CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 MIDTERM TRANSCRIPTION NOTES
I. SEPARATION OF POWERS
- The doctrine is intended to secure action, to
forestall overaction, to prevent depotism and to
obtain efficiency. (Justice Laurel)
II. DELEGATION OF POWERS
Article VI Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and
a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to
the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
GENERAL RULE:
Potestas delegate non delegari potest
“What has been delegated cannot be further
delegated.”
EXCEPTIONS (PETAL)
1. People
2. Emergency powers to the President
3. Tariff powers to the President
4. Administrative bodies
5. Local Government
Q: Can the president exercise legislative powers motu proprio
(Latin for: "on his own impulse")?
A: No because the Congress shall have to delegate it first to the
President.
Article VI, Section 23(2). In times of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out
a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
Requisites before Congress may delegate Emergency
Powers:
a) There must be war or other national emergency.
b) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
c) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as
the Congress may prescribe.
d) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out
a national policy declared by the Congress.
Power of subordinate legislation
- aka quasi-legislative power or rule-making power
- It is the authority delegated by the law-making
body to the administrative body to adopt rules
and regulations intended to carry out the
provisions of a law and implement legislative
policy.
Difference of Legislative power and Quasi-legislative power
1. LEGISLATIVE power involves the discretion to
determine what the law shall be. QUASI-legislative
power only involves the discretion to
determine how the law shall be enforced.
2. LEGISLATIVE power CANNOT be delegated. QUASI-
legislative power CAN be delegated.
Tests of a valid delegation of power
1. Completeness test
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- The law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature so
that when it reaches the delegate, it will have
nothing to do but to enforce it.
2. Sufficient Standard test
- The law must offer a sufficient standard to
specify the limits of the delegate’s authority,
announce the legislative policy and specify
the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.
Undue Delegation- for the delegation to be valid, the
delegation itself must be circumscribed by legislative
restrictions otherwise it is a delegation running riot.
Greco Belgica vs Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No.
209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the
Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known
as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the
Congress. It underwent several legal designations from
“Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development
Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is
integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the
following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken
down to – P40 million for “hard projects” (infrastructure
projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for
“soft projects” (scholarship grants, medical assistance,
livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100
million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100
million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of
funds whereby certain cabinet members may request for the
realignment of funds into their department provided that the
request for realignment is approved or concurred by the
legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not
included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel
comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the
Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around since 1976, and
(b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the
earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by
allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers,
headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the
corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by
Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in
funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s
(non-government organizations) which would make it appear
that government funds are being used in legit existing projects
but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then
conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof
concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others,
filed various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning
the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 MIDTERM TRANSCRIPTION NOTES
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is
constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is
constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional.
It is unconstitutional because it violates the following
principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the
release of funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the
other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to
which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement
the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening
was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the
legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF
funds should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the
law they enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of
powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it
was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the
Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as
the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds
go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF,
the executive will still have to get the concurrence of the
legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress
alone. (The Constitution does grant the people legislative
power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and
initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot
be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that
which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but
this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in
times of war or other national emergency, or fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions
as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within
the framework of the national development program of the
Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual
legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF money
should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of
legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely
lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively
and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in
the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the
power to the individual member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power
of the president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem
to be inappropriate. But this power is already being
undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved,
the legislator can now identify the project to which he will
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appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the
president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the
appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA –
again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which
effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the
President useless.”
d. Public Accountability
The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment
roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for
them to become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing,
investigating or monitoring the implementation of the
appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight
would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-
enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities
in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed
out that this very same concept of post-enactment
authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which provides that:
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or
before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other
administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be
interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-
owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his
term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any
office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he
may be called upon to act on account of his office. (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases
of project implementation – a matter before another office of
government – renders them susceptible to taking undue
advantage of their own office.
e. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage
their local affairs. Through their Local Development Councils
(LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies
concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on
the part of the members of the house of representatives,
what’s happening is that a congressman can either bypass or
duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own.
This is an instance where the national government (note, a
congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of
the local government – and this is contrary to the State policy
embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if
that’s all that is happening under the pork barrel system but
worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part
of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential
pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates
Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from
the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any
appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which
created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 MIDTERM TRANSCRIPTION NOTES
by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for
the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among
others, collected from certain energy-related ventures shall
form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall
be used to further finance energy resource development and
for other purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a
part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund
(the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in
government infrastructure projects.
An appropriation made by law under the contemplation of
Section 29(1), Article VI exists when a provision of law (a) sets
apart a determinate or determinable amount of money and (b)
allocates the same for a particular public purpose. These two
minimum designations of amount and purpose stem from the
very definition of the word “appropriation”, which means “to
allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose,”
and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the
legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the Constitution
“does not provide or prescribe any particular form or words or
religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by
Congress shall be made, except that it be ‘made by law,’ an
appropriation law may according to Philconsa – be ”detailed
and as broad as Congress wants it to be” for as long as the
intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same.
PHILCONSA vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ,
G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994
This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto
authority of the president involving the General Appropriations
Bill of 1994 as well as the constitutionality of the pork barrel. The
Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the
countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress
can only allocate funds but they cannot specify the items as to
which those funds would be applied for since that is already the
function of the executive.
In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some
provisions of the GAB of 1994, neither house of congress took
steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Wigberto Tañada
and Alberto Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of
prohibition and mandamus against Executive Secretary Teofisto
Guingona et al. Tañada et al contest the constitutionality of: (1)
the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAB of
1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the
conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of
certain appropriations for the CAFGU’s, the DPWH, and the
National Housing Authority (NHA).
ISSUE: Whether or not the President’s veto is valid.
HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress
acted within its power and that the CDF is constitutional. In the
Tañada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and
granted the others.
Veto on special provisions
The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant
to the ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig. The president particularly
vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994
commenting that the scheme is already taken cared of by other
legislation and may be more properly addressed by revising the
debt policy. He, however did not delete the P86,323,438,000.00
appropriation therefor. Tañada et al averred that the president
cannot validly veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount
allotted therefor. The veto of the president herein is sustained
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for the vetoed provision is considered “inappropriate”; in fact
the Sc found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect
repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making the legislation as a log-
rolling legislation.
Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs
The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s),
the President vetoed special provisions which authorize the use
of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of
revolving funds was likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is
that there were already funds allotted for the same in the
National expenditure Program. Tañada et al claimed this as
unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is in
compliant to the “One Fund Policy” – it avoided double funding
and redundancy.
Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio
for road maintenance
The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may
result to a breach of contractual obligations. The funds if allotted
may result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC
ruled that this Special Provision in question is not an
inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is
not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the
other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended –
70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987
Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special
provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which
cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which they relate
so long as they are “appropriate” in the budgetary sense. The
veto herein is then not valid.
Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of
military equipment
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said
condition and prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate of
non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, “shall
effectively alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization
Fund to cover all military equipment deemed necessary to
modernize the AFP”. The SC affirmed the veto. Any provision
blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or
requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be
incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being
“inappropriate” provisions.
Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension
funds
According to the President, the grant of retirement and
separation benefits should be covered by direct appropriations
specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1)
of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the
authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in
Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained
the veto per reasons provided by the president.
Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU’s
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU’s including
the payment of separation benefits. The President declared in
his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special
Provision to the item on the CAFGU’s shall be subject to prior
Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No.
6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by
the president. Further, if this provision is allowed the it would
only lead to the repeal of said existing laws.
Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 MIDTERM TRANSCRIPTION NOTES
In his veto message: “The said condition is consistent with the
Constitutional injunction prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-
B of the Constitutional which states that ‘no elective or
appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional,
double, or indirect compensation unless specifically authorized
by law.’ I am, therefore, confident that the heads of the said
offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to
the well-established principle on compensation standardization.
Tañada et al claim that the conditions imposed by the President
violated the independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme
court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The SC sustained
the veto: In the first place, the conditions questioned by
petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the
President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the
Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect compensation
can only be given pursuant to law. In the second place, such
statements are mere reminders that the disbursements of
appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such
statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.
Pork Barrel Constitutional
The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The Congressmen,
being representatives of their local districts know more about
the problems in their constituents areas than the national
government or the president for that matter. Hence, with that
knowledge, the Congressmen are in a better position to
recommend as to where funds should be allocated.
GENERAL RULE:
Article VI Section 27(1). Every bill passed by the
Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented
to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign
it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with
his objections to the House where it originated, which
shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and
proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration,
two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall
agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the
objections, to the other House by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-
thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall
become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each
House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the
names of the Members voting for or against shall be
entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it
originated within thirty days after the date of receipt
thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had
signed it.
EXCEPTION: Item veto- applies only to (ART) appropriation,
revenue and tariff bill.
Article VI Section 27(2). The President shall have the
power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall
not affect the item or items to which he does not
object.
Inherent power: applicability
(NOTE: It is ONLY the State which has an inherent power. The
power of taxation is vested by the Constitution to the Local
Government (Article 10 Section 5), BUT the power of eminent
domain and police power is vested by the Congress to the Local
Government by virtue of RA 7610 or the Local Government
Code)
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WILFREDO MOSQUEDA vs PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS &
EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION
G.R. No. 189185
After several committee hearings and consultations with various
stakeholders, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted
Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial
spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities
within Davao City.
ISSUE:
whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due
process and equal protection grounds for being unreasonable and
oppressive, and an invalid exercise of police power: (a) in
imposing a ban on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in
Davao City under Section 5; (b) in decreeing a 3-month transition-
period to shift to other modes of pesticide application under
Section 5; and ( c) in requiring the maintenance of the 30-meter
buffer zone under Section 6 thereof in all agricultural lands in
Davao City.
HELD:
To be considered as a valid police power measure, an ordinance
must pass a two-pronged test: the formal (i.e., whether the
ordinance is enacted within the corporate powers of the local
government unit, and whether it is passed in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law); and the substantive (i.e., involving
inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the
limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as
with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency
with public policy).
The formalities in enacting an ordinance are laid down in Section
53101 and Section 54102 of The Local Government Code. These
provisions require the ordinance to be passed by the majority of
the members of the sanggunian concerned, and to be presented
to the mayor for approval. With no issues regarding quorum
during its deliberation having been raised, and with its approval
of by City Mayor Duterte not being disputed, we see no reason to
strike down Ordinance No. 0309-07 for non-compliance with the
formal requisites under the Local Government Code.
The corporate powers of the local government unit confer the
basic authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations in
order to promote the general welfare. Such legislative powers
spring from the delegation thereof by Congress through either
the Local Government Code or a special law. The General Welfare
Clause in Section 16 of the Local Government Code embodies the
legislative grant that enables the local government unit to
effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of its
creation, and to promote and maintain local autonomy. 104
Section 16 reads:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental
for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall
ensure and support among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the
right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support
the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve
the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 MIDTERM TRANSCRIPTION NOTES
Section 16 comprehends two branches of delegated powers,
namely: the general legislative power and the police power
proper. General legislative power refers to the power delegated
by Congress to the local legislative body, or the Sangguniang
Panlungsod in the case of Davao City, to enable the local
legislative body to enact ordinances and make regulations. This
power is limited in that the enacted ordinances must not be
repugnant to law, and the power must be exercised to effectuate
and discharge the powers and duties legally conferred to the local
legislative body. The police power proper, on the other hand,
authorizes the local government unit to enact ordinances
necessary and proper for the health and safety, prosperity,
morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the local
government unit and its constituents, and for the protection of
their property.
Section 458 of the Local Government Code explicitly vests the
local government unit with the authority to enact legislation
aimed at promoting the general welfare.
In terms of the right of the citizens to health and to a balanced
and healthful ecology, the local government unit takes its cue
from Section 15 and Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
Following the provisions of the Local Government Code and the
Constitution, the acts of the local government unit designed to
ensure the health and lives of its constituents and to promote a
balanced and healthful ecology are well within the corporate
powers vested in the local government unit. Accordingly, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City is vested with the requisite
authority to enact an ordinance that seeks to protect the health
and well-being of its constituents.
Q: Is legislative power exclusive to the Congress?
A: No. Article VI Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested
in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved
to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
Arturo Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance
235 SCRA 630 (1994) – 249 SCRA 635 (1995)
Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716
otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law.
Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively
originate from the House of Representatives as required by
Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716
originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the
HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after
the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means
Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as
Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have
done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting
it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a House Bill
and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of
the HB”. Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco [however] even signed
the said Senate Bill.
ISSUE:
W/N the R.A. is unconstitutional for having “originated” from the
Senate, and not the HoR.
HELD:
Petition is unmeritorious. The enactment of the Senate bill has
not been the first instance where the Senate, in the exercise of its
power to propose amendments to bills (required to originate in
the House), passed its own version. An amendment by
substitution (striking out the text and substituting it), as urged by
petitioners, concerns a mere matter of form, and considering the
petitioner has not shown what substantial difference it would
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make if Senate applied such substitution in the case, it cannot be
applied to the case at bar. While the aforementioned
Constitutional provision states that bills must “originate
exclusively in the HoR,” it also adds, “but the Senate may propose
or concur with amendments.” The Senate may then propose an
entirely new bill as a substitute measure. Petitioners erred in
assuming the Senate version to be an independent and distinct
bill. Without the House bill, Senate could not have enacted the
Senate bill, as the latter was a mere amendment of the former.
As such, it did not have to pass the Senate on second and third
readings.
Petitioners question the signing of the President on both bills, to
support their contention that such are separate and distinct. The
President certified the bills separately only because the
certification had to be made of the version of the same revenue
bill which AT THE MOMENT was being considered.
Petitioners question the power of the Conference Committee to
insert new provisions. The jurisdiction of the conference
committee is not limited to resolving differences between the
Senate and the House. It may propose an entirely new provision,
given that such are germane to the subject of the conference, and
that the respective houses of Congress subsequently approve its
report.
THE BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE
A bill can be passed jointly (when it is a joint session,
supra), or separately. In the latter case, it can be passed
simultaneously (when a bill is taken up by both houses
separately but at the same time), or sequentially (when a bill
originates form one house and goes to the other house). There
is no problem if the bill is passed jointly. But if it is passed
separately, the bill approved by one house goes to the other
house, which can amend such bill. Once the other house
approves the bill, this is called the other house's version of the
bill.
A Bicameral Conference Committee is then organized,
composed of equal number of members from the Senate and
the House, to make recommendations to the respective
chambers on how to reconcile the two versions of the bill. The
respective members are usually granted blanket authority to
negotiate and reconcile the bills. At the end of the process, the
committee comes up with a "Conference Committee Report",
which is then submitted to the respective chambers for
approval.
Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance, 235 SCRA 632 (1994)
HELD:
As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emergency out of a
Conference Committee, it has been explained:
Under congressional rules of procedure, conference committees
are not expected to make any material change in the measure at
issue, either by deleting provisions to which both houses have
already agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this is a difficult
provision to enforce. Note the problem when one house amends
a proposal originating in either house by striking out everything
following the enacting clause and substituting provisions which
make it an entirely new bill. The versions are now altogether
different, permitting a conference committee to draft essentially
a new bill . . .
The result is a third version, which is considered an "amendment
in the nature of a substitute," the only requirement for which
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 MIDTERM TRANSCRIPTION NOTES
being that the third version be germane to the subject of the
House and Senate bills.
Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the power of a
conference committee to include in its report an entirely new
provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate
bill. 17 If the committee can propose an amendment consisting of
one or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose
several provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment in
the nature of a substitute," so long as such amendment is
germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. After
all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both
houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative
department. The charge that in this case the Conference
Committee acted as a third legislative chamber is thus without
any basis. X x X
Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committee's Report
in these cases must have undergone three readings in each of the
two houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to
negotiation since each house may seek modifications of the
compromise bill. The nature of the bill, therefore, requires that it
be acted upon by each house on a "take it or leave it" basis, with
the only alternative that if it is not approved by both houses,
another conference committee must be appointed. But then
again the result would still be a compromise measure that may
not be wholly satisfying to both houses.
Art. VI, § 26(2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to
bills introduced for the first time in either house of Congress, not
to the conference committee report. For if the purpose of
requiring three readings is to give members of Congress time to
study bills, it cannot be gainsaid that H. No. 11197 was passed in
the House after three reading; that in the Senate it was
considered on first reading and then referred to a committee of
that body; that although the Senate committee did not report out
the House bill, it submitted a version (S. No. 1630) which it had
prepared by "taking into consideration" the House bill; that for its
part the Conference Committee consolidated the two bills and
prepared a compromise version; that the Conference Committee
Report was thereafter approved by the House and the Senate,
presumably after appropriate study by their members. We
cannot say that, as a matter of fact, the members of Congress
were not fully informed of the provisions of the bill. The allegation
that the Conference Committee usurped the legislative power of
Congress is, in our view, without warrant in fact and in law.
ARTICLE VI SECTION 5(3). Each legislative district shall
comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
Bai Sandra Sema vs Commission on Elections
558 SCRA 700 – Political Law – Municipal Corporation –
Creation of LGUs by Autonomous Regions (ARMM) –
Population Requirement
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is
part of the province of Maguindanao but it is not part of ARMM
because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite
held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st
legislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other
municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act and
vesting it with power to create provinces, municipalities, cities
and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional
Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao
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Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the
1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated
that the 1st district is now only made of Cotabato City (because
of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo
should be retained; however, just for the purposes of the
elections, the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with
Cotabato City – this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration
from Congress as to Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or
part of any).
Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative
district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema
was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate
legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in
the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was from there
and D was winning – in fact he won). She contended that under
the Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that
province automatically gains legislative representation and since
S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato is
being deprived of a representative in the HOR.
COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and
that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, the legislative
district is not affected and so is its representation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not
ARMM can create validly LGUs.
HELD:
RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government
units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,
which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially
altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units
province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with three
conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must
follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second,
such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units
affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of
authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional
or local legislative bodies the power to create local government
units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can
delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided
no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact,
Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and
municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their
jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in
the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot
validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a
population of at least 250k, and that a province, once created,
should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further
that in order to have a legislative district, there must at least be
250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City did not meet the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 MIDTERM TRANSCRIPTION NOTES
population requirement so Sema’s contention is untenable. On
the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S.
Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district. But this can
never be legally possible because the creation of legislative
districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can
create are barangays not cities and provinces.
ARTICLE VI SECTION 5(2). The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall
be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector.
Q: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be
filled up all the time and under all circumstances?
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC [G.R. No. 136781.
October 6, 2000]
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13
parties which obtained at least 2% of the total number of votes
cast for the party-list system as members of the House of
Representatives. Upon petition for respondents, who were party-
list organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list
representatives although they obtained less than 2% of the total
number of votes cast for the party-list system on the ground that
under the Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives come from the party-
list representatives.
ISSUES:
I. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives
mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution,
mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
II. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat
limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
HELD:
I.
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list
seats in the House of Representatives. The Constitution vested
Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe the
mechanics of the party-list system of representatives. In the
exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it
necessary to require parties participating in the system to obtain
at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to be
entitled to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only
those parties having a sufficient number of constituents
deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.
II.
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to
ensure that only those parties, organizations and coalitions
having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent
can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. The
two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the
framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence
of "representation." Under a republican or representative state,
all government authority emanates from the people, but is
exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have
meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the
mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a
legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be
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the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of
contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a
threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts
are apportioned according to "the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio"
to ensure meaningful local representation.
(NOTE: Fractional representation is NOT ALLOWED. Disregard
the fraction and DO NOT round off.)
Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001
Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No.
3785, which approved the participation of 154 organizations and
parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list
elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private
respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was
intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not
the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec
acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list
elections.
HELD:
Political Parties -- even the major ones -- may participate in the
party-list elections subject to the requirements laid down in the
Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to
the Party List System.
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot
be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground
that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representative may “be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations”. It is however, incumbent upon the Comelec to
determine proportional representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented”, the criteria for participation in relation to the
cause of the party lsit applicants so as to avoid desecration of the
noble purpose of the party-list system.
Ang Atong Paglaum Inc. vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the
Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections for
various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as
representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against
COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying
petitioners from participating in the elections.
HELD:
No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
following prevailing decisions in disqualifying petitioners from
participating in the coming elections. However, since the Court
adopts new parameters in the qualification of the party-list
system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied
by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 MIDTERM TRANSCRIPTION NOTES
COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine
who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to
participate in the coming elections, under the new parameters
prescribed in this Decision.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
mandates that, during the first three consecutive terms of
Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half
of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled,
as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women,
youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except
the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the
party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two
obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives would naturally be open to non-sectoral party-
list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list
system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the
"marginalized and underrepresented."
Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to
sectoral parties applies only for the first "three consecutive terms
after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the
party-list system fully open after the end of the first three
congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will
be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies
under the three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure
ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for
sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or
organizations to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional
parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat,
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list
system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections,
participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the
party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list system is
to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving
as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the
party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless,
patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the
1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
Classification of Parties (Atong Paglaum Inc. vs COMELEC):
1. National Parties/Organizations
2. Regional Parties/Organizations
3. Sectoral Parties/Organizations
a. Those that belong to
marginalized/underrepresented sectors (e.g.
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers)
b. Those that lack well-defined political
constituencies (e.g. professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth)
NOTE: National and Regional Parties/Organizations need not
organize along w/ sectoral nor represent marginalized.
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NOTA BENE: Religious Sectors are prohibited to participate in
the Party List Election as a political party. BUT a priest may run
for public position.
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010
HELD:
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party’s application for registration should be
granted.
Comelec’s citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying
petitioner’s application was a violation of the non-establishment
clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution. The
proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a
secular purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be
repressed is “detrimental or dangerous to those conditions upon
which depend the existence and progress of human society"),
rather than out of religious conformity. The Comelec failed to
substantiate their allegation that allowing registration to Ladlad
would be detrimental to society.
The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its
constitutionally vested rights on the basis of their sexual
orientation. Laws of general application should apply with equal
force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list
system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-
represented sectors. Discrimination based on sexual orientation
is not tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by any international
laws to which we adhere.
ARTICLE VI – THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
A. SENATE
I. COMPOSITION - 24 Senators elected at large by qualified
voters
II. QUALIFICATIONS
1. Natural-born citizen
2. At least 35 on the election day
3. Able to read and write
4. Registered voter in the Philippines
5. Philippine resident for at least 2 years immediately
preceding the election
III. TERM OF OFFICE - 6 years, commencing (unless otherwise
provided by law) at noon, 30 June next following their election.
[Art. VI, Sec. 4 (1)]
IV. TERM LIMITATION
• No Senator shall serve for more than 2 consecutive
terms, and for this purpose, no voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall be considered
for the purpose of interrupting the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected. [Art.
VI, Sec. 4(2)]
B. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
I. COMPOSITION - Not more than 250 Members (*unless
otherwise fixed by law) elected from:
a) Legislative districts (80% of the seats shall be allotted
to district representatives.)
b) Party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations. [Sec. 5(2)]
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 MIDTERM TRANSCRIPTION NOTES
II. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: QUALIFICATIONS
1. Natural-born citizen
2. At least 25 on the day of election
3. Able to read and write
4. Registered voter in the district he seeks to represent
5. Resident of such district for at least 1 year immediately
preceding the election.
III. TERM OF OFFICE - Each member of the House shall be
elected for a term of three (3) years which shall commence
(unless otherwise provided for by law) at noon on 30 June next
following their election. [Art. VI, Sec. 7(1)]
IV. TERM LIMITATION
 No member of the House of Representatives shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected. [Art. VI, Sec. 7(2)]
C. THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM
 The Party-List Law (R.A. No. 7941) AN ACT PROVIDING
FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES
THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, AND
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR.
Ang Bagong Bayani – OFW labor Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
147589, June 26, 2001, En Banc [Panganiban]
HELD: The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not
only to give more law to the great masses of our people who have
less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable
lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the
enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make
the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive
recipients of the State’s benevolence, but active participants in
the mainstream of representative democracy.
The party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens –
specifically those belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties – to be
elected to the House of Representatives.
I. PARTY-LIST NOMINEES: QUALIFICATIONS
No person shall be nominated as party-list representative
unless:
1. natural-born citizen of the Philippines
2. A registered voter
3. A resident of the Philippines for a period of not less
than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election
4. Able to read and write
5. A bona fide member of the party or organization which
he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election
6. At least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election
II. DISQUALIFICATIONS
The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of
any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or
association organized for religious purposes;
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2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its
goal;
3) It is a foreign party or organization;
4) It is receiving support from any foreign government,
foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or
members or indirectly through third parties for
partisan election purposes;
5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections;
6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%)
of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two
(2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered.
III. INVIOLABLE PARAMETERS IN PARTY LIST SYSTEM (Republic
Act No. 7941)
i. The twenty percent allocation - the combined number
of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty
percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the
party list.
ii. The two percent threshold - only those garnering a
minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast
for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat
in the House of Representatives.
iii. The three seat limit - each qualified party, regardless
of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled
to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying"
and two additional seats.
iv. Proportional representation - the additional seats
which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed
"in proportion to their total number of votes."
IV. GUIDELINES FOR SCREENING PARTY-LIST PARTICIPANTS
Ang Bagong Bayani – OFW labor Party v. COMELEC
1) The political party, sector, organization or coalition must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups
identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must
show – through its constitution, articles of incorporation,
bylaws, history, platform of government and track record –
that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its
membership should belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a
conflict of interest, it has chosen or is likely to choose the
interest of such sectors.
2) While even major political parties are expressly allowed by
RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list
system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy
of enabling “Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized 28
and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the
House of Representatives.” In other words, while they are
not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political
parties, they must show, however, that they represent the
interests of the marginalized and underrepresented.
3) In view of the objections directed against the registration
of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a
religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional
provision that the religious sector may not be represented in
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 MIDTERM TRANSCRIPTION NOTES
the party-list system. x x x Furthermore, the Constitution
provides that “religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered.” (Sec. 2 [5], Article IX [C]) The prohibition was
explained by a member of the Constitutional Commission in
this wise: “[T]he prohibition is on any religious organization
registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition
here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not
prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a
political party.”
4) A party or an organization must not be disqualified under
Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for
disqualification as follows:
1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization
or association organized for religious purposes;
2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its
goal;
3) It is a foreign party or organization;
4) It is receiving support from any foreign government,
foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or
members or indirectly through third parties for
partisan election purposes;
5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections;
6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in
the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency
in which it had registered.”
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which
disqualifies a party or group for violation of or
failure to comply with election laws and regulations.
These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which
states that the party-list system seeks to “enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties x x x to become members of the House of
Representatives.” A party or organization,
therefore, that does not comply with this policy
must be disqualified.
5) The party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a
project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the
government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the
party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized
by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent
of the government. The participation of the government or
its officials in the affairs of a partylist candidate is not only
illegal and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the
objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organization
to be elected to the House of Representatives.
6) The party must not only comply with the requirements of
the law; its nominees must likewise do so. x x x
7) Not only the candidate party or organization must
represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so
also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA
7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens “who belong to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties.” Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be
fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban
poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow
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otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine
representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
8) While lacking a well-defined political constituency, the
nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benefit the nation as a whole. x x x
SPECIAL ELECTIONS TO FILL UP VACANCY IN THE CONGRESS
 RA No. 6645 (December 28, 1987)
Under the law, no special election will be called if the vacancy
occurs
(i) less than 18 months before the next regular
election in the case of the Senate, or
(ii) less than 1 year before the next regular election in
the case of the House;
When the vacancy occurs during the period when special
elections are allowed to be conducted:
 18 or 12 months or more before the next regular
election
 if Congress is in session the particular House of
Congress must pass either:
i. a resolution by the House concerned; or
ii. a certification by the Senate President or the
Speaker of the House
 if Congress is not in session,
i. declaring the existence of the vacancy; and
ii. calling for a special election to be held within
45 to 90 days from the date of calling of the
special election (that is, from the date of the
resolution or certification).
NOTE: The Senator or Member of the House thus elected shall
serve only for the unexpired portion of the term. (Art. VI, Sec.
9)
SALARIES
 Art. VI, Sec. 10. The salaries of Senators and Members
of the House of Representatives shall be determined
by law. No increase in said compensation shall take
effect until after the expiration of the full term of all
the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase.
PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES
 Sec. 11, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution
A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress
is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held
liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof.
I. FREEDOM FROM ARREST
Elements of the privilege:
1) Congress must be in session, whether regular (sec.
15) or special (supra).
2) The crime for which the member is to be arrested
is punishable by 6 years of imprisonment or less.
NOTE:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 MIDTERM TRANSCRIPTION NOTES ATTY ANGELO SUAN, CPA

1) It does not matter where the member of Congress may
be found (attending the session, socializing in a private
party, or sleeping at home); so long as Congress is in
session, freedom from arrest holds;
2) It follows too that if the crime is punishable by 6 years
and 1 day of prision mayor or more, the member can
be arrested, even if he is in session in the halls of
Congress.
II. SPEECH AND DEBATE CLAUSE
REQUISITES:
1. Remarks must be made while the legislature or
legislative committee is in session;
2. Must be made in connection with the discharge of
official duties.
(i) Personally appearing as counsel before any court
of justice, the Electoral Tribunal, quasi-judicial
bodies, and other administrative bodies.
(ii) Being interested financially in any
a. contract with, or
b. franchise or special privilege granted by, the
Government, its subdivision, agency or
instrumentality, a government owned or
controlled corporation, or its subsidiary.
NOTE: The prohibition is for the duration of his
term of office.
(iii) Intervening in any matter before any office of the
government for his pecuniary benefit.
(iv) Intervening in any matter where he may be called
upon to act on account of his office.

DISQUALIFICATIONS NOTE: What the Constitution prohibits in the case of members

I. CONFLICT OF INTEREST of Congress who are also members of the bar is their personal
 Art. VI, Sec 12. All Members of the Senate and the appearance before any of these bodies. This is not a prohibition
House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of against, the practice of law in any court. Thus, a member may
office, make a full disclosure of their financial and still sign and file his pleadings, give legal advice, continue as
business interests. They shall notify the House partner, and have a partner or associate appear for him in court.
concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may
arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which SESSIONS
they are authors. I. REGULAR SESSIONS
 Art. VI, Sec. 15. The Congress shall convene once
II. INCOMPATIBLE OFFICES every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular
GENERAL RULE: session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall
 Art. VI, Sec. 13. No Senator or Member of the House continue to be in session for such number of days as it
of Representatives may hold any other office or may determine, until thirty days before the opening of
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including Sundays and legal holidays. xxx
government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.  Sec. 16(5) Neither house during the session of the
Xxx Congress shall, without the consent of the other
house, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any
EXCEPTION: No forfeiture shall take place if the member of other place than that in which the two houses shall be
congress holds the other government office in an “ex officio sitting.
capacity” e.g. membership in the board of regents of U.P. of the
chairman, committee on education, in the Senate II. SPECIAL SESSIONS
Special sessions are held in the following instances
III. FORBIDDEN OFFICES GENERAL RULE:
 Art. VI, Sec. 13. xxx Neither shall he be appointed to a) President calls for a special session at any time (Art. VI,
any office which may have been created or the Sec. 15)
emoluments thereof increased during the term for EXCEPTIONS:
which he was elected. a) Special election due to a vacancy in the offices of
President and Vice-President (Art. VII, Sec. 10)
Distinction between Incompatible and Forbidden Offices o Congress shall convene 3 days after vacancy
@ 10AM w/o need of call
Incompatible Office - is a Forbidden Office - is one to b) To decide on the disability of the President because the
post which a member cannot which a member cannot be Cabinet (majority) has "disputed" his assertion that he
accept unless he waives or appointed even if he is is able to dispose his duties and powers. (Art. VII, Sec.
forfeits his seat in Congress. willing to give up his seat in 11.)
The moment he accepts the Congress. o Congress shall convene, if it is not in session,
same, the original office is within 48 hours, without need of call.
deemed forfeited.
c) To revoke or extend the Presidential Proclamation of
Incompatibility arises only
Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
because of his simultaneous
membership in both. (Art. VII, Sec. 18).
o Congress, if not in session, following such
shall convene within 24 hours without need
IV. OTHER PROHIBITIONS of a call.

III. JOINT SESSION

When both houses meet jointly, they generally vote separately.

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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 MIDTERM TRANSCRIPTION NOTES
JOINT SESSION AND SEPARATE VOTING TAKE PLACE IN THE
FOLLOWING INSTANCES:
A. Voting Separately
a) Tie between two or more candidates for President
and Vice-President having an equal and the
highest number of votes (Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 5).
b) President's inability to discharge the powers and
duties of his office (Art. VII, Sec. 11, par. 4).
o decision by 2/3 votes
c) Vacancy in the Office of the VP (Art. VII, Sec. 9).
o such person shall assume office upon
confirmation by a majority vote of all the
members of both Houses.
d) Existence of a state of war [Art. VI, Sec, 23(1)].
o Declaration by 2/3 votes
e) Proposes to amend the Constitution [Art. XVII,
Sec. 1(1)].
o 3/4 vote of the members
B. Voting Jointly
a) When, there has been a proclamation of Martial
law or a suspension of the writ by the President,
and Congress has to decide whether to revoke or
to extend such proclamation or suspension
(majority vote of all members, voting jointly) (Art.
VII, Sec. 18)
ELECTION OF OFFICERS
 First order of business - election by each house of the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House,
and such other officers that the rules of each house
may provide.
 A majority vote of all the respective members is
required to elect these two officers.
When shall the Congress be deemed organized?
Upon the election of the President and the Speaker, the
Constitution deems the Houses "organized." (Art. VI, sec. 19)
QUORUM
1. Conduct business - majority (1/2 + 1) of all the
members.
2. pass a law – majority of present. This is known as the
"shifting majority"
DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS
The penalty may consist of:
i. censure;
ii. suspension, not exceeding 60 days, upon 2/3 votes of
all members of the house; or
iii. expulsion upon 2/3 votes of all members of the house.
JOURNAL AND CONGRESSIONAL RECORDS
 Journal - a resume of minutes of what transpired
during a legislative session.
 Record - a verbatim transcript of the proceedings
taken during the session.
Matters Required to be Entered in the Journal:
a) The yeas and nays on third and final reading of a bill
[Art. VI, Sec. 26(2)];
b) Veto message of the President [Art. VI, Sec. 27(1)];
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ATTY ANGELO SUAN, CPA
c) The yeas and nays on the repassing of a bill vetoed by
the President (Art. VI, Sec. 27(1)];
d) The yeas and nays on any question at the request of
1/5 of the members present [Art. VI, Sec. 16(4)]
e) summary of the proceedings.
 Journal Entry Rule vs. Enrolled Bill Theory
• The journal is conclusive.
• The Enrolled Bill Doctrine: Once a bill has been
approved by both houses, the bill is engrossed or
enrolled, and this "Enrolled Copy of the Bill" bears the
certification of the Presiding Officer of the house
(either Senate President or Speaker of the House) that
this bill as enrolled is the version passed by each house.
The purpose of the certification is to prevent attempts
at smuggling in "riders". The enrolled copy is then sent
to the President for his action.
ADJOURNMENT
 Art. VI, Sec. 16(5). Neither house during the session of
the Congress shall, without the consent of the other
house, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any
other place than that in which the two houses shall be
sitting.
THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
 Art. VI, Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members
of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties
and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
I. COMPOSITION
1. 3 Supreme Court Justices to be designated by the Chief
Justice; &
2. 6 Members of the Senate or House, as the case may
be.
II. ORGANIZATION
(Art. VI, Sec. 19) The Electoral Tribunal shall be
constituted within 30 days after the 2 houses shall
have been organized with the election of the President
and the Speaker.
III. FUNCTIONS
(id., Sec. 17) The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the
(i) election,
(ii) returns, and
(iii) qualifications of their respective
members.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 MIDTERM TRANSCRIPTION NOTES ATTY ANGELO SUAN, CPA

THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS  The Commission rules by a majority vote of all its
members.
 Art. VI, Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of the President of the
Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and
twelve Members of the House of Representatives,
elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission
shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission
shall act on all appointments submitted to it within
thirty session days of the Congress from their
submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority
vote of all the Members.

 Art. VI, Sec. 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the

Commission on Appointments shall be constituted
within thirty days after the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall have been organized with the
election of the President and the Speaker. The
Commission on Appointments shall meet only while
the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or
a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers
and functions as are herein conferred upon it.

I. FUNCTION

 (Art. VII, Sec. 16) The Commission shall confirm or

approve nominations made by the President of certain
public officers named by the Constitution or by law:

1. Heads of the executive departments

2. Ambassadors, other public ministers, and

consuls

3. Officers of the Armed Forces from the rank

of colonel or naval captain

4. Other officers whose appointments are

vested in him in this Constitution

a. Chairman and members of 3

Constitutional Commissions

b. Regular members of the Judicial

and Bar Council

c. Members of the Regional

Consultative council

II. SESSIONS AND PROCEDURE (Secs. 18 & 19)

 The Commission on Appointments shall meet to
discharge its powers and functions only while the
Congress is in session.
 The meeting may be called by
(a) the Chairman, or
(b) a majority of all its members.
 The Chairman of the Commission does not vote, except
to break a tie.
 The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within 30 session days of the Congress
from their submission.

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