1

DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

VISAKHAPATNAM, AP, INDIA

PROJECT TITLE

WAR AND IMPACT ON POLITICS

SUBJECT

POLITICAL SCIENCE

NAME OF THE FACULTY

MS T.Y.NIRMALA DEVI

NAME OF THE STUDENT

ALLAKA M

ROLL NO: 2018006

SEMESTER- I

SECTION- A
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am highly indebted to my Hon‘ ble Political Science professor, Ms. T.Y.Nirmala Devi, for
giving me a wonderful opportunity to work on the topic: ―WAR AND ITS IMPACT OF
POLITICS‖, and it is because of her excellent knowledge, experience and guidance, this project
is made with great interest and effort. I would also like to thank my seniors who have guided my
novice knowledge of doing research on such significant topic. I would also take this as an
opportunity to thank my parents for their support at all times. I have no words to express my
gratitude to each and every person who have guided and suggested me while conducting my
research work.
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PROJECT SYNOPSIS

Topic of the project WAR AND ITS IMPORTANCE OF POLITICS

Aim of project: The aim of this project is to analyse the concept of war and its importance of
politics and to evaluate the various problems that took place during different century and the way
in which those problems were solved.

Type of review: Here the method followed is secondary review as all sorts of information have
been collected from secondary sources.

Literature review: The Primary Literature that has been reviewed while doing the research in
books and web sources.

Scope of the project: The scope of the project is to understand the concept of war and peace in
detail and it is limited to the occurrences happened in 18th, 19th and 20th century.

Significance of the project: In this research the researcher mainly focus on the various
occurrences that happened in different places in India and the country it was involved with in
wars under the guidance of various leaders and the ways adopted to bring about peace in the
society and how they played major role in support or against of war.

Research methodology: Doctrinal method of research is followed.

Hypothesis: The different ways adopted to reduce the various social problems taking place in
the society and to understand the significant role played by the various organisations in doing it.
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ABSTRACT

War making that culminated in the elimination of local rivals gave rise to one centralized,
coercive strong state power that had a large-scale monopoly on violence.

Eventually, this large-scale monopoly on violence held by the state was extended to serve the
state's clients or supporters. This encouraged pacification, led to the formation of police forces,
and provided protection as a state service.

War making and military expansion would not be possible without extracting resources from the
population and accumulating capital. Historically, this led to the establishment of fiscal and
accounting institutions to collect taxes from the population to fuel war.

Finally, courts of law, guarantees of rights, and representative institutions were demanded for by
the state's populations whose resistance to war making and state making led to concessions being
made by the state. This enabled the population to protect their individual property without
allowing them to use force, which would compromise the state's monopoly on violence. War
making and the extraction, protection, and state making that followed were interdependent.

Here in this research the research deals with war that India was in involved in and the one it
witnessed closely
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………06
2. The First Indo-Pakistani War…………………………………………………..09
3. Indo-Pakistani War of 1965……………………………………………………12
4. Indo-Pakistani War of 1971……………………………………………………15
5. Sino-Indian war,1962…………………………………………………………..22
6. Cold War effects on India……………………………………………………...30
7. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...31
8. Bibliograpghy…………………………………………………………………..32
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INTRODUCTION

Every war has an impact on politics of the state. As war and politics is a vast topic, the
researcher has narrowed it down to Indian concept. India since being converted from
homogenous to heterogeneous society has always been at war with one or the other of its
neighbors. The society of India got expanded with the arrival of Aryans into to ancient Indian
sub-continent.

It's most classical and colonially tinged incarnation, it portrayed the Aryans as a highly advanced and
culturally superior race in the ancient world, locating their original home in Northern Europe. It then
went on to suggest that some time in antiquity, the Aryans migrated from their original home in
Europe and brought with them their language and their superior culture and transcendental
philosophy to civilize the primitive and materially backward Dravidian people of the subcontinent.
All the greatness of Indian civilization was ascribed to the Aryans, thus implying that if India were to
ever achieve greatness again, a return to Aryan rule was imperative.1

Through the centuries Indian sub-continent has witnessed a countless number of foreign invasion
which resulted in both internal and external tension. The series of invasion that majorly caused both
social and political tension began in the 711 AD when the son in law of Hajjaj Muhammad-Bin-
Qasim attacked Sindh.

The religious zeal of the Arabs, the desire to extend the empire and the allurement of wealth through
conquest were primary reasons of this attack though a pretext was found that Dahar, the ruler of
Sindh, had failed to punish those sea-pirates who had captured the presents sent by the king of
Ceylon to Hajjaj.

At that time, India was politically divided into many states which constantly fought against each
other, yet were powerful enough to check foreign invasions. Socially, the caste-system existed
but it had not grown rigid. The position of the women was, certainly, not equal to men, yet
women enjoyed a respectable position.

The rift that began in 711 AD continued and manifested itself a huge social turmoil which led to
a series of war in modern India.

The 1947–48 War

1
Sri Aurobindo: The Origins of Aryan Speech, (The Secret of the Veda, p. 554)
 7

The first war arose over Kashmir, in NW India, in 1947 when Muslim subjects revolted and were
supported by Pakistani troops. The Hindu ruler appealed to India for aid, agreeing to cede the
state to India in return. India moved quickly to consolidate its position in Kashmir, pushing
Pakistan's "volunteers" back. Conflicts also arose in the Punjab and in Bengal. The undeclared
war in Kashmir continued until Jan. 1, 1949, when a truce was arranged through UN mediation;
negotiations between India and Pakistan began and lasted until 1954 without resolving the
Kashmir problem. Pakistan controlled part of the area, Azad (Free) Kashmir, while India held
most of the territory, which it annexed in 1957.2

The 1965 War

The second war began in Apr., 1965, when fighting broke out in the Rann of Kachchh, a sparsely
inhabited region along the West Pakistan–India border. In August fighting spread to Kashmir and
to the Punjab, and in September Pakistani and Indian troops crossed the partition line between
the two countries and launched air assaults on each other's cities. After threats of intervention by
China had been successfully opposed by the United States and Britain, Pakistan and India agreed
to a UN-sponsored cease-fire and withdrew to the pre-August lines. Prime Minister Shri Lal
Bahadur Shastri of India and President Ayub Khan of Pakistan met in Tashkent, USSR (now in
Uzbekistan), in Jan., 1966, and signed an agreement pledging continued negotiations and respect
for the cease-fire conditions. After the Tashkent Declaration another period of relative peace
ensued.3

The 1971 War

Indo-Pakistani relations deteriorated when civil war erupted in Pakistan, pitting the West
Pakistan army against East Pakistanis demanding greater autonomy. The fighting forced 10
million East Pakistani Bengalis to flee to India. When Pakistan attacked Indian airfields in
Kashmir, India attacked both East and West Pakistan. It occupied the eastern half, which
declared its independence as Bangladesh, on Dec. 6, 1971. Under great-power pressure, a UN
cease-fire was arranged in mid-December, after Pakistan's defeat. Pakistan lost its eastern half,
an army of 100,000 soldiers, and was thrown into political turmoil. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto emerged

2
Lamb, Crisis in Kashmir, 1947–1966 (1966); W. N. Brown, The United States and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh
(1972); S. Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia (1986); R. Sisson, War and Secession (1990)
3
Ibid
 8

as leader of Pakistan, and Mujibur Rahman as prime minister of Bangladesh. Tensions were
alleviated by the Shimla accord of 1972, and by Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh in 1974,
but tensions have periodically recurred.4

Further colonial rule over India did raise even raise more problems with the international
relation.

Sino-India War, 1962

In 1962 India became involved in the Sino-Indian War, which was fought between India and
China.

1. The bone of contention between the two powers were the bordering regions of Aksai
Chin and parts of the present Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. Sovereignty over these
two areas was the primary issue. The area known as Aksai Chin was claimed by India to
be part of Kashmir, and by China to be in its province of Xinjiang or Sinkiang.

2. In 1957, China constructed a road through Aksai Chin, linking the Chinese province of
Xinjiang and Lhatse in Tibet. This road went south of the Johnson Line in many areas.
3. India gave asylum to the 14th Dalai Lama, the head of Tibet. He had fled from Lhasa
after the Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule had failed.
4. India had built several outposts around the Thagla ridge, Namka Chu, and Chushul
regions along the Sino-Indian border, under the Forward Policy (to evacuate the territory
of Chinese forces). 5

Another war that effected India this time indirectly was the Cold War 1945-91. After the new
constitution was created, minimum wage and health benefits were given to India‘s workers, and
the country started to industrialize making better roads and irrigation. Nehru‘s strategy was to
make the economy a ‗mixed‘ economy meaning that there was some state owned industry as
well as private businesses. During the period of the Cold War many governments began to

4
Ibid
5
Implications for Sino India War,L Venkateshwaran, Indo US embrace, Asian Affairs .
 9

support privately owned industries, which is a capitalist idea, even though some communist
countries began to follow it.

Each and every war held a different form of impact on Indian Politics.
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The First Indo-Pakistani War

Cause

The state of Jammu and Kashmir was one of a number of Indian states that recognized British
paramountcy. Prior to the withdrawal of the British from India, the state came under pressure
from both India and Pakistan to join them. The Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh wanted to
remain independent and tried to delay the issue. However at the time of British withdrawal the
state was invaded by a concentrated force of Pro-Pakistan Tribes from North West Frontier
Province (NWFP) and regular Pakistani soldiers. This forced him to accede Kashmir to India,
who promptly rushed into Kashmir and thus started the war. The accession is still questioned by
the Pakistanis. The Pakistani claim was that since the majority of the Kashmiri population is
Muslim, the princely state should have been given to Pakistan. The Indian claim arises from both
Maharaja Hari Singh's accession, as had happened with all of the other Indian states, and also
that 48 percent of Kashmir was Sikh, Buddhist, and Hindu.

Summary of war

India‘s independence was a tumultuous event. Mass migration of populations was underway.
Violence and massacre between communities was rampant. Only the Army could intervene to
control it. British Officers were still holding the higher positions in both the newly forming
nations. In this chaos arose another major crisis the accession of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).

The Army was inducted into J&K only after the Maharaja of the State signed the Instrument of
Accession on 26 October 1947. There had been no previous plans whatsoever to send troops to
J&K. As a result, the operation was mounted on an impromptu basis on the spur of the moment.
Intelligence with regard to the Pakistani game plan was nonexistent. Military intelligence never
got a chance to get established. 1 SIKH which was inducted was stationed at Gurgaon very near
the Palam airport in Delhi.

A MADRAS battalion located in Delhi was considered for induction but due to political
complications of it being commanded by a British Officer the move was dropped. Initially as
recorded, the Pakistanis denied that it was giving any aid to the Laschars (tribal raiders) who it
 11

claimed comprised persecuted Muslims of J&K State rising in revolt and joined by a number of
independent tribesmen from areas beyond the NWFP; by persons from contiguous areas of
Pakistan and Muslim refugees of East Punjab. However, later the Pakistani Foreign Minister
admitted that three Brigades of regular troops had been operating since May 1948.

At that time Indian Army had 127 Infantry battalions on its Order Of Battle. Some 50 battalions
were already in J&K, 29 were in East Punjab guarding the vital sector of Indo-Pak frontier. 19
battalions were stationed in Hyderabad where Razakars supporting the Nizam were a threat, thus
leaving 29 battalions for Internal Security tasks and as general reserve. By December 1948 India
had two Divisional HQ‘s with 12 Infantry Brigades HQ‘s and 50 Infantry battalions besides 14
Brigades HQ‘s, 63 Infantry battalions and 24 battalions worth of SCOUTS and irregulars. Cease
Fire came into effect on the midnight of night 1-2 January 1949.

It stands out clearly that even while the Government is involved in dialogue and discussions, it
must warn the armed forces to be prepared for an eventuality to deploy adequate force for any
task if talks fail. Had this been done more forces could have been pre-positioned nearer Jammu
to be inducted by road and for an airlift to Srinagar from, probably, Jalandhar which would have
generated more sorties per day than by the induction process from Delhi. The units could have
carried out battle inoculation and troops and their commanders prepared to the ensuing battle.
Also the build up of logistics could have been planned in greater detail as later this became the
major factor in curtailing the momentum of the offensive and limiting the scope of the
operations. Thus operations were planned as a reaction to the offensive by Pak forces.

The Army‘s combat ratios were inadequate to generate worthwhile potential to ensure quick
tactical gains and exploit opportunities. Extended pause was to be built in to build up logistics
and redeploy troops for attack. Thus while attacks were successful, enveloping movement to cut
off and capture retreating enemy was not possible. Overall the plan recapture J&K was adhoc
and limited due to paucity of all sorts of resources and long lines of communication which were
vulnerable to disruptive actions by Pak irregular forces. While the war was on negotiations had
been going on for a year and a Cease Fire had been also been proposed. However, the military
 12

was not warned of this impending decision which was to be effective from a particular hour that
the Nehru government had already decided.

Had the Army been apprised of the impending Cease Fire the troops on ground could have made
advances to capture tactically more sound positions which later had an effect on the alignment of
the Cease Fire Line (the same later was more-or-less transformed into the Line of Control). A
greater alertness on the part of junior leadership on the spot could have prevented
encroachments. Also if they were given more freedom of action and had exercised greater
initiative and boldness they could have evicted these encroachments even without directions
from higher authority. This is a bane in the rigid command and control system generally
followed due to unnecessary caution of the commanders at tactical level. It has been opined that
had the Army been taken into confidence it would have resulted in the liberation of the rest of
J&K.
Nehru‘s single point control of national affairs and unopposed decision making was to lead to a
greater tragedy in just over a decade later.

Results of the war

India claimed that the accession had the people's support through the support of the National
Conference, the most popular organisation in the state.Historians have questioned the
representativeness of the National Conference and the clarity of its leaderships' goals. They
observe that while many Kashmiris supported Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference at
the state level, they also supported Jinnah and the Muslim League at the all-India level.

Following the end of the war and the ceasefire, India had managed to acquire two thirds of
Kashmir while Pakistan had a third of the region. The Indians retained control of the relatively
wealthy and populous Kashmir Valley, and a majority of the population. The number of
casualties in the war are estimated at 2,000 for both sides. In 1957, the area became the state of
Jammu and Kashmir in the India union. The cease fire line has, over the years, become a de
facto division of the state.
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Indo-Pakistani War of 1965

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, also known as the Second Kashmir War, was the
culmination of a series of skirmishes that occurred between April 1965 and September 1965,
between India and Pakistan. The war was the second fought between India and Pakistan over the
region of Kashmir. The war lasted five weeks, resulted in thousands of casualties on both sides
and ended in a United Nations (UN) mandated ceasefire. It is generally accepted that the war
began following the failure of Pakistan's "Operation Gibraltar" which was designed to infiltrate
and invade Jammu and Kashmir.

Much of the war was fought by the countries' land forces in the region of Kashmir and along the
International Border (IB) between India and Pakistan. The war also involved a limited
participation from the countries' respective air forces. This war saw the largest amassing of
troops in Kashmir, a number that was overshadowed only during the 2001-2002 military standoff
between India and Pakistan, during which over a million troops were placed in combat positions
in the region. Many details of this war, like those of most Indo-Pakistani Wars, remain unclear
and riddled with media biases.

The war

On August 15, 1965, Indian forces crossed the ceasefire line and launched an attack on Pakistan
administered Kashmir, marking an official beginning to the war. Pakistani reports cite this attack
as unprovoked.6Indian reports cite the attack as a response to a tip the Indian forces received
from Kashmiri civilians about Pakistani soldiers crossing the Line of Control (LoC) dressed as
local Kashmiris.7 Most of the war was fought on land by each country's infantry and armored
units, with substantial backing from their air forces. Initially, the Indian Army met with
considerable success in the northern sector (Kashmir). After launching a prolonged artillery
barrage against Pakistan, India was able to capture three important mountain positions. However,
by the end of the month both sides were on even footing, as Pakistan had made progress in areas
such as Tithwal, Uri, and Punch and India had gains in Pakistan Administered Kashmir (Azad

6
Story of Pakistan, The Lahore Offensive.July 13, 2007
7
BC Chakravorty, "The Indo-Pak War, 1965". History Division, Ministry of Defence. 1992, July 13, 2007
 14

Kashmir, Pakistan Occupied Kashmir), having captured the Haji Pir Pass eight kilometers inside
Pakistani territory.8

These territorial gains and rapid Indian advances were met with a counterattack by Pakistan in
the southern sector (Punjab) where Indian forces, having been caught unprepared, faced
technically superior Pakistani tanks and suffered heavy losses. India then called in its air force to
target the Pakistani attack in the southern sector. The next day, Pakistan retaliated, initializing its
own air force to retaliate against Indian forces and air bases in both Kashmir and Punjab. India
crossed the International Border (IB) on the Western front on September 6 (some officially claim
this to be the beginning of the war). On September 6, the 15th Infantry Division of the Indian
Army, under World War II veteran Major General Prasad battled a massive counterattack by
Pakistan near the west bank of the Ichhogil Canal (BRB Canal), which was a de facto border of
India and Pakistan. The General's entourage itself was ambushed and he was forced to flee his
vehicle. A second, this time successful, attempt to cross over the Ichhogil Canal was made
through the bridge in the village of Barki, just east of Lahore. This brought the Indian Army
within range of Lahore International Airport, and as result the United States requested a
temporary ceasefire to allow it to evacuate its citizens in Lahore.

The same day, a counter offensive consisting of an armored division and infantry division
supported by Pakistan Air Force Sabres rained down on the Indian 15th Division forcing it to
withdraw to its starting point. On the days following September 9, both nations' premiere
formations were routed in unequal battles. India's 1st Armored Division, labeled the "pride of the
Indian Army," launched an offensive towards Sialkot. The Division divided itself into two
prongs and came under heavy Pakistani tank fire at Taroah and was forced to withdraw.
Similarly, Pakistan's pride, the 1st Armored Division, pushed an offensive towards Khemkaran
with the intent to capture Amritsar (a major city in Punjab, India) and the bridge on River Beas
to Jalandhar. The Pakistani 1st Armored Division never made it past Khem Karan and by the end
of September 10 lay disintegrated under the defenses of the Indian 4th Mountain Division at
what is now known as the Battle of Asal Uttar (Real Answer). The area became known as Patton

8
Library of Congress, A Country Study: India. July 13, 2007.
 15

Nagar (Patton Town) as Pakistan lost/abandoned nearly 100 tanks, mostly Patton tanks obtained
from the United States.

The war was heading for a stalemate, with both nations holding territory of the other. The Indian
army suffered 3,000 battlefield deaths, while Pakistan suffered 3,800. The Indian army was in
possession of 710 mile² (1,840 km²) of Pakistani territory and the Pakistan army held 210 mile²
(545 km²) of Indian territory, mostly in Chumb, in the northern sector.

Ceasefire
On September 22, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a resolution that
called for an unconditional ceasefire from both nations. The war ended the following day.
The Soviet Union, led by Premier Alexey Kosygin, brokered a ceasefire in Tashkent (now
in Uzbekistan), where Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub
Khan signed an agreement to withdraw to pre-August lines no later than February 25, 1966. The
war remained largely inconclusive despite Pakistan suffering relatively more losses, and saw a
six year period of relative peace between the two neighboring rivals before war broke out once
again in 1971.

Consequences of the war

The war created a tense state of affairs in its aftermath. Though the war was indecisive, Pakistan
suffered much heavier material and personnel casualties than India. Many war historians believe
that had the war continued, with growing losses and decreasing supplies, Pakistan would have
been eventually defeated. India's decision to declare ceasefire with Pakistan caused some outrage
among the Indian populace, who believed they had the upper hand. Both India and Pakistan
increased their defense spending and Cold War politics had taken root in the subcontinent. Partly
as a result of the inefficient information gathering, India established the Research and Analysis
Wing for external espionage and intelligence. India slowly started aligning with the Soviet
Union both politically and militarily. This would be cemented formally years later, before
 16

the Bangladesh Liberation War. In light of the previous war against the Chinese, the performance
in this war was viewed as a "politico-strategic" victory in India.

Many Pakistanis, rated the performance of their military positively. September 6 is celebrated as
Defense Day in Pakistan, commemorating the successful defense of Sailkot against the Indian
army. The Pakistani Air Force's performance was seen in much better light compared to that of
the Pakistani navy and army. However, the end game left a lot to desire, as Pakistan had lost
more ground than gained and more importantly did not achieve the goal of occupying Kashmir,
which has been viewed by many impartial sources as a defeat for Pakistan.9Many high ranking
Pakistani officials and military experts later criticized the faulty planning during Operation
Gibraltar that ultimately led to the war. The Tashkent declaration was further seen as a raw deal
in Pakistan, though few citizens realized the gravity of the situation that existed at the end of the
war. Under the advice of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's then foreign minister, Ayub Khan had
raised very high expectations among the people of Pakistan about the superiority—if not
invincibility—of its armed forces.10 But Pakistan's inability to attain its military aims during the
war created a political liability for Ayub. The defeat of its Kashmiri ambitions in the war led to
the army's invincibility being challenged by an increasingly vocal opposition. And with the war
creating a huge financial burden, Pakistan's economy, which had witnessed rapid progress in the
early 60s, took a severe beating.

Another negative consequence of the war was the growing resentment against the Pakistani
government in East Pakistan. Bengali leaders accused the government for not providing adequate
security for East Pakistan, even though large sums of money were taken from the east to finance
the war. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was apprehensive of this situation and the need for greater
autonomy for the east led to another war between India and Pakistan in 1971.

9
U.S. Department of State, Profile of Pakistan. Retrieved July 13, 2007
10
Dr Ahmad Faruqui, Remember 6th of September, 1965
 17

Indo-Pakistani War of 1971

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 was a major military conflict between India and Pakistan. The
war is closely associated with the Bangladesh Liberation War (sometimes also referred to as
Pakistani Civil War). There is an argument about exact dates of the war. However, the armed
conflict on India's western front during the period between December 3, 1971 and December 16,
1971 is called the Indo-Pakistani War by both the Bangladeshi and Indian armies. The war ended
in a crushing defeat for Pakistani military in just a fortnight.

Background

The Indo-Pakistani conflict was sparked by the Bangladesh Liberation War, a conflict between
the traditionally dominant West Pakistanis and the majority East Pakistanis. The war ignited after
the 1970 Pakistani election, in which the East Pakistani Awami League won 167 of 169 seats in
East Pakistan, thus securing a simple majority in the 313-seat lower house of the
Pakistani parliament. Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman presented Six Points and
claimed the right to form the government. After the leader of the Pakistan People's
Party, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, refused to give premiership of Pakistan to Mujibur, President Yahya
Khan called in the military, which was made up largely of West Pakistanis.

Mass arrests of dissidents began, and attempts were made to disarm East Pakistani soldiers and
police. After several days of strikes and non-cooperation movements, Pakistani military cracked
down on Dhaka on the night of March 25, 1971. The Awami League was banished, and many
members fled into exile in India. Mujib was arrested and taken to West Pakistan.

On March 27, 1971, Ziaur Rahman, a rebellious major in the Pakistani army, declared
the independence of Bangladesh on behalf of Mujibur. In April, exiled Awami League leaders
formed a government-in-exile in Boiddonathtola of Meherpur. The East Pakistan Rifles, an elite
paramilitary force, defected to the rebellion. A guerrilla troop of civilians, the Mukti Bahini, was
formed to help the Bangladesh Army.

India's involvement in Bangladesh Liberation War

On March 27, 1971, the Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi, expressed full support of her
government to the Bangladeshi struggle for freedom. The Bangladesh-India border was opened
 18

to allow the tortured and panic-stricken Bangladeshis safe shelter in India. The governments of
West Bengal, Bihar, Assam, Meghalaya, and Tripura established refugee camps along the
border. Exiled Bangladeshi army officers and voluntary workers from India immediately started
using these camps for the recruitment and training of Mukti Bahini guerrillas.

As the massacres in East Pakistan escalated, an estimated 10 million refugees fled to India,
causing financial hardship and instability in the country. The United States, a long and close ally
of Pakistan, continued to ship arms and supplies to West Pakistan.

Indira Gandhi launched a diplomatic offensive in the early fall of 1971 touring Europe, and was
successful in getting both the United Kingdom and France to break with the United States, and
block any pro-Pakistan directives in the United Nations security council. Gandhi's greatest coup
was on August 9, when she signed a twenty-year treaty of friendship and co-operation with
the Soviet Union, greatly shocking the United States, and providing India with insurance that the
People's Republic of China would not be involved in the conflict. China, an ally of Pakistan, had
been providing moral support, but little military aid, and did not advance troops to its border with
India.

Operation of the Mukti Bahini caused severe casualties to the Pakistani Army, which was in
control of all district headquarters. As the flow of refugees swelled to a tide, the economic costs
for India began to escalate. India began providing support, including weapons and training, for
the Mukti Bahini, and began shelling military targets in East Pakistan.

India's official engagement with Pakistan

By November, war seemed inevitable; a massive buildup of Indian forces on the border with East
Pakistan had begun. The Indian military waited for winter, when the drier ground would make
for easier operations and Himalayan passes would be closed by snow, preventing any Chinese
intervention. On November 23, Yahya Khan declared a state of emergency in all of Pakistan and
told his people to prepare for war.

On the evening of Sunday, December 3, the Pakistani air force launched sorties on eight airfields
in north-western India. This attack was inspired by the Arab-Israeli Six Day War and the success
of the Israeli preemptive strike. However, the Indians had anticipated such a move and the raid
was not successful. The Indian Air Force launched a counter-attack and quickly achieved air
 19

superiority. On the Eastern front, the Indian Army joined forces with the Mukti Bahini to form
the Mitro Bahini (Allied Forces); the next day, Indian forces responded with a massive
coordinated air, sea, and land assault on East Pakistan.

Yahya Khan counter-attacked India in the West, in an attempt to capture land which might have
been used to bargain for territory they expected to lose in the east. The land battle in the West
was crucial for any hope of preserving a united Pakistan. The Indian Army quickly responded to
the Pakistan Army's movements in the west and made some initial gains, including capturing
around 5,500 sq miles of Pakistan territory (land gained by India in Pakistani Kashmir and the
Pakistani Punjab sector were later ceded in the Shimla Agreement of 1972, as a gesture of
goodwill). The Indian Army described its activities in East Pakistan as:

The Indian Army merely provided the coup de grace to what the people of Bangladesh had
commenced—active resistance to the Pakistani Government and its Armed Forces on their soil.

At sea, the Indian Navy proved its superiority by the success of Operation Trident, the name
given to the attack on Karachi's port. It also resulted in the destruction of two destroyers and one
minesweeper, and was followed by the successful Operation Python. The waters in the east were
also secured by the Indian Navy. The Indian Air Force conducted 4,000 sorties in the west while
its counterpart, the PAF put up little retaliation, partly because of the paucity of non-Bengali
technical personnel. This lack of retaliation has also been attributed to the deliberate decision of
the PAF High Command to cut its losses, as it had already incurred huge casualties in the
conflict. In the east, the small air contingent of Pakistan Air Force No. 14 Sqn was destroyed
achieving air superiority in the east. Faced with insurmountable losses, the Pakistani military
capitulated in just under a fortnight. On December 16, the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan
surrendered. The next day India announced a unilateral ceasefire, to which Pakistan agreed.

American involvement
The United States supported Pakistan both politically and materially. President Richard
Nixon denied getting involved in the situation, saying that it was an internal matter of Pakistan.

Several documents released from the Nixon Presidential Archives11show the extent of the tilt that
the Nixon Administration demonstrated in favor of Pakistan. Among them, the infamous Blood

11
The National Security Archive, The Tilt: The U.S. and the South Asian Crisis of 1971
 20

telegram from the U.S. embassy in Dacca, East Pakistan, stated the horrors of genocide taking
place. Nixon, backed by Henry Kissinger, is alleged to have wanted to protect the interests of
Pakistan, as he was apprehensive of India. Archer Blood was promptly transferred out of Dacca.
As revealed in the newly declassified transcripts released by the State Department, 12 President
Nixon was using the Pakistanis to normalize relations with China. This would have three
important effects: Opening rifts between the Soviet Union, China, and North Vietnam, opening
the potentially huge Chinese market to American business and creating a foreign policy coup in
time to win the 1972 Presidential Elections. Since Nixon believed the existence of Pakistan to be
critical to the success of his term, he went to great lengths to protect his ally. In direct violation
of the Congress-imposed sanctions on Pakistan, Nixon sent military supplies to Pakistan and
routed them through Jordan and the Shah-ruled Iran.13

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations George H. W. Bush branded the Indian action as
"aggression" at the time and took up the matter in the UN Security Council. The United States
believed that should Pakistan's armed forces in the east collapse, India would transfer its forces
from there to attack West Pakistan, which was an ally in the Central Treaty Organization. This
was confirmed in official British secret transcripts declassified in 2003.14 Nixon also showed a
bias towards Pakistan despite widespread condemnation of the dictatorship even amongst his
administration, as Oval Office records show. Kissinger wanted China to attack India for this
purpose.

When Pakistan's defeat seemed certain, Nixon sent the USS Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal
from the Gulf of Tonkin. Enterprise arrived on station on December 11, 1971. Originally, the
deployment of Enterprise was claimed to be for evacuating U.S. citizens and personnel from the
area. Later, Nixon claimed that it was also as a gesture of goodwill towards Pakistan and China.
Enterprise's presence was considered an intimidation, and hotly protested by India and the Soviet
Union. The Soviet Union called this U.S. move one of Gunboat Diplomacy. On December 6, and
December 13, the Soviet Navy dispatched two groups of ships, armed with nuclear missiles,
from Vladivostok; they trailed U.S. Task Force 74 in the Indian Ocean from December 18 until
January 7, 1972.

12
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1969-1976, South Asia Crisis, 1971
13
Stephen R. Shalom, The Men Behind Yahya in the Indo-Pak War of 1971
14
BBC, War secrets showing that India could have invaded West Pakistan
 21

Effects

The war led to the immediate surrender of Pakistani forces to the Indian Army. Bangladesh
became an independent nation, and the third most populous Muslim country. Loss of East
Pakistan demoralized the Pakistani military and Yahya Khan resigned, to be replaced by Zulfiqar
Ali Bhutto. Mujibur Rahman was released from West Pakistani prison and returned to Dhaka on
January 10, 1972.

The exact cost of the violence on the people of East Pakistan is not known. R.J. Rummel cites
estimates ranging from one to three million people killed. Other estimates place the death toll
lower, at 300,000.

On the brink of defeat around December 14, the Pakistani Army and its local collaborators
systematically killed a large number of Bengali doctors, teachers, and intellectuals, part of
a pogrom against the Hindu minorities who constituted the majority of urban educated
intellectuals. Young men, who were seen as possible rebels, were also targeted, especially
students.

The cost of the war for Pakistan in monetary and human resources was high. In the book Can
Pakistan Survive? Pakistan based author Tariq Ali writes, "Pakistan lost half its navy, a quarter
of its air force and a third of its army." India took 93,000 prisoners of war that included Pakistani
soldiers as well as some of their East Pakistani collaborators. It was one of the largest surrenders
since World War II. India originally wished to try them for war crimes for the brutality in East
Pakistan, but eventually acceded to releasing them as a gesture of reconciliation. The Simla
Agreement, created the following year, also saw most of Pakistani territory (more than 13,000
km²) being given back to Pakistan to create "lasting peace" between the two nations.15

15
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Indo-Pakistani_Wars cite_ref-9 (Last access 27 October 2018)
 22

Sino-Indian War 1962

Background to the War

The primary cause of the 1962 war between India and China was the disputed border between
the two countries, in the high mountains of Aksai Chin. India asserted that the region, which is
slightly larger than Portugal, belonged to the Indian-controlled portion of Kashmir. China
countered that it was part of Xinjiang.

The roots of the disagreement go back to the mid 19th century when the British Raj in India and
the Qing Chinese agreed to let the traditional border, wherever that might be, stand as the
boundary between their realms. As of 1846, only those sections near the Karakoram Pass and
Pangong Lake were clearly delineated; the rest of the border was not formally demarcated.

In 1865, the British Survey of India placed the boundary at the Johnson Line, which included
about 1/3 of Aksai Chin within Kashmir. Britain did not consult with the Chinese about this
demarcation because Beijing was no longer in control of Xinjiang at the time. However, the
Chinese recaptured Xinjiang in 1878. They gradually pressed forward, and set up boundary
markers at Karakoram Pass in 1892, marking off Aksai Chin as part of Xinjiang.

The British once again proposed a new border in 1899, known as the Macartney-Macdonald
Line, which divided the territory along the Karakoram Mountains and gave India a larger piece
of the pie. British India would control all of the Indus River watersheds while China took the
Tarim River watershed. When Britain sent the proposal and map to Beijing, the Chinese did not
respond. Both sides accepted this line as settled, for the time being.

Britain and China both used the different lines interchangeably, and neither country was
particularly concerned since the area was mostly uninhabited and served only as a seasonal
trading route. China had more pressing concerns with the fall of the Last Emperor and the end of
the Qing Dynasty in 1911, which set off the Chinese Civil War. Britain would soon have World
War I to contend with, as well. By 1947, when India gained its independence and maps of the
subcontinent were redrawn in the Partition, the issue of Aksai Chin remained unresolved.
 23

Meanwhile, China's civil war would continue for two more years, until Mao Zedong and the
Communists prevailed in 1949.

The creation of Pakistan in 1947, the Chinese invasion and annexation of Tibet in 1950, and
China's construction of a road to connect Xinjiang and Tibet through land claimed by India all
complicated the issue. Relations reached a nadir in 1959, when Tibet's spiritual and political
leader, the Dalai Lama, fled into exile in the face of another Chinese invasion. Indian Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru reluctantly granted the Dalai Lama sanctuary in India, angering Mao
immensely.16

The war

From 1959 forward, border skirmishes broke out along the disputed line. In 1961, Nehru
instituted the Forward Policy, in which India tried to establish border outposts and patrols north
of Chinese positions, in order to cut them off from their supply line. The Chinese responded in
kind, each side seeking to flank the other without direct confrontation.

The summer and fall of 1962 saw increasing numbers of border incidents in Aksai Chin. One
June skirmish killed more than twenty Chinese troops. In July, India authorized its troops to fire
not only in self-defense but to drive the Chinese back. By October, even as Zhou Enlai was
personally assuring Nehru in New Delhi that China did not want war, the People's Liberation
Army of China (PLA) was massing along the border. The first heavy fighting took place on
October 10, 1962, in a skirmish that killed 25 Indian troops and 33 Chinese soldiers.

On October 20, the PLA launched a two-pronged attack, seeking to drive the Indians out of
Aksai Chin. Within two days, China had seized the entire territory. The main force of the
Chinese PLA was 10 miles (16 kilometers) south of the line of control by October 24. During a
three-week ceasefire, Zhou Enlai ordered the Chinese to hold their position, as he sent a peace
proposal to Nehru.

The Chinese proposal was that both sides disengage and withdraw twenty kilometers from their
current positions. Nehru responded that the Chinese troops needed to withdraw to their original

16
Sino Indian war-1962 causes and consequences , Shodhganga
 24

position instead, and he called for a wider buffer zone. On November 14, 1962, the war resumed
with an Indian attack against the Chinese position at Walong.

After hundreds of more deaths and an American threat to intervene on behalf of the Indians, the
two sides declared a formal ceasefire on November 19. The Chinese announced that they would
"withdraw from their present positions to the north of the illegal McMahon Line." However, the
isolated troops in the mountains did not hear about the ceasefire for several days and engaged in
additional firefights.

The war lasted just one month but killed 1,383 Indian troops and 722 Chinese troops. An
additional 1,047 Indians and 1,697 Chinese were wounded, and nearly 4,000 Indian soldiers
were captured. Many of the casualties were caused by the harsh conditions at 14,000 feet, rather
than by enemy fire. Hundreds of the wounded on both sides died of exposure before their
comrades could get medical attention for them.

In the end, China retained actual control of the Aksai Chin region. Prime Minister Nehru was
roundly criticized at home for his pacifism in the face of Chinese aggression, and for the lack of
preparation prior to the Chinese attack. 17

Aftermath

1. China

According to the China's official military history, the war achieved China's policy objectives of
securing borders in its western sector, as China retained de facto control of the Aksai Chin. After
the war, India abandoned the Forward Policy, and the de facto borders stabilised along the Line
of Actual Control.

According to James Calvin of Marine Corps Command and Staff College, even though China
won a military victory it lost in terms of its international image. China's first nuclear weapon test
in October 1964 and its support of Pakistan in the 1965 India Pakistan War tended to confirm the
American view of communist world objectives, including Chinese influence over Pakistan.

17
Ibid
 25

Lora Saalman opined in a study of Chinese military publications, that while the war led to much
blame, debates and ultimately acted as causation of military modernisation of India but the war is
now treated as basic reportage of facts with relatively diminished interest by Chinese analysts.

2. India

The aftermath of the war saw sweeping changes in the Indian military to prepare it for similar
conflicts in the future, and placed pressure on Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who was
seen as responsible for failing to anticipate the Chinese attack on India. Indians reacted with a
surge in patriotism and memorials were erected for many of the Indian troops who died in the
war. Arguably, the main lesson India learned from the war was the need to strengthen its own
defences and a shift from Nehru's foreign policy with China based on his stated concept of
"brotherhood". Because of India's inability to anticipate Chinese aggression, Prime
Minister Nehru faced harsh criticism from government officials, for having promoted pacifist
relations with China.

Indian President Radhakrishnan said that Nehru's government was naive and negligent about
preparations, and Nehru admitted his failings. According to Inder Malhotra, a former editor
of The Times of India and a commentator for The Indian Express, Indian politicians invested
more effort in removing Defence Minister Krishna Menon than in actually waging war. Krishna
Menon's favoritism weakened the Indian Army, and national morale dimmed. The public saw the
war as a political and military debacle. Under American advice (by American envoy John
Kenneth Galbraith who made and ran American policy on the war as all other top policy makers
in the US were absorbed in coincident Cuban Missile CrisisIndians refrained, not according to
the best choices available, from using the Indian air force to beat back the Chinese advances. The
CIA later revealed that at that time the Chinese had neither the fuel nor runways long enough for
using their air force effectively in Tibet. Indians in general became highly sceptical of China and
its military. Many Indians view the war as a betrayal of India's attempts at establishing a long-
standing peace with China and started to question the once popular "Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai"
(meaning "Indians and Chinese are brothers"). The war also put an end to Nehru's earlier hopes
that India and China would form a strong Asian Axis to counteract the increasing influence of
the Cold War bloc superpowers.
 26

The unpreparedness of the army was blamed on Defence Minister Menon, who resigned his
government post to allow for someone who might modernise India's military further. India's
policy of weaponisation via indigenous sources and self-sufficiency was thus cemented. Sensing
a weakened army, Pakistan, a close ally of China, began a policy of provocation against India
by infiltrating Jammu and Kashmir and ultimately triggering the Second Kashmir War with India
in 1965 and Indo-Pakistani war of 1971. The Attack of 1965 was successfully stopped and
ceasefire was negotiated under international pressure. In the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 India
won a clear victory, resulting in liberation of Bangladesh (formerly East-Pakistan).

According to James Calvin, an analyst from the U.S. Navy, India gained many benefits from the
1962 conflict. This war united the country as never before. India got 32,000 square miles (8.3
million hectares, 83,000 km2) of disputed territory even if it felt that NEFA was hers all along.
The new Indian republic had avoided international alignments; by asking for help during the war,
India demonstrated its willingness to accept military aid from several sectors. And, finally, India
recognised the serious weaknesses in its army. It would more than double its military manpower
in the next two years and it would work hard to resolve the military's training and logistic
problems to later become the second-largest army in the world. India's efforts to improve its
military posture significantly enhanced its army's capabilities and preparedness. This played a
role in subsequent wars against Pakistan.

Soon after the end of the war, the Indian government passed the Defence of India Act in
December 1962, permitting the "apprehension and detention in custody of any person
[suspected] of being of hostile origin." The broad language of the act allowed for the arrest of
any person simply for having a Chinese surname, Chinese ancestry or a Chinese spouse. The
Indian government incarcerated thousands of Chinese-Indians in an internment camp
in Deoli, Rajasthan, where they were held for years without trial. The last internees were not
released until 1967. Thousands more Chinese-Indians were forcibly deported or coerced to leave
India. Nearly all internees had their properties sold off or looted. Even after their release, the
Chinese Indians faced many restrictions in their freedom. They could not travel freely until the
mid-1990s. 18

Present Day Environment Between India And China

18
The war of 1962 Herderson Brooks-Bhagat Report
 27

International and regional politics continue to shape the diplomatic relations between India and
China today as well. After the dismemberment of the USSR, the influence of the Soviet Bloc was
considerably reduced, and the U.S. emerged as the sole superpower in the world. Although
Russia continues to play an important role in the international politics, its role was considerably
reduced in the post-cold war era. The U.S. now sees its relations with both India and China in a
new and very complex framework. With the focus of world economy shifting to Asia, these three
powers are becoming increasingly important to each other. Progressive improvement of U.S.-
India relations is gaining attention in the world, and is being viewed suspiciously by China

The growth of China‘s power in the 1990s had an impact on the U.S. policies towards India and
vice-versa. The growing military-to-military cooperation between India and the U.S. especially
in the Indian Ocean, is viewed with grave concerns in Beijing, given the growing dependence of
Chinese imports transiting the Indian Ocean. China also expressed concerns over the U.S.-Indian
civilian nuclear deal, as it undermined the nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, China
later showed restraint as this paved way for the Chinese to support Pakistan in the nuclear field.

The strategic equation between Pakistan and China poses a hindrance to any substantive
improvement in India‘s relations with China. The Sino-Pak relationship is a comprehensive
friendship that spans the entire gamut of political, military, nuclear and economic activities. This
relationship grew in the 1960s to counterbalance India. In 1963, Pakistan ceded to China the
Trans-Karakoram Tract, also known as Shaksam Valley, in the disputed territory of Kashmir.
This area links Pakistan to China‘s Xinjiang region 32 along the Karakoram Highway. China‘s
upgrade of the Karakoram Highway and its development of railways, as well as other
construction including dams and tunnels, enables it to extend its strategic reach to the Arabian
Sea and the Persian Gulf through Pakistan. While Chinese officials ascribe this to economic and
infrastructure development in the region, this is a cause of for security concerns in New Delhi.19

China and India also remain engaged in an effort to counter each other‘s interests in regional
politics. China has undertaken a number of development projects in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri
Lanka, Maldives and Nepal. China has also provided sufficient military assistance to these
countries to increase their leverage vis-à-vis India. Beijing has sold modern missile boats to

19
SINO-INDIAN WAR 1962–WHERE DO INDIA AND CHINA STAND TODAY?, QASIM HAMEEDY,
MAJOR, PAKISTAN ARMY M.Sc, National Defense University Pakiston, 2011
 28

Bangladesh and provided military aid to Sri Lanka to help them overcome Tamil insurgency.
China‘s main interests in Nepal stem from its concerns over movement of large numbers of
Tibetans into Nepal. Therefore, India is not only concerned with growing Chinese influence in
India‘s arch rival Pakistan, but her extensive economic and security relationship with Myanmar,
Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, and increasing naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
Conversely, China views the Indian oil exploration activities in South China Sea in collaboration
with Vietnam, and the Indian plan of for the Trilateral Highway between India, Myanmar and
Thailand as a source of grave concern.20

Besides international and regional politics, bilateral relations between India and China also play
a profound role. The formal diplomatic relations remained virtually suspended until the early
1980s. This was a natural outcome of the bitter memories of the Sino-Indian War of 1962. The
normalization of diplomatic exchanges and discussion on border disputes began in the 1980s
when a series of talks were held. This development 33 could still not sustain the test of time, as
India conducted nuclear explosions in 1998, and used its enmity with China to justify this act.
However, bilateral relations again improved in the early 2000s, after high-level visits between
the two countries. Prime Minister Vajpayee‘s visit to Beijing in 2003, marked an important
breakthrough in Sino-Indian relations as India acknowledged China‘s sovereignty over the Tibet
Autonomous Region (TAR).42 The visits of Chinese President Wen Jiabao in 2005 and 2010,
and two visits of the Indian Premier Manmohan Sing to China in 2008, were focused on
improving bilateral trade and economic relations between both the countries.21

In 2013, India and China continue to posture against each other instead of continuing to improve
their relations. In the article, ―Pakistan‘s Nuclear Future,‖ published by the Strategic Studies
Institute in November 2002, Brigadier Feroz Hassan Khan mentions Chinese centrality in Indian
strategic thinking:

―Indian designs on China could be constructed as the following: in the short term, engage China
to buy time while maintaining the rivalry in order to receive Western support and to justify an
arms build-up–thus narrowing the developmental and technological gap between India and
China. In the long term, force China to accept India as a peer competitor with global status.44

20
Ibid
21
Ibid
 29

Despite continuous efforts by both governments and increased assurances for continued
development of bilateral trade and economic ties, there are still some factors.‖

Despite continuous efforts by both governments and increased assurances for continued
development of bilateral trade and economic ties, there are still some factors which inhibit
improvement in the bilateral and diplomatic relationship. China was issuing stapled visas to the
residents of Jammu and Kashmir in 2010, and did not put stamps on the Indian passports to
reinforce the claim that Jammu and Kashmir was a disputed territory that belong to Pakistan.45
The issue reached its height when China denied a visa to Indian controlled Kashmir to an Indian
general. The defense ties between both the countries were put on hold, and military-to-military
exchanges were cancelled.

It was a result of Beijing‘s uneasiness over India‘s efforts to develop ties with the Southeast
Asian countries. Although the issue was later resolved in 2011, it had left unpleasant effects.

In January 2012, China denied a visa to a senior Indian Air Force officer hailing from Arunachal
Pradesh, who was to be a part of the defense team travelling to China under a bilateral defense
exchange program.46 The Chinese authorities used this diplomatic overture to further her claim
over Arunachal Pradesh, implying that the official was a Chinese citizen, and therefore did not
need a visa to visit China. These issues were resolved over a period of time; however, these
continuous pin pricks keep creating strained relations. However, they do not indicate any prelude
to a major conflict between the countries. They do indicate one thing, that China and India do not
see each other favorably. The activities of the last decade have shown a lot of improvement in
diplomatic exchanges at the ministerial level and improvement in economic fields. 22

22
Ibid
 30

Cold War Effects on India

Decolonization

This one effect was the most important. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the bipolar
world was divided between two superpowers. Although they disagreed on almost every issue,
one issue which they agreed on was that imperialism had to go. Decolonization therefore was a
product of the Cold War. Although, India does not owe its independence to the Cold War, WWII
did play an important role in its freedom. It was due to Britain being exhausted from the war
and Indians being aware of the importance of independence that India finally gained freedom.

The superpowers insisted that imperialism be gone. The reason for this was that with more
countries being free, each superpower could then influence the newly found nations to come
within its sphere of influence. This would increase the influence of their respective blocs.

Relationship with the USA and Russia

All through the duration of the cold war, India remained non-aligned, to a large extent. The
Americans found that India was not willing to plunge into their camp and hence turned to other
allies in the neighbourhood, well those who were within striking distance of the Soviet
Union. Pakistan fitted the bill perfectly. It was a new State. Without much resources and eager
to make friends. While USA-Pakistan relations have also been rocky, they have not been as blow
hot-blow cold as India-USA relations. India-Russia relations on the other hand have been solid.
In the days of the Cold War, communist Russia and socialist India found a lot of common
ground. There was a lot of engagement on the economic, military and political front. This
engagement continues to date; notice how India has not only not condemned but in some way
supported Russian invasion of Crimea by saying "Russia may have a legitimate interest in
Crimea".

Relationship with Pakistan

When Pakistan came into being, few on the Indian side expected it to last long. This belief
showed in the way in which India dealt with Pakistan in the initial years, the way a big brother
would treat a prankster of a younger brother. Over time as Pakistan fell into the American
camp in the Cold War, it started receiving a lot of aid in return, I sometimes feel that rather than
ideological reasons, the driving force for Pakistan was aid. As indeed it was to most of the
countries who fell in one camp or the other. However, what this meant was that the Pakistan
 31

military could stay afloat and dream of combatting with the bigger and more powerful Indian
military machine. Staying afloat in the face of all expectations of failure itself proved to be a
powerful driver. This continued for generations and you can see that in everything now; there is
no contest even on sporting fields only war! Over time, the Indian position on Pakistan also
hardened. Gone now are the last vestiges of fraternal feelings. While not the only reason, the
Cold War did help Pakistan stay a 'going concern' thereby affecting India.

NAM

Contrary to the superpowers expectations that the newly freed nations would choose one bloc,
India and other third world nations went their own way and formed a Non-Aligned Movement.
In effect, this was neutrality. This increased India's standing in the world, it increased India's
self respect. And it showed the world that although India was a fledgling nation it would not
sacrifice its principles.

India gained a lot of respect by this. It showed the world that India could not be towed. As a
result, India was not treated with contempt by either of the superpowers.

Conclusion

The wars play a major role in the international role in shaping the politics of country. They shape
the international relations between the countries. India had various wars since its independence
and every war has given a new twist to its politics. After the Indo-China war, the relations which
were once thought to grow and make strong regional block were shattered. The panchasheel
agreement which was thought to be a turning point in the regional politics went in vain. The
1971 war with Pakistan played a very important role in shaping the politics of the sub-continent.

India‘s politics were hugely influenced during the Cold war by the western and eastern blocs.
Each bloc wanted to align India towards its side and Indian Government was not keen to support
either. These effect the local politics of India and shaped its future. Though during the Cold War
era India was a supporter and friend of the USSR, post cold war and collapse of the Soviet Union
India‘s relations in the international politics.
 32

Bibliography

Websites

 http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/86843/11/11_chapter%202.pdf
 http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/lessons-from-indias-wars-post-independence/
 http://www.claudearpi.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Henderson_Brooks_Bhagat.pdf

Books

 The Impact of the Border War on Indian Perceptions of China, G. Eric Hansen.
 Changing Demographics in India's Northeast and Its Impact on Security, Ashwani Gupta
 History of Political Thought, R.S. Chaurasia