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PRA___| Scientific Foundations of Cognitive Theory and Therapy of Depression David A. Clark and Aaron T. Beck, with Brad A. Alford John Wiley & Sons, Inc. New York ¢ Chichester ¢ Weinheim © Brisban e © Singapore * Toronto CHAPTER 3 The Philosophical and Theoretical Basis of Cognitive Theory IN THIS chapter, we examine the philosophical and theoretical tenets of the cognitive model. Critics of the cognitive model have questioned whether it meets the criteria for a scientific theory. Blaney (1977) suggested that the cognitive model may not be a satisfactory scientific theory because of its ability to accommodate apparently contradictory experimental findings, thereby making it impossible to disconfirm. Coyne and Gotlib (1983) criti- cized that its key cognitive concepts were too imprecise and so required better operationalization. In their review, Beidel and Turner (1986) con- cluded that cognitive behavioral treatment strategies (which included Beck’s cognitive therapy) do not have an adequate theoretical basis. Teas- dale and Barnard (1993), on the other hand, argued that Beck’s cognitive model of depression does not meet the criteria for a scientific theory but instead is a clinical theory whose primary purpose is to provide the clini- cian with a tool for understanding and treating depression. Does the cognitive model meet criteria for a scientific theory? Does it have an adequate theoretical basis for conducting research and guiding treatment of depressive states? Most of this chapter will consider the philo- sophical and theoretical basis of cognitive theory. According to Popper (1959), a scientific theory must possess a set of assumptions that are both necessary and sufficient for defining the theoretical system. Thus in this chapter, we discuss the theoretical assumptions or statements that form the basis of the cognitive model. Each proposition describes a necessary characteristic of the model and, together with the remaining statements, 54 Philosophical Basis of Cognitive Theory 55 ive perspective. The theoretical statements refer to fea- nature that serve as assumptions for the cognitive model. s of the cognitive model, then, is in part dependent on a of its theoretical assumptions. tion of the chapter, we examine Teasdale and Barnard’s Beck’s cognitive model of depression constitutes a clini- |a scientific theory. We discuss whether this dichotomy be- scientific theory is justified, and whether the cognitive dale and Barnard's criteria of an applied science model. ion, we conclude that the cognitive model can be con- ied science theory, and so can be evaluated in terms of its t for relevant clinical phenomena and experimental OPHICAL BASIS OF COGNITIVE THEORY ‘of the cognitive model is that human information pro- g construction influences all emotional and behavioral is assumption of the centrality of cognition in human ex- a long history in philosophy, psychiatry, and psychology. gical approach to psychology, in which one’s view of the al world determines behavior, can be traced back to the ophy of Zeno of Cytium, Epictetus, Cicero, and Seneca aar, 1989; Ellis, 1989). Immanuel Kant proposed that ders are the result of a failure to correct “private sense” with (Raimy, 1975). Other 19th-century philosophers such as Husserl also emphasized the importance of conscious ence. As noted by Raimy, the 19th-century hypnotists at “morbid ideas” were responsible for psychological distur- ie turn of the century, other noted medical researchers such et, and Breuer believed that pathogenic thoughts or ideas ible for mental disorders (Raimy, 1975). ‘on the importance of subjective consciousness in psy- was picked up by the neo-Freudians such as Alder, Horney. Alder, for example, considered “mistaken opin- irce of neurosis and emphasized the need for therapists to e conscious meaning that individuals attach to their experi- & Rush, 1988; Raimy, 1975). Raimy interpreted Sullivan's ic distortions” in psychological disorders as synony- ‘en perceptions or conceptions, whereas Horney’s con- ized self-image” can be understood in terms of a cluster about the self (Horney, 1945). In later years, the view

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