without probative value.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the petitions are the appropriate proceeding covered
by Paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII sufficient to invoke the
mode of review required of this Court
2.W/N the President in declaring martial law and suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is:
a. required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in
his appreciation of facts
b. required to obtain the favorable recommendation
thereon of the Secretary of National Defense; or
c. required to take into account only the situation at the
time of the proclamation, even if subsequent events
prove the situation to have not been accurately
reported
3. W/N the power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis is independent of the actual actions that have
been taken by Congress jointly or separately
4. W/N there were sufficient factual basis for the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus?
a. What are the parameters for review?
b. Who has the burden of proof?
c. What is the threshold of evidence?
5. W/N the exercise of the power of judicial review by the
Court involves the calibration of graduated powers granted
the President as Commander-in-Chief? 

6.W/N Proclamation No. 216 may be considered vague and
thus null and void:
a. with its inclusion of “other rebel groups”; or
b. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual
operational parameters within the entire Mindanao
region
7. W/N the armed hostilities mentioned in the proclamation
and in the Report of the
President to the Congress sufficient bases:
 a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or
b. b. for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire
Mindanao region
8. W/N terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism equivalent
to actual rebellion and the requirements of public safety
sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus
9. W/N the nullifying Proclamation No.216
a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No.55 s.2016;
or
b. also nullify acts of the President in calling out the
armed forces to quell lawless violence in Marawi and
other parts of the Mindanao region?
HELD:
1. YES.
 As a general rule, the challenger must have a “personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has has
sustained, will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.
 In Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, it states
that “The Supreme Court may review in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
30 days from its filing.”
 The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII clearly indicate that it should be treated as sui
generis separate and different from those enumerated in
Article VIII.
 Under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a
petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different
rule on standing as any citizen may file it.
 Said provision of the Constitution also limits the issue to
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the
Chief Executive of his emergency powers.
 The usual period for filing pleadings in Petition for
Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII
is likewise not applicable under the third paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII considering the limited period within
which the Court has to promulgate its decision.
 The phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" appearing on
the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any
action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the
Chief Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases.
 It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a
matter to be resolved by the Court.
2. a. NO.
 In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
declaration and/or the suspension, the Court should look
into the full complement or totality of the factual basis,
and not piecemeal or individually.
 Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of
the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written
Report as the President could not be expected to verify
the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due
to the urgency of the situation.
 To require precision in the President's appreciation of facts
would unduly burden him and therefore impede the
process of his decision-making.
 Such a requirement will practically necessitate the
President to be on the ground to confirm the correctness
of the reports submitted to him within a period that only
the circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate.
b. NO.
 Even the recommendation of, or consultation with, the
Secretary of National Defense, or other high-ranking
military officials, is not a condition for the President to
declare martial law.
 A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
shows that the President's power to declare martial law is
not subject to any condition except for the requirements
of actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety
requires it.
 Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if the
decision of the President is made dependent on the
recommendation of his mere alter ego.
 Rightly so, it is only on the President and no other that the
exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief under
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is bestowed.
c. YES.
 Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the
President, the determination of the Court as to whether
there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of the
power to declare martial law and/or suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, must be based only on facts
or information known by or available to the President at
the time he made the declaration or suspension which
facts or information are found in the proclamation as well
as the written Report submitted by him to Congress.
 These may be based on the situation existing at the time
the declaration was made or past events. As to how far the
past events should be from the present depends on the
President.
 Similarly, events that happened after the issuance of the
proclamation, which are included in the written report,
cannot be considered in determining the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the declaration of martial law and/or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
since these happened after the President had already
issued the proclamation.
 If at all, they may be used only as tools, guides or
reference in the Court's determination of the sufficiency of
factual basis, but not as part or component of the portfolio
of the factual basis itself.
3. YES.
 The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of ML or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus under Sec. 18,
Article VII is independent of the actions taken by Congress.
 The suspension of the privilege of the writ of Habeas
Corpus and the proclamation of ML are now subject to the
veto powers of the Court and Congress, under the 1987
Constitution.
 The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation
in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the
ground of lack of sufficient factual basis.
 On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation
or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by
the President.
 The Court considers only the information and data
available to the President prior to or at the time of the
declaration; it is not allowed to undertake an independent
investigation beyond pleadings.
 Congress may take into consideration not only data
available prior to, but likewise events supervening the
declaration.
 Unlike the Court, which does not look into the absolute
correctness of the factual basis, Congress could probe
further and deeper, delving into the accuracy of the facts
presented before it.
 The Court’s review power is passive and thus, can only be
initiated by the filing of a petition in an appropriate
proceeding by a citizen.
 The review mechanism of Congress is automatic which
may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the
proclamation or suspension was made.
 The power to review by the Court and the power to
revoke by the Congress are independent from each other.
However, both nullify the proclamation of the President.
4. YES.
 The President deduced from the facts available to him that
there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose
of which was to remove from the allegiance to the
Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to
deprive the Chief Executive of any of his powers and
prerogative, leading the President to believe that there
was probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and is
being committed and that public safety requires the
imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.
 Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for
determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for the
declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, "namely (1) actual
invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the
exercise of such power."
 Without the concurrence of the two conditions, the
President's declaration of martial law and/or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must be struck
down.
 A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to
conclude that the President, in issuing Proclamation No.
216, had sufficient factual ' bases tending to show that
actual rebellion exists.
 The President's conclusion, that there was an armed public
uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the removal
from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a
portion of its territory and the deprivation of the President
from performing his powers and prerogatives, was
reached after a tactical consideration of the facts.
 In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden
of proof. After all, what the President needs to satisfy is
only the standard of probable cause for a valid declaration
of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
 What the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of
probable cause for a valid declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. 
 and/or declaring martial law may be exercised
5. NO.
 The power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating
the President's decision pertaining to which extraordinary
power to avail given a set of facts or conditions.
 To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the
exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on
the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the
President.
 The President as the Commander-in-Chief has 3
extraordinary powers:
o Calling out the Armed Forces
o Suspending the privilege of the writ of Habeas
Corpus
o Declaring Martial Law
 These powers may be resorted to only under specified
conditions.
o The calling out power is the most benighted
and involves ordinary action.
 The President may only resort to this
power whenever it becomes necessary
to prevent lawless violence, invasion, or
rebellion. The power is fully
discretionary to the President.
 However, he must act within
permissible constitutional boundaries or
in a manner not constituting grave
abuse of discretion.
o The suspending of the privilege of the writ
only when there is:
 (a) actual invasion or rebellion, and
 (b) public safety requires it.
 The limitations imposed in the 1987 Constitution are:
o a time limit of 60 days;
o review and possible revocation by Congress;
and
o review and possible nullification by the SC.
6. a. NO.
 The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is
not at all vague when viewed in the context of the words
that accompany it.
 Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other
rebel groups" found in Proclamation No. 55, which it cited
by way of reference in its Whereas clauses.
b. NO.
 There is no need for the Court to determine the
constitutionality of the implementing and/or operational
guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders
issued after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its
review.
 Thus, any act committed under the said orders in violation
of the Constitution and the laws, such as criminal acts or
human rights violations, should be resolved in a separate
proceeding.
 Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades into these
areas, it would be deemed a trespassing into the sphere
 that is reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of
its power to revoke.
7. YES.
 A review of the facts available to the President that there
was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of
which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine
Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the
Chief Executive of any of his power and prerogatives
leading to President to believe that there was probable
cause that the crime of rebellion was and is being
committed and that public safety requires the imposition
of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
 The President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had
sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual
rebellion exists.
 The President’s conclusion was reached after a tactical
consideration of the facts.
 In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden
of proof. After all, what the President needs to satisfy is
only the standard of probable cause for a valid declaration
of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
8. YES.
 For a declaration of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to be valid, there
must be concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion and
the public safety requirement.
 In his report, the President noted that the acts of violence
perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group were
directed not only against government forces or
establishment but likewise against civilians and their
properties.
 In addition, and in relation to the armed hostilities, bomb
threats were issued, road blockades and checkpoints were
set up, schools and churches were burned, civilian
hostages were taken and killed, non-Muslim or Christians
were targeted, young male Muslims were forced to join
their group, medical services and delivery of basic services
were hampered, reinforcement of government troops and
civilian movement were hindered, and the security of the
entire Mindanao Islands was compromised.
 Based on the foregoing, Proclamation No. 216 has
sufficient factual basis there being probable cause to
believe that rebellion exists and that public safety requires
the martial law declaration and the suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus. 

9. a. NO.
 The calling out power is in a different category from the
power to declare martial law and the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
 The Court’s declaration of a state of national emergency
on account of lawless violence in Mindanao through
Proclamation No. 55 dated September 4, 2016 where he
called upon the Armed Forces and the Philippine National
Police (PNP) to undertake such measures to suppress any
and all forms of lawless violence from spreading and
escalating elsewhere in the Philippines.
 The President’s calling out power is in a different category
from the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and
the power to declare martial law.
 In other words, the President may exercise the power to
call out the Armed Forces independently of the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to
declare martial law, although, of course, it may also be
precluded to a possible future exercise of the latter
powers, as in this case.
b. NO.
 Under the “operative fact doctrine”, the unconstitutional
statute is recognized as an “operative fact” before it is
declared unconstitutional.
 The actual existence of a statute prior to such a
determination of constitutionality is an operative fact that
may have consequence which cannot always be erased by
a new judicial declaration.
 The effect of the subsequent ruling as to the invalidly may
have to be considered in various aspects- with respect to
particular regulations, individual and corporate and
particular conduct, private and official.
PADILLLA v CONGRESS
Commander-in-Chief
FACTS:
P.S. Resolution No. 388 was approved, after receiving
seventeen (17) affirmative votes as against five (5) negative
votes, and was adopted as Senate Resolution No. 49[5]
entitled "Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate Not to
Revoke, at this Time, Proclamation No. 216, Series of 2017,
Entitled 'Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of
Mindanao.'"[6]P.S. Resolution No. 390, on the other hand,
garnered only nine (9) votes from the senators who were in
favor of it as opposed to twelve (12) votes from the senators
who were against its approval and adoption.[7]On May 31,
2017, the House of Representatives, having previously
constituted itself as a Committee of the Whole House,[8] was
briefed by Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea
(Executive Secretary Medialdea), Secretary Lorenzana, and
other security officials for about six (6) hours.
After the closed-door briefing, the House of Representatives
resumed its regular meeting and deliberated on House
Resolution No. 1050 entitled "Resolution Expressing the Full
Support of the House of Representatives to President Rodrigo
Duterte as it Finds No Reason to Revoke Proclamation No.
216, Entitled 'Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending
the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of
Mindanao.'"[9] The House of Representatives proceeded to
divide its members on the matter of approving said resolution
through viva voce voting. The result shows that the members
who were in favor of passing the subject resolution secured
the majority vote.[10]The House of Representatives also
purportedly discussed the proposal calling for a joint session
of the Congress to deliberate and vote on President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216. After the debates, however, the
proposal was rejected.[11]These series of events led to the
filing of the present consolidated petitions.
he Padilla Petition Petitioners in G.R. No. 231671 raise the
question of "[w]hether Congress is required to convene in
joint session, deliberate, and vote jointly under Article VII,
[Section] 18 of the Constitution"
HE PLAIN TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION, SUPPORTED BY THE
EXPRESS INTENT OF THE FRAMERS, AND CONFIRMED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, REQUIRES THAT CONGRESS CONVENE IN
JOINT SESSION TO DELIBERATE AND VOTE AS A SINGLE
DELIBERATIVE BODY.
Petitioners claim that in Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[18] this
Court described the "duty" of the Congress to convene in joint
session as "automatic." The convening of the Congress in joint
session when former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(President Macapagal-Arroyo) declared martial law and
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao was also a legislative precedent where the
Congress clearly recognized its duty to convene in joint
session.[19]
The Tañada Petition... he petitioners in G.R. No. 231694
chiefly opine that: A PLAIN READING OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION LEADS TO THE INDUBITABLE CONCLUSION
THAT A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS TO REVIEW A
DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW BY THE PRESIDENT IS
MANDATORY.FAILURE TO CONVENE A JOINT SESSION
DEPRIVES LAWMAKERS OF A DELIBERATIVE AND
INTERROGATORY PROCESS TO REVIEW MARTIAL LAW.FAILURE
TO CONVENE A JOINT SESSION DEPRIVES THE PUBLIC OF
TRANSPARENT PROCEEDINGS WITHIN WHICH TO BE
INFORMED OF THE FACTUAL BASES OF MARTIAL LAW AND
THE INTENDED PARAMETERS OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION.THE
FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION INTENDED THAT A JOINT
SESSION OF CONGRESS BE CONVENED IMMEDIATELY AFTER
THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW.
Consolidation of Respondents' Comments Respondents assert
firmly that there is no mandatory duty on their part to "vote
jointly," except in cases of revocation or extension of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.[29] In the absence of such duty,
the non-convening of the Congress in joint session does not
pose any actual case or controversy that may be the subject of
judicial review.[30] Additionally, respondents argue that the
petitions raise a political question over which the Court has no
jurisdiction.
Respondents further contend that the constitutional right to
information, as enshrined under Article III, Section 7 of the
Constitution, is not absolute. Matters affecting national
security are considered as a valid exception to the right to
information of the public. For this reason, the petitioners' and
the public's right to participate in the deliberations of the
Congress regarding the factual basis of a martial law
declaration may be restricted in the interest of national
security and public safety... espondents allege that petitioners
failed to present an appropriate case for mandamus to lie.
Mandamus will only issue when the act to be compelled is a
clear legal duty or a ministerial duty imposed by law upon the
defendant or respondent to perform the act required that the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or
station.
According to respondents, it is erroneous to assert that it is
their ministerial duty to convene in joint session whenever
martial law is proclaimed or the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended in the absence of a clear and specific
constitutional or legal provision. In fact, Article VII, Section 18
does not use the words "joint session" at all, much less impose
the convening of such joint session upon the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. What the Constitution requires is joint voting
when the action of the Congress is to revoke or extend the
proclamation or suspension.
Subsequent EventsOn July 14, 2017, petitioners in G.R. No.
231671, the Padilla Petition, filed a Manifestation, calling the
attention of the Court to the imminent expiration of the sixty
(60)-day period of validity of Proclamation No. 216 on July 22,
2017. Despite the lapse of said sixty (60)-day period,
petitioners exhort the Court to still resolve the instant cases
for the guidance of the Congress, State actors, and all
Filipinos.On July 22, 2017, the Congress convened in joint
session and, with two hundred sixty-one (261) votes in favor
versus eighteen (18) votes against, overwhelmingly approved
the extension of the proclamation of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Mindanao until December 31, 2017.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of these consolidated petitions;
2. Whether or not the Congress has the mandatory duty to
convene jointly upon the President's proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution;
and
3. Whether or not a writ of mandamus or certiorari may be
issued in the present cases.
HELD:
1. YES. The Court's jurisdiction over these consolidated
petitions
Contrary to respondents' protestations, the Court's exercise of
jurisdiction over these petitions cannot be deemed as an
unwarranted intrusion into the exclusive domain of the
Legislature. Bearing in mind that the principal substantive
issue presented in the cases at bar is the proper interpretation
of Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, particularly
regarding the duty of the Congress to vote jointly when the
President declares martial law and/or suspends the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, there can be no doubt that the
Court may take jurisdiction over the petitions. It is the
prerogative of the Judiciary to declare "what the law is."
Corollary to respondents' invocation of the principle of
separation of powers, they argue that these petitions involve a
political question in which the Court may not interfere. It is
true that the Court continues to recognize questions of policy
as a bar to its exercise of the power of judicial review.

2. YES. The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to
convene in joint session except to vote jointly to revoke the
President's declaration or suspension. By the language of
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, the Congress.
is only required to vote jointly to revoke the President's
proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to
the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least
a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
revoke such proclamation or suspension which revocation
shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of
the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend
such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall
persist and public safety requires it.The Congress, if not in
session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its
rules without need of a call.
The provision in question is clear, plain, and unambiguous. In
its literal and ordinary meaning, the provision grants the
Congress the power to revoke the President's proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and prescribes how the Congress may exercise
such power, i.e., by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members, voting jointly, in a regular or special session. The
use of the word "may" in the provision - such that "[t]he
Congress x x x may revoke such proclamation or suspension x
x x" - is to be construed as permissive and operating to confer
discretion on the Congress on whether or not to revoke,[71]
but in order to revoke, the same provision sets the
requirement that at least a majority of the Members of the
Congress, voting jointly, favor revocation.
It is worthy to stress that the provision does not actually refer
to a "joint session." While it may be conceded, subject to the
discussions below, that the phrase "voting jointly" shall
already be understood to mean that the joint voting will be
done "in joint session," notwithstanding the absence of clear
language in the Constitution,[72] still, the requirement that
"[t]he Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority
of all its Members in regular or special session, x x x" explicitly
applies only to the situation when the Congress revokes the
President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Simply put, the
provision only requires Congress to vote jointly on the
revocation of the President's proclamation and/or suspension.
Hence, the plain language of the subject constitutional
provision does not support the petitioners' argument that it is
obligatory for the Congress to convene in joint session
following the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, under
all circumstances
The deliberations of the 1986 ConCom reveal the framers'
specific intentions to (a) remove the requirement of prior
concurrence of the Congress for the effectivity of the
President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (b) grant to the
Congress the discretionary power to revoke the President's
proclamation and/or suspension by a vote of at least a
majority of its Members, voting jointly.
As the Court established in its preceding discussion, the clear
meaning of the relevant provision in Article VII, Section 18 of
the 1987 Constitution is that the Congress is only required to
vote jointly on the revocation of the President's proclamation
of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. Based on the Civil Liberties Union case, there is
already no need to look beyond the plain language of the
provision and decipher the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution.
That the Congress will vote on the revocation of the
President's proclamation and/or suspension in a joint session
can only be inferred from the arguments of the
Commissioners who pushed for the "voting jointly"
amendment that the Members of the House of
Representatives will benefit from the advice, opinion, and/or
wisdom of the Senators, which will be presumably shared
during a joint session of both Houses. Such inference is far
from a clear mandate for the Congress to automatically
convene in joint session, under all circumstances, when the
President proclaims martial law and/or suspends the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, even when Congress does not
intend to revoke the President's proclamation and/or
suspension.
There was no obligation on the part of the Congress herein to
convene in joint session as the provision on revocation under
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution did not even
come into operation in light of the resolutions, separately
adopted by the two Houses of the Congress in accordance
with their respective rules of procedure, expressing support
for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216.
The provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution
requiring the Congress to vote jointly in a joint session is
specifically for the purpose of revocation of the President's
proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. In the petitions at bar, the
Senate and House of Representatives already separately
adopted resolutions expressing support for President
Duterte's Proclamation No. 216. Given the express support of
both Houses of the Congress for Proclamation No. 216, and
their already evident lack of intent to revoke the same, the
provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution on
revocation did not even come into operation and, therefore,
there is no obligation on the part of the Congress to convene
in joint session.
It cannot be disputed then that the Senate and House of
Representatives placed President Duterte's Proclamation No.
216 under serious review and consideration, pursuant to their
power to revoke such a proclamation vested by the
Constitution on the Congress.
The Court highlights the particular circumstance herein that
both Houses of Congress already separately expressed
support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216, so
revocation was not even a possibility and the provision on
revocation under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution requiring the Congress to vote jointly in a joint
session never came into operation. It will be a completely
different scenario if either of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, or if both Houses of the Congress, resolve/s
to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, in
which case, Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution
shall apply and the Congress must convene in joint session to
vote jointly on the revocation of the proclamation and/or
suspension.
Petitioners invoke the following provision also in Article VII,
Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution: "The Congress, if not in
session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension convene in accordance with its
rules without call." Petitioners reason that if the Congress is
not in session, it is constitutionally mandated to convene
within twenty-four (24) hours from the President's
proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, then it is with all the more
reason required to convene immediately if in session.
First, the provision specially addresses the situation when the
President proclaims martial law and/or suspends the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus while the Congress is in recess. To
ensure that the Congress will be able to act swiftly on the
proclamation and/or suspension, the 1987 Constitution
provides that it should convene within twenty-four (24) hours
without need for call. It is a whole different situation when the
Congress is still in session as it can readily take up the
proclamation and/or suspension in the course of its regular
sessions, as what happened in these cases.
Second, the provision only requires that the Congress convene
without call, but it does not explicitly state that the Congress
shall already convene in joint session. In fact, the provision
actually states that the Congress "convene in accordance with
its rules," which can only mean the respective rules of each
House as there are no standing rules for joint sessions. And
third, it cannot be said herein that the Congress failed to
convene immediately to act on Proclamation No. 216. Both
Houses of the Congress promptly took action on Proclamation
No. 216, with the Senate already issuing invitations to
executive officials even prior to receiving President Duterte's
Report, except that the two Houses of the Congress acted
separately.
There is likewise no basis for petitioners' assertion that
without a joint session, the public cannot hold the Senators
and Representatives accountable for their respective positions
on President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216. Senate records
completely chronicled the deliberations and the voting by the
Senators on Senate Resolution No. 49 (formerly P.S.
Resolution No. 388) and P.S. Resolution No. 390. While it is
true that the House of Representatives voted on House
Resolution No. 1050 viva voce, this is only in accordance with
its rules. Per the Rules of the House of Representatives... ince
no one moved for nominal voting on House Resolution No.
1050, then the votes of the individual Representatives cannot
be determined. It does not render though the proceedings
unconstitutional or invalid.
The Congress did not violate the right of the public to
information when it did not convene in joint session.
Petitioners contend that the Constitution requires a public
deliberation process on the proclamation of martial law: one
that is conducted via a joint session and by a single body. They
insist that the Congress must be transparent, such that there
is an "open and robust debate," where the evaluation of the
proclamation's factual bases and subsequent implementation
shall be openly discussed and where each member's position
on the issue is heard and made known to the public.
However, based on their internal rules, each House has the
discretion over the manner by which Congressional
proceedings are to be conducted. Verily, sessions are
generally open to the public,[84] but each House may decide
to hold an executive session due to the confidential nature of
the subject matter to be discussed and deliberated upon.
t is clear that matters affecting the security of the state are
considered confidential and must be discussed and
deliberated upon in an executive session, excluding the public
therefrom.
That these matters are considered confidential is in
accordance with settled jurisprudence that, in the exercise of
their right to information, the government may withhold
certain types of information from the public such as state
secrets regarding military, diplomatic, and other national
security matters.
Thus, to demand Congress to hold a public session during
which the legislators shall openly discuss these matters, all the
while under public scrutiny, is to effectively compel them to
make sensitive information available to everyone, without
exception, and to breach the recognized policy of preserving
these matters' confidentiality, at the risk of being sanctioned,
penalized, or expelled from Congress altogether.
3. NO. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus
that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the
respondent to perform the act required. Mandamus never
issues in doubtful cases.
Although there are jurisprudential examples of the Court
issuing a writ of mandamus to compel the fulfillment of
legislative duty,[94] we must distinguish the present
controversy with those previous cases. In this particular
instance, the Court has no authority to compel the Senate and
the House of Representatives to convene in joint session
absent a clear ministerial duty on its part to do so under the
Constitution and in complete disregard of the separate actions
already undertaken by both Houses on Proclamation No. 216,
including their respective decisions to no longer hold a joint
session, considering their respective resolutions not to revoke
said Proclamation.

In the same vein, there is no cause for the Court to grant a
writ of certiorari.
To reiterate, the two Houses of the Congress decided to no
longer hold a joint session only after deliberations among
their Members and putting the same to vote, in accordance
with their respective rules of procedure. Premises considered,
the Congress did not gravely abuse its discretion when it did
not jointly convene upon the President's issuance of
Proclamation No. 216 prior to expressing its concurrence
thereto.
RODRIGUEZ v MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
Commander-in-Chief
FACTS:
Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti
Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization
affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He
claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State
under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured
repeatedly when he refused to confess to his membership in
the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of
Amparo and and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with
Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and
Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The
petition was filed against former Pres. Arroyo, et al. The writs
were granted but the CA dropped Pres Arroyo as party-
respondent, as she may not be sued in any case during her
tenure of office or actual incumbency.
ISSUES:
1. Whether former Pres GMA should be dropped as
respondent on the basis of presidential immunity from suit
2. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be
used in amparo and habeas data cases.
3. Whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the
military, can be held responsible or accountable for
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
4. Whether Rodriguez has proven through substantial
evidence that former President Arroyo is responsible or
accountable for his abduction.
HELD:
1. NO. It bears stressing that since there is no determination
of administrative, civil or criminal liability in amparo and
habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as
ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the enforced
disappearance or extrajudicial killing.
As was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting
President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts
committed during the latter’s tenure; that courts should look
with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity,
especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the
vindication of a right. The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission also reveal that the intent of the framers is clear
that presidential immunity from suit is concurrent only with
his tenure and not his term. (The term means the time during
which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and
fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during
which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be
shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power
of the incumbent.) Therefore, former Pres. GMA cannot use
such immunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that
would assess whether, within the context of amparo
proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the
abduction of Rodriguez.
2. YES. As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, command
responsibility pertains to the "responsibility of commanders
for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed
forces or other persons subject to their control in
international wars or domestic conflict." Although originally
used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command
responsibility doctrine has also found application in civil cases
for human rights abuses. This development in the use of
command responsibility in civil proceedings shows that the
application of this doctrine has been liberally extended even
to cases not criminal in nature. Thus, it is our view that
command responsibility may likewise find application in
proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo.
Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command
responsibility may be used to determine whether respondents
are accountable for and have the duty to address the
abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise
remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing
precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of command
responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain
responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances.
In other words, command responsibility may be loosely
applied in amparo cases in order to identify those accountable
individuals that have the power to effectively implement
whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In such
application, the amparo court does not impute criminal
responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to
be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved
party. Such identification of the responsible and accountable
superiors may well be a preliminary determination of criminal
liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation
by the appropriate government agency.
Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or
administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command
responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain
responsibility and accountability within these foregoing
definitions.
3. YES. To hold someone liable under the doctrine of
command responsibility, the following elements must obtain:
a) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship
between the accused as superior and the perpetrator
of the crime as his subordinate;
b) the superior knew or had reason to know that the
crime was about to be or had been committed; and
 c) the superior failed to take the necessary and
reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or
punish the perpetrators thereof.84
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed
forces, necessarily possesses control over the military that
qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command
responsibility doctrine.
4. NO. Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation
that on the basis of the "Melo Commission" and the "Alston
Report," respondents in G.R. No. 191805 already had
knowledge of and information on, and should have known
that a climate of enforced disappearances had been
perpetrated on members of the NPA. Without even attaching,
or at the very least, quoting these reports, Rodriguez contends
that the Melo Report points to rogue military men as the
perpetrators. While the Alston Report states that there is a
policy allowing enforced disappearances and pins the blame
on the President, we do not automatically impute
responsibility to former President Arroyo for each and every
count of forcible disappearance. Aside from Rodriguez’s
general averments, there is no piece of evidence that could
establish her responsibility or accountability for his abduction.
Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she
should have known about the violation of his right to life,
liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish
or prevent it.
DAVID v ARROYO
Emergency Powers
FACTS:
February 24, 2006 (20th anniversary of EDSA Revolution):
President Gloria Macapal Arroyo (PGMA) issued Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) declaring a national state of
emergency. On the same day, PGMA issued General Order No.
5 (G.O. 5) implementing PP 1017, directing the members of
the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent
acts of terrorism and lawless violence."
 Factual Justifications for declarations:
o Insurgents of the NPA and some members of the
political opposition were allegedly conspiring to
assassinate or unseat PGMA (without refutation from
petitioner’s counsel)
o Oplan Hackle: plot to bomb and attack the PMA in
Baguio.
o Seizure of various documents and information from a
communist safehouse in Batangas.
o CPP-NPA forging alliances with police establishments.
o Growth of Anti-Arroyo movements and
counter-insurgents in Mindanao by the National
Democratic Front.
o Bombing of telecommunication towers in Bulacan and
Bataan
o Raid in Benguet
RESPONDENTS: Proximate cause behind the executive
issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers,
leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA), and some
members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or
assassinate President Arroyo.
PETITIONERS: Assails PP 1017 and G.O. 5 because (1) it
encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a
subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the
imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of
assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal
arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives
pursuant to PP 1017.
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: argued that the issuance
of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and contended that
the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary
powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling
out the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the
facts stated by the Solicitor General.
ISSUES:
1. W/N there was factual basis to exercise the proclamations
2. W/N the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.
HELD:
1. YES.
IBP v Zamora: President’s calling­out power as a discretionary
power, but does not prevent an examination of its exercise
within permissible constitutional limits, without grave abuse
of discretion.
Lansang v. Garcia: examination is to determine whether the
President acted arbitrarily, not necessarily if it was a correct
exercise.
Petitioners failed to show that PGMA‘s exercise was bereft of
factual basis. The respondents, as well as the OSG, were able
to prove facts substantial to the declarations.
2. YES. EXCEPT for the power to issue decrees (see “Take
Care” Power) and the provision on terrorism under G.O. 5.
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three
important provisions:
 FIRST: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by
Section 18, Article VII ... do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and
order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress
all forms of lawless violence as well any act of
insurrection or rebellion”
 SECOND: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and
to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by
me personally or upon my direction;”
 THIRD: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the
Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.”
PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the
first provision of the decree.
Calling Out Power
 “whenever it becomes necessary”: the President may call
the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.” (IBP v. Zamora) President Arroyo’s
declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act
declaring a status or condition of public moment or
interest, a declaration allowed under the Revised
 Administration Code. Declaration of such is harmless,
without legal significance and is not deemed in writing
(SANLAKAS)
 In this case, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state
of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely
on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision
calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article
XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take
over privately-owned public utility and business affected
with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise
of an awesome power. Proclamation cannot be deemed
harmless.
Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power. The second
provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed (Art. 7, Sec 17).
 VALID EXERCISE: but it does not authorize the
President to take over privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest without prior
legislation
 The enabling clause of PP 1017 is: to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction.
 President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to those
allowed by law (granted under Administrative Code,
Chapter 2, Book III which are EOs, AOs, Proclamations,
Memorandum Orders and Circulars, and GOs)
 Therefore, PGMA does NOT have authority to enact
decrees similar to former President Marcos (see
Lansang v. Garcia). Decrees must be declared void and
unenforceable. With respect to laws, she cannot call
the military to enforce or implement laws other than
to suppress lawless violence.
Third Provision: The “Take Over” Power. This is distinct from
the President’s authority to declare “a state of national
emergency” and to exercise emergency powers.
 “State of National Emergency”: Section 18, Article VII
grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate
constitutional objection can be raised.
 “Emergency Powers”: manifold constitutional issues
arise.
o In general, Congress is the repository of
emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor
of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to
delegate such powers to the President.
Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not
reposed upon it. However, knowing that during
grave emergencies, it may not be possible or
practicable for Congress to meet and exercise
its powers, the framers of our Constitution
deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant
emergency powers to the President, subject to
certain conditions.
G.O 5: CONSTITUTIONAL. Provides a standard by which the
AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is
“necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress
and prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering that “acts
of terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable
by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared
unconstitutional.
However, the words “acts of terrorism” have not been legally
defined and made punishable by Congress. This should be
deleted. No law has been enacted to guide the military, nor
the courts, to determine the limits of the AFP in carrying out
this portion.
Warrantless arrests against David and Llamas, as well as
members of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU are unconstitutional.
The warrantless search and seizure of the Tribune are likewise
declared unconstitutional.
PP 1017 is limited to calling out by President. When the
military and police commit acts which violate rights of citizens,
the Court must declare such illegal and unconstitutional.
CONSTANTINO v CUISIA
Contracting and Guaranteeing Foreign Loans
FACTS:
During the Aquino regime, her administration came up w/ a
scheme to reduce the country’s external debt. The solution
resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring
programs were sought to initiate the program for foreign
debts – they are basically buyback programs & bond-
conversion programs). Constantino as a taxpayer and in behalf
of his minor children who are Filipino citizens, together w/
FFDC averred that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes
are onerous and they do not constitute the loan “contract” or
“guarantee” contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. 7 of the
Constitution.
And assuming that the President has such power unlike other
powers which may be validly delegated by the President, the
power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the
Constitution in the person of the President. They argue that
the gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the
Filipino nation requires that the President alone must exercise
this power. They argue that the requirement of prior
concurrence of an entity specifically named by the
Constitution–the Monetary Board–reinforces the submission
that not respondents but the President “alone and personally”
can validly bind the country. Hence, they would like Cuisia et
al to stop acting pursuant to the scheme.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the president can validly delegate her debt
power to the respondents.
HELD:
There is no question that the president has borrowing powers
and that the president may contract or guarantee foreign
loans in behalf of this country w/ prior concurrence of the
Monetary Board. It makes no distinction whatsoever and the
fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant. On the
other hand, the president can delegate this power to her
direct subordinates. The evident exigency of having the
Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President
to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the
fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy
for managing the government’s debt is deep within the realm
of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is
to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and
cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt
management goals.
If the President were to personally exercise every aspect of
the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause
from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of
time-consuming detailed activities–the propriety of
incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among
the many methods that may be taken toward this end,
meeting countless times with creditor representatives to
negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board,
explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public,
and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of
execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional
interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet
positions and the respective expertise which the holders
thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the
President’s effectivity in running the government. The act of
the respondents are not unconstitutional.
EXCEPTION
There are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be
validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the
President. There are certain constitutional powers and
prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must
be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or
ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by
any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law and the
exercise by him of the benign prerogative of pardon (mercy).
There are certain presidential powers which arise out of
exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the
suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the
supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised
by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of
martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and
the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the
judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within
this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the
President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by
no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the
executive power in question is of similar gravitas and
exceptional import.
NICOLAS v ROMULO
Foreign Affairs
FACTS:
Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member
of the United States Armed Forces. He was charged with the
crime of rape committed against a Filipina, Nicolas (petitioner)
The undersigned accused LCpl. Daniel Smith, Ssgt. Chad Brian
Carpentier, Dominic Duplantis, Keith Silkwood and Timoteo L.
Soriano, Jr. of the crime of Rape upon a complaint by Suzette
S. Nicolas. The Complaint was rephradesd. On Nov 1 2005,
inside the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Olongapo City the above-
named accused, being then members of the United States
Marine Corps, except Timoteo L. Soriano (the driver)
conspired and raped Suzette S. Nicolas, a 22-year old
unmarried woman inside a Starex Van
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) the US, at its
request, was granted custody of defendant Smith pending the
proceedings.
During the Trial (which was transferred from the RTC
Zambales to the RTC of Makati for security reasons) the US
Government faithfully complied with its undertaking to bring
defendant Smith to the trial court every time his presence was
required.
RTC found defendant Smith guilty, but acquitted the others
(sentenced to reclusion perpetua)
Part of dispositive: Pursuant to Article V, paragraph No. 10,
VFA accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH shall
serve his sentence in the facilities that shall, thereafter, be
agreed upon by appropriate Philippine and United States
authorities. Pending agreement on such facilities, accused
L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH is hereby temporarily committed to
the Makati City Jail.
Romulo- Kenney Agreement:
On December 29, 2006, however, defendant Smith was taken
out of the Makati jail by a contingent of Philippine law
enforcement agents, purportedly acting under orders of the
DILG, and brought to a facility for detention under the control
of the US government, provided for under new agreements
between the Philippines and the United States, referred to as
the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 19, 2006 which
states:
 The RP and US Governments agree that, in accordance
with the VFA Corporal Daniel J. Smith, US Marine
Corps, be returned to U.S. military custody at the U.S.
Embassy in Manila.
 The RP DFA and the US Embassy agree that, in
accordance with the VFA upon transfer of Lance
Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine Corps,
from the Makati City Jail, he will be detained at the
first floor, Rowe (JUSMAG) Building, U.S. Embassy
Compound in a room of approximately 10 x 12 square
feet. He will be guarded round the clock by U.S.
military personnel. The Philippine police and jail
authorities, under the direct supervision of the
Philippine DILG will have access to the place of
detention to ensure the US compliance with the terms
of the VFA.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the VFA is constitutional
2. Whether or not the criminal jurisdiction provisions of the
VFA are unconstitutional
3. Whether or not Smith can be detained in the Embassy
HELD:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL
Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody
of defendant L/CPL Smith because the VFA is void and
unconstitutional. This issue has been resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of the VFA in Bayan v. Zamora, brought by
Bayan, one of petitioners in the present cases.
Rationale of Sec 25: The provision is thus designed to ensure
that any agreement allowing the presence of foreign military
bases, troops or facilities in Philippine territory shall be equally
binding on the Philippines and the foreign sovereign State
involved. The idea is to prevent a recurrence of the situation
in which the terms and conditions governing the presence of
foreign armed forces in our territory were binding upon us but
not upon the foreign State.
The resolution on the issue depends on whether or not the
presence of US Armed Forces in Philippine territory pursuant
to the VFA is allowed “under a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate xxx and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
State.”
In Bayan v. Zamora, the VFA was duly concurred in by the
Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the
US as attested and certified by the duly authorized
representative
of the US government. The fact that the VFA was not
submitted for advice and consent of the United States Senate
does not detract from its status as a binding international
agreement or treaty recognized by the US o The US has an
internationally known practice of submitting to its Senate for
advice and consent agreements that are policymaking in
nature, whereas those that carry out or further implement
these policymaking agreements are merely submitted to
Congress, under the provisions of the so-called Case–Zablocki
Act, within sixty days from ratification.
The second reason has to do with the relation between the
VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951.
This earlier agreement was signed and duly ratified with the
concurrence of both the RP Senate and the US Senate. RP-US
Mutual Defense Treaty’s purpose is for developing the
capability to resist an armed attack fall. The VFA, is simply an
implementing agreement to the main RP-US Military Defense
Treaty. The Preamble of the VFA states that it is “Reaffirming
their obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty of August
30, 1951”
As an implementing agreement of the RP-US Mutual Defense
Treaty, it was not necessary to submit the VFA to the US
Senate for advice and consent, but merely to the US Congress
under the Case–Zablocki Act within 60 days of its ratification.
2. NO.
The VFA provides that in cases of offenses committed by the
members of the US Armed Forces in the Philippines, the
following rules apply:
 Article V Criminal Jurisdiction: The custody of any United
States personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise
jurisdiction shall immediately reside with United States
military authorities, if they so request, from the
commission of the offense until completion of all judicial
proceedings. Also, the one year period will not include any
time during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed
 because United States authorities, after timely notification
by Philippine authorities to arrange for the presence of the
accused, fail to do so.
Petitioner argues that this violates the exclusive power of this
Court to adopt rules of procedure for all courts in the
Philippines. They argue also argue that this violates the equal
protection clause
 The EPC is not violated, because there is a substantial
basis for a different treatment of a member of a
foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our
territory and all other accused.
 The rule in international law is that a foreign armed
forces allowed to enter one’s territory is immune from
local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon.
The Status of Forces Agreements involving foreign
military units around the world vary in terms and
conditions, but the principle remains. The power of
this Court to adopt rules of procedure is not curtailed
or violated, but is normally encountered the world.
 Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements
recognizing immunity from jurisdiction or
 some aspects of jurisdiction (such as custody), in
relation to long-recognized subjects of such immunity
like Heads of State, diplomats and members of the
armed forces contingents of a foreign State allowed to
enter another State’s territory. On the contrary, the
Constitution states that the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land. (Art. II, Sec. 2).
3. NO.
There is a different treatment when it comes to detention as
against custody. The moment the accused has to be detained,
e.g., after conviction, the rule that governs is the following
provision of the VFA:
 Article V Criminal Jurisdiction Sec. 10. The confinement
or detention by Philippine authorities of United States
personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by
appropriate Philippines and United States authorities.
United States personnel serving sentences in the
Philippines shall have the right to visits and material
assistance.
 The above clearly states not only that the detention
shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by
authorities of both parties, but also that the detention
shall be “by Philippine authorities.”
 Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of
December 19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements on
the detention of the accused in the United States
Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because
such detention is not “by Philippine authorities.”
 Respondents should therefore comply with the VFA
and negotiate with representatives of the US towards
an agreement on detention facilities under Philippine
authorities
Next, the Court addresses the recent decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Medellin v. Texas which held that
treaties entered into by the United States are not
automatically part of their domestic law unless these treaties
are self-executing or there is an implementing legislation to
make them enforceable.
 First, the VFA is a self-executing Agreement, as that
term is defined in Medellin itself, because the parties
intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely
because the Agreement is intended to carry out
obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual
Defense Treaty. The VFA has been implemented and
executed, with the US faithfully complying with its
obligation to produce L/CPL Smith before the court
during the trial.
 The VFA is covered by implementing legislation, the
Case-Zablocki Act, inasmuch as it is the very purpose
and intent of the US Congress that executive
agreements registered under this Act within 60 days
from their ratification be immediately implemented.
The parties to these present cases do not question the
fact that the VFA has been registered under the Case-
Zablocki Act.
In sum, therefore, the VFA differs from the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations and the Avena decision of the ICJ
subject matter of the Medellin decision, as these are not self-
executing and are not registrable under the Case-Zablocki Act,
and thus lack legislative implementing authority.
Finally, the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty was advised and
consented to by the US Senate on March 20, 1952, as
reflected in the US Congressional Record, 82nd Congress.
Furthermore, as held by the US Supreme Court in Weinberger
v. Rossi, an executive agreement is a “treaty” within the
meaning of that word in international law and constitutes
enforceable domestic law vis-à-vis the US.
There are three types of treaties in the American system:
1. Art. II, Sec. 2 treaties – These are advised and
consented to by the US Senate in accordance with Art.
II, Sec. 2 of the US Constitution
2. Executive–Congressional Agreements: These are joint
agreements of the President and Congress and need
not be submitted to the Senate.;
3. Sole Executive Agreements. – These are agreements
entered into by the President. They are to be
submitted to Congress within sixty (60) days of
ratification under the provisions of the Case-Zablocki
Act after which they are recognized by the Congress
and may be implemented.
As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense
Treaty, military aid or assistance has
been given under it and this can only be done through
implementing legislation. The VFA itself is another form of
implementation of its provisions.
PEOPLE’S MOVEMENT FOR PRESS FREEDOM v MANGLAPUS
Foreign Affairs
FACTS:
Petitioners, consisted of members of the mass media, were
seeking information from the Presidents representatives on
the state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement. A collision between governmental
power over the conduct of foreign affairs and the citizen’s
right to information.
ISSUES:
Whether the information sought by the petitioners are of public
concern and are still covered by the doctrine of executive privilege?
HELD:
The Court adopted the doctrine in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp. that the President is the sole organ of the nation
in its negotiations with foreign countries. The Court denied
the petition, stressing that "secrecy of negotiations with
foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional
provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the
freedom of access to information."
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS v EASTERM SEA TRADING
Foreign Affairs
FACTS:
EST was a shipping company charged in the importation from
Japan of onion and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the
Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture
of the import goods because EST was not able to comply with
Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were
pursuant to EO 328 w/c sought to regulate the importation of
such non-dollar goods from Japan (as there was a Trade and
Financial Agreement b/n the Philippines and Japan then). EST
questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the said EO
was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was
elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in
favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of at
least 2/3 of the Senate.
HELD:
No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are
subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members of
the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall
short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive
agreements and are no less common in our scheme of
government than are the more formal instruments — treaties
and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges
of notes and at other times that of more formal documents
denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’. The point where
ordinary correspondence between this and other
governments ends and agreements — whether denominated
executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise —
begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It
would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large
variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time
to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those
entered into under the trade- agreements act, have been
negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be
sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under
the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are
not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our
history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore
entered into by the Executive without the approval of the
Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels,
navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission
of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations
generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration
of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were
concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in
conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with
respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while
still others, particularly those with respect to the settlement
of claims against foreign governments, were concluded
independently of any legislation.
GO TEK v DEPORTATION BOARD
Foreign Affairs
FACTS:
Go Tek was arrested by the National Bureau of Investigation
after a search of an office in Sta Cruz, Manila. He was alleged
to have with him at the time of the arrest fake dollar checks in
violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Court which
rendered him an undesirable alien. The Chief Prosecutor of
the Deportation filed a complaint against Go Tek with a prayer
that after the trial the Deportation Board recommend to the
President of the Philippines Go Tek’s immediate deportation
as his presence in this country having been, and will always be
a menace to the peace. welfare, and security of the
community.
Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint was premature because there was a pending case
against him and that the Board had no jurisdiction to try the
case in view of the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation
Board, 118 Phil. 868 that aliens may be deported only on the
grounds specified in the law.
The Board denied the motion. They reasoned that it was not
necessary for an alien to be convicted before the State can
exercise its right to deport said alien. Besides the Board is only
a fact finding body whose function is to report and
recommend to the President in whom is lodged the exclusive
power to deport an alien.
The CFI ruled in favor of Go Tek and issued a writ of
prohibition against the Board.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Deportation Board can entertain a
deportation proceeding based on a ground not specified in
Section 37 of the Immigration Law and although the alien has
not yet been convicted of the offense imputed to him.
HELD:
YES
A thorough comprehension of the President's power to deport
aliens may show the baselessness of the instant prohibition
action of Go Tek. The President's power to deport aliens and
the investigation of aliens subject to deportation are provided
for in the following provisions of the Revised Administrative
Code:
SEC. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power. A subject of
a foreign power residing in the Philippine Islands shall not be
deported expelled, or excluded from said Islands or
repatriated to his own country by the Governor-General
except upon prior investigator, conducted by said Executive or Disposition CFI decision is reversed and set aside
his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is
contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall he
informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be
allowed not less than three days for the preparation of his
defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or
counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-
examine the opposing witnesses.

On the other hand, section 37 of the Immigration Law

Provides that certain aliens may be arrested upon the warrant
of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer
designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the
Commissioner's warrant - "after a determination by the Board
of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien."

So, under existing law; the deportation of an undesirable alien

may be effected (1) by order of the President, after due
investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code and (2) by the Commissioner of
Immigration upon recommendation of the Board of
Commissioners under section 37 of the immigration Law (Qua
Chee Gan vs- Deportation Board, supra).

- The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable

aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40
Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be exercise by the Chief
Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the
peace and domestic tranquility of the nation.