Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
[Lahore]
ALI MUHAMMAD---Appellant
Versus
Khalil-ur-Rehman v. Town Committee, Rabwah through Chairman PLD 1990 SC 792 rel.
ORDER
MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ, J.--To decide this F.A.O. reference to the pleaded facts is
not necessary. Suffice it to say that on 4-11-1989 the appellant filed a suit against the
respondents as well as the Province of Punjab. The suit was instituted in the Court of a
learned Senior Civil Judge, Sahiwal and was entrusted to a learned Civil Judge at
Sahiwal. Vide order dated 23-5-1991 the said learned Court deleted the Province of
Punjab from the array of defendants. Notwithstanding the fact that respondents Nos.21
and 22 i.e. Tehsildar Chichawatni and Patwari Halqa were parties, the learned District
Judge, Sahiwal by means of an administrative order transferred the case to Chichawatni.
Vide judgment and decree dated 27-10-1998 a learned Civil Judge, Ist Class at Tehsil
Chichawatni decreed the suit. Some of the private respondents tiled a first appeal against
the said judgment and decree. It was heard by a learned Additional District Judge at
Chichawatni, who found that since the said public servants were parties to the case, it
could not have been heard at the Tehsil Headquarter. The matter was accordingly referred
to the learned District Judge, Sahiwal for entrustment of the suit to a competent Civil
Judge at Sahiwal. This was done vide judgment and decree 19-3-2003.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that his client could not be made to suffer
for an act of Court inasmuch as the suit was in fact filed at the District Headquarter but
was transferred to Chichawatni by the learned District Judge. He further contends that no
Page No. 1 of 2
objection was taken to the jurisdiction of the learned Civil Judge at the Tehsil
Headquarter and as such the learned Additional District Judge could not have set aside
the judgment and decree on the said ground. It is further complained that the matter is
pending since last about 20 years.
3. I have gone through the copies of the records. There is no denial that the matter is
governed by section 24 of the Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962. This being so, there was an
express bar in law against trial of the suit to which public officers are parties at a place
other than Headquarter of the District. This provision of law, came to be interpreted by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Khalil-ur-Rehman v. Town
Committee, Rabwah through Chairman (PLD 1990 SC 792) and it was observed that the
said Ordinance being a special law will govern the case and displaced the general
provisions of Code of Civil Procedure with regard to the territorial jurisdiction and as
such section 21, C.P.C. would not be available in protecting the proceedings not held at
the headquarter. This being so, no exception can be taken to the impugned order of the
learned Additional District Judge. It is true that an act of Court should not cause prejudice
to any of the parties but it is equally true that Courts of this country are governed in the
matter of jurisdiction vesting in them by law and even a consent of the parties or for that
matter a wrong order of Court would not confer jurisdiction which otherwise is not
vesting in a Court by law.
4. So far as the said complaint of the learned counsel is concerned, a copy of order of this
Court be remitted to the learned District Judge, Sahiwal, for onward transmission to the
learned Civil Judge, who is seized of the suit, who shall proceed to decide the case after
reading the evidence of the parties already recorded and after hearing the parties
preferably within 6 months of the date of receipt of this order. No orders as to costs.
Page No. 2 of 2
2003 Y L R 1468
[Karachi]
Versus
----O. VII, R. 10---West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance (II of 1962), S.24---Specific
Relief Act (I of 1877), S.8---Suit for possession--Territorial jurisdiction of Court---Return
of plaint---Suit was filed in Court at place 'H'--Plaint was returned to the plaintiffs for
presenting the same before the Court having jurisdiction holding that as the
subject-matter of suit was situated at place 'T.M.', Civil Court at 'TM.' had the jurisdiction
over the matter---Order of return of plaint was challenged on the ground that though
subject-matter of suit was situated at 'T.M. ', but since Province of Sindh and two Public
Officers were party to the suit, Court at place TM. would have no jurisdiction in view of
bar imposed by S.24(1)(2) of West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962---Plea of
plaintiffs was that West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 being a special law would
override general provisions of Civil Procedure Code 1908---Subsection (1) of S.24 of
West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 had made it clear that in suits in which
Pakistan or any of its Provinces or any public officer was party, jurisdiction of only that
Civil Court would be barred which would not have unlimited jurisdiction as regards the
value in original suit, which would mean that jurisdiction of Civil Court having unlimited
pecuniary jurisdiction, was not barred in such suits--Subsection (2) of S.24 of West
Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 also spoke of institution of such suits in the Court
of Civil Judge having jurisdiction in original suit without limits as regards value---Plot
which was subject-matter of suit, was situated within territorial jurisdiction of Court at
place 'T M.' which had unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction, in view of this position, the
Court at place 'T.M.' would have jurisdiction over the suit---Plaint, in circumstances, was
rightly returned for presenting the same before Court at place 'T.M.' having the
jurisdiction.
JUDGMENT
By this judgment I intend to dispose of six revision applications in which same questions
of law are involved.
The facts relevant to this judgment are that the applicants filed suit in the Court of Senior
Civil Judge, Hyderabad, pleading therein substantially that during 1969 the respondent
had unauthorizedly occupied an area out of C.S. No.99 R.S. No.38 Ward 'A' Tando
Muhammad Khan, a property under the management and control of Auqaf Department,
He then constructed house and shop on the plot. Later on he agreed to pay the rent to
Auqaf Department and had been paying the same. However, after some years he stopped
Page No. 1 of 3
paying the rent and claimed ownership over the plot on the basis of false and fabricated
documents. He was, therefore, liable to ejectment. The prayers in the suit were as
under:--
(a) That this Honourable Court may please to deliver the vacant possession of suit
property and the defendant No. 1 be ejected through the process of this Court.
(b) That this Honourable Court may please to cancel the document executed or
issued if any, possession of defendant No. 1.
(c) That this Honourable Court may please to award mesne profit Rs.20,000 to the
plaintiffs to be paid by the defendant No. 1.
(e) Any other relief which this Honourable Court deems fit and proper be
granted.
By order dated 30-9-1991 the plaint of the suit was returned to the applicants/plaintiffs
for presenting the same before the Court having jurisdiction. It was held in the order that
subject-matter of the suit was situated at Tando Muhammad Khan, therefore, Senior Civil
Judge, Tando Muhammad Khan had jurisdiction over the matter. The applicants/plaintiffs
challenged that order before District Judge, Hyderabad, through Miscellaneous Civil
Appeal No.48 of 1991. The appeal was assigned to the 1st Additional District Judge,
Hyderabad who dismissed it by judgment dated 28-4-1992. Both of the decisions have
been assailed through present revision application.
While arguing the application Mr. Shoukat Ali Jafferi, the learned advocate for the
applicants contended that although the subject-matter of the suit is situate at Tando
Muhammad Khan within the territorial jurisdiction of Senior Civil Judge, Tando
Muhammad Khan but since Province of Sindh and two Public Officers i.e. Sub-Registrar,
Tando Muhammad Khan and Mukhtiarkar Tando Muhammad Khan are party to the suit
that Court does not have jurisdiction in view of the bar imposed by section 24(1) and (2),
Civil Courts Ordinance 1962. He argued that Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, being a
special law will override the general provisions of Civil Procedure Code, 1908.
According to the learned advocate it is Senior Civil Judge, Hyderabad who has
jurisdiction over the suit. In support of his arguments Mr. Jafferi referred to decision of
the Honourable apex Court in Khalil ur Rehman v. Town Committee, Rabwah (PLD 1990
SC 792).
Mr. Masood A. Noorani, the learned Additional A.-G. defended the impugned orders
arguing that section 24, Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, bars the jurisdiction of the Civil
Court which does not have unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction. Since Senior Civil Judge,
Tando Muhammad Khan has unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction the bar is not applicable
against his Court.
For proper appreciation of contentions it will be beneficial to reproduce section 24(1) and
(2) as applicable to Sindh after enforcement of Civil Courts Sindh (Amendment)
Ordinance XIII of 1971. It reads as under:--
24. Civil Courts having unlimited Jurisdiction regarding value to try suits against
the State and its servants in their official capacity.---(1) No Civil Court not having
jurisdiction in original suits without limit as regards Value and no Court of the
Small Causes shall receive, entertain or register any suit in which Pakistan or any
of its Provinces or any public officer defined in clause (17) of section 2 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) in his official capacity is a party:---
[Provided that in the Karachi District any such suit, if the value thereof does not
exceed twenty-five thousand rupees, may be instituted in the Court of District
Judge, the Additional District Judge or a Civil Judge of the First Class, and in the
High Court where the value of the suit exceeds twenty-five thousand rupees.]
Page No. 2 of 3
(2) In every such case the plaintiff shall be referred to the Court of the Civil Judge
having jurisdiction in original suits without limit as regard value and such suit
shall be instituted only in the Court of Civil Judge and shall be heard at the
headquarters of the District.
A bare look at subsection (1) makes it clear that in the suits in which Pakistan or any of
its Provinces or any public officer is party the jurisdiction of only that Civil Court is
barred which does not have unlimited jurisdiction as regards value in the original suit. In
other words the jurisdiction of Civil Court having unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction is not
barred in such suits.
Also section 2 speaks of institution of such suits in the Courts of Civil Judge having
jurisdiction in original suits without limits as regards value.
Undisputedly the plot which is subject-matter of the suit is situated within the territorial
jurisdiction of Senior Civi, Judge, Tando Muhammad Khan. It is also admitted position
that Senior Civil Judge, Tando Muhammad Khan has unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction.
Therefore, it is the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Tando Muhammad Khan which had the
jurisdiction over the suit and not the Senior Civil Judge, Hyderabad. Thus the plaint of
the suit was rightly returned to the plaintiff under Order VII, rule 10, C.P.C. for
presenting the same before the Court having jurisdiction.
The last part of subsection (2) relates to the hearing of the suit at the Head Quarter of the
District and does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court at Tando Muhammad Khan. It is
to be seen as to whether the requirement relating to the place of hearing is absolute or
directory. Although the word 'shall' oftenly makes the requirement mandatory but it is not
so in each and every case. Here the provision for enforcement of the requirement about
proceeding of the suit at District Head Quarter is absent. Also the non-compliance will be
neither prejudicial to any of the parties to the suit nor will it cause miscarriage of justice.
Therefore, the requirement is directory and not mandatory and, as such, non-compliance
thereof will not affect the validity of the proceedings at the place of sitting of Senior Civil
Judge, Tando Muhammad Khan.
In the result of above the revision applications are dismissed being merit-less.
H.B.T./C-73/K
Page No. 3 of 3
2001 P L C (C.S.) 262
versus
Province of Punjab and another v. Abdul Majid NLR 1993 Service 56 and Khalil-ur-
Rehman v. Town Committee, Rabwah PLD 1990 SC 792 ref.'
JUDGMENT
According to the averments of writ petition a suit filed against District Council was
entrusted to Mr. Naeem Mohy-ud-Din, Civil Judge II-Class, Sargodha. The learned Civil
Judge appointed Mr. Muhammad Hussain Balouch, Advocate, as Local Commission vide
order, dated 8-7-1998 to inspect the disputed site and determine about the existence of
road and the material lying at the spot. The petitioner feeling aggrieved by this order filed
Civil Revision before District Judge, Sargodha on the ground that the learned Civil Judge
had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter, which was dismissed by the learned
Additional District Judge vide order, dated 1-8-1998. Hence this writ petition.
2. Mr. Akhtar Masood Khan, Advocate, for respondents Nos. l and 2 and Mr. Naseem
Sabir Additional Advocate-General have entered appearance at limine stage. I have heard
the learned counsel- for parties at length and have perused the record. This case is,
therefore, being decided as -a notice case.
3. The learned counsel for petitioner has contended that under section 24 of West
Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, Civil Judge 1st Class, can adjudicate upon the matter
where it has been filed by or against a public servant. The learned Civil Judge-II Class
has no jurisdiction to try the suit and order, dated 8-7-1998 is without jurisdiction. It’s
further contended that Additional District Judge did not advert to the point of jurisdiction
and decided the case on wrong assumptions. The learned counsel for petitioner in support
of his arguments has relied upon Province of Punjab and another v. Abdul Majid (NLR
1993 Service 56) and Khalil-ur-Rehman v. Town Committee, Rabwah (PLD 1990
Supreme Court 792).
Page No. 1 of 2
4. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents Nos. l and 2 has failed to
controvert the arguments advanced by learned counsel for petitioner on the point of
jurisdiction.
5. Subsections (1) and (2) of section.24 of the Civil Courts Ordinance provide as under:--
"24. Civil Courts having unlimited jurisdiction regarding value to try suits against
the state and its servants in their official capacity.--(1) No Civil Court not having
jurisdiction in original suits without limit as regards value and no Court of the
Small Causes shall receive, entertain or register any suit in which Pakistan or any
of its provinces or any Public Officer as defined in clause (17) of section 2 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) in his official capacity is a party:
Provided that in the Karachi District any such suit, if the value thereof does not
exceed twenty-five thousand rupees, may be instituted in the Court of the District
Judge, the Additional District Judge or a Civil Judge of the First Class, and in the
High Court where the value of the suit exceeds twenty-five. thousand rupees.
(2) In every such case the plaintiff shall be referred to the Court of the Civil
Judge having jurisdiction in original suits without limit as regard value and such
suit shall be instituted only in the Court of such Civil Judge and shall be heard at
the headquarter of the district. "
In PLD 1990 Supreme Court 792 supra it has been held as follows:--
"The Civil Courts Ordinance, being a special law will govern the case and
displace the general provisions of Code of Civil Procedure with regard to
territorial jurisdiction. In that view of the matter, section 21 of C.P.C. will not be
of avail in protecting the proceedings not held at the Headquarter. "
5-A At the time when the present suit was instituted by the petitioner District Council was
headed by Deputy Commissioner as its Administrator, who is a public officer and on
account of bar contained under section 24 of Civil Courts Ordinance the case was
wrongly entrusted to Civil Judge II Class. Both the Courts below have illegally ignored
the bar contained under section 24 of the Civil Courts Ordinance.
6. In view of the above, the impugned orders, dated 8-7-1998 anti 1-8-1998 are decaled to
have been passed without jurisdiction and without lawful authority and of no legal
consequence. The same are set aside. Copy of this order be sent to District Judge,
Sargodha, who shall entrust the case to the Court of competent jurisdiction, who shall
decide the same afresh in accordance with the law.
Page No. 2 of 2
P L D 1990 Supreme Court 792
KHALIL-UR-REHMAN----Appellant
versus
(From the judgment of Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 21-2-1988 passed in
Civil Revision No.549 of 1986).
Tauqir Afzal Malik, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch.Mehdi Khan Mehtab,
Advocate-on-Record (absent) for Respondent.
JUDGMENT
"Practically nothing was asserted to take out the case from the purview of
subsection (2) ibid or the dictum laid down in the precedent case. Since section 24
Page No. 1 of 1
in its implication as also application was peremptory, noncompliance therewith
would unmistakably make the judgment null and void. This result cannot be
escaped especially because the facts of the present case were quite akin to those of
the cited case so, however, if the controlling authority there was held not to be a
member of the Local Body in order to claim exemption under section 24(3), on
analogy the Administrator of the petitioner-Committee was also not a member
thereof. He remained to be a civil servant and was acting as Administrator of the
Committee in his official capacity so as to fall within the mischief of the
governing clauses of the section."
The High Court set aside the judgment and decree and remanded the case to the
Senior Civil Judge, Jhang, for its disposal in accordance with law.
3. The learned counsel for the appellant Mr. Hamid Aslam Oureshi, has contended
that as the specific objection which prevailed in the High Court with regard to the
jurisdiction was not taken up in the trial Court, the same was not available for
interfering with the judgments otherwise correctly recorded. For this submission
reliance has been placed on section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Secondly it
has been contended that the trial was held at the Headquarters of a Sub-Division
and this amounted to substantial compliance with the requirement of the law.
Thirdly the contention is that the party sued was the Town Committee and it was
only incidentally that it was being sued through the Administrator who happened
to be the Ilaqa Magistrate. Therefore, in fact there was no non-compliance with
the requirement of section 24(2) of the Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962.
4. Subsections (1) and (2) of section 24 of the Civil Courts Ordinance provide as
hereunder:--
"24. Civil Courts having unlimited jurisdiction regarding value to try suits against
the State and its servants in their official capacity.--(1) No Civil Court not having
jurisdiction in original suits without limit as regards value and no Court of the
Small Causes shall receive, entertain or register any suit in which Pakistan or any
of its Provinces or any Public Officer as defined in clause (17) of section 2 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) in his official capacity is a party:
Provided that in the Karachi District any such suit, if the value thereof does not
exceed twenty-rive thousand rupees, may be instituted in the Court of the District
Judge, the Additional District Judge or a Civil Judge of the First Class, and in the
High Court where the value of the suit exceeds twenty-five thousand rupees.
(2) In every such case the plaintiff shall be referred to the Court of the Civil Judge
having jurisdiction in original suits without limit as regard value and such suit
shall be instituted only in the Court of such Civil Judge and shall be heard at the
headquarters of the district."
5. The Civil Courts Ordinance being a special law will govern the case and
displace the general provisions of Code of Civil Procedure with regard to
territorial jurisdiction. In that view of the matter, section 21 of C.P.C. will not be
of avail in protecting the proceedings not held at the Headquarters.
7. At the time when the suit was instituted by the appellant, the Administrator
through whom the Town Committee was sued, satisfied the definition of `public
officer', and on that account the provisions of section 24 of C the Civil Courts
Ordinance were attracted to the case and were rightly applied by the High Court.
Page No. 2 of 1
8. We are informed that subsequent to the remand, the case has been decided
afresh by the trial Court and also the appeal arising out of it.
9. For the foregoing reasons we find no merit in this appeal and the same is
dismissed.
Page No. 3 of 1
Page No. 4 of 1