A.M. No.
MTJ-99-1231 March 17, 2004 but be meted the most minimum penalty, allowed probation and
ANTONIO GAMAS and FLORENCIO SOBRIO, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ORLANDO A. OCO, in his capacity as presiding
judge of Municipal Trial Court, Polomolok, South Cotabato
and PNP SPO4 WILLIE ADULACION in his capacity as
public prosecutor of MTC-Polomolok, South Cotabato,
Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a complaint for grave misconduct and gross
ignorance of the law filed by complainants
Antonio Gamas and Florencio Sobrio (complainants) against
Judge Orlando A. Oco (respondent judge), formerPresiding
Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court, Polomolok, South Cotabato (MTC Polomolok) and SPO4
Willie Adulacion (respondent Adulacion), a police prosecutor in
the MTC Polomolok.
The Facts
In their Complaint (Complaint) and supporting affidavits,
complainants allege that they are the accused in a case for
theft[2] which, at the time material to this case, was pending in
the sala of respondent judge. As respondent judge had issued
warrants for their arrest, complainants on 3 October 1996 went
to the MTC Polomolok to post bail. Complainants allege that
respondent Adulacionenticed them to plead guilty to the charge,
apply for probation, and thus avoid imprisonment.
Respondent Adulacion, who had allegedly prepared a
draft decision embodying his suggestion, conferred with
respondent judge, and handed the draft decision to respondent
judge. After reading the document, respondent judge signed it,
told complainants O, plead guilty man kamo (O, youre pleading
guilty), and handed the document to a clerk. Respondent judge
told the clerk to read the contents of the decision to
complainants and to instruct them on what to do. The clerk read
the contents of the document to complainants and asked them
to sign it. Complainants signed the document upon
respondent Adulacions assurance that once the police
apprehend the rest of the accused,[3] the police will revive the
case and respondent Adulacion will present complainants as
star witnesses. Complainants later found out that what they
signed was an Order[4] (3 October 1996 Order) finding them
guilty of theft and sentencing them each to imprisonment for six
(6) months and one (1) day.
Finding the proceedings highly irregular, complainants
sought the assistance of a lawyer. Upon motion of complainants
counsel, respondent judge vacated the 3 October 1996 Order,
ostensibly on the ground that complainants had entered
improvident guilty pleas. Respondent judge scheduled
complainants re-arraignment on 2 February 1997.
In the present complaint, complainants contend that
respondent judge is administratively liable for rendering
judgment against them without the benefit of an arraignment and
in violation of their right to be represented by counsel.[5]
In his Answer (Answer), respondent judge denied
complainants allegations regarding the alleged procedural
irregularities in the issuance of the 3 October
1996 Order. According to respondent judge, the following
transpired in his sala on 3 October 1996:
2. On [the] session day [of October 3, 1996,] prosecutor
Willie Adulacion with two men who turned out to be
complainants,
Antonio Gamas and Florencio Sobrio approached me. It
was Adulacion who talked. He stated that these two have long
pending warrants of arrest and they cannot afford to
file P10,000.00 bail. They were charged of theft of corn
worth P4,500.00. x x x They were caught with two others who
are their relatives hauling 3 or 4 tricycle loads of corn cabs
[sic]. Adulacion said that Gamas and Sobrio asked him to
propose to the judge that Sobrio and Gamas would plead guilty,
after which they be released [on] their own recognizance
because they cannot file their bailbonds.
3. Their predicament at that moment if I cannot attend to them
immediately was that Mr. Adulacion [would] have to lock them in
jail because they surrendered. Gamas and Sobrio were lucky
that instant because there was a lull in my proceedings so they
were able to see me.
4. As soon as Adulacion ha[d] articulated his piece of talk, in the
hearing distance of Gamas and Sobrio because we were face to
face[,] I asked them if what Adulacion said was true and they
replied yes.
5. That instant I knew that Sobrio and Gamas wanted things
done instantly so they will not be locked in jail so I ordered for
the records from my staff. I read thoroughly while the three
waited across the table, seated.
6. I gathered from my readings that [the] tricycle drivers with
their tricycles were apprehended in flagrante delicto carrying
corn cabs [sic] right in the corn field of Dole. I asked why there
were released with the tricycles inspite of this apprehension but
I did not get satisfactory answer from any of the 3. x x x
7. For me to instantly respond to their plea that they be allowed
to plead guilty, meted the minimum sentence, allowed probation
and pending probation they be released on recognizance, they
will solve their very immediate problem of being locked in jail
because they had surrendered to Adulacion and they had no
ready bails. Knowing the course of action they wanted, I begun
discoursing on their rights as accused. I told them of their right
to counsel, to be given free of charge if they cannot afford to
solicit services of one, to confront the witnesses and cross
examine and because they had voluntarily articulated the desire
to plead guilty, I estimated to them the probable penalty. I also
told them that they have [a] right to apply for probation but
pending action they may be required to file bailbonds but they
begged that they be allowed to plead guilty but released pending
probation proceedings.
8. After the discourse I read from them that they would like to
really plead guilty and wanted instant action so that they will not
be in jail. As called for by the situation I arraigned them. I read
to them in the dialect they understand the accusation and
informed them [of] the nature of the evidence arrayed but they
pleaded guilty, always begging that they be sentenced with the
most minimum penalty, allowed probation and released
immediately in their recognizance.
xxx
11. [Thus], there was arraignment and that their plea of guilt was
voluntary.
12. I wrote the decision in long hand in their very presence then
handed it to the typist who typed it; then I read silently what the
typist typed and satisfied that what I wrote was correctly typed I
signed [the 3 October 1996 Order], then required my court
interpreter to read the whole decision in the language they
know. I looked while the interpreter was reading. They looked
satisfied that what the interpreter was reading corresponded
with what they proposed and what we discussed. After the
reading, Gamas and Sobrio signed the decision.
13. It was I who wrote that decision, Mr. Adulacion cannot write
that.
14. So it is clear that before deciding I
arraigned Gamas and Sobrio upon their demand for instant
solution to their predicament. Before arraignment
I counselled them of their rights and I even warned them the
exact penalty I will give them. There was no lawyer in
attendance but the lawyer was their problem. I heard them
saying that since they were caught carrying the corn, a lawyer
would not have much use, moreover they expressed they have
no money to pay for a lawyer. I argued that I can give them a
PAO lawyer but they insisted they plead guilty so that all will get
done without jailing them that instant.[6]
Respondent judge claims that complainants assailed the
validity of the 3 October 1996 Order to avoid serving their
sentences as they had allegedly violated the terms of their
probation by failing to report to their probation
officer. Respondent judge maintains that there was no
irregularity in the issuance of the 3 October
1996 Order. Respondent judge adds that he decided to set
aside his ruling merely out of compassion for complainants. [7]
We referred this matter to the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court
of Polomolok, South Cotabato (RTC Polomolok) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The Investigating Judges Findings
On 7 December 2000, Executive Judge
Eddie Roxas (Executive Judge Roxas) of
RTC Polomolok submitted his Report (Report), finding
respondent judge liable for simple neglect of duty and
recommending the imposition of P10,000 fine on the latter. The
Report reads in pertinent parts:
The basic issues to be resolved in this case x x x are as follows:
1. Whether or not complainants waived their right to
counsel;
2. Whether or not complainants were properly
arraigned; and
3. Whether or not the Order dated October 3,
1996 was prepared by Prosecutor Adulacion.
To resolve the first issue, it is noteworthy to state that in all
criminal prosecution[s], the accused shall be entitled to be
present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of
the proceedings, that is from the arraignment to the
promulgation of the judgment (Sec. 1(c), Rule 115, Rules of
Court). In relation to such statutory right of the accused, the
Court has been given the correlative duty to inform the accused
of his right to counsel as expressly provided under Section 6 of
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. The right to be assisted by
counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules
of procedure it is not enough for the court to apprise an accused
of his right to have an attorney, but it is essential that the court
should assign one de oficio [counsel] for him if he so desires and
he is poor, or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney
of his own.
xxx
In the case under investigation, it is clear that the herein
complainants were not assisted by counsel when they were
allegedly arraigned by the Respondent Judge. Nowhere in the
records of the case [was it shown] that the said complainants
were indeed assisted by their own counsel of choice, or a
counsel de oficio from the time they were allegedly arraigned up
to the promulgation of their sentence. x x x
[S]uch fact has been admitted by the Respondent Judge,
however, he alleged that the right to counsel had already been
waived by the complainants after they were apprised of the said
right.
While it is true that the complainants were informed of their right
to have counsel, however, it is not enough that said
complainants be simply informed of their right to counsel; they
should also be asked whether they want to avail themselves of
one and should be told that they can hire a counsel of their own
choice if they desire to have one, or that one can be provided to
them at their own request.
xxx
[I]t is x x clear from the investigation conducted that the herein
complainants did not satisfactorily waived their right to counsel,
for although they were mechanically informed and inadequately
explained of the same, its not a guaranty that they have
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived such right. One
cannot waive a right if in the first place he does not know and
understand such right. In that instance, there is no valid waiver
to speak of.
xxx
With regard to the second issue, the undersigned Investigating
Judge cannot be persuaded that on the very basic procedure
alone, involving just the mechanical process of arraignment
outlined in Section 1 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, there
was the necessary degree of compliance by the Respondent
Judge. Other considerations reveal how flawed the supposed
arraignment actually was. For instance, there is no showing that
the complainants were afforded with counsel, nor furnished a
copy of the Amended Complaint with the list of witnesses
against them in order that they may duly prepare and comply
with their responsibilities.
xxx
Not frequently indeed, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a
lenient treatment, or upon a bad advice or promises of the
authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or
express remorse. It is the duty of the Judge, like the herein
Respondent Judge, to see to it that he does not labor under
these mistaken impression. Failure or omission on the part of
the Respondent Judge to exercise caution against the demands
of sheer speed in disposing of cases, whether voluntarily or
involuntarily, should not only be censured but also
condemned. [A] Court cannot, therefore, hold liberty and life
forfeit, no matter how despicable the offender when effective
protection for his basic rights were denied because of poverty or
ignorance.
For failure of the Respondent Judge to strictly follow and
observe the mandatory provisions of Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court, it can therefore be gainfully said that the herein
complainants were not properly arraigned last October 3, 1996.
Anent the last issue, the complainants failed to adduce sufficient
evidence that it was indeed Police Prosecutor
Willie Adulacion who prepared the Order dated 3 October
1996. The Respondent Judge adequately proved that it was he
who wrote the subject Order duly substantiated and
corroborated by the testimonies of the other witnesses. Such
proof has never been controverted by the complainants. Thus,
the complainants claim that it was Police Prosecutor
Willie Adulacion who prepared the subject Order is without merit
for [utter] lack of basis in truth and in fact.[8]
On 31 January 2001, we referred the Report to the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
The OCAs Evaluation and Recommendation
In its Memorandum dated 11 May 2001, the OCA, while
agreeing with the findings of Executive Judge Roxas, finds
respondent judge liable not for mere simple neglect of duty but
for gross ignorance of the law. Accordingly, the OCA
recommends that respondent judge be fined P20,000. The OCA
explains:
[R]espondent judge showed his ignorance not only of the scope
of his authority to arraign the complainants but also of the
procedure to follow in conducting an arraignment. Moreover,
respondent failed to properly apprise complainants of their right
to counsel and to provide them with counsel
de oficio particularly during the arraignment, if they do not have
a counsel by reason of their poverty. This is a fundamental
constitutional precept which respondent Judge is expected to
know. Where, as in this case, the law involved is simple and
elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.[9]
 The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds the recommendation of the OCA well-
taken.
Respondent Judge Failed to Properly Apprise
Complainants of their Right to Counsel
The Constitution mandates that [I]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall x x x enjoy the right to be heard
by himself and counsel.[10] Indeed, the accused has a right to
representation by counsel from the custodial investigation all the
way up to the appellate proceedings.[11] At the arraignment
stage, Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
SEC. 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel.
Before arraignment, the court shall inform the accused of his
right to counsel and ask him if he desires to have one. Unless
the accused is allowed to defend himself in person or has
employed counsel of his choice, the court must assign a counsel
de oficio to defend him. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 6 of Rule 116 means that:
[W]hen a defendant appears [at the arraignment] without [an]
attorney, the court has four important duties to comply with: 1 It
must inform the defendant that it is his right to have [an] attorney
before being arraigned; 2 After giving him such information the
court must ask him if he desires the aid of attorney; 3 If he
desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign
[an] attorney de oficio to defend him; and 4 If the accused
desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant
him a reasonable time therefor.[12]
Compliance with these four duties is mandatory. [13] The
only instance when the court can arraign an accused without the
benefit of counsel is if the accused waives such right and the
court, finding the accused capable, allows him to represent
himself in person. However, to be a valid waiver, the accused
must make the waiver voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently.[14] In determining whether the accused can make a
valid waiver, the court must take into account all the relevant
circumstances, including the educational attainment of the
accused. In the present case, however, respondent judge
contends that complainants waived their right to counsel and
insisted on their immediate arraignment.
After reviewing the records and taking into account the
circumstances obtaining in this case, we find that respondent
judge did not properly apprise complainants of their right to
counsel prior to their arraignment. Consequently, there was no
basis for complainants alleged waiver of such right.
In his Answer, respondent judge does not deny that when
he arraigned complainants, no lawyer assisted the
complainants. However, respondent judge asserted that the
attendance of a lawyer was their (complainants)
problem. Respondent judge stated that before arraigning
complainants, he gave a discourse [of] their rights as accused.
Respondent judge also stated that since the police caught
complainants in flagrante delicto, complainants told him a
lawyer would not have much use. Respondent judge further
stated that complainants expressed that they have no money
to pay for a lawyer. Respondent judge informed complainants
he can give them a PAO lawyer if they so desired. However,
respondent judge did not appoint a PAO lawyer despite being
informed by complainants that they could not afford a lawyer.
These do not amount to compliance with Section 6 of Rule
116. Respondent judge has the duty to insure that there is no
violation of the constitutional right of the accused to
counsel. Respondent judge is grossly mistaken in saying that
securing a lawyer was their (complainants) problem. Once the
accused informs the judge that he cannot afford a lawyer and
the court has not allowed the accused to represent himself, or
the accused is incapable of representing himself, the judge has
the duty to appoint a counsel de oficio to give meaning and
substance to the constitutional right of the accused to counsel.
Respondent judge knew that complainants are mere
tricycle drivers. Respondent judge could not have expected
complainants to be conversant with the rules on criminal
procedure.[15]Respondent judge should not only have followed
Section 6 of Rule 116 to the letter, but should also have
ascertained that complainants understood the import of the
proceedings. Respondent judge should not have proceeded
with complainants arraignment until he had ascertained that
complainants waiver of their right to counsel was made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently and that they were
capable of representing themselves. As well observed by
Executive Judge Roxas:
[Respondent judge] is not only duty-bound to tell the
complainants the right to which they are entitled, he must also
explain their effects in practical terms, and in a language the
complainants fairly understand. In other words, the right of the
complainants to be informed of their right to have a counsel
implies a correlative obligation on the part of the Respondent
Judge to explain and contemplates an effective communication
that results in understanding what is conveyed. Since the right
to be informed implies comprehension, the degree of
explanation required will necessarily vary, depending upon the
education, intelligence and other relevant personal
circumstances of the complainants. Suffice it to say that a
simpler and more lucid explanation is needed when the subject
is unlettered as in this particular case. Short of this, there is a
denial of the right as it cannot truly be said that the herein
complainants have been informed of their rights to
counsel.[16] (Emphasis supplied)
The unfortunate but expected result of respondent judges
failure to comply strictly with Section 6 of Rule 116 surfaced
during the investigation of this case. Complainants uniformly
testified that they were unaware of the meaning and
consequence of their guilty pleas. Thus,
complainant Gamas testified:
[ATTY. OCO]:
Q You did not want to plead guilty, of course?
[ANTONIO GAMAS]:
A At that time we do not know what plead guilty is. It
is only now that I am aware.
xxx
Q When you arrived there at the office of Adulacion,
what did Adulacion tell you, if he told you
anything?
A He said that since you have no cashbond, you just
pleaded guilty since you loaded stolen items.
Q So what was your reaction when Adulacion told
you that?
A We were dumbfounded.
Q So you have no reaction at all when Adulacion told
that you will plead guilty because you dont
have cashbond?
A Nothing, because it was only lately that I came to
know the meaning of plead guilty.
xxx
Q You did not understand the word plead guilty?
A I do not know what is plead guilty.
Q You did not ask Adulacion, what is that all about,
Sir?
A I did not ask anymore, because he also added that
he will give us lighter sentence.
Q So because of that promise of Adulacion, you
conformed with his suggestion that you will
plead guilty?
A Because he said we are supposed to be star
witnesses and he will apprehend the three
others, so we pleaded guilty.
 Q The fact that you pleaded guilty, you were in
conformity to the suggestion of
Willie Adulacion?
A We cannot do anything at that time, we were
dumbfounded.[17] (Emphasis supplied)
Complainant Sobrio similarly testified:
[ATTY. OCO]:
Q What was the story that transpired between you
and Adulacion?
[FLORENCIO SOBRIO]:
A Since we dont have any cashbond, we will plead
guilty.
COURT:
xxx
Q So what was your answer if there was an answer?
A I said, What is plead guilty, I dont understand that?
Q Did Willie Adulacion explain to you what is plead
guilty after you inquired from him?
A No.
Q After you asked him, what was the answer
of Adulacion when you asked him what is that
plead guilty?
A He said that we apply for probation so that he can
help us.
Q He did not explain to you that by pleading guilty is
admitting the charge against you?
A No.[18] (Emphasis supplied)
These testimonies underscore the need for trial court
judges to comply strictly with Section 6 of Rule 116. That the
accused, like complainants, insist on their arraignment without
representation is no reason for a judge to accede readily to their
wishes. A judge has the duty to protect the accused in their
rights, even against their wishes, when it is clear, as in this case,
that they are not in a position to validly exercise or waive those
rights. As we had occasion to observe:
[E]ven the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in
the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and,
without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty
but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are
ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be
assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become
a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our
rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an
accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask
him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential
that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires
and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an
attorney of his own.[19] (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, by subsequently vacating his 3 October
1996 Order, respondent judge tacitly admits that complainants
were in no position to represent themselves during their
arraignment, causing them to enter guilty pleas improvidently.
Respondent Judges Arraignment of
Complainants Highly Irregular
Section 1(a), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure states:
Arraignment and plea; how made. The accused must be
arraigned before the court where the complaint or information
was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in
open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with
a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the
language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he
pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial
witnesses other than those named in the complaint or
information.
We have explained the rationale, requirements, and
compliance of this rule in this manner:
[S]ection 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment should
be made in open court by the judge himself or by the clerk of
court [1] furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or
information with the list of witnesses stated therein, then [2]
reading the same in the language or dialect that is known to him,
and [3] asking him what his plea is to the charge. The
requirement that the reading be made in a language or dialect
that the accused understands and knows is a mandatory
requirement, just as the whole of said Section 1 should be strictly
followed by trial courts. This the law affords the accused by way
of implementation of the all-important constitutional mandate
regarding the right of an accused to be informed of the precise
nature of the accusation leveled at him and is, therefore, really
an avenue for him to be able to hoist the necessary defense in
rebuttal thereof. It is an integral aspect of the due process clause
under the Constitution.[20]
We subscribe to Executive Judge Roxas finding that
respondent judge similarly failed to comply with the
requirements of Section 1(a) of Rule 116. Complainants deny
respondent judges claim that he arraigned complainants by
read[ing] to them [the information] in the dialect they understand
and inform[ing] them [of] the nature of the evidence arrayed
[against them].[21] However, there is no disputing that
respondent judge failed to furnish complainants a copy of the
information with the list of the witnesses.
The procedural steps laid down in Section 1(a) of Rule 116
are not empty rituals that a judge can take lightly. Each step
constitutes an integral part of that crucial stage in criminal
litigation where the issues are joined x x x and without which the
proceedings cannot advance further.[22] Respondent judge may
have genuinely desired to spare complainants the travails of
being detained in jail, thus the rush in arraigning them, accepting
their guilty pleas, imposing a light sentence, and granting them
probation. While well-intentioned, such conduct unjustifiably
short-circuited the mandatory arraignment procedure in Section
1(a) of Rule 116.
Respondent Judges Acts and Omissions
Constitute Gross Ignorance of the Law
The rule is that when the law is so elementary, not to know
it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance
of the law.[23] The provisions of the Constitution on the right of
the accused to counsel, and of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure on the requirements for the arraignment of an
accused, are basic. Every judge should know the fundamental
substantive and procedural requirements on arraignment and
right to counsel.
By holding complainants arraignment in the manner he
conducted it, respondent judge is liable for this administrative
transgression. It may very well be that respondent judge knew
the substantive and procedural rules in question. What renders
him liable is that he acted as if he did not.
On the Appropriate Imposable Penalty
Under Section 11(A), in relation to Section 8(8), of Rule
140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,
gross ignorance of the law or procedure is punishable by:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the
benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided,
however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include
accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from the office without salary and other benefits
for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not
exceeding P40,000.00.
This schedule of penalties under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, which
took effect on 1 October 2001, does not apply
retroactively.[24] Accordingly, we sustain
the OCAs recommendation that respondent judge be required
to pay a fine of P20,000, a penalty we have meted in similar
administrative cases involving gross ignorance of the law. [25]
The Court has no Jurisdiction Over
Respondent Adulacion
We refrain from passing upon the complaint against
respondent Adulacion, as he is neither a member of the
Bar[26] nor a judiciary employee. This Courts administrative
jurisdiction extends only to members of the bar and over all
courts and their personnel.[27] However, the dismissal is without
prejudice to any action complainants may wish to file against
respondent Adulacion before the appropriate body.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Orlando A. Oco,
former Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court, Polomolok, South Cotabato, GUILTY of gross ignorance
of the law. Accordingly, we FINE respondent Orlando
A. Oco P20,000, to be taken from his withheld retirement
benefits. The complaint against respondent Willie Adulacion is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183345 September 17, 2014
MA. GRACIA HAO and DANNY HAO, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before this Court is the petition for review on certiorari 1 under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by Ma. Gracia Hao and
Danny Hao (petitioners). They seek the reversal of the Court of
Appeals' (CA) decision2 dated February 28, 2006 and
resolution3 dated June 13, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86289.
These CA rulings affirmed the February 26, 2004 4 and July 26,
20045 orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, which
respectively denied the petitioners' motion to defer arraignment
and motion to lift warrant of arrest.6
Factual Antecedents
On July 11, 2003 private complainant Manuel Dy y Awiten (Dy)
filed a criminal complaint against the petitioners and Victor Ngo
(Ngo) for syndicated estafa penalized under Article 315(2)(a) of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, in relation with
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1689.7
Dy alleged that he was a long-time client of Asiatrust Bank,
Binondo Branch where Ngo was the manager. Because of their
good business relationship, Dy took Ngo’s advice to deposit his
money in an investment house that will give a higher rate of
return. Ngo then introduced him to Ma. Gracia Hao (Gracia),
also known as Mina Tan Hao, who presented herself as an
officer of various reputable companies and an incorporator of
State Resources Development Corporation (State Resources),
the recommended company that can give Dy his higher
investment return.8
Relying on Ngo and Gracia’s assurances, Dy initially invested in
State Resources the approximate amount of Ten Million Pesos
(₱10,000,000.00). This initial investment earned the promised
interests, leading Dy, at the urging of Gracia, to increase his
investment to almost One Hundred Million Pesos
(₱100,000,000.00). Dy increased his investments through
several checks he issued in the name of State Resources.9 In
return, Gracia also issued several checks to Dy representing his
earnings for his investment. Gracia issued checks in the total
amount of One Hundred Fourteen Million, Two Hundred Eighty
Six Thousand, Eighty Six Pesos and Fourteen Centavos
(₱114,286,086.14). All these checks10 were subsequently
dishonored when Dy deposited them.
Dy sought the assistance of Ngo for the recovery of the amount
of the dishonored checks. Ngo promised assistance, but after a
few months, Dy found out that Ngo already resigned from
Asiatrust Bank and could no longer be located. Hence, he
confronted Gracia regarding the dishonored checks. He
eventually learned that Gracia invested his money in the
construction and realty business of Gracia’s husband, Danny
Hao (Danny). Despite their promises to pay, the petitioners
never returned Dy’s money.
On July 17, 2003, Dy filed a supplemental affidavit to include in
the criminal complaint Chester De Joya, Allan Roxas, Samantha
Roxas, Geraldine Chiong, and Lyn Ansuas – all incorporators
and/or directors of State Resources.11
On the basis of Dy’s complaint12 and supplemental
affidavit,13 the public prosecutor filed an information14 for
syndicated estafa against the petitioners and their six co-
accused. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-
219952 and was raffled to respondent RTC of Manila, Branch
40.
Judge Placido Marquez issued warrants of arrest against the
petitioners and the other accused. Consequently, petitioners
immediately filed a motion to defer arraignment and motion to
lift warrant of arrest. In their twin motions, they invoked the
absence of probable cause against them and the pendency of
their petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ).15
In its February 26, 2004 order, the trial court denied the
petitioners’ twin motions.16 The petitioners moved for
reconsideration but the trial court also denied this in its July 26,
2004 order. Consequently, the petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA.
The CA’s Ruling
The CA affirmed the denial of the petitioners’ motion to defer
arraignment and motion to lift warrant of arrest.
In determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, a judge is mandated to personally evaluate the resolution
of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence.17 The CA noted
that Judge Marquez only issued the warrants of arrest after his
personal examination of the facts and circumstances of the
case. Since the judge complied with the Rules, the CA
concluded that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed
to him.18
In its decision, however, the CA opined that the evidence on
record and the assertions in Dy’s affidavits only show probable
cause for the crime of simple estafa, not syndicated estafa.
Under PD No. 1689, in order for syndicated estafa to exist, the
swindling must have been committed by five or more persons,
and the fraud must be against the general public or at least a
group of persons. In his complaint-affidavit, Dy merely stated
that he relied on the petitioners’ false representations and was
defrauded into parting with his money, causing him
damage.19 Since there was no evidence that State Resources
was formed to defraud the public in general or that it was used
to solicit money from other persons aside from Dy, then the
offense charged should only be for simple estafa.20
Nevertheless, the CA found that the trial court did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrants of arrest
against the petitioners as there was still probable cause to
believe that the petitioners committed the crime of simple
estafa.21
The Petition
The petitioners submit that an examination of Dy’s affidavits
shows inconsistencies in his cited factual circumstances. These
inconsistencies, according to the petitioners, negate the
existence of probable cause against them for the crime charged.
The petitioners also contend that it was only Ngo who enticed
Dy to invest his money. As early as August 1995, State
Resources had already been dissolved, thus negating the
assertion that Dy advanced funds for this corporation. 22 They
question the fact that it took Dy almost five years to file his
complaint despite his allegation that he lost almost
₱100,000,000.00.23
Lastly, the petitioners claim that the warrants of arrest issued
against them were null and void. Contrary to the trial court’s
findings, the CA noted in the body of its decision, that PD 1689
was inapplicable to their case. There was no evidence to show
that State Resources was formed to solicit funds not only from
Dy but also from the general public. Since simple estafa and
syndicated estafa are two distinct offenses, then the warrants of
arrest issued to petitioners were erroneous because these
warrants pertained to two different crimes.24
The Court’s Ruling
We resolve to DENY the petition.
Procedural Consideration
We note that the present petition questions the CA’s decision
and resolution on the petition for certiorari the petitioners filed
with that court. At the CA, the petitioners imputed grave abuse
of discretion against the trial court for the denial of their twin
motions to defer arraignment and to lift warrant of arrest.
This situation is similar to the procedural issue we addressed in
the case of Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation25 where
we faced the question of how to review a Rule 45 petition before
us, a CA decision made under Rule 65. We clarified in this cited
case the kind of review that this Court should undertake given
the distinctions between the two remedies. In Rule 45, we
consider the correctness of the decision made by an inferior
court. In contrast, a Rule 65 review focuses on jurisdictional
errors.
As in Montoya, we need to scrutinize the CA decision in the
same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was
presented to it. Thus, we need to examine the CA decision from
the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or
absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court
and not on the basis of whether the trial court’s denial of
petitioners’ motions was strictly legally correct. In question form,
the question to ask is: did the CA correctly determine whether
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners’ motions to defer arraignment and lift warrant of
arrest?
Probable Cause for the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest
Under the Constitution26 and the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure,27 a judge is mandated to personally determine the
existence of probable cause after his personal evaluation of the
prosecutor’s resolution and the supporting evidence for the
crime charged. These provisions command the judge to refrain
from making a mindless acquiescence to the prosecutor’s
findings and to conduct his own examination of the facts and
circumstances presented by both parties.
Section 5(a) of Rule 112, grants the trial court three options upon
the filing of the criminal complaint or information. He may: a)
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to
establish probable cause; b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds
probable cause; or c) order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause.28
In the present case, the trial court chose to issue warrants of
arrest to the petitioners and their co-accused. To be valid, these
warrants must have been issued after compliance with the
requirement that probable cause be personally determined by
the judge. Notably at this stage, the judge is tasked to merely
determine the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the
accused. In doing so, he need not conduct a de novo hearing;
he only needs to personally review the prosecutor's initial
determination and see if it is supported by substantial
evidence.29
The records showed that Judge Marquez made a personal
determination of the existence of probable cause to support the
issuance of the warrants. The petitioners, in fact, did not present
any evidence to controvert this. As the trial court ruled in its
February 26, 2004 order:
The non-arrest of all the accused or their refusal to surrender
practically resulted in the suspension of arraignment exceeding
the sixty (60) days counted from the filing of co-accused De
Joya’s motions, which may be considered a petition for review,
and that of co-accused Spouses Hao’s own petition for review.
This is not to mention the delay in the resolution by the
Department of Justice. On the other hand, co-accused DeJoya’s
motion to determine probable cause and co-accused Spouses
Hao’s motion to lift warrant of arrest have been rendered moot
and academic with the issuance of warrants of arrest by this
presiding judge after his personal examination of the facts and
circumstances strong enough in themselves to support the belief
that they are guilty of the crime that in fact
happened.30 [Emphasis ours]
Under this situation, we conclude that Judge Marquez did not
arbitrarily issue the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. As
stated by him, the warrants were only issued after his personal
evaluation of the factual circumstances that led him to believe
that there was probable cause to apprehend the petitioners for
their commission of a criminal offense.
Distinction between Executive and Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause
In a criminal prosecution, probable cause is determined at two
stages. The first is at the executive level, where determination is
made by the prosecutor during the preliminary investigation,
before the filing of the criminal information. The second is at the
judicial level, undertaken by the judge before the issuance of a
warrant of arrest.
In the case at hand, the question before us relates to the judicial
determination of probable cause. In order to properly resolve if
the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s issuance of the warrants
of arrest against the petitioners, it is necessary to scrutinize the
crime of estafa, whether committed as a simple offense or
through a syndicate.
The crime of swindling or estafa is covered by Articles 315-316
of the RPC. In these provisions, the different modes by which
estafa may be committed, as well as the corresponding
penalties for each are outlined. One of these modes is estafa by
means of deceit. Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC defines how this
particular crime is perpetrated:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent
acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of
the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar
deceits.
Under this provision, estafa has the following elements: 1) the
existence of a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means; 2) the execution of the false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means prior to or simultaneously with the commission
of the fraud; 3) the reliance by the offended party on the false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, which induced him
to part with his money or property; and 4) as a result, the
offended party suffered damage.31
As Dy alleged in his complaint-affidavit, Ngo and Gracia induced
him to invest with State Resources and promised him a higher
rate of return.32 Because of his good business relationship with
Ngo and relying on Gracia’s attractive financial representations,
Dy initially invested the approximate amount of ₱10,000,000.00.
This first investment earned profits. Thus, Dy was enticed by
Gracia to invest more so that he eventually advanced almost
₱100,000,000.0033 with State Resources. Gracia’s succeeding
checks representing the earnings of his investments, however,
were all dishonored upon deposit.34 He subsequently learned
that the petitioners used his money for Danny’s construction and
realty business.35 Despite repeated demands and the
petitioners’ constant assurances to pay, they never returned
Dy’s invested money and its supposed earnings. 36
These cited factual circumstances show the elements of estafa
by means of deceit. The petitioners induced Dy to invest in State
Resources promising higher returns. But unknown to Dy, what
occurred was merely a ruse to secure his money to be used in
Danny’s construction and realty business. The petitioners’
deceit became more blatant when they admitted in their petition
that as early as August 1995, State Resources had already been
dissolved.37This admission strengthens the conclusion that the
petitioners misrepresented facts regarding themselves and
State Resources in order to persuade Dy to part with his money
for investment with an inexistent corporation.
These circumstances all serve as indicators of the petitioners’
deceit. "Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact,
whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations,
or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed,
which deceives or is intended to deceive another, so that he
shall act upon it to his legal injury."38
Thus, had it not been for the petitioners’ false representations
and promises, Dy would not have placed his money in State
Resources, to his damage. These allegations cannot but lead us
to the conclusion that probable cause existed as basis to arrest
the petitioners for the crime of estafa by means of deceit.
We now address the issue of whether estafa in this case was
committed through a syndicate.
Under Section 1 of PD No. 1689,39 there is syndicated estafa if
the following elements are present: 1) estafa or other forms of
swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC was
committed; 2) the estafa or swindling was committed by a
syndicate of five or more persons; and 3) the fraud resulted in
the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or
members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon[s]," or
farmers associations or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public. 40
The factual circumstances of the present case show that the first
and second elements of syndicated estafa are present; there is
probable cause for violation of Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC
against the petitioners. Moreover, in Dy’s supplemental
complaint-affidavit, he alleged that the fraud perpetrated against
him was committed, not only by Ngo and the petitioners, but also
by the other officers and directors of State Resources. The
number of the accused who allegedly participated in defrauding
Dy exceeded five, thus satisfying the requirement for the
existence of a syndicate.
However, the third element of the crime is patently lacking. The
funds fraudulently solicited by the corporation must come from
the general public. In the present case, no evidence was
presented to show that aside from Dy, the petitioners, through
State Resources, also sought investments from other people.
Dy had no co-complainants alleging that they were also
deceived to entrust their money to State Resources. The
general public element was not complied with. Thus, no
syndicated estafa allegedly took place, only simple estafa by
means of deceit.
Despite this conclusion, we still hold that the CA did not err in
affirming the trial court’s denial of the petitioners’ motion to lift
warrant of arrest.
A warrant of arrest should be issued if the judge after personal
evaluation of the facts and circumstances is convinced that
probable cause exists that an offense was committed.
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the
existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an
offense was committed by the person sought to be
arrested.41 This must be distinguished from the prosecutor’s
finding of probable cause which is for the filing of the proper
criminal information. Probable cause for warrant of arrest is
determined to address the necessity of placing the accused
under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.42
In People v. Castillo and Mejia,43 we explained the distinction
between the two kinds of probable cause determination:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause:
executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable
cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a
function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is
given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause
exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed
the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial.
Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to
determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court.
Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by
the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct
ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a
matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand,
is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of
arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must
satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is
necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause,
the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest
warrant.44 [Emphasis ours]
With our conclusion that probable cause existed for the crime of
simple estafa and that the petitioners have probably committed
it, it follows that the issuance of the warrants of arrest against
the petitioners remains to be valid and proper. To allow them to
go scot-free would defeat rather than promote the purpose of a
warrant of arrest, which is to put the accused in the court’s
custody to avoid his flight from the clutches of justice.
Moreover, we note that simple estafa and syndicated estafa are
not two entirely different crimes. Simple estafa is a crime
necessarily included in syndicated estafa. An offense is
necessarily included in another offense when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those
constituting the latter.45
Under this legal situation, only a formal amendment of the filed
information under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court46 is
necessary; the warrants of arrest issued against the petitioners
should not be nullified since probable cause exists for simple
estafa.
Suspension of Arraignment
Under Section 11(c), Rule 116of the Rules of Court, an
arraignment may be suspended if there is a petition for review
of the resolution of the prosecutor pending at either the DOJ, or
the Office of the President. However, such period of suspension
should not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the
petition with the reviewing office.
As the petitioners alleged, they filed a petition for review with the
DOJ on November 21, 2003. Since this petition had not been
resolved yet, they claimed that their arraignment should be
suspended indefinitely.
We emphasize that the right of an accused to have his
arraignment suspended is not an unqualified right.1âwphi1 In
Spouses Trinidad v. Ang,47 we explained that while the
pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of
the arraignment, the Rules limit the deferment of the
arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of
the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that
after the expiration of the 60-day period, the trial court is bound
to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer
arraignment.48
As the trial court found in its February 26, 2004 order, the DOJ's
delay in resolving the petitioners' petition for review had already
exceeded 60 days. Since the suspension of the petitioners'
arraignment was already beyond the period allowed by the
Rules, the petitioners' motion to suspend completely lacks any
legal basis.
As a final note, we observe that the resolution of this case had
long been delayed because of the petitioners' refusal to submit
to the trial court's jurisdiction and their erroneous invocation of
the Rules in their favor. As there is probable cause for the
petitioners' commission of a crime, their arrest and arraignment
should now ensue so that this case may properly proceed to
trial, where the merits of both the parties' evidence and
allegations may be weighed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the
petition and AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATION the February 28,
2006 decision and June 13, 2008 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 86289. We hereby order that
petitioners Ma. Gracia Hao and Danny Hao be charged for
simple estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended and be arraigned for this charge. The
warrants of arrest issued stand.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2399 November 19, 2014
[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 13-4013-RTJ]
GASPAR BANDOY, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE S. JACINTO, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE,
BRANCH 45, and ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH
46, both at REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN JOSE,
OCCIDENT AL MINDORO, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
For review before the Court is this administrative case against
respondent Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr. (Judge Jacinto, Jr.) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branches 451 and 46,2 San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, filed by Gaspar Bandoy (Bandoy) for Grave
Abuse of Authority in relation to Criminal Case No. 2-
1928,3 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Caspar Bandoy,
Peter Alfaro and Randolph Ignacio" and Criminal Case No. Z-
1910, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Romulo De Jesus,
Jr."
Complainant Bandoy alleged, in his verified complaint,4 that he
was one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 2-1928, for Serious
Illegal Detention filed by Romulo De Jesus, Jr. (De Jesus,
Jr.),which was raffled to Branch 44 of the RTC, Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro (RTC-Br. 44), with Judge Jacinto, Jr. as the
Assisting Presiding Judge. Bandoy claimed that the case was
initiated by De Jesus, Jr. to get back at him for being
instrumental in the filing of an earlier criminal complaint against
him for Violation of Article XXII, Section 261, paragraph 7,
number 14 of the Omnibus Election Code (Ballot Switching).
The said case was likewise raffled to RTC-Br. 44.
Bandoy also averred that he was an election watcher of former
Mayor Joel Panaligan during the 2007 local elections, while De
Jesus, Jr., a teacher of their municipality’s public elementary
school, was one of the chairpersons of the Board of Election
Inspectors; thatthey were both assigned in Precinct 3-A of
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro; that De Jesus, Jr. was rumored
to be closely associated with the rival mayoralty candidate,
Voltaire Anthony C. Villarosa (Voltaire), son of House
representative Amelita C. Villarosa (Cong. Villarosa)and Mayor
Jose Tapales Villarosa (Mayor Villarosa) of San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro; that in the said local elections, De Jesus,
Jr. was caught in the act of ballot switching, which was captured
on video by a member of the media, a certain Randy Bool; that
by virtue of a search warrant from the Commission of Elections
(COMELEC), De Jesus, Jr. was caught in possession of some
ballots inside his backpack; and that as a result of this incident,
De Jesus, Jr. was criminally charged with the offense of ballot
switching. Accordingly, on August 17, 2007, a warrant of arrest
was issued against De Jesus, Jr.5
According to Bandoy, on August 20, 2007, De Jesus, Jr.
personally appeared before Provincial Prosecutor Levitico
Salcedo to file a criminal case for Serious Illegal Detention
against him, Peter Alfaro, Randolph Ignacio, and then Election
Supervisor, Atty. Judy Lorenzo (Atty. Lorenzo). Apparently, De
Jesus, Jr. did this while there was a standing warrant of arrest
against him. Worse, De Jesus, Jr. remained at-large until he was
able to post bail on March 7, 2008 before then Las Pinas RTC
Judge Raul B. Villanueva.6 Because complainant Bandoy was
charged with Serious Illegal Detention, the provincial prosecutor
recommended "no bail" leaving them incarcerated for more than
two years.7
Bandoy further claims that Judge Jacinto, Jr. committed grave
abuse of his authority by displaying manifest bias and partiality
in favor of De Jesus, Jr. when he granted several
postponements of De Jesus, Jr.’s arraignment, originally
scheduled on April 23, 2008,8 but was reset for seven times until
De Jesus, Jr. entered a plea of not guilty supposedly inside
Judge Jacinto, Jr.’s chambers on July 6, 2011.9
Bandoy emphasized that many of the said resetting were mostly
due to De Jesus, Jr.’s non-appearance for failure to locate him
at his given address. Despite these supposed obvious court
defiance, Judge Jacinto, Jr. remained lenient and seemingly
tolerated his continuous non-appearance in the court’s
subsequent scheduled hearings. Another example of Judge
Jacinto, Jr.’s supposed unreasonable bias towards Bandoy was
his lack of interest to dispose of the case of serious illegal
detention despite De Jesus, Jr.’s obvious dilatory tactics and
unjustified absences when his appearance was necessary.
Bandoy, along with his co-accused, moved for reconsideration
and filed a petition for review before the Department of Justice
(DOJ)to have the serious illegal detention case against them
dismissed. Meanwhile, co-accused Atty. Lorenzo filed a
separate petition with the Court of Appeals (CA)and won the
case. The Court later affirmed the dismissal of the case against
her. At first, the DOJ denied their petition. Upon reconsideration,
however, the DOJ, under the helm of Justice Secretary Leila De
Lima, directed the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor,
Occidental Mindoro, to cause the withdrawal of the case against
Bandoy and his co-accused.10 Accordingly, the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor filed its Motion to Withdraw Information.
Judge Jacinto, Jr., in an order,11 dated July 5, 2011, denied the
motion to withdraw information. In the end, Bandoy was only
able to regain temporary freedom when Judge Jacinto, Jr. finally
resolved12 to allow him to post a bail bond of ₱100,000.00 each
or a total of ₱300,000.00.13 Bandoy added that Voltaire was a
principal sponsor in the wedding of Judge Jacinto, Jr.’s child.
Thereafter, Judge Jacinto, Jr. was assigned to another sala,
while Judge Wilfredo De Joya Mayor (Judge Mayor) became the
assisting presiding judge of Branch 44. It was during this time
that the case for serious illegal detention was temporarily
dismissed, but upon reconsideration, Judge Mayor decided to
reinstate and continue the case against Bandoy. Meanwhile, the
case of ballot switching against De Jesus, Jr. was dismissed on
October 25, 2012,14while their bail for the serious illegal
detention case was cancelled.15
According to complainant Bandoy, the compelling force that
made him initiate this present administrative case was because
Judge Jacinto, Jr. would take over Judge Mayor’s assignments
on account of the latter’s compulsory retirement from service on
December 1, 2012, which would include their pending serious
illegal detention case. He claimed that Judge Jacinto, Jr.
ordered the police and the CIDG to re-arrest him and his co-
accused even though there was no warrant of arrest against
them.16 He begged the Court not to let Judge Jacinto, Jr. handle
their case of serious illegal detention for fear that they would
have to endure another bout of extreme bias and partiality from
him.
In his Comment,17 Judge Jacinto, Jr. denied being an ally of the
Villarosa clan.18 He also denied having a hand in the order to
arrest Bandoy and his co-accused as the Chief of PNP and the
CIDG Chief, both of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, merely
consulted him on how to go about the order of cancellation of
bail that Judge Mayor issued. He explained "wala po akong alam
sa Kautusan kaya binasa po sa akin ang nilalaman nito sa
cellphone at pagkatapos ay nagwika po akong parang may
kulang sa Kautusan at kapag nakansela ang piyansa ay babalik
sila sa selda dahil wala na po silang piyansa (as a consequence
thereof)."19 Judge Jacinto, Jr. even refused to issue a warrant of
arrest when he was asked because he was not handling the
case anymore.20
Bandoy, in his Reply,21 brought to the attention of the Court that
Judge Jacinto, Jr., in order to thwart the enemies of his
supposed master, Mayor Villarosa, issued warrants of arrest
against ten individuals.22 He also divulged that the audit team
from the Court was personally assisted by Judge Jacinto, Jr. and
given accommodations in "Aroma Center," one of the properties
of Mayor Villarosa.23 Bandoy was thankful that Judge Jacinto,
Jr. did not deny the fact that the police officials wanted to arrest
them even without a warrant of arrest. 24 Bandoy showed a
timeline of events supposedly depicting how De Jesus, Jr.,
through the tolerance and partiality of Judge Jacinto, Jr., evaded
arraignment on numerous occasions effectively delaying the
progress of the case for ballot switching and even actually
conducting the arraignment in his chambers.25 He further
reiterated his plea not to let Judge Jacinto, Jr. preside over the
affairs of Branch 44.
In his Rejoinder,26 Judge Jacinto, Jr. stated that he was again
assigned as Assisting Presiding Judge of Branch 44. 27He
clarified that he indeed issued warrants of arrest against ten
individuals in connection with a serious illegal detention case
against them, but only after a finding of probable cause by the
public prosecutor handling it. Judge Jacinto, Jr. reiterated that
he merely affirmed the finding of probable cause, which justified
the issuance of the warrants of arrest as the charge was a non-
bailable offense.28 He likewise denied seeking any favor from
Mayor Villarosa to accommodate the audit team in their
property, the Aroma Family Hotel. He explained that the audit
team paid him a "courtesy call" where he assured the team of
his cooperation.29 He again restated that the police officials
merely coordinated with him as was customary because he was
the Executive Judge of the municipality. 30 Judge Jacinto, Jr.
believes that Bandoy’s accusations against him were designed
to oust him as Presiding Judge of Branches 45 and 46 of San
Jose and even as Assisting Presiding Judge of Branch 44,
Mamburao, both in the province of Occidental Mindoro. 31
In its Report,32 dated June 03, 2014, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) did not give credence to Bandoy’s
allegation that Judge Jacinto, Jr. issued an order for his arrest
without a warrant and to the insinuation that the Court’s audit
team was conveniently housed in Aroma Family Hotel of the
Villarosas for failure to present proof. 33The OCA observed,
however, that Judge Jacinto, Jr. never refuted the allegations of
leniency over the several resetting of the arraignment of De
Jesus, Jr. and that the arraignment was held in his chambers.
As such, the OCA equated his silence to admission. 34
Thus, the OCA recommended that:
1. The administrative complaint against Presiding
Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr., Branch 45, Regional Trial
Court, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, be RE-
DOCKETED as regular administrative matter; and
2. Respondent Judge Jose Jacinto, Jr. be found
GUILTY of Bias and Partiality and Gross Ignorance of
the Law and Procedure and, accordingly, be FINED in
the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (₱40,000.00)
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.35
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the OCA.
Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates
that a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence. Indeed, competence and diligence are
prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.36
Everyone, especially a judge, is presumed to know the law. One
who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and
the Court the duty to maintain professional competence at all
times.37
In this case, Judge Jacinto, Jr. was directly confronted with an
allegation that he arraigned De Jesus, Jr. inside his
chambers.1âwphi1 He was given the opportunity to answer, but
he chose not to delve into it. Ultimately, Judge Jacinto, Jr. did
not squarely face the issues being imputed against him, which
was quite irregular since it was his name and his capacity as a
member of the bench that was being challenged. As aptly
observed by the OCA, "The natural instinct of man impels him
to resist an unfounded claim or imputation and defend himself.
It is against human nature to just remain reticent and say nothing
in the face of false accusations."38 His silence introduces doubt
in the minds of the public, which is not acceptable.
Given the exacting standards required of magistrates in the
application of the law and procedure, the Court finds Judge
Jacinto, Jr. administratively guilty of gross ignorance of Rule 116
of the Revised Rules of Court, specifically Section 1(a) thereof
requiring arraignment of an accused to be made in open court,
to wit:
Section 1. Arraignment and plea, how made. – (a) the accused
must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or
information was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall
be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the
accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the
same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him
whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call
at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or
information.
(Emphasis supplied)
The procedural steps laid down in Section 1(a) of Rule 116 are
not empty rituals that a judge can take nonchalantly. Each step
constitutes an integral part of that crucial stage in criminal
litigation "where the issues are joined x x x and without which
the proceedings cannot advance further."39
Thus, anything less than is required by Section 1(a) of Rule 116
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.40 There is gross
ignorance of the law when the error committed by the judge was
"gross or patent, deliberate or malicious." 41 It may also be
committed when a judge ignores, contradicts or fails to apply
settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption.42 Gross ignorance of the law or
incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good faith. 43
The Court has impressed upon judges that they owe it to the
public and the legal profession to know the very law that they
are supposed to apply in a given controversy.44 They are called
upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules, to be conversant with the basic
law, and to maintain the desired professional
competence.45 When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity
with the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the
courts. A judge owes the public and the Court the duty to be
proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of laws and
prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can
easily be the mainspring of injustice.46
Canon 2,47 Rule 2.0148 and Canon 349 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct likewise emphasize that judges, as officers of the court,
have the duty to see to it that justice is dispensed with evenly
and fairly. Not only must they be honest and impartial, but they
must also appear to be honest and impartial in the dispensation
of justice. Judges should make sure that their acts are
circumspect and do not arouse suspicion in the minds of the
public. When they fail to do so, such acts may cast doubt upon
their integrity and ultimately the judiciary in general.50 As held in
Joselito Rallos, et al., vs. Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr., Branch 5
RTC, Cebu City:51
Well-known is the judicial norm that "judges should not only be
impartial but should also appear impartial." Jurisprudence
repeatedly teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing less than
the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The other elements of
due process, like notice and hearing, would become
meaningless if the ultimate decision is rendered by a partial or
biased judge. Judges must not only render just, correct and
impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free of any
suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.
This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal,
metropolitan and regional trial court judges like herein
respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have
direct contact with the litigating parties. They are the
intermediaries between conflicting interests and the
embodiments of the people’s sense of justice. Thus, their official
conduct should be beyond reproach.
Here, the Court cannot fathom why the arraignment of De Jesus,
Jr. was postponed from 2007 to 2011 without appropriate action
coming from the court. Judge Jacinto, Jr. should have availed of
known legal remedies to compel De Jesus, Jr. to personally
appear for his arraignment, but he did not. The appearance of
leniency seemingly exhibited in favor of De Jesus, Jr. gives an
impression of bias and partiality that should be addressed and
corrected.1âwphi1
Consequently, under Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of
the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Section
11 (A) of the same Rule provides that the penalty to be imposed
if a respondent Judge is found guilty of a serious charge is either
a fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not more than ₱40,000.00,
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
more than three but not exceeding six months, or dismissal from
the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned
or controlled corporations.
The Court is aware of the other pending administrative cases
against Judge Jacinto, Jr., but they cannot be fully considered
in the imposition of the penalty in this case as they are still under
review and evaluation. Thus, a fine of ₱40,000.00 52 is deemed
appropriate under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose S.
Jacinto, Jr. GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and
Procedure and of Bias and Partiality. Accordingly, he is FINED
in the amount of Forty Thousand (₱40,000.00) Pesos with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 163972-77 March 28, 2008
JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth
Division), Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Joselito Raniero J. Daan (petitioner), one of the accused in
Criminal Cases Nos. 24167-24170, 24195-24196, questions the
denial by the Sandiganbayan of his plea bargaining proposal.
The antecedents facts are laid down by Sandiganbayan in its
Resolution dated March 25, 2004, as follows:
Said accused, together with accused Benedicto E. Kuizon,
were charged before this Court for three counts
of malversation of public funds involving the sums
of P3,293.00, P1,869.00, and P13,528.00, respectively, which
they purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying the time book and
payrolls for given period making it appear that some laborers
worked on the construction of the new municipal hall building
of Bato, Leyte and collected their respective salaries thereon
when, in truth and in fact, they did not. Thus, in addition to the
charge for malversation, the accused were also indicted before
this Court for three counts of falsification of public document by
a public officer or employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their
plea of not guilty and substitute the same with a plea of guilty,
provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of
guilt and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In
the alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said accused
proposed instead to substitute their plea of not guilty to the crime
of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee
with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser crime of falsification of a
public document by a private individual. On the other hand, in
the malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their
plea of not guilty thereto with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser
crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.
Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution
found as acceptable the proposal of the accused to plead guilty
to the lesser crime of falsification of public document by a private
individual. The prosecution explained:
With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it
appears that the act of the accused in pleading guilty for a lesser
offense of falsification by a private individual defined and
penalized under Article 172 of the Revised Penal code will
strengthen our cases against the principal accused, Municipal
Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be the master mind of
these criminal acts.
Insofar as the malversation cases are concerned, the
prosecution was likewise amenable to the offer of said accused
to plead guilty to the lesser crime of failure of
an accountable officer to render accounts because:
x x x JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the
total amount of P18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the
provincial government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In
short, the damage caused to the government has already been
restituted x x x.
The Sandiganbayan, in the herein assailed Resolution,
dated March 25, 2004, denied petitioners Motion to Plea
Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the prosecution,
on the main ground that no cogent reason was presented to
justify its approval.
The Sandiganbayan likewise denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration in a Resolution dated May 31, 2004.
This compelled petitioner to file the present case
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/ or writ of preliminary injunction
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying his plea bargaining offer on the
following grounds: first, petitioner is not an accountable officer
and he merely affixed his signature on the payrolls on
a routinary basis, negating any criminal intent; and that the
amount involved is only P18,860.00, which he already
restituted.
The petition is meritorious.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the
accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory
disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually
involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to
only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in
return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.
Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. At arraignment, the
accused, with the consent of the offended party and the
prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a
lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still
be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after
withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary. (sec. 4, cir. 38-98)
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of
the proceedings. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 118 of the Rules of
Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court
at the pre-trial conference, viz:
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. In all criminal
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court
shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date
the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused,
unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars
of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider
the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the
charge but interposes a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the
criminal and civil aspects of the case.
SEC. 2. Pre-trial agreement. All agreements or admissions
made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced
in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise,
they cannot be used against the accused. The agreements
covering the matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be
approved by the court. (Emphasis supplied)
But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after
the prosecution has finished presenting its evidence and rested
its case. Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial that plea
bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was
made only after the prosecution already presented several
witnesses.
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic
requisites upon which plea bargaining may be made, i.e., that it
should be with the consent of the offended party and the
prosecutor, and that the plea of guilt should be to a lesser
offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. The rules however use word may in the second
sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion upon
the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make
such plea. Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea
of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not
supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or
compromise for the convenience of the accused.
In People of the Philippines v. Villarama, the Court ruled that the
acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not
demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter
that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial
court, viz:
x x x In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court
and the Office of the Prosecutor with a yardstick within which
their discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in People
v. Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437,
450), We held that the rules allow such a plea only when the
prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the
guilt of the crime charged. In his concurring opinion in People
v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA
373, 377), then Justice Antonio Barredo explained clearly and
tersely the rationale or the law:
x x x (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis
on which the fiscal and the court could rightfully act in allowing
the appellant to change his former plea of not guilty to murder to
guilty to the lesser crime of homicide could be nothing more
nothing less than the evidence already in the record. The reason
for this being that Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule
116) under which a plea for a lesser offense is allowed was not
and could not have been intended as a procedure for
compromise, much less bargaining. (Emphasis supplied)
However, Villarama involved plea bargaining after the
prosecution had already rested its case.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the
present case, the trial court'sexercise of its discretion should
neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a capricious and
whimsical exercise of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion
implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's
plea offer on the ground that petitioner and the prosecution failed
to demonstrate that the proposal would redound to the benefit
of the public. The Sandiganbayan believes that approving the
proposal would only serve to trivialize the seriousness of the
charges against them and send the wrong signal to potential
grafters in public office that the penalties they are likely to face
would be lighter than what their criminal acts would have merited
or that the economic benefits they are likely to derive from their
criminal activities far outweigh the risks they face in committing
them; thus, setting to naught the deterrent value of the laws
intended to curb graft and corruption in government.
Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in
rejecting petitioner's plea offer. However, subsequent events
and higher interests of justice and fair play dictate that
petitioner's plea offer should be accepted. The present case
calls for the judicious exercise of this Court's equity jurisdiction
-
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach
and do complete justice where courts of law, through the
inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their
judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are
incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the
letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the
circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts
and of its power of control and supervision over the proceedings
of lower courts, in order to afford equal justice to petitioner.
In People of the Philippines v. Estrada, the Sandiganbayan, in
its Resolution dated March 14, 2007, approved the Plea
Bargaining Agreement entered into by the prosecution and one
of the accused, Charlie Atong Ang. The agreement provided
that the accused undertakes to assist in the prosecution of the
case and promises to return the amount of P25,000,000.00. In
approving the Plea Bargaining Agreement,
the Sandiganbayan took into consideration the timeliness of the
plea bargaining and whether the agreement complied with the
requirements of Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court. The Sandigabayan noted that the accused had already
withdrawn his earlier plea of not guilty; and that the prosecution
consented to the plea of guilt to a lesser offense; and the lesser
offense, which is Corruption of Public Officials in relation to
Indirect Bribery, is necessarily included in the offense charged,
which is Plunder.
The Court sees no reason why the standards applied by
the Sandiganbayan to Estrada should not be applied to the
present case. Records show that there was a favorable
recommendation by the Office of the Special Prosecutor to
approve petitioner's motion to plea bargain. Thus, in its
Memorandum dated August 16, 2002, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor rationalized:
In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that JOSELITO
RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total amount
of P18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the provincial
government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In short, the
damage caused to the government has already been restituted
by the accused.
There is also no dispute that accused DAAN voluntarily
surrendered in the instant cases.Moreover, the accused is also
willing to plead guilty to a lesser offense which to our mind,
merits consideration.
With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it
appears that the act of the accused in pleading guilty for a lesser
offense of falsification by private individual defined and
penalized under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code will
strengthen our cases against the principal accused, the
Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be the
master mind of these criminal acts. After all, the movants herein
JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN was merely designated as
draftsman detailed as foreman/timekeeper of
the Municipality of Bato, Leyte.
Moreover, the lesser offenses of Falsification by Private
Individuals and Failure to Render Account by an Accountable
Officer are necessarily included in the crimes of Falsification of
Public Documents and Malversation of Public Funds,
respectively, with which petitioner was originally charged.
Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, for
the crime of Falsification of Public Documents through an
untruthful narration of facts to be established, the following
elements must concur: (a) the offender makes in a document
untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has
a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c)
the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and (d)
the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with
the wrongful intent of injuring a third person.
On the other hand, Falsification by Private Individuals penalized
under Article 172, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code has
the following elements: (a) the offender is a private individual
ora public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his
official position; (b) the offender committed any of the acts of
falsification enumerated under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code; and (c) the falsification was committed in a public or
official or commercial document.
As regards the crime of Malversation of Public Funds defined
and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, with
which petitioner was also charged, the elements are as follows:
(a) the offender is a public officer; (b) he has custody or control
of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c)
the funds or property involved are public funds or property for
which he is accountable; and (d) he has appropriated, taken or
misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment
or negligence permitted, the taking by another person of such
funds or property. Article 217 also provides that the failure of
the public officer to have duly forthcoming such public funds or
property, upon demand by a duly authorized officer, shall
be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal use. In this regard, it has been ruled that
once such presumption is rebutted, then it is completely
destroyed; in fact, the presumption is never deemed to
have existed at all.
Meanwhile, under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code,
Failure to Render Account by an Accountable Officer, the lesser
offense which petitioner seeks to plead guilty of, the following
elements must concur: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b) the
offender must be an accountable officer for public funds or
property; (c) the offender is required by law or regulation
to render accounts to the COA or to a provincial auditor; and (d)
the offender fails to render an account for a period of two months
after such accounts should be rendered.
Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states when an offense
includes or is included in the other, to wit:
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An
offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And
an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense
proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute
or form part of those constituting the latter.
An offense may be said to necessarily include another
when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former as alleged in the complaint or information constitute the
latter. And vice versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily
included in another when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
In this case, the allegations in the Information filed against
petitioner are sufficient to hold petitioner liable for the lesser
offenses. Thus, in the charge for Falsification of Public
Documents, petitioner may plead guilty to the lesser offense of
Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not
appear that petitioner took advantage of his official position in
allegedly falsifying the time book and payroll of
the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. In the same vein, with regard
to the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, while
the Informations contain allegations which make out a case
for Malversation against petitioner, nevertheless, absent the
element of conversion, theoretically, petitioner may still be held
liable for Failure to Render Account by an Accountable Officer if
it is shown that the failure to render account was in violation of
a law or regulation that requires him to render such an
accounting within the prescribed period.
Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of
offenses charged in this case likewise constitute the lesser
offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser
offenses.
Finally, as propounded by petitioner, indeed, he is not an
accountable officer in that the nature of his duty as
foreman/timekeeper does not permit or require possession or
custody of local government funds, not to mention that petitioner
has already restituted the amount ofP18, 860.00 involved in this
case. Unlike Estrada which involves a crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death, and a
whopping P25,000,000.00 taken from the public coffers, this
case tremendously pales in comparison.
Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case, where
gross inequity will result in a discriminatory dispensation of
justice, the Court will not hesitate to intervene in order to
equalize the imbalance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions
dated March 25, 2004 and May 31,
2004 are SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is
hereby ORDERED to grant petitioner's Motion to Plea
Bargain. Let records of this case be REMANDED to
the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings in accordance with
this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164953 February 13, 2006
JOHN JOSEPH LUMANLAW y BULINAO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO B. PERALTA JR., in his capacity as
acting presiding judge, Regional Trial Court Branch 13,
Manila, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, CJ:
Vexatious, oppressive, unjustified and capricious
delays in the arraignment violates the constitutional right to
speedy trial and speedy case disposition, particularly when the
accused is detained. Under the circumstances of the present
case, mandamus is a proper remedy for relief from prolonged
detention. This Court safeguards liberty and will therefore
always uphold the basic constitutional rights of the people,
especially the weak and the marginalized.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Mandamus[1] under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, seeking (1) the dismissal of the
Information filed against Petitioner John Joseph
Lumanlaw y Bulinao; and (2) his release from the Manila City
Jail.
The Facts
Culled from the parties pleadings are the following
undisputed facts.
Petitioner Lumanlaw was apprehended by the Western Police
District near San Diego Street, Sampaloc, Manila, on the
evening of November 26, 2002, for illegal possession of a
dangerous drug. He was charged in an Information[2]filed with
Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, as
follows:
That on or about November 24,
2002, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, not
being lawfully authorized to possess
any dangerous drug, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in his possession,
custody and control one (1) heat
sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing zero point zero
one one (0.011) grams of white
crystalline substance known as
SHABU containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.
A Commitment Order was consequently issued by
Presiding Judge Luis J. Arranz directing the detention of
petitioner in the Manila City Jail and setting the latter’s
arraignment on January 8, 2003. On even date, petitioners
counsel manifested his intention to file a motion for preliminary
investigation. Because of the Manifestation, the arraignment
was deferred to February 21, 2003. The aforesaid Motion was
filed together with a Petition to Reduce Bail on January 17,
2003.
The resolution of these matters was overtaken by
Judge Arranz’s retirement from public service. Thus, the
arraignment scheduled for February 21, 2003, had to be
postponed. This Court designated herein respondent, Judge
Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., as acting presiding judge of Branch 13,
Regional Trial Court, Manila, in Administrative Order No. 27-
2003 issued on February 18, 2003.
On March 26, 2003, the newly designated acting presiding judge
issued an Order setting the arraignment of petitioner on April 23,
2003. On the latter date, the arraignment was reset to June 25,
2003, due to the public prosecutors absence.
On June 25, 2003, petitioners counsel received the lower courts
Order granting Lumanlaw’s Petition to Reduce Bail and denying
his Motion for Preliminary Investigation for having been filed
beyond the reglementary period. In the same Order, the trial
court set petitioners arraignment on August 6, 2003.
The arraignment was postponed again, this time due to the
absence of petitioners counsel. According to him, he requested
the court to proceed with the arraignment, with the public
defender assisting the accused, but that respondent judge
denied the request on the ground that petitioner was already
represented by a counsel de parte. The trial court then re-
scheduled the arraignment on September 24, 2003.
In what was beginning to be a pattern of laxity, the September
24 arraignment was likewise postponed in view of the scheduled
meeting of presiding judges with accredited newspaper
publishers and was thus reset to October 1, 2003.
On the latter date, respondent judge issued the
following Order:
In view of the draft Order dated
August 6, 2003 which impeded the
Produce Order for the arraignment
and pre-trial conference this afternoon
of defendant John Joseph Lumanlaw
in relation to Criminal Case No. 02-
208426, the arraignment and pre-trial
conference are hereby reset on
December 10, 2003 at 2:00 o’clock in
the afternoon, on the date amenable
to Atty. Ernesto Delfin, as well as the
defendant.
Again, the arraignment did not occur on December 10, 2003,
because petitioner had not been brought to the court by the
wardens of the Manila City Jail. According to the trial courts
Order,[16] there was no proof of service on the Manila City
Jail. The arraignment was thus reset to March 1, 2004.
Notably, a year had passed since the filing of the
Information, yet Lumanlaw remained uninformed of the charges
against him, while continuing to be in detention and despair all
throughout that period of limbo. Owing to this insufferable state
of affairs, petitioners counsel manifested his intention to file a
motion to dismiss on account of the violation of his clients right
to a speedy trial. Accordingly, an Urgent Motion to Dismiss[ was
filed on December 19, 2003. The Motion was heard on February
20, 2004, but was promptly denied by the trial court. The
arraignment was reset yet again to March 17, 2004.
The arraignment did not take place, however, because the
accused was not produced in court by the jail wardens
concerned. It turned out that the trial court had not issued a
produce order to the Manila City Jail. Another resetting was
ordered for April 16, 2004.
Now frustrated with the repeated postponements, petitioner filed
a Second Urgent Motion to Dismiss on March 22, 2004. Relying
on the provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
mandating that arraignment should be held within thirty (30)
days from the date the court acquired jurisdiction over the
accused, petitioner argued that the protracted delay of his
arraignment violated his constitutional right to speedy trial.
On April 16, 2004, the RTC could not proceed with the
arraignment. What transpired on that date is evident from its
Order:
Inasmuch as the Trial Prosecutor has
just furnished a copy of her Comment
dated April 12, 2004 to the defense
counsel, as prayed for by Atty.
Ernesto Delfin, counsel for accused
John Joseph Lumanlaw in Criminal
Case No. 02-208426, he is GRANTED
five (5) days from today to submit his
Reply. After which, the
pending Second Urgent Motion to
Dismiss dated March 21, 2004 filed on
March 22, 2004 (page 33, Record in
Criminal Case No. 02-208426) will be
deemed submitted for resolution.
Meanwhile, without prejudice to the
resolution of the pending motion, the
arraignment and pre-trial conference
of John Joseph Lumanlaw are
hereby tentatively scheduled on May
26, 2004 at 2:00 oclock in the
afternoon.
On May 26, 2004, the arraignment could not be conducted,
again because of the Manila City Jails failure to bring petitioner
to the court despite notice.[24] On the same day, his counsel
received[25] the trial courts Order[26] dated May 3, 2004, denying
his Second Urgent Motion to Dismiss. The arraignment was
reset to June 16, 2004.
On this date, it was respondent judges absence that caused the
postponement of the arraignment, which was reset to July 21,
2004.[28] But on that date, no hearing was conducted in Branch
13 because of the ongoing semestral inventory of cases in
respondent judges regular sala, Branch 17.[29]
Hence, the present Petition.[30]
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
Whether or not the failure of public
respondent to conduct the
arraignment of the petitioner despite
the delay of one (1) year, nine (9)
months and four (4) days constitute
undue and unjustifiable delay in
violation of his constitutional right to
speedy trial.
Whether or not such undue and
unjustifiable delay would warrant the
dismissal of the Information filed
against the petitioner.
That should the decision by the
Honorable Supreme Court be one
 finding merit in this Petition, whether
or not the said decision is binding
upon the newly appointed presiding
judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch
13, Manila, as successor of public
respondent.[31]
On the other hand, respondent asks whether the
Petition for Mandamus should be given due course. [32]
On the whole, the issues may be reduced to the
following: 1) whether there was a violation of the right to speedy
trial, warranting a quashal of the Information against petitioner;
and 2) whether mandamus is the proper remedy.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Right to Speedy Trial
Arraignment is a vital stage in criminal proceedings in
which the accused are formally informed of the charges against
them.[33] The proper conduct of the arraignment is provided in
Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. A perusal
of the provision shows that arraignment is not a mere formality,
but an integral part of due process.[34] Particularly, it implements
the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them and their right
to speedy trial.
On this point, petitioner argues that, by respondents
failure to act expeditiously on his arraignment, his right to
speedy trial was violated. He points out the fourteen
postponements that resulted in his intolerable detention for
almost two years. Moreover, he cites Section 2 of Supreme
Court Circular No. 38-98 (implementing Republic Act No. 8493,
otherwise known as The Speedy Trial Act of 1998), which
provides that arraignment shall be held within thirty days from
the date the court acquired jurisdiction over the accused.
On the other hand, respondent counters that there
were no capricious and oppressive delays that would justify a
dismissal of the Information. The Office of the Solicitor General
points to the participation of petitioner himself in the protracted
proceedings, such as his filing of a Motion for Preliminary
Investigation and his counsels absence from one of the
scheduled hearings.[35]
Speedy Trial Construed
The thirty-day period invoked by petitioner was
construed in Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How.[36] It was
held in that case that the period was not absolute. Certain delays
were allowed by law and excluded from the computation of the
time within which trial must commence. The Court ruled that
those exclusions should reflect the fundamentally recognized
principle that the concept of speedy trial is a relative term and
must necessarily be a flexible concept.[37] It held further that
courts must strive to maintain a delicate balance between the
demands of due process and the strictures of speedy trial, on
the one hand; and, on the other, the right of the State to
prosecute crimes and rid society of criminals.
Indeed, judicial proceedings do not exist in a vacuum. They
must contend with the realities of everyday life. Thus, a sensible
assessment of their conduct must consider several factors,
rather than a mere mathematical calculation of periods that have
elapsed between stages. Jurisprudence has set forth the
following guidelines:
x x x. [T]he right to a speedy
disposition of a case, like the right to
speedy trial, is deemed violated only
when the proceeding is attended
by vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays; or
when unjustified postponements of
the trial are asked for and secured, or
when without cause or justifiable
motive a long period of time is allowed
to elapse without the party having his
case tried. Equally applicable is the
balancing test used to determine
whether a defendant has been denied
his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy
disposition of a case for that matter, in
which the conduct of both the
prosecution and the defendant are
weighed, and such factors as length of
the delay, reason for the delay, the
defendants assertion or non-assertion
of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant resultingfrom the delay, are
considered.[38]
Reasonable Postponements
It should be stressed that petitioner never acquiesced
to the seemingly endless postponements of the arraignment. He
asserted his right to speedy trial twice, but was denied by
respondent in both instances. Considering that petitioner has
been under detention since December 2002, we need not
belabor the prejudice, distress, and anxiety he suffered as a
result of the delayed arraignment.
We concede that the bases for some of the delays were
completely sound, such as the retirement of
Judge Arranz[39] and the manifestation of petitioner that the
latter would be filing a Motion for Preliminary
Investigation.[40] Those matters were manifestly not intended to
delay the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 02-208426.
The delay caused by Judge Arranzs retirement may be
deemed a normal part of the ordinary conduct of court business
and was not necessarily unreasonable. The second ground was
the right of the accused accorded by Section 7 of Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.[41] Verily, petitioners
request for a preliminary investigation before arraignment was
well-advised, in view of the rule that failure to do so would
constitute a waiver of the right.[42] Thus, it has been held that
though the conduct of a preliminary investigation may hold back
the progress of a case, such investigation is necessary so that
the defendants right will not be compromised or sacrificed at the
altar of expediency.[43]
Unjustified Delay
This Court reviewed the other reasons for the
postponements in this case, but finds them far from being
reasonable. There were fourteen postponements in all. Going
over the causes for the delays, we see the lack of earnest effort
on the part of respondent to conduct the arraignment as soon as
the court calendar would allow. Most of the postponements
could have easily been avoided if he had been more keen on
respecting and upholding petitioners constitutional right to
speedy trial and speedy disposition.
Given the length and the unreasonableness of the
majority of the delays, a violation of the right of petitioner to
speedy trial becomes manifest. Almost two years[44] elapsed
from the filing of the Information against him until the filing of this
Petition; incredibly, he has not been arraigned. An arraignment
takes, at most, ten minutes of the courts business and does not
normally entail legal gymnastics. It consists simply of reading to
the accused the charges leveled against them, ensuring their
understanding of those charges, and obtaining their plea to the
charges. A prudent and resolute judge can conduct an
arraignment as soon as the accused are presented before the
court.
In fact, by fixing a period of only thirty days from the
filing of the information to the conduct of an arraignment, RA
8493 recognizes that this fundamental right should and can be
done with minimal delay. For this reason alone, we are
astonished that the court a quo could not complete such a
simple but fundamental stage in the proceedings. The
protracted delay became all the more oppressive and vexatious
when viewed from the perspective that the liberty of the accused
was being curtailed for the entire duration.
Postponement Due to
Absence of Counsel
It will be recalled that the arraignment set for August 6,
2003, was postponed by the trial court due to the absence of the
counsel of petitioner.[45] The latter sought to proceed with the
arraignment by requesting the assistance of the public defender
as counsel de oficio, but the request was denied on the flimsy
ground that the accused already had a counsel de parte. We
find no legal basis for the trial courts action.
 The appointment of a counsel de oficio in the absence
of the defendants counsel de parte is not prohibited,[46] not even
by the Constitution,[47]especially when the accused themselves
request that appointment. In fact, the court has a mandatory
duty to appoint a counsel de oficio when the accused have no
counsel of choice at the time of their arraignment.[48] People
v. Serzo[49] held thus:
x x x [A]n accused may exercise his
right to counsel by electing to be
represented either by a court-appointed
lawyer or by one of his own choice. While his
right to be represented by counsel is
immutable, his option to secure the services
of counsel de parte, however, is not absolute.
The court is obliged to balance the privilege to
retain a counsel of choice against the state's
and the offended party's equally important
right to speedy and adequate justice. Thus,
the court may restrict the accused's option to
retain a counsel de parte if the accused
insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or the
chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or
the attorney declines to represent the
accused for a valid reason, e.g. conflict of
interest and the like.[50]
Like other personal rights, the right to a
counsel de parte is waivable, so long as 1) the waiver is not
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good
customs; or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized
by law; and 2) the waiver is unequivocally, knowingly and
intelligently made.[51]
Applying these principles, it would have been more
prudent for respondent judge to have appointed a
counsel de oficio for purposes of arraignment only. This course
of action became more compelling in the instant case when
petitioner himself requested the appointment.[52] To be sure, he
would not have been prejudiced by that action, provided there
was a proper observance of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Under Section 8 of this rule, before
proceeding with the arraignment, the court is mandated to give
the appointed counsel de oficio reasonable time to consult with
the accused as to the latters plea.[53]
Clearly, respondent judges postponement of the
arraignment on August 6, 2003, had no substantial basis. Thus,
the postponement, initially caused by the absence of petitioners
counsel, became unreasonable and ultimately attributable to
respondents inflexibility as regards contingencies.
Responsibility of Judges
in Minimizing Delay
The foremost cause for the lengthy delay in this case
was the repeated failure of the jail wardens to bring the accused
to court. No less than four court settings,[54] spanning seven
months, were postponed on this ground alone. To be sure, this
recurring circumstance was caused, in different instances, by
the failure of the court personnel to issue the produce order on
time and by the dereliction of the jail wardens. Remarkably,
although respondent judge was justified in deferring the
arraignment until the accused was presented, [55] the problem
could have been easily averted by efficient court management.
In his role as administrator, respondent should have
supervised his clerk of court to ensure a timely service of the
produce order on the wardens of the Manila City Jail. Judges
must keep a watchful eye on the level of performance and
conduct of the court personnel under their immediate
supervision, who are primarily employed to aid in the
administration of justice. Judges who set the pace for greater
efficiency, diligence and dedication, could prompt their
personnel to be more diligent and efficient in the performance of
official duties. For certain, leniency in the administrative
supervision of court personnel must be avoided.[56]
We stress the need to remind judges to exhibit more
diligence and efficiency in the performance of their judicial duties
to avoid loss of faith and confidence in the administration of
justice. Rule 3.09 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
requires them to organize and supervise the court personnel to
ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business x x x.
Additionally, Section 5(d) of Rule 135 confers upon every court
the power to control the conduct of its ministerial officers and of
all other persons who in any manner are connected with a case
before it.
Respondent did not exercise his prerogatives in
administering speedy justice. Instead, he was content with
issuing reminders[57] that miserably failed to resolve the problem
expeditiously. We can only conclude from the distinct
circumstances of the case that he failed to assert actively his
authority to expedite the proceedings.
Instead of being proactive and steering the course of
the proceedings with deliberate dispatch, respondent tended to
be passive and reactive by allowing the pace of the proceedings
to be dictated by the listlessness of the parties, his staff, and the
jail wardens. Judges should be more deliberate in their actions
and, within the bounds of law, make full use of their authority to
expedite proceedings while continuing to respect the rights of
parties to ventilate their respective causes fully.
Indeed, judges are required to dispose of the courts
business expeditiously, in accordance with Rule 3.05 of Canon
3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which we quote:
A judge shall dispose of the
courts business promptly and decide
cases within the required period.
This Court has constantly impressed upon judges the
need to act promptly on their cases. Delay in the disposition of
cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the
judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute. [58]
In the light of the numerous and unreasonable delays
in the arraignment of petitioner, the sought for dismissal of the
Information filed against him is in order.
Second Issue:
Propriety of a Petition for Mandamus
Respondent maintains that mandamus is not the
proper remedy, because he did not neglect his duties.
Considering the above findings of inordinate delay, respondents
contention evidently has no leg to stand on.
It is established that a writ of mandamus may be issued
to control the exercise of discretion[59] when, in the performance
of duty, there is undue delay that can be characterized as a
grave abuse of discretion resulting in manifest injustice. [60] In
view of our finding of unwarranted delays in the conduct of the
arraignment of petitioner, he has indeed the right to demand --
through a writ of mandamus -- expeditious action from all
officials tasked with the administration of justice. Thus, he may
not only demand that his arraignment be held but, ultimately,
that the information against him be dismissed on the ground of
the violation of his right to speedy trial.
Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who seek
to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a
public duty, most especially when the public right involved is
mandated by the Constitution.[61] Besides, it has long been
established in this jurisdiction that the writ of mandamus is
available to the accused to compel a dismissal of the case.[62]
Respondent argues for the dismissal of the instant
Petition on the ground that petitioner did not move for a
reconsideration of the trial courts Order dated May 3, 2004.
Respondent insists that a motion for reconsideration is a
prerequisite to a mandamus petition, because the former
remedy is plain, speedy, and adequate in the ordinary course of
law.[63] Indeed, his contention expresses the general rule, but is
not impervious to exceptions.
In the face of extraordinary and compelling reasons, it
has been held that the availability of another remedy does not
preclude a resort to a special civil action under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. These reasons arise when, among others, the
assailed order issued with grave abuse of discretion is
null,[64] when the available remedy will not afford expeditious
relief,[65] and when a motion for reconsideration will be
useless.[66]
The instant case falls under these exceptional cases.
To begin with, the numerous and unreasonable postponements
displayed an abusive exercise of discretion. The delays were
ordered in total disregard of the constitutional right of
petitioner. In fact, the Orders denying his motions to dismiss did
not even bother to explain the reasonableness of the bases for
the postponements. The Order dated February 20, 2004,
contains only this general statement:
Pending resolution of certain
incidents as chronicled by the Court in open
court, and given the Trial Prosecutors
objections thereto lifted from the record as to
why the arraignment and pre-trial conference
of the [petitioner] John Joseph Lumanlaw y
Bolinao were not scheduled forwith(sic) as
expected by counsel for the defense, the
Court opted to DENY the Urgent Motion to
Dismiss dated December 17, 2003 in Criminal
Case No. 02-208426.[67]
After enumerating all the causes for the
postponements, the Second Urgent Motion to Dismiss was
denied by respondent in the Order dated May 3, 2004, in words
that were just as vague, as shown below:
Based on the foregoing
chronological backdrop, there were causes
that justified the suspension of the
arraignment that shall be excluded in
computing the period for arraignment per
Section 1 (g), Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, thusly:
Unless a shorter
period is provided by
special law or Supreme
Court circular, the
arraignment shall be held
within thirty (30) days from
the date the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person
of the accused. The time of
the pendency of a motion to
quash or for a bill of
particulars or other causes
justifying suspension of the
arraignment shall be
excluded in computing the
period.
Accordingly, the Second Urgent
Motion to Dismiss dated March 21, 2004 from
defense counsel in Criminal Case No. 02-
208426 must be and is hereby
DENIED. x x x.[68]
The Orders did not even discuss why the
postponements were justified, or which of them could be
excluded from the computation of the prescribed period. Absent
any discussion of these matters, baseless was the court a
quos conclusion that there was no violation of petitioners right
to speedy trial. A veritable display of capriciousness cannot be
countenanced when weighed against an immutable right
protected by the Constitution.
As further aggravation, respondent did not exert any
effort to expedite the arraignment even after petitioner had filed
two urgent motions to dismiss.Indeed, there was basis for the
latters belief that filing a motion for reconsideration would have
been only an exercise in futility.[69]
Respondent also contends that the instant Petition
should be dismissed for disregarding the hierarchy of
courts. This Court has full discretionary power to take
cognizance of a petition filed directly with it. [70] In the interest of
speedy justice, the Court deemed it best to take cognizance of
the present Petition, notwithstanding the hierarchy of courts.
Remanding the legal issues to the Court of Appeals would have
only exacerbated the violation of petitioners rights.
It is the policy of this Court not to deny a writ of
mandamus on purely technical matters, if a party would be
deprived of substantive rights. Procedural rules should not be
strictly enforced when their enforcement would result in a
miscarriage of justice. This principle holds, especially when a
petition is meritorious and the trial judge clearly violated
petitioners constitutional right.The protection of our peoples civil
liberties overwhelms all rules of procedure.These rules are mere
tools for facilitating the attainment of justice. As explicitly
provided in the Rules of Court itself, they shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.[71]
Let it be known that this Court will not shirk from the
responsibility -- nay, the duty -- to set aside all obstacles to the
fortification of every citizens constitutionally enshrined rights.
We will not condone or give our imprimatur to the sluggish pace
of the proceedings below. The Court has the duty to safeguard
liberty; hence, it will always uphold the basic constitutional rights
of our people, especially the weak and the marginalized.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Criminal Case
No. 02-208425-26 pending before Branch 13 of the Manila
Regional Trial Court is DISMISSED.Petitioner is hereby
ordered RELEASED from the Manila City Jail, where he is
currently detained, unless he is being held for any other lawful
cause.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188314 January 10, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
KHADDAFY JANJALANI, GAMAL B. BAHARAN, ANGELO
TRINIDAD, GAPPAL BANNAH ASALI, JAINAL SALI,
ROHMAT ABDURROHIM, and other JOHN and JANE
DOES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated 30 June 2008, which affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Criminal
Case Nos. 05-476 and 05-4777 dated 18 October 2005. The
latter Decision convicted the three accused-appellants namely,
Gamal B. Baharan a.k.a. Tapay, Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu
Khalil, and Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky of the
complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated
murder, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death by
lethal injection. The CA modified the sentence to reclusion
perpetua as required by Republic Act No. 9346 (Act Abolishing
the Imposition of Death Penalty).
Statement of Facts
The pertinent facts, as determined by the trial court, are
as follows:
On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its
usual southbound route, from its Navotas bus terminal towards
its Alabang bus terminal via Epifanio de los Santos Avenue
(EDSA). Around 6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, while they were
about to move out of the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus
stop, the bus conductor noticed two men running after the bus.
The two insisted on getting on the bus, so the conductor obliged
and let them in.
According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, he
immediately became wary of the two men, because, even if they
got on the bus together, the two sat away from each other one
sat two seats behind the driver, while the other sat at the back
of the bus. At the time, there were only 15 passengers inside the
bus. He also noticed that the eyes of one of the men were
reddish. When he approached the person near the driver and
asked him whether he was paying for two passengers, the latter
looked dumb struck by the question. He then stuttered and said
he was paying for two and gave PhP20. Andales grew more
concerned when the other man seated at the back also paid for
both passengers. At this point, Andales said he became more
certain that the two were up to no good, and that there might be
a holdup.
Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious
because both men kept on asking him if the bus was going to
stop at Ayala Avenue. The witness also noticed that the man at
the back appeared to be slouching, with his legs stretched out
in front of him and his arms hanging out and hidden from view
as if he was tinkering with something. When Andales would get
near the man, the latter would glare at him. Andales admitted,
however, that he did not report the suspicious characters to the
police.
As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner
of Ayala Avenue and EDSA, the two men insisted on getting off
the bus. According to Andales, the bus driver initially did not
want to let them off the bus, because a Makati ordinance
prohibited unloading anywhere except at designated bus stops.
Eventually, the bus driver gave in and allowed the two
passengers to alight. The two immediately got off the bus and
ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an
explosion. He then saw fire quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out
of the bus towards a nearby mall. After a while, he went back to
where the bus was. He saw their bus passengers either lying on
the ground or looking traumatized. A few hours after, he made a
statement before the Makati Police Station narrating the whole
incident.
The prosecution presented documents furnished by
the Department of Justice, confirming that shortly before the
explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group Abu
Solaiman announced over radio station DZBB that the group
had a Valentines Day gift for former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. After the bombing, he again went on radio
and warned of more bomb attacks.
As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave
ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive interview some time after
the incident, confessing his participation in the Valentines Day
bombing incident. In another exclusive interview on the network,
accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing
incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview,
confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14
February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the
accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were
the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of
14 February.
Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group namely Khaddafy
Janjalani, Gamal B. Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, Gappal Bannah
Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or
Zaky, and other John and Jane Does were then charged with
multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. Only Baharan,
Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other
accused remain at-large.
On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge
(Crim. Case No. 05-476), Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all
entered a plea of guilty. On the other hand, upon arraignment
for the multiple frustrated murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-
477), accused Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan
pled not guilty. Rohmat pled not guilty to both charges. During
the pretrial hearing, the parties stipulated the following:
1.) The jurisdiction of this court over
the offenses charged.
2.) That all three accused namely
alias Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali
admitted knowing one another
before February 14, 2005.
3.) All the same three accused
likewise admitted that a bomb
exploded in the RRCG bus while the
bus was plying the EDSA route
fronting the MRT terminal which is in
front of the Makati Commercial
Center.
4.) Accused Asali admitted knowing
the other accused alias Rohmat
whom he claims taught him how to
make explosive devices.
5.) The accused Trinidad also
admitted knowing Rohmat before
the February 14 bombing incident.
6.) The accused Baharan, Trinidad,
and Asali all admitted to causing the
bomb explosion inside the RRCG
bus which left four people dead and
more or less forty persons injured.
7.) Both Baharan and Trinidad
agreed to stipulate that within the
period March 20-24 each gave
separate interviews to the ABS-CBN
news network admitting their
participation in the commission of
the said crimes, subject of these
cases.
8.) Accused Trinidad and Baharan
also admitted to pleading guilty to
these crimes, because they were
guilt-stricken after seeing a man
carrying a child in the first bus that
they had entered.
9.) Accused Asali likewise admitted
that in the middle of March 2005 he
gave a television news interview in
which he admitted that he supplied
the explosive devices which resulted
in this explosion inside the RRCG
bus and which resulted in the filing of
these charges.
10.) Finally, accused Baharan,
Trinidad, and Asali admitted that
they are members of the Abu
Sayyaf.[1]
In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court
asked whether accused Baharan and Trinidad were amenable
to changing their not guilty pleas to the charge of multiple
frustrated murder, considering that they pled guilty to the
heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent
inconsistency in their pleas. Defense counsel conferred with
accused Baharan and Trinidad and explained to them the
consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged the
inconsistencies and manifested their readiness for re-
arraignment. After the Information was read to them, Baharan
and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated
murder.[2]
After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali
testified that while under training with the Abu Sayyaf in 2004,
Rohmat, a.k.a Abu Jackie or Zaky, and two other persons taught
him how to make bombs and explosives. The trainees were told
that they were to wage battles against the government in the
city, and that their first mission was to plant bombs in malls, the
Light Railway Transit (LRT), and other parts of Metro Manila.
As found by the trial court, Asali, after his training, was
required by the Abu Sayyaf leadership, specifically Abu
Solaiman and Rohmat, to secure eight kilos of TNT, a soldering
gun, aluminum powder, a tester, and Christmas lights, all of
which he knew would be used to make a bomb. He then recalled
that sometime in November to December 2004, Trinidad asked
him for a total of 4 kilos of TNT that is, 2 kilos on two separate
occasions. Rohmat allegedly called Asali to confirm that
Trinidad would get TNT from Asali and use it for their first
mission. The TNT was allegedly placed in two buses sometime
in December 2004, but neither one of them exploded.
Asali then testified that the night before the Valentines
Day bombing, Trinidad and Baharan got another two kilos of
TNT from him. Late in the evening of 14 February, he received
a call from Abu Solaiman. The latter told Asali not to leave home
or go to crowded areas, since the TNT taken by Baharan and
Trinidad had already been exploded in Makati. Thirty minutes
later, Trinidad called Asali, repeating the warning of Abu
Solaiman. The next day, Asali allegedly received a call from
accused Rohmat, congratulating the former on the success of
the mission.[3] According to Asali, Abu Zaky specifically said, Sa
wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo.
Assignment of Errors
Accused-appellants raise the following assignment of
errors:
 I. The trial court gravely erred in
accepting accused-appellants plea
of guilt despite insufficiency of
searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full
comprehension of the
consequences of the said plea.
II. The trial court gravely erred in
finding that the guilt of accused-
appellants for the crimes charged
had been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.[4]
First Assignment of Error
Accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad argue that the trial
court did not conduct a searching inquiry after they had changed
their plea from not guilty to guilty. The transcript of stenographic
notes during the 18 April 2005 re-arraignment before the Makati
Regional Trial Court is reproduced below:
COURT : Anyway, I think what we should have to do,
considering the stipulations that were
agreed upon during the last hearing, is to
address this matter of pleas of not guilty
entered for the frustrated murder charges
by the two accused, Mr. Trinidad and Mr.
Baharan, because if you will recall they
entered pleas of guilty to the multiple
murder charges, but then earlier pleas of
not guilty for the frustrated multiple
murdercharges remain [I]s that not
inconsistent considering the stipulations
that were entered into during the initial
pretrial of this case? [If] you will recall, they
admitted to have caused the bomb
explosion that led to the death of at least
four people and injury of about forty other
persons and so under the circumstances,
Atty Pea, have you discussed this matter
with your clients?
ATTY. PEA : Then we should be given enough time
to talk with them. I havent conferred with
them about this with regard to the multiple
murder case.
COURT : Okay. So let us proceed now. Atty. Pea,
can you assist the two accused because if
they are interested in withdrawing their
[pleas], I want to hear it from your lips.
ATTY. PEA : Yes, your Honor.
(At this juncture, Atty. Pea confers with the two
accused, namely Trinidad and Baharan)
I have talked to them, your Honor, and I have
explained to them the consequence of their
pleas, your Honor, and that the plea of guilt
to the murder case and plea of not guilty to
the frustrated multiple murder actually are
inconsistent with their pleas.
COURT : With matters that they stipulated upon?
ATTY. PEA : Yes, your Honor. So, they are now,
since they already plead guilt to the murder
case, then they are now changing their
pleas, your Honor, from not guilty to the one
of guilt. They are now ready, your Honor,
for re-arraignment.
INTERPRETER: (Read again that portion [of the
information] and translated it in Filipino in a
clearer way and asked both accused what
their pleas are).
Your Honor, both accused are entering separate
pleas of guilt to the crime charged.
COURT : All right. So after the information was re-
read to the accused, they have withdrawn
their pleas of not guilty and changed it to
the pleas of guilty to the charge
of frustrated murder. Thank you. Are there
any matters you need to address at pretrial
now? If there are none, then I will terminate
pretrial and accommodate[5]
As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court
has ruled that all trial judges must refrain from accepting with
alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while justice demands a
speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra
solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he
understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an
inevitable conviction.[6] Thus, trial court judges are required to
observe the following procedure under Section 3, Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense;
reception of evidence. When the accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court
shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of
the consequences of his plea and shall
require the prosecution to prove his guilt and
the precise degree of culpability. The accused
may also present evidence in his behalf.
(Emphasis supplied)
The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so
in cases of re-arraignment. In People v. Galvez, the Court noted
that since accused-appellant's original plea was not guilty, the
trial court should have exerted careful effort in inquiring into why
he changed his plea to guilty.[7] According to the Court:
The stringent procedure governing the
reception of a plea of guilt, especially in a
case involving the death penalty, is imposed
upon the trial judge in order to leave no room
for doubt on the possibility that the accused
might have misunderstood the nature of the
charge and the consequences of the plea.[8]
Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should
not be deemed satisfied in cases in which it was the defense
counsel who explained the consequences of a guilty plea to the
accused, as it appears in this case. In People v. Alborida, this
Court found that there was still an improvident plea of guilty,
even if the accused had already signified in open court that his
counsel had explained the consequences of the guilty plea; that
he understood the explanation of his counsel; that the accused
understood that the penalty of death would still be meted out to
him; and that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or
threatened.[9]
We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the
conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as
they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the
accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken
impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects,
and consequences of their guilty plea.[10]This requirement is
stringent and mandatory.[11]
Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context
under which the re-arraignment was conducted or of the factual
milieu surrounding the finding of guilt against the accused. The
Court observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad previously
pled guilty to another charge multiple murder based on the
same act relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge.
The Court further notes that prior to the change of plea to one of
guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other
confessions of guilt one through an extrajudicial confession
(exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by both accused
during pretrial), and the other via judicial admission (pretrial
stipulation). Considering the foregoing circumstances, we deem
it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the searching inquiry
in this instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not
warranted, as the accuseds plea of guilt was not the sole basis
of the condemnatory judgment under consideration.[12]
Second Assignment of Error
 In People v. Oden, the Court declared that even if the
requirement of conducting a searching inquiry was not complied
with, [t]he manner by which the plea of guilt is made loses much
of great significance where the conviction can be based on
independent evidence proving the commission by the person
accused of the offense charged.[13] Thus, in People v. Nadera,
the Court stated:
Convictions based on an improvident plea
of guilt are set aside only if such plea is
the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial
court relied on sufficient and credible
evidence to convict the accused, the
conviction must be sustained, because
then it is predicated not merely on the guilty
plea of the accused but on evidence proving
his commission of the offense
charged.[14] (Emphasis supplied.)
In their second assignment of error, accused-appellants assert
that guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. They
pointed out that the testimony of the conductor was merely
circumstantial, while that of Asali as to the conspiracy was
insufficient.
Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad
are concerned, the evidence for the prosecution, in addition to
that which can be drawn from the stipulation of facts, primarily
consisted of the testimonies of the bus conductor, Elmer
Andales, and of the accused-turned-state-witness, Asali.
Andales positively identified accused Baharan and Trinidad as
the two men who had acted suspiciously while inside the bus;
who had insisted on getting off the bus in violation of a Makati
ordinance; and who had scampered away from the bus
moments before the bomb exploded. On the other hand, Asali
testified that he had given accused Baharan and Trinidad the
TNT used in the bombing incident in Makati City. The guilt of the
accused Baharan and Trinidad was sufficiently established by
these corroborating testimonies, coupled with their respective
judicial admissions (pretrial stipulations) and extrajudicial
confessions (exclusive television interviews, as they both
stipulated during pretrial) that they were indeed the perpetrators
of the Valentines Day bombing.[15] Accordingly, the Court
upholds the findings of guilt made by the trial court as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.
Anent accused Rohmat, the evidence for the
prosecution consisted of the testimony of accused-turned-state-
witness Asali. Below is a reproduction of the transcript of
stenographic notes on the state prosecutors direct examination
of state-witness Asali during the 26 May 2005 trial:
Q : You stated that Zaky trained you and Trinidad.
Under what circumstances did he train you, Mr.
Witness, to assemble those explosives, you and
Trinidad?
A : Abu Zaky, Abu Solaiman, Khadaffy Janjalani, the
three of them, that Angelo Trinidad and myself be
the one to be trained to make an explosive, sir.
Q : Mr. witness, how long that training, or how long
did it take that training?
A : If I am not mistaken, we were thought to make
bomb about one month and two weeks.
Q : Now, speaking of that mission, Mr. witness, while
you were still in training at Mr. Cararao, is there
any mission that you undertook, if any, with
respect to that mission?
A : Our first mission was to plant a bomb in the malls,
LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila, sir.[16]
The witness then testified that he kept eight kilos of
TNT for accused Baharan and Trinidad.
Q : Now, going back to the bomb. Mr. witness, did
you know what happened to the 2 kilos of bomb
that Trinidad and Tapay took from you sometime
in November 2004?
A : That was the explosive that he planted in the G-
liner, which did not explode.
Q : How did you know, Mr. witness?
A : He was the one who told me, Mr. Angelo
Trinidad, sir.
Q : What happened next, Mr. witness, when the
bomb did not explode, as told to you by Trinidad?
A : On December 29, Angelo Trinidad got 2 more
kilos of TNT bombs.
Q : Did Trinidad tell you why he needed another
amount of explosive on that date, December 29,
2004? Will you kindly tell us the reason why?
A : He told me that Abu Solaiman instructed me to
get the TNT so that he could detonate a bomb
Q : Were there any other person, besides Abu
Solaiman, who called you up, with respect to the
taking of the explosives from you?
A : There is, sir Abu Zaky, sir, called up also.
Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you when he called you
up?
A : He told me that this is your first mission.
Q : Please enlighten the Honorable Court. What is
that mission you are referring to?
A : That is the first mission where we can show our
anger towards the Christians.
Q : The second time that he got a bomb from you,
Mr. witness, do you know if the bomb explode?
A : I did not know what happened to the next 2 kilos
taken by Angelo Trinidad from me until after I was
caught, because I was told by the policeman that
interviewed me after I was arrested that the 2
kilos were planted in a bus, which also did not
explode.
Q : So besides these two incidents, were there any
other incidents that Angelo Trinidad and Tapay
get an explosive for you, Mr. witness?
A : If I am not mistaken, sir, on February 13, 2005 at
6:30 p.m.
Q : Who got from you the explosive Mr. witness?
A : Its Angelo Trinidad and Tapay, sir.
Q : How many explosives did they get from you, Mr.
witness, at that time?
A : They got 2 kilos TNT bomb, sir.
Q : Did they tell you, Mr. witness, where are they
going to use that explosive?
A : No, sir.
Q : Do you know, Mr. witness, what happened to the
third batch of explosives, which were taken from
you by Trinidad and Tapay?
A : That is the bomb that exploded in Makati, sir.
Q : Why did you know, Mr. witness?

A : Because I was called in the evening of February
14 by Abu Solaiman. He told me not to leave the
house because the explosive that were taken by
Tapay and Angelo Trinidad exploded.
Q : Was there any other call during that time, Mr.
Witness?
A : I was told by Angelo Trinidad not to leave the
house because the explosive that he took
exploded already, sir.
Q : How sure were you, Mr. witness, at that time, that
indeed, the bomb exploded at Makati, beside the
call of Abu Solaiman and Trinidad?
A : It was told by Abu Solaiman that the bombing in
Makati should coincide with the bombing in
General Santos.
A : He told it to me, sir I cannot remember the date
anymore, but I know it was sometime in February
2005.
Q : Any other call, Mr. witness, from Abu Solaiman
and Trinidad after the bombing exploded in
Makati, any other call?
A : There is, sir The call came from Abu Zaky.
Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you, Mr. witness?
A : He just greeted us congratulations, because we
have a successful mission.
A : He told me that sa wakas, nag success din yung
tinuro ko sayo.
Q : By the way, Mr. witness, I would just like to clarify
this. You stated that Abu Zaky called you up the
following day, that was February 15, and
congratulating you for the success of the mission.
My question to you, Mr. witness, if you know what
is the relation of that mission, wherein you were
congratulated by Abu Zaky, to the mission, which
have been indoctrinated to you, while you were
in Mt. Cararao, Mr. witness?
A : They are connected, sir.
Q : Connected in what sense, Mr. witness?
A : Because when we were undergoing training, we
were told that the Abu Sayyaf should not wage
war to the forest, but also wage our battles in the
city.
Q : Wage the battle against who, Mr. witness?
A : The government, sir.[17]
What can be culled from the testimony of Asali is that
the Abu Sayyaf Group was determined to sow terror in Metro
Manila, so that they could show their anger towards the
Christians.[18] It can also be seen that Rohmat, together with
Janjalani and Abu Solaiman, had carefully planned the
Valentines Day bombing incident, months before it happened.
Rohmat had trained Asali and Trinidad to make bombs and
explosives. While in training, Asali and others were told that their
mission was to plant bombs in malls, the LRT, and other parts
of Metro Manila. According to Asali, Rohmat called him on 29
December 2004 to confirm that Trinidad would get two kilos of
TNT from Asali, as they were about to commence their first
mission.[19] They made two separate attempts to bomb a bus in
Metro Manila, but to no avail. The day before the Valentines Day
bombing, Trinidad got another two kilos of TNT from Asali. On
Valentines Day, the Abu Sayyaf Group announced that they had
a gift for the former President, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. On
their third try, their plan finally succeeded. Right after the bomb
exploded, the Abu Sayyaf Group declared that there would be
more bombings in the future. Asali then received a call from
Rohmat, praising the former: Sa wakas nag success din yung
tinuro ko sayo.[20]
In the light of the foregoing evidence, the Court upholds
the finding of guilt against Rohmat. Article 17 of the Revised
Penal Code reads:
Art. 17. Principals. The following are considered
principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of
the act
2. Those who directly force or induce others to
commit it
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the
offense by another act without which it would not
have been accomplished
Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the
second paragraph, or the provision on principal by inducement.
The instructions and training he had given Asali on how to make
bombs coupled with their careful planning and persistent
attempts to bomb different areas in Metro Manila and Rohmats
confirmation that Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as
part of their mission prove the finding that Rohmats co-
inducement was the determining cause of the commission of the
crime.[21] Such command or advice [was] of such nature that,
without it, the crime would not have materialized.[22]
Further, the inducement was so influential in producing
the criminal act that without it, the act would not have been
performed.[23] In People v. Sanchez, et al., the Court ruled that,
notwithstanding the fact that Mayor Sanchez was not at the
crime scene, evidence proved that he was the mastermind of
the criminal act or the principal by inducement. Thus, because
Mayor Sanchez was a co-principal and co-conspirator, and
because the act of one conspirator is the act of all, the mayor
was rendered liable for all the resulting crimes.[24] The same
finding must be applied to the case at bar.
The Court also affirms the finding of the existence of
conspiracy involving accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Rohmat.
Conspiracy was clearly established from the collective acts of
the accused-appellants before, during and after the commission
of the crime. As correctly declared by the trial court in its
Omnibus Decision:
Asalis clear and categorical
testimony, which remains unrebutted on its
major points, coupled with the judicial
admissions freely and voluntarily given by the
two other accused, are sufficient to prove the
existence of a conspiracy hatched between
and among the four accused, all members of
the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf, to wreak
chaos and mayhem in the metropolis by
indiscriminately killing and injuring civilian
victims by utilizing bombs and other similar
destructive explosive devices.
While said conspiracy involving the
four malefactors has not been expressly
admitted by accused Baharan, Angelo
Trinidad, and Rohmat, more specifically with
respect to the latters participation in the
commission of the crimes, nonetheless it has
been established by virtue of the
aforementioned evidence, which established
the existence of the conspiracy itself and the
indispensable participation of accused
Rohmat in seeing to it that the conspirators
criminal design would be realized.
It is well-established that conspiracy
may be inferred from the acts of the accused,
which clearly manifests a concurrence of
wills, a common intent or design to commit a
crime (People v. Lenantud, 352 SCRA 544).
Hence, where acts of the accused collectively
and individually demonstrate the existence of
 a common design towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful
purpose, conspiracy is evident and all the
perpetrators will be held liable as principals
(People v. Ellado, 353 SCRA 643).[25]
In People v. Geronimo, the Court pronounced that it
would be justified in concluding that the defendants therein were
engaged in a conspiracy when the defendants by their acts
aimed at the same object, one performing one part and the other
performing another part so as to complete it, with a view to the
attainment of the same object; and their acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating
closeness of personal association, concerted action and
concurrence of sentiments.[26]
Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is
inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
It is true that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator
against a co-conspirator are admissible only when made during
the existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled
in People v. Buntag, if the declarant repeats the statement in
court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission,
making the testimony admissible as to both
conspirators.[27] Thus, in People v. Palijon, the Court held the
following:
[W]e must make a distinction between
extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An
extrajudicial confession may be given in
evidence against the confessant but not
against his co-accused as they are deprived
of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A
judicial confession is admissible against the
declarants co-accused since the latter are
afforded opportunity to cross-examine the
former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or
admissions and not to testimony at trial
where the party adversely affected has the
opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant. Mercenes admission implicating
his co-accused was given on the witness
stand. It is admissible in evidence against
appellant Palijon. Moreover, where several
accused are tried together for the same
offense, the testimony of a co-accused
implicating his co-accused is competent
evidence against the latter.[28]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, as affirmed with modification by
the Court of Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 213455 August 11, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. AMPARO M.
CABOTAJE-TANG, HON. SAMUEL R. MARTIRES, and
HON. ALEX L. QUIROZ OF THE THIRD DIVISION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the “petition for certiorari with prayers (a) for the
Court En Banc to act on the petition; (b) to expedite the
proceedings and to set the case for oral arguments; and (c) to
issue a temporary restraining order to the respondents from
holding a pre-trial and further proceedings in Criminal Case No.
SB-14-CRM-0238”[1] filed by petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile
(Enrile) challenging the July 11, 2014 resolutions [2] of the
Sandiganbayan.
I.
THE ANTECEDENTS
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an
Information[3] for plunder against Enrile, Jessica Lucila Reyes,
Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de
Asis before the Sandiganbayan.
The Information reads:
xxxx
In 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, in the Philippines, and
within this Honorable Court’s jurisdiction, above-named accused
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA
LUCILA G. REYES, then Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile’s Office,
both public officers, committing the offense in relation to their
respective offices, conspiring with one another and with JANET
LIM NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND
DE ASIS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally
amass, accumulate, and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting
to at least ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (Php172,834,500.00) through a combination or series
of overt criminal acts, as follows:
by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her
representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or
commissions under the following circumstances: before,
during and/or after the project identification, NAPOLES gave,
and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a percentage of the
cost of a project to be funded from ENRILE’S Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of
(a)
ENRILE’S endorsement, directly or through REYES, to the
appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES’ non-
government organizations which became the recipients
and/or target implementors of ENRILE’S PDAF projects,
which duly-funded projects turned out to be ghosts or
fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the
PDAF proceeds for her personal gain;
by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their
official positions, authority, relationships, connections, and
(b) influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and
to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Enrile responded by filing before the Sandiganbayan (1)
an urgent omnibus motion (motion to dismiss for lack of
evidence on record to establish probable cause and ad
cautelam motion for bail),[4] and (2) a supplemental opposition
to issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of
Information,[5] on June 10, 2014, and June 16, 2014,
respectively. The Sandiganbayan heard both motions on June
20, 2014.
On June 24, 2014, the prosecution filed a consolidated
opposition to both motions.
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s
motions and ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest on the
plunder case against the accused.[6]
On July 8, 2014, Enrile received a notice of hearing[7] informing
him that his arraignment would be held before the
Sandiganbayan’s Third Division on July 11, 2014.
On July 10, 2014, Enrile filed a motion for bill of
particulars[8] before the Sandiganbayan. On the same date, he
filed a motion for deferment of arraignment[9] since he was to
undergo medical examination at the Philippine General Hospital
(PGH).
On July 11, 2014, Enrile was brought to the Sandiganbayan
pursuant to the Sandiganbayan’s order and his motion for bill of
particularswas called for hearing. Atty. Estelito Mendoza (Atty.
Mendoza), Enrile’s counsel, argued the motion orally.
Thereafter, Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice (PJ) Amparo
Cabotaje-Tang (Cabotaje-Tang), declared a “10-minute recess”
to deliberate on the motion.
When the court session resumed, PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced
the Court’s denial of Enrile’s motion for bill of
particulars essentially on the following grounds: was a serious violation of his constitutional right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
the details that Enrile desires are “substantial
reiterations” of the arguments he raised in his Enrile further alleges that he was left to speculate on what his
(1)
supplemental opposition to the issuance of warrant of specific participation in the crime of plunder had been. He posits
arrest and for dismissal of information; and that the Information should have stated the details of the
the details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best particular acts that allegedly constituted the imputed series or
(2)
ventilated during trial. combination of overt acts that led to the charge of plunder. Enrile
essentially reiterates the “details desired” that he sought in his
Atty. Mendoza asked for time to file a motion for reconsideration, motion for bill of particulars, as follows:
stating that he would orally move to reconsider the
Sandiganbayan’s denial if he would not be given time to seek a Allegations of Information Details Desired
reconsideration. The Sandiganbayan then directed Atty. “x x x accused JUAN PONCE
Mendoza to immediately proceed with his motion for ENRILE, then a Philippine
reconsideration. Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G.
REYES, then Chief of Staff of
Atty. Mendoza thus orally presented his arguments for the Senator Enrile’s Office, both
reconsideration of the denial of Enrile’s motion for bill of public officers, committing the
particulars. The Sandiganbayan again declared a recess to offense in relation to their
a. Who among the accused
deliberate on the motion. After five (5) minutes, PJ Cabotaje- respective offices, conspiring
acquired the alleged “ill-gotten
Tang announced the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the motion for with one another and with
wealth amounting to at least
reconsideration.[10] JANET LIM NAPOLES,
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY
RONALD JOHN LIM, and
TWO MILLION EIGHT
The Sandiganbayan reduced its rulings into writing on Enrile’s JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, did
HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR
written and oral motions. The pertinent portion of this ruling then and there willfully,
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
reads: unlawfully, and criminally
PESOS
amass, accumulate, and/or
(Php172,834,500.00)”? One of
xxxx acquire ill-gotten wealth
them, two of them or all of
amounting to at least ONE
them? Kindly specify.
In today’s consideration of accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO
for Bill of Particulars, the Court heard the parties on oral MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
arguments in relation thereto. Thereafter, it declared a ten- THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND
minute recess to deliberate thereon. After deliberating on the FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
said motion as well as the arguments of the parties, the Court (Php172,834,500.00) through a
resolves to DENY as it hereby DENIES the same motion for bill combination or series of overt
of particulars for the following reasons: (1) the details desired in acts, x x x.”
paragraphs 2 to 5 of the said motion are substantially b. The allegation “through a
reiterations of the arguments raised by accused Enrile in his combination or series of overt
Supplemental Opposition to Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and criminal acts” is a conclusion
for Dismissal of Information dated June 16, 2014 x x x. of fact or of law. What are the
particular overt acts which
The Court already upheld the sufficiency of the allegations in the constitute the “combination”?
Information charging accused Enrile, among other persons, with What are the particular overt
the crime of plunder in its Resolution dated July 3, 2014. It finds acts which constitute the
no cogent reasons to reconsider the said ruling. “series”? Who committed
those acts?
Moreover, the “desired details” that accused Enrile would like x x x by repeatedly receiving
the prosecution to provide are evidentiary in nature, which need from NAPOLES and/or her
not be alleged in the Information. They are best ventilated during representatives LIM, DE ASIS,
the trial of the case. and others, kickbacks or
commissions under the
Counsel for accused Juan Ponce Enrile orally sought a following circumstances:
reconsideration of the denial of his motion for bill of particulars before, during and/or after the
which was opposed by the prosecution. The Court then declared project identification, NAPOLES
another ten-minute recess to deliberate on the said motion for gave, and ENRILE and/or
reconsideration. After deliberation thereon, the Court likewise REYES received, a percentage
resolved to DENY as it hereby DENIES accused Juan Ponce of the cost of a project to be a. What was “repeatedly”
Enrile’s motion for reconsideration there being no new or funded from ENRILE’S Priority received? If sums of money,
substantial grounds raised to warrant the grant thereof. Development Assistance Fund the particular amount. If on
(PDAF), in consideration of several occasions and in
ACCORDINGLY, the scheduled arraignment of accused Juan ENRILE’S endorsement, different amounts, specify the
Ponce Enrile shall now proceed as previously scheduled. directly or through REYES, to amount on each occasion and
the appropriate government the corresponding date of
SO ORDERED.[11] agencies, of NAPOLES’ non- receipt.
government organizations
Atty. Mendoza subsequently moved for the deferment of Enrile’s which became the recipients
arraignment. The Sandiganbayan responded by directing the and/or target implementers of
doctors present to determine whether he was physically fit to be ENRILE’S PDAF projects,
arraigned. After he was declared fit, the Sandiganbayan which duly-funded projects
proceeded with Enrile’s arraignment. Enrile entered a “no plea,” turned out to be ghosts or
prompting the Sandiganbayan to enter a “not guilty” plea on his fictitious, thus enabling
behalf. NAPOLES to misappropriate
the PDAF proceeds for her
personal gain;
II. b. Name the specific person(s)
who delivered the amount of
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI Php172,834,500.00 and the
specific person(s) who
Enrile claims in this petition that the Sandiganbayan acted with received the amount; or if not
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of in lump sum, the various
jurisdiction when it denied his motion for bill of amounts totaling
particulars despite the ambiguity and insufficiency of the Php172,834,500.00. x x x
Information filed against him. Enrile maintains that the denial Specify particularly the person
 who delivered the amount,
Napoles or Lim or De Asis, and
who particularly are “the
others.”
c. To whom was the money
given? To Enrile or Reyes?
State the amount given on
each occasion, the date when
and the placewhere the
amount was given.
d. x x x Describe each project
allegedly identified, how,
and by whom was the project
identified, the nature of each
project, where it is located and
the cost of each project.
e. For each of the years 2004-
2010, under what
law or official document is a
portion of the “Priority
Development Assistance
Fund” identified as that of a
member of Congress, in this
instance, as ENRILE’s, to be
found? In what amount for
each year is ENRILE’s Priority
Development Assistance
Fund? When, and to whom,
did Enrile endorse the projects
in favor of “Napoles non-
government organizations
which became the recipients
and/or target implementers of
ENRILE’s PDAF
projects?” Name Napoles
non-government organizations
which became the recipients
and/or target implementers of
ENRILE’s PDAF
projects. Who
paid Napoles, from whom did
Napoles collect the fund for the
projects which turned out to be
ghosts or fictitious? Who
authorized the payments for
each project?
f. x x x what COA audits or field
investigations were conducted
which validated the findings
that each of Enrile’s PDAF
projects in the years 2004-
2010 were ghosts or spurious
projects?
a. Provide the details of how
Enrile took undue advantage,
on several occasions, of his
official positions, authority,
relationships, connections,
and influence to unjustly
x x x by taking undue
enrich himself at the expense
advantage, on several
and to the damage and
occasions of their official
prejudice, of the Filipino
positions, authority,
people and the Republic of the
relationships, connections, and
Philippines. Was this because
influence to unjustly enrich
he receivedany money from
themselves at the expense and
the government? From
to the damage and prejudice, of
whom and for whatreason did
the Filipino people and the
he receive any money or
Republic of the Philippines.
property from the government
through which he “unjustly
enriched himself”? State the
details from whom
each amount was received,
the place and the time.
Enrile posits that his ‘desired details’ are not evidentiary in
nature; they are material facts that should be clearly alleged in
the Information so that he may be fully informed of the charges
against him and be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
Enrile adds that the grounds raised in his motion for bill of
particulars are cited in a context different from his opposition to
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. He maintains that the
resolution of the probable cause issue was interlocutory and
did “not bar the submission of the same issue in subsequent
proceedings especially in the context of a different
proceeding.”
Enrile thus prays that: “(a) the Court en banc act on
the present petition; (b) by way of an interim measure, the
Court issue a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
the Sandiganbayan from holding the pre-trial and subsequent
proceedings against him in Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-
0238 during the pendency of the present petition; (c) the Court
expedite the proceedings and set the case for oral arguments;
and (d) at the conclusion of the proceedings, the Court annul
and set aside the Sandiganbayan’s July 11, 2014 resolution
and his arraignment.”
A. The People’s Comment
In its Comment,[12] the People of the
Philippines[13] counters that the Sandiganbayan did not
exercise its discretionary power in an arbitrary or despotic
manner. Even assuming that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of
Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars was erroneous, the error
did not amount to lack or excess or jurisdiction. It further
maintains that the assailed Sandiganbayan rulings were
arrived at based on the procedures prescribed under Section
2, Rule VII of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan.
The People also argues that the Information already
contained the ultimate facts; matters of evidence do not need
to be averred.
B. Enrile’s Reply
In his Reply, Enrile essentially claims that the right to
move for a bill of particulars is “ancillary to and in
implementation” of an accused’s rights to due process, to be
heard, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. He maintains that the
Sandiganbayan’s denial of his motion for bill of particulars is
not “a mere denial of a procedural right under the Rules of
Court, but of rights vested in an accused under the Constitution
to ensure fairness in the trial of the offense charged.” Enrile
also adds that there could only be a fair trial if he could
properly plead to the Information and prepare for trial.
Enrile further argues that the People’s Comment did
not dispute the relevance of the details sought in the motion for
bill of particulars. He likewise claims that the “desired details”
could not be found in the bundle of documents marked by
the prosecution during the preliminary conference. Finally,
Enrile maintains that his motion for bill of particulars was not
dilatory.
III.
THE COURT’S RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to partially GRANT the
petition under the terms outlined below.
A. The constitutional right of the accused to be informed
Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged
of a criminal offense has the right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.[14] This right has long
been established in English law, and is the same right
expressly guaranteed in our 1987 Constitution. This right
requires that the offense charged be stated with clarity and
with certainty to inform the accused of the crime he is facing in
sufficient detail to enable him to prepare his defense.[15]
In the 1904 case of United States v. Karelsen,[16] the
Court explained the purpose of informing an accused in writing
of the charges against him from the perspective of his right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him:
The object of this written accusation was – First. To
furnish the accused with such a description of the charge
against him as will enable him to make his defense; and
 second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for
protection against a further prosecution for the same
cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged,
so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction, if one should be had. (United States
vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542.) In order that this requirement
may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions
of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent;
these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable
particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant),
and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a
specific allegation of every fact and circumstances
necessary to constitute the crime charged. x x
x.[17][Emphasis supplied.]
The objective, in short, is to describe the act with
sufficient certainty to fully appraise the accused of the nature of
the charge against him and to avoid possible surprises that
may lead to injustice. Otherwise, the accused would be left
speculating on why he has been charged at all.[18]
In People v. Hon. Mencias, et al.,[19] the Court further
explained that a person’s constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him signifies
that an accused should be given the necessary data on why he
is the subject of a criminal proceeding. The Court added that
the act or conduct imputed to a person must be described with
sufficient particularity to enable the accused to defend himself
properly.
The general grant and recognition of a protected right
emanates from Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
which states that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. The purpose of the
guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against the
life, liberty, and property of individuals; to secure the individual
from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government,
unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and
distributive justice x x x; and to secure to all persons equal and
impartial justice and the benefit of the general law. [20]
Separately from Section 1, Article III is the specific
and direct underlying root of the right to information in criminal
proceedings – Section 14(1), Article III – which provides that
“No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law.” Thus, no doubt exists that the
right to be informed of the cause of the accusation in a criminal
case has deep constitutional roots that, rather than being
cavalierly disregarded, should be carefully protected.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (2nd
Division),[21] the Court, in sustaining the Sandiganbayan’s grant
of the motion for bill of particulars of Ferdinand Marcos, Jr.,
held that “the facile verbosity with which the legal counsel for
the government flaunted the accusation of excesses against
the Marcoses in general terms must be soonest refurbished by
a bill of particulars, so that respondent can properly prepare an
intelligent responsive pleading and so that trial in this case will
proceed as expeditiously as possible.”[22] The Court
additionally stated that:
This Court has been liberal in giving the lower courts
the widest latitude of discretion in setting aside default orders
justified under the right to due process principle. Plain justice
demands and the law requires no less that defendants must
know what the complaint against them is all about.
x x x In the interest of justice, we need to dispel the
impression in the individual respondents' minds that they are
being railroaded out of their rights and properties without due
process of law.[23]
B. Procedural Sufficiency of the Information
An Information is an accusation in writing charging a
person with an offense, signed by the prosecutor and filed with
the court.[24] The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in
implementing the constitutional right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, specifically require certain matters to be stated in the
Information for its sufficiency. The requirement aims to
enable the accused to properly prepare for his defense
since he is presumed to have no independent knowledge
of the facts constituting the offense charged.[25]
To be considered as sufficient and valid, an
information must state the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense;
and the place where the offense was committed.[26]
If there is no designation of the offense, reference
shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute
penalizing it. The acts or omissions constituting the offense
and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances alleged must
be stated in ordinary and concise language; they do not
necessarily need to be in the language of the statute, and
should be in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is charged and what
qualifying and aggravating circumstances are alleged, so that
the court can pronounce judgment.[27] The Rules do not require
the Information to exactly allege the date and place of the
commission of the offense, unless the date and the place are
material ingredients or essential elements of the offense, or are
necessary for its identification.
B.1. Ultimate facts versus Evidentiary facts
An Information only needs to state the ultimate facts
constituting the offense; the evidentiary and other details (i.e.,
the facts supporting the ultimate facts) can be provided during
the trial.[28]
Ultimate facts is defined as “those facts which the
expected evidence will support. The term does not refer to the
details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which
these material elements are to be established.” It refers to the
facts that the evidence will prove at the trial.[29]
Ultimate facts has also been defined as the principal,
determinative, and constitutive facts on whose existence the
cause of action rests;[30] they are also the essential and
determining facts on which the court's conclusion rests and
without which the judgment would lack support in essential
particulars.[31]
Evidentiary facts, on the other hand, are the facts
necessary to establish the ultimate facts; they are the premises
that lead to the ultimate facts as conclusion.[32] They are facts
supporting the existence of some other alleged and
unproven fact.[33]
In Bautista v. Court of Appeals,[34] the Court explained
these two concepts in relation to a particular criminal case, as
follows:
The distinction between the elements of the
offense and the evidence of these elements is
analogous or akin to the difference between ultimate
facts and evidentiary facts in civil cases. Ultimate
facts are the essential and substantial facts which
either form the basis of the primary right and duty
or which directly make up the wrongful acts or
omissions of the defendant, while evidentiary facts
are those which tend to prove or establish
said ultimate facts. x x x.[35] [Emphasis supplied.]
While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must
be alleged in the Information, matters of evidence – as
distinguished from the facts essential to the nature of the
offense – do not need to be alleged. Whatever facts and
circumstances must necessarily be alleged are to be
determined based on the definition and the essential elements
of the specific crimes.[36]
C. Arraignment
The procedural due process mandate of the
Constitution requires that the accused be arraigned so that he
may be fully informed as to why he was charged and what
penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on showing
that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full
opportunity to disprove the evidence against him.[37] During
arraignment, the accused is granted the opportunity to fully
know the precise charge that confronts him and made
fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life,
depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him.[38]
An arraignment thus ensures that an accused be fully
acquainted with the nature of the crime imputed to him in the
Information and the circumstances under which it is allegedly
committed.[39] It is likewise at this stage of the proceedings
when the accused enters his plea,[40] or enters a plea of not
guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the
offense charged.[41]
A concomitant component of this stage of the
proceedings is that the Information should provide the accused
with fair notice of the accusations made against him, so that
he will be able to make an intelligent plea and prepare a
defense.[42] Moreover, the Information must provide some
means of ensuring that the crime for which the accused is
brought to trial is in fact one for which he was charged,
rather than some alternative crime seized upon by the
prosecution in light of subsequently discovered
evidence.[43] Likewise, it must indicate just what crime or
crimes an accused is being tried for, in order to avoid
subsequent attempts to retry him for the same crime or
crimes.[44] In other words, the Information must permit the
accused to prepare his defense, ensure that he is prosecuted
only on the basis of facts presented, enable him to plead
jeopardy against a later prosecution, and inform the court of
the facts alleged so that it can determine the sufficiency of the
charge.
Oftentimes, this is achieved when the Information
alleges the material elements of the crime charged. If the
Information fails to comply with this basic standard, it would be
quashed on the ground that it fails to charge an offense.[45] Of
course, an Information may be sufficient to withstand a
motion to quash, and yet insufficiently inform the accused
of the specific details of the alleged offenses. In such
instances, the Rules of Court allow the accused to move
for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and
to prepare for trial.[46]
C.1. Bill of Particulars
In general, a bill of particulars is the further
specification of the charges or claims in an action, which
an accused may avail of by motion before arraignment, to
enable him to properly plead and prepare for trial. In civil
proceedings, a bill of particulars has been defined as a
complementary procedural document consisting of an
amplification or more particularized outline of a pleading, and is
in the nature of a more specific allegation of the facts recited in
the pleading.[47] The purpose of a motion for bill of particulars in
civil cases is to enable a party to prepare his responsive
pleading properly.
In criminal cases, a bill of particulars details items or
specific conduct not recited in the Information but nonetheless
pertain to or are included in the crime charged. Its purpose is
to enable an accused: to know the theory of the government’s
case;[48] to prepare his defense and to avoid surprise at the
trial; to plead his acquittal or conviction in bar of another
prosecution for the same offense; and to compel the
prosecution to observe certain limitations in offering
evidence.[49]
In criminal proceedings, the motion for a bill of
particulars is governed by Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:
Section 9. Bill of particulars. - The accused may, before
arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him
properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall
specify the alleged defects of the complaint or
information and the details desired.
The rule requires the information to describe the
offense with sufficient particularity to apprise the accused of
the crime charged with and to enable the court to pronounce
judgment. The particularity must be such that persons of
ordinary intelligence may immediately know what the
Information means.[50]
The general function of a bill of particulars, whether in
civil or criminal proceedings, is to guard against surprises
during trial. It is not the function of the bill to furnish the
accused with the evidence of the prosecution. Thus, the
prosecutor shall not be required to include in the bill of
particulars matters of evidence relating to how the people
intend to prove the elements of the offense charged or how the
people intend to prove any item of factual information included
in the bill of particulars.[51]
C.2. Origin of bill of particulars in criminal cases[52]
Even before the promulgation of the 1964 Rules of
Court, when the applicable rules for criminal procedure was
still General Order No. 58,[53] the Court had already recognized
the need for a bill of particulars in criminal cases. This
recognition came despite the lack of any specific provision in
General Order No. 58 setting out the rules for a bill of
particulars in criminal cases.
In U.S. v. Schneer,[54] the issue presented was
whether a bill of particulars was available in a criminal case for
estafa after the accused had already been arraigned. The
Court essentially ruled that there was no specific provision of
law expressly authorizing the filing of specifications or bills of
particulars in criminal cases, and held that:
We know of no provision either in General Orders,
No. 58, or in the laws existing prior thereto which requires the
Government to furnish such a bill of particulars, and we
accordingly hold that it was not error on the part of the court
below to refuse to do so.
In U.S. v. Cernias,[55] however, the Court formally
recognized the existence and applicability of a bill of particulars
in criminal cases. In this case, the prosecution filed an
information charging Basilio Cernias with several counts of
brigandage before the Court of First Instance of Leyte. In
overruling the accused’s objection, the Court declared that the
prosecution’s act of specifying certain acts done by the
conspirators in the Information “did no more than to furnish the
defendant with a bill of particulars of the facts which it intended
to prove at the trial x x x.”[56]
In sum, the Court essentially held that a detailed
complaint or information is not objectionable, and that the
details it contains may be properly considered as specifications
or bill of particulars.[57]
In People v. Abad Santos,[58] the court first recognized
a bill of particulars, as a right that the accused may ask for
from the court. In this case, the prosecution charged
respondent Joseph Arcache with the crime of treason before
the People’s Court. The Information filed against the accused
contained, in counts 2 and 3, the phrase “and other similar
equipment.”
The counsel for the accused verbally petitioned the
People’s court to order the prosecution to “make more specific
[the] phrase ‘and other similar equipment,’” which request the
People’s Court granted. The People of the Philippines filed a
petition for certiorari, but the Court dismissed this petition.
In upholding the order of the People’s Court, the
Court ruled that “in the absence of specific provisions of law
prohibiting the filing of specifications or bills of particulars in
criminal cases, their submission may be permitted, as they
cannot prejudice any substantial rights of the accused. On the
contrary, they will serve to apprise the accused clearly of the
charges filed against them, and thus enable them to prepare
intelligently whatever defense or defenses they might have. [59]
Notably, Abad Santos emphasized the importance of
a bill of particulars in criminal cases, stating that “x x x
inasmuch as in criminal cases not only the liberty but even the
life of the accused may be at stake, it is always wise and
proper that the accused should be fully apprised of the true
charges against them, and thus avoid all and any possible
surprise, which might be detrimental to their rights and
interests; and ambiguous phrases should not, therefore, be
permitted in criminal complaints or informations; and if any
such phrase has been included therein, on motion of the
defense, before the commencement of the trial, the court
should order either its elimination as surplusage or the filing of
the necessary specification, which is but an amendment in
mere matters of form.”[60]
In these cited cases, the Courts did not rely on the
Rules of Court to provide for a bill of particulars in criminal
cases. A specific provision granting the accused the right “to
move for or demand a more definite statement or a bill of
particulars” was not incorporated as a formal rule until the 1964
Rules of Court,[61] under its Section 6, Rule 116. This initial
provision later became Section 10 of Rule 116 under the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure[62] and Section 9 of Rule 116
under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended.[63]
C.3. The Distinctive Role of a Bill of Particulars
When allegations in an Information
are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the accused is not a
motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars.
The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague facts or
allegations in the complaint or information to enable the
accused to properly plead and prepare for
trial. It presupposes a valid Information, one that presents
all the elements of the crime charged, albeit under vague
terms. Notably, the specifications that a bill of particulars may
supply are only formal amendments to the complaint or
Information.
In Virata v.Sandiganbayan,[64] the Court expounded
on the purpose of a bill of particulars as follows:
It is the office or function, as well as the object or
purpose, of a bill of particulars to amplify or limit a
pleading, specify more minutely and particularly a
claim or defense set up and pleaded in general terms,
give information, not contained in the pleading, to the
opposite party and the court as to the precise nature,
character, scope, and extent of the cause of action or
defense relied on by the pleader, and apprise the
opposite party of the case which he has to meet, to the
end that the proof at the trial may be limited to the
matters specified, and in order that surprise at, and
needless preparation for, the trial may be avoided, and
that the opposite party may be aided in framing his
answering pleading and preparing for trial. It has also
been stated that it is the function or purpose of a
bill of particulars to define, clarify, particularize,
and limit or circumscribe the issues in the case, to
expedite the trial, and assist the court. A general
function or purpose of a bill of particulars is to
prevent injustice or do justice in the case when that
cannot be accomplished without the aid of such a
bill.[65]
x x x x [Emphasis ours.]
Notably, the failure of the accused to move for the
specification of the details desired deprives him of the
right to object to evidence that could be introduced and
admitted under an Information of more or less general
terms but which sufficiently charges the accused with a
definite crime.[66]
Although the application for the bill of particulars is
one addressed to the sound discretion of the court [67] it should
nonetheless exercise its discretion within the context of the
facts and the nature of the crime charged in each case
and the right of the accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation against him. As articulated in
the case of People v. Iannone:[68]
It is beyond cavil that a defendant has a basic and
fundamental right to be informed of the charges against him so
that he will be able to prepare a defense. Hence the courts
must exercise careful surveillance to ensure that a defendant is
not deprived of this right by an overzealous prosecutor
attempting to protect his case or his witnesses. Any effort to
leave a defendant in ignorance of the substance of the
accusation until the time of trial must be firmly rebuffed. This is
especially so where the indictment itself provides a paucity of
information. In such cases, the court must be vigilant in
safeguarding the defendant's rights to a bill of particulars and
to effective discovery. Should the prosecutor decide to use an
indictment which, although technically sufficient, does not
adequately allow a defendant to properly prepare for trial, he
may well run afoul of the defendant's right to be informed of the
accusations against him.
Thus, if the Information is lacking, a court should take
a liberal attitude towards its granting[69] and order the
government to file a bill of particulars elaborating on the
charges. Doubts should be resolved in favor of granting the
bill[70] to give full meaning to the accused’s Constitutionally
guaranteed rights.
Notably, the government cannot put the accused in
the position of disclosing certain overt acts through the
Information and withholding others subsequently discovered,
all of which it intends to prove at the trial. This is the type of
surprise a bill of particulars is designed to avoid.[71] The
accused is entitled to the observance of all the rules
designated to bring about a fair verdict.
This becomes more relevant in the present case
where the crime charged carries with it the severe penalty
of capital punishment and entails the commission of
several predicate criminal acts involving a great number of
transactionsspread over a considerable period of time.
C.4. Motion to Quash vs. Motion for Bill of Particulars
A bill of particulars presupposes a valid Information
while a motion to quash is a jurisdictional defect on account
that the facts charged in the Information does not constitute an
offense.[72]
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his dissent, avers that
the allegations in the information are not vague because the
Information needs only allege the ultimate facts constituting the
offense for which the accused stands charged, not the finer
details of why and how the illegal acts alleged were committed.
In support of his position, Justice Carpio cited the cases
of Miguel v. Sandiganbayan,[73] Go v. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas,[74] and People v. Romualdez,[75] among others, to
support the superfluity of the details requested by Enrile.
Justice Carpio’s reliance on these cases
is misplaced for they involve the issue of quashal of an
information on the ground that the facts charge do not
constitute an offense, rather than a request for bill of
particulars. That is, these cited cases involve the critical issue
of the validity of an information, and not a request for specificity
with request to an offense charged in an information.
On the other hand, the cases of People v.
Sanico,[76] People v. Banzuela,[77] Pielago v. People,[78] People
v. Rayon, Sr.,[79] People v. Subesa,[80] People v.
Anguac,[81] and Los Baños v. Pedro,[82] which were likewise
cited by Justice Carpio, involve the issue that an Information
only need to allege the ultimate facts, and not the specificity of
the allegations contained in the information as to allow the
accused to prepare for trial and make an intelligent plea.[83]
Notably, in Miguel,[84] to which Justice Carpio
concurred, this Court mentioned that the proper remedy, if
at all, to a supposed ambiguity in an otherwise valid
Information, is merely to move for a bill of particulars and
not for the quashal of an information which sufficiently
alleges the elements of the offense charged.[85]
Clearly then, a bill of particulars does not
presuppose an invalid information for it merely fills in the
details on an otherwise valid information to enable an
accused to make an intelligent plea and prepare for his
defense.
I stress, however, that the issue in the present case
involves abuse of discretion for denying Enrile’s request for a
bill of particulars, and not a motion to quash.
If the information does not charge an offense,
then a motion to quash is in order.[86]
But if the information charges an offense and the
averments are so vague that the accused cannot prepare
to plead or prepare for trial, then a motion for a bill of
particulars is the proper remedy.[87]
Thus viewed, a motion to quash and a motion for a bill
of particulars are distinct and separate remedies, the latter
presupposing an information sufficient in law to charge an
offense.[88]
D. The Grave Abuse of Discretion Issue
The grant or denial of a motion for bill of particulars is
discretionary on the court where the Information is filed. As
usual in matters of discretion, the ruling of the trial court will not
be reversed unless grave abuse of discretion or a manifestly
erroneous order amounting to grave abuse of discretion is
shown.[89]
Grave abuse of discretion refers to the capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment that amounts or is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law such as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility.[90] For the extraordinary writ
of certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary, or
whimsical exercise of power.
It will be recalled that the Sandiganbayan denied
Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars on two grounds, namely:
the details sought were evidentiary in nature and
(1)
are best ventilated during trial; and
his desired details were reiterations of the details
(2) he sought in his supplemental opposition to the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.
We shall separately examine these grounds in
determining whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion when it denied Enrile’s motion for a bill of
particulars and his subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Sandiganbayan Ground #1:
The details sought were evidentiary in nature
D.1. The Law of Plunder
A determination of whether the details that Enrile
sought were evidentiary requires an examination of the
elements of the offense he is charged with, i.e., plunder under
Republic Act No. 7080.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, reads:
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder;
Penalties. — Any public officer who, by himself or
in connivance with members of his family, relatives
by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through
a combination or series of overt criminal acts as
described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death. Any person who participated with
the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be
punished for such offense. In the imposition of
penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal
Code, shall be considered by the court. The court
shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their
interests and other incomes and assets including the
properties and shares of stocks derived from the
deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the
State. [Emphasis supplied.]
Based on this definition, the elements of plunder are:
That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or
in connivance with members of his family, relatives by
(1)
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates,
or other persons;
That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten
(2) wealth through a combination or series of the following
overt or criminal acts:
through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
(a) malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury;
by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift,
share, percentage, kickback or any other form of
pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in
(b)
connection with any government contract or project or by
reason of the office or position of the public officer
concerned;
by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of
assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
(c)
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of government-
owned or -controlled corporations or their subsidiaries;
by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly
any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
(d)
participation including the promise of future employment in
any business enterprise or undertaking;
by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation
(e)
of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular
persons or special interests; or
by taking undue advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich
(f) himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage
and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines; and,
That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten
(3) wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least
P50,000,000.00. [Emphasis supplied.]
D.1.a. The Conspiracy Element and its Requested Details
Taking these elements into account, we hold that
Enrile’s requested details on Who among the accused
acquired the alleged “ill-gotten wealth” are not proper
subjects for a bill of particulars.
The allegation of the Information that the accused and
Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, “conspiring with one another and with
Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de
Asis x x x” expressly charges conspiracy.
The law on plunder provides that it is committed by “a
public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with x x x.”
The term “connivance” suggests an agreement or consent to
commit an unlawful act or deed with another; to connive is to
cooperate or take part secretly with another.[91] It implies both
knowledge and assent that may either be active or passive.[92]
Since the crime of plunder may be done in
connivance or in conspiracy with other persons, and the
Information filed clearly alleged that Enrile and Jessica Lucila
Reyes conspired with one another and with Janet Lim
Napoles, Ronald John Lim and John Raymund De Asis, then it
is unnecessary to specify, as an essential element of the
offense, whether the ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least
P172,834,500.00 had been acquired by one, by two or by all of
the accused. In the crime of plunder, the amount of ill-
gotten wealth acquired by each accused in a conspiracy is
immaterial for as long as the total amount amassed,
acquired or accumulated is at least P50 million.
We point out that conspiracy in the present case is
not charged as a crime by itself but only as the mode of
committing the crime. Thus, there is no absolute necessity of
reciting its particulars in the Information because conspiracy is
not the gravamen of the offense charged.
It is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the
commission of an offense in either of the following manner: (1)
by use of the word “conspire,” or its derivatives or synonyms,
such as confederate, connive, collude; or (2) by allegations of
basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a
person of common understanding would know what is
intended, and with such precision as the nature of the crime
charged will admit, to enable the accused to competently enter
a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. [93]

Our ruling on this point in People v. Quitlong[94] is
particularly instructive:
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all
the components of conspiracy or allege all the details
thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein
have performed, the evidence proving the common
design or the facts connecting all the accused with one
another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it
necessary to describe conspiracy with the same
degree of particularity required in describing a
substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment
contains a statement of the facts relied upon to be
constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise
language, with as much certainty as the nature of the
case will admit, in a manner that can enable a person
of common understanding to know what is intended,
and with such precision that the accused may plead his
acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment
based on the same facts. x x x[95]
D.1.b. The Requested Details of Enrile’s PDAF
We similarly rule that the petitioner is not entitled to
a bill of particulars for specifics sought under the questions –
For each of the years 2004-2010, under what law
or official document is a portion of the “Priority
Development Assistance Fund” identified as that of a
member of Congress, in this instance, as ENRILE’s, to be
found? In what amount for each year is ENRILE’s Priority
Development Assistance Fund?
and
x x x what COA audits or field investigations were
conducted which validated the findings that each of
Enrile’s PDAF projects in the years 2004-2010 were ghosts
or spurious projects?
These matters will simply establish and support the
ultimate fact that Enrile’s PDAF was used to fund fictitious or
nonexistent projects. Whether a discretionary fund (in the form
of PDAF) had indeed been made available to Enrile as a
member of the Philippine Congress and in what amounts are
evidentiary matters that do not need to be reflected with
particularity in the Information, and may be passed upon at the
full-blown trial on the merits of the case.
D.1.b(i) The yearly PDAF Allocations
Specifically, we believe that the exact amounts of
Enrile’s yearly PDAF allocations, if any, from 2004 to 2010
need not be pleaded with specific particularity to enable him to
properly plead and prepare for his defense. In fact, Enrile may
be in a better position to know these details than the
prosecution and thus cannot claim that he would be taken by
surprise during trial by the omission in the Information of his
annual PDAF allocations.
Thus, whether the amounts of Enrile’s PDAF
allocations have been specified or not, Enrile has been
sufficiently informed that he stands charged of endorsing
Napoles’ non-government organizations to implement spurious
or fictitious projects, in exchange for a percentage of his PDAF.
D.1.b(ii) The details of the COA Audits
The details of the “COA audits or field investigations”
only support the ultimate fact that the projects implemented by
Napoles’ NGOs, and funded by Enrile’s PDAF, were
nonexisting or fictitious. Thus, they are evidentiary in nature
and do not need to be spelled out with particularity in the
Information.
To require more details on these matters from the
prosecution would amount to asking for evidentiary information
that the latter intends to present at the trial; it would be a
compulsion on the prosecution to disclose in advance of the
trial the evidence it will use in proving the charges alleged in
the indictment.
D.1.c. Other Sources of Kickbacks and Commissions
We also deny Enrile’s plea for details on who “the
others” were (aside from Napoles, Lim and De Asis) from
whom he allegedly received kickbacks and commissions.
These other persons do not stand charged of conspiring with
Enrile and need not therefore be stated with particularly, either
as specific individuals or as John Does. The Court cannot
second-guess the prosecution’s reason for not divulging the
identity of these “others” who may potentially be witnesses for
the prosecution.
What the Constitution guarantees the accused is
simply the right to meet and examine the prosecution
witnesses. The prosecution has the prerogative to call
witnesses other than those named in the complaint or
information, subject to the defense’s right to cross-examine
them.[96] Making these “others” known would in fact be
equivalent to the prosecution’s premature disclosure of its
evidence. We stress, to the point of repetition, that a bill of
particulars is not meant to compel the prosecution
to prematurely disclose evidentiary matters supporting its case.
D.2. The Overt Acts constituting the “Combination”
or “Series” under the Plunder Law
We hold that Enrile is entitled to a bill of
particulars for specifics sought under the following questions
–
What are the particular overt acts which constitute the
“combination”? What are the particular overt acts which
constitute the “series”? Who committed those
acts? [Emphasis ours.]
D.2.a. Reason for Requirement for Particulars of Overt
Acts
Plunder is the crime committed by public officers
when they amass wealth involving at least P50 million by
means of a combination or series of overt acts.[97] Under these
terms, it is not sufficient to simply allege that the amount of ill-
gotten wealth amassed amounted to at least P50 million; the
manner of amassing the ill-gotten wealth – whether through a
combination or series of overt acts under Section 1(d) of
R.A. No. 7080 – is an important element that must be alleged.
When the Plunder Law speaks of “combination,” it
refers to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories
listed in Section 1, paragraph (d) of R.A. No. 7080 [for
example, raids on the public treasury under Section 1,
paragraph (d), subparagraph (1), and fraudulent conveyance of
assets belonging to the National Government under Section 1,
paragraph (d), subparagraph (3)].
On the other hand, to constitute a “series” there must
be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under
the same category of enumeration found in Section 1,
paragraph (d) [for example, misappropriation, malversation and
raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Section 1,
paragraph (d), subparagraph (1)].[98]
With respect to paragraph (a) of the Information –
[(i.e., by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or
her representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others,
kickbacks or commissions under the following
circumstances: before, during and/or after the project
identification, NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE and/or
REYES received, a percentage of the cost of a project
to be funded from ENRILE’S Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of
ENRILE’S endorsement, directly or through REYES, to
the appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES’
non-government organizations which became the
recipients and/or target implementers of ENRILE’S
PDAF projects, which duly funded projects turned out
to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to
misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal
gain x x x)] –
We hold that the prosecution employed a generalized
or shotgun approach in alleging the criminal overt acts
allegedly committed by Enrile. This approach rendered the
allegations of the paragraph uncertain to the point of
ambiguity for purposes of enabling Enrile to respond and
prepare for his defense. These points are explained in
greater detail below.
The heart of the Plunder Law lies in the phrase
“combination or series of overt or criminal acts.” Hence, even if
the accumulated ill-gotten wealth amounts to at least P50
million, a person cannot be prosecuted for the crime of
plunder if this resulted from a single criminal act. This
interpretation of the Plunder Law is very clear from the
congressional deliberations.[99]
Considering that without a number of overt or criminal
acts, there can be no crime of plunder, the various overt acts
that constitute the “combination” and “series” the Information
alleged, are material facts that should not only be alleged, but
must be stated with sufficient definiteness so that the accused
would know what he is specifically charged of and why he
stands charged, so that he could properly defend himself
against the charge.
Thus, the several (i.e., at least 2) acts which are
indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy must not
be generally stated; they should be stated with enough
particularity for Enrile (and his co-accused) to be able to
prepare the corresponding refuting evidence to meet these
alleged overt acts.
It is insufficient, too, to merely allege that a set of acts
had been repeatedly done (although this may constitute a
series if averred with sufficient definiteness), and aver that
these acts resulted in the accumulation or acquisition of ill-
gotten wealth amounting to at least P172,834,500.00, as in this
case. The Information should reflect with particularity the
predicate acts that underlie the crime of plunder, based on the
enumeration in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080.
A reading of the Information filed against Enrile in the
present case shows that the prosecution made little or no
effort to particularize the transactions that would
constitute the required series or combination of overt
acts.
In fact, it clustered under paragraph (a) of the
Information its recital of the manner Enrile and his co-
accused allegedly operated, thus describing its general
view of the series or combination of overt criminal acts
that constituted the crime of plunder.
Without any specification of the basic transactions
where kickbacks or commissions amounting to at least
P172,834,500.00 had been allegedly received, Enrile’s
preparation for trial is obviously hampered. This defect is not
cured by mere reference to the prosecution’s attachment,
as Enrile already stated in his Reply that the “desired
details” could not be found in the bundle of documents
marked by the prosecution, which documents are not
integral parts of the Information. Hence, the prosecution
does not discharge its burden of informing Enrile what these
overt acts were by simply pointing to these documents.
In providing the particulars of the overt acts that
constitute the “combination” or “series” of transactions
constituting plunder, it stands to reason that the amounts
involved, or at their ball park figures, should be stated;
these transactions are not necessarily uniform in amount, and
cannot simply collectively be described as amounting to
P172,834,500.00 without hampering Enrile’s right to respond
after receiving the right information.
To stress, this final sum is not a general ball park
figure but a very specific sum based on a number of
different acts and hence must have a breakdown. Providing
this breakdown reinforces the required specificity in describing
the different overt acts.
Negatively stated, unless Enrile is given the
particulars and is later given the chance to object to unalleged
details, he stands to be surprised at the trial at the same time
that the prosecution is given the opportunity to play fast and
loose with its evidence to satisfy the more than P50 Million
requirement of law.
D.2.b. Approximate Dates of Commissions or Kickbacks
Enrile should likewise know the approximate dates, at
least, of the receipt of the kickbacks and commissions, so that
he could prepare the necessary pieces of evidence,
documentary or otherwise, to disprove the allegations against
him. We point out that the period covered by the indictment
extends from “2004 to 2010 or thereabout,” of which, we again
stress that different overt acts constituting of the elements of
Plunder took place during this period.
Undoubtedly, the length of time involved – six
years – will pose difficulties to Enrile in the preparation of his
defense and will render him susceptible to surprises. Enrile
should not be left guessing and speculating which one/s from
among the numerous transactions involving his discretionary
PDAF funds from 2004 to 2010, are covered by the indictment.
D.2.c. The Projects Funded and NGOs Involved
Enrile is also entitled to particulars specifying the
project that Enrile allegedly funded coupled with the name of
Napoles’ NGO(e.g., Pangkabuhayan Foundation, Inc.), to
sufficiently inform Enrile of the particular transactions referred
to.[100]
Be it remembered that the core of the indictment is:
(1) the funding of nonexisting projects using Enrile’s
PDAF;
(2) Enrile’s endorsement of Napoles’ NGOs to the
government agencies to implement these projects; and
(3) Enrile’s receipt of kickbacks or commissions in
exchange for his endorsement.
Under the elaborate scheme alleged to have been
committed by Enrile and his co-accused, the project
identification was what started the totality of acts constituting
plunder: only after a project has been identified could Enrile
have endorsed Napoles’ NGO to the appropriate government
agency that, in turn, would implement the supposed project
using Enrile’s PDAF. Note that without the project
identification, no justification existed to release Enrile’s PDAF
to Napoles’ allegedly bogus NGO.
In these lights, the “identified project” and “Napoles’
NGO” are material facts that should be clearly and definitely
stated in the Information to allow Enrile to adequately prepare
his defense evidence on the specific transaction pointed to.
The omission of these details will necessarily leave Enrile
guessing on what transaction/s he will have to defend against,
since he may have funded other projects with his PDAF.
Specification will also allow him to object to evidence not
referred to or covered by the Information’s ultimate facts.
D.2.d. The Government Agencies Serving as Conduits
The government agencies to whom Enrile endorsed
Napoles’ NGOs are also material facts that must be specified,
since they served a necessary role in the crime charged – the
alleged conduits between Enrile and Napoles’ NGOs. They
were indispensable participants in the elaborate scheme
alleged to have been committed.
The particular person/s in each government agency
who facilitated the transactions, need not anymore be named
in the Information, as these are already evidentiary matters.
The identification of the particular agency vis-à-vis Napoles’
NGO and the identified project, will already inform Enrile of the
transaction referred to.
In Tantuico v. Republic,[101] the Republic filed a case
for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and
damages before the Sandiganbayan against former President
Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda Marcos, Benjamin Romualdez, and
Francisco Tantuico, Jr. Tantuico filed a motion for bill of
particulars essentially alleging that the complaint was couched
in general terms and did not have the particulars that would
inform him of the alleged factual and legal bases. The
Sandiganbayan denied his motion on the ground that the
particulars sought are evidentiary in nature. Tantuico moved to
reconsider this decision, but the Sandiganbayan again denied
his motion.
The Court overturned the Sandiganbayan’s ruling and
directed the prosecution to prepare and file a bill of particulars.
Significantly, the Court held that the particulars prayed for,
such as: names of persons, names of corporations, dates,
amounts involved, a specification of property for
identification purposes, the particular transactions
involving withdrawals and disbursements, and a
statement of other material facts as would support the
conclusions and inferences in the complaint, are not
evidentiary in nature. The Court explained that those
particulars are material facts that should be clearly and
definitely averred in the complaint so that the defendant may
be fairly informed of the claims made against him and be
prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
To be sure, the differences between ultimate and
evidentiary matters are not easy to distinguish.
While Tantuico was a civil case and did not involve the crime of
plunder, the Court’s ruling nonetheless serves as a useful
guide in the determination of what matters are indispensable
and what matters may be omitted in the Information, in relation
with the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
In the present case, the particulars on the:
(1) projects involved;
(2) Napoles’ participating NGOs; and
(3) the government agency involved in each transaction
Will undoubtedly provide Enrile with sufficient data to know the
specific transactions involved, and thus enable him to prepare
adequately and intelligently whatever defense or defenses he
may have.
We reiterate that the purpose of a bill of particular is
to clarify allegations in the Information that are indefinite,
vague, or are conclusions of law to enable the accused to
properly plead and prepare for trial, not simply to inform
him of the crime of which he stands accused. Verily, an
accused cannot intelligently respond to the charge laid if the
allegations are incomplete or are unclear to him.
We are aware that in a prosecution for plunder, what
is sought to be established is the commission of the criminal
acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In the
language of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7080, for purposes of
establishing the crime of plunder, it is sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth.[102]
The term “overall unlawful scheme” indicates a
general plan of action or method that the principal accused and
public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve
their common criminal goal. In the alternative, if no overall
scheme can be found or where the schemes or methods used
by the multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must
form part of a conspiracy to attain a common criminal goal. [103]
Lest Section 4 be misunderstood as allowing the
prosecution to allege that a set of acts has
been repeatedly done (thereby showing a ‘pattern’ of overt
criminal acts), as has been done in the present case, we point
out that this section does not dispense with the requirement of
stating the essential or material facts of each component or
predicate act of plunder; it merely prescribes a rule of
procedure for the prosecution of plunder.
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,[104] we construed this
procedural rule to mean that [w]hat the prosecution needed to
prove beyond reasonable doubt was only the number of acts
sufficient to form a combination or series that would constitute
a pattern involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00.
There was no need to prove each and every other act alleged
in the Information to have been committed by the accused in
furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth.[105]
If, for example, the accused is charged in the
Information of malversing public funds on twenty different (20)
occasions, the prosecution does not need to prove all 20
transactions; it suffices if a number of these acts of
malversation can be proven with moral certainty, provided only
that the series or combination of transaction would amount to
at least P50,000,000.00. Nonetheless, each of the twenty
transactions should be averred with particularity, more so
if the circumstances surrounding each transaction are not
the same. This is the only way that the accused can properly
prepare for his defense during trial.
D.3. Paragraph (b) of the Information
As his last requested point, Enrile wants the
prosecution to provide the details of the allegation under
paragraph (b) of the Information (i.e., x x x by taking undue
advantage, on several occasions, of their official position,
authority, relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly
enrich themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines) in the following manner:
Provide the details of how Enrile took undue
advantage, on several occasions, of his official positions,
authority, relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly
enrich himself at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines. Was this because he received any money from the
government? From whom and for what reason did he receive
any money or property from the government through which he
“unjustly enriched himself”? State the details from whom
eachamount was received, the place and the time.
Our ruling on Enrile’s desired details – specifically, the
particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the “combination”
and “series” charged in the Information; a breakdown of the
amounts of the kickbacks and commissions allegedly received,
stating how the amount of P172,834,500.00 was arrived at; a
brief description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks and
commissions were received; the approximate dates of receipt
of the alleged kickbacks and commissions from the identified
projects; the name of Napoles’ non-government organizations
(NGOs) which were the alleged “recipients and/or target
implementors of Enrile’s PDAF projects;” and the government
agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed Napoles’ NGOs
– renders it unnecessary to require the prosecution to
submit further particulars on the allegations contained
under paragraph (b) of the Information.
Simply put, the particular overt acts alleged to
constitute the combination or series required by the crime of
plunder, coupled with a specification of the other non-
evidentiary details stated above, already answer the question
of how Enrile took undue advantage of his position, authority,
relationships, connections and influence as Senator to unjustly
enrich himself.
We also point out that the PDAF is a discretionary
fund intended solely for public purposes. Since the Information
stated that Enrile, as “Philippine Senator,” committed the
offense “in relation to his office,” by “repeatedly receiving
kickbacks or commissions” from Napoles and/or her
representatives through projects funded by his (Enrile’s) PDAF,
then it already alleged how undue advantage had been taken
and how the Filipino people and the Republic had been
prejudiced. These points are fairly deducible from the
allegations in the Information as supplemented by the required
particulars.
E. The Grave Abuse of Discretion
In the light of all these considerations, we hold that
the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s motion for a
bill of particulars, on the ground that the details sought to
be itemized or specified are all evidentiary – without any
explanation supporting this conclusion – constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.
As discussed above, some of the desired details are
material facts that must be alleged to enable the petitioner to
properly plead and prepare his defense. The Sandiganbayan
should have diligently sifted through each detail sought to be
specified, and made the necessary determination of whether
each detail was an ultimate or evidentiary fact, particularly after
Enrile stated in his Reply that the “desired details” could not be
found in the bundle of documents marked by the prosecution.
We cannot insist or speculate that he is feigning ignorance of
the presence of these desired details; neither can we put on
him the burden of unearthing from these voluminous
documents what the desired details are. The remedy of a bill of
particulars is precisely made available by the Rules to enable
an accused to positively respond and make an intelligent
defense.
Justice Carpio’s reference to the voluminous 144-
page Ombudsman’s resolution (which found probable cause to
indict the petitioner and his co-accused not only of the crime of
plunder, but also for violations of several counts of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practice Act) to justify his argument that
Enrile was already aware of the details he seeks in his motion
for a bill of particulars, all the more strengthens our conclusive
position that the Information for plunder filed against Enrile was
ambiguous and glaringly insufficient to enable him to make a
proper plea and to prepare for trial. We reiterate, to the point of
being repetitive, that the purpose of the bill of particulars in
criminal cases is to supply vague facts or allegations in the
complaint or information to enable the accused to properly
plead and prepare for trial.
Moreover, a resolution arising from a preliminary
investigation does not amount to nor does it serve the purpose
of a bill of particulars.
A bill of particulars guards against the taking of an
accused by surprise by restricting the scope of the
proof;[106] it limits the evidence to be presented by the
parties to the matters alleged in the Information as
supplemented by the bill. It is for this reason that the failure
of an accused to move for a bill of particulars deprives him of
the right to object to evidence which could be lawfully
introduced and admitted under an information of more or less
general terms which sufficiently charges the defendants with a
definite crime.
The record on preliminary investigation, in
comparison, serves as the written account of the inquisitorial
process when the fiscal determined the existence of prima
facie evidence to indict a person for a particular crime. The
record of the preliminary investigation, as a general rule, does
not even form part of the records of the case.[107] These
features of the record of investigation are significantly different
from the bill of particulars that serves as basis, together with
the Information, in specifying the overt acts constituting the
offense that the accused pleaded to during arraignment.
Notably, plunder is a crime composed of several
predicate criminal acts. To prove plunder, the prosecution
must weave a web out of the six ways of illegally
amassing wealth and show how the various acts reveal a
combination or series of means or schemes that reveal a
pattern of criminality. The interrelationship of the separate
acts must be shown and be established as a scheme to
accumulate ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P50 million.
Plunder thus involves intricate predicate criminal acts
and numerous transactions and schemes that span a period of
time. Naturally, in its prosecution, the State possesses an
“effective flexibility” of proving a predicate criminal act or
transaction, not originally contemplated in the Information, but
is otherwise included in the broad statutory definition, in light of
subsequently discovered evidence. The unwarranted use of
the flexibility is what the bill of particulars guards against.
Justice Carpio further argues that
the ponencia transformed the nature of an action from an
accusation in writing charging a person with an offense to
an initiatory pleading alleging a cause of action.
We see nothing wrong with such treatment, for a
motion for a bill of particulars in criminal cases is designed to
achieve the same purpose as the motion for a bill of particulars
in civil cases. In fact, certainty, to a reasonable extent, is an
essential attribute of all pleadings, both civil and criminal, and
is more especially needed in the latter where conviction is
followed by penal consequences.[108]
Thus, even if the Information employs the statutory
words does not mean that it is unnecessary to allege such
facts in connection with the commission of the offense as will
certainly put the accused on full notice of what he is called
upon to defend, and establish such a record as will effectually
bar a subsequent prosecution for that identical offense. [109]
Notably, conviction for plunder carries with it the
penalty of capital punishment; for this reason, more
process is due, not less. When a person’s life interest –
protected by the life, liberty, and property language recognized
in the due process clause – is at stake in the proceeding, all
measures must be taken to ensure the protection of those
fundamental rights.
As we emphasized in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan,[110] “the administration of justice is not a
matter of guesswork. The name of the game is fair play, not
foul play. We cannot allow a legal skirmish where, from the
start, one of the protagonists enters the arena with one arm
tied to his back.”
Finally, we find no significance in Justice Carpio’s
argument that Atty. Estelito Mendoza did not previously find
vague the Information for plunder filed against President
Joseph Estrada in 2001.
Under the amended Information[111] against Estrada,
et al., each overt act that constituted the series or combination
and corresponding to the predicate acts under Section 1(d)
had been averred with sufficient particularity so that there was
no doubt what particular transaction was referred to.
We point out that unlike in the Information against
Enrile, the following matters had been averred with sufficient
definiteness, viz: the predicate acts that constitute the crime of
plunder; the breakdown of how the alleged amount of
P4,097,804,173.17, more or less, had been arrived at; the
participants involved in each transaction; and the specific
sources of the illegal wealth amassed.
At any rate, that Atty. Mendoza did not previously
question the indictment of President Estrada via a motion for
bill of particulars does not ipso facto mean that the present
Information for plunder filed against Enrile is not vague and
ambiguous.
Sandiganbayan Ground #2:
That Enrile’s cited grounds are reiterations of the grounds
previously raised
Enrile does not deny that the arguments he raised in
his supplemental opposition to issuance of a warrant of arrest
and for dismissal of information and in his motion for bill of
particulars were identical. He argues, however, that the mere
reiteration of these grounds should not be a ground for the
denial of his motion for bill of particulars, since “the context in
which those questions were raised was entirely different.”
While both the motion to dismiss the Information and
the motion for bill of particulars involved the right of an accused
to due process, the enumeration of the details desired in
Enrile’s supplemental opposition to issuance of a warrant of
arrest and for dismissal of information and in his motion for bill
of particulars are different viewed particularly from the prism
of their respective objectives.
In the former, Enrile took the position that the
Information did not state a crime for which he can be
convicted; thus, the Information is void; he alleged a defect of
substance. In the latter, he already impliedly admits that the
Information sufficiently alleged a crime but is unclear and
lacking in details that would allow him to properly plead and
prepare his defense; he essentially alleged here a defect of
form.
Note that in the former, the purpose is to dismiss the
Information for its failure to state the nature and cause of the
accusation against Enrile; while the details desired in
the latter (the motion for bill of particulars) are required to be
specified in sufficient detail because the allegations in the
Information are vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions
and will not allow Enrile to adequately prepare his defense
unless specifications are made.
That every element constituting the offense had
been alleged in the Information does not preclude the
accused from requesting for more specific details of the
various acts or omissions he is alleged to have
committed. The request for details is precisely the
function of a bill of particulars.
Hence, while the information may be sufficient for
purposes of stating the cause and the crime an accused is
charged, the allegations may still be inadequate for purposes
of enabling him to properly plead and prepare for trial.
We likewise find no complete congruence between
the grounds invoked and the details sought by Enrile in his
motion for bill of particulars, and the grounds invoked in
opposing the warrant for his arrest issued, so that the
Sandiganbayan’s action in one would bar Enrile from
essentially invoking the same grounds.
The judicial determination of probable cause is one
made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy
himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is
necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice.[112] Simply put, the judge
determines whether the necessity exists to place the accused
under immediate custody to avoid frustrating the ends of
justice.
On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure grants the accused the remedy of a bill of
particulars to better inform himself of the specifics or
particulars concerning facts or matters that had not been
averred in the Information with the necessary clarity for
purposes of his defense.
Its purpose is to better acquaint the accused of the
specific acts and/or omissions in relation with the crime
charged, to limit the matters and the evidence that the
prosecution may otherwise be allowed to use against him
under a more or less general averment, and to meet the
charges head on and timely object to evidence whose
inadmissibility may otherwise be deemed waived.
Based on these considerations, the question of
whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest
against an accused, is separate and distinct from the issue of
whether the allegations in the Information have been worded
with sufficient definiteness to enable the accused to properly
plead and prepare his defense. While the grounds cited for
each may seemingly be the same, they are submitted for
different purposes and should be appreciated from different
perspectives, so that the insufficiency of these grounds for one
does not necessarily translate to insufficiency for the other.
Thus, the resolution of the issue of probable cause should not
bar Enrile from seeking a more detailed averment of the
allegations in the Information.
The Sandiganbayan grossly missed these legal points
and thus gravely abused its discretion: it used wrong and
completely inapplicable considerations to support its
conclusion.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing:
a. We PARTIALLY GRANT the present petition for certiorari,
and SET ASIDE the Sandiganbayan’s resolutions dated July
11, 2014, which denied Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars
and his motion for reconsideration of this denial.
b. We DIRECT the People of the Philippines to SUBMIT, within
a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from finality of
this Decision, with copy furnished to Enrile, a bill of particulars
containing the facts sought that we herein rule to be material
and necessary. The bill of particulars shall specifically contain
the following:
1. The particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the
“combination or series of overt criminal acts” charged in
the Information.
2. A breakdown of the amounts of the “kickbacks or
commissions” allegedly received, stating how the amount
of P172,834,500.00 was arrived at.
3. A brief description of the ‘identified’ projects where
kickbacks or commissions were received.
4. The approximate dates of receipt, “in 2004 to 2010 or
thereabout,” of the alleged kickbacks and commissions
from the identified projects. At the very least, the
prosecution should state the year when the kickbacks and
transactions from the identified projects were received.
5. The name of Napoles’ non-government organizations
(NGOs) which were the alleged “recipients and/or target
implementors of Enrile’s PDAF projects.”
6. The government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly
endorsed Napoles’ NGOs. The particular person/s in each
government agency who facilitated the transactions need
not be named as a particular.
All particulars prayed for that are not included in the above are
hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140208 March 12, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELPIDIO PASTOR, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
For automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of the City of Tagbilaran, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No.
10283, dated August 30, 1999, finding accused-appellant
Elpidio Pastor guilty of incestuous rape and sentencing him to
suffer the supreme penalty of death with its accessory
penalties, to indemnify the complainant Maria Niña R. Pastor
the sum of P75,000.00, and to pay the costs.1
In an Information2 dated March 12, 1999, accused-appellant
was charged with the crime of Incestuous Rape, committed as
follows:
"That on or about the 7th day of May, 1998, in the
Municipality of Loon, Province of Bohol, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused with lewd designs, entered the
room of his own daughter, Maria Niña R. Pastor
(accused being the biological father of the victim), a
13-year-old girl, and once inside did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force
and intimidation, lie on top of her, insert his penis in
the vagina of the said offended victim, Maria Niña R.
Pastor, and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of
her against her will and without her consent resulting
in the pregnancy of the victim, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter.1âwphi1.nêt
Acts committed in violation of Sec. 2, Art. 266-B, par.
1, of RA 8353, amending [Article] 335 of the Revised
Penal Code."
On April 8, 1999, accused-appellant was arraigned and, with
the assistance of PAO lawyer Atty. Perpetuo Magallano,
entered a plea of not guilty.
During the hearing on June 23, 1999, Atty. Adriano Damalerio
of PAO manifested that after a conference with accused-
appellant, the latter had decided to change his plea from Not
Guilty to Guilty. The trial court ordered that the previous plea of
not guilty be set aside and that accused-appellant be arraigned
anew. Upon re-arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea
of guilty to the Information which was read and translated to
him in the Visayan dialect. Thereafter, the trial court
propounded clarificatory questions to accused-appellant to
ascertain whether he understood the consequences of his
plea.
Accused-appellant then testified on the mitigating
circumstances of plea of guilty, voluntary surrender and
drunkenness which is not habitual. The prosecution admitted
the plea of guilty and voluntary surrender. Accused-appellant
offered evidence to prove drunkenness. He testified that on
May 7, 1998, he drank tuba and in his drunkenness, he was
led to think bad about his daughter, herein complainant,
because his wife left him. He claims that it was never his
intention to rape his daughter.3
Subsequently, the prosecution was ordered to prove the
culpability of accused-appellant. Complainant Maria Niña
testified that on May 7, 1998, at about 3 o'clock in the morning,
she was raped by her father, herein accused-appellant, in their
house at Catagbacan Sur, Loon, Bohol. Her parents were
already separated at that time and her mother was living in
Manila. Complainant was impregnated4 and gave birth on
December 12, 1998.5 On cross examination, complainant
testified that she was 13 years old at the time of the
incident;6 that she had a premature delivery and her baby died
five days after birth; that nobody forced her to file the complaint
against accused-appellant; and that she pursued the
prosecution of the case against accused-appellant knowing
that he may be sentenced to death.7
On August 30, 1999, the court a quo rendered judgment
finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of incestuous rape. It nevertheless recommended the
commutation of the sentence from death to reclusion
perpetua by reason of the remorseful attitude exhibited by
accused-appellant. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
"WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 10283, the
Court finds accused ELPIDIO PASTOR, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Incestuous
Rape, defined under Par 1 (a) of Article 266-A and
penalized under Par 5, No. (1) of Article 266-B, of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 8353, and hereby sentences said
accused ELPIDIO PASTOR to suffer the supreme
and indivisible penalty of DEATH, in the manner
provided for by law, with the accessory penalties of
the law, to indemnify the offended party, Maria Niña
R. Pastor the sum of P75,000.00, and to pay the
costs.
The Court herein was saved of its precious time in
conducting (a) full-dress trial because the accused
pleaded guilty. The prosecution even conformed to
accused' (sic) claim of the mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender and spontaneous plea of guilt.
When the accused took the witness stand to prove
the circumstance of drunkenness, which is not
habitual, which was not conceded by the prosecution,
we found him to be meditative and remorseful, a
behaviour which is quite different from other death-
row convicts, who despite the onus of the evidence
against them, with insistence, persist in needlessly
taxing the court on their claim of innocence, all
throughout the trial and even after the affirmance of
their conviction by our Highest Court. We believe that
accused herein should not be equated to the likes of
these calloused and non-repentant offenders.
It is therefore on the basis of the foregoing
circumstances, and in the highest interest of humane
and compassionate justice, that we are minded of the
provisions of Article 5, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code, and hereby, without suspending the
execution of the sentence herein, recommends unto
the President of the Republic of the Philippines, thru
the Secretary of Justice, the commutation of accused'
(sic) sentence from death to reclusion perpetua.
Accordingly, let copy of this decision be furnished the
Secretary of Justice, Padre Faura, Manila, for
whatever recommendation he may deem proper to
His Excellency, the President of the Republic of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED."
In his appellant's brief, accused-appellant avers that the trial
court gravely erred in not applying the guidelines for a plea of
guilty to a capital offense provided in Section 3, Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Specifically, it is
contended that the trial court failed to conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of the accused-appellant's plea, pursuant to the
ruling laid down in the cases of People vs. Bello8 and People
vs. Dayot.9 Allegedly, the questions propounded to the
accused-appellant were limited to his family background and
personal circumstances. Accused-appellant thus prays that the
case be remanded to the court a quo for a full-blown trial.
Section 3, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides, viz:
"SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of
evidence. - When the accused pleads guilty to a
capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension
of the consequences of his plea and shall require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree
of his culpability. The accused may present evidence
in his behalf."
When a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered, the trial
court is duty bound to: (1) conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness of the plea and the accused's full comprehension
of the consequences thereof; (2) require the prosecution to
present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability; and (3) inquire from the
accused if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and
allow him to do so if he desires.10 The rationale behind the rule
is that the courts must proceed with more care where the
possible punishment is in its severest form, namely death, for
the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable
and experience has shown that innocent persons have at times
pleaded guilty.11 Moreover, the requirement of taking further
evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in
determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea.12
I.
Anent the first requirement, the searching inquiry must
determine whether the plea of guilt was based on a free and
informed judgment. Hence, it must focus on (1) the
voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea.13 Although there is no definite and
concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a "searching
inquiry," we have held that the following guidelines should be
observed:
1. Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was
brought into the custody of the law; (b) whether he
had the assistance of a competent counsel during the
custodial and preliminary investigations; and (c) under
what conditions he was detained and interrogated
during the investigations. This is intended to rule out
the possibility that the accused has been coerced or
placed under a state of duress either by actual threats
of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or
simply because of the judge's intimidating robes.
 2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to Let's ask the accused Elpidio Pastor,
whether he had conferred with, and completely whether he understood the Information read
explained to, the accused the meaning and and translated to him in the Visayan
consequences of a plea of guilty. vernacular.

3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the COURT INTERPRETER TO THE ACCUSED:
accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and
educational background, which may serve as a Q Do you understand the Information read to you?
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and
informed plea of guilty.
ACCUSED ELPIDIO PASTOR:
4. Inform the accused the exact length of
imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law A Yes, Your Honor.
and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For
not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope COURT:
of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because
of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter Q Now, having understood the Information, Mr.
penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is Elpidio Pastor, what is your plea, guilty or not guilty?
the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does
not labor under these mistaken impressions because
a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of ACCUSED ELPIDIO PASTOR:
authorship of the crime proper but also of the
aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase A I admit, Your Honor, that I have committed a
punishment.14 sin.

5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which COURT:

he is charged and fully explain to him the elements of
the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure
Enter a plea of Guilty as expressed by
of the court to do so would constitute a violation of his
accused Elpidio Pastor through his very own
fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature
mouth, upon his re-arraignment today.
of the accusation against him and a denial of his right
to due process.15
COURT TO ELPIDIO PASTOR:
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a
language known and understood by the latter.16 Q You are Elpidio Pastor?
A Yes, Your Honor.
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the
accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The Q How old are you?
accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or A 35 years old, Your Honor.
reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.17
Q You are married?
In the case at bar, the records will show that the trial court A Yes, Your Honor.
miserably failed to discharge its duty to conduct a "searching
inquiry," to wit: Q What is the name of your wife?
A Josefina Requello.
"ATTY. ADRIANO DAMALERIO:
Q You and your wife were married in church?
Yes, your Honor, and the accused is now A Yes, Your Honor.
ready to enter a plea of Guilty, and I would
like to manifest, Your Honor, that the Q Do you have children?
accused was already arraigned and he A Yes, Your Honor, five (5) children.
entered the plea of Not Guilty and he would
like to change his plea of Not Guilty to Guilty,
Q Tell the Court the names of your children?
Your Honor, and we move that the earlier
A Goldelyn the eldest.
plea of Not Guilty be vacated and the
accused be re-arraigned.
Q How old is Goldelyn now?
A 16 years old.
COURT:

Q Where is Goldelyn now?

Let the previous plea of Not Guilty by the
A She is in Mindanao, Don Carlos, Mindanao.
accused Elpidio Pastor be set aside and re-
arraign the accused now.
Q Your second child, what is the name?
A Maria Niña, Your Honor.
COURT:

Q Maria Niña is the private complainant in this

Call the accused, Elpidio Pastor, and arraign
case?
the accused.
A Yes, Your Honor.

RECORD:
Q How old is Maria Niña?
A 14 years old, Your Honor.
COURT INTERPRETER: reads the
Information of Incestuous Rape and
Q Maria Niña was living with you during the
translated the same to the accused in
incident?
Visayan vernacular.
A Yes, Your Honor.

COURT TO ACCUSED ELPIDIO PASTOR:

Q The third child, what is the name?
A Joel.
Q How old is Joel? aggravating circumstances
A 12 years old, Your Honor. cannot (sic) be availed of.

Q How about the 4th child? ATTY. ADRIANO DAMALERIO:

A Rodel.
Only to save him, Your Honor, for (sic)
Q How old is Rodel? the penalty of death.
A 10 years old, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q And the 5th child?
A Jenelyn. Okay, let's hear the accused.
Call the accused to the witness stand.
Q How old is Jenelyn?
A 8 years old. xxx xxx xxx

Q Your wife Josefina is living with you? ATTY. ADRIANO DAMALERIO:

A We got separated, Your Honor, she left for
Manila and she did not return because she had a
boyfriend. The purpose of the testimony of Elpidio
Pastor, Your Honor, is to prove the three (3)
mitigating circumstances: 1. Plea of guilt; 2.
Q Of the five (5) children, how many children were Voluntary surrender; and 3. Drunkenness
living with you at that time of the incident? which is not habitual, Your Honor.
A Four (4), Your Honor.
FISCAL HELEN T. CABATOS:
Q Who supported your four (4) children, Maria
Niña, Joel, Rodel and Jenelyn?
A Me and my mother. We admit the plea of guilt, Your Honor, and
the voluntary surrender, Your Honor.
Q Why, what is your work?
A Fisherman, Your Honor. xxx xxx xxx

Q You have changed your plea from Not Guilty to DIRECT EXAMINATION ON ELPIDIO PASTOR
Guilty, is this correct? BY: ATTY. ADRIANO DAMALERIO
A Yes, Your Honor, that is true that I have
committed a sin. Q You have just admitted and in fact pleaded
guilty to the crime which accordingly committed (sic)
Q Nobody has forced you to plead guilty to this on May 7, 1998, now please tell the Court why did
Information? you do this kind of crime and what led you to do
A None, Your Honor. this crime?
A I have drunk tuba.
Q In other words, your pleading guilty is your free
and voluntary act? Q And what did you feel after you drunk tuba?
A Yes, Your Honor. A A little bit tipsy.

Q Do you know that by pleading guilty you may be Q You mean you are drunk?
sentenced to a death penalty? A Yes, sir.
A I do not know what will be the outcome of
my pleading guilty, Your Honor. Q And because of that drunkenness, what did you
do?
Q The Court is now telling you, that by pleading A I was led to think bad about my
guilty you may be sentenced to a death penalty. daughter because my wife left me.
A Yes, Your Honor, I understand.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Despite of your knowledge, you still insist on
your plea of guilt? CROSS EXAMINATION:
A Yes, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q I said, this is not the first time that you were
No further questions. drunk?
A There are times that I got drunk but that was the
ATTY. ADRIANO DAMALERIO: only time that I committed that kind of incident.

Your Honor, we would like to present the xxx xxx xxx

accused himself to the witness stand to
prove three (3) mitigating circumstances:
First, the plea of guilt; Second, voluntary
surrender; and Third, drunkenness which is
not habitual and at that time of the incident,
Your Honor, he was drunk.
COURT TO COUNSELS:
I have to inform counsels that in cases of
Incestuous Rape, neither mitigating nor
COURT:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, did you purposely take tuba in order to
commit crime (sic) against your child?
A When I drunk (sic), Your Honor, that was not
my intention to do it."18
The questions propounded by the trial court failed to show the
voluntariness of the plea of guilt of accused-appellant nor did
the questions demonstrate that he fully understood the Q And you heard him pleaded (sic) guilty to the
consequences of his plea. crime charge (sic)?
A Yes maam, I heard.
First, all the questions propounded by the court were couched
in English but there is nothing in the records to show that Q Having heard your father admitted (sic) the
accused-appellant had a good comprehension, or at least, a crime charged against him, do you still insist to
nodding acquaintance with the English language. The records pursue in prosecuting this case?
also do not show whether the judge translated and explained A Yes, Your Honor.
his questions to accused-appellant in a language or dialect
known and understood by the latter.19 Accused-appellant is a COURT:
simple fisherman and his educational background is unknown.
Record that the witness is crying.
Second, the trial court failed to explain to accused-appellant
the elements of the crime of rape. Moreover, when the trial
court asked accused-appellant if he knew that by pleading xxx xxx xxx
guilty he may be sentenced to a death penalty, the latter
answered "I do not know what will be the outcome of my Q Now, if you can recall, when was that that
pleading guilty, Your Honor." Given the vagueness of your father raped you?
accused-appellant's answer, the trial court went no further to A May 7, 1998.
find out whether or not he fully comprehended the
consequences of his plea. In addition, accused-appellant was Q Where did it happen?
not categorically advised that his plea of guilt would not under A In our house.
any circumstance affect or reduce his sentence. The records
reveal that it was the defense counsel, not accused-appellant,
who was informed and warned by the court that in cases of Q Where is your house located?
incestuous rape, mitigating and aggravating circumstances do A Catagbacan Sur, Loon, Bohol.
not matter.20 When accused-appellant attempted to prove the
mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty, voluntary surrender Q Can you recall what time was that, that your
and drunkenness, he was under the mistaken assumption that father sexually abused you?
his liability would be reduced.21 He was not warned that the A That was 3:00 o'clock dawn.
penalty of death is indivisible and is not affected by either
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.22 The trial court's
Q By the way, where was your mother at that time
statement that by pleading guilty he "may" be sentenced to a
when your father sexually abused you?
death penalty is inadequate. It should have warned him, in a
A My mother is not there.
language that cannot be misinterpreted, that should the court
find that the qualifying circumstances alleged in the information
were proved during the trial, along with the elements of the xxx xxx xxx
crime of rape, he would be meted the death penalty. 23
Q What was the result of that sexual
Third, when accused-appellant was questioned by the court as abused (sic) committed by your father on May 7,
to the act he committed, he answered that he "was led to think 1998?
bad about my daughter because my wife left me." Again, the A I got ill and always vomit.
answer is hardly comprehensible yet, the court failed to probe
deeper into the material details of the crime. Q What was the caused (sic) of vomiting?
A I was pregnant.
We hold that in the absence of a "searching inquiry" into the
voluntariness of the plea of guilt of accused-appellant and his Q Were you examined by a doctor, to prove that
full comprehension of the consequences thereof, the re- you were pregnant of that rape incident?
arraignment of accused-appellant is fatally flawed. A Yes, maam.

II. xxx xxx xxx

The second requirement prescribes that the trial court must Q Now, you said that you were pregnant,
order the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused- eventually did you give birth of (sic) a child?
appellant and the precise degree of his culpability beyond A Yes, maam.
reasonable doubt. It must be stressed that under the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure, a conviction in capital offenses
Q When did you give birth?
cannot rest alone on a plea of guilt. The prosecution evidence
A December 12, 1998.
must be sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction
independently of the plea of guilty.24
Q And where is your baby now?
A She died.
In the case at bar, complainant Maria Niña testified as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

"Q Ma. Niña, the accused in this case is Elpidio
Pastor, how are you related to him?
A My father. Q What did you feel about the sexual assault
committed by your father against you?
A I'm mad.
Q If your father is inside this court room today
please point (sic) him?
A That one, ma'am. Q What else did you feel?
A Angry.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Is that all your feelings because of this incident?
A I'm also sad.
Q Were you present during the arraignment of
your father, the accused in this case?
A Yes, maam. xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL HELEN T. CABATOS:

 No further questions, Your Honor.
COURT:
Cross.
ATTY. ADRIANO DAMALERIO:
No cross, Your Honor, accused had
already pleaded guilty."25
The prosecution formally offered its documentary evidence
which consist of the birth certificate of complainant to prove
that she was 13 years old at the time of the incident and that
accused-appellant is her father,26 and two medical certificates,
one showing that complainant has been pregnant for 23-3/7
weeks,27 and the other that she gave birth to a baby girl who
died five days thereafter.28
As heretofore discussed, the plea of guilty of accused-
appellant was made improvidently. Convictions based on an
improvident plea of guilt are set aside if such plea is the sole
basis of the judgment. If, however, the trial court relied on
sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the
conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not
merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence
proving his commission of the offense charged.29
A perusal of the decision of the trial court will reveal that the
judge failed to state the factual and legal reasons on which he
based accused-appellant's conviction. The judge merely stated
that the complainant "positively declared that on May 7, 1998,
her father (the accused in this case), without her consent,
forcibly obtained carnal knowledge with her, which resulted in
her being pregnant." He then concluded that the lone testimony
of the victim, if credible, is enough to sustain a conviction, and
made a bare recital of Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. 8353. There is no discussion of the
facts of the case and the qualifying circumstances alleged in
the information, in utter disregard of the constitutional
injunction that "no decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based."30
Also, there is no evaluation of the evidence and no reason
given why the court found that the testimony of the
complainant is credible. We note that the first question asked
of the complainant in her direct examination was if she could
recall when she was raped by the accused-appellant. It did not
elicit the specific details as to how the rape was committed
against complainant. The prosecution simply presumed that
the complainant was indeed raped on the basis of the plea of
guilty of accused-appellant.
Moreover, there was practically no evidence presented to
prove force and intimidation as well as the relationship of
accused-appellant with complainant. It is true that our
jurisprudence is replete with cases where the moral
ascendancy of a parent over his child has been allowed to
justify a finding that there was intimidation sufficient to convict
the accused of incestuous rape. However, in the case
of People vs. Alberto Chua,31 we held that the mere fact that
accused-appellant is her father and therefore exercises moral
ascendancy over his daughter cannot ipso facto justify this
Court to conclude that the victim was intimidated. Thus, we
held:
"There must be some evidence of intimidation
employed on the victim as to indubitably show how
vitiated the victim's consent was to the violation of her
womanhood. After all, rape is committed against or
without the consent of the victim. x x x The court
cannot rely on presumptions of moral ascendancy x x
x [which] cannot and should not prevail over the
constitutional presumption of innocence. Force or
intimidation is an element of the crime of rape. There
must, therefore, be proof beyond reasonable doubt
that the victim did not resist her defloration due to the
moral ascendancy of the accused."
We have ruled that it is the concurrence of the minority of the
victim and her relationship with the offender that would qualify
the rape as heinous and thus justify the imposition of the
supreme penalty.32 Both qualifying circumstances of age and
relationship must be alleged in the information and proved
during the trial. In the case at bar, the qualifying circumstance
of relationship was not established beyond moral certainty. The
rule is that relationship, as a qualifying circumstance of rape,
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, just as the crime
itself. It has been held that the bare testimony of the
complainant and the admission of accused-appellant as to their
relationship is not sufficient.33 The birth certificate of herein
complainant which was not duly certified cannot be given
probative value insofar as the relationship of complainant with
accused-appellant is concerned.34 Since the relationship of
complainant to accused-appellant has not been sufficiently
established, it was error for the trial court to impose the penalty
of death.
In addition, the trial court, in convicting accused-appellant,
considered pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution
that are inadmissible for being hearsay. The prosecution
merely asked complainant to identify the two medical
certificates relating to her pregnancy without presenting the
doctors who issued the certifications to testify thereon. The
defense counsel failed to object to the documentary evidence
of the prosecution and worse, even expressed his conformity
to its admission. Such lapses should not have been allowed by
the trial court considering that it was trying a case where a life
was at stake. Life cannot be lost due to the ignorance of
counsel.
III.
Under the third requirement, the court must ask the accused if
he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to
do so if he desires. In the present case, there is nothing in the
records to show that accused-appellant was informed, either
by his counsel or by the court, of his right to present evidence,
if he so desires.
Very glaring is the manifest lack of enthusiasm of the defense
counsel, Atty. Damalerio, for his client's cause when he
refused to cross examine the complainant, on the pretext that
accused-appellant has pleaded guilty. We reiterate that it is the
bounden duty of lawyers to protect the constitutional right of an
accused even when he has pleaded guilty to the crime
charged, viz.:
"It may be so that defense counsel personally found
Oleby's testimony to be believable. Nonetheless, he
had the bounden duty to scrutinize private
complainant's testimony to ensure that the accused's
constitutional right to confront and examine the
witnesses against him was not rendered for naught.
It bears pointing out that in rape cases, it is often the
word of the complainant against that of the accused,
the two being the only persons present during the
commission of the offense. While the lone testimony
of the victim is sufficient to convict the accused, such
testimony must be clear, positive, convincing and
consistent with human nature and the normal course
of things. Complainant's testimony cannot be
accepted with precipitate credulity without denying the
accused's constitutional right to be presumed
innocent. This is where cross examination becomes
essential to test the credibility of the witnesses,
expose falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the truth
which rehearsed direct examination testimonies may
successfully suppress, and demonstrate
inconsistencies in substantial matters which create
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and
thus to give substance to the constitutional right of the
accused to confront the witnesses against him. For
unless proven otherwise to be guilty beyond all
reasonable doubt, the accused is presumed to be
innocent. 1âwphi1.nêt
xxx xxx xxx
 Atty. Brotonel, as counsel de oficio, had the duty to
defend his client and protect his rights, no matter how
guilty or evil he perceives accused-appellant to be.
The performance of this duty was all the more
imperative because the life of accused-appellant
hangs in the balance. His duty was no less because
he was counsel de oficio."35
This utter lack of concern is further aggravated by Atty.
Damalerio's lackadaisical and perfunctory discharge of his
obligation to present evidence in behalf of accused-appellant.
After the prosecution rested its case, Atty. Damalerio
manifested that since the accused-appellant had already
pleaded guilty, he is not presenting any defense, and merely
prayed that his client be credited with the mitigating
circumstances earlier claimed by him.36 To say the least, Atty.
Damalerio's attitude falls short of the noble duty of a lawyer to
defend an accused however guilty he may appear to be if only
to assure that his prosecution is in accord with the procedure
laid down by our law. In cannot be over emphasized that even
the guilty cannot be prosecuted by means revolting to the
civilized demands of due process.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the judgment appealed from is SET
ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings in accord with the guidelines set forth in this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 128289 April 23, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GREGORIO LIMA y SILPA, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Among the heinous crimes, none stirs up so much public
outrage, repulsion and hatred than incestuous rape. It is so
odious and disgusting that the perpetrator rightfully must feel
the anger and spurn of society. Indeed, a father who stains the
purity and dignity of his own flesh and blood has reduced
himself to the lowliest of lowly beasts.
Gregorio S. Lima was charged by her own daughter, Sherilyn
Lima, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, Davao
City, with two counts of rape under the following informations:
Criminal Case No. 36,517-961
"The undersigned accuses the above-named accused
of the crime of rape under Art. 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, upon the instance of the complainant,
Sherilyn B. Lima, who is a minor, and her mother,
Erlinda B. Lima, and witness SPO2 Ricardo M. Arcilla,
whose affidavits are hereto attached to form part of
this information. The crime is committed as follows:
"That sometime in 1992, in the City of Davao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, by
means of force and intimidation and abuse of superior
strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with her daughter,
Sherilyn B. Lima, a minor who is below fourteen (14)
years of age, against her will.
"Contrary to law."
Criminal case No. 36,380-962
"The undersigned, SHERILYN LIMA Y BARLIZO,
after having been duly sworn according to law,
accuses her father, GREGORIO LIMA Y SILPA of the
crime of rape, under Art. 335, par. 1 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659,
committed as follows:
"That on or about January 20, 1996, in the City of
Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused by
means of force and intimidation, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with the undersigned complainant, who is
14 years of age against her will.
"Contrary to law."
The two cases were originally raffled to the two branches of the
said RTC. When arraigned separately on the two Informations,
accused pleaded "Not guilty." Thereafter, the two cases were
consolidated in Branch 17.
On November 20, 1996, counsel for the accused manifested
that the latter would change his plea of not guilty to both
charges.3 Upon rearraignment, he entered a plea of "Guilty."
Thereafter, upon order of the trial court, the prosecution
presented its evidence and rested its case.
The prosecution’s evidence consisted of the testimonies of the
victim, Sherilyn Lima, her mother, Erlinda Lima, SP02 Ricardo
Arcilla, and Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma.
Sherilyn was 15 years old when she testified in court on
November 20, 1996 about her harrowing experience in the
hands of her very own father. She identified her Certificate of
Live Birth4 which indicates that she was born on August 14,
1981 in Davao City, and that her father is Gregorio Silpa Lima,
the accused. She narrated that sometime in 1992, when she
was only 10 years old, her father, whom she identified in court,
raped her in their house located in Sitio Concepcion, Indangan,
Buhangin, Davao City. He warned her not to inform anyone
about that incident lest he would kill all of their family members.
Because of fear that he would harm them, she did not tell her
mother what he did to her. Since that incident in 1992, she had
been repeatedly ravished by the accused on occasions when
her mother was out of the house. In all those instances, she
repeatedly pleaded to him to stop abusing her, but her pleas
only fell on deaf ears.5
Sherilyn further testified that in the evening of January 20,
1996, when she was 14 years old, she was sleeping in the sala
of their house together with her brothers. At that time, her
mother was attending a birthday party in her sister’s place
about 16 kilometers away. Sherilyn was roused from her sleep
by the accused, telling her to transfer to the master’s bedroom.
When she asked why, he replied that he would do something
to her. Inside the room, he instructed her to undress and lie
down. He then placed himself on top of her, kissed her private
parts, and inserted his organ into her vagina. Sherilyn felt
extreme pain in her vagina while he was raping her. But she
could not resist for fear he would kill her.6
According to Erlinda Lima, Sherilyn’s mother, at around 10:00
in the evening of the same date, she arrived home and noticed
that the gate of the house was locked from inside. She then
entered the gate of her brother-in-law, which was beside their
house, and proceeded to her house. When she entered the
master’s bedroom, she was surprised to find Sherilyn sleeping
on the bed. She approached her daughter, removed the
blanket and saw her totally naked. Erlinda told her to dress up
because they were attending her nephew’s birthday party. At
that moment, the accused went out to open the gate. When he
returned, Erlinda did not let him notice her suspicion. On their
way to the house of Erlinda’s sister, Sherilyn cried as she
confided to her mother that the accused raped her. She also
told her mother that when she was ten, or four years earlier,
she was already ravished by her father. Thereupon, Erlinda
brought Sherilyn to the police station and reported the rape
incidents.
In the course of her testimony, Erlinda also identified and
confirmed the Certificate of Live Birth (Exhibit "B") of her
daughter and further testified that she is legally married to
accused Gregorio Lima.7
Meanwhile, at midnight of that same day, January 20, 1996,
SPO2 Ricardo Arcilla and several policemen, together with
Sherilyn and her mother, proceeded to the house of accused.
SP02 Arcilla invited him to go with them to the police station,
but the latter resisted. Forthwith, Arcilla asked a fellow
policeman to handcuff the accused and brought him to the
police station.8
Thereafter, Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma, Medico-legal Officer of the
Davao City Health Office, physically examined Sherilyn and
found "old healed deep lacerations at 3 and 8 o’clock
positions" in her hymen. He also observed that her "hymenal
orifice...admits a tube 3.0 in diameter." He estimated that the
lacerations could be more than four (4) months old, or possibly
more than three (3) years old. He also found spermatozoa in
her vaginal canal. These findings are reflected in the Medical
Certificate he issued on January 22, 1996.9
The accused pleaded guilty to the charges. He testified that
on January 21, 1996, the police went to his house and invited
him to the police station for investigation regarding the rape
incident. He then extended his two arms to be handcuffed
showing that he voluntarily surrendered.10 He already knew
that his wife Erlinda and daughter Sherilyn would go to the
police station to have him arrested. He declared that her
daughter "agreed" to what he had done to her "because she
used to get money from my wallet, (so) she cannot refuse
anymore." When asked why he raped his daughter, he
answered, "Because at times that I am drunk, I lost my
composure and Sherilyn used to lay down inside my room." He
also admitted having raped her when she was 10 years old.11
The defense rested its case with the prayer that the "voluntary
plea of guilty and voluntary surrender" be appreciated as
mitigating circumstances so as to reduce the penalty to be
imposed upon the accused.12
On November 29, 1996, the trial court rendered a Joint
Judgment,13 the dispositive portion of which reads:
"Accordingly, finding the evidence of the
prosecution more than sufficient to prove the guilt
of the accused Gregorio Lima Y Silpa beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged for
rape under Criminal Case No. 36, 517-96, said
accused is sentenced to suffer an indivisible penalty
of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Art. 335, par. 3 of
the Revised Penal Code, together with all the
accessory penalty attached therewith in accordance
with law.
"In Criminal Case No. 36,380-96, finding the
evidence of the prosecution, notwithstanding the
plea of guilty of the accused voluntarily entered,
more than sufficient to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of accused, pursuant to Republic Act
7659, Sec. 11 thereof, sub-paragraph 7, accused
Gregorio Lima y Silpa is sentenced to suffer the
supreme penalty of death by electrocution pursuant
to sec. 24 of R.A. 7659 in the manner therein
provided, subject to such other method of carrying out
his sentence as may be provided for by law, under
existing procedure or maybe regulated through other
means such as lethal injection to be executed in the
manner and procedure therein provided.
"Moreover, pursuant to Art. 100, in relation to Art. 104
of the Revised Penal Code, governing civil indemnity,
accused is furthermore ordered to indemnify
complainant Sherilyn Lima... the amount of
P30,000.00 by way of moral damages of all the
ignominy and sufferings she incurred out of accused
demonic act of sexually abusing his own
daughter.1âwphi1.nêt
"x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
In this appeal, appellant asserts, as his lone assignment of
error, that "the trial court gravely erred in convicting (him) on
an improvident plea of guilty and sentencing him to
suffer reclusion perpetua (in Criminal Case No. 36,517-96) and
the supreme penalty of death (in Criminal Case No. 36,380-
96)."14
Appellant argues, in essence, that his plea in both cases was
"improvident, fatally defective and void" because the trial court
failed to observe the mandatory provisions of Sec. 3, Rule 116
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides –
"Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of
evidence - When the accused pleads guilty to
a capitaloffense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his
plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and
the precise degree of culpability. The accused may
also present evidence in his behalf."
Appellant claims that nothing on record shows that: a) he
understood the two (2) separate charges against him; and b)
he was made to understand and was specifically warned that
in Crim. Case No. 36,380-96, he shall be sentenced to death
and that his plea of guilty shall not in any way affect or reduce
the penalty.
The records of the proceedings during the rearraignment of
appellant show how he entered his plea of guilty, thus:
"ATTY ARIQUEZ: For the accused. We would like to
inform the Honorable Court that the accused intend to
withdraw his plea of not guilty to both charges and
instead enters a plea of guilty to both charges.
COURT: Does he understand the consequences of
this?
ATTY. ARIQUEZ: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: Alright, re-arraign the accused.
COURT INTERPRETER:
Reading both informations to accused:
ACCUSED: GUILTY.
COURT: In these two informations against you, you
understand the extent and implication of your plea of
guilty?
ACCUSED: I know, your Honor because I committed
a mistake.
COURT: Were these matters explained and fully
understood by you upon assistance by your counsel?
ACCUSED: Yes, I was advised by my lawyer and I
understand what he explained to me, very clearly.
COURT: I would like to explain to you and
understand, that upon your plea of guilty on the two
offenses, very serious offenses, in fact, capital
offenses, you may be sentenced to life or death
penalty, you understand that?
ACCUSED: Whatever will be the judgment I will gladly
accept it Your Honor.
COURT: The court is explaining to you the
consequences now, did you understand the
explanation given to you by the court?
ACCUSED: I understand your Honor.
COURT: Do you still insist that you plead guilty in
these two offenses just read to you?
 ACCUSED: Yes, I will accept it.
COURT: Were you forced or intimidated or unduly
influenced by anybody in your plea of guilty in these
two offenses?
Philippines vs. Alberto Diaz (G.R. No. 119073, March
13, 1996) and the case of People vs. Rolly Albert y
Oliver (G.R. No. 114001, promulgated on December
11, 1995), required the prosecution to present its
evidence against the accused . . . ."

ACCUSED: No one has forced me to admit the two
charges, it is voluntary on my part.
COURT: In other words, despite the explanation of
the court and your lawyer, it is voluntary on your part
that you will plead guilty to the two offenses?
ACCUSED: It is my voluntary plea of guilty in these
two cases.
It bears stressing that four credible witnesses were presented
by the prosecution who were extensively cross-examined by
appellant’s counsel. The victim, Sherilyn, herself gave a clear,
positive and straightforward account of how she was sexually
assaulted by appellant. The three other witnesses strongly
corroborated her testimony which established beyond
reasonable doubt appellant’s guilt. But to be sure, the victim’s
testimony is sufficient to establish the crimes charged,23 thus:
"Q: How old are you now Sherilyn Lima?

COURT: The court is convinced on the voluntariness A: 15 years old.

of plea of guilty of accused in both cases, but
considering the matter of these charges against the
accused, capital offenses, and pursuant to the ruling Q: Do you have a birth certificate to prove your age?
of the Supreme Court, despite his plea of guilty, the
prosecution will still present its evidence against the A: Yes, I have.
accused, and the accused, if the defense decides to
present, the court will receive his evidence, despite Q: I am showing to you a birth certificate, marked Exh.
his plea of guilty."15 "A", is this the same birth certificate?

Appellant’s theory does not convince us. A: Yes.

There is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge Q: And you were born on October 4, 1981, you can
may go about the matter of a proper "searching inquiry" as confirm that?
required by the aforecited rule.16 It is incumbent upon a trial
judge to ascertain and be totally convinced that the plea of
guilty was voluntarily made and its consequences fully A: Yes.
comprehended by the accused.
Q: Your father is Gregorio Lima?
In the present case, to fully determine whether such
voluntariness and comprehension attended appellant’s A: Yes.
plea of guilty, his whole testimony must be taken into
account and be read together with his statements made Q: Is this the Gregorio lima accused in this case?
during the rearraignment proceedings. As narrated earlier,
after the prosecution rested its case, appellant admitted that he
sexually abused her daughter Sherilyn because of the A: Yes.
influence of wine which made him lost his composure; and that
at the time he slept with Sherilyn in 1992, she was 10 years Q: Now, on January 20, 1996, where were you
old.17 This admission is significant since appellant Sherilyn?
furnished and explained to the trial court the missing
details of why he committed the offenses charged.
A: In our house.
Certainly, his explanation is an earmark of voluntariness
of his plea of guilty and a clear comprehension of the
consequences thereof. Q: Who were your companion in your house?

Moreover, as noted earlier, the defense, after presenting the A: My brother.

testimony of the accused, earnestly prayed before the trial
court that his "voluntary plea of guilty" be taken into account Q: And aside from your brother, who else?
as a mitigating circumstance in reducing his penalty. By
invoking such plea of guilty, the appellant has completely
A: My father.
demolished his argument that his plea was improvidently
made.
Q: And where was your mother at that time?
In any case, contrary to appellant’s assertion, he was
convicted by the trial court, not on the basis of his plea of A: She was in the house of my auntie attending a party.
guilty, but on the strength of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution. As held by this Court in People vs. Q: At that time on January 20, 1996, at that night while
Lakindanum,18 People vs. Nismal,19 People vs. your mother was not in your house attending party, where
Petalcorin,20 and People vs. Tahop,21 convictions based on did you sleep?
pleas of guilty to capital offenses have been set aside because
of improvidence of the plea, but only when such plea is the
sole basis of the judgment. Where, as here, the trial court A: In the sala.
relied solely on the prosecution’s sufficient and convincing
evidence to convict the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, Q: Of your house?
not on his guilty plea, the same must be sustained.22 As the
trial court aptly stated in its appealed decision of November 29, A: Yes.
1996:
Q: Who were your supposed companion in sleeping in
"Notwithstanding, the plea of guilty of accused and his your sala?
open confession of his understanding as to its legal
import and consequences, the court, aware of his
rights and prevailing jurisprudence decided by the A: My brother.
Supreme Court en banc in the case of People of the
Q: How about your father, where was he slept that Q: Please describe to the Hon. Court, how did your
night? father rape you?

A: In his room. A: He placed himself on top of me.

Q: Is that the room of your father and mother? Q: What happened when he was on top of you?

A: Yes. A: He kissed my private parts.

Q: While you were sleeping in the sala on Jan. 20, 1996, Q: Aside from kissing your private parts, what happened
tell the court Sherilyn what did your father do, if any? next?

A: He woke me up. A: He did something to my private parts.

Q: Why did your father wake you up? Q: Please specify that something he did on your private
part?
A: He wanted me to go to his room.
A: He inserted his organ to my private part.
Q: What was your reaction to that, when your father
asked you to go to his room? FISCAL EVANGELIO:

A: I was surprised why he wanted me to go inside his Please make it on record, that the witness is crying.
room.
Q: How did you know that the private part of your father
Q: What did you tell your father when he told you to go was inserted in your vagina?
to his room?
A: Because I was awake when he did that to me.
A: I asked him why he was going to bring me to his
room. Q: Aside from awake, what did you feel when his organ
was inserted in your vagina?
Q: What was the answer of your father?
A: I feel great pain.
A: According to him, he wanted me to sleep in his room.
He wanted to do something to me. Q: More or less, how long this so-called sexual
molestation made by your father on the evening of January
Q: Did you go with your father to the room? 20, 1996?

A: Yes. A: I cannot estimate, how long was that.

Q: And while in the room, what did your father tell you, if Q: Sherilyn, while your father was doing the act on
any? January 20, 1996, why did you not resist?

A: He told me to undress. A: Because he will kill me.

Q: What was your reaction when you were told by your Q: Why, did he hold you?
father to undress?
A: He held my hands.
A: I was surprised.
Q: Prior to January 20, 1996, do you recall what your
Q: Precisely. Aside from being surprised, what did your father has been doing to you long before January 20, 1996?
father tell you?
A: He molested me.
A: Just to undress myself.
Q: That was sometime in 1992?
Q: When you were told to undress, what happened
next? A: Yes.

A: He had me lie down. Q: Why did you not report the matter to your mother?

Q: Did you comply with his instruction? A: Because if I reveal the matter, he will kill all of us.

A: Yes. Q: How often did your father do this to you in 1992?

Q: When you lied down, what happened? A: Many times.

A: He molested me. Q: Where?

Q: Sherilyn, how did your father molest you? A: In the house.

A: He raped me. Q: At that time, how old are you in 1992, when he
started molesting you?
 A: 10 years old. A: When I entered the house, I cannot find my
daughter. So I proceeded to the room of my husband to
Q: Why is it that it was only in 1996 that you have the look for my daughter.
courage to tell your mother about it?
Q: What did you notice, if any?
A: I was afraid because my mother might be harmed.
A: I was surprised because I saw my daughter already
Q: In that evening of January 20, 1996, do you recall if sleeping beside the bed where my husband sleep,
your mother woke you up when she returned from your because at that time, my husband went out to open the
Auntie from Lanang? gate. I was surprised, I approached her and took off the
blanket and she was already naked.
A: Yes.
Q: Totally naked?
Q: What was your physical appearance at that time
when your mother woke you up? A: Yes, sir.

A: I was sleeping. Q: To that situation, what did you tell your daughter?

Q: Aside from sleeping, were you dressed? A: She was sleeping, so I have to wake her up
because we were invited by my sister for the birthday.
A: I was naked.
Q: While at that moment, where was your husband?
Q: Where did your mother bring you?
A: In the house.
A: To the birthday party of my cousin.
Q: When you instructed your daughter to dress up,
where was your husband?
Q: What transportation did you take in going there?
A: He was still opening the gate.
A: The car of my auntie.
Q: Were you able to leave the house?
Q: On the same evening, you reported the incident to
the Buhangin Police Station?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes.
Q: What was the reaction of your husband, if any?
Q: On January 22, 1996, do you recall if you submitted
yourself for examination? A: Nothing. There was no reaction because I told him
that we were attending the party of my nephew. We did
not let him notice that we have suspicion.
A: Yes.
Q: In going to the place of your sister, what
Q: I have here a medical certificate. Is this the same transportation did you take?
medical certificate issued to you by Dr. Ledesma?
A: The vehicle of my sister.
A: Yes."24
Q: And while in the vehicle of your sister going to your
It is worthy to note that Sherilyn cried while testifying. Such sister’s house in Lanang, do you have a conversation with
actuation, undoubtedly, demonstrates her sincerity, your daughter?
spontaneity and truthfulness of what she was narrating. 25
A: Yes, sir.
In a plethora of cases, we have held that the crime of rape is
difficult to prove because it is generally unwitnessed and very
often, only the victim is left to testify for herself. Fortunately for Q: And what did your daughter tell the court, that your
the victim here, her testimony is reinforced by the testimonies daughter confided also that prior to January 20, 1996, she
of two other witnesses who were extensively cross-examined. was also abused?

Sherilyn’s mother, Erlinda Lima, testified as follows: 26 A: Yes, sir.

"Q: You said you went home at 10:00 p.m. Please tell Q: Upon learning of the incident on that evening,
us why you went home at 10:00 p.m.? where did you bring your daughter?

A: Because it was the birthday of my nephew and this A: We proceeded to the Buhangin Police Station.
nephew of mine wanted that my children will also attend
the birthday, so that I went home to get my children. Q: What did you do in the Buhangin Police Station?

xxx xxx xxx A: We reported what her father had done to her.

Q: Where did you proceed when you entered the Q: Was your report recorded in the log book?
house?
A: Yes, Sir.
A: When I reached the house, I knock and the one
who opened the door was my son? Q: And do you know what action was taken by the
police based on your report?
Q: Where did you proceed?
 A: They immediately arrested my husband. heard the witnesses should not be disturbed on appeal and
should be given considerable weight and respect, especially on
Q: Do you know if your daughter was subjected to the credibility of the witnesses, since he was in a better
medical examination by the City Health Office? position to decide the question, having heard and observed the
demeanor, attitude, conduct and deportment of witnesses. 28
A: Yes, sir.
Based on the prosecution’s evidence, and as correctly found
by the trial court, the crimes charged have been sufficiently
Q: Why do you know that? established beyond reasonable doubt. Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic
A: Because I was the one who brought her to Dr. Act No. 7659, provides:
Ledesma."
"Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. -Rape is
Also, Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma of the Davao City Health Office committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under
testified, thus:27 any of the following circumstances:

"Q: As medico-legal officer of the Davao City Health 1. By using force or intimidation;
Office, do you recall having attended to the patient named
Sherilyn Lima? 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
A: Yes, sir.
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
Q: Sometime in 1996? demented.

A: Yes, sir. "The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion

perpetua.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Q; Now, it appears in your findings, that I call your
attention to the genital examination you conducted "The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of
wherein you said among others that there was healed, rape is committed with any of the following circumstances:
deep laceration on the private parts of patient, what was
your basis in that finding of yours? "1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
A: When I examined the genital of the patient, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
particularly the hymen, I saw old healed deep laceration at the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of
3:00 and 8:00 o’clock position, if it is compared to a clock, the parent of the victim. (Emphasis supplied)
wherein the lacerations were found at 3:00 and 8:00
o’clock positions. xxx xxx xxx"

Q: And what does that imply or indicate, Doctor?
A: Meaning to say that these lacerations when I saw
and examined the victim more than four months.
Q: And in your examination of the patient, have you
found out what would have caused such lacerations?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And finally you said, the patient was positive for
spermatozoa, what do you mean by that, Doctor?
A: With vaginal discharges were taken smear, there
was the presence of sperm cells.
Q: And when you said sperm cells, from male organ?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Finally, in your opinion, this old healed laceration,
you found on the private parts of patient, how long more or
less were these lacerations exist, old healed lacerations?
A: More than 4 months, when I saw patient, it could
be more than one year, more than 3 years."
The foregoing testimonies effectively corroborated Sherilyn’s
account.
Furthermore, the trial court found that the prosecution’s
witnesses were telling the truth. We have consistently held that
the findings of fact of the trial judge who tried the case and
The prosecution has sufficiently established that in Criminal
Case No. 36,517-96, the victim was only ten years old when
she was raped by her father. However, the death penalty
cannot be imposed upon the appellant because the crime was
committed in 1992 when R.A. 7659 was not yet in effect.29 As
regards Criminal Case No. 36,380-96, it was proven that the
victim was only 14 years old when she was raped by her father
in 1996. Thus, the penalty of death was correctly meted out by
the trial court.
The mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty cannot be
appreciated in his favor because reclusion
perpetua and death are indivisible penalties imposed in their
entirety regardless of any mitigating circumstance that
attended the commission of the crime.30
Finally, we rectify the error committed by the trial court with
respect to the award of damages to the victim. The award of
₱30,000.00 as moral damages is not in line with the prevailing
jurisprudence,31 fixing the amount at ₱50,000.00 for each count
of rape. In addition, the amount of ₱50,000.00 should be
awarded to her as indemnity ex delicto in Criminal Case No.
36,517-96 since the penalty is only reclusion perpetua; while in
Criminal Case No. 36,380-96 where the penalty imposed is
death, the indemnity ex delicto for the victim should be in the
amount of ₱75,000.00.32 Since the fact of relationship between
the offender and the victim is an aggravating circumstance,
she is entitled to the award of exemplary damages of
₱25,000.00 for each count of rape.33 In People vs.
Catubig,34 this Court clarified that an aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party
to an award of exemplary damages within the meaning of
Article 2230 of the Civil Code.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the appealed Joint Decision in Criminal Case
Nos. 36,517-96 and 36,380-96 is AFFIRMED,
with MODIFICATION in the sense that appellant Gregorio S.
Lima is ordered to PAY the victim, Sherilyn Lima, ₱50,000.00
as indemnity ex delicto in Criminal Case No. 36,517-96, and
₱75,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 36,380-96; and, in each
case, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱25,000.00 as
exemplary damages. Costs against the appellant.
Relative to Criminal Case No. 36,380-96 wherein we affirm the
imposition of death penalty upon the appellant, three (3)
members of the Court, although maintaining their adherence to
the separate opinions expressed in People vs. Echegaray that
R.A. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death, is
unconstitutional, nevertheless submit to the ruling of the
majority that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty
should be accordingly imposed.
In consonance with Sec. 25 of R.A. 7659, amending Art. 83 of
the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this Decision, let the
record of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the
President for the possible exercise of his pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164258 August 22, 2012
ESTRELLA TAGLAY, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUDGE MARIVIC TRABAJO-DARAY and LOVERIE
PALACAY, accused-appellant.
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside
the Orders[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Digos City,
Branch 18, dated March 9, 2004 and June 7, 2004, in Criminal
Case No. FC-71-02. The March 9, 2004 Order denied herein
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, while the June 7, 2004 Order
denied her Motion for Reconsideration.
The instant petition arose from a Criminal Complaint[2] for
Qualified Trespass to Dwelling filed by private respondent
against herein petitioner with the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Sta. Maria-Malita-Don Marcelino, Davao del
Sur on June 19, 2001.
Finding probable cause to indict petitioner, the Public
Prosecutor assigned to handle the case filed an
Information[3] against her on November 19, 2001. The
Information reads as follows:
The undersigned Prosecutor accuses ESTRELLA TAGLAY of
the crime of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling as defined and
penalized under Article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, committed as follows:
That on June 2, 2001 at about 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon at
Tibangao, Malita, Davao del Sur, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforesaid accused, a
private person and without any justifiable reason and by means
of violence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously enter into the dwelling of Loverie Palacay without
her consent and against her will and once inside maltreated,
boxed and choked her, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Upon arraignment on June 7, 2002, petitioner pleaded not
guilty.[5] Pre-trial conference was set on August 13, 2002.
However, on August 15, 2002, the MCTC issued an Order,[6] to
wit:
It appearing that private complainant Loverie Palacay was a
minor on June 2, 2001, the date of the incident, since she was
born on August 7, 1983, per Certification dated August 15,
2002 issued by Municipal Registrar Josephine A. Marquez, this
case, upon manifestation of Prosecutor Perfecto P. Ordaneza
and pursuant to Republic Act. No. 8369 and Circular 11-99, is
hereby transferred to Branch 20, Regional Trial Court, Digos
City, for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, the case was transferred to the RTC of Digos
City where petitioner was brought to trial.
Witnesses were then presented by the prosecution. Prior to the
presentation of the final witness for the prosecution, petitioner
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner contended that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case, because the MCTC erroneously transferred the
case to the RTC instead of dismissing it. Petitioner also argued
that the RTC's lack of jurisdiction was further aggravated when
she was not arraigned before the RTC.
On March 9, 2004, the RTC issued its assailed Order[7] ruling
that it acquired jurisdiction over the case when it received the
records of the case as a consequence of the transfer effected
by the MCTC; that the transfer of the case from the MCTC is
authorized under Administrative Matter No. 99-1-13-SC and
Circular No. 11-99; that there is no doubt that the offended
party is a minor and, thus, the case falls within the original
jurisdiction of Family Courts pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8369. The RTC also held that even granting that there was
defect or irregularity in the procedure because petitioner was
not arraigned before the RTC, such defect was fully cured
when petitioner's counsel entered into trial without objecting
that his client had not yet been arraigned. Furthermore, the
RTC noted that petitioner's counsel has cross-examined the
witnesses for the prosecution. Consequently, the RTC denied
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was
denied by the RTC via its Order[8] dated June 7, 2004.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
Petitioner raises two main grounds.
First, petitioner contends that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case because Circular No. 11-99, which
authorizes the transfer of Family Courts cases filed with first-
level courts to the RTCs, is applicable only to cases which
were filed prior to the effectivity of the said Circular on March 1,
1999. Petitioner argues that all Family Courts cases filed with
first-level courts after the effectivity of the said Circular can no
longer be transferred to the RTC; instead they should be
dismissed. Considering that the Information in the instant case
was filed with the MCTC on November 19, 2001, petitioner
avers that the MCTC should have dismissed the case instead
of ordering its transfer to the RTC.
Second, petitioner insists that she should have been arraigned
anew before the RTC and that her arraignment before the
MCTC does not count because the proceedings conducted
therein were void.
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that, generally, a direct
recourse to this Court in a petition for certiorari is highly
improper for it violates the established policy of strict
observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts.[9]While this Court
has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the CA to issue
writs of certiorari, this concurrence is not to be taken as an
unrestrained freedom of choice as to which court the
application for the writ will be directed.[10] There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs.[11] This Court is a court of last resort and
must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions
assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial
tradition.[12] A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction to issue these extraordinary writs is allowed only
when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly
and specifically set out in the petition.[13]
However, it is also settled that this Court has full discretionary
power to take cognizance of a petition filed directly with it if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues
raised, so warrant.[14] Under the present circumstances, the
Court will take cognizance of this case as an exception to the
principle of hierarchy of courts, considering that the Information
against petitioner was filed way back in November
2001.[15] Any further delay in the resolution of the instant
petition will be prejudicial to petitioner. Moreover, the principle
may be relaxed when pure questions of law are raised as in
this case.[16]
Now, on the merits of the petition.
It is significant to point out, at this juncture, the well-entrenched
doctrine that the jurisdiction of a tribunal over the subject
matter of an action is conferred by law.[17] Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time
of the commencement of the action.[18] The Family Courts Act
of 1997, which took effect on November 23, 1997.[19] Section 5
(a) of R.A. 8369 clearly provides that Family Courts have
exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases where one or
more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but
not less than nine (9) years of age, or where one or more of
the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the
offense. In the present case, there is no dispute that at the
time of the commission of the alleged offense on June 2, 2001,
private respondent, who is also the private complainant, was a
minor. Hence, the case falls under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of Family Courts.
Anent the first issue raised, the Court agrees that the
Resolution of this Court in Administrative Matter No. 99-1-13-
SC and Circular No. 11-99, issued pursuant thereto, is
applicable only to Family Courts cases which were filed with
first-level courts prior to the effectivity of the said Resolution on
March 1, 1999.[20] This is evident in the language used by the
Court in the third "Whereas" clause of the subject Resolution
wherein it was stated that "pending the constitution and
organization of the Family Courts and the designation of
branches of the Regional Trial Courts as Family Courts in
accordance with Section 17 (Transitory Provisions) of R.A.
8369, there is a need to provide guidelines in the hearing and
determination of criminal cases falling within the jurisdiction of
Family Courts which have heretofore been filed with first-level
courts." The operative word, as correctly cited by petitioner, is
"heretofore" which means "before this" or "up to this
time."[21]Moreover, Section 1 of the same Resolution directs all
first-level courts, within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of
the subject Resolution, to take an inventory of all criminal
cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Family Courts which
were filed with them (first-level courts), to prepare an
appropriate inventory and to submit the same to the Court
Management Office of the Office of the Court Administrator.
Logic dictates that only those cases which were filed prior to
the issuance of the Resolution shall be included in the
inventory and, therefore, shall be subject to transfer by first-
level courts to the appropriate RTCs. The necessary
implication then is that all cases filed with first-level courts after
the effectivity of the Resolution on March 1, 1999 should be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In the present case, the
Information was filed against petitioner on November 19, 2001.
Thus, the MCTC is already bereft of any authority to transfer
the case to the RTC as the same no longer falls under the
coverage of Circular No. 11-99. What the MCTC should have
done was to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
More importantly, what justifies the dismissal of the case is that
the Information filed with the MCTC cannot be used as a basis
for the valid indictment of petitioner before the RTC acting as a
Family Court, because there was no allegation therein of
private complainant's minority. To proceed to trial before the
RTC on the basis of the Information filed with the MCTC would
be an exercise in futility as there is an infirmity in the
Information constituting a jurisdictional defect which cannot be
cured. There is no point in proceeding under a defective
Information that could never be the basis of a valid
conviction.[22] The Information filed with the MCTC must thus
first be amended and thereafter filed with the RTC. Pending
the filing of such Information, the RTC has not yet acquired
jurisdiction because while a court may have jurisdiction over
the subject matter, it does not acquire jurisdiction over the case
itself until its jurisdiction is invoked with the filing of a valid
Information.[23]
The Court also agrees with petitioner in her contention in the
second issue raised that she should have been arraigned by
the RTC.
It is true that petitioner was arraigned by the MCTC. However,
the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
present case. It is settled that the proceedings before a court
or tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null
and void.[24] Considering that the MCTC has no jurisdiction, all
the proceedings conducted therein, including petitioner's
arraignment, are null and void. Thus, the need for petitioner's
arraignment on the basis of a valid Information filed with the
RTC.
It is also true that petitioner's counsel participated in the
proceedings held before the RTC without objecting that his
client had not yet been arraigned. However, it is wrong for the
RTC to rely on the case of People v. Cabale,[25]because the
accused therein was in fact arraigned, although the same was
made only after the case was submitted for decision. In the
similar cases of People v. Atienza and Closa[26] and People v.
Pangilinan,[27] the accused in the said cases were also
belatedly arraigned. The Court, in these three cases, held that
the active participation of the counsels of the accused, as well
as their opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution
witnesses during trial without objecting on the ground that their
clients had not yet been arraigned, had the effect of curing the
defect in the belated arraignment. Moreover, the accused in
these cases did not object when they were belatedly arraigned.
The same, however, cannot be said in the instant case. There
is no arraignment at all before the RTC. On the other hand, the
arraignment conducted by the MCTC is null and void. Thus,
there is nothing to be cured. Petitioner's counsel also timely
raised before the RTC the fact that her client, herein petitioner,
was not arraigned.
Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing
the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.[28] The
purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the
possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the
nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to
inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized
against him.[29] As an indispensable requirement of
due process, an arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or
brushed aside peremptorily.[30] Otherwise, absence of
arraignment results in the nullity of the proceedings before the
trial court.[31]
As a final note, it may not be amiss to stress that at all stages
of the proceedings leading to his trial and conviction, the
accused must be charged and tried according to the procedure
prescribed by law and marked by observance of the rights
given to him by the Constitution.[32] In the same way that the
reading of the Information to the accused during arraignment is
not a useless formality, so is the validity of the information
being read not an idle ceremony.[33]
Criminal due process requires that the accused must be
proceeded against under the orderly processes of law.[34] In all
criminal cases, the judge should follow the step-by-step
procedure required by the Rules.[35] The reason for this is to
assure that the State makes no mistake in taking the life or
liberty except that of the guilty.[36]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders
of the Regional Trial Court of Digos City, Branch 18, dated
March 9, 2004 and June 7, 2004, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one rendered dismissing the Information in
Criminal Case No. FC-71-02, without prejudice to refiling the
same in the proper court.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172707 October 1, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
vs.
HALIL GAMBAO Y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM Y USO, EDWIN
DUKILMAN Y SUBOH, TONY ABAO Y SULA, RAUL UDAL Y
KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN Y NANDING, JAMAN
MACALINBOL Y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS Y AMPIL,
NORA EVAD Y MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN Y RAFON
A.K.A LARINA PERPENIAN AND JOHN DOES, ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court for Automatic Review is the Decision 1 dated
28 June 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 00863, which affirmed with modification the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City,
Branch 109 dated 16 October 1998, finding accused-
appellants Halil Gambao y Esmail, Eddie Karim y Uso, Edwin
Dukilman y Suboh, Tony Abao y Sula, Raul Udal y Kagui, Teng
Mandao y Haron, Theng Dilangalen y Nanding, Jaman
Macalinbol y Katol, Monette Ronas y Ampil, Nora Evad y
Mulok and Thian Perpenian y Rafon guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of kidnapping for ransom as defined and penalized
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659.
The accused-appellants, along with an unidentified person,
were charged under the criminal information3 which reads:
Criminal Case No. 98-0928
For Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA 7659
That on August 12, 1998 at around 7:30 o’clock in the evening
at No. 118 FB Harrison Pasay City and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above named-accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping
themselves together, did then and there by force and
intimidation, and the use of high powered firearms, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away and deprive Lucia
Chan y Lee of her liberty against her will for the purpose of
extorting ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was made as
a condition for her release amounting to FOUR HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (₱400,000.00) to the damage and
prejudice of Lucia L. Chan in the said amount and such other
amounts as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the
Civil Code.
The antecedent facts were culled from the records of the
case:4
Lucia Chan (Chan) was a fish dealer based in Manila. She
usually expected fish deliveries, which were shipped by her
suppliers from the provinces. Sometime in the afternoon of 11
August 1998, two persons, one of whom was identified as
Theng Dilangalen (Dilangalen), went to Chan’s residence at FB
Harrison St., Pasay City to inquire about a certain passport
alleged to have been mistakenly placed inside a box of fish to
be delivered to her. Unable to locate said passport, the two left.
The next morning, Dilangalen, together with another
companion identified as Tony Abao (Abao), returned looking
for Chan but were told that she was out. When the two
returned in the afternoon, Chan informed them that the fish
delivery had yet to arrive. Chan offered instead to accompany
them to the airport to retrieve the box of fish allegedly
containing the passport. Dilangalen and Abao declined and
told Chan that they would be back later that evening. 5
Dilangalen, accompanied by an unidentified person who
remains at large, returned to Chan’s residence that evening.
Chan’s houseboy ushered them in and Chan met them by the
stairs.6 Thereat, the unidentified companion of Dilangalen
pointed his gun at Chan’s son, Levy Chan (Levy), and the
house companions.7 As the unidentified man forcibly dragged
Chan, her son Levy tried to stop the man by grabbing his
mother’s feet. Seeing this, Dilangalen pointed his gun at Levy’s
head forcing the latter to release his grip on Chan’s feet. 8 Levy
thereafter proceeded to the Pasay Police Headquarters to
report the incident.9
Chan was forced to board a "Tamaraw FX" van.10 After
travelling for about two hours, the group stopped at a certain
house. Accused-appellant Edwin Dukilman (Dukilman) warned
Chan not to shout as he had his gun pointed at her mouth.
Chan was ordered to go with two women,11 later identified in
court by Chan as appellants Monette Ronas (Ronas) and Nora
Evad (Evad).12 Chan was brought inside a house and was
made to lie down on a bed, guarded by Ronas, Evad,
Dukilman and Jaman Macalinbol (Macalinbol).13 Ronas and
Evad threatened Chan that she would be killed unless she paid
20 Million Pesos.14
On 13 August 1998, Chan was awakened by Evad and was
asked to board the "Tamaraw FX" van. After travelling for
about ten minutes, the van stopped and the group alighted.
Chan was brought to a room on the second floor of the house.
Inside the room were three persons whom Chan identified in
court as Macalinbol, Raul Udal (Udal) and Halil Gambao
(Gambao).15 Another woman, later identified as Thian
Perpenian (Perpenian), arrived.16 At about 9:00 o’clock in the
evening, a man who was later identified as Teng Mandao
(Mandao), entered the room with a handgun and asked Chan
"Bakit kayo nagsumbong sa pulis?"17 Another man, whom
Chan identified in court as Eddie Karim (Karim), ordered
Mandao out of the room. Karim informed Chan that he was
sent by their boss to ask her how much money she
has.18 Chan was instructed to talk to her son through a cell
phone and she gave instructions to her son to get the ₱75,
000.00 she kept in her cabinet.19 The group then talked to
Chan’s son and negotiated the ransom amount in exchange for
his mother’s release. It was agreed upon that Levy was to
deliver ₱400,000.00 at the "Chowking" Restaurant at Buendia
Avenue.20
Inspectors Narciso Ouano, Jr. (Inspector Ouano) and Cesar
Mancao (Inspector Mancao), who were assigned at the Pasay
City area to conduct the investigation regarding the kidnapping,
were informed that the abductors called and demanded for
ransom in exchange for Chan’s release.21 During their
surveillance the following day, Inspectors Ouano and Mancao
observed a Red Transport taxicab entering the route which led
to the victim’s residence. The inspectors observed that the
occupants of the taxicab kept on looking at the second floor of
the house. The inspectors and their team tailed the taxicab
until Pansol, Calamba, Laguna, where it entered the Elizabeth
Resort and stopped in front of Cottage 1. Convinced that the
woman the team saw in the cottage was the victim, they
sought clearance from Philippine Anti Organized Crime Task
Force (PAOCTF) to conduct a rescue operation.22
On 14 August 1998, P/Insp. Vicente Arnado (Inspector Arnado)
received information that the abductors acceded to a
₱400,000.00 ransom money to be delivered at "Chowking"
Restaurant at Buendia Avenue at around 2:00 am. Upon
learning of the information, the team immediately and
strategically positioned themselves around the vicinity of the
restaurant. At about 2:00 am, a light blue "Tamaraw FX" van
with 4 people on board arrived. The four took the ransom
money and headed towards the South Luzon Expressway. The
surveillance team successfully intercepted the van and
arrested the 4 men, later identified in court as Karim, Abao,
Gambao and Dukilman. The team was also able to recover the
₱400,000.00 ransom.23
At about 5:00 o’clock in the morning of the same day, the
police team assaulted Cottage No. 1, resulting in the safe
rescue of Chan and the apprehension of seven of her
abductors, later identified in court as Dilangalen, Udal,
Macalinbol, Mandao, Perpenian, Evad and Ronas. 24
During the 7 October 1998 hearing, after the victim and her
son testified, Karim manifested his desire to change his earlier
plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." The presiding judge then
explained the consequences of a change of plea, stating: "It
would mean the moment you withdraw your previous pleas of
not guilty and enter a plea of guilty, the court of course, after
receiving evidence, as in fact it has received the testimonies of
[the] two witnesses, will [outrightly] sentence you to the penalty
provided by law after the prosecution shall have finished the
presentation of its evidence. Now that I have explained to you
the consequences of your entering a plea of guilty, are you still
desirous of entering a plea of ‘guilty’?" Eddie Karim answered,
"Yes."25 On hearing this clarification, the other appellants
likewise manifested, through their counsel who had earlier
conferred with them and explained to each of them the
consequences of a change of plea, their desire to change the
pleas they entered. The trial court separately asked each of the
appellants namely: Gambao, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen,
Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad if they understood the
consequence of changing their pleas. All of them answered in
the affirmative.26 Similarly, Dukilman manifested his desire to
change his plea and assured the trial court that he understood
the consequences of such change of plea.27 Thereupon, the
trial court ordered their re-arraignment. After they pleaded
guilty,28 the trial court directed the prosecution to present
evidence, which it did.
On 16 October 1998, the RTC rendered a decision convicting
Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen,
Macalinbol, Ronas, Evad and Perpenian of Kidnapping for
Ransom. Hence, they appealed to the CA.
In a Decision dated 28 June 2005, the appellate court affirmed
with modifications the decision of the trial court. The dispositive
portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding
accused-appellants HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIE
KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y
SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI, TENG MANDAO y HARON,
THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y
KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL and NORA EVAD y
MULOK guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for
ransom defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659 and imposing upon each
of them the supreme penalty of death is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION that each of them is ordered to pay jointly and
severally the victim in the amount of ₱50,000.00 by way of
moral damages.
It appearing that accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y
RAFON was only 17 years old at the time of the commission of
the crime, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.29
Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by
Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the appellate court
certified the case to this Court and accordingly ordered the
elevation of the records.
In a Resolution30 dated 20 June 2006, we required the parties
to file their respective supplemental briefs. The issues raised
by the accused-appellants in their respective briefs,
supplemental briefs and manifestations will be discussed
collectively.
Insufficiency of Evidence
Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas, Evad would have this
Court believe that the witness, Chan, was not able to positively
identify them because of her failing eyesight due to old age.
This argument is bereft of merit. We note that both the trial
court and the CA found Chan’s testimony credible and
straightforward. During her testimony, she positively identified
the accused-appellants. If she had not met them before, she
could not have positively identified them in open court. In fact,
the participation of these accused-appellants was further
established through the testimonies of the other prosecution
witnesses.
Time and again, this Court has maintained that the question of
credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to
determine. For this reason, its observations and conclusions
are accorded great respect on appeal. They are conclusive
and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or
unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight
and influence has not been considered.31 In People v.
Tañedo,32 this Court had occasion to reiterate the ruling that
findings of fact of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of
witnesses command great respect since it had the opportunity
to observe their demeanor while they testified in court.33 It can
be observed that the briefs submitted by the accused-
appellants are replete with generalities and wanting in relevant
particulars. It is for this reason that we are giving full credence
to the findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of
witness Chan.
Perpenian likewise argued that the evidence for her conviction
is insufficient. We also find her argument bereft of merit.
The testimony of Inspector Ouano, establishing Perpenian as
one of the seven people apprehended when they conducted
the rescue operation at around 5:00 o’clock in the morning of
14 August 1998,34 and the positive identification of Perpenian
by Chan constituted adequate evidence working against her
defense of denial.
Further, it should be noted that the only defense the accused-
appellants proffered was denial. It is established jurisprudence
that denial cannot prevail over the witnesses’ positive
identification of the accused-appellants, more so where the
defense did not present convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for them to have been present at the
crime scene at the time of the commission of the crime.35
The foregoing considered, the positive identification by Chan,
the relevant testimonies of witnesses and the absence of
evidence other than mere denial proffered by the defense lead
this Court to give due weight to the findings of the lower courts.
Improvident Plea
As provided for by Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by RA 7659, the penalty for kidnapping for ransom is
death. A review of the records36 shows that on 7 October 1998,
the accused-appellants withdrew their plea of "not guilty" and
were re-arraigned. They subsequently entered pleas of "guilty"
to the crime of kidnapping for ransom, a capital offense. This
Court, in People v. Oden,37 laid down the duties of the trial
court when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense. The
trial court is mandated:
(1)
to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea of guilt,
(2)
to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused
and the precise degree of his culpability, and
(3)
to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present
evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.38
The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed
with more care where the possible punishment is in its
severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution
of such a sentence is irreversible. The primordial purpose is to
avoid improvident pleas of guilt on the part of an accused
where grave crimes are involved since he might be admitting
his guilt before the court and thus forfeiting his life and liberty
without having fully understood the meaning, significance and
consequence of his plea.39 Moreover, the requirement of taking
further evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in
determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea.40
Anent the first requisite, the searching inquiry determines
whether the plea of guilt was based on a free and informed
judgement. The inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the
plea and the full comprehension of the consequences of the
plea. This Court finds no cogent reason for deviating from the
guidelines provided by jurisprudence41 and thus, adopts the
same:
Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial
judge must conduct a "searching inquiry," we have held that
the following guidelines should be observed:
Ascertain from the accused himself
(a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;
(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent
counsel during the custodial and preliminary
investigations; and
(c) under what conditions he was detained and
interrogated during the investigations. This is intended
to rule out the possibility that the accused has been
coerced or placed under a state of duress either by
actual threats of physical harm coming from
malevolent quarters or simply because of the judge’s
intimidating robes.
Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether
he had conferred with, and completely explained to, the
accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused,
such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational
background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his
capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature
of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve
such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty
in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or
because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter
penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty
of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under
these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries
with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper
but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that
increase punishment.
Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is
charged and fully explain to him the elements of the crime
which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do
so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be
informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him
and a denial of his right to due process.
All questions posed to the accused should be in a language
known and understood by the latter.
The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in
pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required to
narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing
details.
It is evident from the records42 that the aforesaid rules have not
been fully complied with. The questions propounded by the trial
court judge failed to ensure that accused-appellants fully
understood the consequences of their plea. In fact, it is readily
apparent from the records43 that Karim had the mistaken
assumption that his plea of guilt would mitigate the imposable
penalty and that both the judge and his counsel failed to
explain to him that such plea of guilt will not mitigate the
penalty pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
Karim was not warned by the trial court judge that in cases
where the penalty is single and indivisible, like death, the
penalty is not affected by either aggravating or mitigating
circumstances. The trial court judge’s seemingly annoyed
statement that a conditional plea is not allowed, as provided
below, is inadequate:
Atty. Ferrer:
Your Honor please, may we be allowed to say something
before the trial. For accused Eddie Karim we manifest and
petition this court that he be allowed to be re-arraigned Your
Honor please, considering that he will plead guilty as charged
but the imposable penalty is lowered, Your Honor.
Court:
You cannot make a conditional plea of guilty, that is what the
law says. You plead guilty, no condition attached. Conditional
plea is not allowed.
Atty. Ferrer:
Considering, Your Honor, accused Eddie Karim is already
repenting
Court:
Nevertheless. Read the law. If you entered a plea of guilty
there should be no condition attached. We cannot make that
condition and dictate to the court the penalty. 44
Although the pleas rendered, save for Perpenian’s, were
improvidently made, this Court will still not set aside the
condemnatory judgment. Despite the trial court judge’s
shortcomings, we still agree with his ruling on accused-
appellants’ culpability.
As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of
guilt are set aside and the cases are remanded for further
proceedings if such plea is the sole basis of judgement. If the
trial court, however, relied on sufficient and credible evidence
to convict the accused, as it did in this case, the conviction
must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on
the guilty plea but on evidence proving the commission of the
offense charged.45 The manner by which the plea of guilty is
made, whether improvidently or not, loses legal significance
where the conviction can be based on independent evidence
proving the commission of the crime by the accused.46
Contrary to accused-appellants’ assertions, they were
convicted by the trial court, not on the basis of their plea of
guilty, but on the strength of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution, which was properly appreciated by the trial
court.47 The prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the
accused-appellants and their degrees of culpability beyond
reasonable doubt.
Degree of Culpability
Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas and Evad argue in their
respective briefs that conspiracy, insofar as they were
concerned, was not convincingly established. Dukilman hinges
his argument on the fact that he was not one of those arrested
during the rescue operation based on the testimony of
Inspector Ouano.48 On the other hand, Ronas and Evad base
their argument on the fact that they had no participation
whatsoever in the negotiation for the ransom money.
We hold otherwise. Although Dukilman was not one of those
apprehended at the cottage during the rescue operation, the
testimony of Police Inspector Arnado sufficiently established
that he was one of the four people apprehended when the
police intercepted the "Tamaraw FX" at the Nichols
Tollgate.49 Likewise, the testimony of Police Inspector Ouano
sufficiently established that Ronas and Evad were two of those
who were arrested during the rescue operation.50 This Court
has held before that to be a conspirator, one need not
participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even
take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to
be performed by the others in the execution of the
conspiracy.51 Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the
act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of
participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the
conspirators are principals.52 Moreover, Chan positively
identified the accused-appellants and placed all of them at the
crime scenes.
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
a felony and decide to commit it. It has been a long standing
opinion of this Court that proof of the conspiracy need not rest
on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the
collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the
commission of the crime indicating a common understanding
among them with respect to the commission of the
offense.53 The testimonies, when taken together, reveal the
common purpose of the accused-appellants and how they
were all united in its execution from beginning to end. There
were testimonies proving that (1) before the incident, two of the
accused-appellants kept coming back to the victim’s house; (2)
during the kidnapping, accused-appellants changed shifts in
guarding the victim; and (3) the accused appellants were those
present when the ransom money was recovered and when the
rescue operation was conducted.
Seeing that conspiracy among Gambao, Karim, Dukilman,
Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad
was established beyond reasonable doubt based on the
proffered evidence of the prosecution, the act of one is the act
of all the conspirators.
In Perpenian’s Supplemental Brief,54 she directs this Court’s
attention to the manifestation made by the prosecution
regarding their disinterest in prosecuting, insofar as she was
concerned.55 However, pursuant to the ruling of this Court in
Crespo v. Judge Mogul,56 once the information is filed, any
disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of
the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence
and discretion of the courts; more so in this case, where no
Motion to Dismiss was filed by the prosecution.
The trial court took note of the fact that Perpenian gave
inconsistent answers and lied several times under oath during
the trial.57 Perpenian lied about substantial details such as her
real name, age, address and the fact that she saw Chan at the
Elizabeth Resort. When asked why she lied several times,
Perpenian claimed she was scared to be included or identified
with the other accused-appellants. The lying and the fear of
being identified with people whom she knew had done wrong
are indicative of discernment. She knew, therefore, that there
was an ongoing crime being committed at the resort while she
was there. It is apparent that she was fully aware of the
consequences of the unlawful act.
As reflected in the records,58 the prosecution was not able to
proffer sufficient evidence to hold her responsible as a
principal. Seeing that the only evidence the prosecution had
was the testimony59 of Chan to the effect that on 13 August
1998 Perpenian entered the room where the victim was
detained and conversed with Evad and Ronas regarding
stories unrelated to the kidnapping, this Court opines that
Perpenian should not be held liable as a co-principal, but
rather only as an accomplice to the crime.
Jurisprudence60 is instructive of the elements required, in
accordance with Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, in order
that a person may be considered an accomplice, namely, (1)
that there be community of design; that is knowing the criminal
design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with
the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the
execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of
supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in
an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between the
acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person
charged as accomplice.
The defenses raised by Perpenian are not sufficient to
exonerate her criminal liability.1âwphi1 Assuming arguendo
that she just came to the resort thinking it was a swimming
party, it was inevitable that she acquired knowledge of the
criminal design of the principals when she saw Chan being
guarded in the room. A rational person would have suspected
something was wrong and would have reported such incident
to the police. Perpenian, however, chose to keep quiet; and to
add to that, she even spent the night at the cottage. It has
been held before that being present and giving moral support
when a crime is being committed will make a person
responsible as an accomplice in the crime committed.61 It
should be noted that the accused-appellant’s presence and
company were not indispensable and essential to the
perpetration of the kidnapping for ransom; hence, she is only
liable as an accomplice.62Moreover, this Court is guided by the
ruling in People v. Clemente, et al.,63 where it was stressed
that in case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be
considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of a
principal.
Having admitted their involvement in the crime of kidnapping
for ransom and considering the evidence presented by the
prosecution, linking accused-appellants’ participation in the
crime, no doubt can be entertained as to their guilt. The CA
convicted the accused-appellants of kidnapping for ransom
and imposed upon them the supreme penalty of death,
applying the provisions of Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code. Likewise, this Court finds accused-appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principals to the crime of
kidnapping for ransom. However, pursuant to R.A. No.
9346,64 we modify the penalty imposed by the trial court and
reduce the penalty to Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility for
parole.
Modification should also be made as to the criminal liability of
Perpenian. Pursuant to the passing of R.A. No. 9344,65 a
determination of whether she acted with or without
discernment is necessary. Considering that Perpenian acted
with discernment when she was 17 years old at the time of the
commission of the offense, her minority should be appreciated
not as an exempting circumstance, but as a privileged
mitigating circumstance pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344,66 the suspension of
sentence of a child in conflict with the law shall still be applied
even if he/she is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at
the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Unfortunately, at the present age of 31, Perpenian can no
longer benefit from the aforesaid provision, because under
Article 40 of R.A. No. 9344,67 the suspension of sentence can
be availed of only until the child in conflict with the law reaches
the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. This leaves the
Court with no choice but to pronounce judgment. Perpenian is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the
crime of kidnapping for ransom. Since this Court has ruled that
death as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code shall
no longer form part of the equation in the graduation of
penalties pursuant to R.A. No. 9346,68 the penalty imposed by
law on accomplices in the commission of consummated
kidnapping for ransom is Reclusion Temporal, the penalty one
degree lower than what the principals would bear (Reclusion
Perpetua).69 Applying Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code,
the imposable penalty should then be adjusted to the penalty
next lower than that prescribed by law for accomplices. This
Court, therefore, holds that as to Perpenian, the penalty of
Prision Mayor, the penalty lower than that prescribed by law
(Reclusion Temporal), should be imposed. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty, which is
one degree lower than the maximum imposable penalty, shall
be within the range of Prision Correccional; and the maximum
penalty shall be within the minimum period of Prision Mayor,
absent any aggravating circumstance and there being one
mitigating circumstance. Hence, the Court imposes the
indeterminate sentence of six (6) months and one (1) day of
Prision Correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1)
day of Prision Mayor, as maximum.
As regards Perpenian’s possible confinement in an agricultural
camp or other training facility in accordance with Section 51 of
R.A. 9344, this Court held in People v. Jacinto70 that the age of
the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation
of the judgment is not material. What matters is that the
offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender
age. This Court, however, finds such arrangement no longer
necessary in view of the fact that Perpenian’s actual served
term has already exceeded the imposable penalty for her
offense. For such reason, she may be immediately released
from detention.
We note that in the Order71 dated 9 October 1998, the trial
court admitted the documentary evidence offered by the
counsel for the defense proving that the real name of Thian
Perpenian is Larina Perpenian.
In view of the death of Mandao during the pendency of this
case, he is relieved of all personal and pecuniary penalties
attendant to the crime, his death72 having occurred before
rendition of final judgement.73
There is prevailing jurisprudence,74 on civil liabilities arising
from the commission of kidnapping for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victim or any other person under Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code. The persons convicted were held
liable for ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱75,000.00 as moral
damages; and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
We take this opportunity to increase the amounts of indemnity
and damages, where, as in this case, the penalty for the crime
committed is death which, however, cannot be imposed
because of the provisions of R.A. No. 9346:75
1. ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2. ₱100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is
assumed to have suffered and thus needs no proof;
and
3. ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an
example for the public good.
These amounts shall be the minimum indemnity and damages
where death is the penalty warranted by the facts but is not
imposable under present law.
The ruling of this Court in People v. Montesclaros76 is
instructive on the apportionment of civil liabilities among all the
accused-appellants. The entire amount of the civil liabilities
should be apportioned among all those who cooperated in the
commission of the crime according to the degrees of their
liability, respective responsibilities and actual participation.
Hence, each principal accused-appellant should shoulder a
greater share in the total amount of indemnity and damages
than Perpenian who was adjudged as only an accomplice.
Taking into account the difference in the degrees of their
participation, all of them shall be liable for the total amount of
₱300,000.00 divided among the principals who shall be liable
for ₱288,000.00 (or ₱32,000.00 each) and Perpenian who
shall be liable for ₱12,000.00. This is broken down into
₱10,666.67 civil indemnity, ₱10,666.67 moral damages and
₱10,666.67 exemplary damages for each principal; and
₱4,000.00 civil indemnity, ₱4,000.00 moral damages and
₱4,000.00 exemplary damages for the lone accomplice.
WHEREFORE, the 28 June 2005 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR–H.C. No. 00863 is hereby AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants HALIL GAMBAO
y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y
SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI,
THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y
KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL and NORA EVAD y
MULOK are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principals in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced
to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of
parole. Accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON
A.K.A. LARINA PERPENIAN is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months
and one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to six (6)
years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum.
Accused-appellants are ordered to indemnify the victim in the
amounts of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as
moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages
apportioned in the following manner: the principals to the crime
shall jointly and severally pay the victim the total amount of
₱288,000.00 while the accomplice shall pay the victim
₱12,000.00, subject to Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code
on several and subsidiary liability.
The Court orders the Correctional Institute for Women to
immediately release THIAN PERPENIAN A.K.A. LARINA
PERPENIAN due to her having fully served the penalty
imposed on her, unless her further detention is warranted for
any other lawful causes.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate
implementation to the Director of the Correctional Institute for
Women by personal service. The Director of the Correctional
Institute for Women shall submit to this Court, within five (5)
days from receipt of a copy of the decision, the action he has
taken thereon.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174056 February 27, 2007
[Formerly G.R. No. 138257]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee
vs.
ROGELIO GUMIMBA y MORADANTE alias ROWING and
RONTE ABABO (acquitted), Appellants,
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
For review before the Court is the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated 26 April 2006, affirming with modification
the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Ozamiz City,
Branch 15,3 dated 10 March 1999, finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide.
In an Information4 dated 17 April 1997, appellant Rogelio
Gumimba y Morandante alias Rowing and co-accused Ronie
Abapo (Abapo) were charged before the RTC, with the crime of
rape with homicide of an eight (8)-year old child, thus:
That on or about April 8, 1997, in Barangay Pantaon, Ozamiz
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
with each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and by means of force, violence and intimidation, to
wit: by then and there pinning down one [AAA],5 a minor, 8 years
of age, and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her and
as a result thereof she suffered 6-12 o'clock lacerated wounds
of [sic] the vagina as well as fatal stab wounds on the different
parts of her body and which were the direct cause of her death
thereafter.
CONTRARY to Article 335 in relation with Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code.
On 16 May 1997, appellant and Abapo both entered a plea of
not guilty on arraignment.6 Thereafter, the case proceeded to
trial with the prosecution first presenting two witnesses: (1)
Emelio Magallano, President of Purok I, Barangay Pantaon,
Ozamiz City; and (2) Sofronio Arañas, a Civilian Volunteer
Officer (CVO) of the same barangay.
Magallano and Arañas testified that at around 9 o'clock in the
evening of 10 April 1997, appellant went to Magallano's home
and confessed to him that he alone and by himself raped and
killed his (appellant's) niece, AAA, in Purok Pantaon, Ozamiz
City. Subsequently, Magallano accompanied appellant to the
residence of Arañas where he reiterated his confession. That
same night, Magallano, Arañas, appellant and family members
of the witnesses proceeded to the home of Barangay Captain
Santiago Acapulco, Jr. who conducted an investigation.
Appellant repeated his narration and confessed to the barangay
captain that he had raped and killed the victim, and that he was
alone when he committed the crime. As a result thereof,
Acapulco, Jr., in the company of the others, brought appellant to
the Ozamiz City Hall and turned him over to the police
authorities.7
However, appellant manifested though counsel (before the
court) at the following hearing on 22 May 1997 that he would like
to change his earlier plea of not guilty to a plea of guilty. 8 The
RTC ordered appellant's re-arraignment and the latter
accordingly entered a plea of guilty. 9 The court conducted an
inquiry to ascertain the voluntariness of appellant's plea and his
full comprehension of the consequences thereof. Prosecution
was likewise charged to establish the guilt and degree of
culpability of appellant.10
In accordance with the court's directive, the prosecution
continued with the presentation of its evidence in chief. It
presented Dr. Pedrita Rosauro, the physician who conducted
the autopsy on the body of the victim, and who testified that the
victim was raped before she was killed. The examination by Dr.
Rosauro revealed that AAA sustained four (4) stab wounds in
front, two (2) stab wounds in her back and one (1) lacerated
wound each on her neck and on her middle upper extremity.
Furthermore, she found 6 and 12 o'clock laceration wounds on
the external genital organ of the victim.11
Before resting its case, the prosecution presented appellant as
witness against his co-accused Abapo. Appellant testified that
he and Abapo raped and killed the victim. He likewise explained
that he had previously confessed to Magallano, Arañas and
Acapulco that he alone committed the crime in the hope that the
parents of the victim, who were relatives of his, might take pity
on him.12
In his defense, Abapo testified that at the time the crime was
allegedly committed, he was with his mother and three (3)
siblings at the Labo River, about two (2) kilometers away from
Barangay Pantaon, washing their clothes.13 In support thereof,
Abapo presented his mother Virgencita Abapo, Elisa Carreon
and Raymundo Orot, all of whom corroborated his alibi. 14 The
defense also presented witness Arañas who reiterated his
earlier testimony that appellant confessed to him that he alone
was responsible for the raping and killing of the victim.15 Finally,
Eugenio Bucog, a teacher at Capucao Elementary School, was
presented to demonstrate Abapo's good character when he was
his student.16
On 10 March 1999, the RTC promulgated its Decision. On the
basis of appellant's plea of guilty, the RTC found him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged. Appellant
was sentenced to suffer the death penalty and ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amounts of ₱50,000.00
as indemnity for the life of the victim, ₱30,000.00 as moral
damages, and costs.17 On the other hand, the trial court
acquitted Abapo on the ground that his guilt was not established
beyond reasonable doubt. Except for the lone testimony of
appellant, the RTC held that no other evidence was adduced to
prove the participation of Abapo. Moreover, the court a
quo found that appellant's testimony implicating Abapo was not
worthy of credence coming as it did from a polluted source. 18
With the death penalty imposed on appellant, the case was
elevated to this Court on automatic review. Pursuant to this
Court's decision in People v. Mateo,19 the case was transferred
to the Court of Appeals.
On 26 April 2006, the appellate court rendered its
Decision20 affirming the appellant's conviction, but with
modification as to damages awarded to the heirs of the victim.
The dispositive portion of the said Decision states:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated March 10,
1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, of Ozami[s] City, is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount of
civil indemnity ex delicto is hereby increased from ₱50,000.00
to ₱100,000.00, including the award of moral damages from
₱30,000.00 to ₱50,000.00. Conformably with the ruling of the
Supreme Court in People of the Philippines v. Efren Mateo, We
refrain from entering judgment, and the Division Clerk of Court
is hereby directed to elevate the entire records of the case to the
Honorable Supreme Court for its final disposition.
SO ORDERED."21
On 3 October 2006, the Court issued an order requiring the
parties to simultaneously submit supplemental briefs within thirty
(30) days from notice should they so desire.22 On 21 November
and 24 November 2006, appellant and appellee filed similar
manifestations that they are adopting the briefs they filed before
the Court of Appeals.23
Thus, appellant raises the following errors in this petition for
review:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF HIS
IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILTY AND HIS ALLEGED
SEPARATE CONFESSIONS TO ONE EM[I]LIO MAGALLANO,
AND ONE SOFRONIO ARAÑAS, THE LATTER BEING
HEARSAY AND WITHOUT PROBATIVE VALUE
WHATSOEVER.
II
THE COURT A QUO LIKEWISE ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE DESPITE
THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THE
LATTER'S GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, AND THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OWNING UP ONLY TO THE CRIME
OF SIMPLE RAPE.24
The ultimate issue is whether appellant's guilt was established
by evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
It must be conceded at the outset that the trial court failed in its
duty to conduct the prescribed "searching inquiry" into the
voluntariness of appellant's plea of guilty and full comprehension
thereof. Consequently, appellant's plea of guilty was made
improvidently and it is rendered inefficacious.25 Nevertheless,
the Court must rule against appellant as the evidence on record
is ample to sustain the judgment of conviction independent from
his plea of guilty.
The crime of rape with homicide is punishable with death under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7659, which provides:
Article 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any
of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
demented.
The crime of rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death.
xxxx
The Information, to which appellant pleaded guilty, alleged that
homicide was committed by reason or on the occasion of the
rape of AAA. This, if proven, would warrant the penalty of death
at that time.26 Accordingly, a plea of guilty to such charges calls
into play the provisions of Section 3, Rule 116 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus -
Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. -
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court
shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall
require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree
of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf.
Based on this rule, when a plea of guilty to a capital offense is
entered, there are three (3) conditions that the trial court must
observe to obviate an improvident plea of guilty by the accused:
(1) it must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and
full comprehension by the accused of the consequences of his
plea; (2) it must require the prosecution to present evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability; and (3) it must ask the accused whether he desires
to present evidence on his behalf, and allow him to do so if he
so desires. 27
There is no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a
"searching inquiry," or as to the number and character of
questions he may ask the accused, or as to the earnestness with
which he may conduct it, since each case must be measured
according to its individual merit.28 However, the logic behind the
rule is that courts must proceed with caution where the
imposable penalty is death for the reason that the execution of
such a sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown that
innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty.29 An improvident
plea of guilty on the part of the accused when capital crimes are
involved should be avoided since he might be admitting his guilt
before the court and thus forfeit his life and liberty without having
fully comprehended the meaning and import and consequences
of his plea.30 Moreover, the requirement of taking further
evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in determining
the propriety or impropriety of the plea.31
must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the
crime or furnish its missing details.33
An examination of the records of the proceedings will illustrate
the court's treatment of appellant's change of plea, viz:
Atty. Cagaanan:
Considering the voluntary plea of guilty of the accused[,] we pray
that the mitigating circumstance to prove his plea of guilty be
appreciated in favor of the accused. We likewise pray that
another mitigating [circumstance] of voluntary surrender be
appreciated in his favor.
Pros. Edmilao:
Considering the gravity of the crime, may we ask your Honor
that we will present evidence inorder [sic] that it will give also
justice to the victim.

In the instant case, when the accused entered a plea of guilty at Court:
his re-arraignment, it is evident that the RTC did not strictly
observe the requirements under Section 3, Rule 116 above. A
mere warning Present evidence to prove gravity of the crime.

that the accused faces the supreme penalty of death is Pros. Edmilao:
insufficient.32 Such procedure falls short of the exacting
guidelines in the conduct of a "searching inquiry," as follows: Our first witness is the ABC president.

(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was Court:
brought into the custody of the law; (b) whether he had
the assistance of a competent counsel during the
What matter will Santiago Acapulco testify?
custodial and preliminary investigations; and (c) under
what conditions he was detained and interrogated
during the investigations. This is intended to rule out Court:
the possibility that the accused has been coerced or
placed under a state of duress either by actual threats Was there cruelty done by the accused in picking [sic] the life of
of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or the minor girl?
simply because of the judge's intimidating robes.
xxxx
(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to
whether he had conferred with, and completely
Pros. Edmilao:
explained to, the accused the meaning and
consequences of a plea of guilty.
May we ask that we will present her [sic] in the next
hearing.1awphi1.net
(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the
accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and
educational background, which may serve as a Court:
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and
informed plea of guilty. The court will call the accused to the witness stand.

(4) Inform the accused of the exact length of xxxx

imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law
and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For
not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope (The witness after having administered an oath, took the witness
of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because stand and declared that he is:
of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter
penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is ROGELIO GUMIMBA
the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does
not labor under these mistaken impressions because a 20 years old
plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of
authorship of the crime proper but also of the
aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase Single
punishment.
Occupation- duck raising
(5) Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which
he is charged and to fully explain to him the elements Resident of Capucao, Ozamiz City)
of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure
of the court to do so would constitute a violation of his xxxx
fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature
of the accusation against him and a denial of his right
to due process. Court:

(6) All questions posed to the accused should be in a
language known and understood by the latter.
(7) The trial judge must satisfy himself that the
accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused
The court will allow the prosecutor or the defense to profound
[sic] question [sic] on the matter and the accused understand
[sic] and fully comprehend [sic] the consequence of his plea of
guilty.
xxxx
Pros. Edmilao: A I was drank [sic] at that time.

Q Mr. Rogelio Gumimba[,] are you the same accused in this Q And you said you tied [AAA], what did you use in tying her?
case in Crim. Case No. RTC 2074?
A Banana skin.
A Yes, sir.
Q How did you tie [AAA]?
Q Now the victim in this case is [AAA], a minor, 8 years of age[.]
Since you have admitted this in what particular place wherein A I tied both her hands.
[sic] you raped and slew [AAA]?
Q The hands of [AAA], you placed at the back?
A Purok Pantaon, Ozamiz City.
A In front of her.
Q How far is that place wherein you slew and raped [AAA] from
her house?
Q After tying her [,] what did you do to her?
A Very near, sir.
A After that I went home.
Q Can you estimate how many meters?
Q You did not stab [AAA]?
A One meter, sir.
A I stabbed her, Your Honor.
Q Was it committed inside or outside the house?
Q What weapon did you use in stabbing her?
A Outside.
A A long bolo.
Q In what particular place of the house[:] in front, at the side or
at the back? Q You mean you were bringing [a] long bolo at that time?

A At the back of the house of the victim. A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Will you please tell the court, how did you do it, will you please Q After stabbing her, what did you do to her?
narrate.
A No more, Your Honor.
A I raped her by tying her hand, then I killed her.
Q How many times did you stab [AAA]?
Q Before you raped and killed [AAA], where did you get her?
A I could not count how many stab wounds I inflicted to [sic] her.
A I saw her roaming around.
Q But you will agree that you have stabbed her many times?
Q In committing the crime, were you alone?
A I could no longer count how many stab wounds, Your Honor.
Atty. Anonat:
Q When you were arraigned, you pleaded guilty, do you
Objection… understand the consequence of your pleading guilty?

Court: A I do not know Your Honor [,] the consequence.

Sustained. Q You pleaded guilty to the offense of rape with homicide,

did you understand?
Pros. Edmilao:
A Yes, Your Honor, I understand.
You stated that you pushed her and even tied her hand and
raped her and stabbed her, were you the one alone [sic]? Q That by your pleading guilty to the offense you will be
sentenced to die?
Atty. Anonat:
A Yes, I am aware.
Objection…
Q Your act of pleading guilty to the offense charged is your
voluntary will?
Court:
A Yes, I admitted that crime, but we were two.
Sustained.
Q You mean to say there were two of you who raped [AAA]?
Court:
A Yes, your Honor.
Q When you said you raped her, you mean you inserted your
penis inside the vagina of [AAA]?
Q Before raping her, was [AAA] wearing clothes?
A No, Your Honor.
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q When you said you raped her, what do you mean?
Q Was [AAA] wearing [a] panty before you raped her?
A Yes, Your Honor. xxxx

Q Did you remove her panty before raping her? Q While she [AAA] was there gathering oranges, you mean to
say you were close to the place [AAA] was?
A No, You Honor, I did not.
A I, together with Ronie Abapo go [sic] near to the place [AAA]
Q How did you rape [AAA]? was.

A I have sexed [sic] with her. Q When you were already near at [sic] the place where [AAA]
was climbing, was she still up there at the orange tree?
Q What do you mean by I "remedio" her, you mean you have
inserted your penis into the vagina of [AAA]? A She already came down.

A No, Your Honor, my penis did not penetrate into the vagina of Q When she came down, what followed next then?
[AAA].
A We held her hands.
Q Why your penis did [sic] not able to penetrate into the vagina
of [AAA]? Q Who held her hands?

A The vagina of [AAA] is very small. A The two of us.

Q Can you tell this Court how tall was [AAA]? Q You mean one hand was held by you and the other hand was
held by Ronie Abapo?
A (The witness demonstrated that from the floor about 3 feet
high was the height of [AAA]) Atty. Anonat:

Q If you are standing and [AAA] is also standing side by side Objection, leading.
with you, up to what part of your body is the height of [AAA]?
Pros. Edmilao:
A Up to my waist line.
Q You said that you were holding the hands of [AAA], how did
Atty. Cagaanan: you do it?

Q When you pleaded guilty [,] was it in your own free will? A We held her hands and tied it [sic] with banana skin.

A Yes, sir. Q Who tied the hands of [AAA]?

Q Were you not forced or coerced by anybody with this A Both of us.
crime?
Q After tying the hands of [AAA][,] with banana stalk where did
A No, sir.34 you place her?

The inefficacious plea of guilty notwithstanding, the totality of the A We brought her to the [sic] grassy place.
evidence for the prosecution undeniably establishes appellant's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with Q What happened then after [AAA] was brought to the [sic]
homicide. Apart from his testimony upon changing his plea to a grassy place?
plea of guilty, appellant gave a subsequent testimony when he
was presented by the prosecution as a witness against his co-
accused. This second testimony which constitutes another A We killed her.
judicial confession, replete with details and made consciously as
it was, cured the deficiencies which made his earlier plea of Q Before you killed her, what did you do to her?
guilty improvident. The latter testimony left no room for doubt as
to the voluntariness and comprehension on appellant's part of A We raped her.
his change of plea, as well as completed his narration of how he
raped and killed the victim. The pertinent portions of the second
testimony follow, thus: Q Who raped her first?

Pros. Jose A. Edmilao: A It was Ronie Abapo, then followed by me.

Q While you were gathering firewoods [sic] and Ronie Abapo Q How did you rape her?
was pasturing carabao, do you recall of any untoward incident
that happened? A We undress[sed] her.

A We raped and killed. Q What was she wearing at that time?

Q Whom did you rape and kill? A She wore a dress.

A [AAA]. Q What about Ronie Abapo?

Q And when you said [AAA], who was then your companion, A He did not undress.
because you said we?
Q How did you let your penis out?
A Ronie Abapo.
A I removed my t-shirt.
Q How about your pants? Q But you tried to insert your penis inside the vagina?

A I also removed my pants. A Yes, sir.

Q What was then the reaction of [AAA], when you first tied her
hand?
A She did not cry, because we covered her mouth.
Q Who covered her mouth? You or Ronie?
Q And your penis touched the vagina of [AAA]?
A Yes, sir.
Q Only your penis was not able to enter the vagina because
[AAA] is [sic] still a small girl?

A Ronie. A Yes, sir.

Q What [sic] you said that it was Ronie Abapo, what did you do Q After trying to insert your penis after Ronie Abapo, what did
then when he was on [sic] the act of raping her? you do to [AAA]?

A I was just near to [sic] them. A I walked away, but he called me.

Q The after Ronie Abapo, what did you do then? Q Who called you?

A He told me that you will be the next [sic]. A Ronie Abapo.

Q So when he told you that you will be the next [sic], what did Q Why did he call you?
you do next?
A He asked me, what to do with [AAA]. It might be that she will
A I also raped her. tell us to somebody [sic], we will kill her.

Q Again, when you said you raped her, you inserted your penis Q What did you do?
into the vagina of [AAA]?
A I did not answer.
A It did not enter [sic].
Q And what was your answer?
Q Why?
A Because he keep [sic] on persuading me.
A It did not penetrate, because I was afraid.
Q How did he persuade you?
Q But your penis erected [sic]?
A He persuaded me because we might be caught.
A No, Your Honor.
Q And what did he tell you to do?
Q You said that Ronie was the first to have sexual intercourse,
was he able to insert his penis into the vagina of [AAA]? A That we will kill [AAA].

A No, sir, because he was watching, if there was person [sic] Q How did he tell you that?
around.
A Rowing[,] we will kill her.
Q Were you able to see the penis of Ronie inserted into the
vagina of [AAA]?
Q And what was your reply?
A I have [sic] not seen.
A I refused.
xxxx
Q When you refused, what did he do then?
Q You said that you and Ronie Abapo raped [AAA], what do you
mean or what do you understand by the word rape? A He keep [sic] on persuading me.

A We undressed her. Q And what did eventually came [sic] to your mind?

Q Why did you undress her? A Evil came to my mind, so we killed her.

A We undressed her, because we want [sic] to do something to Q How did you kill her?
her.
A We stabbed her.
Q What is that something that you want [sic] top do to [AAA]?
Q What weapon you used [sic] when you killed her?
A We raped her.
A A long bolo.
Q When you said we raped her, you mean, you inserted your
penis inside the vagina of [AAA]? Q Whose [sic] the owner of that long bolo?

A No, sir. A Mine, but Ronie Abapo used it.

Q Who was the first one to use it? A I have already told.

A Ronie Abapo. Q Who was the person whom you talked about [sic]?

Q But the bolo was in your hands, how did [sic] he be able to A My neighbor.
use it?
Q Whose [sic] the name of that neighbor?
A I put it on the ground and he got it.
A Emilio Magallano.
Q You said that he made the first struck [sic]. Where was [AAA]
first hit? Q After Emilio Magallano[,] to whom did you report?

A In the stomach. A Sofronio Aranas.

Q How many times did Ronie Abapo strike her with the use of Q Who else?
that bolo?
A Rico Magallano.
A I cannot remember anymore.
Q Who else?
Q Aside from the stomach, where were the other pants [sic] of
[AAA] also hit?
A The wife of Panyong.
A At the left side.
Q In the reporting [sic] this matter[,] were you together with
Ronie Abapo telling these persons that you raped [AAA]?
Q How about you, did you made [sic] the following stab to
[AAA]?
A I was alone.
A I was hesitant to stab, but eventually I stabbed her.
Q And did you tell her that you were two in killing and raping with
Ronie Abapo?
Q How many times?
A No, sir.
A Only one.
Q Why not?
Q What part of her body was she hit?
A According to Emilio that the mother of the victim might be [sic]
A At the stomach. pity enough to me, because I am related to them.

Q Do you mean to say that you also got the bolo from the hands
of Ronie Abapo and also stabbed [AAA]?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why was [AAA] not killed, when Ronie Abapo made stabbed
[sic] on her?
A He [sic] was already dead.
Q Why did you stab her, when she was already dead?
A I just stabbed her, because I thought that she was still alive.
xxxx
Q Do you know where is [sic] the bolo used in stabbing [AAA]?
A No, sir.
Q When you reported to these persons you have mentioned, did
you also tell them that you were together with Ronie Abapo in
killing and raping?
A No, sir.35
While the trial court found appellant's second testimony insofar
as it implicated his co-accused to be unworthy of credence,
there is absolutely nothing on record which militates against its
use as basis for establishing appellant's guilt. In fact, in his Brief,
appellant submits that he must be convicted of simple rape
alone and not rape with homicide. Thus, he admits in writing,
albeit implicitly, that he raped the victim.
Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside
only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial
court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the
accused, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is
predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on
evidence proving his commission of the offense
charged.36 Thus, as we have ruled in People v. Derilo:37

Q After killing [AAA], where did you place the bolo?

While it may be argued that appellant entered an improvident
plea of guilty when re-arraigned, we find no need, however, to
A In our place. remand the case to the lower court for further reception of
evidence. As a rule, this Court has set aside convictions based
Q It [sic] it there in your home? on pleas of guilty in capital offenses because of improvidence
thereof and when such plea is the sole basis of the
condemnatory judgment. However, where the trial court
A Already taken.
receives evidence to determine precisely whether or not the
accused has erred in admitting his guilt, the manner in which the
Q Who got? plea of guilty is made (improvidently or not) loses legal
significance, for the simple reason that the conviction is based
A The barangay captain. on evidence proving the commission by the accused of the
offense charged.
Q Now, did you tell to [sic] anybody regarding the raping and
killing of [AAA] aside from here in Court?
Thus, even without considering the plea of guilty of appellant, he Q Aside from the stomach, where were the other pants [sic] of
may still be convicted if there is adequate evidence on record on [AAA] also hit?
which to predicate his conviction. x x x x
A At the left side.
Here, the prosecution was able to establish, through the
separate testimonies of appellant, that at around 1:00 o'clock in Q How about you, did you made [sic] the following stab to
the afternoon of 8 April 1997, appellant was gathering firewood [AAA]?
not far from the house of the victim AAA in Barangay Pantaon,
Ozamiz City. He met co-accused Ronie Abapo who was then
pasturing his carabao also within the vicinity of the victim's A I was hesitant to stab, but eventually I stabbed her.
home. They spotted the victim picking oranges with her three
(3)-year old brother at the back of their house and together Q How many times?
approached her from behind, tied her hands with banana skin
and dragged her to a grassy place.38 Abapo raped the victim A Only one.
first.39 Thereafter, appellant followed suit.40 Once they had
finished with their dastardly acts, they stabbed and killed the
victim with a long bolo which belonged to appellant. 41 Q What part of her body was she hit?

Through the testimony of the physician who conducted the A At the stomach.
autopsy on AAA's body, it was established that the victim had 6
and 12 o'clock lacerations on her external genital organ. Thus, Q Do you mean to say that you also got the bolo from the hands
it is clear that the rape was consummated. of Ronie Abapo and also stabbed AAA?

Appellant challenges the testimonies of the witnesses A Yes, sir.

Magallano and Arañas on what appellant had confessed to or
told them for being hearsay. The challenge fails. The
Q Why was [AAA] not killed, when Ronie Abapo made stabbed
testimonies, it should be conceded, cannot serve as a proof of
[sic] on her?
extrajudicial confession for an extrajudicial confession has to be
in writing, among others, to be admissible in evidence.42 That is
why the testimonies are of use in the case as corroborative A He [sic] was already dead.
evidence only. Such utility, however, cannot be defeated by the
hearsay rule. The testimonies covered are independently Q Why did you stab her, when she was already dead?
relevant statements which are not barred by the hearsay
rule.1awphi1.net
A I just stabbed her, because I thought that she was still
alive.45
Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only
the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the
Thus, the finding of guilt as pronounced by the RTC and the
truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not
Court of Appeals should be sustained. However, with the
apply. The statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as
passage of R.A. No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the
to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary,
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," the penalty of
for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be
death can no longer be imposed. Accordingly, the penalty
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. 43
imposed upon appellant is reduced from death to reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole.46
Moreover, where, as in the case at bar, there is no evidence to
show any dubious reason or improper motive for a prosecution
With respect to the civil liability of appellant, we modify the award
witness to bear false testimony against the accused or falsely
in light of prevailing jurisprudence. Accordingly, appellant is
implicate him in a crime, his or her testimony should be given
ordered to indemnify the heirs of AAA in the amount of
full faith and credit.44
₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages,
₱25,000.00 as temperate damages and ₱100,000.00 as
Next, we address appellant's contention that he can only be exemplary damages.47
convicted of simple rape, as this is the only crime to which he
has owned up. Arguing that the victim may have already been
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
dead after his co-accused had allegedly hacked her first,
CR-HC No. 00193 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
appellant theorizes that he, at most, would be guilty of an
Appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
impossible crime.
perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay the heirs of the
victim, AAA, in the amounts of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity,
Appellant is clutching at straws. It is extremely doubtful that ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, ₱25,000.00 as temperate
appellant could have known positively that the victim was damages, and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus costs.
already dead when he struck her. The proposition not only
completely contradicts his judicial confession, it is also
SO ORDERED.
speculative as to cause of death. In light of the particular
circumstances of the event, appellant's mere conjecture that
AAA had already expired by the time he hacked her cannot be
sufficient to support his assertion of an impossible crime. An
examination of the testimony is again called for, thus:

Pros. Edmilao: G.R. No. 172868 March 14, 2008

Q You said that he (Abapo) made the first strike, where was PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
[AAA] first hit? vs.
ROBERTO AGUILAR, accused-appellant.
A In the stomach.
DECISION
Q How many times did Ronie Abapo strike her with the use of CARPIO MORALES, J.:
that bolo?
On petition for review is the Court of Appeals' decision [1] of
August 31, 2005 which affirmed with modification that of
A I cannot remember anymore.
Branch 69 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig convicting
appellant, Roberto Aguilar, of Qualified Rape.[2]

The inculpatory portion of the information, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 125621-H charging appellant with Qualified
Rape of his daughter, reads:
That on or about the 4th day of May, 2003 in Taguig, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, taking advantage of his
moral authority and ascendancy and by means of force and
intimidation did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of [AAA][3]against her will
and consent, the said crime having been attended by the
qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority, the said
accused being the father of the said victim, a 15-year old minor
at the time of the commission of the crime, and that the said
rape was committed in full view of the sister of the victim,
thereby raising the crime to a [sic] QUALIFIED RAPE, which is
aggravated by the circumstances oftreachery, evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength, nighttimeand
dwelling, to the damage and prejudice of said victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4] (Underscoring supplied)
The following facts were not disputed by appellant.
The private complainant, AAA, daughter of appellant and his
wife BBB, was born on January 22, 1989,[5] and was thus 14
years old on May 4, 2003, the date the offense is alleged to
have been committed.
At the time of the commission of the offense, AAA's mother
BBB was working in Pakistan, leaving the custody and care of
their three children to her husband-appellant.
Around 2:00 o'clock in the morning of May 4, 2003, while AAA
was sleeping with her younger sister CCC at their house in
Purok 6, Tuktukan, Taguig, Metro Manila, she was roused from
her sleep as she felt someone undressing her. She quickly
recognized her father, herein appellant, who was removing her
short pants and later also removed his. He soon lay atop her,
inserted his penis in her vagina, and proceeded to perform a
push and pull motion.
The noise produced by the push and pull motion of appellant
awakened CCC who, overtaken by fear, feigned to be asleep
albeit she made sure she witnessed the incident.
Later that day, the siblings' aunt DDD, sister of their mother
BBB, visited their home. CCC at once reported to DDD what
she had witnessed earlier. AAA confirmed the report. After
consulting her husband about the incident, DDD, together with
AAA proceeded to the Taguig Police Station and filed a
complaint against appellant.
On examination of AAA at the Philippine National Police
Laboratory by Medico-legal Officer Paul Ed C. Ortiz, the
following findings, quoted verbatim, were noted:
Hymen: With pressure if shallow healed lacerations at 2, 3, 6 &
9 o'clock and a deep healed laceration at 11 o'clock position.
xxx xxx xxx
CONCLUSION: Subject is non-virgin state physically. There
are no external signs of application of any form of trauma. [6]
On his scheduled date of arraignment on June 23, 2003,
appellant's counsel de oficio informed the trial court that
appellant intended to plead guilty to the charge. To afford
appellant time to reflect on his intended plan and its
consequences, however, the trial court postponed the
arraignment to July 6, 2003, and later to July 21, 2003.
On arraignment on July 21, 2003, appellant pleaded guilty to
the charge. The trial court thereupon conducted a searching
inquiry to determine the voluntariness of appellant's plea and
his full comprehension of the consequences thereof. On being
convinced that appellant indeed voluntarily admitted his guilt
and fully understood its consequences, the trial court directed
the prosecution to present evidence "to prove the guilt of
[appellant] and [the] exact degree of culpability."
The prosecution thus presented as witnesses AAA, CCC, and
DDD.
After the prosecution rested its case, when asked by the trial
court "What can you say, are you going to testify," appellant
answered in the negative.[7]
By decision of October 10, 2003, the trial court convicted
appellant and imposed the death penalty on him, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Roberto Aguilar guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Qualified Rape, this court hereby
sentences accused to suffer the Death penalty and to pay
offended party [AAA] P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED.[8]
The case was thereupon elevated for automatic review to this
Court, appellant faulting the trial court on the sole ground that
in convicting him, it failed to comply with Section 3, Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court
shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall
require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise
degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his
behalf.
Following People v. Mateo,[9] the Court transferred the case to
the Court of Appeals for intermediate review.
By Decision of August 31, 2005, the Court of Appeals, finding
the evidence for the prosecution to have proved beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of appellant, affirmed the decision of
the trial court with modification by increasing the award of civil
indemnity, disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, the October 10, 2003 Decision of the Regional
Trial court, Branch 69, Pasig City, in Criminal Case No.
125621-H, is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Roberto Aguilar guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Qualified Rape, this court hereby
sentences accused to suffer the Death Penalty and to pay
offended party [AAA] P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[10] (Emphasis supplied)
The case is back before this Court.
The parties were, by Resolution of July 11, 2006, required by
the Court to submit Supplemental Briefs if they so
desired.[11] Both parties manifested that they no longer
intended to submit the same.[12]
The above-quoted provision of Sec. 3 of Rule 116 provides the
procedure to be observed when an accused pleads guilty to a
capital offense in order to safeguard his rights.
The Court has in several cases prescribed the following
guidelines on the manner in which a searching inquiry should
proceed:
(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought
into the custody of the law; (b) whether he had the assistance
of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary
investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained
and interrogated during the investigations. This is intended to
rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or
placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of
physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply
because of the judge's intimidating robes. Anong natapos mo?

(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to ACCUSED:

whether he had conferred with, and completely explained to,
First year high school po.
the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
COURT:
(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the
accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and Ano ang trabaho mo bago nangyari ang
educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy insidenteng ito?
index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
ACCUSED:
(4) Inform the accused of the exact length of imprisonment or
nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he Isa po akong smoked-fish vendor.
will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused COURT:
pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad
advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a Ano ang religion mo?
lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is
the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor ACCUSED:
under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty
carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime Roman Catholic po.
proper but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it,
COURT:
that increase punishment.
How about your daughter?
(5) Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is
charged and to fully explain to him the elements of the crime A- Opo.
which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do
so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be COURT:
informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him
and a denial of his right to due process. Kasal ka ba sa iyong asawa?

A- Opo.
(6) All questions posed to the accused should be in a
language knownand understood by the latter. COURT:

(7) The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in Kailan?
pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required to
narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing ACCUSED:
details.[13]
May 19.
The trial court attempted to observe these guidelines as
COURT:
reflected in the following excerpt of the proceedings taken on
July 21, 2003: Alam mo ba kung ilang taon si [AAA]?
COURT: ACCUSED:
Make it of record that accused admitted complete Fifteen po sa January 22.
responsibility to Criminal Case No. 125621 duly
assisted by counsel for qualified rape. COURT:
Question Alam mo ba nasapag-amin mo sa kasong
qualified rape bibigyan ka ng parusang lethal Pinagsisisihan mo ba ang ginawa mo sa anak mo?
injection or life sentence depende sa testimony ng
ACCUSED:
complainant, nalalaman mo ba ito?
Opo.
ACCUSED:
COURT:
Opo.
Bibistahan ko pa rin ito at saka kita bibigyan ng
Bakit mo naman inamin itong kaso laban sa
COURT: kaukulang parusa matapos kong marining [sic] ang
iyo?
testimony ng iyong anak at ng kanyang testigo.
ACCUSED:
ACCUSED:
Dahil ginawa ko po kase talaga at naaawa ako
Opo.[14] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
sa asawa ko na nagpapakagastos pa sa kaso at
saka umaabsent pa eskwela ang anak ko sa From the above-quoted transcript of the proceedings, the Court
pagpunta punta dito. finds that the trial court failed to fully observe the above-
enumerated guidelines.
COURT:

Ito ba ay napagisipan mong mabuti bago ka Nevertheless, as did the appellate court, the Court finds that
umamin? appellant's conviction must be sustained, not on the basis of
his plea of guilt which he affirmed on the witness stand but on
ACCUSED: the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution
showing the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of appellant which,
Opo, mulapa noong July 7. Noon ko unang sinabi by choice, he failed to rebut.
na aamin ako.
Consider the following testimony of AAA:
COURT:

Ilang taon ka na ngayon? Prosecutor Deza

ACCUSED:
xxx xxx xxx
Forty-five po.
When did this alleged molestation of the accused to
Q-
COURT: you happened? [sic]
A- May 4, 2003 Sir. Q- Did you ever attempt to prevent him from doing so?

Q- And where did it occur? A- I pushed him but he was strong Sir.

In our residence in Purok 6, Tuktukan, Taguig, Metro Aside from his acts did he say anything while he was doing
A- Q-
Manila Sir. such molestation to you?

Q- What time did it occur? He told me not to make any noise because somebody might
A-
hear us, "tapos minura pa niya ako."
A- Two o'clock in the morning Sir.
Q- Were you afraid with [sic] your father?
Will you please inform the Honorable Court how did the
Q-
alleged rape started? [sic] A- Yes Sir.

I was sleeping at around seven o'clock in the evening
A- when I was awakened because somebody was
undressing me.
And who were your companion [sic] or rather persons, if
Q-
any, sleeping with you on that night of May 4, 2003?
At that time that [sic], when your father bad mouth or
Q-
"minura ka" was that enough to make you afraid?
A- Yes Sir and he was threatening me Sir.
Court (to the witness)

A- My sister was sleeping beside me. Q- How did he threaten you?

Q- Who else if any? He said that he will kill me Your Honor. He told me that if I
A-
will shout or do something against him he will kill me.
Only the two of us were sleeping while the others were
A- Prosecutor Deza
sleeping outside Sir.

How about your father? Where was he supposed to sleep Did he have the influence or the means to kill you at
Q- Q-
then? that time?

A- Outside of the room Sir. Yes Sir because he has a knife with him and he can stab
A-
me anytime.
So what time if you can remember were you awakened
Q- Q- Did you see the knife?
when somebody was undressing you?

A- About two o'clock. A- Yes Sir.

And when you were awakened because you were being Court (to the witness)
Q- undressed do [sic] you recognize who was undressing
Q- When did you see the knife?
you?
When I was last used he pointed the knife at me Your
A- Yes Sir. A-
Honor.
Q- And who was he?
Prosecutor Deza
A- Roberto Aguilar Sir.
When you said your last used when was that last used?
Q-
When you open [sic] your eyes and you saw Roberto [sic] Were you referring to this one May 4?
Q-
Aguilar undressing you was he undressed or dressed?
A- Yes Sir.[15] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
He was dressed when he removed my short pants and then
A- Undoubtedly, AAA's testimony, which was corroborated by her
he also undressed himself.
sister CCC, proves beyond reasonable doubt that appellant
xxx xxx xxx had carnal knowledge of his minor daughter AAA.

So what happen [sic] after he undressed himself and It bears reiterating at this juncture that in the earlier-quoted
Q-
you were also undressed? transcript of his testimony during the searching inquiry
conducted by the trial court after he pleaded guilty to the
He put himself on top of me and he inserted his organ charge, appellant, when asked why he made such plea,
A-
part [sic] to my private part. answered, "Dahil ginawa ko po kase talaga," and that after the
prosecution rested its case, appellant opted not to present
Q- You said he inserted his organ to yours. Did you see it?
evidence in his defense.
A- Yes Sir.
With the passage, however, on June 24, 2006 of R.A. No.
What was he actually doing when he was on top of 9346, "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Q- Philippines," the penalty of death cannot be imposed.
you?

A- "Niyuyugyug po niva ako. kinakabayo po niya ako." Accordingly, the penalty imposed upon appellant is reduced
to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.[16]
Court

Make it of record that the witness was crying while narrating WHEREFORE, the challenged August 31. 2005 decision of the
her story. Court of Appeals is MODIFIED in that appellant, Roberto
Aguilar, is sentenced to suffer, reclusion perpetua, without
Prosecutor Deza eligibility for parole. In all other respects, the appellate court's
decision is AFFIRMED.
Can you remember how long did this "niyuyugyug ka
Q-
niya" last? SO ORDERED.
A- Three (3) minutes po.
G.R. No. 137554 October 01, 2003
Q- Did you feel his organ to [sic] your organ?
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner-Appellee
A- Yes Sir. vs.
Q- And how did you feel? JOHN MAMARION, LENY LEYSA, JULIET HARISCO,
BEBOT DELA ROSA alias “BEBOT VILLAROSA”, BENJIE
A- It was painful Sir. BERNAJE, SERGIO MENDOZA, ROLAND PORQUEZ,
ROLANDO V. MACLANG, CHARLITO
DOMINGO, Respondent-Appellants
PER CURIAM:
This is an automatic review of the decision[1] of the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City (Branch 50) in Criminal
Case No. 96-17590 finding appellants John
Mamarion y Hisugan, Charlito Domingo y Gorospe, Rolando
Maclang yVentura and Juliet Harisco y Carrera guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR
RANSOM, sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of
DEATH and to indemnify solidarily the heirs of the late Roberta
Cokin in the amount of P50,000.00.
An Information for Kidnapping For Ransom was
initially filed on March 11, 1996 against appellant Mamarion
together with Amado Gale, Jr. (Gale for brevity), Roger Biona
and a John Doe[2] based on a Resolution dated March 4, 1996
issued by the Acting City Prosecutor and Assistant City
Prosecutor of Bacolod City finding probable cause against
them and dismissing the charges against Ronaldo Porquez
and appellants Maclang and Harisco for insufficiency of
evidence.[3]
On May 9, 1996, the Information was amended to
include appellant Domingo as co-accused.[4]
Thereafter, a Second Amended Information was filed
against appellants Mamarion, Domingo, Harisco and Maclang
together with Gale, Biona, Leny Leysa, Bebot Dela Rosa @
Bebot Villarosa, Benie Bernaje, Sergio Mendoza @ SM @
Bambi @ Friday, Ronald Porquez, John Doe, Peter Doe,
Richard Doe and Edward Doe as accused.[5] The Information
reads:
That on or about July 16, 1995 or and sometime prior
thereto, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
John Mamarion, Amado, Gale, Charlito Domingo, Roger Biona,
Juliet Harisco, Leny Leysa, Bebot Dela Rosa @ Bebot
Villarosa, Benie Bernaje, Sergio Mendoza @) SM @ Bambi @
Friday, Ronald Porquez, Rolando V. Maclang, together with
John Doe, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and Edward Doe whose
true names, identities and whereabouts are still unknown,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another
with the use of firearms of different calibers by means of
violence against and intimidation of person, did then, and
there, kidnap ROBERTA COKIN, detain and deprive her of her
liberty for the period of more than three (3) days for the
purpose of extorting money in the amount of Two Million Pesos
(P2,000,000.00) from her sister, Teresita Cokin, for her
(Roberta's) release and that after the pay-off was intercepted
and accused John Mamarion was arrested: as a consequence
thereof, victim Roberta Cokin was inflicted multiple physical
injuries on different parts of her body which caused her death,
to the damage and prejudice of her heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
Only accused Gale and appellants Mamarion and
Domingo were arraigned on January 27, 1997. The other
accused remained at-large. Gale and appellant Domingo
pleaded "not guilty" while a plea of "not guilty" was entered by
the trial court for appellant Mamarion as he refused to enter
any plea.[7] Trial proceeded only with respect to Gale,
appellants Mamarion and Domingo.
On March 23, 1997, accused Leysa was arrested in
Tondo, Manila. Upon his arraignment on April 30, 1997, he
pleaded "not guilty."[8] Trial then ensued with respect to him.
Meanwhile, accused Gale filed a motion, with the
approval of the public prosecutor, seeking that he be allowed
to plead guilty to a lesser offense, i.e.,from Kidnapping for
Ransom to Slight Illegal Detention.[9] Acting on said motion, the
trial court conferred with the victim's sister, Teresita Cokin, and
the latter agreed.[10] There being no evidence presented as yet
against Gale[11] and on the condition that he will testify for the
prosecution, the trial court found no impediment to grant the
motion. Gale was re-arraigned and entered a plea of guilty to
Slight Illegal Detention. Accordingly, the trial court rendered a
Decision dated May 13, 1997, sentencing Amado Gale as
follows:
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused
Amado Gale, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Slight Illegal Detention defined and penalized
under Art. 268 of the Revised Penal Code, and taking
into consideration the mitigating circumstances of no
intention to commit so grave a wrong and voluntary
surrender, without any aggravating circumstance, the
penalty that should be imposed on the accused
is prision mayor in its maximum period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day
of prision correccional as minimum, to 10 years
of prision mayor as maximum.[12]
On July 7, 1997, accused Villarosa was arraigned and pleaded
"not guilty,"[13]and trial proceeded with regard to him.
Accused Biona was killed some time in October 1997
during an encounter with the military in Metro Manila. [14]
Accused Mendoza was arrested on October 6,
1997,[15] and on October 27, 1997, he was arraigned, to which
he pleaded "not guilty."[16] The last to be arrested were
appellants Maclang and Harisco who were brought to court for
arraignment on November 7, 1997 and both pleaded "not
guilty."[17] Joint trial was held with regard to these three
accused.[18]
Based on the evidence presented before it, the trial
court made the following findings of facts surrounding the
kidnapping for ransom and death of Roberta Cokin:
. . . Roberta Cokin, nicknamed Obing, is a rich Filipino-
Chinese businesswoman with business interests in Bacolod
City and in the province and City of Iloilo. These varied
business interest include a grocery store, commercial
buildings, real estate and agricultural landholdings. Roberta
or "Obing" as she is fondly called, lives together with her only
surviving sister, Teresita Cokin, in their house at Mercedes
St., in Bacolod City. Both Roberta and Teresita are spinsters.
xxx xxx xxx
At about 11:45 in the evening of July 15, 1995, Roberta
passed by her cockfarm situated in front of the Bacolod City
National High School along Libertad Street (now Henares
Street) in Bacolod City. She came from the Tangub cockpit
where she attended a cockfight and she was alone driving by
herself a Toyota Hi-Lux pick-up.
Roberta never made it home. A group of armed men
came and took away Roberta and her pick-up. On the
following morning, Teresita Cokin, Roberta's younger sister,
saw the abandoned Hi-Lux pick-up in front of the San
Sebastian Cathedral. Later, Teresita received a telephone call
from one identifying himself as Bravo, informing her that
Roberta was kidnapped and would be released only after a
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) ransom is paid.
Andres Sumpay, the nephew of Roberta Cokin, was at
the Cokin grocery early in the morning of July 15, 1995. He
was minding the store when he noticed a man pacing the
sidewalk in front of the store. The man later identified as the
accused John Mamarion, handed over to Andres a plastic bag
containing some papers. When this bag was later opened by
Teresita Cokin, it contained the driver's license of Roberta.
Inserted in the jacket cover of the driver's license of Roberta
(Exh. I), is the ransom note (Exh J), a piece of yellow pad
paper on which appears, in Roberta's own handwriting, the
following:
Teresita, please give the bearer One Million
(P1,000,000.00) for I am kidnap by them. Don't tell the police
or any law enforcer for my security reason." (Sgd) Obing.
"Please produce immediately. Same"
Teresita had in mind to follow Obing's instruction and
keep the police out of the incident but without her knowledge,
her nephew, Andres Sumpay, with the help of a family friend
a retired policeman Graciano Reyes, reported the kidnapping
to the NBI. Teresita was at first furious when the NBI started
to investigate but as she could do nothing more, she accepted
and welcomed the NBI's intervention.
The NBI sought the assistance of the Bacolod Anti-
Syndicated Crime Unit (BASCU) a unit of the Bacolod City
Police specifically organized for the purpose of going after
syndicated crimes and big-time criminals. The NBI set up
shop in the house of Cokin and monitored the calls made by
the kidnappers.
When Bravo made follow-up calls for the payment of
the ransom money, Teresita, following the instructions of the
NBI, demanded that she be allowed to talk with her sister.
Teresita heard the voice of Roberta over the telephone but
their conversation was very brief. All that Roberta said was for
her sister to be obedient to the wishes of her kidnappers.
Bravo thereafter told Teresita that the ransom money is raised
to Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00). The NBI monitoring the
call failed to trace its origin as the call was made with the use
of a cellular telephone.
Bravo's last call was made in the afternoon of July 20,
1995. Teresita had already raised the amount of Two Million
Pesos (P2,000,000.00) in cash and Bravo wants the money
to be delivered at the Holiday Restaurant in the place which is
known as the Shopping Center. The person who is carrying
the money should wear a red cap and the money should be
given to one who will identify himself as Bravo. The pay-off
time was at 5:30 p.m.
The NBI and the BASCU laid out a plan to apprehend
the kidnappers and recover the ransom money during the
pay-off. An NBI agent, Ed Rasco, together with a Bacolod City
policeman, concealed themselves inside the KC-20 pick-up
car driven by Mario Mahusay when the latter left to deliver the
ransom money. Other BASCU personnel posted themselves
at strategic places around Holiday Restaurant.
Mario Mahusay was very conspicuous with his red cap
inside the Holiday Restaurant at about 5:30 p.m. that day, July
20, 1995. When the restaurant's telephone rung, Mario was
told that someone would like to talk with him. It was Bravo on
the other end of the line and he instructed Mario to take a taxi
and proceed to the Tops Bowling Lanes which is about a little
less than a kilometer away.
Fortuitously, a taxi was on hand when Mario stepped
out of the restaurant. Mario boarded the taxi and it
immediately sped away.
The NBI and the BASCU men were caught unprepared
by the sudden turn of events. Their communication system
heated up with frenzied calls and instructions. Jumping on
their vehicles, they sped northward following the route taken
by the taxi.
The taxi, with Mario Mahusay on board, stopped in
front of Tops Bowling Lanes and Mario alighted. He went
inside the building and waited. He did not wait long as in a few
moments, a man came and identified himself as Bravo. Mario
delivered the bags containing the Two Million Pesos
(P2,000,000.00) to the man who took them. The man gave
Mario P50.00 and they both left the premises of Tops.
The BASCU team, on board their service vehicle,
found no trace of the taxi. They proceeded to the Ceres bus
terminal at the Shopping Center and looked over the buses
and the passengers hoping to find suspicious looking
characters. Not finding any, they again boarded their service
vehicle and moved towards the direction of the Queen of
Peace Church (Hua Ming Church). The church is just near the
Top's Bowling Alley.
Before the BASCU team could reach the vicinity of the
church, they chanced upon a man with a bag walking
hurriedly. When accosted, the man fired at the BASCU team.
After a brief firefight and the explosion of a grenade, the man
was subdued. The bags containing the ransom money were
recovered. The BASCU team also took from the man a .357
caliber homemade revolver with ammunitions and a holster
(Exhs. A, B, C and D). The man was later identified as John
Mamarion.
xxx xxx xxx
The firearm recovered from Mamarion (Exh. A) was
marked by Officer Tubongbanua with the initial "JM" and it
was indorsed to the NBI together with the live ammunitions
(Exh. B), the spent shells (Exh. C) and the holster (Exh. D).
The bags containing the ransom money was also turned over
to the NBI.
xxx xxx xxx
The remains of Obing Cokin was discovered in a shallow
grave in a secluded area of a sugarcane plantation in the town
of Anilao, Iloilo on August 7, 1995. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Teresita Cokin positively identified the corpse to be that
of her elder sister, Obing. There is absolutely no doubt in this
identification as Teresita is intimately familiar with the features
of her sister, including her dentures. Moreover, she knew the
blouse of Obing which has a red and white fish design and a
long sleeve. Accordingly, Teresita executed an affidavit of
identification allowing Dr. Ricardo H. Jaboneta, Medico-Legal
Officer of the NBI to autopsy the remains of Roberta Cokin.
xxx xxx xxx
Roberta died of "Traumatic shock, secondary to multiple
physical injuries." The autopsy was conducted on August 8,
1995. Dr. Jaboneta opines that Roberta died not earlier than
August 1, 1995 and not later then August 5, 1995.[19]
The trial court relied principally on the testimony of Gale
together with the corroborating testimonies of the other
prosecution witnesses, namely: Andres Sumpay, Teresita
Cokin and Mario Mahusay as to appellant Mamarion,
establishing the participation of appellants in the commission of
the crime of Kidnapping with Ransom, as follows:
June 18, 1995 accused Ronaldo Porquez (at-large)
together with appellants John Mamarion and Charlito
Domingo, John's brother, Felipe "Oloy" Mamarion[20] and
Gale, held a meeting at the Ocean City Restaurant in Iloilo
City wherein Porquez introduced the plan of kidnapping
(1)
Roberta Cokin for the ransom of one million pesos to be
participated in by the group as follows Porquez will finance
the operation in Iloilo City, Gale will identify the victim and
monitor her activities and the brothers Mamarion and
Domingo were the ones who will abduct the victim;[21]
June 19 to 22, 1995 the group, consisting of the
brothers Mamarion, Domingo and Gale, went around Iloilo
and Bacolod City looking for a safehouse but was not
(2)
successful; while they were in Bacolod City, the group
used the Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Gale and owned by
his cousin, Atty. Tranquilino Gale;[22]
June 22, 1995 Gale met appellant Maclang for the first
time in appellant Harisco's duplex in Capitol Heights,
Bacolod City; in the afternoon of the same day, Bale, Oloy
Mamarion, appellants Mamarion and Domingo proceeded
to Harisco's store in Gatuslao-Gonzaga street, where
(3)
appellant Harisco gave money to appellant Mamarion; they
then went to Bata, Taculing and Mansilingan, looking for a
safehouse; finding none, Gale brought them back to the
duplex in Cpitol Heights and appellant Maclang paid him
P500.00 for his services;[23]
June 23, 1995 Gale brought the group to Banago wharf
(4) and he was instructed by appellant Mamarion to come
back for them in the morning of July 3, 1995;[24]
July 3, 1995 Accused Biona, came into the picture; he
(5) arrived from Manila and was in camouflage uniform and
armed;[25]
July 6, 1995 a meeting was again held at the Ocean City
Restaurant; Porquez informed Gale, the
brothers Mamarion, Domingo, and Biona that the
(6)
kidnapping will take place in Bacolod City and
that appellants Maclang and Harisco will provide the funds
in Bacolod City;[26]
July 10, 1995 at 5:30 in the morning, the group had a
breakfast meeting in Harisco's duplex, and appellants
Maclang and Hariscogave "instructions" to the group;
Maclang informed the group that Roberta Cokin will be
(7) abducted at the Tangub cockpit on July 15, 1995 while
Harisco said that it will be appellant Mamarion who will get
Roberta as they trust him, and she will finance the
operation; Harisco then borrowed the Lancer from Gale for
4 days, paid Gale P2,000.00 as rent, and told Gale that his
 services will not be needed in the interim; appellant
Mamarion told Gale to be back on July 14, 1995; [27]
(8) July 15, 1995
3:00 p.m. Appellants Mamarion and Domingo, alias "Jack",
Biona, two unidentified persons and Gale met in the public
plaza, as agreed upon; Gale was instructed
by Mamarion to drive to Tangub cockpit; on the way
there, Domingo and Oloy Mamarion alighted at
Goldenfield; upon reaching the cockpit, appellant
Mamarion and Biona went down and Gale was instructed
by appellant Mamarion to come back at 8:00 p.m.; [28]
8:00 p.m. Gale fetched appellant Mamarion and Biona, and
they proceeded to Goldenfield where Gale saw Oloy
Mamarion and appellant Domingo having drinks at an
open-space store;[29]
11:00 p.m. Gale heard appellant Mamarion receive a
message on his handset from a female voice, after which
they left Goldenfield; while in traffic, they saw the white Hi-
Lux pick-up of Roberta Cokin which they tailed; when they
reached Cokin's cock farm in front of the Bacolod City High
School, they saw her unloading several boxes and
appellant Mamarion told Gale to park 20-25 meters
away; appellants Mamarion and Domingo then got off the
car and proceeded towards Cokin's pick-up while Biona
told Gale to move away; they parked in Libertad Street and
stayed there for 20 minutes; when Biona received a
message in his handset, he told Gale to leave Libertad
Street and when they passed by the cockfarm, Cokin's
pick-up was no longer there; they proceeded to a newly-
cemented portion between Homesite and Bata
Subdivision, and saw Cokin's pick-up there; appellant
Mamarion was holding Cokin's right hand while appellant
Domingo was holding her left; she was struggling to free
herself; upon seeing this, Gale cried as he took pity on
Cokin; Gale was told to transfer to the victim's pick-up and
together with Oloy Mamarion, they parked the pick-up in
front of the Bacolod Cathedral; they alighted and went to
the State Theater; meanwhile, appellants Mamarion and
Domingo together with Biona, who were in the Lancer
previously driven by Gale, proceeded towards Homesite;
after an hour, appellant Mamarion arrived at the State
Theater on board the Lancer, and Oloy Mamarion and
Gale boarded the car; they went to a small house situated
on a vacant lot in Homesite; appellant Mamarion left; [30]
(9) July 16, 1995
6:00 a.m. Appellant Mamarion came back, and with Gale
and Oloy Mamarion, they went to Harisco's duplex; Gale
remained in the car; appellant Mamarion came back and
they picked up appellant Domingo; the three drove to the
Cokin building in Lopez Jaena-Libertad Street, and parked
along the street; Gale stayed behind in the car
while appellants Mamarion and Domingo alighted;
Domingo was holding a piece of yellow paper; shortly
thereafter, the two came back and Domingo mentioned
that the person who received the note was mestizo-
looking; they proceeded to the public plaza and Gale saw
appellant Mamarion talking in a public phone booth at
Gonzaga street;[31]
at around 6:00 a.m., Andres Sumpay noticed a man
wearing a cap, pacing back and forth in front of the Cokin
Grocery; the man handed to him a plastic bag containing
some papers which he later found out to be the driver's
license of the victim; he gave the bag to Cokin's house
helper, and told her to give it to Teresita Cokin; Andres
Sumpay later identified the man as appellant Mamarion;[32]
Teresita Cokin, after attending the 5:00 a.m. mass at the
San Sebastian Cathedral, saw Roberta's pick-up in front of
the church; when she got home she received a phone call
from a certain Bravo who asked her if she got the ransom
note with the victim's driver's license; she asked Andres
Sumpay about it, and he told her that he gave it to
Amparing, who placed it on the table; she then got the
drivers license and ransom note;[33]
after appellant Mamarion used the public phone, he went
back to the car and told Gale that he talked to Teresita who
got angry because there was blood in the pick-up; they
went to Tops Bowling Lanes on 6th Street and appellant
Mamarion alighted and went inside; when appellant
Mamarion went back to the car, he told Gale that Teresita
was still angry; they returned to the vacant lot and waited
until evening; Gale told appellant Mamarion that the
Lancer's papers are ready and he has to leave on the 18th
to bring it to Manila; he referred Benjie Bernaje as the one
who will substitute him in driving them around;[34]
July 17, 1995 Gale and appellant Mamarion went to see
Bernaje, who agreed to substitute for Gale; on the way to
Banago wharf, they stopped by Tops Bowling Lanes where
(10)appellant Mamarion made another phone call to Teresita,
asking if the money is ready; in Banago, appellant
Mamarion gave the Lancer's key to Gale, and told Gale
that he is going to Iloilo;[35]
(11)July 19, 1995
Gale, together with the Lancer, arrived in Manila in the
afternoon, and proceeded to Atty. Tranquilino Gale's house
in Alabang;[36]
Teresita Cokin received another phone call from Bravo;
she was able to talk to Roberta who told her to obey her
captor's wishes; Bravo told her that they are raising the
ransom amount to 2 million pesos;[37]
July 20, 1995 Mario Mahusay, the Cokin's driver, handed
the ransom money to a man wearing a red cap who
identified himself as Bravo, at the Tops Bowling Lanes;
Mahusay later pointed to appellant Mamarion as the man
(12)
who posed as Bravo; members of the Bacolod Anti-
Syndicated Crime Unit (BASCU) team who were
monitoring the pay-off apprehended appellant Mamarion in
front of the Hua Ming Church after a brief gun fight; [38]
The trial court found appellants Mamarion, Domingo,
Maclang and Harisco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Kidnapping with Ransom in its Decision dated October
7, 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court Finds the
accused JOHN MAMARION y HISUGAN and CHARLITO
DOMINGO y GOROSPE GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
as PRINCIPAL BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION and the
accused ROLANDO MACLANG y VENTURAand JULIET
HARISCO y CARRERA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
as PRINCIPALS BY INDUCEMENT and all of them as CO-
CONSPIRATORS of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR
RANSOM defined and penalized under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended. They are all sentenced
to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. By way of civil
liability, they are all ordered to pay solidarily the heirs of the
late Roberta Cokin the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as indemnification for her death.
The accused JOSE VILLAROSA, LENY
LEYSA and SERGIO MENDOZAare all acquitted as their
guilt have not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Their
immediate release is ordered unless they are detained for
some other cause.[39]
Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
In their respective briefs, appellants raise the following
assignments of errors, to wit:
For appellant John Mamarion:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING
THE TESTIMONY OF AMADO GALE, JR. AGAINST
ACCUSED JOHN MAMARION.
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
ACCUSED JOHN MAMARION GUILTY BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING
FOR RANSOM AND FOR THE DEATH OF ROBERTA
COKIN.[40]
 For appellant Charlito Domingo:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE
TO THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISCREDITING THE
TESTIMONIES AND EVIDENCE FOR APPELLANT
CHARLITO DOMINGO, PARTICULARLY HIS DEFENSE
OF ALIBI.
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
APPELLANT CHARLITO DOMINGO ON REASONABLE
DOUBT.[41]
For appellant Juliet Harisco:
I HIS UNDERTAKING TO TESTIFY AS ONE OF THE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING JULIET
HARISCO OF KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM AND
SENTENCING HER TO DEATH WITHOUT SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE.
A.1 PARTICIPATION AS PRINCIPAL BY
INDUCEMENT AND CONSPIRACY ON THE PART OF
JULIET HARISCO ARE NOT ESTABLISHED.
A.2 AMADO GALE IS A POLLUTED AND INCREDIBLE
WITNESS, WHOSE TESTIMONY IS NOT
CORROBORATED BY ANY OTHER EVIDENCE.
A.3 THE TESTIMONY OF AMADO GALE, A CONFESS
(sic) CO-CONSPIRATOR IS NOT ADMISSIBLE IN THE
ABSENCE OF INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE OF
CONSPIRACY.
B. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
AS SINCERE, CREDIBLE AND TRUTHFUL THE
TESTIMONY OF AMADO GALE, AN ACTIVE
PARTICIPANT IN THE PLANNING AND ACTUAL
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM OF HER FORMER
EMPLOYER, ROBERTA COKIN, DESPITE THE MANY
INCONSISTENCIES ON MATERIAL POINTS.
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
ACCUSED JULIET HARISCO ON THE BASIS OF THE
SOLE AND UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF
AMADO GALE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE LATTER
FAILED ON TWO (2) OCCASIONS TO IDENTIFY HER
PERSON.
D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ARBITRARILY
ACCEPTING HOOK, LINE AND SINKER THE
EXPLANATION OF AMADO GALE THAT HE DID NOT
IDENTIFY ACCUSED JULIET HARISCO (AND CO-
ACCUSED ROLANDO MACLANG) BECAUSE HE WAS
AFRAID FOR HIS LIFE AND THAT OF HIS FAMILY.
E. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF JOE JOVEN
AND JOI SIMPAS, BJMP SECURITY ESCORTS OF
AMADO GALE DURING THE AUGUST 8, 1996
REINVESTIGATION, WHO TESTIFIED THAT, DURING
AFORESAID HEARING IN ILOILO CITY, AMADO GALE
ACTED NORMALLY AND DID NOT APPEAR TO BE
NERVOUS OR APPREHENSIVE AND FURTHERMORE,
THAT AMADO GALE DID NOT GO TO THE COMFORT
ROOM AS HE ALLEGED WHERE HE WAS HANDED A
WRITTEN DEATH THREAT.
F. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
ACCUSED JULIET HARISCO DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH MOTIVE ON
HER PART FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE CRIME
CHARGED.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
JULIET HARISCO BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE IN HER FAVOR.
III
THE CONVICTION OF JULIET HARISCO IS A GROSS
INJUSTICE THAT REQUIRES IMMEDIATE VINDICATION
AND RECTIFICATION BY THE EARLY RESOLUTION OF
HER APPEAL.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING NEW
TRIAL.[42]
For appellant Rolando Maclang:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING
PRINCIPAL ACCUSED AMADO GALE TO CHANGE HIS
PLEA OF NOT GUILTY TO A LESSER OFFENSE OF
SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION IN CONSIDERATION OF
PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED, ROLANDO V. MACLANG BASED ON THE
UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF PRINCIPAL
ACCUSED TURNED PROSECUTION WITNESS, AMADO
GALE, WHOSE PREVIOUS TESTIMONY IN THE
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION STAGE WAS TOTALLY
REJECTED BY THE TWO (2) SETS OF
INVESTIGATORS, AND WAS NOT MADE THE BASIS OF
INDICTING THE ACCUSED.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
TESTIMONY OF PRINCIPAL ACCUSED TURNED
PROSECUTION WITNESS AMADO GALE IS ENTITLED
TO FULL FAITH AND CREDIT.[43]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) supports
the convictions handed down by the trial court. However, it
recommends that the award of civil indemnity in the amount of
P50,000.00 should be shouldered by each of the appellants,
following the award made by the Court in People vs. Yambot,
G.R. No. 120350, October 13, 2000.[44]
The Court will first determine whether or not the trial
court erred in allowing Gale to plead to a lesser offense in
consideration of testifying as a prosecution witness.
Appellants assail Gale's plea to a lesser offense
arguing that it should have been made during the plea
bargaining stage of the trial and that it should not be subject to
the condition that he will testify against appellants. In the Brief
for the State, the OSG maintains that Gale was validly
discharged as a state witness. Under the circumstances, it is
not correct to state that Gale was discharged as a state
witness under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Gale
was allowed to change his plea pursuant to the then prevailing
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court,[45] which provided:
Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. The accused, with
the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be
allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense,
regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the
crime charges, or is cognizable by a court of lesser
jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary.
A conviction under this plea, shall be equivalent to a
conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double
jeopardy.
Records show that during the May 13, 1997 hearing,
the Chief State Prosecutor manifested that he has approved
Gale's motion to be allowed to plead to a lesser
offense, i.e. Slight Illegal Detention.[46] Private complainant
Teresita Cokin, upon query of the trial court, consented to
Gale's offer of plea to a lesser offense Slight Illegal
Detention.[47]
It is immaterial that said plea was not made during the
pre-trial stage or that it was made only after the prosecution
already presented several witnesses. In People vs. Villarama,
Jr.,[48] a 1992 case, the trial court allowed the accused therein
to change his plea even after the prosecution had rested its
case, applying the herein above-quoted Section 2, Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court. The Court elucidated, thus:
 Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process
whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It
usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser
offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count
indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the
graver charge. Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the
pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings. However, the law
still permits the accused sufficient opportunity to change his
plea thereafter. Thus, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, Section 2
thereof, provides:
xxx xxx xxx
However, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a
lesser offense under the aforequoted rule is not
demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a
matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion
of the trial court.
In the case at bar, the private respondent (accused)
moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense after the prosecution
had already rested its case. In such situation, jurisprudence
has provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor
with a yardstick within which their discretion may be properly
exercised. Thus, in People vs. Kayanan, we held that the
rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does
not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the
crime charged.[49] (Emphasis supplied)
Gale's testimony was crucial to the prosecution as
there was no other direct evidence linking appellants to the
commission of the crime. Hence, the trial court did not err in
allowing Gale to plead guilty to a lesser offense.
The Court will now determine: (1) whether or not the
trial court erred in giving full faith and credit to the testimony of
Gale; and (2) whether or not the participation and conspiracy of
the four appellants in the commission of the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom had been proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
On the first issue:
As a general rule, the testimony of a co-conspirator is
not sufficient for the conviction of the accused unless other
evidence supports such testimony.[50]There is, however, an
exception to said rule. In People vs. Sala,[51] the Court said:
It is true that the testimony of a co-conspirator is not
sufficient for the conviction of the accused unless such
testimony is supported by other evidence. Such testimony
comes from a polluted source and, therefore, must be received
with caution. As an exception, however, the testimony of a co-
conspirator, even if uncorroborated, will be considered
sufficient if given in a straightforward manner and it contains
details which could not have been the result of deliberate
afterthought.[52](Italics supplied)
In upholding the credibility of Gale, the trial court
stated in its decision, thus:
The testimony of Amado Gale on how the conspiracy
to kidnap Roberta Cokin was hatched and implemented
resounds with all the earmarks of sincerity and truth. His
testimony is sox (sic) rich with details of persons, time, places
and things and portrays with vivid imagery the action and the
happenings as he saw them. This is the kind of testimony that
carries the hallmarks of honesty and truth.
Testimonies which are unequivocal, forthright and
replete with details are seals of self-authentication in their
credibility.
Moreover, Amado Gale is only a driver whose
educational attainment is only Grade II. It will require a good
measure of ingenuity to invent a story of kidnapping, abundant
with all the gory details, an ingenuity which Amado certainly do
(sic) not possess.[53] . . .
Appellants take exception to such finding arguing that
the prosecutors had previously rejected Gale's testimony
during the second re-investigation and his testimony is
incredible and full of inconsistencies. The Court is not
convinced.
The trial court's assessment of Gale as a credible
witness and the credibility of his testimony is binding upon the
Court. This is so because the trial court had the opportunity to
observe and examine the witness' conduct and demeanor on
the witness stand, having personally heard and observed him,
and thus, it is in a better position to decide the question of his
credibility.[54]
A perusal of the transcripts of Gale's testimony
confirms the trial court's assessment. Notably, Gale testified
twice. The first time was against appellants Mamarion and
Domingo as well as accused Villarosa and Leysa. The second
instance was against appellants Maclang and Harisco, and,
accused Mendoza. All throughout his testimony, his narration
of the events, from the moment he was first taken in by the
group on June 18, 1995 up to the time he was fetched by his
wife and the authorities in Laguna on September 25, 1995,
Gale was consistent in his account. Even during the rigorous
cross-examination conducted by appellants' counsel, Gale was
steadfast in his account of the commission of the crime and the
participation of all appellants.
The fact that the trial court found the testimony of
another prosecution witness Ruperto Legarda, Jr. to be replete
with inconsistencies and incongruities pertaining to significant
and important details and "suffers from serious improbabilities"
does not lessen the credibility of Gale.
The testimony of Gale, sans that of Legarda, Jr., is
sufficient to convict appellants. Truth is established not by the
number of witnesses but by the quality of their
testimonies.[55] The testimony of a single witness if positive and
credible is sufficient to support a conviction, as convictions rest
not on the number of witnesses, but on the credibility of the
testimony of even one witness who is able to convince the
court of the guilt of the accused beyond a shadow of doubt.[56]
Appellants Maclang and Harisco insist that Gale's
testimony is incredible and replete with inconsistencies. They
maintain that Gale was inconsistent when: (1) he testified on
July 7, 1997 that he saw Maclang for the first time in the
morning of June 22, 1995 at the duplex seated at the balcony;
while during his December 17, 1997 testimony, he said that
when he fetched Mamarion's group on June 22, 1995 at the
duplex, he saw Maclang seated on the chair facing the table,
and that he already knew Maclang because the latter used to
attend occasions hosted by Porquez for whom Gale used to
work;[57] (2) he did not state in his July 7, 1997 testimony when
and where the kidnapping will take place as discussed during
their July 10, 1995 meeting; while in his December 17, 1997
testimony, he specified that Maclang said on July 10, 1995 that
Roberta Cokin will be kidnapped on July 15, 1995 at the
Tangub cockpit;[58]and (3) during the August 8, 1996 re-
investigation, he said that Mamarion and Roger Biona informed
him that the duplex house was owned by appellant Harisco,
while when further examined, he said that he found out that the
duplex was owned by Harisco only after his affidavit was
taken.[59]
These alleged inconsistencies, if they can be
considered as such, are negligible and merely refer to minor
details that do not bear relevance on the material and
significant fact that appellants were part of the group which
concocted and carried out the kidnapping of Roberta Cokin.
Moreover, while it is true that, Gale did not state
during his July 7, 1997 testimony that the details of the
kidnapping were discussed during the group's July 10, 1995
breakfast meeting at the duplex house, it is because the
prosecution did not ask him particularly as to what took place
during such breakfast conference. What was asked of him
during that portion of his direct examination merely pertained to
his companions at that time, thus:
Q Now, on July 10, 1995 in the morning, where were you?
WITNESS:
On July 10, I went to the Duplex house to fetch John
A Mamarion alias "Oloy" and Roger Biona. And that was
the time I recognized Juliet Harisco.
ATTY. BANZON:
Now, in that breakfast conference with Major Maclang
Q and Juliet Harisco on July 10, 1995, who were the other
persons present in the morning of July 10, 1995?
 I saw some people. Some people are matured and some
A are young. I don't know their names but I can recognize
them by face if I saw again.
How about John Mamarion, Felipe "Oloy"
Q Mamarion, alias"Jack" and Roger Biona, were they also
in that conference?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir, they were present while Major Maclang and
A Juliet Harisco instructed them while they were eating
their breakfast.
Now, Mr. Gale, after that breakfast conference on July
Q Q
10, 1995, do you know where did you proceed?
WITNESS:
After the breakfast conference, Juliet Harisco told me
that she will borrow or rent the car for four (4) days. She
A will pay the car Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos, a day,
because they are going to North Negros for a very
confidential transaction and I am not needed.[60]
Obviously, Gale could not have testified as to the
details of their breakfast meeting because proper questions on
direct examination were not propounded by the prosecution.
The above-quoted testimony cannot be considered an
inconsistency but rather it is the result of an omission on the
part of the prosecutor who conducted the direct examination. It
must be emphasized that a response to a question is not to be
isolated in relation to other queries and answers
thereto.[61] The rule is that testimonies must be taken in their
entirety.[62]
Thus, during the cross-examination of Gale by
counsel for Mamarion on July 24, 1997, the Court finds that
Gale elucidated on the participation of appellant Maclang, viz.:
ATTY. ROMERO:
You testified here that while in Bacolod City, there was
an occasion that you ate breakfast at the duplex house
Q at Capitol Heights, wherein Rolando Maclang, during
that breakfast suggested that the kidnapping of Roberta
Cokin will be in Bacolod City?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. ROMERO:
And during that meeting, what Major Maclang had only
Q told you group that the kidnapping will be in Bacolod
City, and that is all?
COURT:
Only "said". Maclang said.
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. ROMERO:
Q And that was all that Maclang said in that meeting?
A There were many other things.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. ROMERO:
Now, in Iloilo City, what was told to you by Ronal
Porquez was that, "We will kidnap a certain
businesswoman in Bacolod City." And while in Bacolod,
Q myself. It was Juliet Harisco who instructed us to follow
it was Rolando Maclang who finally decided that the
kidnapping will be held in Bacolod City. That is your
testimony here in court, is that correct?
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Porquez in that meeting in Iloilo never mentioned
Q Rolando Maclang and to be the person who will meet
you here in Bacolod City? Is that correct or not?
A Yes, he has mentioned that.
ATTY. ROMERO:
What was the statement about Rolando Maclang made
Q COURT:
by Roland Porquez?
WITNESS:
That here in Bacolod, everything will be taken cared of
A WITNESS:
by Major Maclang.[63]
This is further reinforced when Gale testified about the
participation of appellants Maclang and Harisco on December
17, 1997, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Now, after arriving at Bacolod City on July 8, 1995,
Q question is, was there a date mentioned as to when the
where did you and your group proceed?
We proceed directly to the duplex house at Capitol
A WITNESS:
Heights, where Rolando Maclang and Juliet Harisco live.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. BANZON:
So what happened, when you arrived at the duplex
Q
house from San Carlos on July 8, 1995?
John Mamarion, Carlito Domingo, Roger Biona, and
Oloy Mamarion alighted, and then I proceeded to
A
Mansilingan. They instructed me again to come back the
following day, that is already July 9, 1995.
Now, as instructed by them, were you able to fetch them
Q
in the morning of July 9, 1995 at the duplex house?
A Yes, sir.
After fetching them in the morning of July 9, 1995, where
did you and your group proceed?
WITNESS:
We went around the city to look for a safehouse. We
A proceeded to Goldenfield, Mansiligan, Airport, and
Tangub, until they decided to go back to the duplex . . .
xxx xxx xxx
We went back to the duplex house at Capitol Heights.
A John Mamarion instructed me again to fetch them early
in the morning the following day.
Now, on July 10, 1995 in the morning, as instructed by
Q
John Mamarion, were you able to fetch them?
In the morning I went back to the duplex house and
when I arrived there, Juliet Harisco and Rolando
A
Maclang were there as well as the group. We took our
breakfast there and had a meeting.
Now, in that breakfast meeting where you also attended
Q
and participated on July 10, 1995, who are present?
Major Maclang, Juliet Harisco, John Mamarion, Roger
Biona, Charlito Domingo, Oloy Mamarion and myself,
A
and some young persons whom I do not know, but I
could identify them if ever I could see them.
ATTY. BANZON:
Now, what transpired in the breakfast meeting that you
Q said you attended on the morning of July 10, 1995 with
Major Maclang and Juliet Harisco among others?
Major Maclang told us that Roberta Cokin will be
A
kidnapped at the cockpit of Tangub.
Q What else has transpired in that breakfast meeting?
In the course of our meeting, Juliet Harisco stated further
that John Mamarion will be the one to get Roberta Cokin
because they trust John Mamarion, and she will be the
one to finance. She told me that only the group will go,
A
and that I will not go with them. So, I told them that if
ever they will use the car, they have to pay me in
advance the amount of P500.00 pesos per day because
they will use the car for four (4) days.
Q What else happened in that breakfast meeting?
Juliet Harisco stated further that they will go to Central
A
Market, and that I will follow them.
When you said they will leave for the Central Market,
Q and your group will follow them, who were those are you
referring to?
WITNESS:
John Mamarion, Charlito Domingo, Roger Biona and
them because we will get the money and the group,
A
composed of John Mamarion, Charlito Domingo, Roger
Biona, Oloy Mamarion and myself will get the money in
the amount of P2,000.00 pesos from her.
Were you able to receive that P2,000.00 pesos from
Q
Juliet Harisco on July 10, 1995?
Yes, sir. After I received the P2,000.00 pesos, they
proceeded north, but they dropped me at the corner of
Pepsi/Bata because John Mamarion told me that I could
A not go with them as their travel is confidential. He
instructed me that I have to wait again in that same
place where they dropped me on July 14, 1995 when
they will return the vehicle.
This P2,000.00 pesos represents the advance rental of
Q
the vehicle?
A Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. BANZON:
Now, let's go back to that breakfast meeting on July 10,
1995. You said earlier in your direct testimony that Major
Maclang told you and the group that Roberta Cokin
Q
would be kidnapped in the . . . at the Tangub cockpit. My
kidnap should be effected or made?
 Yes, sir. Because he knew that Roberta Cokin would be
A
joining the derby.
Q What date?
July 15, 1995. But he stated further that whatever
A happens, he will not be pointed to as a participant in the
kidnapping.[64](Italics supplied)
Furthermore, while it is true that the names of
Maclang and Harisco do not appear in the affidavits previously
executed by Gale and that the latter failed to identify them
during the re-investigation of the case, still, they were
specifically pointed out and unequivocally identified by Gale
during the trial as those who were with the group when the
plan to kidnap the victim was hatched. Such testimony prevails
over the affidavits which Gale previously executed. It is settled
that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and
the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands
greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are
inferior to testimony given in court, the former being almost
invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.[65]
Moreover, delay in revealing the identity of the
perpetrators of a crime does not necessarily impair the
credibility of a witness, especially where the delay is
explained.[66] Gale was able to satisfactorily explain why he did
not name or identify Maclang and Harisco in his affidavits and
during the re-investigation of the case. On cross-examination
by counsel for appellant Maclang, Gale staunchly declared: "I
purposely did not make mention of Major Maclang because the
person who was taking my affidavit was a policeman and I am
afraid because Major Maclang was also a policeman, I was
afraid because even Oloy Mamarion, our companion was even
killed."[67] Gale further explained that he was afraid because
Major Maclang and Juliet Harisco have warned him not to
implicate them.[68] Upon further questioning, Gale stated that
he was not afraid anymore "because when my family had
already left, I trusted myself to the Lord and I said to myself
that I will tell the truth."[69] Thus, the omission of the names of
appellants Maclang and Harisco by Gale in his affidavits does
not demolish his credibility when he subsequently implicated
them on the witness stand.
Witnesses are usually reluctant to volunteer
information about a criminal case or are unwilling to be
involved in or dragged into criminal investigations due to a
variety of valid reasons.[70] Fear of the criminal is one such
reason.[71]On that account, Gale's fear was not without basis.
In his testimony Gale revealed that on July 23, 1995, after
arriving from Manila, several armed men went to his house in
Old Escalante at around 11:00 p.m., and looked for him, but he
hid.[72] Meanwhile, his wife who likewise came from Manila on
the same day, dropped by Benjie Bernaje's house, and there,
Bernaje's' maid handed her a note coming from John
Mamarion which contained two bullet slugs and read: "(T)his
two (2) slugs let Amado eat this dispense slug." [73]Gale also
received a death threat on May 8, 1996 during the re-
investigation of the case at the City Prosecutor's office while he
was in the comfort room and someone sidled up to him and
handed him a note warning him not to name Maclang or else
he will not return to Bacolod alive.[74]
Gale's escorts, JO1 Leo Joven and JO1 Jose Gerard
Simpas, testified that they did not see Gale leave Prosecutor
Baldago's office at the Iloilo City Hall of Justice during the re-
investigation on May 8, 1996, nor did they notice any unusual
behavior on his part at the time he allegedly received the death
threat.[75] This, however, should not be taken as proof that he
did not actually receive those death threats. As the trial court
aptly elucidated:
. . . they certainly based their perception on the outward
appearance and actuations of Amado. They certainly
were not in the position to observe the anxiety on
Amado's mind and fear that digs deep in Amado's heart.
The Court observed Amado to be a quiet and pensive
person. By keeping to himself and remaining quiet,
Amado acted normally. Without claiming expertise on the
field of human behavior, the Court is nevertheless
convinced that Amado is the type who would remain
outwardly quiet although an inner turmoil gnaws
inveterately inside his guts.
JO1 Joven declared that Amado did not leave the
re-investigation room to go to the comfort room. The
matter of Amado going to the comfort room during the re-
investigation is so insignificant and trivial that it could not
possibly leave a mark in Mr. Joven's memory. In any
event, JO1 Joven left Amado Gale and the other
detainee he was guarding (Charlito Domingo) when he
bought coke and siopao on the ground floor of the
building. JO1 Simpas also left the detainees when he
purchased coffee for Amado who requested for the
change of the coke to coffee.[76]
There being no showing that Gale has any ill motive
to testify against appellants, the presumption is that he was not
so moved and his testimony was untainted with bias, and thus
entitled to full faith and credit.[77]
In sum, the trial court did not commit any error when it
gave probative weight and credence to Gale's testimony.
On the second issue:
The prosecution evidence clearly shows that
appellants were conspirators in the perpetration of the
kidnapping for ransom of Roberta Cokin. Conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it.[78] Appellants Mamarion's and Domingo's acts of monitoring
the victim's activities, coordinating the abduction, handing the
ransom note, collecting the ransom, and detaining Roberta
Cokin; and the concerted acts of appellants Maclang and
Harisco in giving instructions and providing funds for their
operations, prove that they acted in concert in committing the
crime. Appellants' individual participation, viewed in its totality,
point to a joint purpose and criminal design. Thus, they are all
equally liable given that in a conspiracy, the act of one is the
act of all.[79]
Appellant Mamarion questions the failure of the
prosecution to present the money allegedly paid as ransom.
On this score, it must be pointed out that the corpus delicti in
the crime of kidnapping for ransom does not pertain to the
ransom money itself. It is the fact of the commission of the
crime which may be proved by the testimony of the witnesses
who saw it. To prove the corpus delicti, it is sufficient for the
prosecution to be able to show that (1) a certain fact has been
proven, and (2) a particular person is criminally responsible for
the act.[80]
From the evidence brought before the trial court, the
name and participation of appellant Mamarion in the planning
and execution of the crime of Kidnapping with Ransom
consistently and persistently crop up. However, for reasons
known only to himself, he chose to remain silent. In open court,
his counsel manifested that he was waiving his right to present
evidence in his defense. Mamarion confirmed said
manifestation, thus:
COURT:
Your lawyer declared in Court that you are not adducing
Q any evidence by way of your defense. Did your lawyer
give you that information?
JOHN MAMARION
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q Do you confirm that information of your lawyer?
A Yes, your Honor.
Did your lawyer explain to you the consequences of your
Q
not presenting evidence?
A Yes, Sir.
Now, the Court will explain to you that if you do not
present any evidence for your own behalf the case will
Q
be decided solely on the basis of the evidence presented
by the prosecution against you. Do you understand that?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Do you still insist that you will not present any evidence?
A Yes, Your Honor.
And you confirm to the Court that you were not enticed
or persuaded by your lawyer, but this is your own
Q
voluntary decision that you will not be presenting
evidence? Of course, upon conferring with your lawyer?
A Yes, Your Honor.
I think you are aware that this is a heinous crime that
Q
you are charged with in this court?
A Yes, Your Honor.
 Are you aware of the penalty that may be imposed if you
Q
are found guilty of the offense?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What do you know?
A Death penalty.
And inspite of that, are you still insisting that you will not
Q testify here, or you will not present any other witness to
testify on your behalf?
A Yes, Your Honor.[81]
His silence works against him as it goes against the
principle that the first impulse of an innocent man when
accused of wrongdoing is to express his innocence at the first
opportune time.[82]
Appellant Domingo's defense is alibi. He claims that
he was on duty from June 15 to July 25, 1995 as Apprentice
Specialist at the 2nd Air Division of the Philippine Air Force
based in Mactan although he went on leave of absence from
June 23 to June 26, 1995. The trial court refused to give any
weight to the Morning Reports presented by Domingo showing
that he was on duty on the dates Gale stated as these
documents do not appear to be tamper-proof,[83] and that they
do not accurately reflect absences of Air Force personnel out
on a pass.[84] Aside from this, prosecution witness Brgy. Capt.
Marlon Villa testified that he saw Domingo whom he knows as
"Jack", together with Roger Biona at the Odiongan barrio
fiesta on June 29, 1995,[85] and again, on the first week of July
1995 also in Brgy. Odiongan although they didn't talk to each
other,[86] while Gale positively identified Domingo as
the alias "Jack" who was part of their group.[87] Given these
testimonies, the trial court was correct in disregarding
Domingo's alibi as jurisprudence gives greater weight to the
positive narration of prosecution witnesses than to the negative
testimonies of the defense.[88]
The defense of appellant Harisco is denial and alibi.
The Court will first deal on her alibi. Her defense of denial will
be taken up together with that of appellant Maclang.
It is axiomatic that alibi is inherently weak and
unavailing,[89] and should be established with clear and
convincing evidence in order to be acceptable.[90]The burden is
upon the accused to present credible and tangible proof of
physical impossibility to be at the scene of the crime;
otherwise, an alibi may not prevail over the positive testimony
and clear identification of the accused by prosecution
witnesses.[91]
Harisco claims that at 5:15 in the morning of July 10,
1995, she was already in the airport refuting Gale's testimony
that they had a breakfast meeting on said date at 5:30 in the
morning.
The trial court was not persuaded with her alibi. In
disregarding Harisco's alibi, the trial court found that her PAL
plane ticket shows that the flight for Cebu on July 10, 1995 was
scheduled to leave at 8:40 in the morning, and Harisco and her
companion can be at the airport minutes before the flight such
that her presence during the breakfast meeting at 5:30 in the
morning cannot be foreclosed. Harisco, however, points out
that the trial court was mistaken when it stated that the flight
was at 8:40 in the morning, because the time reflected on the
ticket refers to her connecting flight from Cebu to Zamboanga
on the same date, not from Bacolod City to Cebu.
On this score, the best evidence that would prove
Harisco's flight details on July 10, 1995 would be the plane
ticket itself.[92] A review of Harisco's plane ticket indeed
discloses that the 8:40 flight indicated therein pertains to the
connecting flight from Cebu to Zamboanga.[93] However, there
is nothing on record that will buttress Harisco's denial that she
was present at the breakfast meeting as she had an early
morning flight for Cebu. It must be pointed out that it devolves
upon Harisco to prove the truth of her allegations, or denials,
for that matter. Her plane ticket does not state the specific time
of her flight from Bacolod to Cebu as said flight was booked
with an open date.[94]Harisco's witness, May Luzuriaga,
testified that the flight from Bacolod to Cebu was at 6:10 in the
morning.[95] But further review of the evidence on record shows
that the flight was in fact at 6:50 in the morning. Particularly, in
the passenger manifest brought and presented by Bacolod
Branch PAL Manager Job Lamela, it was specifically written
that the time of Flight No. 371 on July 10, 1995 was at 0650H,
or in layman's term, 6:50 in the morning,[96]thus debunking
Harisco's claim. Absent proof therefore, Harisco's claim is
reduced to an unsupported allegation that bears little
persuasive effect, definitely insufficient to prevail over Gale's
positive identification.[97]
And even assuming that Harisco's flight was at 6:10 in
the morning, it does not follow that it was physically impossible
for her to negotiate the distance between her house and the
airport. From 5:30 in the morning up to boarding time, Harisco
had ample time to be at the meeting and subsequently board
the plane bound for Cebu.
The trial court took judicial notice that Harisco can be
at the airport even minutes before the flight with her ticket and
baggage already checked-in earlier in her behalf.[98]
Physical impossibility takes into consideration not only
the geographical distance between the scene of the crime, in
the present case, the scene of the planning of the crime and
the place where appellant maintains she was at, but more
importantly, the accessibility between these two points how this
distance translates to number of hours of
travel.[99] Geographical distances may be taken judicial notice
of, but this alone will not suffice for purposes of proving an
alibi.[100]
The burden is on Harisco to demonstrate that it was
physically impossible for her to have been in her duplex in
Capitol Heights where Gale testified that she had breakfast
meeting with and gave instructions to members of the group in
carrying out the kidnapping with ransom of Roberta
Cokin.[101] Harisco, failed to discharge such burden. The Court
does not find any evidence that shows that the trial court erred
in taking judicial notice of the fact that appellant Harisco can be
at the airport in a few minutes time thus making it possible for
her to be in the breakfast meeting before going to the airport
for the 6:10 a.m. flight, if indeed the flight of appellant Harisco
from Bacolod City to Cebu was actually 6:10 in the morning of
July 10, 1995.
In the light of Gale's positive testimony that Harisco
participated in the planning of the kidnapping and was present
at the breakfast meeting on July 10, 1995, her defense of alibi
must fail, especially when there is no showing that Gale had
any improper motive to testify falsely against her[102] or that it
was physically impossible for her to be at the duplex during the
meeting.
Appellant Maclang denies any involvement, claiming
that his indictment was politically motivated and that at the time
the alleged conspiracy was brewing, he was already assigned
in the Regional Special Office in Camp Delgado, Iloilo
City,[103] and later at the Iloilo Police Provincial Command in
Sta. Barbara, Iloilo.[104] Maclang's denials are futile. As a
defense, denials are insipid and weak, being easy to fabricate
and difficult to disprove.[105] Mere denial of involvement in a
crime cannot take precedence over positive testimony.[106]Also,
as in the case of Harisco and Domingo, Maclang failed to
prove the impossibility of his presence when the crime was
being planned or that Gale was ill-motivated in identifying him
as one of those who spearheaded the crime.
The participation of both appellants Harisco and
Maclang is spelled-out very clearly by the trial court, based on
the evidence adduced before it, as follows:
. . . The facts and circumstances which indubitably show
the participation of Major Maclang and Juliet Harisco in
the conspiracy may be succinctly summed up, thus:
1. Major Maclang is the benefactor of the accused John
Mamarion whom he took in as an asset in the Task Force
Iron Eagle of which he was the Operations Officer. John
Mamarion also worked for Juliet Harisco in the latter's
barter trade business. Both Maclang and Harisco
exercised moral ascendancy and influence over
Mamarion;
2. Maj. Maclang is a friend of the accused Ronaldo
Porquez. Porquez' participation in the conspiracy as
instigator was duly established. If the kidnapping is to be
segmented, Major Maclang and Juliet Harisco handles
the Bacolod City segment while Porquez is in-charge of
the Iloilo side. Porquez expressly made known to
 Mamarion and the kidnap group that in Bacolod City, Maj.
Maclang and Juliet Harisco will answer for their
expenses;
3. Maclang and Harisco have an illicit affair and both stay
at the duplex house at Homesite. John Mamarion and the
kidnap group stay at the duplex house in the course of
the preparations for the kidnapping;
4. The fact that the kidnap group did not return to the
duplex house after snatching Roberta reinforces the
evidence of the duo's participation. This is too obvious to
be further explained;
5. Maclang and Harisco actually delivered moneys to
John Mamarion which were spent during the preparations
for the kidnapping;
6. It was Maj. Maclang who ordered the kidnapping to be
held on July 15, 1995 at the Tangub cockpit. Juliet
Harisco pointed to John Mamarion reiterating his
assigned role as the one who will actually snatch Roberta
Cokin. This incident took place during the breakfast
meeting at the duplex house in the morning of July 10,
1995. It was during that time when Major Maclang gave
out a warning that whatever happens, his name should
not be mentioned in connection with the kidnapping;
7. After the filing of the charges against them, both
Maclang and Harisco took flight and evaded arrest. They
were arrested in the same house at Taytay, Rizal on
October 25, 1997. As testified by Lt. Col. Rolando Lopez,
both Maclang and Harisco occupy adjacent rooms at the
upper portion of the building.
The evidence clearly show that both Maj. Maclang and
Juliet Harisco were aware of the filing of the present case
against them and they both evaded arrest. Maclang's
feeble explanation for his flight was that he was trying to
recover the folder in the possession of Roger Biona as
the documents therein contained would unravel the
mystery of the Cokin kidnapping. This claim is too shallow
and too nebulous as to be given any serious
consideration. Harisco's explanation is that she could not
accept being charged for a crime she did not commit. This
explanation wilts and fades in illuminating brightness of
clear and positive evidence pointing to her participation
in the kidnap-slay as a principal by inducement.[107]
Both appellants Maclang and Harisco argue that: (1) it
is inconceivable that they should be involved in a crime
involving such a measly mount considering that Harisco is
engaged in a successful business and owns several
properties,[108] and that Maclang is a be-medalled military
officer;[109] (2) Harisco has no motive for committing the
crime;[110] (3) the bungled crime cannot be the handiwork of an
experienced military man like Maclang;[111] (4) it is illogical that
Maclang will allow Harisco to give instructions to the group
when he is supposedly to be the one to do it.[112]
These arguments, which are vain attempts on
appellants' part to discredit Gale, are plain surmises and
conjectures that pale in the light of Gale's positive identification
and unwavering testimony. That Harisco is well-off is irrelevant.
As the Court has declared in People vs. Deang possession of
wealth does not make one a saint and poverty alone does not
make one a criminal.[113] Thus, lack of motive on the part of
Harisco is a moot point in the face of the positive identification
and testimony of Gale on Harisco's participation. Proof of ill
motive to commit the crime then becomes
irrelevant.[114]Likewise, Maclang's so-called achievements do
not necessarily connote that he is innocent of the crime
charged or that he is incapable of committing it. An accused is
not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous, or
even present, good moral character and exemplary
conduct.[115]
Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 8 of R.A. No. 7659 kidnapping for ransom
is penalized as follows:
Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private
individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any
manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than
five days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public
authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted
upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to
kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor,
female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or
detention was committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none
of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in
the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed. (Italics supplied)
The prosecution has established beyond reasonable
doubt that appellants conspired to commit, and in fact,
committed the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, as charged in
the Information. In addition, the prosecution adduced proof
beyond reasonable doubt that as a consequence of the
detention of the victim, she sustained physical injuries which
resulted in her death. Applying Article 4, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, the appellants are criminally liable for the
death of the victim. There being no evidence that any
modifying circumstances attended the killing of the victim, the
appellants are guilty only of the special complex crime of
kidnapping for ransom with homicide.[116]
Kidnapping for ransom is punishable by death. Under
the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, if
the victim of the kidnapping dies as a result of her detention,
the penalty is also death. However, since the appellants
committed only one felony namely, the special complex crime
of kidnapping for ransom with homicide, the appellant should
be sentenced to only one death penalty.[117]
Three Justices of the Court maintain their position that
R.A. No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the
death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the
majority that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty
can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
As regards the civil liability of appellants resulting
from the death of Roberta Cokin, Article 110 of the Revised
Penal Code is explicit: "(N)otwithstanding the provisions of the
next preceding article, the principals, accomplices, and
accessories, each within their respective class, shall be liable
severally (in solidum) among themselves for their quotas, and
subsidiarily liable for those of the other persons liable." Hence,
the trial court did not err in declaring that appellants' liability for
the civil indemnity, as principals, is solidary [118] or joint and
several.
The trial court did not err in awarding P50, 000.00 as
civil indemnity for the death of Roberta Cokin.
In addition, the trial court is correct in not awarding
actual damages to the heirs of Roberta Cokin. While Teresita
Cokin testified that she incurred and defrayed the expenses of
transferring the remains of the victim from the funeral parlor in
Anilao to Somo Funeral Home in Iloilo, no receipt or any
document was presented in support thereof.
However, the Court has ruled in recent cases that
when no sufficient proof of actual damages is offered, the heirs
of the victim may be awarded temperate damages in the
amount of P25,000.00.[119]
The trial court is likewise correct in not awarding
moral damages. When Teresita Cokin testified that she
emotionally suffered as a result of the death of Roberta
Cokin,[120] the defense timely objected to its introduction[121] on
the ground that the prosecution inadvertently failed to offer
Teresita's testimony for the purpose of proving moral
damages,[122] in which case, the trial court did not err in
disallowing said evidence.
Hence, actual and moral damages may not be
awarded for lack of legal basis.
 In view of the presence of two circumstances, namely,
the ransom demand and the death of the victim, exemplary
damages in the amount of P100,000.00 should be awarded to
the heirs of Roberta Cokin, conformably with the ruling of this
Court in People vs. Deang,[123] to wit:

The law also allows exemplary damages in criminal

cases as part of the civil liability of the malefactors when the
crime is attended by one or more aggravating circumstances.
As discussed above, this requisite had already been met.
Exemplary damages are, however, imposed "not to enrich one
party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against
or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions."
In the case at bar, exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00 are awarded to the private complainants, by way
of example or correction, in addition to the damages herein
awarded.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of

the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City (Branch 50) in
Criminal Case No. 96-17590, convicting appellants John
Mamarion y Hisugan, Charlito Domingo y Gorospe, Rolando
Maclang y Ventura and Juliet Harisco y Carrera of the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom, sentencing them to suffer the penalty
of DEATH and ordering them to pay jointly and severally, to the
heirs of Roberta Cokin the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as civil indemnity with MODIFICATIONthat they
are further ordered to pay an additional amounts of Twenty
Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate damages
and One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as
exemplary damages.

Upon finality of this decision, pursuant to Section 25

of R.A. No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, let the records of this case be immediately forwarded to
the Office of the President for possible exercise of the
pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.