G.R. No.

L-24440 March 28, 1968

THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE,defendants-appellants.

Fortugaleza, Lood, Sarmiento, M. T. Yap & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for defendants-appellants.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of
the then Zamboanga Province. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the
Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the Act also provided that —

Buildings and properties which the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another
place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General.

The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and some buildings constructed thereon, located
in the City of Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga
Province. As far as can be gleaned from the records, 1 said properties were being utilized as follows —

No. of Lots Use

1 ................................................ Capitol Site
3 ................................................ School Site
3 ................................................ Hospital Site
3 ................................................ Leprosarium
1 ................................................ Curuan School
1 ................................................ Trade School
2 ................................................ Burleigh School
2 ................................................ High School Playground
9 ................................................ Burleighs
1 ................................................ Hydro-Electric Site (Magay)
1 ................................................ San Roque
23 ................................................ vacant

It appears that in 1945, the capital of Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog. 2 Subsequently, or on
June 16, 1948, Republic Act 286 was approved creating the municipality of Molave and making it the capital of
Zamboanga Province.

On May 26, 1949, the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General, pursuant to Commonwealth Act
39, fixed the value of the properties and buildings in question left by Zamboanga Province in Zamboanga City at
P1,294,244.00. 3

On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into two (2):
Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. As to how the assets and obligations of the old province were to be
divided between the two new ones, Sec. 6 of that law provided:

Upon the approval of this Act, the funds, assets and other properties and the obligations of the
province of Zamboanga shall be divided equitably between the Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the
Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Auditor
General.
 Pursuant thereto, the Auditor General, on January 11, 1955, apportioned the assets and obligations of the
defunct Province of Zamboanga as follows: 54.39% for Zamboanga del Norte and 45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur.
Zamboanga del Norte therefore became entitled to 54.39% of P1,294,244.00, the total value of the lots and
buildings in question, or P704,220.05 payable by Zamboanga City.

On March 17, 1959, the Executive Secretary, by order of the President, issued a ruling 4 holding that
Zamboanga del Norte had a vested right as owner (should be co-owner pro-indiviso) of the properties mentioned in
Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39, and is entitled to the price thereof, payable by Zamboanga City. This ruling
revoked the previous Cabinet Resolution of July 13, 1951 conveying all the said 50 lots and buildings thereon to
Zamboanga City for P1.00, effective as of 1945, when the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province was
transferred to Dipolog.

The Secretary of Finance then authorized the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to deduct an amount equal
to 25% of the regular internal revenue allotment for the City of Zamboanga for the quarter ending March 31, 1960,
then for the quarter ending June 30, 1960, and again for the first quarter of the fiscal year 1960-1961. The
deductions, all aggregating P57,373.46, was credited to the province of Zamboanga del Norte, in partial payment of
the P764,220.05 due it.

However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039 was approved amending Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39 by
providing that —

All buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within
the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City of Zamboanga.
(Stressed for emphasis).

Consequently, the Secretary of Finance, on July 12, 1961, ordered the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to
stop from effecting further payments to Zamboanga del Norte and to return to Zamboanga City the sum of
P57,373.46 taken from it out of the internal revenue allotment of Zamboanga del Norte. Zamboanga City admits that
since the enactment of Republic Act 3039, P43,030.11 of the P57,373.46 has already been returned to it.

This constrained plaintiff-appellee Zamboanga del Norte to file on March 5, 1962, a complaint entitled
"Declaratory Relief with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction" in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte
against defendants-appellants Zamboanga City, the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. It was prayed that: (a) Republic Act 3039 be declared unconstitutional for depriving plaintiff province of
property without due process and just compensation; (b) Plaintiff's rights and obligations under said law be declared;
(c) The Secretary of Finance and the Internal Revenue Commissioner be enjoined from reimbursing the sum of
P57,373.46 to defendant City; and (d) The latter be ordered to continue paying the balance of P704,220.05 in
quarterly installments of 25% of its internal revenue allotments.

On June 4, 1962, the lower court ordered the issuance of preliminary injunction as prayed for. After
defendants filed their respective answers, trial was held. On August 12, 1963, judgment was rendered, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Republic Act No. 3039 unconstitutional insofar
as it deprives plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte of its private properties, consisting of 50 parcels of land and the
improvements thereon under certificates of title (Exhibits "A" to "A-49") in the name of the defunct province
of Zamboanga; ordering defendant City of Zamboanga to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P704,220.05
payment thereof to be deducted from its regular quarterly internal revenue allotment equivalent to 25%
thereof every quarter until said amount shall have been fully paid; ordering defendant Secretary of Finance
to direct defendant Commissioner of Internal Revenue to deduct 25% from the regular quarterly internal
revenue allotment for defendant City of Zamboanga and to remit the same to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte
until said sum of P704,220.05 shall have been fully paid; ordering plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte to execute
through its proper officials the corresponding public instrument deeding to defendant City of Zamboanga the
50 parcels of land and the improvements thereon under the certificates of title (Exhibits "A" to "A-49") upon
payment by the latter of the aforesaid sum of P704,220.05 in full; dismissing the counterclaim of defendant
City of Zamboanga; and declaring permanent the preliminary mandatory injunction issued on June 8, 1962,
pursuant to the order of the Court dated June 4, 1962. No costs are assessed against the defendants.
 It is SO ORDERED.

Subsequently, but prior to the perfection of defendants' appeal, plaintiff province filed a motion to reconsider
praying that Zamboanga City be ordered instead to pay the P704,220.05 in lump sum with 6% interest per annum.
Over defendants' opposition, the lower court granted plaintiff province's motion.

The defendants then brought the case before Us on appeal.

Brushing aside the procedural point concerning the property of declaratory relief filed in the lower court on the
assertion that the law had already been violated and that plaintiff sought to give it coercive effect, since assuming
the same to be true, the Rules anyway authorize the conversion of the proceedings to an ordinary action, 5 We
proceed to the more important and principal question of the validity of Republic Act 3039.

The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the 50 lots and buildings thereon in question. For,
the matter involved here is the extent of legislative control over the properties of a municipal corporation, of which a
province is one. The principle itself is simple: If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal
corporation) in its public and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over
it. But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no
absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just compensation. 6

The capacity in which the property is held is, however, dependent on the use to which it is intended and
devoted. Now, which of two norms, i.e., that of the Civil Code or that obtaining under the law of Municipal
Corporations, must be used in classifying the properties in question?

The Civil Code classification is embodied in its Arts. 423 and 424 which provide:1äwphï1.ñët

ART. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property for public use
and patrimonial property.

ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of the provincial
roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works
for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.

All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without
prejudice to the provisions of special laws. (Stressed for emphasis).

Applying the above cited norm, all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as High School
playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga province. Even the capital
site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for public
use. They would fall under the phrase "public works for public service" for it has been held that under the ejusdem
generis rule, such public works must be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the preceding
enumerated properties in the first paragraph of Art 424. 7 The playgrounds, however, would fit into this category.

This was the norm applied by the lower court. And it cannot be said that its actuation was without
jurisprudential precedent for in Municipality of Catbalogan v. Director of Lands, 8 and in Municipality of Tacloban v.
Director of Lands, 9 it was held that the capitol site and the school sites in municipalities constitute their patrimonial
properties. This result is understandable because, unlike in the classification regarding State properties, properties
for public service in the municipalities are not classified as public. Assuming then the Civil Code classification to be
the chosen norm, the lower court must be affirmed except with regard to the two (2) lots used as playgrounds.

On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of Municipal
Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service are deemed public; the
rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered public, it is enough that the property be held and,
devoted for governmental purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc. 10

Supporting jurisprudence are found in the following cases: (1) HINUNANGAN V. DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, 11where it was stated that "... where the municipality has occupied lands distinctly for public purposes, such
as for the municipal court house, the public school, the public market, or other necessary municipal building, we will,
in the absence of proof to the contrary, presume a grant from the States in favor of the municipality; but, as indicated
by the wording, that rule may be invoked only as to property which is used distinctly for public purposes...." (2)
VIUDA DE TANTOCO V. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO 12 held that municipal properties necessary for
governmental purposes are public in nature. Thus, the auto trucks used by the municipality for street sprinkling, the
police patrol automobile, police stations and concrete structures with the corresponding lots used as markets were
declared exempt from execution and attachment since they were not patrimonial properties. (3) MUNICIPALITY OF
BATANGAS VS. CANTOS 13 held squarely that a municipal lot which had always been devoted to school purposes
is one dedicated to public use and is not patrimonial property of a municipality.

Following this classification, Republic Act 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as capitol site, school
sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites and the high school playground sites — a total of 24 lots —
since these were held by the former Zamboanga province in its governmental capacity and therefore are subject to
the absolute control of Congress. Said lots considered as public property are the following:

TCT Number Lot Number Use

2200 ...................................... 4-B ...................................... Capitol Site
2816 ...................................... 149 ...................................... School Site
3281 ...................................... 1224 ...................................... Hospital Site
3282 ...................................... 1226 ...................................... Hospital Site
3283 ...................................... 1225 ...................................... Hospital Site
3748 ...................................... 434-A-1 ...................................... School Site
5406 ...................................... 171 ...................................... School Site
5564 ...................................... 168 ...................................... High School Play-ground
5567 ...................................... 157 & 158 ...................................... Trade School
5583 ...................................... 167 ...................................... High School Play-ground
6181 ...................................... (O.C.T.) ...................................... Curuan School
11942 ...................................... 926 ...................................... Leprosarium
11943 ...................................... 927 ...................................... Leprosarium
11944 ...................................... 925 ...................................... Leprosarium
5557 ...................................... 170 ...................................... Burleigh School
5562 ...................................... 180 ...................................... Burleigh School
5565 ...................................... 172-B ...................................... Burleigh
5570 ...................................... 171-A ...................................... Burleigh
5571 ...................................... 172-C ...................................... Burleigh
5572 ...................................... 174 ...................................... Burleigh
5573 ...................................... 178 ...................................... Burleigh
5585 ...................................... 171-B ...................................... Burleigh
5586 ...................................... 173 ...................................... Burleigh
5587 ...................................... 172-A ...................................... Burleigh

We noticed that the eight Burleigh lots above described are adjoining each other and in turn are between the
two lots wherein the Burleigh schools are built, as per records appearing herein and in the Bureau of Lands. Hence,
there is sufficient basis for holding that said eight lots constitute the appurtenant grounds of the Burleigh schools,
and partake of the nature of the same.

Regarding the several buildings existing on the lots above-mentioned, the records do not disclose whether
they were constructed at the expense of the former Province of Zamboanga. Considering however the fact that said
buildings must have been erected even before 1936 when Commonwealth Act 39 was enacted and the further fact
that provinces then had no power to authorize construction of buildings such as those in the case at bar at their own
expense, 14 it can be assumed that said buildings were erected by the National Government, using national funds.
Hence, Congress could very well dispose of said buildings in the same manner that it did with the lots in question.
 But even assuming that provincial funds were used, still the buildings constitute mere accessories to the
lands, which are public in nature, and so, they follow the nature of said lands, i.e., public. Moreover, said buildings,
though located in the city, will not be for the exclusive use and benefit of city residents for they could be availed of
also by the provincial residents. The province then — and its successors-in-interest — are not really deprived of the
benefits thereof.

But Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the value of the rest
of the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since they are not being utilized for distinctly, governmental
purposes. Said lots are:

TCT Number Lot Number Use

5577 ......................................
13198 ......................................
5569 ......................................
5558 ......................................
5559 ......................................
5560 ......................................
5561 ......................................
5563 ......................................
5566 ......................................
5568 ......................................
5574 ......................................
5575 ......................................
5576 ......................................
5578 ......................................
5579 ......................................
5580 ......................................
5581 ......................................
5582 ......................................
5584 ......................................
5588 ......................................
5589 ......................................
5590 ......................................
5591 ......................................
5592 ......................................
5593 ......................................
7379 ......................................
177 ...................................... Mydro, Magay
127-0 ...................................... San Roque
169 ...................................... Burleigh 15
175 ...................................... Vacant
188 ...................................... "
183 ...................................... "
186 ...................................... "
191 ...................................... "
176 ...................................... "
179 ...................................... "
196 ...................................... "
181-A ...................................... "
181-B ...................................... "
182 ...................................... "
197 ...................................... "
195 ...................................... "
159-B ...................................... "
194 ...................................... "
190 ...................................... "
184 ...................................... "
187 ...................................... "
189 ...................................... "
192 ...................................... "
193 ...................................... "
185 ...................................... "
4147 ...................................... "

Moreover, the fact that these 26 lots are registered strengthens the proposition that they are truly private in
nature. On the other hand, that the 24 lots used for governmental purposes are also registered is of no significance
since registration cannot convert public property to private. 16

We are more inclined to uphold this latter view. The controversy here is more along the domains of the Law of
Municipal Corporations — State vs. Province — than along that of Civil Law. Moreover, this Court is not inclined to
hold that municipal property held and devoted to public service is in the same category as ordinary private property.
The consequences are dire. As ordinary private properties, they can be levied upon and attached. They can even be
acquired thru adverse possession — all these to the detriment of the local community. Lastly, the classification of
properties other than those for public use in the municipalities as patrimonial under Art. 424 of the Civil Code — is
"... without prejudice to the provisions of special laws." For purpose of this article, the principles, obtaining under the
Law of Municipal Corporations can be considered as "special laws". Hence, the classification of municipal property
devoted for distinctly governmental purposes as public should prevail over the Civil Code classification in this
particular case.
 Defendants' claim that plaintiff and its predecessor-in-interest are "guilty of laches is without merit. Under
Commonwealth Act 39, Sec. 50, the cause of action in favor of the defunct Zamboanga Province arose only in 1949
after the Auditor General fixed the value of the properties in question. While in 1951, the Cabinet resolved transfer
said properties practically for free to Zamboanga City, a reconsideration thereof was seasonably sought. In 1952,
the old province was dissolved. As successor-in-interest to more than half of the properties involved, Zamboanga
del Norte was able to get a reconsideration of the Cabinet Resolution in 1959. In fact, partial payments were
effected subsequently and it was only after the passage of Republic Act 3039 in 1961 that the present controversy
arose. Plaintiff brought suit in 1962. All the foregoing, negative laches.

It results then that Zamboanga del Norte is still entitled to collect from the City of Zamboanga the former's
54.39% share in the 26 properties which are patrimonial in nature, said share to computed on the basis of the
valuation of said 26 properties as contained in Resolution No. 7, dated March 26, 1949, of the Appraisal Committee
formed by the Auditor General.

Plaintiff's share, however, cannot be paid in lump sum, except as to the P43,030.11 already returned to
defendant City. The return of said amount to defendant was without legal basis. Republic Act 3039 took effect only
on June 17, 1961 after a partial payment of P57,373.46 had already been made. Since the law did not provide for
retroactivity, it could not have validly affected a completed act. Hence, the amount of P43,030.11 should be
immediately returned by defendant City to plaintiff province. The remaining balance, if any, in the amount of
plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 lots should then be paid by defendant City in the same manner originally adopted
by the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and not in lump sum. Plaintiff's prayer,
particularly pars. 5 and 6, read together with pars. 10 and 11 of the first cause of action recited in the
complaint 17clearly shows that the relief sought was merely the continuance of the quarterly payments from the
internal revenue allotments of defendant City. Art. 1169 of the Civil Code on reciprocal obligations invoked by
plaintiff to justify lump sum payment is inapplicable since there has been so far in legal contemplation no complete
delivery of the lots in question. The titles to the registered lots are not yet in the name of defendant Zamboanga City.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and another judgment is hereby entered as
follows:.

(1) Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby ordered to return to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte in lump sum the
amount of P43,030.11 which the former took back from the latter out of the sum of P57,373.46 previously paid to the
latter; and

(2) Defendants are hereby ordered to effect payments in favor of plaintiff of whatever balance remains of
plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 patrimonial properties, after deducting therefrom the sum of P57,373.46, on the
basis of Resolution No. 7 dated March 26, 1949 of the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General, by way
of quarterly payments from the allotments of defendant City, in the manner originally adopted by the Secretary of
Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. No costs. So ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
G.R. No. 71159 November 15, 1989

CITY OF MANILA, and EVANGELINE SUVA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, IRENE STO. DOMINGO and for and in behalf of her minor
children, VIVENCIO, JR., IRIS, VERGEL and IMELDA, all surnamed STO. DOMINGO, respondents.

The City Legal Officer for petitioners.

Jose M. Castillo for respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside: (a) the Decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court now Court of Appeals 1 promulgated on May 31, 1984 in AC-G.R. CV No. 00613-R entitled Irene
Sto. Domingo et al., v. City Court of Manila et al., modifying the decision of the then Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch VIII 2 in Civil Case No. 121921 ordering the defendants (herein petitioners,) to give plaintiffs (herein
private respondents) the right to use a burial lot in the North Cemetery corresponding to the unexpired term of the
fully paid lease sued upon, to search the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. and to bury the same in a
substitute lot to be chosen by the plaintiffs; and (b) the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 28, 1985
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

As found by the Court of Appeals and the trial court, the undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

Brought on February 22, 1979 by the widow and children of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. was
this action for damages against the City of Manila; Evangeline Suva of the City Health Office; Sergio
Mallari, officer-in-charge of the North Cemetery; and Joseph Helmuth, the latter's predecessor as
officer-in-charge of the said burial grounds owned and operated by the City Government of Manila.

Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. deceased husband of plaintiff Irene Sto. Domingo and father of the
litigating minors, died on June 4,1971 and buried on June 6,1971 in Lot No. 159, Block No. 194 of
the North Cemetery which lot was leased by the city to Irene Sto. Domingo for the period from June
6, 1971 to June 6, 2021 per Official Receipt No. 61307 dated June 6, 1971 (see Exh. A) with an
expiry date of June 6, 2021 (see Exh. A-1). Full payment of the rental therefor of P50.00 is
evidenced by the said receipt which appears to be regular on its face. Apart from the aforementioned
receipt, no other document was executed to embody such lease over the burial lot in question. In
fact, the burial record for Block No. 194 of Manila North Cemetery (see Exh. 2) in which subject Lot
No. 159 is situated does not reflect the term of duration of the lease thereover in favor of the Sto.
Domingos.

Believing in good faith that, in accordance with Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 1975, dated
March 6, 1975, of the City Mayor of Manila (See Exh. 1) prescribing uniform procedure and
guidelines in the processing of documents pertaining to and for the use and disposition of burial lots
and plots within the North Cemetery, etc., subject Lot No. 159 of Block 194 in which the mortal
remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo were laid to rest, was leased to the bereaved family for
five (5) years only, subject lot was certified on January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation.

On the basis of such certification, the authorities of the North Cemetery then headed by defendant
Joseph Helmuth authorized the exhumation and removal from subject burial lot the remains of the
late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr., placed the bones and skull in a bag or sack and kept the same in
the depository or bodega of the cemetery y Subsequently, the same lot in question was rented out to
another lessee so that when the plaintiffs herein went to said lot on All Souls Day in their shock,
consternation and dismay, that the resting place of their dear departed did not anymore bear the
stone marker which they lovingly placed on the tomb. Indignant and disgusted over such a sorrowful
finding, Irene Sto. Domingo lost no time in inquiring from the officer-in-charge of the North Cemetery,
 defendant Sergio Mallari, and was told that the remains of her late husband had been taken from the
burial lot in question which was given to another lessee.

Irene Sto. Domingo was also informed that she can look for the bones of her deceased husband in
the warehouse of the cemetery where the exhumed remains from the different burial lots of the North
Cemetery are being kept until they are retrieved by interested parties. But to the bereaved widow,
what she was advised to do was simply unacceptable. According to her, it was just impossible to
locate the remains of her late husband in a depository containing thousands upon thousands of
sacks of human bones. She did not want to run the risk of claiming for the wrong set of bones. She
was even offered another lot but was never appeased. She was too aggrieved that she came to
court for relief even before she could formally present her claims and demands to the city
government and to the other defendants named in the present complaint. (Decision, Court of
Appeals, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 34-55)

The trial court, on August 4, 1981, rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendants to give plaintiffs the right to
make use of another single lot within the North Cemetery for a period of forty-three (43) years four
(4) months and eleven (11) days, corresponding to the unexpired term of the fully paid lease sued
upon; and to search without let up and with the use of all means humanly possible, for the remains
of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. and thereafter, to bury the same in the substitute lot to be
chosen by the plaintiffs pursuant to this decision.

For want of merit, defendant's counterclaim is DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 31)

The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals which on May 31, 1984 rendered a decision (Rollo, pp. 33-40)
modifying the decision appealed from, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED (is
hereby modified) and another one is hereby entered:

1. Requiring in full force the defendants to look in earnest for the bones and skull of the late Vivencio
Sto. Domingo, Sr., and to bury the same in the substitute lot adjudged in favor of plaintiffs
hereunder;

2. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants jointly and severally P10,000.00 for breach of
contract;

3. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, P20,000.00 for moral
damages;

4. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants jointly and severally, P20,000.00 for exemplary
damages;

5. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, P10,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees;

6. Ordering defendants, to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, on the foregoing amounts
legal rate of interest computed from filing hereof until fully paid; and

7. Ordering defendants, to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 40)

The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

Hence, this instant petition (Rollo, pp. 7-27) filed on July 27, 1985.

The grounds relied upon for this petition are as follows:

THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES

AGAINST THE PETITIONERS HEREIN, NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR GOOD FAITH AND THEIR
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR CONSENT TO THE REMOVAL OF THE SKELETAL REMAINS OF
THE LATE VIVENCIO STO. DOMINGO, SR. FROM THE SUBJECT BURIAL LOT.

II

THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING PETITIONERS HEREIN

RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ALLEGED TORTS OF THEIR SUBORDINATE OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES, INSPITE OF THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 4 OF THE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 409
(REVISED CHARTER OF MANILA) AND OTHER APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE ON THE
SUBJECT EXEMPTING THE PETITIONERS FROM DAMAGES FROM THE MALFEASANCE OR
MISFEASANCE OF THEIR OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, IF THERE BE ANY IN THIS CASE.
(Brief for Petitioners, Rollo, pp. 93-94)

In the resolution dated November 13, 1985 (,Rollo, p. 84), the petition was given due course.

The pivotal issue of this case is whether or not the operations and functions of a public cemetery are a
governmental, or a corporate or proprietary function of the City of Manila. The resolution of this issue is essential to
the determination of the liability for damages of the petitioner city.

Petitioners alleged in their petition that the North Cemetery is exclusively devoted for public use or purpose as
stated in Sec. 316 of the Compilation of the Ordinances of the City of Manila. They conclude that since the City is a
political subdivision in the performance of its governmental function, it is immune from tort liability which may be
caused by its public officers and subordinate employees. Further Section 4, Article I of the Revised Charter of
Manila exempts the city from liability for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the
Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provision of its charter or any other laws, or
ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board or any other officers while enforcing or attempting to
enforce said provisions. They allege that the Revised Charter of Manila being a special law cannot be defeated by
the Human Relations provisions of the Civil Code being a general law.

Private respondents on the other hand maintain that the City of Manila entered into a contract of lease which involve
the exercise of proprietary functions with private respondent Irene Sto. Domingo. The city and its officers therefore
can be sued for any-violation of the contract of lease.

Private respondents' contention is well-taken.

Under Philippine laws, the City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such endowed with the faculties of
municipal corporations to be exercised by and through its city government in conformity with law, and in its proper
corporate name. It may sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted with. Its powers are twofold in character-
public, governmental or political on the one hand, and corporate, private and proprietary on the other. Governmental
powers are those exercised in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they
include the legislative, judicial, public and political. Municipal powers on the one hand are exercised for the special
benefit and advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial, private and corporate. In McQuillin
on Municipal Corporation, the rule is stated thus: "A municipal corporation proper has ... a public character as
regards the state at large insofar as it is its agent in government, and private (so called) insofar as it is to promote
local necessities and conveniences for its own community (Torio v. Fontanilla, 85 SCRA 599 [1978]). In connection
with the powers of a municipal corporation, it may acquire property in its public or governmental capacity, and
private or proprietary capacity. The New Civil Code divides such properties into property for public use and
patrimonial properties (Article 423), and further enumerates the properties for public use as provincial roads, city
streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service
paid for by said provisions, cities or municipalities, all other property is patrimonial without prejudice to the provisions
of special laws (Article 424; Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, et al., 22 SCRA 1334 [1968]).

Thus in Torio v. Fontanilla, supra, the Court declared that with respect to proprietary functions the settled rule is that
a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu (Municipality of Moncada v. Cajuigan, et al.,
21 Phil. 184 (1912) or ex delicto (Mendoza v. de Leon, 33 Phil. 508 (1916).

The Court further stressed:

Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and in tort....

xxx xxx xxx

The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must answer civilly for the negligence
or want of skill of its agent or servant in the course or line of his employment, by which another who
is free from contributory fault, is injured. Municipal corporations under the conditions herein stated,
fall within tile operation of this rule of law, and are liable accordingly, to civil actions for damages
when the requisite elements of liability co-exist. ... (Emphasis supplied)

The Court added:

... while the following are corporate or proprietary in character, viz: municipal waterworks, slaughter
houses, markets, stables, bathing establishments, wharves, ferries and fisheries. Maintenance of
parks, golf courses, cemeteries and airports among others, are also recognized as municipal or city
activities of a proprietary character. (Dept. of Treasury v. City of Evansvulle, Sup. Ct. of Indiana, 60
N.E. 2nd 952, 954 cited in Torio v. Fontanilla, supra) (Emphasis supplied)

Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special law, the North Cemetery is a patrimonial
property of the City of Manila which was created by resolution of the Municipal Board of August 27, 1903 and
January 7, 1904 (Petition, Rollo pp. 20-21 Compilation of the Ordinances of the City of Manila). The administration
and government of the cemetery are under the City Health Officer (Ibid., Sec. 3189), the order and police of the
cemetery (Ibid., See. 319), the opening of graves, niches, or tombs, the exhuming of remains, and the purification of
the same (Ibid., Sec. 327) are under the charge and responsibility of the superintendent of the cemetery. The City of
Manila furthermore prescribes the procedure and guidelines for the use and dispositions of burial lots and plots
within the North Cemetery through Administrative Order No. 5, s. 1975 (Rollo, p. 44). With the acts of dominion,
there is, therefore no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in
its proprietary or private character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the
private respondents. Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties.
Thus a lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law between them. (Henson v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 11 [1 987]). Therefore, a breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to
damages even if no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the contract. (Boysaw v. Interphil Promotions, Inc., 148
SCRA 635 [1987]).

Noteworthy are the findings of the Court of Appeals as to the harrowing experience of private respondents and their
wounded feelings upon discovery that the remains of their loved one were exhumed without their knowledge and
consent, as said Court declared:

It has been fully established that the appellants, in spite or perhaps because, of their lowly station in
life have found great consolation in their bereavement from the loss of their family head, by visiting
his grave on special or even ordinary occasions, but particularly on All Saints Day, in keeping with
the deep, beautiful and Catholic Filipino tradition of revering the memory of their dead. It would have
been but fair and equitable that they were notified of the intention of the city government to transfer
the skeletal remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo to give them an opportunity to demand the
faithful fulfillment of their contract, or at least to prepare and make provisions for said transfer in
order that they would not lose track of the remains of their beloved dead, as what has actually
happened on this case. We understand fully what the family of the deceased must have felt when on
 All Saints Day of 1978, they found a new marker on the grave they were to visit, only to be told to
locate their beloved dead among thousands of skeletal remains which to them was desecration and
an impossible task. Even the lower court recognized this when it stated in its decision thus:

All things considered, even as the Court commiserates with plaintiffs for the
unfortunate happening complained of and untimely desecration of the resting place
and remains of their deceased dearly beloved, it finds the reliefs prayed for by them
lacking in legal and factual basis. Under the aforementioned facts and
circumstances, the most that plaintiffs ran ask for is the replacement of subject lot
with another lot of equal size and similar location in the North Cemetery which
substitute lot plaintiffs can make use of without paying any rental to the city
government for a period of forty-three (43) years, four (4) months and eleven (11)
days corresponding to the unexpired portion of the term of the lease sued upon as of
January 25, 1978 when the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. were
prematurely removed from the disputed lot; and to require the defendants to look in
earnest for the bones and skull of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo Sr. and to bury the
same in the substitute lot adjudged in favor of plaintiffs hereunder. (Decision,
Intermediate Appellate Court, p. 7, Rollo, p. 39)

As regards the issue of the validity of the contract of lease of grave lot No. 159, Block No. 195 of the North
Cemetery for 50 years beginning from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021 as clearly stated in the receipt duly signed by
the deputy treasurer of the City of Manila and sealed by the city government, there is nothing in the record that
justifies the reversal of the conclusion of both the trial court and the Intermediate Appellate Court to the effect that
the receipt is in itself a contract of lease. (Decision, Intermediate Appellate Court, p. 3, Rollo, pp. 5-6).

Under the doctrine of respondent superior, (Torio v. Fontanilla, supra), petitioner City of Manila is liable for the
tortious act committed by its agents who failed to verify and check the duration of the contract of lease. The
contention of the petitioner-city that the lease is covered by Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1975 dated March
6, 1975 of the City of Manila for five (5) years only beginning from June 6, 1971 is not meritorious for the said
administrative order covers new leases. When subject lot was certified on January 25, 1978 as ready for
exhumation, the lease contract for fifty (50) years was still in full force and effect.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), J., is on leave.

 [G.R. No. 135962. March 27, 2000]

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION,

INC., respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Not infrequently, the government is tempted to take legal shortcuts to solve urgent problems of the people. But even
when government is armed with the best of intention, we cannot allow it to run roughshod over the rule of law.
Again, we let the hammer fall and fall hard on the illegal attempt of the MMDA to open for public use a private road
in a private subdivision. While we hold that the general welfare should be promoted, we stress that it should not be
achieved at the expense of the rule of law. h Y

Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Respondent
Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in
Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a
road inside Bel-Air Village.

On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated December 22,
1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. The notice
reads: Court

"SUBJECT: NOTICE of the Opening of Neptune Street to Traffic

"Dear President Lindo,

"Please be informed that pursuant to the mandate of the MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924 which
requires the Authority to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and
convenient movement of persons, Neptune Street shall be opened to vehicular traffic effective
January 2, 1996.

"In view whereof, the undersigned requests you to voluntarily open the points of entry and exit on
said street.

"Thank you for your cooperation and whatever assistance that may be extended by your association
to the MMDA personnel who will be directing traffic in the area.

"Finally, we are furnishing you with a copy of the handwritten instruction of the President on the
matter.

"Very truly yours,

PROSPERO I. ORETA

Chairman"[1]

On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent
Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. Sppedsc

On January 2, 1996, respondent instituted against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 136, Makati
City, Civil Case No. 96-001 for injunction. Respondent prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall.
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order the following day.
On January 23, 1996, after due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction.[2] Respondent
questioned the denial before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549. The appellate court conducted an
ocular inspection of Neptune Street[3] and on February 13, 1996, it issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
the implementation of the MMDAs proposed action.[4]

On January 28, 1997, the appellate court rendered a Decision on the merits of the case finding that the MMDA has
no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its
perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance. The decision disposed
of as follows: Jurissc

"WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the challenged Order dated January 23, 1995, in Civil
Case No. 96-001, is SET ASIDE and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on February 13, 1996
is hereby made permanent.

"For want of sustainable substantiation, the Motion to Cite Roberto L. del Rosario in contempt is
denied.[5]

"No pronouncement as to costs.

"SO ORDERED."[6]

The Motion for Reconsideration of the decision was denied on September 28, 1998. Hence, this recourse. Jksm

Petitioner MMDA raises the following questions:

"I

HAS THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (MMDA) THE MANDATE TO

OPEN NEPTUNE STREET TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC PURSUANT TO ITS REGULATORY AND
POLICE POWERS?

II

IS THE PASSAGE OF AN ORDINANCE A CONDITION PRECEDENT BEFORE THE MMDA MAY

ORDER THE OPENING OF SUBDIVISION ROADS TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC?

III

IS RESPONDENT BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. ESTOPPED FROM DENYING OR

ASSAILING THE AUTHORITY OF THE MMDA TO OPEN THE SUBJECT STREET? Jlexj

WAS RESPONDENT DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS DESPITE THE SEVERAL MEETINGS HELD
BETWEEN MMDA AND THE AFFECTED BEL-AIR RESIDENTS AND BAVA OFFICERS?

HAS RESPONDENT COME TO COURT WITH UNCLEAN HANDS?"[7]

Neptune Street is owned by respondent BAVA. It is a private road inside Bel-Air Village, a private residential
subdivision in the heart of the financial and commercial district of Makati City. It runs parallel to Kalayaan Avenue, a
national road open to the general public. Dividing the two (2) streets is a concrete perimeter wall approximately
fifteen (15) feet high. The western end of Neptune Street intersects Nicanor Garcia, formerly Reposo Street, a
subdivision road open to public vehicular traffic, while its eastern end intersects Makati Avenue, a national road.
Both ends of Neptune Street are guarded by iron gates. Edp mis
Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the
state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is
traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and
welfare of the general public. It is alleged that the police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the
consolidated cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court.[8] From the premise that it has police power, it is
now urged that there is no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public.[9]

Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in
the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good
and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.[10]The power is plenary and its scope is vast
and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general
welfare.[11]

It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature.[12] It cannot be exercised by any
group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power.[13] The National Legislature, however, may delegate
this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or
local government units.[14] Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred
on them by the national lawmaking body.[15]

A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial
control of local affairs."[16]The Local Government Code of 1991 defines a local government unit as a "body politic
and corporate"[17]-- one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a
corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory.[18] Local government units are the provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays.[19] They are also the territorial and political subdivisions of the state.[20]

Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units in the Local Government Code of 1991.
This delegation is found in Section 16 of the same Code, known as the general welfare clause, viz: Chief

"Sec. 16. General Welfare.Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted,
those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its
efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and
support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety,
enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain
peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants."[21]

Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. The legislative
body of the provincial government is the sangguniang panlalawigan, that of the city government is
the sangguniang panlungsod, that of the municipal government is the sangguniang bayan, and that of the
barangay is the sangguniang barangay. The Local Government Code of 1991 empowers the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality, as the case may be], and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the [province,
city municipality] provided under the Code x x x."[22] The same Code gives the sangguniang barangay the power to
"enact ordinances as may be necessary to discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law or ordinance and
to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants thereon."[23]

Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units - i.e., twelve (12) cities
and five (5) municipalities, namely, the cities of Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon,
Muntinlupa, Las Pinas, Marikina, Paranaque and Valenzuela, and the municipalities of Malabon, , Navotas, ,
Pateros, San Juan and Taguig. With the passage of Republic Act (R. A.) No. 7924[24] in 1995, Metropolitan
Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the Administration of
"metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the
MMDA.[25]
"Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide impact and transcend local political boundaries
or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the individual local
government units comprising Metro Manila."[26] There are seven (7) basic metro-wide services and the scope of
these services cover the following: (1) development planning; (2) transport and traffic management; (3) solid waste
disposal and management; (4) flood control and sewerage management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use
planning, and shelter services; (6) health and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control; and (7) public safety.
The basic service of transport and traffic management includes the following: Lexjuris

"(b) Transport and traffic management which include the formulation, coordination, and
monitoring of policies, standards, programs and projects to rationalize the existing transport
operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares, and promotion of safe and
convenient movement of persons and goods; provision for the mass transport system and
the institution of a system to regulate road users; administration and implementation of all
traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs,
including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metropolitan Manila;"[27]

In the delivery of the seven (7) basic services, the MMDA has the following powers and functions: Esm

"Sec. 5. Functions and powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority.The MMDA shall:

(a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium and long-term plans and
programs for the delivery of metro-wide services, land use and physical development within
Metropolitan Manila, consistent with national development objectives and priorities;

(b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium-term investment programs for
metro-wide services which shall indicate sources and uses of funds for priority programs and
projects, and which shall include the packaging of projects and presentation to funding
institutions; Esmsc

(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide programs and projects for the delivery of specific
services under its jurisdiction, subject to the approval of the Council. For this purpose, MMDA can
create appropriate project management offices;

(d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plans, programs and projects in Metro
Manila; identify bottlenecks and adopt solutions to problems of implementation;

(e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate
and regulate the implementation of all programs and projects concerning traffic management,
specifically pertaining to enforcement, engineering and education. Upon request, it shall be
extended assistance and cooperation, including but not limited to, assignment of personnel,
by all other government agencies and offices concerned;

(f) Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties
for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or non-moving in
nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the enforcement of such
traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of RA 4136 and PD 1605 to the contrary
notwithstanding. For this purpose, the Authority shall impose all traffic laws and regulations
in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may deputize members of the PNP,
traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security guards, or members of
non-governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such
conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose; and

(g) Perform other related functions required to achieve the objectives of the MMDA, including the
undertaking of delivery of basic services to the local government units, when deemed necessary
subject to prior coordination with and consent of the local government unit concerned." Jurismis
The implementation of the MMDAs plans, programs and projects is undertaken by the local government units,
national government agencies, accredited peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private
sector as well as by the MMDA itself. For this purpose, the MMDA has the power to enter into contracts,
memoranda of agreement and other cooperative arrangements with these bodies for the delivery of the required
services within Metro Manila.[28]

The governing board of the MMDA is the Metro Manila Council. The Council is composed of the mayors of the
component 12 cities and 5 municipalities, the president of the Metro Manila Vice-Mayors League and the president
of the Metro Manila Councilors League.[29] The Council is headed by a Chairman who is appointed by the President
and vested with the rank of cabinet member. As the policy-making body of the MMDA, the Metro Manila Council
approves metro-wide plans, programs and projects, and issues the necessary rules and regulations for the
implementation of said plans; it approves the annual budget of the MMDA and promulgates the rules and
regulations for the delivery of basic services, collection of service and regulatory fees, fines and penalties. These
functions are particularly enumerated as follows: LEX

"Sec. 6. Functions of the Metro Manila Council. -

(a) The Council shall be the policy-making body of the MMDA;

(b) It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects and issue rules and regulations
deemed necessary by the MMDA to carry out the purposes of this Act;

(c) It may increase the rate of allowances and per diems of the members of the Council to be
effective during the term of the succeeding Council. It shall fix the compensation of the officers and
personnel of the MMDA, and approve the annual budget thereof for submission to the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM);

(d) It shall promulgate rules and regulations and set policies and standards for metro-wide
application governing the delivery of basic services, prescribe and collect service and regulatory
fees, and impose and collect fines and penalties." Jj sc

Clearly, the scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of these is
transport and traffic management which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects
to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion
of the safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass transport system and the institution of a
system of road regulation, the administration of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and
traffic education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations.
Under this service, the MMDA is expressly authorized "to set the policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and
regulate the implementation of all traffic management programs." In addition, the MMDA may "install and administer
a single ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations. Ca-lrsc

It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of
the local government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila.
The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority."[30] It is an agency created for the purpose of
laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-
governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the
vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the
charter itself, viz:

"Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. -- x x x.

The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process
exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within
 Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning purely
local matters."[31]

Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court[32] where we upheld a
zoning ordinance issued by the Metro Manila Commission (MMC), the predecessor of the MMDA, as an exercise of
police power. The first Sangalang decision was on the merits of the petition,[33] while the second decision denied
reconsideration of the first case and in addition discussed the case of Yabut v. Court of Appeals.[34]

Sangalang v. IAC involved five (5) consolidated petitions filed by respondent BAVA and three residents of Bel-Air
Village against other residents of the Village and the Ayala Corporation, formerly the Makati Development
Corporation, as the developer of the subdivision. The petitioners sought to enforce certain restrictive easements in
the deeds of sale over their respective lots in the subdivision. These were the prohibition on the setting up of
commercial and advertising signs on the lots, and the condition that the lots be used only for residential purposes.
Petitioners alleged that respondents, who were residents along Jupiter Street of the subdivision, converted their
residences into commercial establishments in violation of the "deed restrictions," and that respondent Ayala
Corporation ushered in the full commercialization" of Jupiter Street by tearing down the perimeter wall that
separated the commercial from the residential section of the village.[35]

The petitions were dismissed based on Ordinance No. 81 of the Municipal Council of Makati and Ordinance No. 81-
01 of the Metro Manila Commission (MMC). Municipal Ordinance No. 81 classified Bel-Air Village as a Class A
Residential Zone, with its boundary in the south extending to the center line of Jupiter Street. The Municipal
Ordinance was adopted by the MMC under the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for the National Capital Region
and promulgated as MMC Ordinance No. 81-01. Bel-Air Village was indicated therein as bounded by Jupiter Street
and the block adjacent thereto was classified as a High Intensity Commercial Zone.[36]

We ruled that since both Ordinances recognized Jupiter Street as the boundary between Bel-Air Village and the
commercial district, Jupiter Street was not for the exclusive benefit of Bel-Air residents. We also held that the
perimeter wall on said street was constructed not to separate the residential from the commercial blocks but simply
for security reasons, hence, in tearing down said wall, Ayala Corporation did not violate the "deed restrictions" in the
deeds of sale. Scc-alr

We upheld the ordinances, specifically MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, as a legitimate exercise of police power.[37] The
power of the MMC and the Makati Municipal Council to enact zoning ordinances for the general welfare prevailed
over the "deed restrictions".

In the second Sangalang/Yabut decision, we held that the opening of Jupiter Street was warranted by the demands
of the common good in terms of "traffic decongestion and public convenience." Jupiter was opened by the Municipal
Mayor to alleviate traffic congestion along the public streets adjacent to the Village.[38] The same reason was given
for the opening to public vehicular traffic of Orbit Street, a road inside the same village. The destruction of the gate
in Orbit Street was also made under the police power of the municipal government. The gate, like the perimeter wall
along Jupiter, was a public nuisance because it hindered and impaired the use of property, hence, its summary
abatement by the mayor was proper and legal.[39]

Contrary to petitioners claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case at bar. Firstly, both involved
zoning ordinances passed by the municipal council of Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the basis for the
proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice of December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to
respondent BAVA, through its president. The notice does not cite any ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street.
Petitioner MMDA simply relied on its authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares
for the safe and convenient movement of persons." Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the
acts that fall within the scope of transport and traffic management. By no stretch of the imagination, however, can
this be interpreted as an express or implied grant of ordinance-making power, much less police power. Misjuris

Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is the forerunner
of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows
that the latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA. Jjlex
Metropolitan Manila was first created in 1975 by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 824. It comprised the Greater Manila
Area composed of the contiguous four (4) cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay and Caloocan, and the thirteen (13)
municipalities of Makati, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Las Pinas, Malabon, Navotas, Pasig, Pateros, Paranaque,
Marikina, Muntinlupa and Taguig in the province of Rizal, and Valenzuela in the province of Bulacan.[40] Metropolitan
Manila was created as a response to the finding that the rapid growth of population and the increase of social and
economic requirements in these areas demand a call for simultaneous and unified development; that the public
services rendered by the respective local governments could be administered more efficiently and economically if
integrated under a system of central planning; and this coordination, "especially in the maintenance of peace and
order and the eradication of social and economic ills that fanned the flames of rebellion and discontent [were] part of
reform measures under Martial Law essential to the safety and security of the State."[41]

Metropolitan Manila was established as a "public corporation" with the following powers: Calrs-pped

"Section 1. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila.There is hereby created a public corporation, to be

known as the Metropolitan Manila, vested with powers and attributes of a corporation including
the power to make contracts, sue and be sued, acquire, purchase, expropriate, hold, transfer
and dispose of property and such other powers as are necessary to carry out its purposes.
The Corporation shall be administered by a Commission created under this Decree."[42]

The administration of Metropolitan Manila was placed under the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) vested with the
following powers:

"Sec. 4. Powers and Functions of the Commission. - The Commission shall have the following
powers and functions:

1. To act as a central government to establish and administer programs and provide services
common to the area;

2. To levy and collect taxes and special assessments, borrow and expend money and issue bonds,
revenue certificates, and other obligations of indebtedness. Existing tax measures should, however,
continue to be operative until otherwise modified or repealed by the Commission;

3. To charge and collect fees for the use of public service facilities;

4. To appropriate money for the operation of the metropolitan government and review appropriations
for the city and municipal units within its jurisdiction with authority to disapprove the same if found to
be not in accordance with the established policies of the Commission, without prejudice to any
contractual obligation of the local government units involved existing at the time of approval of this
Decree;

5. To review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and acts of cities and
municipalities within Metropolitan Manila;

6. To enact or approve ordinances, resolutions and to fix penalties for any violation thereof
which shall not exceed a fine of P10,000.00 or imprisonment of six years or both such fine
and imprisonment for a single offense;

7. To perform general administrative, executive and policy-making functions;

8. To establish a fire control operation center, which shall direct the fire services of the city and
municipal governments in the metropolitan area;

9. To establish a garbage disposal operation center, which shall direct garbage collection and
disposal in the metropolitan area;

10. To establish and operate a transport and traffic center, which shall direct traffic activities; Jjjuris
 11. To coordinate and monitor governmental and private activities pertaining to essential services
such as transportation, flood control and drainage, water supply and sewerage, social, health and
environmental services, housing, park development, and others;

12. To insure and monitor the undertaking of a comprehensive social, economic and physical
planning and development of the area;

13. To study the feasibility of increasing barangay participation in the affairs of their respective local
governments and to propose to the President of the Philippines definite programs and policies for
implementation;

14. To submit within thirty (30) days after the close of each fiscal year an annual report to the
President of the Philippines and to submit a periodic report whenever deemed necessary; and

15. To perform such other tasks as may be assigned or directed by the President of the
Philippines." Sc jj

The MMC was the "central government" of Metro Manila for the purpose of establishing and administering
programs providing services common to the area. As a "central government" it had the power to levy and collect
taxes and special assessments, the power to charge and collect fees; the power to appropriate money for its
operation, and at the same time, review appropriations for the city and municipal units within its jurisdiction. It was
bestowed the power to enact or approve ordinances, resolutions and fix penalties for violation of such ordinances
and resolutions. It also had the power to review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and acts of any
of the four (4) cities and thirteen (13) municipalities comprising Metro Manila.

P. D. No. 824 further provided:

"Sec. 9. Until otherwise provided, the governments of the four cities and thirteen municipalities in the
Metropolitan Manila shall continue to exist in their present form except as may be inconsistent with
this Decree. The members of the existing city and municipal councils in Metropolitan Manila
shall, upon promulgation of this Decree, and until December 31, 1975, become members of
the Sangguniang Bayan which is hereby created for every city and municipality of
Metropolitan Manila.

In addition, the Sangguniang Bayan shall be composed of as many barangay captains as may be
determined and chosen by the Commission, and such number of representatives from other sectors
of the society as may be appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Commission.

x x x.

The Sangguniang Bayan may recommend to the Commission ordinances, resolutions or

such measures as it may adopt; Provided, that no such ordinance, resolution or measure
shall become effective, until after its approval by the Commission; and Provided further, that
the power to impose taxes and other levies, the power to appropriate money and the power to
pass ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions shall be vested exclusively in the
Commission."

The creation of the MMC also carried with it the creation of the Sangguniang Bayan. This was composed of
the members of the component city and municipal councils, barangay captains chosen by the MMC and sectoral
representatives appointed by the President. The Sangguniang Bayan had the power to recommend to the MMC
the adoption of ordinances, resolutions or measures. It was the MMC itself, however, that possessed legislative
powers. All ordinances, resolutions and measures recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan were subject to the
MMCs approval. Moreover, the power to impose taxes and other levies, the power to appropriate money, and the
power to pass ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions were vested exclusively in the MMC. Sce-dp
Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a "central government," i.e., the MMC which fully possessed legislative and
police powers. Whatever legislative powers the component cities and municipalities had were all subject to
review and approval by the MMC.

After President Corazon Aquino assumed power, there was a clamor to restore the autonomy of the local
government units in Metro Manila. Hence, Sections 1 and 2 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provided: Sj cj

"Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras as herein provided.

Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy."

The Constitution, however, recognized the necessity of creating metropolitan regions not only in the existing
National Capital Region but also in potential equivalents in the Visayas and Mindanao.[43] Section 11 of the same
Article X thus provided:

"Section 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to
a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain
their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies.
The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic
services requiring coordination."

The Constitution itself expressly provides that Congress may, by law, create "special metropolitan political
subdivisions" which shall be subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected; the jurisdiction of this subdivision shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination; and the
cities and municipalities comprising this subdivision shall retain their basic autonomy and their own local executive
and legislative assemblies.[44] Pending enactment of this law, the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution gave the
President of the Philippines the power to constitute the Metropolitan Authority, viz:

"Section 8. Until otherwise provided by Congress, the President may constitute the Metropolitan
Authority to be composed of the heads of all local government units comprising the Metropolitan
Manila area."[45]

In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E. O.) No. 392 and constituted the Metropolitan Manila
Authority (MMA). The powers and functions of the MMC were devolved to the MMA.[46] It ought to be
stressed, however, that not all powers and functions of the MMC were passed to the MMA. The MMAs power
was limited to the "delivery of basic urban services requiring coordination in Metropolitan Manila."[47] The
MMAs governing body, the Metropolitan Manila Council, although composed of the mayors of the
component cities and municipalities, was merely given the power of: (1) formulation of policies on the
delivery of basic services requiring coordination and consolidation; and (2) promulgation of resolutions and
other issuances, approval of a code of basic services and the exercise of its rule-making power.[48]

Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily responsible for the governance of their
respective political subdivisions. The MMAs jurisdiction was limited to addressing common problems involving
basic services that transcended local boundaries. It did not have legislative power. Its power was merely to
provide the local government units technical assistance in the preparation of local development plans. Any
semblance of legislative power it had was confined to a "review [of] legislation proposed by the local legislative
assemblies to ensure consistency among local governments and with the comprehensive development plan of
Metro Manila," and to "advise the local governments accordingly."[49]

When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a "special development and administrative
region" and the MMDA a "special development authority" whose functions were "without prejudice to the
autonomy of the affected local government units." The character of the MMDA was clearly defined in the
legislative debates enacting its charter.
R. A. No. 7924 originated as House Bill No. 14170/ 11116 and was introduced by several legislators led by Dante
Tinga, Roilo Golez and Feliciano Belmonte. It was presented to the House of Representatives by the Committee on
Local Governments chaired by Congressman Ciriaco R. Alfelor. The bill was a product of Committee consultations
with the local government units in the National Capital Region (NCR), with former Chairmen of the MMC and
MMA,[50] and career officials of said agencies. When the bill was first taken up by the Committee on Local
Governments, the following debate took place:

"THE CHAIRMAN [Hon. Ciriaco Alfelor]: Okay, Let me explain. This has been debated a long time
ago, you know. Its a special we can create a special metropolitan political subdivision. Supreme

Actually, there are only six (6) political subdivisions provided for in the Constitution: barangay,
municipality, city, province, and we have the Autonomous Region of Mindanao and we have the
Cordillera. So we have 6. Now.

HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman. In the case of the Autonomous Region, that is
also specifically mandated by the Constitution.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thats correct. But it is considered to be a political subdivision. What is the
meaning of a political subdivision? Meaning to say, that it has its own government, it has its
own political personality, it has the power to tax, and all governmental powers: police power
and everything. All right. Authority is different; because it does not have its own government.
It is only a council, it is an organization of political subdivision, powers, no, which is not
imbued with any political power. Esmmis

If you go over Section 6, where the powers and functions of the Metro Manila Development
Authority, it is purely coordinative. And it provides here that the council is policy-making. All
right.

Under the Constitution is a Metropolitan Authority with coordinative power. Meaning to say, it
coordinates all of the different basic services which have to be delivered to the constituency. All
right.

There is now a problem. Each local government unit is given its respective as a political subdivision. Kalookan has
its powers, as provided for and protected and guaranteed by the Constitution. All right, the exercise. However, in the
exercise of that power, it might be deleterious and disadvantageous to other local government units. So, we are
forming an authority where all of these will be members and then set up a policy in order that the basic services can
be effectively coordinated. All right. justice

Of course, we cannot deny that the MMDA has to survive. We have to provide some funds,
resources. But it does not possess any political power. We do not elect the Governor. We do
not have the power to tax. As a matter of fact, I was trying to intimate to the author that it must
have the power to sue and be sued because it coordinates. All right. It coordinates practically all
these basic services so that the flow and the distribution of the basic services will be continuous.
Like traffic, we cannot deny that. Its before our eyes. Sewerage, flood control, water system, peace
and order, we cannot deny these. Its right on our face. We have to look for a solution. What would
be the right solution? All right, we envision that there should be a coordinating agency and it is called
an authority. All right, if you do not want to call it an authority, its alright. We may call it a council or
maybe a management agency.

x x x."[51]

Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the
Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs
functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of the metropolis. This was explicitly stated in the last Committee deliberations prior to the bills
presentation to Congress. Thus: Ed-p
 "THE CHAIRMAN: Yeah, but we have to go over the suggested revision. I think this was already
approved before, but it was reconsidered in view of the proposals, set-up, to make the MMDA
stronger. Okay, so if there is no objection to paragraph "f" And then next is paragraph "b," under
Section 6. "It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects and issue ordinances or
resolutions deemed necessary by the MMDA to carry out the purposes of this Act." Do you
have the powers? Does the MMDA because that takes the form of a local government unit, a
political subdivision.

HON. [Feliciano] BELMONTE: Yes, I believe so, your Honor. When we say that it has the policies, its
very clear that those policies must be followed. Otherwise, whats the use of empowering it to come
out with policies. Now, the policies may be in the form of a resolution or it may be in the form of a
ordinance. The term "ordinance" in this case really gives it more teeth, your honor. Otherwise, we
are going to see a situation where you have the power to adopt the policy but you cannot really
make it stick as in the case now, and I think here is Chairman Bunye. I think he will agree that that is
the case now. Youve got the power to set a policy, the body wants to follow your policy, then we say
lets call it an ordinance and see if they will not follow it.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thats very nice. I like that. However, there is a constitutional impediment. You
are making this MMDA a political subdivision. The creation of the MMDA would be subject to
a plebiscite. That is what Im trying to avoid. Ive been trying to avoid this kind of predicament.
Under the Constitution it states: if it is a political subdivision, once it is created it has to be
subject to a plebiscite. Im trying to make this as administrative. Thats why we place the
Chairman as a cabinet rank.

HON. BELMONTE: All right, Mr. Chairman, okay, what you are saying there is .

THE CHAIRMAN: In setting up ordinances, it is a political exercise. Believe me.

HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: Mr. Chairman, it can be changed into issuances of rules and regulations.
That would be it shall also be enforced. Jksm

HON. BELMONTE: Okay, I will .

HON. LOPEZ: And you can also say that violation of such rule, you impose a sanction. But
you know, ordinance has a different legal connotation.

HON. BELMONTE: All right. I defer to that opinion, your Honor. sc

THE CHAIRMAN: So instead of ordinances, say rules and regulations.

HON. BELMONTE: Or resolutions. Actually, they are actually considering resolutions now.

THE CHAIRMAN: Rules and resolutions.

HON. BELMONTE: Rules, regulations and resolutions."[52]

The draft of H. B. No. 14170/ 11116 was presented by the Committee to the House of Representatives. The
explanatory note to the bill stated that the proposed MMDA is a "development authority" which is a "national agency,
not a political government unit."[53] The explanatory note was adopted as the sponsorship speech of the Committee
on Local Governments. No interpellations or debates were made on the floor and no amendments introduced. The
bill was approved on second reading on the same day it was presented.[54]

When the bill was forwarded to the Senate, several amendments were made. These amendments, however, did not
affect the nature of the MMDA as originally conceived in the House of Representatives.[55]

It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with
legislative power. It is not even a "special metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11, Article
X of the Constitution. The creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the approval by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.[56]R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the
inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but
appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to
perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the President,[57] whereas in local government units, the
President merely exercises supervisory authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the
MMDA. Newmiso

Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R. A. No. 7924. Unlike
the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local
government units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police
power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution
ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the
respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling. We desist from ruling on the other issues as they are
unnecessary. Esmso

We stress that this decision does not make light of the MMDAs noble efforts to solve the chaotic traffic condition in
Metro Manila. Everyday, traffic jams and traffic bottlenecks plague the metropolis. Even our once sprawling
boulevards and avenues are now crammed with cars while city streets are clogged with motorists and pedestrians.
Traffic has become a social malaise affecting our peoples productivity and the efficient delivery of goods and
services in the country. The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but
unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public
use of a private street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not
antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law. Sdjad

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
39549 are affirmed.Sppedsc

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 80391 February 28, 1989

SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner,

vs.
CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS, GERRY
TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES, JR., RAUL DAGALANGIT, and
BIMBO SINSUAT, respondents.

Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioner petitioner.

Makabangkit B. Lanto for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are assailed in this petition. The antecedent facts are as
follows:

1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as a member of the
Sangguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government, Region XII, representing Lanao del
Sur.

2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or
Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly for brevity).

3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members. Two of said members, respondents
Acmad Tomawis and Pakil Dagalangit, filed on March 23, 1987 with the Commission on Elections
their respective certificates of candidacy in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections for the district
of Lanao del Sur but they later withdrew from the aforesaid election and thereafter resumed again
their positions as members of the Assembly.

4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim
Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier Razul, Pampook Speaker of Region XI,
Zamboanga City and the petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, in a letter
which reads:

The Committee on Muslim Affairs well undertake consultations and dialogues with
local government officials, civic, religious organizations and traditional leaders on the
recent and present political developments and other issues affecting Regions IX and
XII.

The result of the conference, consultations and dialogues would hopefully chart the
autonomous governments of the two regions as envisioned and may prod the
President to constitute immediately the Regional Consultative Commission as
mandated by the Commission.

You are requested to invite some members of the Pampook Assembly of your
respective assembly on November 1 to 15, 1987, with venue at the Congress of the
Philippines. Your presence, unstinted support and cooperation is (sic) indispensable.

5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to Acting Secretary Johnny
Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November as
"our presence in the house committee hearing of Congress take (sic) precedence over any pending
business in batasang pampook ... ."
6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the petitioner, Acting Secretary Alimbuyao sent to
the members of the Assembly the following telegram:

TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE TELEGRAM

RECEIVED FROM SPEAKER LIMBONA QUOTE CONGRESSMAN JIMMY
MATALAM CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS
REQUESTED ME TO ASSIST SAID COMMITTEE IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE
PROPOSED AUTONOMY ORGANIC NOV. 1ST TO 15. HENCE WERE ALL
ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THERE SHALL BE NO SESSION IN NOVEMBER AS OUR
PRESENCE IN THE HOUSE COMMITTEE HEARING OF CONGRESS TAKE
PRECEDENCE OVER ANY PENDING BUSINESS IN BATASANG PAMPOOK OF
MATALAM FOLLOWS UNQUOTE REGARDS.

7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's advice, with the
following assemblymen present:

1. Sali, Salic

2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)

3. Dagalangit, Rakil

4. Dela Fuente, Antonio

5. Mangelen, Conte

6. Ortiz, Jesus

7. Palomares, Diego

8. Sinsuat, Bimbo

9. Tomawis, Acmad

10. Tomawis, Jerry

After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in
the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance
voted in the affirmative, hence, the chair declared said seat of the Speaker vacant. 8. On November
5, 1987, the session of the Assembly resumed with the following Assemblymen present:

1. Mangelen Conte-Presiding Officer

2. Ali Salic

3. Ali Salindatu

4. Aratuc, Malik

5. Cajelo, Rene

6. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)

7. Dagalangit, Rakil

8. Dela Fuente, Antonio

 9. Ortiz, Jesus

10 Palomares, Diego

11. Quijano, Jesus

12. Sinsuat, Bimbo

13. Tomawis, Acmad

14. Tomawis, Jerry

An excerpt from the debates and proceeding of said session reads:

HON. DAGALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members of the House, with the presence of our
colleagues who have come to attend the session today, I move to call the names of the new comers
in order for them to cast their votes on the previous motion to declare the position of the Speaker
vacant. But before doing so, I move also that the designation of the Speaker Pro Tempore as the
Presiding Officer and Mr. Johnny Evangelists as Acting Secretary in the session last November 2,
1987 be reconfirmed in today's session.

HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions.

PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the two motions presented? Me chair hears
none and the said motions are approved. ...

Twelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant; one
abstained and none voted against. 1

Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that-

(a) This Petition be given due course;

(b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining
respondents from proceeding with their session to be held on November 5, 1987, and on any day
thereafter;

(c) After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by respondents of their
session on November 2, 1987 as null and void;

(d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative Assembly or Batasan Pampook,
Region XII held on March 12, 1987 valid and subsisting, and

(e) Making the injunction permanent.

Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable. 2

Pending further proceedings, this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a resolution filed by the Sangguniang
Pampook, "EXPECTING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK
AUTONOMOUS REGION XII," 3 on the grounds, among other things, that the petitioner "had caused to be prepared
and signed by him paying [sic] the salaries and emoluments of Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned after
filing his Certificate of Candidacy for Congressmen for the First District of Maguindanao in the last May 11,
elections. . . and nothing in the record of the Assembly will show that any request for reinstatement by Abdula was
ever made . . ." 4 and that "such action of Mr. Lim bona in paying Abdula his salaries and emoluments without
authority from the Assembly . . . constituted a usurpation of the power of the Assembly," 5 that the petitioner "had
recently caused withdrawal of so much amount of cash from the Assembly resulting to the non-payment of the
salaries and emoluments of some Assembly [sic]," 6 and that he had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against
some members of the Assembly on question which should have been resolved within the confines of the
Assembly," 7 for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic". 8

The first question, evidently, is whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has made the case
moot and academic.

We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot and academic by reason simply of the expulsion resolution
so issued. For, if the petitioner's expulsion was done purposely to make this petition moot and academic, and to
preempt the Court, it will not make it academic.

On the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone, we hold that the expulsion in question is of no force
and effect. In the first place, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation, and whether
or not the petitioner had been heard in his defense, assuming that there was an investigation, or otherwise given the
opportunity to do so. On the other hand, what appears in the records is an admission by the Assembly (at least, the
respondents) that "since November, 1987 up to this writing, the petitioner has not set foot at the Sangguniang
Pampook." 9 "To be sure, the private respondents aver that "[t]he Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture, wanted
him to come to Cotabato City," 10 but that was "so that their differences could be threshed out and
settled." 11Certainly, that avowed wanting or desire to thresh out and settle, no matter how conciliatory it may be
cannot be a substitute for the notice and hearing contemplated by law.

While we have held that due process, as the term is known in administrative law, does not absolutely require notice
and that a party need only be given the opportunity to be heard, 12 it does not appear herein that the petitioner had,
to begin with, been made aware that he had in fact stood charged of graft and corruption before his collegues. It
cannot be said therefore that he was accorded any opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it stands, then, the
charges now levelled amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant expulsion.

In the second place, (the resolution) appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblymen
against the petitioner arising from what the former perceive to be abduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed, it (the
resolution) speaks of "a case [having been filed] [by the petitioner] before the Supreme Court . . . on question which
should have been resolved within the confines of the Assemblyman act which some members claimed
unnecessarily and unduly assails their integrity and character as representative of the people" 13 an act that cannot
possibly justify expulsion. Access to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution, 14 and, unless the recourse
amounts to malicious prosecution, no one may be punished for seeking redress in the courts.

We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his
removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to commence proper proceedings therefor in line
with the most elementary requirements of due process. And while it is within the discretion of the members of the
Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this
Court in the event that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse.

It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang Pampook(s) are "autonomous," the courts may not
rightfully intervene in their affairs, much less strike down their acts. We come, therefore, to the second issue: Are the
so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the
national courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous governments of
Region IX and XII?

The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by Presidential Decree No.
1618 15 promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things, the Decree established "internal autonomy" 16 in the two
regions "[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines
and its Constitution," 17 with legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and
responsibilities 18specified therein.

It requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all internal administrative matters for the respective
regions," 19 except to "act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence of the National
Government," 20 "which include, but are not limited to, the following:
 (1) National defense and security;

(2) Foreign relations;

(3) Foreign trade;

(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking, and external
borrowing,

(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all natural resources;

(6) Air and sea transport

(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;

(8) Customs and quarantine;

(9) Immigration and deportation;

(10) Citizenship and naturalization;

(11) National economic, social and educational planning; and

(12) General auditing. 21

In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision
and control over the Autonomous Regions ..." 22

Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of

administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and
accountable," 23 "and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective
partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." 24 At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The
President exercises "general supervision" 25 over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law." 26 He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his
own. 27

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local
governments units declare to be autonomous . In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own
destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes
accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency. 28

But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy Muslim Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution involves,
truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than mere administration is a question foreign to this petition, since what
is involved herein is a local government unit constituted prior to the ratification of the present Constitution. Hence,
the Court will not resolve that controversy now, in this case, since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at
the proper time and in the proper case.

Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. Here shall be autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao ,and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. 29
 Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. 30

xxx xxx xxx

See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. 31

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject
alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On
the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the
national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). 32 If the Sangguniang
Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this
Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our
jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An
examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that
they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central government commits
an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have
the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions."33 In the second place, the Sangguniang
Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services, thus:

SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook. The Sangguniang Pampook shall exercise local
legislative powers over regional affairs within the framework of national development plans, policies
and goals, in the following areas:

(1) Organization of regional administrative system;

(2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous Region;

(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the Autonomous Region;

(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region;

(5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region;

(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in this Decree;

(7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established by the Autonomous Region;

(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and other social services, programs
and facilities;

(9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages and culture indigenous to the
Autonomous Region; and

(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law,including the enactment of such measures as
may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the people in the Autonomous Region.

The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure that enactment and acts
of the Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in compliance with this
Decree, national legislation, policies, plans and programs.

The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the Batasang Pambansa. 34
Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more
reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.

Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as Speaker on the grounds that: (1) the Sanggunian, in
convening on November 2 and 5, 1987 (for the sole purpose of declaring the office of the Speaker vacant), did so in
violation of the Rules of the Sangguniang Pampook since the Assembly was then on recess; and (2) assuming that
it was valid, his ouster was ineffective nevertheless for lack of quorum.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under
Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction
of the Sangguniang Pampook," 35 but it provides likewise that "the Speaker may, on [sic] his discretion, declare a
recess of "short intervals." 36 Of course, there is disagreement between the protagonists as to whether or not the
recess called by the petitioner effective November 1 through 15, 1987 is the "recess of short intervals" referred to;
the petitioner says that it is while the respondents insist that, to all intents and purposes, it was an adjournment and
that "recess" as used by their Rules only refers to "a recess when arguments get heated up so that protagonists in a
debate can talk things out informally and obviate dissenssion [sic] and disunity. 37 The Court agrees with the
respondents on this regard, since clearly, the Rules speak of "short intervals." Secondly, the Court likewise agrees
that the Speaker could not have validly called a recess since the Assembly had yet to convene on November 1, the
date session opens under the same Rules. 38 Hence, there can be no recess to speak of that could possibly
interrupt any session. But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin
sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he
could. do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of
Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that a valid recess could
not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that
instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the
circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good
faith.

It does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner had resorted to the aforesaid "recess" in order to forestall the
Assembly from bringing about his ouster. This is not apparent from the pleadings before us. We are convinced that
the invitation was what precipitated it.

In holding that the "recess" in question is valid, we are not to be taken as establishing a precedent, since, as we
said, a recess can not be validly declared without a session having been first opened. In upholding the petitioner
herein, we are not giving him a carte blanche to order recesses in the future in violation of the Rules, or otherwise to
prevent the lawful meetings thereof.

Neither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the Sanggunian from reorganizing itself pursuant to its lawful
prerogatives. Certainly, it can do so at the proper time. In the event that be petitioner should initiate obstructive
moves, the Court is certain that it is armed with enough coercive remedies to thwart them. 39

In view hereof, we find no need in dwelling on the issue of quorum.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII, is
ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE the petitioner as Member, Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII; and (2) REINSTATE
him as Speaker thereof. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., took no part.

 [G.R. No. 93054 : December 4, 1990.]
192 SCRA 100
Cordillera Regional Assembly Member ALEXANDER P. ORDILLO, (Banaue), Ifugao Provincial Board
Member CORAZON MONTINIG, (Mayoyao), Former Vice-Mayor MARTIN UDAN (Banaue), Municipal
Councilors MARTIN GANO, (Lagawe), and TEODORO HEWE, (Hingyon), Barangay Councilman PEDRO W.
DULAG (Lamut); Aguinaldo residents SANDY B. CHANGIWAN, and DONATO TIMAGO; Lamut resident REY
ANTONIO; Kiangan residents ORLANDO PUGUON, and REYNAND DULDULAO; Lagawe residents TOMAS
KIMAYONG, GREGORIO DANGO, GEORGE B. BAYWONG, and VICENTE LUNAG; Hingyon residents PABLO
M. DULNUAN and CONSTANCIO GANO; Mayoyao residents PEDRO M. BAOANG, LEONARDO IGADNA, and
MAXIMO IGADNA; and Banaue residents PUMA-A CULHI, LATAYON BUTTIG, MIGUEL PUMELBAN,
ANDRES ORDILLO, FEDERICO MARIANO, SANDY BINOMNGA, GABRIEL LIMMANG, ROMEO TONGALI,
RUBEN BAHATAN, MHOMDY GABRIEL, and NADRES GHAMANG, Petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS; The Honorable FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Secretary of Justice; Hon. CATALINO MACARAIG,
Executive Secretary; The Cabinet Officer for Regional Development; Hon. GUILLERMO CARAGUE,
Secretary of Budget and Management; and Hon. ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, OIC, National Treasurer,
Respondents.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted
favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such
Region.
The antecedent facts that gave rise to this petition are as follows:
On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao
and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region."
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the Region
was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676
votes in the rest of the provinces and city above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for
the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao. On the
same date, the Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum for the President reiterating the COMELEC resolution
and provided:
". . . [A]nd considering the proviso in Sec. 13(A) that only the provinces and city voting favorably shall be included in
the CAR, the province of Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably — then, alone, legally and validly
constitutes the CAR." (Rollo, p. 7)
As a result of this, on March 8, 1990, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting the elections in the Cordillera
Autonomous Region of Ifugao on the first Monday of March 1991.: nad
Even before the issuance of the COMELEC resolution, the Executive Secretary on February 5, 1990 issued a
Memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional
Assembly created under Executive Order No. 220.
On March 9, 1990, the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act for
the Region. The COMELEC merely noted said petition.
On March 30, 1990, the President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among others that the Cordillera
Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all the offices created under Executive Order No. 220 were
abolished in view of the ratification of the Organic Act.- nad
The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.
The petitioners, then, pray that the Court: (1) declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the
memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order No.
160, and Republic Act No. 6861 and prohibit and restrain the respondents from implementing the same and
spending public funds for the purpose and (2) declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive
Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in force and effect until another organic law
for the Autonomous Region shall have been enacted by Congress and the same is duly ratified by the voters in the
constituent units. We treat the Comments of the respondents as an answer and decide the case.
This petition is meritorious.
The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:
"Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of
the Philippines." (Emphasis Supplied)
The keywords — provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that "region" is to be made up of
more than one constituent unit. The term "region" used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is
supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes
are groupings of contiguous provinces. (Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law
of the land by P.D. No. 1; P.D. No. 742) Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other
provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional
requirements are not present in this case.- nad
The well-established rule in statutory construction that the language of the Constitution, as much as possible should
be understood in the sense it has in common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, must then, be applied in this case. (See
Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757, 770, [1988]; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA
413, 422-423 [1970]).
Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 strengthens the petitioner's
position that the Region cannot be constituted from only one province.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be administered by
the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional Government and local government units. It further provides
that:
"SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the proper
governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili within the
Autonomous Region . . ."
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the
autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of
provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly
the same small area.
Article V, Sections 1 and 4 of Republic Act 6766 vest the legislative power in the Cordillera Assembly whose
members shall be elected from regional assembly districts apportioned among provinces and the cities composing
the Autonomous Region. chanrobles virtual law library
If we follow the respondent's position, the members of such Cordillera Assembly shall then be elected only from the
province of Ifugao creating an awkward predicament of having two legislative bodies — the Cordillera Assembly and
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan — exercising their legislative powers over the province of Ifugao. And since Ifugao is
one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise, it would have too many government officials for so
few people.:-cralaw
Article XII, Section 10 of the law creates a Regional Planning and Development Board composed of the Cordillera
Governor, all the provincial governors and city mayors or their representatives, two members of the Cordillera
Assembly, and members representing the private sector. The Board has a counterpart in the provincial level called
the Provincial Planning and Development Coordinator. The Board's functions (Article XII, Section 10, par. 2,
Republic Act No. 6766) are almost similar to those of the Provincial Coordinator's (Title Four, Chapter 3, Article 10,
Section 220 (4), Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 — Local Government Code). If it takes only one person in the provincial
level to perform such functions while on the other hand it takes an entire Board to perform almost the same tasks in
the regional level, it could only mean that a larger area must be covered at the regional level. The respondent's
theory of the Autonomous Region being made up of a single province must, therefore, fail.
Article XXI, Section 13 (B) (c) alloting the huge amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) to the Regional
Government for its initial organizational requirements cannot be construed as funding only a lone and small
province.
These sections of Republic Act No. 6766 show that a one province Cordillera Autonomous Region was never
contemplated by the law creating it.
The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of the total population of the areas enumerated in Article I, Section 2 (b)
of Republic Act No. 6766 which include Benguet, Mountain Province, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao and Baguio City. It has
the second smallest number of inhabitants from among the provinces and city above mentioned. The Cordillera
population is distributed in round figures as follows: Abra, 185,000; Benguet, 486,000; Ifugao, 149,000; Kalinga-
Apayao, 214,000; Mountain Province, 116,000; and Baguio City, 183,000; Total population of these five provinces
and one city; 1,332,000 according to the 1990 Census (Manila Standard, September 30, 1990, p. 14).
There are other provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 which are either violated or which cannot be complied with.
Section 16 of Article V calls for a Regional Commission on Appointments with the Speaker as Chairman and are (6)
members coming from different provinces and cities in the Region. Under the respondents' view, the Commission
would have a Chairman and only one member. It would never have a quorum. Section 3 of Article VI calls for
cabinet members, as far as practicable, to come from various provinces and cities of the Region. Section 1 of Article
VII creates a system of tribal courts for the various indigenous cultural communities of the Region. Section 9 of
Article XV requires the development of a common regional language based upon the various languages and dialects
in the region which regional language in turn is expected to enrich the national language.
The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region is infused with provisions which
rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting the Region.:-cralaw
To contemplate the situation envisioned by the respondent would not only violate the letter and intent of the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would also be impractical and illogical.
Our decision in Abbas, et al. v. COMELEC, (G.R. No. 89651, November 10, 1969), is not applicable in the case at
bar contrary to the view of the Secretary of Justice.
The Abbas case laid down the rate on the meaning of majority in the phrase "by majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units called for the purpose" found in the Constitution, Article X, Section 18. It stated:
x x x
". . . [I]t is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is simple majority of votes approving the
Organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put
together, as well as in the individual constituent units."
This was the pronouncement applied by the Secretary of Justice in arriving at his conclusion stated in his
Memorandum for the President that:
x x x
". . . [i]t is believed that the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) as mandated by R.A. No.
6766 became effective upon its approval by the majority of the votes cast in the province of Ifugao. And
considering the proviso in Section 13 (a) that only the provinces and city voting favorably shall be included in
the CAR, the province of Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably — can, alone, legally and
validly constitute the CAR." (Rollo. p. 40).
The plebiscites mandated by the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 for the Cordillera and Republic Act No.
6734 for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao determine — (1) whether there shall be an autonomous
region in the Cordillera and in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in the
two Republic Acts, shall comprise said Autonomous Regions. (See III, Record of the Constitutional Commission,
487-492 [1986]).
The Abbas case established the rule to follow on which provinces and cities shall comprise the autonomous region
in Muslim Mindanao which is, consequently, the same rule to follow with regard to the autonomous region in the
Cordillera. However, there is nothing in the Abbas decision which deals with the issue on whether an autonomous
region, in either Muslim Mindanao or Cordillera could exist despite the fact that only one province or one city is to
constitute it.chanrobles virtual law library
Stated in another way, the issue in this case is whether the sole province of Ifugao can validly and legally constitute
the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The issue is not whether the province of Ifugao is to be included in the Cordillera
Autonomous Region. It is the first issue which the Court answers in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. 2259 of the Commission on Elections, insofar as it
upholds the creation of an autonomous region, the February 14, 1990 memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the
February 5, 1990 memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No.
6861 are declared null and void while Executive Order No. 220 is declared to be still in force and effect until properly
repealed or amended.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 149848. November 25, 2004]

ARSADI M. DISOMANGCOP and RAMIR M. DIMALOTANG, petitioners, vs. THE

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
SIMEON A. DATUMANONG and THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET and
MANAGEMENT EMILIA T. BONCODIN, respondents.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

At stake in the present case is the fate of regional autonomy for Muslim Mindanao which is the
epoch-making, Constitution-based project for achieving national unity in diversity.
Challenged in the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction[1] (Petition) are the constitutionality and
validity of Republic Act No. 8999 (R.A. 8999),[2] entitled An Act Establishing An Engineering District in
the First District of the Province of Lanao del Sur and Appropriating Funds Therefor, and Department
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Department Order No. 119 (D.O. 119) [3] on the subject,
Creation of Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office.
The Background
The uncontested legal and factual antecedents of the case follow.
For the first time in its history after three Constitutions, the Philippines ordained the establishment
of regional autonomy with the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. Sections 1 [4]and 15, Article X
mandate the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras. Section 15
specifically provides that [t]here shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common
and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. To effectuate this mandate, the Charter devotes
a number of provisions under Article X.[5]
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Republic Act No. 6734 (R.A. 6734), entitled An Act
Providing for An Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, was enacted and
signed into law on 1 August 1989. The law called for the holding of a plebiscite in the provinces of
Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South
Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and the
cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and
Zamboanga.[6] In the ensuing plebiscite held on 19 November 1989, only four (4) provinces voted for
the creation of an autonomous region, namely: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi.
These provinces became the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). [7] The law contains
elaborate provisions on the powers of the Regional Government and the areas of jurisdiction which
are reserved for the National Government.[8]
In accordance with R.A. 6734, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued on 12 October 1990,
Executive Order No. 426 (E.O. 426), entitled Placing the Control and Supervision of the Offices of the
Department of Public Works and Highways within the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao under
the Autonomous Regional Government, and for other purposes. Sections 1 to 3[9] of the Executive
Order are its operative provisions.
ARMM was formally organized on 6 November 1990. President Corazon C. Aquino flew to
Cotabato, the seat of the Regional Government, for the inauguration. At that point, she had already
signed seven (7) Executive Orders devolving to ARMM the powers of seven (7) cabinet departments,
namely: (1) local government; (2) labor and employment; (3) science and technology; (4) public works
and highways; (5) social welfare and development; (6) tourism; and (7) environment and national
resources.[10]
Nearly nine (9) years later, on 20 May 1999, then Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) Secretary Gregorio R. Vigilar issued D.O. 119 which reads, thus:

Subject: Creation of Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office

Pursuant to Sections 6 and 25 of Executive Order No. 124 dated 30 January 1987, there is
hereby created a DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which shall have
jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWH within
Marawi City and the province of Lanao del Sur. The headquarters of the Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office shall be at the former quarters of the Marawi City Engineering Office.

Personnel of the above-mentioned Sub-District Engineering Office shall be made up of employees

of the National Government Section of the former Marawi City Engineering Office who are now
assigned with the Iligan City Sub-District Engineering Office as may be determined by the DPWH
Region XII Regional Director. (Emphasis supplied)

Almost two (2) years later, on 17 January 2001, then President Joseph E. Estrada approved and
signed into law R.A. 8999. The text of the law reads:

AN ACT ESTABLISHING AN ENGINEERING DISTRICT IN THE FIRST DISTRICT OF THE

PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL SUR AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:
SECTION 1. The City of Marawi and the municipalities comprising the First District of the
Province of Lanao del Sur are hereby constituted into an engineering district to be known as the
First Engineering District of the Province of Lanao del Sur.

SEC. 2. The office of the engineering district hereby created shall be established in Marawi City,
Province of Lanao del Sur.

SEC. 3. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be included in the
General Appropriations Act of the year following its enactment into law. Thereafter, such
sums as may be necessary for the maintenance and continued operation of the engineering
district office shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. (Emphasis supplied)

Congress later passed Republic Act No. 9054 (R.A. 9054), entitled An Act to Strengthen and
Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose
Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as
Amended. Like its forerunner, R.A. 9054 contains detailed provisions on the powers of the Regional
Government and the retained areas of governance of the National Government. [11]
R.A. 9054 lapsed into law[12] on 31 March 2001. It was ratified in a plebiscite held on 14 August
2001. The province of Basilan and the City of Marawi also voted to join ARMM on the same date.
R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054 are collectively referred to as the ARMM Organic Acts.
On 23 July 2001, petitioners Arsadi M. Disomangcop (Disomangcop) and Ramir M. Dimalotang
(Dimalotang) addressed a petition to then DPWH Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong, seeking the
revocation of D.O. 119 and the non-implementation of R.A. 8999. No action, however, was taken on
the petition.[13]
Consequently, petitioners Disomangcop and Dimalotang filed the instant petition, in their capacity
as Officer-in-Charge and District Engineer/Engineer II, respectively, of the First Engineering District of
the Department of Public Works and Highways, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (DPWH-
ARMM) in Lanao del Sur.
Petitioners seek the following principal reliefs: (1) to annul and set aside D.O. 119; (2) to prohibit
respondent DPWH Secretary from implementing D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999 and releasing funds for
public works projects intended for Lanao del Sur and Marawi City to the Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office and other administrative regions of DPWH; and (3) to compel the Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to release all funds for public works projects intended
for Marawi City and the First District of Lanao del Sur to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District
in Lanao del Sur only; and to compel respondent DPWH Secretary to let the DPWH-ARMM First
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur implement all public works projects within its jurisdictional
area.[14]
The petition includes an urgent application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and, after hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin respondent DBM Secretary from
releasing funds for public works projects in Lanao del Sur to entities other than the DPWH-ARMM
First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur, and also to restrain the DPWH Secretary from allowing
others besides the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur to implement public
works projects in Lanao del Sur.[15]
To support their petition, petitioners allege that D.O. 119 was issued with grave abuse of
discretion and that it violates the constitutional autonomy of the ARMM. They point out that the
challenged Department Order has tasked the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office with functions
that have already been devolved to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur.[16]
Petitioners also contend that R.A. 8999 is a piece of legislation that was not intelligently and
thoroughly studied, and that the explanatory note to House Bill No. 995 (H.B. 995) from which the law
originated is questionable. Petitioners assert as well that prior to the sponsorship of the law, no public
hearing nor consultation with the DPWH-ARMM was made. The House Committee on Public Works
and Highways (Committee) failed to invite a single official from the affected agency. Finally,
petitioners argue that the law was skillfully timed for signature by former President Joseph E. Estrada
during the pendency of the impeachment proceedings. [17]
In its resolution of 8 October 2001, the Court required respondents to file their comment.[18] In
compliance, respondents DPWH Secretary and DBM Secretary, through the Solicitor General, filed
on 7 January 2002, their Comment.
In their Comment,[19] respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, maintain the validity
of D.O. 119, arguing that it was issued in accordance with Executive Order No. 124 (E.O. 124).[20] In
defense of the constitutionality of R.A. 8999, they submit that the powers of the autonomous regions
did not diminish the legislative power of Congress.[21]Respondents also contend that the petitioners
have no locus standi or legal standing to assail the constitutionality of the law and the department
order. They note that petitioners have no personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. [22]
Asserting their locus standi, petitioners in their Memorandum[23] point out that they will suffer actual
injury as a result of the enactments complained of.[24]
Jurisdictional Considerations
First, the jurisdictional predicates.
The 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. It establishes the authority
of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of acts of the political departments. It
speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty.[25]
Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of judicial power: First, there
must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the
question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of
the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been
raised at the earliest opportunity. Fifth, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.[26]
In seeking to nullify acts of the legislature and the executive department on the ground that they
contravene the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. As held in Taada v.
Angara,[27] where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. But
in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition questioning acts of the political departments of
government, the Court will not review the wisdom, merits, or propriety thereof, but will strike them
down only on either of two grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and (2) grave abuse of
discretion.[28]
For an abuse to be grave, the power must be exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law. There is grave abuse of discretion when respondent acts in a capricious or
whimsical manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. [29]
The challenge to the legal standing of petitioners cannot succeed. Legal standing or locus
standi is defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term
interest means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from a
mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. [30]
A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show not only that the law is
invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite
way. He must show that he has been, or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he is
lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the
statute complained of.[31]
But following the new trend, this Court is inclined to take cognizance of a suit although it does not
satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interests are involved. In several cases, the
Court has adopted a liberal stance on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to
craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people.[32]
In the instant case, petitioner Disomangcop holds the position of Engineer IV. When he filed this
petition, he was the Officer-in-Charge, Office of the District Engineer of the First Engineering District
of DPWH-ARMM, Lanao del Sur. On the other hand, petitioner Dimalotang is an Engineer II and
President of the rank and file employees also of the First Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM in
Lanao del Sur. Both are charged with the duty and responsibility of supervising and implementing all
public works projects to be undertaken and being undertaken in Lanao del Sur which is the area of
their jurisdiction.[33]
It is thus not far-fetched that the creation of the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office under
D.O. 119 and the creation of and appropriation of funds to the First Engineering District of Lanao del
Sur as directed under R.A. 8999 will affect the powers, functions and responsibilities of the petitioners
and the DPWH-ARMM. As the two offices have apparently been endowed with functions almost
identical to those of DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur, it is likely that
petitioners are in imminent danger of being eased out of their duties and, not remotely, even their
jobs. Their material and substantial interests will definitely be prejudiced by the enforcement of D.O.
119 and R.A. 8999. Such injury is direct and immediate. Thus, they can legitimately challenge the
validity of the enactments subject of the instant case.
Points of Contention
In the petition before us, petitioners contend that R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119 are unconstitutional
and were issued with grave abuse of discretion.
We agree in part.
Republic Act No. 8999
At the outset, let it be made clear that it is not necessary to declare R.A. No. 8999
unconstitutional for the adjudication of this case. The accepted rule is that the Court will not resolve a
constitutional question unless it is the lis mota of the case, or if the case can be disposed of or settled
on other grounds.[34]
The plain truth is the challenged law never became operative and was superseded or repealed by
a subsequent enactment.
The ARMM Organic Acts are deemed a part of the regional autonomy scheme. While they are
classified as statutes, the Organic Acts are more than ordinary statutes because they enjoy
affirmation by a plebiscite.[35] Hence, the provisions thereof cannot be amended by an ordinary statute,
such as R.A. 8999 in this case. The amendatory law has to be submitted to a plebiscite.
We quote excerpts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
FR. BERNAS. Yes, that is the reason I am bringing this up. This thing involves some rather far-
reaching consequences also in relation to the issue raised by Commissioner Romulo with respect to
federalism. Are we, in effect, creating new categories of laws? Generally, we have statutes and
constitutional provisions. Is this organic act equivalent to a constitutional provision? If it is going to
be equivalent to a constitutional provision, it would seem to me that the formulation of the
provisions of the organic act will have to be done by the legislature, acting as a constituent
assembly, and therefore, subject to the provisions of the Article on Amendments. That is the point
that I am trying to bring up. In effect, if we opt for federalism, it would really involve an act of the
National Assembly or Congress acting as a constituent assembly and present amendments to this
Constitution, and the end product itself would be a constitutional provision which would only be
amendable according to the processes indicated in the Constitution.

MR. OPLE. Madam President, may I express my personal opinion in this respect.

I think to require Congress to act as a constituent body before enacting an organic act would be to
raise an autonomous region to the same level as the sovereign people of the whole country. And I
think the powers of the Congress should be quite sufficient in enacting a law, even if it is now
exalted to the level of an organic act for the purpose of providing a basic law for an autonomous
region without having to transform itself into a constituent assembly. We are dealing still with one
subordinate subdivision of the State even if it is now vested with certain autonomous powers on
which its own legislature can pass laws.

FR. BERNAS. So the questions I have raised so far with respect to this organic act are: What
segment of the population will participate in the plebiscite? In what capacity would the legislature
be acting when it passes this? Will it be a constituent assembly or merely a legislative body? What
is the nature, therefore, of this organic act in relation to ordinary statutes and the Constitution?
Finally, if we are going to amend this organic act, what process will be followed?

MR. NOLLEDO. May I answer that, please, in the light of what is now appearing in our report.

First, only the people who are residing in the units composing the regions should be allowed to
participate in the plebiscite. Second, the organic act has the character of a charter passed by the
Congress, not as a constituent assembly, but as an ordinary legislature and, therefore, the organic
act will still be subject to amendments in the ordinary legislative process as now constituted, unless
the Gentlemen has another purpose.

FR. BERNAS. But with plebiscite again.

MR. NOLLEDO. Those who will participate in the plebiscite are those who are directly affected,
the inhabitants of the units constitutive of the region. (Emphasis supplied) [36]

Although R.A. 9054 was enacted later, it reaffirmed the imperativeness of the plebiscite
requirement.[37] In fact, R.A. 9054 itself, being the second or later ARMM Organic Act, was subjected
to and ratified in a plebiscite.
The first ARMM Organic Act, R.A. 6074, as implemented by E.O. 426, devolved the functions of
the DPWH in the ARMM which includes Lanao del Sur (minus Marawi City at the time) [38] to the
Regional Government. By creating an office with previously devolved functions, R.A. 8999, in
essence, sought to amend R.A. 6074. The amendatory law should therefore first obtain the approval
of the people of the ARMM before it could validly take effect. Absent compliance with this
requirement, R.A. 8999 has not even become operative.
From another perspective, R.A. 8999 was repealed and superseded by R.A. 9054. Where a
statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on
the subject, that intention must be given effect.
Of course, the intention to repeal must be clear and manifest.[39] Implied repeal by irreconcilable
inconsistency takes place when the two statutes cover the same subject matter; they are clearly
inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled or harmonized; and both
cannot be given effect, that is, that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the other.[40]
The Court has also held that statutes should be construed in light of the objective to be achieved
and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance
the object, suppress the mischief and secure the benefits intended. [41]
R.A. 9054 is anchored on the 1987 Constitution. It advances the constitutional grant of autonomy
by detailing the powers of the ARG covering, among others, Lanao del Sur and Marawi City, one of
which is its jurisdiction over regional urban and rural planning. R.A. 8999, however, ventures to
reestablish the National Governments jurisdiction over infrastructure programs in Lanao del Sur. R.A.
8999 is patently inconsistent with R.A. 9054, and it destroys the latter laws objective.
Clearly, R.A. 8999 is antagonistic to and cannot be reconciled with both ARMM Organic Acts,
R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054. The kernel of the antagonism and disharmony lies in the regional
autonomy which the ARMM Organic Acts ordain pursuant to the Constitution. On the other hand, R.A.
8999 contravenes true decentralization which is the essence of regional autonomy.
Regional Autonomy Under
R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054
The 1987 Constitution mandates regional autonomy to give a bold and unequivocal answer to the
cry for a meaningful, effective and forceful autonomy.[42] According to Commissioner Jose Nolledo,
Chairman of the Committee which drafted the provisions, it is an indictment against the status quo of
a unitary system that, to my mind, has ineluctably tied the hands of progress in our country . . . our
varying regional characteristics are factors to capitalize on to attain national strength through
decentralization.[43]
The idea behind the Constitutional provisions for autonomous regions is to allow the separate
development of peoples with distinctive cultures and traditions. [44] These cultures, as a matter of right,
must be allowed to flourish.[45]
Autonomy, as a national policy, recognizes the wholeness of the Philippine society in its
ethnolinguistic, cultural, and even religious diversities. It strives to free Philippine society of the strain
and wastage caused by the assimilationist approach.[46] Policies emanating from the legislature are
invariably assimilationist in character despite channels being open for minority representation. As a
result, democracy becomes an irony to the minority group.[47]
Several commissioners echoed the pervasive sentiment in the plenary sessions in their own
inimitable way. Thus, Commissioner Blas Ople referred to the recognition that the Muslim Mindanao
and the Cordilleras do not belong to the dominant national community as the justification for
conferring on them a measure of legal self-sufficiency, meaning self-government, so that they will
flourish politically, economically and culturally, with the hope that after achieving parity with the rest of
the country they would give up their own autonomous region in favor of joining the national
mainstream.[48] For his part, the Muslim delegate, Commissioner Ahmad Alonto, spoke of the diversity
of cultures as the framework for nation-building.[49] Finally, excerpts of the poignant plea of
Commissioner Ponciano Bennagen deserve to be quoted verbatim:

. . . They see regional autonomy as the answer to their centuries of struggle against oppression and
exploitation. For so long, their names and identities have been debased. Their ancestral lands have
been ransacked for their treasures, for their wealth. Their cultures have been defiled, their very lives
threatened, and worse, extinguished, all in the name of national development; all in the name of
public interest; all in the name of common good; all in the name of the right to property; all in the
name of Regalian Doctrine; all in the name of national security. These phrases have meant nothing
to our indigenous communities, except for the violation of their human rights.

...

Honorable Commissioners, we wish to impress upon you the gravity of the decision to be made by
every single one of us in this Commission. We have the overwhelming support of the Bangsa Moro
and the Cordillera Constitution. By this we mean meaningful and authentic regional autonomy. We
propose that we have a separate Article on the autonomous regions for the Bangsa Moro and
Cordillera people clearly spelled out in this Constitution, instead of prolonging the agony of their
vigil and their struggle. This, too is a plea for national peace. Let us not pass the buck to the
Congress to decide on this. Let us not wash our hands of our responsibility to attain national unity
and peace and to settle this problem and rectify past injustices, once and for all. [50]

The need for regional autonomy is more pressing in the case of the Filipino Muslims and the
Cordillera people who have been fighting for it. Their political struggle highlights their unique cultures
and the unresponsiveness of the unitary system to their aspirations. [51] The Moros struggle for self-
determination dates as far back as the Spanish conquest in the Philippines. Even at present, the
struggle goes on.[52]
Perforce, regional autonomy is also a means towards solving existing serious peace and order
problems and secessionist movements. Parenthetically, autonomy, decentralization and
regionalization, in international law, have become politically acceptable answers to intractable
problems of nationalism, separatism, ethnic conflict and threat of secession. [53]
However, the creation of autonomous regions does not signify the establishment of a sovereignty
distinct from that of the Republic, as it can be installed only within the framework of this Constitution
and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. [54]
Regional autonomy is the degree of self-determination exercised by the local government unit vis-
-vis the central government.
In international law, the right to self-determination need not be understood as a right to political
separation, but rather as a complex net of legal-political relations between a certain people and the
state authorities. It ensures the right of peoples to the necessary level of autonomy that would
guarantee the support of their own cultural identity, the establishment of priorities by the communitys
internal decision-making processes and the management of collective matters by themselves. [55]
If self-determination is viewed as an end in itself reflecting a preference for homogeneous,
independent nation-states, it is incapable of universal application without massive disruption.
However, if self-determination is viewed as a means to an endthat end being a democratic,
participatory political and economic system in which the rights of individuals and the identity of
minority communities are protectedits continuing validity is more easily perceived.[56]
 Regional autonomy refers to the granting of basic internal government powers to the people of a
particular area or region with least control and supervision from the central government.[57]
The objective of the autonomy system is to permit determined groups, with a common tradition
and shared social-cultural characteristics, to develop freely their ways of life and heritage, exercise
their rights, and be in charge of their own business. This is achieved through the establishment of a
special governance regime for certain member communities who choose their own authorities from
within the community and exercise the jurisdictional authority legally accorded to them to decide
internal community affairs.[58]
In the Philippine setting, regional autonomy implies the cultivation of more positive means for
national integration. It would remove the wariness among the Muslims, increase their trust in the
government and pave the way for the unhampered implementation of the development programs in
the region.[59] Again, even a glimpse of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission could lend a
sense of the urgency and the inexorable appeal of true decentralization:

MR. OPLE. . . . We are writing a Constitution, of course, for generations to come, not only for the
present but for our posterity. There is no harm in recognizing certain vital pragmatic needs for
national peace and solidarity, and the writing of this Constitution just happens at a time when it is
possible for this Commission to help the cause of peace and reconciliation in Mindanao and the
Cordilleras, by taking advantage of a heaven-sent opportunity. . . . [60]

...

MR. ABUBAKAR. . . . So in order to foreclose and convince the rest of the of the Philippines that
Mindanao autonomy will be granted to them as soon as possible, more or less, to dissuade these
armed men from going outside while Mindanao will be under the control of the national
government, let us establish an autonomous Mindanao within our effort and capacity to do so
within the shortest possible time. This will be an answer to the Misuari clamor, not only for
autonomy but for independence. [61]

...

MR. OPLE. . . . The reason for this abbreviation of the period for the consideration of the Congress
of the organic acts and their passage is that we live in abnormal times. In the case of Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras, we know that we deal with questions of war and peace. These are
momentous issues in which the territorial integrity and the solidarity of this country are being put at
stake, in a manner of speaking.

We are writing a peace Constitution. We hope that the Article on Social Justice can contribute to a
climate of peace so that any civil strife in the countryside can be more quickly and more justly
resolved. We are providing for autonomous regions so that we give constitutional permanence to
the just demands and grievances of our own fellow countrymen in the Cordilleras and in Mindanao.
One hundred thousand lives were lost in that struggle in Mindanao, and to this day, the Cordilleras
is being shaken by an armed struggle as well as a peaceful and militant struggle.

...
Rather than give opportunity to foreign bodies, no matter how sympathetic to the Philippines, to
contribute to the settlement of this issue, I think the Constitutional Commission ought not to forego
the opportunity to put the stamp of this Commission through definitive action on the settlement of
the problems that have nagged us and our forefathers for so long. [62]

A necessary prerequisite of autonomy is decentralization.[63]

Decentralization is a decision by the central government authorizing its subordinates, whether
geographically or functionally defined, to exercise authority in certain areas. It involves decision-
making by subnational units. It is typically a delegated power, wherein a larger government chooses
to delegate certain authority to more local governments. Federalism implies some measure of
decentralization, but unitary systems may also decentralize. Decentralization differs intrinsically from
federalism in that the sub-units that have been authorized to act (by delegation) do not possess any
claim of right against the central government.[64]
Decentralization comes in two formsdeconcentration and devolution. Deconcentration is
administrative in nature; it involves the transfer of functions or the delegation of authority and
responsibility from the national office to the regional and local offices. This mode of decentralization is
also referred to as administrative decentralization.[65]
Devolution, on the other hand, connotes political decentralization, or the transfer of powers,
responsibilities, and resources for the performance of certain functions from the central government
to local government units.[66] This is a more liberal form of decentralization since there is an actual
transfer of powers and responsibilities.[67] It aims to grant greater autonomy to local government units
in cognizance of their right to self-government, to make them self-reliant, and to improve their
administrative and technical capabilities.[68]
This Court elucidated the concept of autonomy in Limbona v. Mangelin,[69] thus:

Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is

decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make
local governments more responsive and accountable, and ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development
and social progress. At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing
local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises general
supervision over them, but only to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law. He
has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor
of local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is
free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to self-
immolation, since in that event the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central
authorities but to its constituency.

In the case, the Court reviewed the expulsion of a member from the Sangguniang Pampook,
Autonomous Region. It held that the Court may assume jurisdiction as the local government unit,
organized before 1987, enjoys autonomy of the former category. It refused, though, to resolve
whether the grant of autonomy to Muslim Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution involves, truly, an
effort to decentralize power rather than mere administration.[70]
 A year later, in Cordillera Broad Coalition v. Commission on Audit,[71] the Court, with the same
composition, ruled without any dissent that the creation of autonomous regions contemplates the
grant of political autonomyan autonomy which is greater than the administrative autonomy granted to
local government units. It held that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution
(Art. X, Sec. 2) refers to administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical
language, the decentralization of government authority. On the other hand, the creation of
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987
Constitution, contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative
autonomy to these regions.[72]
And by regional autonomy, the framers intended it to mean meaningful and authentic regional
autonomy.[73] As articulated by a Muslim author, substantial and meaningful autonomy is the kind of
local self-government which allows the people of the region or area the power to determine what is
best for their growth and development without undue interference or dictation from the central
government.[74]
To this end, Section 16, Article X[75] limits the power of the President over autonomous
regions.[76] In essence, the provision also curtails the power of Congress over autonomous
regions.[77] Consequently, Congress will have to re-examine national laws and make sure that they
reflect the Constitutions adherence to local autonomy. And in case of conflicts, the underlying spirit
which should guide its resolution is the Constitutions desire for genuine local autonomy. [78]
The diminution of Congress powers over autonomous regions was confirmed in Ganzon v. Court
of Appeals,[79] wherein this Court held that the omission (of as may be provided by law) signifies
nothing more than to underscore local governments autonomy from Congress and to break Congress
control over local government affairs.
This is true to subjects over which autonomous regions have powers, as specified in Sections 18
and 20, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Expressly not included therein are powers over certain
areas. Worthy of note is that the area of public works is not excluded and neither is it reserved
for the National Government. The key provisions read, thus:

SEC. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance
and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed
by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define
the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive department and
legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent
political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family and
property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the Constitution and national laws.

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes
cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces,
cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous
region.

SEC. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:

(1) Administrative organization;

(2) Creation of sources of revenues;

(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;

(4) Personal, family and property relations;

(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;

(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;

(7) Educational policies;

(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and

(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of general welfare of
the people of the region. (Emphasis supplied)

E.O. 426 officially devolved the powers and functions of the DPWH in ARMM to the Autonomous
Regional Government (ARG). Sections 1 and 2 of E.O. 426 provide:

SECTION 1. Transfer of Control and Supervision. The offices of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) within the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) including their functions, powers and responsibilities, personnel, equipment,
properties, budgets and liabilities are hereby placed under the control and supervision of the
Autonomous Regional Government.

In particular, these offices are identified as the four (4) District Engineering Offices (DEO) in
each of the four provinces respectively and the three (3) Area Equipment Services (AES)
located in Tawi-Tawi, Sulu and Maguindanao (Municipality of Sultan Kudarat).

SEC. 2. Functions Transferred. The Autonomous Regional Government shall be responsible for
highways, flood control and water resource development systems, and other public works within
the ARMM and shall exercise the following functions:

1. Undertake and evaluate the planning, design, construction and works supervision for the
infrastructure projects whose location and impact are confined within the ARMM;

2. Undertake the maintenance of infrastructure facilities within the ARMM and supervise
the maintenance of such local roads and other infrastructure facilities receiving financial
assistance from the National Government;

3. Ensure the implementation of laws, policies, programs, rules and regulations regarding
infrastructure projects as well as all public and private physical structures within the
ARMM;

4. Provide technical assistance related to their functions to other agencies within the
ARMM, especially the local government units;
 5. Coordinate with other national and regional government departments, agencies,
institutions and organizations, especially the local government units within the ARMM in
the planning and implementation of infrastructure projects;

6. Conduct continuing consultations with the local communities, take appropriate measures
to make the services of the Autonomous Regional Government responsive to the needs of
the general public and recommend such appropriate actions as may be necessary; and

7. Perform such other related duties and responsibilities within the ARMM as may be
assigned or delegated by the Regional Governor or as may be provided by law. (Emphasis
supplied)

More importantly, Congress itself through R.A. 9054 transferred and devolved the administrative
and fiscal management of public works and funds for public works to the ARG. Section 20, Article VI
of R.A. 9054 provides:

ARTICLE VI

THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

SEC. 20. Annual Budget and Infrastructure Funds. The annual budget of the Regional Government
shall be enacted by Regional Assembly. Funds for infrastructure in the autonomous region
allocated by the central government or national government shall be appropriated through a
Regional Assembly Public Works Act.

Unless approved by the Regional Assembly, no public works funds allocated by the central
government or national government for the Regional Government or allocated by the Regional
Government from its own revenues may be disbursed, distributed, realigned, or used in any
manner.

The aim of the Constitution is to extend to the autonomous peoples, the people of Muslim
Mindanao in this case, the right to self-determinationa right to choose their own path of development;
the right to determine the political, cultural and economic content of their development path within the
framework of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippine Republic.[80] Self-determination
refers to the need for a political structure that will respect the autonomous peoples uniqueness and
grant them sufficient room for self-expression and self-construction.[81]
In treading their chosen path of development, the Muslims in Mindanao are to be given freedom
and independence with minimum interference from the National Government. This necessarily
includes the freedom to decide on, build, supervise and maintain the public works and infrastructure
projects within the autonomous region. The devolution of the powers and functions of the DPWH in
the ARMM and transfer of the administrative and fiscal management of public works and funds to the
ARG are meant to be true, meaningful and unfettered. This unassailable conclusion is grounded on a
clear consensus, reached at the Constitutional Commission and ratified by the entire Filipino
electorate, on the centrality of decentralization of power as the appropriate vessel of deliverance for
Muslim Filipinos and the ultimate unity of Muslims and Christians in this country.
With R.A. 8999, however, this freedom is taken away, and the National Government takes control
again. The hands, once more, of the autonomous peoples are reined in and tied up.
 The challenged law creates an office with functions and powers which, by virtue of E.O. 426,
have been previously devolved to the DPWH-ARMM, First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur.
E.O. 426 clearly ordains the transfer of the control and supervision of the offices of the DPWH
within the ARMM, including their functions, powers and responsibilities, personnel, equipment,
properties, and budgets to the ARG. Among its other functions, the DPWH-ARMM, under the control
of the Regional Government shall be responsible for highways, flood control and water resource
development systems, and other public works within the ARMM. Its scope of power includes the
planning, design, construction and supervision of public works. According to R.A. 9054, the reach of
the Regional Government enables it to appropriate, manage and disburse all public work funds
allocated for the region by the central government.
The use of the word powers in E.O. 426 manifests an unmistakable case of devolution.
In this regard, it is not amiss to cite Opinion No. 120, S. 1991 [82] of the Secretary of Justice on
whether the national departments or their counterpart departments in the ARG are responsible for
implementation of roads, rural water supply, health, education, women in development, agricultural
extension and watershed management. Referring to Section 2, Article V of R.A. 6734 which
enumerates the powers of the ARG, he states:

It is clear from the foregoing provision of law that except for the areas of executive power
mentioned therein, all other such areas shall be exercised by the Autonomous Regional
Government (ARG) of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. It is noted that programs
relative to infrastructure facilities, health, education, women in development, agricultural extension
and watershed management do not fall under any of the exempted areas listed in the abovequoted
provision of law. Thus, the inevitable conclusion is that all these spheres of executive responsibility
have been transferred to the ARG.

Reinforcing the aboveview (sic) are the various executive orders issued by the President providing
for the devolution of the powers and functions of specified executive departments of the National
Government to the ARG. These are E.O. Nos. 425 (Department of Labor and Employment, Local
Government, Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources, Social Welfare and Development and
Science and Technology), 426 (Department of Public Works and Highways), 459 (Department of
Education, Culture and Sports) and 460 (Department of Agriculture). The execution of projects on
infrastructure, education, women, agricultural extension and watershed management within the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao normally fall within the responsibility of one of the
aforementioned executive departments of the National Government, but by virtue of the aforestated
EOs, such responsibility has been transferred to the ARG.

E.O. 426 was issued to implement the provisions of the first ARMM Organic Act, R.A. 6734the
validity of which this Court upheld in the case of Abbas v. Commission on Elections.[83] In Section 4,
Article XVIII of said Act, central government or national government offices and agencies in the
autonomous region which are not excluded under Section 3, Article IV [84] of this Organic Act, shall be
placed under the control and supervision of the Regional Government pursuant to a schedule
prescribed by the oversight committee.
Evidently, the intention is to cede some, if not most, of the powers of the national government to
the autonomous government in order to effectuate a veritable autonomy. The continued enforcement
of R.A. 8999, therefore, runs afoul of the ARMM Organic Acts and results in the recall of powers
which have previously been handed over. This should not be sanctioned, elsewise the Organic Acts
desire for greater autonomy for the ARMM in accordance with the Constitution would be quelled. It
bears stressing that national laws are subject to the Constitution one of whose state policies is to
ensure the autonomy of autonomous regions. Section 25, Article II of the 1987 Constitution states:

Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

R.A. 8999 has made the DPWH-ARMM effete and rendered regional autonomy illusory with
respect to infrastructure projects. The Congressional Record shows, on the other hand, that the lack
of an implementing and monitoring body within the area has hindered the speedy implementation, of
infrastructure projects.[85] Apparently, in the legislatures estimation, the existing DPWH-ARMM
engineering districts failed to measure up to the task. But if it was indeed the case, the problem could
not be solved through the simple legislative creation of an incongruous engineering district for the
central government in the ARMM. As it was, House Bill No. 995 which ultimately became R.A. 8999
was passed in record time on second reading (not more than 10 minutes), absolutely without the
usual sponsorship speech and debates.[86] The precipitate speed which characterized the passage of
R.A. 8999 is difficult to comprehend since R.A. 8999 could have resulted in the amendment of the
first ARMM Organic Act and, therefore, could not take effect without first being ratified in a plebiscite.
What is more baffling is that in March 2001, or barely two (2) months after it enacted R.A. 8999 in
January 2001, Congress passed R.A. 9054, the second ARMM Organic Act, where it reaffirmed the
devolution of the DPWH in ARMM, including Lanao del Sur and Marawi City, to the Regional
Government and effectively repealed R.A. 8999.
DPWH Department Order No. 119
Now, the question directly related to D.O. 119.
D.O. 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has jurisdiction over
infrastructure projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur is violative of the provisions of E.O. 426.
The Executive Order was issued pursuant to R.A. 6734which initiated the creation of the
constitutionally-mandated autonomous region[87] and which defined the basic structure of the
autonomous government.[88] E.O. 426 sought to implement the transfer of the control and supervision
of the DPWH within the ARMM to the Autonomous Regional Government. In particular, it identified
four (4) District Engineering Offices in each of the four (4) provinces, namely: Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi.[89]Accordingly, the First Engineering District of the DPWH-ARMM
in Lanao del Sur has jurisdiction over the public works within the province.
The office created under D.O. 119, having essentially the same powers, is a duplication of the
DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur formed under the aegis of E.O. 426. The
department order, in effect, takes back powers which have been previously devolved under the said
executive order. D.O. 119 runs counter to the provisions of E.O. 426. The DPWHs order, like spring
water, cannot rise higher than its source of powerthe Executive.
The fact that the department order was issued pursuant to E.O. 124signed and approved by
President Aquino in her residual legislative powersis of no moment. It is a finely-imbedded principle in
statutory construction that a special provision or law prevails over a general one.[90] Lex specialis
derogant generali. As this Court expressed in the case of Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,[91] another basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general legislation must give
way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only
cases in which the special provisions are not applicable, that specific statute prevails over a general
statute and that where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one
designed therefor specially should prevail.
E.O. No. 124, upon which D.O. 119 is based, is a general law reorganizing the Ministry of Public
Works and Highways while E.O. 426 is a special law transferring the control and supervision of the
DPWH offices within ARMM to the Autonomous Regional Government. The latter statute specifically
applies to DPWH-ARMM offices. E.O. 124 should therefore give way to E.O. 426 in the instant case.
In any event, the ARMM Organic Acts and their ratification in a plebiscite in effect superseded
E.O. 124. In case of an irreconcilable conflict between two laws of different vintages, the later
enactment prevails because it is the later legislative will.[92]
Further, in its repealing clause, R.A. 9054 states that all laws, decrees, orders, rules and
regulations, and other issuances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Organic Act, are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.[93] With the repeal of E.O. 124 which is the basis of D.O. 119,
it necessarily follows that D.O. 119 was also rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.
Grave abuse of discretion
Without doubt, respondents committed grave abuse of discretion. They implemented R.A. 8999
despite its inoperativeness and repeal. They also put in place and maintained the DPWH Marawi
Sub-District Engineering Office in accordance with D.O. 119 which has been rendered functus
officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.
Still, on the issue of grave abuse of discretion, this Court, however, cannot uphold petitioners
argument that R.A. 8999 was signed into law under suspicious circumstances to support the
assertion that there was a capricious and whimsical exercise of legislative authority. Once more, this
Court cannot inquire into the wisdom, merits, propriety or expediency of the acts of the legislative
branch.
Likewise, the alleged lack of consultation or public hearing with the affected agency during the
inception of the law does not render the law infirm. This Court holds that the Congress did not
transgress the Constitution nor any statute or House Rule in failing to invite a resource person from
the DPWH-ARMM during the Committee meeting. Section 27, Rule VII of the Rules of the
House[94] only requires that a written notice be given to all the members of a Committee seven (7)
calendar days before a regularly scheduled meeting, specifying the subject matter of the meeting and
the names of the invited resource persons. And it must be emphasized that the questions of who to
invite and whether there is a need to invite resource persons during Committee meetings should be
addressed solely to Congress in its plenary legislative powers.[95]
Conclusion
The repeal of R.A. 8999 and the functus officio state of D.O. 119 provide the necessary basis for
the grant of the writs of certiorari and prohibition sought by the petitioners. However, there is no
similar basis for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondent DBM Secretary to release
funds appropriated for public works projects in Marawi City and Lanao del Sur to the DPWH-ARMM
First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur and to compel respondent DPWH Secretary to allow the
DPWH-ARMM, First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur to implement all public works projects
within its jurisdictional area. Section 20, Article VI of R.A. 9054 clearly provides that (f)unds for
infrastructure in the autonomous region allocated by the central government or national government
shall only be appropriated through a Regional Assembly Public Works Act passed by the Regional
Assembly. There is no showing that such Regional Assembly Public Works Act has been enacted.
WHEREFORE, considering that Republic Act No. 9054 repealed Republic Act No. 8999 and
rendered DPWH Department Order No. 119 functus officio, the petition insofar as it seeks the writs of
certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Accordingly, let a writ of prohibition ISSUE commanding
respondents to desist from implementing R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119, and maintaining the DPWH
Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office and the First Engineering District of the Province of Lanao del
Sur comprising the City of Marawi and the municipalities within the First District of Lanao del Sur.
However, the petition insofar as it seeks a writ of mandamus against respondents is DENIED.
 No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Acting C.J.), Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, andGarcia, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., on official leave.
Corona, J., on leave.

[1]
Dated 25 September 2001; Rollo, pp. 3-30, with annexes.
[2]
Approved on 17 January 2001.
[3]
Dated 20 May 1999.
[4]
SEC. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided. (Art. X, 1987 CONST.)
[5]
SEC. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed.
SEC. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law to the
autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.
SEC.18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and
participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President
from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government
for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and
representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with
personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the Constitution and national laws.
The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by
the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic
areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
SEC. 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen months from the time of
organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras.
SEC. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national
laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of general welfare of the people of
the region.
SEC. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the local
police agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable
laws. The defense and security of the regions shall be the responsibility of the National Government.
[6]
Par. (2), Sec. 1, R.A. 6734.
[7]
Chiongbian v. Orbos, 315 Phil. 251, 257 (1995).
[8]
ARTICLE V
POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
SECTION 1. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the proper
governance and development of all the constituent units within the Autonomous Region consistent with the
constitutional policy on regional and local autonomy and decentralization: Provided, That nothing herein shall
authorize the diminution of the powers and functions already enjoyed by local government units.
SEC. 2. The Autonomous Region is a corporate entity with jurisdiction in all matters devolved to it by the
Constitution and this Organic Act as herein enumerated:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage;
(9) Powers, functions and responsibilities now being exercised by the departments of the National
Government except;
(a) Foreign affairs;
(b) National defense and security;
(c) Postal service;
(d) Coinage, and fiscal and monetary policies;
(e) Administration of justice;
(f) Quarantine;
(g) Customs and tariff;
(h) Citizenship;
(i) Naturalization, immigration and deportation;
(j) General auditing, civil service and elections;
(k) Foreign trade;
(l) Maritime, land and air transportation and communications that affect areas outside the
Autonomous Region; and
(m) Patents, trademarks, tradenames, and copyrights; and
(10) Such other matters as may be authorized
by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the Region.
ARTICLE XII
URBAN AND RURAL PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
SECTION 1. The Regional Government shall promote and formulate comprehensive and integrated
regional urban and rural development policies, plans, programs and projects responsive to the needs, aspirations
and values of the people within the Region.
 ARTICLE XIX
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
SEC. 4. Upon the organization of the Autonomous Region, the line agencies and offices of the National
Government dealing with local government, social services, science and technology, labor, natural resources, and
tourism, including their personnel, equipment, properties and budgets, shall be immediately placed under the
control and supervision of the Regional Government.
Other National Government offices and agencies in the Autonomous Region which are not excluded
under paragraph (9), Section 2, Article V of this Organic Act, together with their personnel, equipment, properties
and budgets, shall be placed under the control and supervision of the Regional Government pursuant to a
schedule prescribed by the Oversight Committee mentioned in Section 3, Article XIX of this Organic
Act: Provided, however, That the transfer of these offices and agencies and their personnel, equipment,
properties and budgets shall be accomplished within six (6) years from the organization of the Regional
Government.
The National Government shall continue such levels of expenditures as may be necessary to carry out
the functions devolved under this Act: Provided, however, That the annual budgetary support shall, as soon as
practicable, terminate as to the line agencies or offices devolved to the Regional Government.
SEC. 10. The National Government shall, in addition to its regular annual allotment to the Autonomous
Region, provide the Regional Government Two billion pesos (P2,000,000,000.00) as annual assistance for five
(5) years, to fund infrastructure projects duly identified, endorsed and approved by the Regional Planning and
Development Board herein created: Provided, however, That the annual assistance herein mentioned shall be
appropriated and disbursed through a Public Works Act duly enacted by the Regional Assembly: Provided,
further, That this annual assistance may be adjusted proportionately in accordance with the number of provinces
and cities joining the Autonomous Region: and Provided, finally, That the national programs and projects in the
Autonomous Region shall continue to be financed out of national funds.
[9]
SEC. 1. Transfer of Control and Supervision. The offices of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
within the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) including their functions, powers and responsibilities,
personnel, equipment, properties, budgets and liabilities are hereby placed under the control and supervision of
the Autonomous Regional Government.
In particular, these offices are identified as the four (4) District Engineering Offices (DEO) in each of the
four provinces respectively and the three (3) Area Equipment Services (AES) located in Tawi-Tawi, Sulu and
Maguindanao (Municipality of Sultan Kudarat).
SEC 2. Functions Transferred. The Autonomous Regional Government shall be responsible for highways,
flood control and water resource development systems, and other public works within the ARMM and shall
exercise the following functions:
1. Undertake and evaluate the planning, design, construction and works supervision for the infrastructure
projects whose location and impact are confined within the ARMM;
2. Undertake the maintenance of infrastructure facilities within the ARMM and supervise the maintenance
of such local roads and other infrastructure facilities receiving financial assistance from the National Government;
3. Ensure the implementation of laws, policies, programs, rules and regulations regarding infrastructure
projects as well as all public and private physical structures within the ARMM;
4. Provide technical assistance related to their functions to other agencies within the ARMM, especially
the local government units;
5. Coordinate with other national and regional government departments, agencies, institutions and
organizations, especially the local government units within the ARMM in the planning and implementation of
infrastructure projects;
6. Conduct continuing consultations with the local communities, take appropriate measures to make the
services of the Autonomous Regional Government responsive to the needs of the general public and recommend
such appropriate actions as may be necessary; and
7. Perform such other related duties and responsibilities within the ARMM as may be assigned or
delegated by the Regional Governor or as may be provided by law.
SEC. 3. Functions Retained by the National Government. Functions not specified herein shall be retained
by the DPWH. These include, among others, the reserved powers of the National Government in accordance with
Article V, Section 2, as well as those subject to specific provisions, of Republic Act No. 6734; Provided, That, the
DPWH and the Autonomous Regional Government may enter into a Memorandum of Agreement with reference
to operationalizing these functions within the ARMM subject to the approval of the Office of the
President; Provided, however, That the operations of the National Government are not prejudiced.