Vicencio vs.

Villar
Facts: The mandate of the Commission on Audit is to observe the policy that government funds
and property should be fully protected and conserved; and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive
or extravagant expenditures or uses of such funds and property should be prevented. The City
Council or the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Malabon (SPM), presided by Hon. Benjamin
Galauran, then acting Vice-Mayor, adopted and approved City Ordinance No. 15-2003, entitled
“An Ordinance Granting Authority to the City Vice-Mayor, Hon. Jay Jay Yambao, to Negotiate and
Enter into Contract for Consultancy Services for Consultants in the Sanggunian Secretariat Tasked
to Function in their Respective Areas of Concern.”
Arnold Vicencio was elected City Vice-Mayor of Malabon. By virtue of this office, he also became
the Presiding Officer of the SPM and, at the same time, the head of the Sanggunian
Secretariat. Vicencio, representing the City Government of Malabon City, entered into
Contracts for Consultancy Services. After the signing of their respective contracts, the three
consultants rendered consultancy services to the SPM. Thereafter, the three consultants were
correspondingly paid for their services pursuant to the contracts therefor. However, an Audit
Observation Memorandum (AOM) was issued disallowing the amount for being an improper
disbursement. Aggrieved by the disallowance, Vicencio appealed it to the Adjudication and
Settlement Board (ASB) of the Commission on Audit (COA) which subsequently denied it.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Commission on Audit committed serious errors and
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction when it affirmed ASB’s
decision relative to the disallowance of disbursements concerning the services rendered by
hired consultants for the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng
Malabon

HELD:
Under Section 456 of R.A. 7160, or the Local Government Code, there is no inherent authority
on the part of the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the local government
unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor. Thus, the authority of the vice-mayor to enter into
contracts on behalf of the city was strictly circumscribed by the ordinance granting it.
Ordinance No. 15-2003 specifically authorized Vice-Mayor Yambao to enter into contracts for
consultancy services. As this is not a power or duty given under the law to the Office of the Vice-
Mayor, Ordinance No. 15-2003 cannot be construed as a “continuing authority” for any
person who enters the Office of the Vice-Mayor to enter into subsequent, albeit similar,
contracts. The COA’s assailed Decision was made in faithful compliance with its mandate
and in judicious exercise of its general audit power as conferred on it by the Constitution.
The COA was merely fulfilling its mandate in observing the policy that government funds and
property should be fully protected and conserved; and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive
or extravagant expenditures or uses of such funds and property should be prevented. Thus, no
grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to the COA.

USA vs. Guinto et al

Facts: These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state
immunity. In GR No. 76607, The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force
in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber
services in the said base which was won by a certain Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel
the award to the bid winner because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not
included in the invitation to bid, and subsequently, to conduct a rebidding.

In GR No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners
Lamachia, Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation
Center at Camp John Hay Air Station inBaguioCity. It had been ascertained after investigation,
from the testimony of Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion, that Genove had poured urine into the soup
stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. Lamachia, as club manager,
suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators conformably to the
collective bargaining agreement between the center and its employees. The board unanimously
found him guilty and recommended his dismissal. Genove’s reaction was to file his complaint
against the individual petitioners.

In GR No. 80018, Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Cano O’ Donnell,
an extension of Clark Air Bas, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the
individual petitioners who are officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air Force
Office of Special Investigators. On the basis of the sworn statements made by them, an
information for violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, was filed
against Bautista in the RTC of Tarlac. Said officers testified against him at his trial. Bautista was
dismissed from his employment. He then filed a complaint against the individual petitioners
claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed.
In GR No. 80258, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against
the herein petitioners (except theUS), for injuries sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts
of the defendants. There is a conflict of factual allegations here. According to the plaintiffs, the
defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them which bit them in
several parts of their bodies and caused extensive injuries to them. The defendants deny this and
claim that plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they were
struggling and resisting arrest. In a motion to dismiss the complaint, theUS and the individually
named defendants argued that the suit was in effect a suit against theUS, which had not given its
consent to be sued.

ISSUE: Whether the defendants were also immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for
acts done by them in the performance of their official duties.

HELD: The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted
principles of international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even
without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of
international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the
majority of the states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state
as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. All states are
sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them
in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require
the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as
against the state although it has not been formally impleaded.

When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the
other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.
In the case oUS, the customary law of international law on state immunity is expressed with more
specificity in the RP-US Bases Treaty. There is no question that theUS, like any other state, will be
deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its
proprietory or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or
governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied.

It is clear from a study of the records of GR No. 80018 that the petitioners therein were acting in
the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operations against the
complainant and thereafter testified against him at his trial. It follows that for discharging their
duties as agents of theUS, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal,
which has not given its consent to be sued.

As for GR No. 80018, the record is too meager to indicate what really happened. The needed
inquiry first be made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the
parties on the basis of evidence that has yet to be presented at the trial.

Ruling
1) US VS GUINTO (GR No 76607)
The court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US government
to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons. The petitioners cannot plead any
immunity from the complaint, the contract in question being decidedly commercial. Thus, the
petition is DISMISSED and the lower court directed to proceed with the hearing and decision of
the case.

2) US VS RODRIGO (GR No 79470)

The restaurant services offered at the John Hay Station operated for profit as a
commercial and not a government activity. The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of self
immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit filed by Genove. Not even the US
government can claim such immunity because by entering into the employment contract with
Geneove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign
immunity from suit.
Still, the court holds that the complaint against petitioners in the lower court be
dismissed. There was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings in the dismissal of Genove, the
petitioner acted quite properly in terminating the private respondent’s employment for his
unbelievably nauseating act of polluting the soup stock with urine.
3) US VS CEBALLOS (GR No 80018)
It was clear that the individually-named petitioners were acting in the exercise of their
official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation and thereafter testified against
the complainant. For discharging their duties as agents of the United States, thay cannot be
directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be
sued. The conclusion of the trial court that the answer filed by the special counsel of Clark Air
Base was a submission of the US government to its jurisdiction is rejected. Express waiver cannot
be made by a mere counsel of the government but must be effected through a duly-enacted
statute. Neither does it come under the implied form of consent. Thus, the petition is granted
and the civil case filed in the lower court dismissed.

4) US VS ALARCON VERGARA (GR No 80258)

The contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer study of what actually
happened. The record were too meager to indicate that the defendants were really discharging
their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident occurred. Only
after the lower court shall have determined in what capacity the petitioners were acting will the
court determine, if still necessary, if the doctrine of state immunity is applicable.

Prov of Cam Sur vs CA

FACTS:
Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Camarines Sur passed Resolution 129 authorizing the province
to expropriate property in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-agricultural crops
and housing project for the government employees. By virtue of the resolution, Cam Sur filed
two separate cases for expropriation and a motion for the issuance of writ of possession against
San Joaquins, the private respondents.

The San Joaquins moved to dismiss complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered
and a motion for relief. The RTC denied the motions and authorized Cam Sur to take possession
of the property. In their petition before the Court of Appeals, private respondents ask the CA to
declare Resolution 129 null and void, dismiss the expropriation complaints, and set aside the
authority granted to Cam Sur to take possession of property. the Province of Camarines Sur
claimed that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7
of Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and that the expropriations are for a public purpose..
Asked by the CA, the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code
(B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise
by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. however, approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is needed to convert the property from agricultural to non-
agricultural (housing purpose).

CA set aside the decision of the trial court suspending the possession and expropriation of the
property until the province has acquired the approval of DAR, hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the resolution is valid, i.e. the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

Ruling:
The expropriation is for a public purpose, hence the resolution is authorized and valid.

When the Court of Appeals ordered the suspension of the proceedings until the Province of
Camarines Sur shall have obtained the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to change
the classification of the lands sought to be expropriated from agricultural to non-agricultural use,
it assumed that the resolution is valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose or public
use.

There has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of "public purpose" or "public
use" for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The old concept was that the
condemned property must actually be used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges, public
plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public
use". Under the new concept, "public use" means public advantage, convenience or benefit,
which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community,
like a resort complex for tourists or housing project.

The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose.
The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage
of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make
available to the community invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the
cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be
enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution.
As held in Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, "Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in
housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety,
the environment and in sum the general welfare."

Fortrich vs Corona

Facts:
Respondents and intervenors pray that this case be referred to SC En Banc. A careful reading
however, reveals the intention of the framers to draw a distinction between cases, "decided"
referring to cases and "resolved" referring to matters, applying the rule of reddendo singula
singulis. (referring each to each)

The issue presented by the respondents is whether the power of the LGU to reclassify lands is
subject to the approval of the CAR is no longer novel, this having decided in Camarines Sur vs CA
case that the LGU need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands from
agricultural to non-agricultural use.

Intervenors insist that they are real parties in interest inasmuch as they have already been issued
certificates of land ownership award, or CLOAs, and that while they are seasonal farm workers at
the plantation, they have been identified by the DAR as qualified beneficiaries of the property.

Ruling:

Intervenors, who are admittedly not regular but seasonal farm workers, have no legal or actual
and substantive interest over the subject land inasmuch as they have no right to own the land.
Rather, their right is limited only to a just share of the fruits of the land.

Patalinghug vs CA

Facts: On November 17, 1982, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No.
363, otherwise known as the “Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao City,” Sec.8 of which states:

“A C-2 District shall be dominantly for commercial and compatible industrial uses
as provided hereunder:
xxx

3.1. Funeral Parlors/Memorial Homes with adequate off street parking space and
provided that they shall be established not less than 50 meters from any residential
structures, churches and other institutional buildings.”

Petitioner constructed a funeral parlor in the name and style of Metropolitan Funeral Parlor at
Cabaguio Avenue, Agdao, Davao City.

Acting on the complaint of several residents of Brgy. Agdao that the construction of petitioner’s
funeral parlor violated Ordinance No. 363 since it was allegedly situated within a 50-meter radius
from the Iglesia ni Kristo chapel and several residential structures, the Sangguniang Panlungsod
conducted an investigation and found that “the nearest residential structure, owned by Wilfred
Tepoot, is only 8 inches to the south”.

Notwithstanding the findings of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, petitioner continued with the
construction of his funeral parlor until it was finished on November 3, 1987.

Issues:

Whether petitioner’s operation of a funeral home constitutes permissible use within a particular
district or zone in Davao City?

Held:

Petitioner did not violate Sec.8 of Davao City Ordinance No. 363. The question of whether Mr.
Tepoot’s building is residential or not is a factual determination which we should not disturb.
Although the general rule is that findings of the lower courts are conclusive upon the Supreme
Court, this admits of exceptions as when the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals and
of the trial court are contrary to each other. While the trial court ruled that Tepoot’s building was
commercial, the Appellate Court ruled otherwise.

Tax declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning purposes. A property
may well be declared by its owner as residential for real estate taxation purposes but it may well
be within a commercial zone. A discrepancy may thus exist in the determination of the nature of
property for real estate taxation purposes vis-à-vis the determination of a property for zoning
purposes.
A tax declaration only enables the assessor to identify the evidentiary value of a tax for
assessment levels. In fact, a tax declaration does not bind a provincial/city assessor, for under
Sec. 22 of the Real Estate Tax Code, appraisal and assessment are based on the actual use
irrespective of “any previous
assessment or taxpayer’s valuation thereon”. A piece of land declared by a taxpayer as residential may be
assessed by the provincial/city assessor as commercial because its actual use is commercial.

Even if Tepoot’s building was declared for taxation purposes as residential, once a local government has
reclassified an area as commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must prevail. While the commercial
character of the questioned vicinity has been declared through ordinance, private respondents have failed to
present convincing arguments to substantiate their claim that Cabaguio Avenue, where the funeral parlor was
constructed, was still a residential zone. Unquestionably, the operation of a funeral parlor constitutes as
“commercial purposes” as gleaned from Ordinance No. 363.

The declaration of said area as a commercial zone through a municipal ordinance is an exercise of police power
to promote the good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. Corollary thereto, the State may
interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations in order to promote the
general welfare. Thus, persons may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure
the general welfare of the state and to this fundamental aim of the government, the rights of the individual may
be subordinated. The ordinance which regulates the location of funeral homes has been adopted as part of
comprehensive zoning plans for the orderly development of the area covered thereunder.

Notes. The appraisal and assessment of real property for taxation purposes is that the property must be
appraised at its current and fair market value (Reyes vs. Almanzor, 196 SCRA 322).

The exercise by local government of the power to tax is ordained by the present constitution, only guidelines
and limitations that may be established by Congress can define and limit such power of local governments
(Philippine Petroleum Corporation vs. Municipality of Pililia, Rizal, 198 SCRA 82).

CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATION INC. (CREBA) v. SECRETARY OF

AGRARIAN REFORM

FACTS: This case is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, with application for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, filed directly by the petitioner CREBA with the Court seeking to nullify and prohibit
the enforcement of Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 01-02 for having
been issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction as some provisions of the aforesaid administrative issuances are
illegal and unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition shall dismissed for having been filed directly with the Court
HELD: YES.

Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court
forum.

This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of c Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not; however, to

be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of
courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming
regard for that judicial hierarchy

most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuan courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s o allowed only
when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is an
established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the

Court’s time and attention which are bettersdiction,devotedand to to prevent further over-crowding of the
Court’s docket.

The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this
Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court
as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues
because this Court is not a trier of facts. This Court thus reaffirms the judicial policy that it will
not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of
serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling
for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. This Court thus reaffirms the judicial policy that it will
not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of
serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling
for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.
In the case at bench, petitioner failed to specifically and sufficiently set forth special and
important reasons to justify direct recourse to this Court and why this Court should give due
course to this petition. The present petition should have been initially filed in the Court of Appeals
in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. Failure to do so is sufficient cause
for the dismissal of this petition.

Moreover, although the instant petition is styled as a Petition for Certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration
by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02. It, thus, partakes of the
nature of a Petition for Declaratory Relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.
With that, this Petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a Petition
for Declaratory Relief even if only questions of law are involved. Even if the petitioner has properly observed
the doctrine of judicial hierarchy, this Petition is still dismissible. It is beyond the province of certiorari to declare
the aforesaid administrative issuance unconstitutional and illegal because certiorari is confined only to the
determination of the existence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner
cannot simply allege grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and then invoke
certiorari to declare the aforesaid administrative issuances unconstitutional and illegal. Emphasis must be given
to the fact that the writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is a
prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial
discretion.