Van Dorn vs. Romillo
154380, October 5, 2005
139 SCRA 139
FACTS:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen
and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US
citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979.
They established their residence in the
Philippines and had 2 children. They were
divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and
petitioner remarried, this time with
Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against
petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating
that petitioner’s business in Ermita Manila,
the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property
with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be
ordered to render an accounting of the
business and he be declared as the
administrator of the said property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce
between the petitioner and private
respondent in Nevada is binding in the
Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino
citizen.
HELD:
Private respondent is no longer the husband
of the petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue petitioner to exercise control
over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his
own representation before the court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. Petitioner is
not bound to her marital obligations to
respondent by virtue of her nationality laws.
She should not be discriminated against her
own country if the end of justice is to be
served.
Republic vs. Orbecido
GR NO.
FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecido III was married with
Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at
the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son
and a daughter named Kristoffer and
Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife
left for US bringing along their son
Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido
discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen and
learned from his son that his wife sometime
in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and
married a certain Stanley. He thereafter
filed with the trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can
remarry under Article 26 of the Family
Code.

HELD:
The court ruled that taking into
consideration the legislative intent and
applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2
should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the
other party were a foreigner at the time of
the solemnization of the marriage.
Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in
holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as
allowing a Filipino citizen who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired a
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry
under Philippine law.
Manila Chronicle, owned by respondent
Coyuito and in which respondents are
employees, were sued by Yuchengco in
acivil action for damages for libelous
publication, abuse of right and attorney’s The whole question being the effect the
fees and costs. RTC and CA ruled for
Yuchengco andfound respondents liable as
all elements for the action were present publication
including actual malice. However, the CA
later reversed in aResolution ruling that the
articles published were qualifiedly had upon the minds of the readers
privileged communication as they are fair
commentaries on matters of public interest
despite actual malice being present and
, andthey not having been assisted by the
therefore exempted for liability for
damages.
offered explanation in reading the article, it
Issue: won publication is present
comes too late to have the effect of
Ruling: In applying the rules to the language removing thesting, if any there be, from the
of an alleged libel, the court will disregard word used in the publication."
any subtle or ingenious explanation offered
by thepublisher on being called to account.
Rivera v. People
FACTS: April 1998: Ruben Rodil stopped brought to the hospital. The doctor o They should be held criminally liable

working as a taxi driver after a would-be declared his lacerated wound in the for physical injuries only since no intent

rapist threatened his life. He was cited parietal area was slight and superficial to kill and even if they had intent to kill,

as a Bayaning Pilipino by ABS-CBN for and would heal from 1-7 days. the prosecution failed to prove treachery

saving the would-be victim. His wife is a Eyewitnesses Alicia Vera Cruz and

manicurist and they have 3 children. Lucita Villejo: revealed the suddenness
ISSUE: W/N the CA correctly held it as

and unexpectedness of the attack of

Ruben went to a nearby store to buy
attempted murder.

petitioners
food. Edgardo, his neighbour, mocked
RULING: When a wound is not sufficient
• RTC: Frustrated murder
him for being jobless and dependent on
to cause death, but intent to kill is
• CA: Attempted murder
his wife for support and soon a heated
evident, the crime is attempted.
• Petitioned
exchange of words ensued. Ruben was

• Intent to kill is a specific intent which
the prosecution must prove by direct or
circumstantial evidence, while general
criminal intent is presumed from the
commission of a felony by dolo.
o evidence to prove intent to kill in
crimes against persons may consist,
inter alia, in the means used by the
malefactors, the nature, location and
number of wounds sustained by the
victim, the conduct of the malefactors
before, at the time, or immediately after
the killing of the victim, the
circumstances under which the crime
was committed and the motives of the
accused
Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 72964, 7 January 1988
Criminal Law 1 Case Digest
FACTS:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner
Filomeno Urbano (Urbano) was on his way
to his ricefield when he discovered that the
place where he stored palay was flooded
with water coming from an irrigation canal.
When he investigated the area, he saw
Marcelino Javier (Javier) and Emilio Efre
(Efre). Javier admitted that he opened the
irrigation canal. A quarrel ensued, and
Urbano started to hack Javier with a bolo.
Javier was wounded at the right palm of his
hand.
Upon intervention, Urbano and
Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano
agreed to shoulder all the expenses for the
medication of the wound of Javier, as well
as to pay also whatever loss of income
Javier may have suffered. Javier, on the
other hand, signed a statement of his
forgiveness towards Urbano and on that
condition, he withdrew the complaint that
he filed against Urbano.
After several weeks of treatments
and medication, the doctor pronounced
that the wound of Javier was already
healed. However, on November 14, 1980,
Javier was rushed to the hospital when he
had sudden lockjaw and convulsions. The
doctor found the condition to be caused by
tetanus toxin which infected from the
healing wound in his right palm of his hand.
The following day, on November 15, 1980,
Javier died.
The heirs of Javier filed a case of
homicide against Urbano. Urbano was
charged with homicide and was found guilty
both by the trial court and on appeal by the
Intermediate Appellate Court.
Urbano then filed a motion for a
new trial based on the affidavit sworn by
the Barangay Captain who stated that he
saw the deceased catching fish in the
shallow irrigation canals on November 5.
The motion was denied by the respondent
court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the wound inflicted by
Urbano to Javier may be considered as the
proximate cause of the latter’s death.
HOLDING:
No, the wound inflicted by Urbano
cannot be considered as the proximate
cause of Javier’s death.
The Court defined proximate cause
as “that cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred.” In this case, the death
of the victim must be the direct, natural,
and logical consequence of the wounds
inflicted upon him by the accused. And
since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused
caused the victim’s death must convince a
rational mind beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court ruled that Urbano is not
liable for the death of Javier. Urbano is only
liable for the physical injuries inflicted to
Javier through the wound on the right palm
of his hand. The Court took into account the
average incubation period of tetanus toxin,
and medical evidence indicated that
patients affected with tetanus experience
its symptoms within 14 days. If, indeed,
Javier had incurred tetanus poisoning out of
the wound inflicted by Urbano, he would
not have experienced the symptoms on the
23rd day after the hacking incident.
The medical findings lead to a
distinct possibility that the infection of the
wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time
Javier was wounded to the time of his
death. The infection was, therefore, distinct
and foreign to the crime. However, the act
of Javier working in his farm where the soil
is filthy, using his own hands, is an efficient
supervening cause which relieves Urbano of
any liability for the death of Javier. There is
a likelihood that the wound was but the
remote cause and its subsequent infection,
for failure to take necessary precautions,
with tetanus may have been the proximate
cause of Javier's death with which the
petitioner had nothing to do.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision
of the then Intermediate Appellate Court,
now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the
crime of homicide.
GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner
vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
defendant
G.R. No. 107125. January 29,
2001
FACTS:
In the evening of September 25, 1982, at
the National Highway of Malvar,
Santiago, Isabela, George Manantan was
driving a Toyota car going home. At that
time, he was with Fiscal Ambrocio,
Miguel Tabangin and Ruben Nicolas.
Suddenly, a jeepney, coming from the
opposite direction hit the driver side of
the car, driven by Manantan.
Consequently, Manantan, Ambrocio and
Tabangin were injured while Nicolas
died. Trial followed.
The lower court acquitted the accused of
the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide. The respondents
filed their notice of appeal on the civil
aspect of the lower court’s judgment.
Even if the accused was acquitted from
his criminal liability, the Appellate Court
held him civilly liable and ordered him to
indemnify the aggrieved party for the
death of Nicolas.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acquittal of petitioner
extinguished his civil liability.
RULING:
The acquittal was based on reasonable
doubt on the guilt of the accused. Article
29 of the Civil Code provides that a civil
liability is not extinguished in criminal
cases. Therefore, the accused cannot be
exempted from paying civil damages
which may only be proven by
preponderance of evidence.
Manantan claimed that he was placed on
double jeopardy but the courts did not
give merit to this contention. The
following elements must be present for
double jeopardy to exist: (1) A first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second; (2) The first jeopardy must have
terminated; and (3) the third jeopardy
must be for the same offense as the first.
In the case at bar, the initially put into
jeopardy but he it was terminated by his
discharge. When the case was elevated to
the Court of Appeals, the issue was about
the civil aspect of the criminal case. Thus,
there could be no double jeopardy.
People v. Pimentel
Full Text:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1
998/apr1998/100210.htm
Facts:
As early as 1983, Tujan was charged
with Subversion under RA 1700 ( Anti-
Subversion Law) as amended before the
RTC Manila. A warrant for his arrest was
issued on July 1983 but was unserved
as he could not be found.
Seven years after, Tujan was arrested
on the basis of warrant of arrest in the
subversion case. When arrested, an
unlicensed revolver and six rounds of
live ammunition was found in his
possession. On June 1990, Tujan was
charged with Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition in furtherance
of Subversion under PD No. 1866
before RTC Makati. Tujan filed a motion
to quash the information invoking
protection versus double jeopardy since
he claims that alleged possession of
firearms was absorbed in subversion. It
was granted by RTC and CA.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 7363 (An Act
Repealing RA 1700) should be applied
retroactively to Tujan.
Held:
Yes, RA 7363 should be applied
retroactively. The repeal by said law of
RA 1700, as amended was absolute.
There was no saving clause in the
repeal.
Where, as here, the repeal of a penal
law is total and absolute and the act
which was penalized by a prior law
ceases to be criminal under the new
law, the previous offense is obliterated.
It is a recognized rule in this jurisdiction
that a total repeal deprives the courts of
jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence
persons charged with violation of the old
law prior to the repeal.
With the enactment of R.A. No. 7636,
the charge of subversion against the
accused-private respondent has no
more legal basis and should be
dismissed.
Tenebro v. CA, G.R. No. 150758. February
18, 2004
FACTS: Veronico Tenebro contracted
marriage with private complainant Leticia
Ancajas on April 10, 1990. Tenebro and
Ancajas lived together continuously and
without interruption until the latter part of
1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas
that he had been previously married to a
certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10,
1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a
photocopy of a marriage contract
between him and Villareyes. Invoking this
previous marriage, petitioner thereafter
left the conjugal dwelling which he
shared with Ancajas, stating that he was
going to cohabit with Villareyes. On
January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted
yet another marriage, this one with a
certain Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas
learned of this third marriage, she verified
from Villareyes whether the latter was
indeed married to petitioner. In a
handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed
that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was
indeed her husband. Ancajas thereafter
filed a complaint for bigamy against
petitioner. Villegas countered that his
marriage with Villareyes cannot be
proven as a fact there being no record of
such. He further argued that his second
marriage, with Ancajas, has been
declared void ab initio due to
psychological incapacity. Hence he
cannot be charged for bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty
of bigamy.
HELD: Individual who contracts a second
or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is
criminally liable for bigamy
notwithstanding the declaration of the
second marriage as void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S POE-
LLAMANZARES vs.
COMELEC,et al.
GR Nos. 221697 , GR No. 221698-700
March 8,2016
Perez, J.:
FACTS:
In her COC for Presidency on the May
2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that
she is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and that her residence up to
day before May 9, 2016 would be 10
years and 11 months counted from May
24, 2005.
Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as
newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was
legally adopted by RONALD ALLAN
KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS
SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in
1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991
after her marriage to Theodore
Llamanzares who was then based at the
US. Grace Poe then became a
naturalized American citizen in 2001.
On December 2004, he returned to the
Philippines due to his father’s
deteriorating medical condition, who
then eventually demice on February
3,2005. She then quitted her job in the
US to be with her grieving mother and
finally went home for good to the
Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.
On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her
petition declaring that she had
reacquired her Filipino citizenship under
RA 9225. She registered as a voter and
obtained a new Philippine Passport.
In 2010, before assuming her post as
appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB ,
she renounced her American citizenship
to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as
to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship.
From then on, she stopped using her
American passport.
Petitions were filed before the
COMELEC to deny or cancel her
candidacy on the ground particularly
among others, that she cannot be
considered a natural born Filipino citizen
since she was a FOUNDLING and that
her bioligical parents cannot be proved
as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc
cancelled her candidacy on the ground
that she is in want of citizenship and
residence requirements and that she
committed misrepresentation in her
COC.
On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME
COURT, reversed the ruling and held a
vote of 9-6 that POE is qualified as
candidate for Presidency.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Grace Poe-
Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino
citizen
(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-
year residency requirement.
HELD:
YES. GRACE POE is considerably a
natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that,
she satisfied the constitutional reqt that
only natural-born Filipinos may run for
Presidency.
(1) there is high probability that Poe’s
parents are Filipinos, as being shown in
her physical features which are typical of
Filipinos, aside from the fact that she
was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a
municipality wherein there is 99%
probability that residents there are
Filipinos, consequently providing 99%
chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are
Filipinos. Said probability and
circumstancial evidence are admissible
under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on
Evidence.
(2) The SC pronounced that
FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural
born- citizens as based on the
deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional
Convention, wherein though its
enumeration is silent as to foundlings,
there is no restrictive language either to
definitely exclude the foundlings to be
natural born citizens.
(3) That Foundlings are automatically
conferred with the natural-born
citizenship as to the country where they
are being found, as covered and
supported by the UN Convention Law.
As to the residency issue, Grace Poe
satisfied the 10-year residency because
she satisfied the requirements of
ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain
permanently) coupled with ANIMUS
NON REVERTENDI (intent of not
returning to US) in acquiring a new
domicile in the Philippines. Starting May
24,2005, upon returning to the
Philippines, Grace Poe presented
overwhelming evidence of her actual
stay and intent to abandon permanently
her domicile in the US, coupled with her
eventual application to reacquire Filipino
Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her
candidacy for Presidency was granted
by the SC.
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio vs
Republic of the Philippines
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a
male transsexual. He’s a biological male
who feels trapped in a male body. Being
that, he sought gender re-assignment in
Bangkok, Thailand. The procedure was
successful – he (she) now has a female
body. Thereafter, in 2002, he filed a
petition for the change of his first name
(from Rommel to Mely) and his sex (male
to female) in his birth certificate. He filed
the petition before the Manila RTC. He
wanted to make these changes, among
others, so that he can marry his American
fiancé.
The RTC granted Silverio’s petition. The
RTC ruled that it should be granted
based on equity; that Silverio’s
misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body
is not his own doing and should not be in
any way taken against him; that there
was no opposition to his petition (even
the OSG did not make any basis for
opposition at this point); that no harm,
injury or prejudice will be caused to
anybody or the community in granting the
petition. On the contrary, granting the
petition would bring the much-awaited
happiness on the part of Silverio and [her]
fiancé and the realization of their dreams.
Later, a petition for certiorari was filed by
the OSG before the CA. The CA reversed
the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the entries
pertaining to sex and first name in the
birth certificate may be changed on the
ground of gender re-assignment.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that
the change of such entries finds no
support in existing legislation.
Issue on the change of first name
In 2001, Republic Act 9048 (AN ACT
AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR
MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR
THE CONSUL GENERAL TO
CORRECT A CLERICAL OR
TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN
ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST
NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL
REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A
JUDICIAL ORDER) was passed. This
law provides that it should be the local
civil registrar that has jurisdiction in
petitions for the change of first names
and not the regular courts. Hence, the
petition of Silverio insofar as his first
name is concerned is procedurally infirm.
Even assuming that the petition filed
properly, it cannot be granted still
because the ground upon which it is
based(gender re-assignment) is not one
of those provided for by the law. Under
the law, a change of name may only be
grounded on the following:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or
nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has
been habitually and continuously used by
the petitioner and he has been publicly
known by that first name or nickname in
the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any
of the above, he merely alleged gender
re-assignment as the basis.
Issue on the change of sex
This entry cannot be changed either via
a petition before the regular courts or a
petition for the local civil registry. Not with
the courts because there is no law to
support it. And not with the civil registry
because there is no clerical error
involved. Silverio was born a male hence
it was just but right that the entry written
in his birth certificate is that he is a male.
The sex of a person is determined at
birth, visually done by the birth attendant
(the physician or midwife) by examining
the genitals of the infant. Considering
that there is no law legally recognizing
sex reassignment, the determination of a
person’s sex made at the time of his or
her birth, if not attended by error, is
immutable.
But what about equity, as ruled by the
RTC?
No. According to the SC, this amounts to
judicial legislation. To grant the changes
sought by Silverio will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on
marriage and family relations. It will allow
the union of a man with another man who
has undergone sex reassignment (a
male-to-female post-operative
transsexual). Second, there are various
laws which apply particularly to women
such as the provisions of the Labor Code
on employment of women, certain
felonies under the Revised Penal Code
and the presumption of survivorship in
case of calamities under Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, among others. These
laws underscore the public policy in
relation to women which could be
substantially affected if Silverio’s petition
were to be granted.
But the SC emphasized: “If the
legislature intends to confer on a person
who has undergone sex reassignment
the privilege to change his name and sex
to conform with his reassigned sex, it has
to enact legislation laying down the
guidelines in turn governing the
conferment of that privilege.”
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN
GR No. 166676, September 12,
2008
FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the
Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of
Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate
of her name from Jennifer B.
Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her
gender from female to male. It appearing
that Jennifer Cagandahan is
sufferingfrom Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia which is a rare medical
condition where afflicted persons possess
both male and female characteristics.
Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with
secondary male characteristics. To
further her petition, Cagandahan
presented in court the medical certificate
evidencing that she is suffering from
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which
certificate is issued by Dr. Michael
Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry,
University of the Philippines-Philippine
General Hospital, who, in addition,
explained that “Cagandahan genetically
is female but because her body secretes
male hormones, her female organs did
not develop normally, thus has organs of
both male and female.” The lower court
decided in her favor but the Office of the
Solicitor General appealed before the
Supreme Court invoking that the same
was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of
the Rules of Court because the said
petition did not implead the local civil
registrar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as
appearing in her birth certificate be
changed.
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision
of the lower court. It held that, in
deciding the case, the Supreme Court
considered “the compassionate calls for
recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not
be subject to outright denial.” The
Supreme Court made use of the availale
evidence presented in court including the
fact that private respondent thinks of
himself as a male and as to the statement
made by the doctor that Cagandahan’s
body produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen), which is
preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male.”
The Supreme Court further held that they
give respect to (1) the diversity of nature;
and (2) how an individual deals with
what nature has handed out. That is, the
Supreme Court respects the respondent’s
congenital condition and his mature
decision to be a male. Life is already
difficult for the ordinary person. The
Court added that a change of name is not
a matter of right but of judicial
discretion, to be exercised in the light of
the reasons and the consequences that
will follow.
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA
GR No. 119190, January 16, 1997
FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was
married in 1988. After the celebration of
their wedding, they proceed to the
house of defendant’s mother. There
was no sexual intercourse between
them during their first night and same
thing happened until their fourth night.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a
private place, they went to Baguio but
Gina’s relatives went with them. Again,
there was no sexual intercourse since
the defendant avoided by taking a long
walk during siesta or sleeping on a
rocking chair at the living room. Since
May 1988 until March 1989 they slept
together in the same bed but no attempt
of sexual intercourse between them.
Because of this, they submitted
themselves for medical examination to a
urologist in Chinese General Hospital in
1989. The result of the physical
examination of Gina was disclosed,
while that of the husband was kept
confidential even the medicine
prescribed. There were allegations that
the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married
her is to maintain his residency status
here in the country. Gina does not want
to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want
their marriage declared void on the
ground of psychological incapacity. On
the other hand, the latter does not want
to have their marriage annulled because
he loves her very much, he has no
defect on his part and is physically and
psychologically capable and since their
relationship is still young, they can still
overcome their differences. Chi Ming
Tsoi submitted himself to another
physical examination and the result was
there is not evidence of impotency and
he is capable of erection.
ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal
to have sexual intercourse with his wife
constitutes psychological incapacity.
got married in 1985, after a year,
Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity
and irresponsibility both as husband and
If a spouse, although physically capable
a father preferring to spend more time
but simply refuses to perform his or her
with friends whom he squandered his
essential marital obligations and the
money, depends on his parents for aid
refusal is senseless and constant,
and assistance and was never honest
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
with his wife in regard to their finances.
causes to psychological incapacity than
In 1986, the couple had an intense
to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of
quarrel and as a result their relationship
the essential marital obligations under
was estranged. Roridel quit her work
the Family Code is to procreate children
and went to live with her parents in
thus constant non-fulfillment of this
Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks
obligation will finally destroy the integrity
later, Reynaldo left her and their child.
and wholeness of the marriage.
Since then he abandoned them.

HELD:
Republic vs. CA and Molina

The abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his
marriage is strongly indicative of a
serious personality disorder which to the
mind of the Supreme Court clearly
demonstrates an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and
significance tot the marriage within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family
Code.
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
FACTS:
The case at bar challenges the decision
of CA affirming the marriage of the
respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo
Molina void in the ground of
psychological incapacity. The couple
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is
void on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
HELD:
The marriage between Roridel and
Reynaldo subsists and remains valid.
What constitutes psychological
 incapacity is not mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and confliction
personalities. It is indispensable that the
parties must exhibit inclinations which
would not meet the essential marital
responsibilites and duties due to some
psychological illness. Reynaldo’s action
at the time of the marriage did not
manifest such characteristics that would
comprise grounds for psychological
incapacity. The evidence shown by
Roridel merely showed that she and her
husband cannot get along with each
other and had not shown gravity of the
problem neither its juridical antecedence
nor its incurability. In addition, the
expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no
incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility which is not considered
as psychological incapacity.
The following are the guidelines as to
the grounds of psychological incapacity
laid set forth in this case:
 burden of proof to show nullity belongs
to the plaintiff
 root causes of the incapacity must be
medically and clinically inclined
 such incapacity should be in existence
at the time of the marriage
 such incapacity must be grave so as to
disable the person in complying with the
essentials of marital obligations of
marriage
 such incapacity must be embraced in
Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and
225 of the Family Code
 decision of the National Matrimonial
Appellate Court or the Catholic Church
must be respected
 court shall order the prosecuting
attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to
act on behalf of the state.
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,
vs.
ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015
Read the 2011 Kalaw v. Fernandez case
digest HERE.
PONENTE: Bersamin, J.
TOPIC: Psychological incapacity,
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
FACTS:
In the case at bar, Kalaw
presented the testimonies of two
supposed expert witnesses who
concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on
petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s
constant mahjong sessions, visits to the
beauty parlor, going out with friends,
adultery, and neglect of their children.
Petitioner’s experts opined that
respondent’s alleged habits, when
performed constantly to the detriment of
quality and quantity of time devoted to
her duties as mother and wife, constitute
a psychological incapacity in the form of
NPD.
However, the Supreme Court in
its September 19, 2011 decision
dismissed the complaint for declaration
of nullity of the marriage on the ground
that there was no factual basis for the
conclusion of psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage
was void on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
HELD:
YES. The Court in granting the
Motion for Reconsideration held that
Fernandez was indeed psychologically
incapacitated as they relaxed the
previously set forth guidelines with
regard to this case.
Note: Molina guidelines were not
abandoned, expert opinions were just
given much respect in this case.
Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed
IN THIS CASE
The Court held that the
guidelines set in the case of Republic v.
CA have turned out to be rigid, such that
their application to every instance
practically condemned the petitions for
declaration of nullity to the fate of certain
rejection. But Article 36 of the Family
Code must not be so strictly and too
literally read and applied given the clear
intendment of the drafters to adopt its
enacted version of “less specificity”
obviously to enable “some resiliency in its
application.” Instead, every court should
approach the issue of nullity “not on the
basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations, but
according to its own facts” in recognition
of the verity that no case would be on “all
fours” with the next one in the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for
the nullity of marriage; hence, every “trial
judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of
the trial court.
In the task of ascertaining the
presence of psychological incapacity as a
ground for the nullity of marriage, the
courts, which are concededly not
endowed with expertise in the field
of psychology, must of necessity
rely on the opinions of experts in
order to inform themselves on the
matter, and thus enable
themselves to arrive at an
intelligent and judicious
judgment. Indeed, the conditions for
the malady of being grave, antecedent
and incurable demand the in-depth
diagnosis by experts.
Personal examination by party not
required; totality of evidence must
be considered
We have to stress that the
fulfillment of the constitutional mandate
for the State to protect marriage as an
inviolable social institution only relates
to a valid marriage. No protection can be
accorded to a marriage that is null and
void
ab initio, because such a marriage has no
legal existence.
There is no requirement for one
to be declared psychologically
incapacitated to be personally examined
by a physician, because what is important
is the presence of evidence that
adequately establishes the party’s
psychological incapacity. Hence, “if the
totality of evidence presented is enough
to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to.”
Verily, the totality of the
evidence must show a link, medical or the
like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself. If other
evidence showing that a certain condition
could possibly result from an assumed
state of facts existed in the record, the
expert opinion should be admissible and
be weighed as an aid for the court in
interpreting such other evidence on the
causation.
Indeed, an expert opinion on
psychological incapacity should be
considered as conjectural or speculative
and without any probative value only in
the absence of other evidence to establish
causation. The expert’s findings under
such circumstances would not constitute
hearsay that would justify their exclusion
as evidence.
Almelor v. RTC-Las Pinas, G.R. No.
179620, Aug. 26, 2008
FACTS: Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor
(Manuel) and respondent Leonida
Trinidad (Leonida) were married on
January 29, 1989 and had three children.
Manuel and Leonida are both medical
practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a
pediatrician, respectively. After eleven
(11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a
petition with the RTC in Las Piñas City to
annul their marriage on the ground that
Manuel was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations. Leonida that in the public
eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect
husband and father but this was not the
case in his private life. At home, Leonida
described Manuel as a harsh
disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous,
easily angered. Manuel’s unreasonable
way of imposing discipline on their
children was the cause of their frequent
fights as a couple. Leonida complained
that this was in stark contrast to the
alleged lavish affection Manuel has for
his mother. She also alleged that her
husband has concealed from her his
homosexuality. She caught him in an
indiscreet telephone conversation
manifesting his affection for a male caller.
She also found several pornographic
homosexual materials in his possession.
And she saw Manuel kissed another man
on the lips. The man was a certain Dr.
Nogales. When she confronted Manuel,
he denied everything. At this point,
Leonida took her children and left their
conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel
stopped giving support to their children.
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical
psychologist, was presented to prove
Leonida’s claim. She testified that she
conducted evaluative interviews and a
battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida.
She also had a one-time interview with
Manuel and face-to-face. She concluded
that Manuel is psychologically
incapacitated and such incapacity is
marked by antecedence; it existed even
before the marriage and appeared to be
incurable. Manuel countered that the true
cause of Leonida’s hostility against him
was their professional rivalry. The trial
court nullified the marriage, not on the
ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the
Family Code. CA denied the appeal. Leonilo Antonio vs Marie Ivonne F. Reyes
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage
between the two can be declared as null FACTS:
and void due to fraud by reason of
Manuel’s concealment of his
homosexuality.
Antonio and Reyes first got married at
Manila City Hall and subsequently in church
on December 8, 1990. A child was born in
April 1991 but died 5 months later. Antonio
HELD: Concealment of homosexuality is could no longer take her constant lying,
the proper ground to annul a marriage, insecurities and jealousies over him so he
not homosexuality per se. Evidently, no
separated from her in August 1991. He
sufficient proof was presented to
substantiate the allegations that Manuel attempted reconciliation but since her
is a homosexual and that he concealed behavior did not change, he finally left her
this to Leonida at the time of their
for good in November 1991. Only after their
marriage. The lower court considered
the public perception of Manuel’s sexual marriage that he learned about her child
preference without the corroboration of with another man.
witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of
Manuel’s peculiarities and interpreted it
against his sexuality. Even granting that
Manuel is indeed a homosexual, there
was nothing in the complaint or anywhere He then filed a petition in 1993 to have his
in the case was it alleged and proven that
Manuel hid such sexuality from Leonida marriage with Reyes declared null and void
and that Leonida’s consent had been under Article 36 of the Family Code.
vitiated by such.
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006 The trial court gave credence to Antonio's
evidence and thus declared the marriage
null and void.

Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
decision. It held that the totality of
evidence presented was insufficient to
establish Reyes' psychological incapacity. It
declared that the requirements in the 1997
Molina case had not been satisfied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Antonio has established his
cause of action for declaration of nullity
under Article 36 of the Family Code and,
generally, under the Molina guidelines.
RULING:
Yes. The petitioner, aside from his own
testimony, presented a psychiatrist and
clinical psychologist who attested that
constant lying and extreme jealousy of
Reyes is abnormal and pathological and
corroborated his allegations on his wife's
behavior, which amounts to psychological
incapacity.
The factual findings of the trial court are
deemed binding on the SC, owing to the
great weight accorded to the opinion of the
primary trier of facts. As such, it must be
considered that respondent had
consistently lied about many material
aspects as to her character and personality.
Her fantastic ability to invent and fabricate
stories and personalities enabled her to live
in a world of make-believe. This made her
psychologically incapacitated as it rendered
her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage.
The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina
guidelines:
First, that Antonio had sufficiently
overcome his burden in proving the
psychological incapacity of his wife;
Second, that the root cause of Reyes'
psychological incapacity has been medically
or clinically identified that was sufficiently
proven by experts, and was clearly
explained in the trial court's decision;
Third, that she fabricated friends and made
up letters before she married him prove
that her psychological incapacity was have
existed even before the celebration of
marriage;
Fourth, that the gravity of Reyes'
psychological incapacity was considered so
grave that a restrictive clause was
appended to the sentence of nullity
prohibited by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting
marriage without their consent;
Fifth, that she being an inveterate
pathological liar makes her unable to
commit the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses based on love, trust, and
respect.
Sixth, that the CA clearly erred when it
failed to take into consideration the fact
that the marriage was annulled by the
Catholic Church. However, it is the factual
findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not
of the canonical courts, that are accorded
significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh, that Reyes' case is incurable
considering that Antonio tried to reconcile
with her but her behavior remains
unchanged.
Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
143286 April 14, 2004
FACTS: On 13 October 1988, Eusebia
Retuya filed a complaint before the trial
court against her husband Nicolas
Retuya, Pacita Villanueva and Nicolas’
son with Pacita, Procopio Villanueva.
Eusebia sought the reconveyance from
Nicolas and Pacita of several properties
(subject properties), claiming that such
are her conjugal properties with Nicolas.
Plaintiff Eusebia, is the legal wife of
defendant Nicolas, having been married
on October 7, 1926. Out of the lawful
wedlock, they begot five (5) children.
Spouses Retuya resided at Mandaue
City. During their marriage, they acquired
real properties and all improvements
situated in Mandaue City, and
Consolacion, Cebu. Nicolas is the co-
owner of a parcel of land situated in
Mandaue City which he inherited from his
parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina
Solon as well as the purchasers of
hereditary shares of approximately eight
(8) parcels of land in Mandaue City.
Some of the properties earn income from
coconuts leased to corporations
In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his
legitimate family and cohabited with
defendant, Pacita Villanueva, wherein
Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate
son. Nicolas, then, was the only person
who received the income of the
properties. Pacita, from the time she
started living in concubinage with
Nicolas, has no occupation. She had no
properties of her own from which she
could derive income. From the time
Nicolas suffered stroke until the present,
his illegitimate son is already the one who
has been receiving the income of his
properties
Settlement between parties was asked
but not met. Trial court in favor of Eusebia
Natuya. Petitioners appealed. Eusebia
died, and was then substituted by her
heirs. CA upheld trial court’s decision
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject
properties acquired during the marriage
between Eusebia and Procopio are
conjugal
HELD: YES, they are conjugal. Petition
denied; decision of CA affirmed
RATIO: The Family Code provisions on
conjugal partnerships govern the
property relations between Nicolas and
Eusebia even if they were married before
the effectivity of Family Code.
Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly
mandates that the Family Code shall
apply to conjugal partnerships
established before the Family Code
without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired under the Civil Code or other
laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the
properties are acquired during the
marriage, the presumption is that they
are conjugal. The burden of proof is on
the party claiming that they are not
conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the
requirement that the properties must first
be proven to have been acquired during
the marriage before they are presumed
conjugal.
Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7
October 1926. Nicolas and Pacita started
cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on 23
November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas
were married on 16 December 1996.
Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No.
152 was purchased on 4 October 1957.
The date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is
clearly during the marriage of Nicolas
and Eusebia.
Since the subject properties, including
Lot No. 152, were acquired during the
marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the
presumption under Article 116 of the
Family Code is that all these are conjugal
properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner vs
. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO,
Responsdent
G.R. No. 221029 Promulgated: April 24,
2018
REACTION PAPER
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was previously
married in the Philippines to a
Japanese national named Yoshino
Minoro. A case for divorce was filed by
the petitioner Manalo in Japan and after
due proceedings, a divorce decree
dated December 6, 2011 was rendered
by the Japanese Court.
Manalo filed a petition for cancellation of
entry of marriage in the civil registry of
San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a
judgment of divorce rendered by a
japanese court and that she be allowed
to return and use her maiden surname,
Manalo.
Ruling of the RTC
RTC denied the petition for lack of merit.
It ruled that the divorce obtained by
Manalo in Japan should not be
recognized based on Article 15 of the
New Civil Code which does not afford
Filipinos the right to file for a divorce,
whether they are in the country or living
abroad, whether married to a filipino or
to foreigners or if they celebrated they
marriage in the Philippines or in another
country and that unless Filipinos are
naturalized citizens of another country,
Philippine laws shall have
conrol over issues related to Filipinos’
family rights and duties, together with
the determination of the condition and
legal capacity to enter into contracts and
civil relations including marriages.
Ruling of the CA
The Court of Appeals overturned the
RTC decision and held that Article 26 of
the Family code of the Philippines is
applicable even if it was Manalo who
filed for Divorce against her Japanese
husband because the Decree they
obtained makes the latter no longer
maried to the former, capacitating him to
remarry; that the fact that it was Manalo
who filed the divorce case is
inconsequetial. CA ruled that the
meaning of the law should be based on
the intent of the lawmakers and in view
of the legislative intent behind Article 26,
it would be the height of injustice to
consider Manalo as still married to the
Japanese National, who in turn is no
longer married to her.
Le Belle A. Soriano
2 | Page
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT UNDER ARTICLE
26 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES A FILIPINO CITIZEN
HAS THE CAPACITY TO REMARRY
AFTER INITIATING A DIVORCE
PROCEEDING ABROAD AND
OBTAINING A FAVORABLE
JUDGMENT AGAINST HIS OR HER
ALIEN SPOUSE.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
Yes, the filipina spouse who initiated the
divorce and has succesfully obtained a
divorce decree against an alien spouse
may remarry under Art. 26 of the Family
Code of the Philippines.
Laws should be construed as not to
defeat but to carry out its intent and
purposes
The Purpose of Article 26 (2) of the
Family code of the Philippines is to
avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce
decree that is effective in the country
where it was rendered is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse. Even if
the word obtained should be interpreted
to mean that the divorce proceeding
must be actually initiated by the alien
spouse, still the court will not follow the
letter of the statute when to do so would
depart from the true intent of the
legislature or would otherwise yield
conclusions inconsistent with the
general purpose of the act. Indeed,
where the interpretion of a statute
according to its exact and literal import
would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose of the
legilature, it should be construed
according to the spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the
letter of the law. A statute may, therefore
be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as
they come within its spirt or intent.
Whether the filipino spouse initiated the
foreign divorce proceeding or not, a
favorable decree dissolving the marriage
bond and capacitating his or her alien
spouse to remarry will have the same
result. Therefore, the subject provision
shall not make a distinction.
The Nationality Principle is not absolute
and unbending rule
The existence of Article 26 (2) of the
Family Code of the Philippines is a
testament that the state may provide for
an exception thereto. Moreover, blind
adherence to the nationality principle
must be disallowed if it would cause
unjust discrimination and oppression to
certain classes of individuals whose
rights are equally protected by law. The
courts have the duty to enforce the laws
of divorce as written by the Legislature
only if they are constitutional.
Le Belle A. Soriano
3 | Page
Article 26(2) of the Family Code violates
one of the essential requisites of the
equal protection
The limitation of the provision only to a
foreign divorce decree initiated by the
alien spouse is unreasonable as it is
based on superficial, arbitrary and
whimsical classification. There is no
real and substantial difference between
a filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceedings and a filipino who obtained
a divorce decree upon the instance of
his or her alien spouse. To make a
distinction between them based merely
on superficial difference of whether they
initiated the divorce proceedings or not
is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment
gives undue favor to one and unjustly
discrimate against the other. Further, the
differentiation is arbitrary. There is
inequality in treatment because a foreign
divorce decree that was initiated and
obtained by a filipino citizen against his
or her alien spouse would not be
recognized even if based on grounds
similar to Articles 35,36, 37 and 38 of
the family court.
A prohibited view of Article 26(2) would
do more harm than good
The state cannot effectively enforce its
obligation to protect and defend among
others the right of the children from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation and other conditi ons
prejudicial to their development if the
court will limit the application of the
subject provision only to those foreign
divorce initiated by the alien spouse.
Moreover, the court must not lose sight
of the constitutional mandate to value
the dignity of every human person,
guarantee full respect for human rights
and ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men.
RULE 108; CASE #8
FUJIKI VS. MARINAY
GR No. 196049
June 26, 2013
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
 Fujiki was a Japanese national
who married respondent in the
Philippines.
 The marriage did not sit well
with petitioner’s parents. Thus,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually,
they lost contact with each other.
 Marinay met another
Japanese, Maekara. Without the 1st
marriage being dissolved, Marinay
and Maekara were married in
Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara
brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical
abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact
Fujiki.
 Fujiki and Marinay met in
Japan and they were able to
reestablish their relationship.
 Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a
judgment from a family court in
Japan which declared the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void
 Fujiki moved that the Order be
on the ground of bigamy.
reconsidered. He argued that A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated
ordinary civil actions for declaration
 Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC
of nullity and annulment of
entitled: “Judicial Recognition of
marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
SC does not apply. A petition for
Absolute Nullity of Marriage).” Fujiki
recognition of foreign judgment is a
prayed (among others) for the RTC
special proceeding, which "seeks to
to direct the Local Civil Registrar of
establish a status, a right or a
Quezon City to annotate the
particular fact," and not a civil
Japanese Family Court judgment on
action which is "for the enforcement
the Certificate of Marriage between
or protection of a right, or the
Marinay and Maekara and to
prevention or redress of a wrong."
endorse such annotation to the
Office of the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General in the National
 Fujiki argued that Rule 108
Statistics Office (NSO).
(Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court is applicable. Section
 The RTC dismissed the
2 of Rule 108 provides that entries
petition. It based its dismissal on
in the civil registry relating to
Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
"marriages," "judgments of
SC which provides that "[f]ailure to
annulments of marriage" and
comply with any of the preceding
"judgments declaring marriages
requirements may be a ground for
void from the beginning" are subject
immediate dismissal of the
to cancellation or correction. The
petition." Apparently, the RTC took
petition in the RTC sought (among
the view that only "the husband or
others) to annotate the judgment of
the wife," in this case either
the Japanese Family Court on the
Maekara or Marinay, can file the
certificate of marriage between
petition to declare their marriage
Marinay and Maekara.
void, and not Fujiki.

ISSUES:
(1) W/N a husband or wife of a prior
marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage
between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy.
(2) W/N the RTC can recognize the
foreign judgment in a proceeding
for cancellation or correction of
entries in the Civil Registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
HELD:
(1) YES. Since the recognition of a
foreign judgment only requires
proof of fact of the judgment, it may
be made in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries
in the civil registry under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court. Rule 1,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court
provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact." Rule 108
creates a remedy to rectify facts of
a person’s life which are recorded by
the State pursuant to the Civil
Register Law or Act No. 3753. These
are facts of public consequence such
as birth, death or marriage, which
the State has an interest in
recording.
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any
person interested in any act,
event, order or decree concerning
thecivil status of persons which
has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition
for the cancellation or correction of
any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province
where the corresponding civil
registry is located.
Fujiki has the personality to file a
petition to recognize the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy
because the judgment concerns his
civil status as married to Marinay.
For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under
Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
marriage between Marinay and
Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese
Family Court.
(2) YES. A recognition of a foreign
judgment is not an action to nullify
a marriage. It is an action for
Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment,
which presupposes a case which
was already tried and decided
under foreign law. The procedure
in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment annulling a
bigamous marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369
(Family Courts Act of 1997) define
the jurisdiction of the foreign court.