A.C. No.

5838 January 17, 2005 other documents he submitted during the investigation of the present
case.6 However, it ruled that respondent was also negligent because he
SPOUSES BENJAMIN SANTUYO AND EDITHA allowed the office secretaries to perform his notarial functions, including
SANTUYO, complainants, the safekeeping of his notarial dry seal and notarial register.7 It thus
vs. recommended:
ATTY. EDWIN A. HIDALGO, respondent.
WHEREFORE[,] in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended
RESOLUTION that respondent’s commission as notary public be revoked for two (2)
years if he is commissioned as such; or he should not be granted a
commission as notary public for two (2) years upon receipt hereof.8
CORONA, J.:

After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, complainants

In a verified complaint-affidavit dated September 18, 2001,1 spouses
Benjamin Santuyo and Editha Santuyo accused respondent Atty. Edwin
A. Hidalgo of serious misconduct and dishonesty for breach of his
lawyer’s oath and the notarial law.
Complainants stated that sometime in December 1991, they purchased
a parcel of land covered by a deed of sale. The deed of sale was
allegedly notarized by respondent lawyer and was entered in his notarial
register as Doc. No. 94 on Page No. 19 in Book No. III, Series of 1991.
Complainant spouses averred that about six years after the date of
notarization, they had a dispute with one Danilo German over the
ownership of the land. The case was estafathrough falsification of a
public document.
During the trial of the case, German presented in court an affidavit
executed by respondent denying the authenticity of his signature on the
deed of sale. The spouses allegedly forged his notarial signature on said
deed.2
According to complainants, respondent overlooked the fact that the
disputed deed of sale contained all the legal formalities of a duly
notarized document, including an impression of respondent’s notarial
dry seal. Not being persons who were learned in the technicalities
surrounding a notarial act, spouses contended that they could not have
forged the signature of herein respondent. They added that they had no
access to his notarial seal and notarial register, and could not have
made any imprint of respondent’s seal or signature on the subject deed
of sale or elsewhere.3
In his answer4 to the complaint, respondent denied the allegations
against him. He denied having notarized any deed of sale covering the
disputed property. According to respondent, he once worked as a junior
lawyer at Carpio General and Jacob Law Office where he was asked to
apply for a notarial commission. While he admitted that he notarized
several documents in that office, these, however, did not include the
subject deed of sale. He explained that, as a matter of office procedure,
documents underwent scrutiny by the senior lawyers and it was only
when they gave their approval that notarization was done. He claimed
that, in some occasions, the secretaries in the law firm, by themselves,
would affix the dry seal of the junior associates on documents relating
to cases handled by the law firm. Respondent added that he normally
required the parties to exhibit their community tax certificates and made
them personally acknowledge the documents before him as notary
public. He would have remembered complainants had they actually
appeared before him. While he admitted knowing complainant Editha
Santuyo, he said he met the latter’s husband and co-complainant only
on November 5, 1997, or about six years from the time that he
purportedly notarized the deed of sale. Moreover, respondent stressed
that an examination of his alleged signature on the deed of sale
revealed that it was forged; the strokes were smooth and
mild.l^vvphi1.net He suspected that a lady was responsible for forging
his signature.
did not categorically state that they appeared before respondent to
have the deed of sale notarized. Their appearance before him could
have bolstered this allegation that respondent signed the document and
that it was not a forgery as he claimed. The records show that
complainants themselves were not sure if respondent, indeed, signed
the document; what they were sure of was the fact that his signature
appeared thereon. They had no personal knowledge as well as to who
actually affixed the signature of respondent on the deed.1awphi1.nét
Furthermore, complainants did not refute respondent’s contention that
he only met complainant Benjamin Santuyo six years after the alleged
notarization of the deed of sale. Respondent’s assertion was
corroborated by one Mrs. Lyn Santy in an affidavit executed on
November 17, 20019 wherein she stated that complainant Editha
Santuyo had to invite respondent to her house on November 5, 1997 to
meet her husband since the two had to be introduced to each other.
The meeting between complainant Benjamin Santuyo and respondent
was arranged after the latter insisted that Mr. Santuyo personally
acknowledge a deed of sale concerning another property that the
spouses bought.
In finding respondent negligent in performing his notarial functions, the
IBP reasoned out:
xxx xxx xxx.
Considering that the responsibility attached to a notary public is
sensitive respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in
the execution of his duties as such and should not have wholly
entrusted everything to the secretaries; otherwise he should not have
been commissioned as notary public.
For having wholly entrusted the preparation and other mechanics of the
document for notarization to the secretary there can be a possibility
that even the respondent’s signature which is the only one left for him
to do can be done by the secretary or anybody for that matter as had
been the case herein.
As it is respondent had been negligent not only in the supposed
notarization but foremost in having allowed the office secretaries to
make the necessary entries in his notarial registry which was supposed
to be done and kept by him alone; and should not have relied on
somebody else.10
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo is hereby found
GUILTY of negligence in the performance of his duties as notary public
and is hereby SUSPENDED from his commission as a notary public for a
period of two years, if he is commissioned, or if he is not, he is
disqualified from an appointment as a notary public for a period of two
years from finality of this resolution, with a warning that a repetition of
similar negligent acts would be dealt with more severely.

To further refute the accusations against him, respondent stated that, SO ORDERED.
at the time the subject deed of sale was supposedly notarized, on
December 27, 1991, he was on vacation. He surmised that complainants
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and
must have gone to the law office and enticed one of the secretaries,
Garcia, JJ., concur.
with the concurrence of the senior lawyers, to notarize the document.
He claimed he was a victim of a criminal scheme motivated by greed.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation. In a report5 it submitted
to the Court, the IBP noted that the alleged forged signature of A.C. No. 5864 April 15, 2005
respondent on the deed of sale was different from his signatures in
ARTURO L. SICAT, Complainant, purportedly executed by Benitez on January 4, 2001. He likewise never
vs. took issue with the fact that on said date, Benitez was already dead. His
ATTY. GREGORIO E. ARIOLA, JR., respondent. act was a serious breach of the sacred obligation imposed upon him by
the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon
RESOLUTION 1, which prohibited him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct. As a lawyer and as an officer of the court, it was
his duty to serve the ends of justice,9 not to corrupt it. Oath-bound, he
PER CURIAM:
was expected to act at all times in accordance with law and ethics, and
if he did not, he would not only injure himself and the public but also
In an affidavit-complaint,1 complainant Arturo L. Sicat, a Board Member
bring reproach upon an honorable profession.10
of the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Rizal, charged respondent Atty.
Gregorio E. Ariola, the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, Rizal, with
In the recent case of Zaballero v. Atty. Mario J. Montalvan,11 where the
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility by committing fraud,
respondent notarized certain documents and made it appear that the
deceit and falsehood in his dealings, particularly the notarization of a
deceased father of complainant executed them, the Court declared the
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed by a one Juanito
respondent there guilty of violating Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
C. Benitez. According to complainant, respondent made it appear that
Professional Responsibility.12 The Court was emphatic that lawyers
Benitez executed the said document on January 4, 2001 when in fact
commissioned as notaries public should not authenticate documents
the latter had already died on October 25, 2000.
unless the persons who signed them are the very same persons who
executed them and personally appeared before them to attest to the
He alleged that prior to the notarization, the Municipality of Cainta had
contents and truth of what are stated therein. The Court added that
entered into a contract with J.C. Benitez Architect and Technical
notaries public must observe utmost fidelity, the basic requirement in
Management, represented by Benitez, for the construction of low-cost
the performance of their duties, otherwise the confidence of the public
houses. The cost of the architectural and engineering designs amounted
in the integrity of notarized deeds and documents will be undermined.
to P11,000,000 and two consultants were engaged to supervise the
project. For the services of the consultants, the Municipality of Cainta
In the case at bar, the records show that Benitez died on October 25,
issued a check dated January 10, 2001 in the amount of P3,700,000,
2000. However, respondent notarized the SPA, purportedly bearing the
payable to J.C. Benitez Architects and Technical Management and/or
signature of Benitez, on January 4, 2001 or more than two months after
Cesar Goco. The check was received and encashed by the latter by
the latter's death. The notarial acknowledgement of respondent
virtue of the authority of the SPA notarized by respondent Ariola.
declared that Benitez "appeared before him and acknowledged that the
instrument was his free and voluntary act." Clearly, respondent lied and
Complainant further charged respondent with the crime of falsification
intentionally perpetuated an untruthful statement. Notarization is not
penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code by making it
an empty, meaningless and routinary act.13 It converts a private
appear that certain persons participated in an act or proceeding when in
document into a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence
fact they did not.
without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due
execution.14
In his Comment,2 respondent explained that, as early as May 12, 2000,
Benitez had already signed the SPA. He claimed that due to
Neither will respondent's defense that the SPA in question was
inadvertence, it was only on January 4, 2001 that he was able to
superfluous and unnecessary, and prejudiced no one, exonerate him of
notarize it. Nevertheless, the SPA notarized by him on January 4, 2001
accountability. His assertion of falsehood in a public document
was not at all necessary because Benitez had signed a similar SPA in
contravened one of the most cherished tenets of the legal profession
favor of Goco sometime before his death, on May 12, 2000. Because it
and potentially cast suspicion on the truthfulness of every notarial act.
was no longer necessary, the SPA was cancelled the same day he
As the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, he should have been aware of
notarized it, hence, legally, there was no public document that existed.
his great responsibility not only as a notary public but as a public officer
Respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed on the ground of
as well. A public office is a public trust. Respondent should not have
forum-shopping since similar charges had been filed with the Civil
caused disservice to his constituents by consciously performing an act
Service Commission and the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
that would deceive them and the Municipality of Cainta. Without the
According to him, the complaints were later dismissed based on findings
fraudulent SPA, the erring parties in the construction project could not
that the assailed act referred to violations of the implementing rules and
have encashed the check amounting to P3,700,000 and could not have
regulations of PD 1594,3 PD 1445,4 RA 71605 and other pertinent rules
foisted on the public a spurious contract ― all to the extreme prejudice
of the Commission on Audit (COA). He stressed that no criminal and
of the very Municipality of which he was the Administrator. According to
administrative charges were recommended for filing against him.
the COA Special Task Force:

In a Resolution dated March 12, 2003,6 the Court referred the complaint
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation. On August 26, 2003, the IBP submitted its
investigation report:
x x x it is evident that respondent notarized the Special Power of
Attorney dated 4 January 2001 purportedly executed by Juanito C.
Benitez long after Mr. Benitez was dead. It is also evident that
respondent cannot feign innocence and claim that he did not know Mr.
Benitez was already dead at the time because respondent, as member
of the Prequalification and Awards Committee of the Municipality of
Cainta, personally knew Mr. Benitez because the latter appeared before
the Committee a number of times. It is evident that the Special Power of
Attorney dated 4 January 2001 was part of a scheme of individuals to
defraud the Municipality of Cainta of money which was allegedly due
them, and that respondent by notarizing said Special Power of Attorney
helped said parties succeed in their plans.7
Almost all acts of falsification of public documents as enumerated in
Article 171 in relation to Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code were
evident in the transactions of the Municipality of Cainta with J.C. Benitez
& Architects Technical Management for the consultancy services in the
conduct of Detailed Feasibility Study and Detailed Engineering Design of
the Proposed Construction of Cainta Municipal Medium Rise Low Cost
Housing, in the contract amount of P11,000,000. The agent resorted to
misrepresentation, manufacture or fabrication of fictitious document,
untruthful narration of facts, misrepresentation, and counterfeiting or
imitating signature for the purpose of creating a fraudulent contract. All
these were tainted with deceit perpetrated against the government
resulting to undue injury. The first and partial payment, in the amount
of P3,700,000.00 was made in the absence of the required outputs. x x
x15
We need not say more except that we are constrained to change the
penalty recommended by the IBP which we find too light.

The IBP recommended to the Court that respondent's notarial

commission be revoked and that he be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of one year.8
After a careful review of the records, we find that respondent never
disputed complainant's accusation that he notarized the SPA
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, Jr., is found guilty
of gross misconduct and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant
and entered in the records of respondent, and brought to the
immediate attention of the Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
A.C. No. 8254 February 15, 2012
(Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1310)
NESA ISENHARDT, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LEONARDO M. REAL, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This case stemmed from the verified complaint1 filed with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 9 September 2004 by Nesa G.
Isenhardt (complainant), through her counsel Atty. Edgardo Golpeo,
seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonardo M. Real
(respondent) for allegedly notarizing a document even without the
appearance of one of the parties.
The Antecedent Facts
Complainant alleged that on 14 September 2000 respondent notarized a
Special Power Attorney (SPA)2 supposedly executed by her. The SPA
authorizes complainant’s brother to mortgage her real property located
in Antipolo City. Complainant averred that she never appeared before
respondent. She maintained that it was impossible for her to subscribe
to the questioned document in the presence of respondent on 14
September 2000 since she was in Germany at that time.
To support her contention, complainant presented a certified true copy
of her German passport3 and a Certification from the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID)4 indicating that she arrived in the
Philippines on 22 June 2000 and left the country on 4 August 2000. The
passport further indicated that she arrived again in the Philippines only
on 1 July 2001.
Complainant submitted that because of respondent’s act, the property
subject of the SPA was mortgaged and later foreclosed by the Rural
Bank of Antipolo City.
In his answer,5 respondent denied the allegations in the complaint. He
narrated that sometime in the middle of year 2000, spouses Wilfredo
and Lorena Gusi approached him to seek advice regarding the computer
business they were planning to put up. During one of their meetings,
the spouses allegedly introduced to him a woman by the name of Nesa
G. Isenhardt, sister of Wilfredo, as the financier of their proposed
business.
Respondent further narrated that on 14 September 2000, spouses Gusi,
together with the woman purporting to be the complainant, went to his
office to have the subject SPA notarized. He maintained that the parties
all signed in his presence, exhibiting to him their respective Community
Tax Certificates (CTCs). He added that the complainant even presented
to him the original copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)6 of the
property subject of the SPA evidencing her ownership of the property.
Respondent noted that spouses Gusi even engaged his services as
counsel in a civil case filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Antipolo City. The expenses incurred for the case, which was predicated
on the closure of their computer business for non-payment of rentals,
was allegedly financed by complainant. The professional engagement
with the spouses was, however, discontinued in view of differences of
opinion between lawyer and clients, as well as, non-payment of
respondent’s professional fees.
Respondent concluded that complainant’s cause of action had already
prescribed. He argued that under the Rules of Procedure of the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, a complaint for disbarment prescribes in two years from the
date of professional misconduct. Since the document questioned was
notarized in year 2000, the accusation of misconduct which was filed
only in September 2004 had already prescribed. Moreover, respondent
noted that the SPA in question authorizing the grantee Wilfredo Gusi to
mortgage the property of complainant was not used for any transaction
with a third person prejudicial to the latter. The annotation at the back
of the TCT7 would show that the property subject of the SPA was
instead sold by complainant to her brother Wilfredo for ₱500,000.00 on
12 January 2001. Thus, he submits that the SPA did not cause grave
injury to the complainant.
The IBP Report and Recommendation
On 8 September 2006, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No.
XVII-2006-405,8 which adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation9 of the Investigating Commissioner. IBP
Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa, after due proceeding, found
respondent guilty of gross negligence as a notary public and
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for one
year and disqualified from reappointment as notary public for two (2)
years.
Aggrieved, respondent on 13 November 2006 filed a Motion for
Reconsideration10 of the aforesaid Resolution. This was, however,
denied by the IBP Board of Governors in a Resolution dated 11
December 2009.
Our Ruling
We sustain the findings and recommendation of the IBP. As stated by
the IBP Board of Governors, the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner are supported by evidence on record, as well as
applicable laws and rules.
Respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional
Responsibility11 when he made it appear that complainant personally
appeared before him and subscribed an SPA authorizing her brother to
mortgage her property.
It cannot be overemphasized that a notary public should not notarize a
document unless the person who signs it is the same person who
executed it, personally appearing before him to attest to the contents
and the truth of what are stated therein. This is to enable the notary
public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging
party and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free act.12
Section 1, Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law
states:
The acknowledgement shall be before a notary public or an officer duly
authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgements of
instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The
notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgement shall certify
that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to
him and that he is the same person who executed it, acknowledged that
the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under
the official seal, if he is required by law to keep a seal, and if not, his
certificate shall so state.
Such requirement of affiant’s personal appearance was further
emphasized in Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice
of 2004 which provides that:
A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as
signatory to the instrument or document –
(1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the
notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified
by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined
by these Rules.
Respondent insists that complainant appeared before him and
subscribed to the SPA subject of the instant case. His contention,
however, cannot prevail over the documentary evidence presented by
complainant that she was not in the Philippines on 14 September 2000,
the day the SPA was allegedly notarized. Respondent may have indeed
met complainant in person during the period the latter was allegedly
introduced to him by Spouses Gusi but that did not change the fact
established by evidence that complainant was not in the personal
presence of respondent at the time of notarization. It is well settled that
entries in official records made in the performance of a duty by a public
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated.13 This principle aptly covers the Certification from the BID that
complainant left the Philippines on 4 August 2000 and arrived back only
on 1 July 2001.
Respondent’s contention was further negated when he claimed that
complainant presented to him the original TCT of the property subject of
the SPA. A perusal of the TCT would reveal that ownership of the
property was transferred to complainant only on 10 January 2001. Thus,
it could not have been presented to respondent by complainant on 14
September 2000.
The allegation of respondent that there were other documents
subscribed by complainant during the interim of 4 August 2000 and 1
July 2001 or the time that she was supposed to be in Germany deserves
scant consideration. Such allegation was refuted during the hearing
before the Investigating Commissioner when counsel for complainant
informed Commissioner Funa that those documents are subjects of
criminal and civil cases pending before the Regional Trial Courts of Pasig,
Antipolo and Quezon City,14 where the documents are being contested
for being spurious in character.
Anent respondent’s claim of prescription of the offense pursuant to
Section 1, Rule VIII of the Rules of Procedure15of the Commission on
Bar Discipline, we agree with the Investigating Commissioner that the
rule should be construed to mean two years from the date of discovery
of the professional misconduct. To rule otherwise would cause injustice
to parties who may have discovered the wrong committed to them only
at a much later date. In this case, the complaint was filed more than
three years after the commission of the act because it was only after the
property was foreclosed that complainant discovered the SPA.
The duties of a notary public is dictated by public policy and impressed
with public interest.16 It is not a meaningless ministerial act of
acknowledging documents executed by parties who are willing to pay
the fees for notarization. It is of no moment that the subject SPA was
not utilized by the grantee for the purpose it was intended because the
property was allegedly transferred from complainant to her brother by
virtue of a deed of sale consummated between them. What is being
penalized is respondent’s act of notarizing a document despite the
absence of one of the parties. By notarizing the questioned document,
he engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. 17 A
notarized document is by law entitled to full credit upon its face and it is
for this reason that notaries public must observe the basic requirements
in notarizing documents. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in
notarized documents will be undermined.18 1âwphi1
In a catena of cases,19 we ruled that a lawyer commissioned as notary
public having thus failed to discharge his duties as a notary public, the
revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years and
suspension from the practice of law for one year, are in order.
WHEREFORE, the notarial commission of respondent Atty. Leonardo M.
Real is hereby REVOKED. He is disqualified from reappointment as
notary public for a period of two (2) years and SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective immediately. He is
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future
shall be dealt with more severely. He is directed to report the date of
receipt of this Decision in order to determine the date of effectivity of his
suspension.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for
their information and guidance. Let a copy of this Decision be attached
to respondent’s personal record as attorney.
SO ORDERED.
SBC Case No. 519 July 31, 1997
PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant,
vs.
SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that
respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal
profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar examinations on the
fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968.
Before be could take his oath, however, complainant filed the instant
petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a
child out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill
his repeated promises to many her.
The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F.
Sevilla in June and July 1971. Respondent and complainant were
townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in their
teens, they were steadies. Respondent even acted as escort to
complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town fiesta.
Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent
sometime in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born
on December 11, 1964.1 It was after the child was born, complainant
alleged, that respondent first promised he would marry her after he
passes the bar examinations. Their relationship continued and
respondent allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of
marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on the latter's birthdays.
Her trust in him and their relationship ended in 1971, when she learned
that respondent married another woman. Hence, this petition.
Upon complainant's motion, the Court authorized the taking of
testimonies of witnesses by deposition in 1972. On February 18, 1974,
respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case
citing complainant's failure to comment on the motion of Judge Cuello
seeking to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid testimonies by
deposition. Complainant filed her comment required and that she
remains interested in the resolution of the present case. On June 18,
1974, the Court denied respondent's motion to dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on
the ground of abandonment filed by respondent on September 17,
1979.2 Respondent's third motion to dismiss was noted in the Court's
Resolution dated September 15, 1982.3 In 1988, respondent repeated
his request, citing his election as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan
of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active participation in civic
organizations and good standing in the community as well as the length
of time this case has been pending as reasons to allow him to take his
oath as a lawyer.4
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for
failure of complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period
of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyer's oath upon
payment of the required fees.5
Respondent's hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when
the Court, in response to complainant's opposition, resolved to cancel
his scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.
The IBP's report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the
case and that respondent be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's oath in 1971
because of the charge of gross immorality made by complainant. To
recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart,
Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to
marry her after he passes the bar examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting
the permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His
engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises
to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same
does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to
justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that is so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or
disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree."6 It is a willful,
flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of respectable members of the community.7
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the
Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes
Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional
services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe
Marie Labiano, convinced his clients2 to transfer legal representation.
Respondent promised them financial assistance3 and expeditious
collection on their claims.4To induce them to hire his services, he
persistently called them and sent them text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn
affidavit5 of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon
him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize
respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of ₱50,000.
Complainant also attached "respondent’s" calling card:6
Front

We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang8 quite relevant because mere

intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no
impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on
the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a
result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.9 LAW OFFFICE

Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
were evidently consensual. We do not find complainant's assertions that W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
she had been forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to
see and be respondent's girlfriend even after she had given birth to a Fe Marie L. Labiano
son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of amicable and intimate Paralegal
relations refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual
congress with him. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and
actively pursued their relationship and was not an innocent young girl Tel:
who could be easily led astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to 1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd
362-7820
marry and settle permanently with another woman. We cannot Flr. Rm. M-01
Fax: (632)
castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage 6th Ave., cor M.H. Del
362-7821
is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of Pilar
Cel.:
love, not for any other reason. Grace Park, Caloocan
(0926)
City
2701719
We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a
woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to
make respondent suffer severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing
the profession he worked very hard to be admitted into. Even assuming Back
that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that
respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute
sufficient punishment therefor. During this time there appears to be no
other indiscretion attributed to him.10 Respondent, who is now sixty-two
years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the SERVICES OFFERED:
lawyer's oath.

CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
Simeon Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
payment of the proper fees. INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
SO ORDERED. ABROAD.

Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, 1avvphi1
Mendoza, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres Jr., JJ., are on leave.

(emphasis supplied)

Hence, this complaint.

A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing
the printing and circulation of the said calling card.7
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.8
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report
and recommendation,9 found that respondent had encroached on the
professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.0210 and other
canons11of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he
contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or
through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 13812 of the
Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be
reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a
heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent
but we modify the recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by
respondent into complainant’s professional practice in violation of Rule
8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in furtherance
of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of
ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to,
including the manner by which a lawyer’s services are to be made
known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only
true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of
facts.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a
profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents
as merchants advertise their wares.13 To allow a lawyer to advertise his
talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the
profession in the public’s estimation and impair its ability to efficiently
render that high character of service to which every member of the bar
is called.14
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed
primarily to solicit legal business.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers.15 Such
actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.16
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which
provides:
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any
kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in
order to gain employment)17 as a measure to protect the community
from barratry and champerty.18
Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn
statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to
respondent’s office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal
business as well as profited from referrals’ suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he
later admitted it during the mandatory hearing.
Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited.
Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength
of Labiano’s word that respondent could produce a more favorable
result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment
violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.1avvphi1
With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is
the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce
the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or
reduced fees for his services.20 Again the Court notes that respondent
never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving
benefits from Labiano’s "referrals." Furthermore, he never denied
Labiano’s connection to his office.21Respondent committed an unethical,
predatory overstep into another’s legal practice. He cannot escape
liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as
borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the
client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client
except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary
expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only
exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s fees for
transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond,
etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so
that the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely
affected.22 It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is
handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause.
If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the client’s
case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of
the case or an additional stake in its outcome. 23Either of these
circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather
than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of
his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his
duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s cause.24
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes
malpractice25 which calls for the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary
powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions
for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of
obtaining employment.26 Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule
to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of
unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of
the prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction
recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the
wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by
petitioner. A lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited reputation
for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and
conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their
services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple
professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyer’s name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.28
Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance."
The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had
representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance
their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their
original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and
emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the
integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession.
However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability,
the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and
directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labiano’s calling
cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating
Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period
of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He
is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of
the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5299 August 19, 2003
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and
Chief, Public Information Office,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 157053 August 19, 2003
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G.
KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and
Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that
appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily
Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist
532-4333/521-2667."1
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information
Office of the Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number
and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo,
who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in
handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four
to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of property
or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges
a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the
case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public
Information Office revealed that similar advertisements were published
in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5,
2000 issue of The Philippine Star.2
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as
Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office,
filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for
improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of
Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.3
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but
argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts;
that the time has come to change our views about the prohibition on
advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served
by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift
the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the
decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he
be exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court
promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a
lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it
is dignified.4
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation.5 On June 29, 2002, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306,6
finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with
the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more
severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11,
2002.7
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration,8 which was denied by the IBP in Resolution No.
XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 20029
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R.
No. 157053 entitled, "Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court
Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents." This
petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Court’s Resolution
dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to
manifest whether or not they were willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings.10 Complainant filed his
Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any
additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early
resolution on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. 11 Respondent,
on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20,
2003.
We agree with the IBP’s Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and
XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a
business.12 It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money,
is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a
money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits.13 The gaining of a livelihood should be a
secondary consideration.14 The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers,
who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves.15 The following elements distinguish the legal profession
from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and
in which one may attain the highest eminence without making much
money;
2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice
involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness,
and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising
and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their
clients.16
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of.
He himself admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements.
While he professes repentance and begs for the Court’s indulgence, his
contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal
services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that
he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his
answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001
issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper. 17 Ten months later, he
caused the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001
issue of Buy & Sell.18 Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and
contemptuous affront on the Court’s authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising
himself as a self-styled "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he wittingly
or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the
sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the
contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in
assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four
to six months from the time of the filing of the case,19 he in fact
encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and
would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether
proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible
with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and
decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the
bar.20 Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the
lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well
as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are
permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable. 21
Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and
informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v.
Legal Clinic, Inc.:22
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of
the lawyer’s name and the names of his professional associates;
addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools
attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal
authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar
associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and
legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the
names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the
names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that
purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper,
magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for
other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his
brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be
published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which
are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to
lower dignity or standing of the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The
card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law
firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special
branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of
the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates,
firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession,
is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a
telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law.
(emphasis and italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T.
SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the
Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1)
YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Acting Chairman),Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman ), abroad, on official business.
A.C. No. 6788 August 23, 2007
(Formerly, CBD 382)
DIANA RAMOS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension1 against Atty. Jose R.
Imbang for multiple violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The Complaint
In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of
respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions
against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos.2 She gave
respondent ₱8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for
₱5,000 only.3
The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases
against the Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter
the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He would then come
out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been
cancelled and rescheduled.4 This happened six times and for each
"appearance" in court, respondent charged her ₱350.
After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became
suspicious. She personally inquired about the status of her cases in the
trial courts of Biñan and San Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn
that respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that
he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).5
Respondent's Defense
According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the
government service from the very start. In fact, he first met the
complainant when he was still a district attorney in the Citizen's Legal
Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO) of Biñan, Laguna and was
assigned as counsel for the complainant's daughter.6
In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action for
damages against the Jovellanoses.7 Because he was with the PAO and
aware that the complainant was not an indigent, he
declined.8 Nevertheless, he advised the complainant to consult Atty.
Tim Ungson, a relative who was a private practitioner.9 Atty. Ungson,
however, did not accept the complainant's case as she was unable to
come up with the acceptance fee agreed upon.10Notwithstanding Atty.
Ungson's refusal, the complainant allegedly remained adamant. She
insisted on suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid that she "might spend" the
cash on hand, the complainant asked respondent to keep the ₱5,000
while she raised the balance of Atty. Ungson's acceptance fee.11
A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an
antedated receipt because one of her daughters asked her to account
for the ₱5,000 she had previously given the respondent for
safekeeping.12 Because the complainant was a friend, he agreed and
issued a receipt dated July 15, 1992.13
On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO.14 A few months
later or in September 1994, the complainant again asked respondent to
assist her in suing the Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as he was now a private
practitioner, respondent agreed to prepare the complaint. However, he
was unable to finalize it as he lost contact with the complainant.15
Recommendation of the IBP
Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely
to public service. For this reason, the private practice of profession is
prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees provides:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute prohibited acts
and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby
declared unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public
officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with
their official function.25

Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for

Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
they are expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where the complaint was filed,
respective offices.
received evidence from the parties. On November 22, 2004, the CBD
submitted its report and recommendation to the IBP Board of
In this instance, respondent received ₱5,000 from the complainant and
Governors.16
issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he was still connected with the
PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client
The CBD noted that the receipt17 was issued on July 15, 1992 when
relationship.26Respondent's admission that he accepted money from
respondent was still with the PAO.18 It also noted that respondent
the complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an
described the complainant as a shrewd businesswoman and that
attorney-client relationship between him and the complainant.
respondent was a seasoned trial lawyer. For these reasons, the
Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the complainant's case
complainant would not have accepted a spurious receipt nor would while he was still a government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the
respondent have issued one. The CBD rejected respondent's claim that
prohibition on private practice of profession.
he issued the receipt to accommodate a friend's request. 19 It found
respondent guilty of violating the prohibitions on government lawyers
Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees.
from accepting private cases and receiving lawyer's fees other than their
The PAO was created for the purpose of providing free legal assistance
salaries.20 The CBD concluded that respondent violated the following
to indigent litigants.27 Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Revised Administrative Code provides:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

Sec. 14. xxx
deceitful conduct.

The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
extending free legal assistance to indigent persons in criminal, civil,
received for or from a client.
labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.28

Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which he

As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees
knows or should know that he is not qualified to render. However, he
from the complainant as this was inconsistent with the office's
may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain
mission.29 Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal
as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
fees other than his salary.

Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law

for three years and ordered him to immediately return to the
complainant the amount of ₱5,000 which was substantiated by the
receipt.21
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the
CBD that respondent violated Rules 1.01, 16.01 and 18.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. It, however, modified the CBD's
recommendation with regard to the restitution of ₱5,000 by imposing
interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995 or, in case of respondent's
failure to return the total amount, an additional suspension of six
months.22
The Court's Ruling
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 1. — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.
Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law.30 This undertaking includes
the observance of the above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated
by respondent when he accepted the complainant's cases and received
attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services. Consequently,
respondent's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on
the private practice of profession disqualified him from acting as the
complainant's counsel.

Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases

We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.
and accepting attorney's fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived
the complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint against the
Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and
Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have done),
integrity.23 More specifically, lawyers in government service are
respondent also led the complainant to believe that he really filed an
expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are
action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases
subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but
were being tried and asked the complainant to pay his "appearance
also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service.24
fees" for hearings that never took place. These acts constituted
dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.31
Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral
character required of all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office.
Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain from any act or
omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry
in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all
times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A
government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a
high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private
practice.321avvphi1
There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of
violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the complainant
but accepted it as his attorney's fees. He neither held the amount in
trust for the complainant (such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in
satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor of the client) 33 nor was it
given to him for a specific purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees
and bail bond).34 Nevertheless, respondent should return the ₱5,000 as
he, a government lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and not
allowed to accept them.35
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the
lawyer’s oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ordered
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also ordered to return to
complainant the amount of ₱5,000 with interest at the legal rate,
reckoned from 1995, within 10 days from receipt of this resolution.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of
respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant and notice of the same be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No.7054 November 11, 2014
CONRADO N. QUE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's consideration is the Profound Appeal for Judicial
Clemency1 filed by Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. (respondent), who
seeks to be reinstated as a member of the Philippine Bar.
Factual Background
In a Decision2 dated December 4, 2009, this Court disbarred the
respondent from the practice of law on the following grounds: abuse of
court procedures and processes; filing of multiple actions and
forum-shopping; willful, intentional and deliberate resort to falsehood
and deception before the courts; maligning the name of his fellow
lawyer; and fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court.
The material portions of the subject Decision provide:
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed
various acts of professional misconduct and thereby failed to live up to
the exacting ethical standards imposed on members of the Bar. We
cannot, agree, however, that only a penalty of one-year suspension
from the practice of law should be imposed. Neither should we limit
ourselves to the originally recommendedpenalty of suspension for two
(2) years.
Given the respondent’s multiple violations, his past record as previously
discussed, and the nature of these violations which shows the readiness
to disregard court rules and to gloss over concerns for the orderly
administration of justice,we believe and so hold that the appropriate
action of this Court is to disbar the respondent to keep him away from
the law profession and from any significant role in the administration of
justice which he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public
that the legal profession serves. Not even his ardor and
overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save him.
Such traits at the expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of
the profession and the orderly administration of justice, this Court
cannot accept nor tolerate.
Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondent’s
first ethical infraction of the same nature. We penalized him in Plus
Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for
his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court
procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for
collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We showed
leniency then by reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6) months.
We cannot similarly treat the respondent this time; it is clear that he did
not learn any lesson from his past experience and since then has
exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the
respondent’s professional legal career for the sake of the public, the
profession and the interest of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No.
XVII-2005-164 dated December 17, 2005 and Resolution No.
XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of the Board of Governors of
the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as respondent Atty.
Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable for professional misconduct for
violations of the Lawyer’s Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon
10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; and Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility;and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty the IBP
imposed, and hold that the respondent should be DISBARREDfrom the
practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
On July 8, 2010, the respondent filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency
and Compassion3 praying that his license to practice law be restored
based on humanitarian considerations, but the Court En Bancresolved
to deny the petition for lack of merit.
The respondent subsequently filed on January 11, 2011, an Appeal for
Grace, Succor, and Mercy4 asking the Court to take a second look at the
penalty imposed upon him. He maintained that Conrado N. Que
(complainant) failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
he committed grossly immoral conduct meriting the severe penalty of
disbarment. He also attempted to pass the blame on another individual
(a certain Gerolin Piedad, General Manager of Kalayaan Development
Corporation) to free himself from liability by claiming that one of the
charges leading to his disbarment was not of his own doing.
In a Resolution5 dated February 8, 2011, the Court denied the appeal.
The respondent again wrote the Court on July 13, 2011, reiterating his
pleas for the Court’s compassion and mercy.6He sought the Court’s
forgiveness stating that he has learned his lesson; but at the same time,
questioning the Court’s finding for lackof factual support. He appended
to his appeal proofs of his updated payment of IBP membership
dues,7 MCLE compliance,8 and a letter from the Bishop of
Marinduque.9 His appeal, however, was denied by a Resolution10 dated
August 2, 2011.
On May 17, 2012, the respondent sent a letter11 addressed to the
Members of the Court En Banc once again reiterating his prayer to lift
the order of disbarment. He alleged among others that for more than
three years that he has been disbarred in the practice of law, he has
never been involved in any immoral or illegal activities, has devoted
himself in the services of St. Peter Parish and Shrine,
CommonwealthAvenue as Eucharistic Minister leader, has conducted
regular monthly lectures on the subject of marriage at the Diocese of
Novaliches, and has participated as monthly financial contributor to Mr.
Carmel Church, Lucena City. He also begged the Court to no longer
prolong his penalty since it had already served its purpose. The plea was
also denied on July 3, 2012.12
On August 30, 2012, the respondent once more prayed for his
reinstatement professing repentance and remorse for what he did.13 He
pleaded for the Court’s consideration, and vowed that he will no longer
misuse the rules of procedure but instead, devote his time and energy
for its proper observance and implementation. He also stated that for
almost three years of being disbarred from the practice of law, he has
never been involved in any unlawful, dishonest, and immoral activities.
He promised to maintain at all times a high degree of legal proficiency,
morality, integrity, and fair dealings to the courts, clients, and the legal
profession in accordance with the values and morals embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
In a Resolution14 dated October 9, 2012, the Court denied his petition
for lack of merit. Aggrieved, the respondent filed on March 27, 2013 a
letter15 pleading the Court to revisit his previousrequests for
reinstatement.
Treating his letter as a motion for the reconsideration of the resolutions
dated August 2, 2011, July3, 2012, and October 9, 2012, the Court, on
June 4, 2013 deniedthe motion with finality.16 On July 18, 2014, the
respondent filed a Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency17 reiterating
his apologies to the Court. He stressed that the penalty of disbarment
has already taken its toll on his health; he has now become most frail
and weak; and he had been diagnosed with chronic kidney disease at
stage five (5) and undergoing dialysis thrice weekly. He also stressed
that in the years that he had been excluded from the practice of law, he
devoted his time to Christian and charity pursuits serving with all
humility as a Lay Minister and a regular lecturer on Legal Aspect of
Marriage at St. Peter Church, Quezon City.
The respondent also pleads for clemency, not because he intends to
practice law again, but to be made whole, to recover from being
shattered, and to finally have peace of mind. Heexpressed his sincere
repentance and deep remorse by taking full responsibility for his
misdemeanor. He also prayed that his disbarment be lifted and that he
be reinstated as a member of the Philippine bar. As part of his petition,
he submitted a Medical Abstract18 evidencing his diagnosis for chronic
kidney disease, and a certification19 from St. Peter Parish,
Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, proving that he and his family are
dedicated parishioners.
The Court's Ruling
We deny the present appeal.
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. 20 It is not
a natural, absolute or constitutional right granted to everyone who
demands it, but rather, a special privilege granted and continued only to
those who demonstrate special fitness inintellectual attainment and in
moral character.21 The same reasoning applies to reinstatement of a
disbarred lawyer. When exercising its inherent power to grant
reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only those who establish
their present moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted
to the Bar. Thus, though the doors to the practice of law are never
permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the Court owes a duty to
the legal profession as well as to the general public to ensure that if the
doors are opened,it is done so only as a matter of justice.22
The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatementto the practice of law is
whether the lawyer has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in
conduct and character.23 Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in
the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of
the Court.24 The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy of membership in the
Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or her character and
standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the
charge/s for which he or she was disbarred, his or her conduct
subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in
between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.25
In the present case, we note that before his admission to the Bar, the
respondent had demonstrated an active involvement and participation
in community and church activities by joining Youth For Christ,
Catechism, and Bible Study and Sharing. Likewise, upon admission to
the Bar, the respondent worked as Municipal Attorney in Sta. Cruz,
Marinduque rendering free legal assistance to his townmates who were
inneed of legal service. Thereafter, the respondentwas appointed as a
Municipal Administrator and had continued extending assistance to the
indigent residents.
The respondent also actively engaged and participated in various
community projects, through the Marinduque Jaycees, where he served
as President from 1980 to 1981, and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Marinduque Chapter, where he served as a member,
Director, and President from 1982 to 1987.
In his present appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent
acknowledged his indiscretions and claimed to have taken full
responsibility for his misdemeanor. Unlike in his previous
petitions/appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent no
longerquestioned the Court’s decision. According to him, he has long
expressed deep remorse and genuine repentance.
The respondent also claimed that the long period of his disbarment
gave him sufficient time to reflect on his professional conduct, to show
remorse and repentance, and to realize the gravity of his mistakes.
After his disbarment, the respondent continued lending assistance, and
deviated his time and effort in pursuing civic and religious work that
significantly contributed to his character reformation.He professed that
during his almost five (5) years of disbarment, he has been an active
member of the Couples for Christ, Marriage Encounter, and Knights of
Columbus; and through his affiliations with these groups, he had served
in the ecclesial affairs in his parish as an Extraordinary Minister for Holy
Communion and a lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage Pre-Cana and
Marriage Preparation Seminar at the Parish Church of St. Peter in
Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
Although the Court believes that the respondent is not inherently
lacking in moral fiber as shown by his conduct prior to his disbarment,
we are not convinced that he had sufficiently achieved moral
reformation.
In Rodolfo M. Bernardo v. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia,26 the Court, in deciding
whether or not to reinstate Atty. Mejia, considered that 15 years had
already elapsed from the time hewas disbarred, which gave him
sufficient time to acknowledge his infractions and to repent. The Court
also took into account the fact that Atty. Mejiais already of advanced
years, has long repented, and suffered enough. The Court also
notedthat he had made a significant contribution by putting up the
Mejia Law Journal containing his religious and social writings; and the
religious organization named "El Cristo Movement and Crusade on
Miracle of the Heart and Mind." Furthermore, the Court considered that
Atty. Mejia committed no other transgressions since he was disbarred.
Similarly in Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,27 the Court granted
the reinstatement of the disbarred lawyer (found to be guilty of
intercalating a material fact in a CA decision) and considered the period
of three (3) years as sufficient time to do soul-searching and to prove
that he is worthy to practice law. In that case, the Court took into
consideration the disbarred lawyer’s sincere admission of guilt and
repeated pleas for compassion.
Also in Valencia v. Antiniw,28 the Court reinstated Atty. Antiniw (who
was found guilty of malpractice in falsifying a notarized deed of sale and
subsequently introducing the document in court) after considering the
long period of his disbarment (almost 15 years). The Court considered
that during Atty. Antiniw’s disbarment, he has been persistent in
reiterating his apologies to the Court, has engaged inhumanitarian and
civic services, and retained an unblemished record as an elected public
servant, as shown by the testimonials of the numerous civic and
professional organizations, government institutions, and members of
the judiciary.
In all these cases, the Court considered the conduct of the disbarred
attorney before and after his disbarment, the time that had elapsed
from the disbarment and the application for reinstatement, and more
importantly, the disbarred attorneys’ sincere realization and
acknowledgement of guilt.
In the present case, we are not fully convinced that the passage of more
than four (4) years is sufficient to enable the respondent to reflect and
to realize his professional transgressions.
We emphasize that this is the second timethat the respondent was
accused and was found guilty of gross misconduct.1âwphi1 The
respondent, in an earlier case of Plus Builders, Inc. v. Atty. Anastacio E.
Revilla,Jr.,29 was likewise found guilty of gross misconduct for
committing willful and intentional falsehood before the court; misusing
court procedure and processes to delay the execution of a judgment;
and collaborating with nonlawyers in the illegal practice of law – mostly
the same grounds on which the Decision dated December 4, 2009 (2nd
disbarment) was based. In Plus Builders, we granted the respondent’s
motion for reconsideration and reduced the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law from two (2) years to six (6) months out of
compassion to the respondent.
Considering the respondent’s earlier disbarment case(and subsequent
reduction of the penalty imposed as an act of clemency), and another
disbarment case against him still pending review by the Court, we are
not fully and convincingly satisfied that the respondent has already
reformed. The period of five (5) years is likewise not considerably long
considering the nature and perversityof the respondent’s misdeeds. We
believe that it is still early for the Court to consider the respondent’s
reinstatement.
Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the respondent's sincerity in
acknowledging his guilt.1âwphi1 While he expressly stated in his appeal
that he had taken full responsibility of his misdemeanor, his previous
inclination to pass the blame to other individuals, to invoke self-denial,
and to make alibis for his wrongdoings, contradicted his assertion. The
respondent also failed to submit proof satisfactorily showing his
contrition. He failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
he is again worthy of membership in the legal profession. We thus
entertain serious doubts that the respondent had completely reformed.
As a final word, while the Court sympathizes with the respondent's
unfortunate physical condition, we stress that in considering his
application for reinstatement to the practice of law, the duty of the
Court is to determine whether he has established moral reformation and
rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling of sympathy or pity. Surely at this
point, this requirement was not met. Until such time when the
respondent can demonstrate to the Court that he has completely
rehabilitated himself and deserves to resume his membership in the Bar,
Our decision to disbar him from the practice of law stands.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Profound Appeal for Judicial
Clemency filed by Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6317 August 31, 2006
LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO P. TERRADO, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On February 13, 2004, an administrative complaint 1 was filed by
complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco against respondent Atty. Rogelio P.
Terrado for gross misconduct, malpractice and conduct unbecoming of
an officer of the court when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to
him despite receipt of payment representing attorney’s fees.
According to the complainant, she engaged the services of respondent
sometime in January 2001 for P70,000.00 to assist in recovering her
deposit with Planters Development Bank, Buendia, Makati branch in the
amount of P180,000.00 and the release of her foreclosed house and lot
located in Calamba, Laguna. The property identified as Lot No. 408-C-2
and registered as TCT No. T-402119 in the name of said bank is the
subject of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession then
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna, Branch 24
docketed as LRC Case No. B-2610.
Complainant alleged that respondent failed to appear before the trial
court in the hearing for the issuance of the Writ of Possession and did
not protect her interests in the Compromise Agreement which she
subsequently entered into to end LRC Case No. B-2610.2
Respondent denied the accusations against him. He averred that the
P70,000.00 he received from complainant was payment for legal
services for the recovery of the deposit with Planters Development Bank
and did not include LRC Case No. B-2610 pending before the Regional
Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna.
The complaint was referred3 to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. On September 21,
2005, the Investigating Commissioner submitted his report finding
respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provide:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
Rule 9.02 – A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal
services with persons not licensed to practice law, except:
a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate
that, upon the latter’s death, money shall be paid over a reasonable
period of time to his estate or to the persons specified in the agreement;
or
b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of
a deceased lawyer; or
c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a
retirement plan, even if the plan is based in whole or in part, on a
profit-sharing arrangement.
In finding the respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the Investigating Commissioner
opined that:
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant. To be made the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the
charge against him must be established by convincing proof. The record
must disclose as free from doubt a case which compels the exercise by
the Supreme Court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of
the act done as well as of the motivation thereof must be clearly
demonstrated. x x x.
In the instant scenario, despite the strong protestation of respondent
that the Php70,000.00 legal fees is purely and solely for the recovery of
the Php180,000.00 savings account of complainant subsequent acts
and events say otherwise, to wit:
1.) The Php70,000.00 legal fees for the recovery of a Php180,000.00
savings deposit is too high;
2.) Respondent actively acted as complainant’s lawyer to effectuate the
compromise agreement.
By openly admitting he divided the Php70,000.00 to other individuals as
commission/referral fees respondent violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall
not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not
licensed to practice law. Worst, by luring complainant to participate in a
compromise agreement with a false and misleading assurance that
complainant can still recover after Three (3) years her foreclosed
property respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which says a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.4
The Investigating Commissioner thus recommended:
WHEREFORE, finding respondent responsible for aforestated violations
to protect the public and the legal profession from his kind, it is
recommended that he be suspended for Six (6) months with a stern
warning that similar acts in the future will be severely dealt with.5
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendation of the
investigating commissioner.6
A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his client’s
case. Once he agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task
with dedication and care. If he fails in this duty, he is not true to his
oath as a lawyer. Thus, a lawyer should accept only as much cases as
he can efficiently handle in order to sufficiently protect his clients’
interests. It is not enough that a lawyer possesses the qualification to
handle the legal matter; he must also give adequate attention to his
legal work. Utmost fidelity is demanded once counsel agrees to take the
cudgels for his client’s cause.18

In view of the foregoing, we find that suspension from the practice of

We agree with the findings of the IBP.
law for six months is warranted. In addition, he is directed to return to
complainant the amount he received by way of legal fees pursuant to
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show that they
existing jurisprudence.19
possessed and continue to possess the legal qualifications for it. Indeed,
lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY of violating
proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
Rules 1.01, 9.02, 18.02 and 20.01 of the Code of Professional
They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession,
the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
months effective from notice, and STERNLY WARNED that any similar
infraction will be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered
Responsibility.7
to RETURN, within thirty (30) days from notice, the sum of P70,000.00
to complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco and to submit to this Court proof
Lawyers are prohibited from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
of his compliance within three (3) days therefrom.
or deceitful conduct8 and are mandated to serve their clients with
competence and diligence.9 They shall not neglect a legal matter
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and
entrusted to them, and this negligence in connection therewith shall
served on the IBP, as well as on the Court Administrator who shall
render them liable.10
circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.

Respondent’s claim that the attorney’s fee pertains only to the recovery
SO ORDERED.
of complainant’s savings deposit from Planter’s Development Bank
cannot be sustained. Records show that he acted as complainant’s
counsel in the drafting of the compromise agreement between the latter CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
and the bank relative to LRC Case No. B-2610. Respondent admitted
that he explained the contents of the agreement to complainant before
the latter affixed her signature. Moreover, the Investigating
Commissioner observed that the fee of P70,000.00 for legal assistance
in the recovery of the deposit amounting to P180,000.00 is
unreasonable. A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.11

Respondent’s disregard for his client’s interests is evident in the

iniquitous stipulations in the compromise agreement where the
complainant conceded the validity of the foreclosure of her property;
that the redemption period has already expired thus consolidating
ownership in the bank, and that she releases her claims against it.12As
found by the Investigating Commissioner, complainant agreed to these
concessions because respondent misled her to believe that she could
still redeem the property after three years from the foreclosure. The
duty of a lawyer to safeguard his client’s interests commences from his
retainer until his discharge from the case or the final disposition of the
subject matter of litigation. Acceptance of money from a client
establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of
fidelity to the client’s cause. The canons of the legal profession require
that once an attorney agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the
task with zeal, care and utmost devotion.13

Respondent’s admission14 that he divided the legal fees with two other
people as a referral fee does not release him from liability. A lawyer shall
not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not
licensed to practice law, except in certain cases.15

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar
may be disbarred or suspended on the following grounds: 1) deceit; 2)
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office; 3) grossly immoral
conduct; 4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; 5) violation
of the lawyer’s oath; 6) willful disobedience to any lawful order of a
superior court; and 7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
without authority.

In Santos v. Lazaro16 and Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.,17 we held that Rule

18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is a basic postulate in
legal ethics. When a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he
will exercise due diligence in protecting his rights. The failure to exercise
that degree of vigilance and attention makes such lawyer unworthy of
the trust reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable not just
to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society.