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ASSEMBLY OF THE UNION

Thirty-First Ordinary Session
1 - 2 July 2018
Nouakchott, MAURITANIA

Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
Original: English

PROGRESS REPORT OF THE CHAIRPERSON OF

THE COMMISSION ON THE AU INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
PURSUANT TO ASSEMBLY DECISION ASSEMBLY/AU/Dec.635(XXVIII)
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PROGRESS REPORT OF THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE COMMISSION ON THE AU

INSTITUTIONAL REFORM PURSUANT TO ASSEMBLY DECISION
ASSEMBLY/AU/Dec.635(XXVIII)

I. BACKGROUND

1. This report provides an overview of progress made in the implementation of

Assembly Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.635(XXVIII) and a summary of the reform
implementation proposals to be discussed during the July 2018 AU Assembly of Heads
of State and Government.

2. The January 2017 AU Assembly Decision, Assembly/AU/Dec.635(XXVIII), on the

Institutional Reform of the African Union (AU) sets out a comprehensive AU reform
agenda. It is aimed at fundamentally re-positioning the organization to meet the evolving
needs of its Member States and the continent and identifies the following core reform
priorities:

 Focus on key priorities with continental scope;

 Realign African Union institutions in order to deliver against those

priorities;

 Connect the African Union to its citizens;

 Manage the business of the African Union efficiently and effectively at

both the political and operational levels;

 Finance the African Union sustainably and with the full ownership of the
Member States.

3. The Assembly Decision on reform provides a framework for the transformation of

the African Union into an effective and efficient organisation that delivers for African
citizens. Based on this framework detailed implementation proposals are being
developed.

4. The reform decision took into account previous reform proposals, most notably
the 2007 Adedeji Audit, which made extensive and far-reaching recommendations on
how to improve the overall effectiveness of the Union. Unfortunately, most of these were
never implemented.

II. MANDATE, IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH AND PRINCIPLES

5. Based on the previous implementation challenges, and the strategic importance

of the reform agenda, the AU Assembly took the decision to oversee the reform
process. The reform decision designated President Paul Kagame to supervise the
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implementation process. It was also determined that he would work with two other
Heads of State, the 2016 Chair of the Union, President Idriss Deby, and the 2017 Chair
of the Union, President Alpha Conde.

6. The Assembly also requested President Kagame to report on progress made in

implementing Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.635 (XXIX) at each Ordinary Session of the
Assembly.

7. During the January 2018 Summit, the AU Assembly decided that as part of the
process of deepening consultations around the reform implementation process, the
Reform Troika, should be expanded to the Bureau of the Assembly of the Union. The
Assembly also decided to established a group of fifteen (15) Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
three per region to play an advisory role to the reform process

III. CONSULTATION MEETINGS

May 2018 Consultation Meetings

8. The Bureau of the Assembly, the fifteen Ministers of Foreign Affairs met on 26
May 2018. Chief Executives from the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) also
participated in the consultation meeting.

Meeting of the Ministerial Advisory Group of fifteen (15) on the reform process

9. The Ministerial meeting was attended by ten (10) Ministers of Foreign Affairs
from Angola, Congo, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Namibia, Mali, Sudan, Sahrawi Arab
Democratic Republic, and representatives of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs from
Algeria, Cameroon, Kenya, Liberia, South Africa and Togo. The meeting discussed the
ongoing reform implementation process and a Draft Issues Paper and Roadmap on
Establishing an Effective division of labour between the AU, RECS and continental
organizations.

10. There was agreement that this reform is necessary and timely. It was agreed that
the reform process would be implemented within the framework of the Constitutive Act
and that the inter-governmental nature of the organization would always be kept in
mind.

11. The reform of the Commission was identified as a central part of the reform
process. There was consensus that the effective structural reform of the Commission
was necessary and should involve independent experts.

Consultations with REC Chief Executives

12. A working lunch was held on the division of labour between the AU, RECs and
continental organizations. The draft Issues Paper and Roadmap, which had been
circulated to participants in advance by the AU Commission, provided the framework for
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the discussion. There was general agreement that establishing an effective division of
labour at the level of the AU, RECs and continental organizations has been an
unresolved issue for several decades. There was consensus that if this could be
delivered, it will have a transformational effect in ensuring that the continental
integration agenda is implemented faster and more efficiently. We cannot afford to
continue dispersing and duplicating our efforts- it is costly and counter-productive.

13. There were strong calls for the further rationalization of the RECs from 8 to 5 in
line with the AU regions. REC Chief Executives called for better representation within
the AU and a fundamental change in the way the AU-REC relationship is managed.

Meeting of the Bureau of the Assembly

14. The Bureau of the Assembly was briefed on the Ministerial discussions and met
later that evening to deliberate further on the reform process. The meeting was attended
by President Paul Kagame, President Denis Sassou-Nguesso and the ministers of
Foreign Affairs from representatives from Libya, Guinea and South Africa. Egypt was
invited to attend the Bureau meeting in its capacity as Incoming Chair of the Union.

Consultations by the Reform Implementation Unit

15. The Head of the Reform Implementation Unit, Professor Pierrre Moukoko
Mbonjo, undertook various meetings and consultations with key AU Organs and
institutions. as follows:

 President of the Pan-African Parliament, Roger Nkodo Dang and his team
from 6-9 March in Midrand South Africa;

 President of the Court of Human & People’s Rights, Sylvain Ore along with
the 10 judges on 15 March 2018 in Arusha Tanzania;

 Chair of the Advisory Board on Anti-Corruption, Bogoto Miarom and other

Board members on 15 March 2018 in Arusha Tanzania;

 The Chair s of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights,

Soyata Maiga and all Commissioners on 27 April 2018 in Nouakchott,
Mauritania;

 The Chief Executive of the African Peer Review Mechanism, Eddy Maloka
and his team on 5 March 2018 in Midrand South Africa;

 The Chief Executive of the New Partnership for African Development Co-
ordinating Agency, Ibrahim Mayaki and his team on5 March 2018 in
Midrand South Africa and the NEPAD Steering Committee (16 April 2018).
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16. Consultations with the Regional Economic Communities, at their headquarters,

were also undertaken as follows:

 The Secretary General of the Common Market for East and Southern Africa
(COMESA), Sindiso Ngwenya, and his team on 8 May 2018 in Lusaka,
Zambia;

 The Executive Secretary of the Economic Community for West African

States (ECOWAS), Jean-Claude Kassi Brou, and his team on 15 May 2018
in Libreville, Gabon;

 The Secretary General of the Economic Community for Central African

States (ECCAS) Ahmad Alam-Mi and his team on 14 May 2018 in Abuja,
Nigeria;

 The Executive Secretary of the Intergovernmental Authority on

Development (IGAD), Mahboub Maalim and his team on 6 June 2018, in
Djibouti, Djibouti;

 The Executive Secretary of the Southern African Development Community

(SADC), Stergomena Tax and her team on 14 June 2018 in Gaborone,
Botswana.

17. The remaining consultations with the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-
SAD), the East African Community (EAC) and the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) will be
taken forward after the July 2018 Summit.

18. During this period, official submissions on the reform implementation process
were received from the following group of countries: Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia and
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic; the following RECs: COMESA, ECCAS, ECOWAS,
IGAD and SADC. Official submissions were also received from the following Organs
and institutions: the Pan-African Parliament, the Court of Justice, the Commission for
Human & People’s Rights, the Anti-Corruption Board and the African Peer Review
Mechanism.

IV. REFORM IMPLEMENTATION PROPOSALS TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE

JULY 2018 AU ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE & GOVERNMENT

19. In line with the July 2017 AU Assembly Decision 635, the following reform
updates and proposals will be discussed during the July 2018 Summit:
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The AU-RECs-COs division of labour

i) AU-REC-COs Division of Labour Issues Paper and Roadmap (Annex 1)

Initial findings for the AU Organs

i) Peace & Security Council;

ii) Pan-African Parliament (PAP);

iii) Judicial and quasi-judicial Organs;

iv) Reform of the AU Commission.

Proposals and Recommendations on key AU institutions

i) African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)

Financing the Union

i) AU Budget Reforms
ii) The revised Scale of Assessment
iii) Sanctions regime
iv) Implementation of 0.2% levy
v) Peace Fund
REVIEW OF THE AFRICAN UNION ORGANS & INSTITUTIONS
INITIAL FINDINGS
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THE PAN-AFRICAN PARLIAMENT

Background
Current mandate of the PAP

1. The mandate of the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) is enshrined in the Protocol to

the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) Relating to the Pan-
African Parliament of 2001 (hereafter referred to as the PAP Protocol). The PAP
Protocol, which has been ratified by 49 Member States and entered into force in 2003,
stipulates that “the Pan-African Parliament shall have consultative and advisory powers
only”. The PAP Protocol provides for the following functions and powers of the PAP (Art.
11):

 Examine, discuss or express an opinion on any matter, either on its own

initiative or at the request of the Assembly or other policy organs and make
any recommendations it may deem fit relating to, inter alia, matters
pertaining to respect of human rights, the consolidation of democratic
institutions and the culture of democracy, as well as the promotion of good
governance and the rule of law;

 Discuss its budget and the budget of the Community and make
recommendations thereon prior to its approval by the Assembly;

 Work towards the harmonization or co-ordination of the laws of Member

States;

 Make recommendations aimed at contributing to the attainment of the

objectives of the OAU/AEC and draw attention to the challenges facing the
integration process in Africa as well as the strategies for dealing with them;

 Request officials of the OAU/AEC to attend its sessions, produce

documents or assist in the discharge of its duties;

 Promote the programmes and objectives of the OAU/AEC, in the

constituencies of the Member States;

 Promote the coordination and harmonization of policies, measures,

programmes and activities of the Regional Economic Communities and the
parliamentary fora of Africa.

Revised Protocol

2. Article 25 of the PAP Protocol makes provisions for the revision of the protocol
five years after the entry into force by the Conference of the States Parties to the
Protocol.
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3. Taking advantage of this article, a discussion on the revised mandate of the PAP
ensued and culminated in the adoption of an updated text in Malabo in 2014. The
revisions are reflected in the proposed Protocol to the Constitutive Act of the African
Union Relating to the Pan African Parliament (2014) (hereafter referred to as the
Malabo Protocol). The key adjustment to the Protocol related to the powers of the
PAP. The revised Protocol speaks of “the ultimate aim of the Pan-African Parliament”
being “an institution with full legislative powers, whose members are elected by
universal adult suffrage.”

4. In addition to the powers stipulated under the PAP Protocol, the Malabo Protocol
provides the following additional powers of the PAP:

 The Pan African Parliament shall be the legislative organ of the African
Union. In this regard,

a) The Assembly shall determine the subjects/areas on which the Pan

African Parliament may propose draft model laws;

b) The Pan African Parliament may on its own make proposals on the
subjects/areas on which it may submit or recommend draft model laws
to the Assembly for its consideration and approval.

 Receive, consider and submit opinions on draft legal instruments, treaties

and other international agreements as may be referred to it by the Council
or Assembly;

 Receive and consider reports of other organs of the African Union as may
be referred to it by the Council or the Assembly, including audit and other
reports and make recommendations thereon;

 Liaise with National Parliaments or other deliberative bodies and the

Parliaments of the Regional Economic Communities on all matters relating
to the African Union and regional integration in Africa;

 Without prejudice to the preceding paragraphs and in so far as it is not in

conflict with the mandate of any other organ of the AU, the powers and
functions of the parliament may also be exercised through: a) fact-finding or
inquiry missions; b) observer missions.

5. Almost four years after its adoption, the Malabo Protocol is yet to be ratified by
the required minimum number of 28 member-states for it to enter into force (see Annex
1). So far, 20 Member-States have signed the Protocol and 6 countries have ratified and
deposited their instruments, with Madagascar being the last country to deposit its
instrument on 7 May 2018.
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6. Although the specific reasons for the slow pace of ratifications are yet to be
identified, it is important to note that unlike other legislative organs, the PAP will have
restricted legislative powers even under the Malabo Protocol. Indeed, the Protocol limits
the legislative powers of the PAP to the development of Model Laws, which are subject
to approval by the Assembly. There are a number of concerns, not insurmountable,
around issues that would result from the entry into force of the protocol. These include
the financing of a universal suffrage election, the alignment of electoral calendars
across all member states, as well as the development of the electoral law guiding the
elections process of the PAP.

7. That said the PAP, once fully operationalized will play a central role in
establishing a proper system of oversight, checks and balances within the AU. Various
parliamentarians argued that their oversight function has been captured by the
Permanent Representatives Committee and that this needs to be addressed. Linked to
this was the strong sentiment that the recognition of the role of parliamentarians has
been steadily eroded over time including in the lack of recognition of their status as
elected officials. The issue of the status of parliamentarians is linked to financial and
budget considerations but is a continuing point of frustration for parliamentarians.

8. The loss of the PAP’s role in initiating its own election monitoring missions was
also identified as problematic. PAP members now participate in election monitoring
missions as part of the AU Commission Election Observation Missions.

Achievements of the PAP

Delivering against the current mandate

9. A review of the activities of the PAP shows that, the PAP has focused
systematically on three specific areas of its mandate; namely:

 Table the budget of the union and make recommendations (done since
2016);

 Request AU officials to attend sessions of the parliament. Several

representatives from different organs and specialized agencies have been
invited by the PAP to address the plenary including: AUC Chairperson and
Commissioners, Chief Executive Officer of the NEPAD Planning and
Coordination Agency (NPCA), Head of the Reform Implementation Unit,
tabling of the Country Review Reports of the African Peer Review
Mechanism (APRM);

 Make recommendations related to regional integration. This is done at the

end of every bi-annual sitting of the PAP on a variety of topics such as the
annual theme of the AU.
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10. In addition, the PAP has engaged, although largely on an ad hoc basis, with
other AU departments/ specialized agencies to promote AU instruments. The main
example is the collaboration with the AUC-Department of Political Affairs (DPA) in
advocating for the ratification of the African Charter for Democracy and Human Rights
(ACDEG), which entered into force in 2012. Other forms collaborations have also taken
place between the NPCA and the AUC-Department of Social Affairs to develop model
laws.

Moving beyond the objectives and mandate of the PAP Protocol

11. Although the Malabo Protocol (2014) is not yet into force due to the low level of
ratifications, the PAP is already engaged in activities related to the objectives and
mandate under this Protocol.

12. First, the PAP has engaged structurally with the European Union Parliament (EP)
in relation to international partnerships. Article 3(l) of the Malabo Protocol pertaining
to the objectives of the PAP, states that one of the PAP’s objective is to “cooperate with
…similar bodies within and outside Africa …” The PAP has held a structured dialogue
with the EP in the context of the Joint EU-Africa Strategy (JAES). A permanent
delegation in the respective parliaments has been established in 2009 to lead the
annual exchanges between the two parliaments (mirroring the college-to-college
meetings between the two European Commission and the African Union Commission).
In addition to the annual meetings, the PAP and the EP have systematically held
Parliamentary pre-summits ahead of the Summits between the Heads of States and
presented their report to the Heads of States meetings.

13. Second, Article 8 (1.b) of the Malabo Protocol provides the mandate to the PAP
to initiate model laws. In that respect, the PAP has contributed to the development of a
set of model laws. In 2016, following a consultations process, the PAP in partnership
with the NPCA successfully submitted the African Union (AU) Model Law on Medical
Products Regulation, which was adopted by the Assembly of Heads of States in 2016.
However, it is important to note that, as per the Malabo Protocol, the PAP cannot
develop a model law without consultations with the Assembly – which has been largely
the case so far. Nonetheless, the adoption of the Model Law on Medical Products
Regulation by the Assembly in 2016 sets a precedent that opened the way for additional
Model Laws to be developed and adopted by the AU Assembly.

14. Currently, a number of model laws are being development; including a Disability
Model Law to support eventual efforts by member states to introduce relevant legislation
to implement the AU’s Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on
the Rights of Persons with Disability (initiated in 2018) and an African Union (AU) Model
Law on the Protection of Cultural Property and Heritage (initiated in 2015) jointly with
the AUC department of Social Affairs. Whether the model laws will be considered by the
Assembly – again – in the absence of a mandate remains to be seen.
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Relations with other regional parliaments

15. There are currently four (4) regional parliamentary groupings in Africa with North
Africa being the only region without a regional parliamentary arrangement of some kind.
The table below provides an overview of the type of mandate the groupings have in
relation to the regional grouping they belong to (see also Annex 2). With the exception
of AU-specific instruments, the mandates of the four legislative bodies cover similar
issues relating to the promotion of governance, regional integration, human rights, etc.
There are no working modalities at present to ensure coordination between the PAP
and regional parliaments/forums where they exist despite a meeting having taken place
between the PAP and regional parliaments in 2016.

Parliamentary Grouping Legislative Advisory

East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
Parliament
Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
Parliamentary Forum
Forum of Parliaments of the International Conference on 
the Great Lakes Region (FP-ICGLR)
Economic & Monetary Union of Central Africa (CEMAC) 
Parliament

Financing the PAP

16. Article 15 of the PAP Protocol (2001) notes that “the annual budget of the Pan-
African Parliament shall constitute an integral part of the regular budget of the
OAU/AEC”. This has been the practice with respect to the PAP. In 2018, the PAP was
allocated a total budget of US$20M of which US$3 million was provided by international
partners. This makes the PAP the 2nd most financed organ of the AU after the AU
Commission. The budget is broken down into three components; namely staffing
(US$9.8 M), operations including costs for the sessions of Parliament (US$7 M) and
capital expenses (US$171K).

17. The EALA, which sits once a year has budget of EALA’s US$17 for the period
2017-2018. The ECOWAS Strategic plan 2018-2010 lists budget of US$6 Million/year.

Challenges
Matching mandate with capacity

18. The PAP is a deliberative and a consultative body of the Union with some powers
and space to initiate and engage proactively to influence key discussions in the AU.
Beyond the deliberations of the parliamentary sittings, which are prepared by the
relevant committees. The structure of the PAP (designed largely around bi-annual
plenary deliberations with Parliamentarians who are not in the PAP on a regular basis –
see Annex 3) is not yet fit to engage in a substantive manner on a range of issues. The
alignment of PAP sub-committees with the AU’ Specialized Technical Committees
would be a first step in establishing some coherence and the ability to more effectively
engage with thematic issues at the overall AU level. There is scope to enhance the
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capacity of the Secretariat, to enable the Parliament to continue its work program on
substantive issues between sittings of the bi-annual sessions. The lack of permanence
of the Bureau or the President of the Parliament is also a constraint. Consideration
should be given to permanently locating the President of the PAP at its headquarters as
is the case for the President of the Court of Human & People’s Rights.

Result-orientation

19. The PAP strategy for follow-up on the deliberations of the different committees of
the PAP and the Plenary remains weak, therefore reinforcing the perception that the
PAP remains deliberative with limited capacity to implement its mandate. Although the
PAP has developed consecutive Strategic Plans, there has been no comprehensive
assessments of impact to ascertain whether or not the objectives set out in the strategic
plans have been met. A stronger focus on result-orientation is therefore needed to
strengthen the effectiveness of the PAP. The extent to which parliamentarians are really
communicating with their local constituencies on AU programmes and priorities also
needs to be strengthened.

Added value compared to regional parliaments

20. As is the case for other continental bodies with similar structures at the REC level
(e.g. commissions and their peace and security architectures), there is a need to reflect
on the subsidiarity arrangements between the PAP and other regional parliamentary
groupings, where regional parliaments exist. There are clear differences notably on the
role of the PAP and other regional parliamentary groupings in promoting the legal
instruments of their respective regional grouping. However, in a number of other areas
(e.g. fact-finding missions or promotion of governance practices) regional parliamentary
groupings, where they exist, may be better placed than the PAP to exercise such
mandates. It is important to coordinate with regional parliaments where they exist while
ensuring that the PAP does not duplicate efforts where regional forums are involved.

Recommendations

21. The PAP should be invited to prepare a roadmap on how a transition towards
the expanded mandate could be managed. This should include a reflection of core
issues related to financing and management of the election process.

22. The results framework of the PAP could be further strengthened to clearly link
activities to the Strategic Plan of the PAP and its mandate. The PAP is encouraged to
engage into a dialogue with other AU organs to share experiences (e.g. AUC, regional
parliaments) on how they developed their results framework and identify potential areas
of cooperation so as to ensure efficiency and effectiveness.

23. The roles and functions of the Bureau of the PAP and the Secretariat, particularly
with respect to the Chief Accounting Officer function, should be clarified and aligned
with those of similar Organs.
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24. In relation to international partnerships, the PAP should engage with key
institutions, notably the AUC in order to coordinate any engagement related to common
African positions especially in relation to international agreements.

25. The PAP should report to the Assembly, and if this is to be delegated it should be
to the Executive Council and no lower.

The judicial and quasi-judicial Organs

26. During this period in-depth consultations were held with the African Court of
Justice, and the African Commission for Human and People’s Rights. A summary of the
initial findings is contained below:

I. African Court of Human & People’s Rights

27. The Court was established in 1998 to complement and reinforce the functions of
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The Court was established by
Article 1 of the Protocol to the Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which was adopted
in June 1998 by OAU members, in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. The Protocol came
into force on 25 January 2004, 30 days after it had been ratified by 15 Member States.
As of 1 September 2014, 27 states had ratified the Protocol.

28. The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR) has jurisdiction over
all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application of
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which is the main African human
rights instrument.

29. The Court can make binding decisions, including orders of compensation or
reparation, while the Commission can only make recommendations. Under article 5 of
the 1998 Protocol establishing the Court, the Commission, State Parties to the Protocol
and African inter-governmental organizations are entitled to submit cases to the Court.

30. Non-governmental organizations with observer status before the Commission

and individuals from State Parties that have made a declaration accepting the
jurisdiction of the Court can also institute cases directly in accordance with Article 34(6).

31. Since its establishment, the Court has received 182 applications and disposed of
51 applications. The Court has handed down 24 orders for interim measures and
rendered 12 Advisory Opinions. There are 131 matters pending.

32. While there is no independent mechanism to verify whether there has been full
compliance with the Court’s orders, there are generally low levels of compliance. Out of
the 42 judgments the court has handed down, only one country (Burkina Faso) has fully
complied with a Court judgment. Tanzania has complied with some of the Court’s
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orders. This has raised questions with respect to Member States’ willingness to accept
the competence of the Court.

Mandate Issues

(a) Legal Framework

33. There are three Protocols relating to the Court- Ouagadougou, Sharm-Al Sheikh
and Malabo- this proliferation has introduced a level of confusion and doubt. Member
States are now unclear about what protocols to adopt.

34. The Sharm el Sheikh Protocol requires a Declaration which is a complicating

factor in terms of the Court’s effectiveness on the Continent. Only 8 countries have
signed the Declaration thereby allowing their nationals and NGOs direct access to the
Court. As a result, the Court has not been able to effectively deliver on its mandate
since access to the Court is very limited. The Court has recommended that this
requirement be removed.

35. 6 countries have ratified the Sharm-el Sheikh Protocol. 18 countries have ratified
the protocol relating to the Court of Justice foreseen in the Constitutive Act which
proposes a merger of the African Court of Justice proposed in the Constitutive Act with
the African Court of Human & People’s Rights. This number of ratifications is sufficient
to operationalize the Court of Justice, but there appears to be no clear strategy for
taking this forward.

36. The Court requested that the reform process be used to help accelerate Member
State ratifications.

37. The judges proposed that the Protocol should be amended to include three
issues:

 Access to the Court by citizens and NGOs (should be automatic on

ratification). It is the key mandate inhibiting issue. Article 34.6;

 Judges should work on a full-time basis. We are taking too long to

deliver our judgments (1-2 years is too long particularly in the case of
human rights cases which are time-sensitive) Article 15.4 and Article 20;

 Introduction of a system of Chambers/Panels so that 5 judges can

work in parallel on a range of matters. At the moment all judges have to
work on one case at the same time which reduces the efficiency of the
Court. Should be 5 because there is no appeal mechanism. Article 23
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
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(b) Reporting & Governance

38. The Protocol states that the Court should report to the Executive Council. The
Executive Council has delegated this to the PRC which, in the view of the judges, has
turned out to be problematic.

39. The Protocol requires the Court to report on compliance issues. The PRC has
stated that the Court should not name Member States that have not complied with the
Court’s judgments. The Court has maintained that this reporting is a requirement within
the Protocol. The PRC subsequently proposed that the Court could leave non-compliant
Member States’ names in the Court’s report but that the names would be removed from
the PRC’s Draft Decisions that would be submitted to the Executive Council and the
Assembly. The President of the Court subsequently questioned this decision at the level
of the Executive Council but the matter has not been revisited.

Working Methods and Operational Issues

40. The PRC responded favourably to the Court’s request to increase their sessions
from 3-4 weeks. This has helped speed up the hearing of cases.

(a) Budget

41. The Court’s budget is provided by the AU. Member States currently fund 80%
and in 2019 decided that Member States would fund the court 100% to guarantee the
independence and integrity of the Court. The Chairperson of the Commission is the
Chief Accounting Officer (CAO), the President of the Court is the Controlling Officer but
the Registrar carries out this function under delegated authority. In practice it is the
Registrar who manages finance. There has been a conscious decision to divest the
President of this role for reputational issues.

(b) Staffing & Recruitment

42. New structure for the Court was adopted. The Court submitted a recruitment plan
with a view to filling 44 new positions. As a result of budget reductions they are making
slow progress in recruitment. There are 62 staff in place against a full staff complement
of 90. The current structure allows for 10 Legal Officers. 5 staff are in place following 3
resignations. The Court has 4 translators/interpreters.

43. Article 24 of the Protocol establishing the Court, gives the Court powers to
‘appoint’ its own registrar and other staff of the registry. This has raised several audit
queries which remain unaddressed. The Court has asked for a proposal on the
delegation of powers to the Registry for the recruitment of professional staff at P5 and
below;

44. The judges practically do not have the time to carry out recruitment, as this must
typically be done in session which reduces the time available for core business.
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II. African Commission on Human & People’s Rights

45. The ACHPR is charged with three major functions: Promotion of human and
peoples’ rights, Article 45(1); protection of human and peoples’ rights, Article 45(2), and
Interpretation of the Charter, Article 45(3).

46. The mandate of the ACHPR is not confined to the Charter it also covers the
Maputo Protocol, the African Charter on Democratization, the Kampala Charter on
internal displacement, to name a few. The breadth and depth of the ACHPR is therefore
huge. The Commission has made a significant contribution to the protection and
promotion of human rights on the continent and provides a unique platform in
connecting to African citizens. Observers are able to place their issues on the agenda.

Key mandate delivery challenges

47. The implementation of decisions or follow up to initiatives is a serious challenge.

The Commission relies on willingness of State authorities to receive ACHPR missions
which can be a challenge. With respect to the complementarity between the
Commission and the Court. Further thinking on the institutional and resource
implications of operationalizing the complementarity principle contained in the Court’s
Protocol may be required. The Commission has not been allocated any additional
resources/capacity to enable this complementarity principle to be operationalised.

Working Methods & Operational Issues

(a) Budget

48. The budget allocated to the Commission is not commensurate with its work load
and is relatively low compared to that of the Court. The AU Member State budget line
has historically covered very little which has led to high levels of dependency on
external financing.

49. The Commissioners welcomed the process initiated by the Commission on the
harmonization of remuneration, allowances and benefits across the Organs, but
requested that this process be fast-tracked and concluded.

(b) Staffing and Recruitment

50. The Commission operates on a part-time basis but has a heavy workload which
carries over beyond the mandated sessions and is not remunerated. The ACHPR is
supposed to work in 4 languages but are not able to cover Arabic or Portuguese
because of lack of interpretation capacity.
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
Page 17

51. The Secretariat is very lean, and therefore capacity is often supplemented
externally. It is dependent on external partners, NGOs, international partners and this
affects its independence and priority-setting which is a serious issue. Provision for a
larger staff complement has been made but recruitment is slow and staff are
overburdened- 25 out of 46 posts are currently vacant.

52. The Commissioners, argued that the ACHPR, as an autonomous body and
should be able organize and manage its administrative affairs in order to ensure
effective delivery. As it stands, the ACHPR has no authority to do this which is in
contrast with the Court of Justice which can manage its own administrative affairs.
Commissioners complained in particular about the lack of recruitment autonomy and
lengthy and ineffective recruitment process in Addis.

The Peace & Security Council

53. The Reform Implementation Unit met with the Peace & Security Council on 25
April to agree a way forward on how to take forward the following specific Assembly
decision: The Peace and Security Council (PSC) should be reformed to ensure that it
meets the ambition foreseen in its Protocol, by strengthening its working methods and
its role in conflict prevention and crisis management.

54. It was agreed that there is already a rich and extensive body of material to draw
on to inform this process. Over the years the PSC has itself initiated a number of
reviews and held a number of retreats which have reflected on how to improve its
working methods and overall effectiveness in relation to its mandate. These processes
have generated several recommendations and proposals.

55. In 2017, it was agreed that a further study on the effectiveness of the African
Peace & Security (APSA) and African Governance architecture (AGA) would be initiated
by the AU Commission. The effectiveness of the PSC in relation to its mandate as well
as how to improve the PSC’s working methods within the PSC have been identified as a
key element of this study.

56. The review process will, therefore, draw on this historic body of material as well
as relevant elements of the ongoing study. It was agreed that the review process will
engage the Peace & Security Council’s Committee of Experts in the development of
proposals and recommendations on the Assembly Decision outlined above. In the first
phase, the review will deliver the following:

 A Draft Issues Paper setting out that the key challenges providing a
summary of the existing recommendations and proposals, on how to
strengthen the Peace & Security Council’s role in conflict prevention and
crisis management and how to improve its working methods along with a
review of progress made in implementation. A draft will be prepared by
September 2018 for discussion with the PSC.
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
Page 18

57. Based on this, it was also agreed that the review and assessment process of the
Peace & Security Council (PSC), which will be informed by the APSA/AGA Study, will
include the following further key steps:

 A Desk review of all existing reviews, assessments and evaluations of the

PSC, this should include the PSC’s own Retreat recommendations on its
working methods and a stock take of actions taken in response to
recommendations arising from reviews, assessments and evaluations, to
generate key issues and findings;

 Assessment of the PSC’s performance and effectiveness in the delivery of

its conflict prevention and crisis management mandate. This should include
the identification of any opportunities and challenges that could enhance or
constrain mandate delivery;

 Structured interviews with PSC members, relevant AU Commission

departments and other key stakeholders;

 Assessment of performance and effectiveness in relation to mandate

delivery. This should include the identification of any opportunities and
challenges that could enhance or constrain mandate delivery.

58. A final report will be ready for discussion with the PSC in November 2018.
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
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THE AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM

Background

Mandate 


1. The Base Document of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) (2002)
stipulates that the mandate of the APRM is to “ensure that the policies and practices of
participating states conform to the agreed political, economic and corporate governance
values, codes and standards contained in the Declaration on Democracy, Political,
Economic and Corporate Governance.”1 This is therefore in line with the Decision of the
Assembly of January 2017 (Assembly/AU/Dec.635(XXVIII)) with respect to the role of
the APRM as a key instrument of the Union to “track implementation and oversee
monitoring and evaluation in key governance areas of the continent”.

2. As a voluntary “mutually agreed instrument for self-monitoring by the participating

member governments”, the key purpose of the APRM is to “foster the adoption of
policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth,
sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic
integration through sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful and best
practice, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs for capacity
building”.2 The Base Document identifies some key principles that should guide the
APRM, namely that its reviews need to be “technically competent, credible and free of
political manipulation.”3

3. In January 20174, the Assembly welcomed the commitment of the African Peer
Review Forum (APR Forum), which emanated from a Special Summit of the Forum of
Heads of States and Government of the APRM in January 2016, to “repositioning of the
APRM to play a monitoring and evaluation role for the African Union [AU] Agenda 2063
and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals [SDGs] Agenda 2030”. This
same decision also deliberated on the issue of voluntary accession to the APRM and
called on the Chairperson of the APR Forum to “consider launching a campaign on
Universal Accession to the Mechanism to encourage more AU Members States to
accede.”

4. The Assembly, in its decision Assembly/AU/Draft/Dec.10 (XXVIII) on the

Revitalisation of the APRM of January 2017 took note of the “Statutes on the APRM
integration into the AU, provisionally adopted by the APR Forum, and duly provides to
consider for adoption in June 2017.” The Statute, which is yet to be formally adopted by
the Assembly, establishes the APRM as a Specialised Agency of the AU.

1
APRM Base Document (2002) para. 2
2
APRM Base document, Op cit Para. 3
3
Ibid para 4
4
AU Assembly decision AU Assembly/AU/Draft/Dec.10 (XXVIII) on the Revitalisation of the APRM of January 2017
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
Page 20

Membership and reviews

5. Currently, 37 AU members are signatories to the APRM, of which 22 have

already been reviewed. An additional 3 members are currently undergoing their review,
which would bring the number of reviewed countries to 25 by the end of 2018 (see
Annex 1 for the list of membership and reviewed countries). The 22 reviews took place
over a period of 13 years.

Key findings

Stronger institutional capacity of the Secretariat and delivery capacity

6. The APRM Secretariat is a key component of the structure of the APRM and its
capacity and functioning have affected the successful implementation of the mandate of
the APRM as a process (see Annex 2 for an overview of the governance structure of the
APRM). Reviewing the institutional development process of the Secretariat since its
establishment, it is clear that the APRM Secretariat has evolved institutionally. Following
a dynamic period largely driven by enthusiasm by pioneer countries, the APRM entered
a period of recession (approximately covering the period 2008-2016) largely driven by
institutional challenges within the Secretariat including a leadership crisis as well as
concerns around financial management of resources then managed through the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Trust Fund for the APRM. In 2016, an
APRM Revitalization Programme was launched to reposition the APRM and a new
Statute was approved at the 25th Summit of the APR Forum held in August 2016 in
Nairobi, Kenya. A new CEO was also appointed in January 2016 to lead the Secretariat.

7. The capacity of the Secretariat has substantially increased. The organogram

has evolved to reflect the mandate of the Secretariat. Adaptations in the organogram
were accompanied with an increase in the number of staff; from 13 staff in January
2016 to 50 as per March 2018. The growth included 2 divisional heads as well as
technical experts and advisors. The increasing capacity of the Secretariat since 2016
has in turn contributed to the relaunching of country reviews following a period of
stagnation that followed the initial wave of reviews between 2005 and 2008 (see Annex
4).

Challenges in tracking impact

8. The value of the APRM is perceived to be ‘intangible’ as a result of poor

monitoring. While there is anecdotal evidence on the impact of the APRM in shaping
policies within some reviewed countries, findings show the need to develop clear
monitoring processes to allow the APRM to fulfil its mandate beyond the Country
Review Report (see Annex 5).

9. Poor monitoring is compounded by the lack of systematic reporting by

countries of progress achieved in implementing the APRM has made it difficult to
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
Page 21

effectively track implementation. Only few countries submitted reports at regular

intervals while most have not done so. Furthermore, even when countries did submit
their progress reports, a review of the progress reports shows that it is difficult to clearly
identify changes introduced as a result of the APRM review. It then becomes difficult to
establish the contribution (let alone the direct impact) of the APRM process to policy
changes introduced in the country.

Peer reviews could be further strengthened and deepened

10. There is a recognition that more could be done to stimulate a frank exchange
and promote peer learning. The APRM Strategic Plan acknowledged challenges in
this respect, which it attributed to several factors including “uncertain or variable levels
of political support” to the process, “poor state of finances and unpredictability of APRM
contributions”, and “irregular attendance of meetings by some Focal Points”.

11. Additionally, the APRM has so far not diversified its reviews. Although the
Guidelines on the APRM Organisation and processes (2003) provide for “other types
of reviews requested by countries or anticipated crisis situations” to be conducted, the
APRM continued to focus on comprehensive country reviews. This is attributed to on
the one hand, the reluctance of countries in crisis to open up to a review process (so far
one case has been tested in Lesotho) and on the other hand, countries may not be fully
aware that they could request specific reviews. Yet, these reviews would not only allow
the APRM to move beyond being a ‘one-product’ institution but to also service member
states by providing more targeted review to inform key policy processes at the country
level or to facilitate peer exchanges in specific policy areas on which a given country
would like to be supported.

‘Expanded mandate’ to monitor the implementation of Agenda 2063 and the

SDGs

12. In implementing Assembly Decision Assembly/AU/Draft/Dec.10 (XXVIII), the

Secretariat has identified Agenda 2063 Aspiration 3 and SDG 16 as the key areas of
focus. So far, no specific reports on these particular components are available at the
continental level. This may provide the Secretariat with the opportunity to build
partnerships and discharge this mandate. One of the key gaps, however, remains the
peer learning component which is catered for under regional reporting for the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The APRM has a strong added value on the
continent. Some ad hoc peer learning sessions have been initiated by the Secretariat,
notably between Planning Authorities. Strengthening this component to serve the
regional coordination dimension for the SDGs as well as Agenda 2063 could also be a
route to be explored.

13. The implementation of the so-called ‘expanded mandate’ of the APRM to monitor
the SDGs and Agenda 2063 could be an opportunity only if well managed, to avoid
overlaps with work done by other institutions. Already, the AUC in partnership with the
United National Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the African
Development Bank (AfDB) are comprehensively monitoring the SDGs and are already
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
Page 22

producing the Africa Regional Report of the SDGs. The AUC Strategic Planning Unit
has also developed a monitoring tool to track the implementation of Agenda 2063.

Non-institutionalized linkages with key AU organs & role overlaps

14. The potential of the APRM as an early warning tool is not optimally used to
enable relevant AU Policy Organs to react in a timely manner in the area of conflict
prevention. Although paragraph 25 of the APRM Base Document notes that the APRM
reports should be tabled at the Peace and Security Council (PSC), institutional
arrangements to facilitate such briefings are yet to be established. The result is that the
APRM reports remain decoupled from key institutions with the mandate to engage
member states on conflict prevention.

15. Furthermore, the division of labour between the APRM and other AU organs,
notably the AU Commission (AUC) Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the AUC
Peace and Security Department (PSD), could be further refined. With respect to
monitoring the state of governance for instance, the African Charter on Democracy,
Elections and Good Governance (ACDEG) as a comprehensive legal instrument of the
AU covers a wide range of issues – if not all of those – covered by the Democratic
Governance window of the APRM questionnaire. As per the ACDEG, the AUC (through
DPA) is mandated to monitor the implementation of the ACDEG. The AUC DPA has
developed a State Reporting questionnaire to this effect. The APRM is also clearly
mandated to cover a range of issues covered by the Charter. Both the APRM and the
AUC DPA could therefore be monitoring the same issues. Similarly, the APRM review
covers a number of structural conflict issues monitored through both tools of the AUC
PSD led Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF).

African countries joining international review processes

16. Members of the APRM are increasingly joining other international peer review
processes, notably the Open Government Partnership (OGP). multilateral initiative that
aims to secure concrete commitments from governments to promote transparency,
empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness new technologies to strengthen
governance. Like the APRM, the OGP is guided nationally by a steering committee
composed of governmental and non-state actors. Although the process follows largely
that of the APRM country self-assessment process, its action plans focus on fewer
priorities. The monitoring is done by the concerned government as well as through an
independent review conducted by the OGP.

17. To date 105 APRM members are members of the OGP and have undergone
review (Tanzania, the 11th member, has withdrawn). All but 36 have also completed their
APRM reviews. The duplication between the OGP review and the APRM review is
significant, at times with some commitments overlapping (e.g. in the area of the fight
against corruption).

5
Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Tunisia
6
Cote d’Ivoire (ongoing), Malawi, Tunisia
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
Page 23

Financing the APRM

18. The Guidelines on the APRM Organisation and processes (2003) note: “It is
essential…that the APRM does not rely on external partners for funding, although such
partnerships could be welcomed if they are managed in a way that clearly respects
African ownership of the APRM and all its processes. Support from external partners
should be sought mainly for the implementation of the Country Programme of Action
and capacity building to improve performance in the weak areas.”7

19. The financing of APRM Country Reviews has been largely financed by the
member states, although it is important to note that in the first years, funding was also
provided through the UNDP-managed APRM Trust Fund which was resourced through
bilateral and other donors.8 The principle that review missions should be financed from
member states assessed contributions is currently in application, with bilateral donors
and strategic partners financing projects.9 In 2018, additional funding was provided to
the APRM through the AU budget to the tune of US$2.1Million.

20. As of 2017, member states were expected to contribute US$200K/ year for their
membership to the APRM. As of April 2018, only 5 countries had paid their full
contributions and had no arrears, leaving the remaining 31 in arrears totalling US$21
Million. Contributions are at their lowest since 2007 (see Annex 6). The budget gap
between the assessed contributions and the budget of the APRM Secretariat is as a
result significant (see Annex 7).

21. With budget constraints, the APRM has sought ways to conduct the reviews in a
more cost-effective manner. The cost of country review – for the Secretariat and
excluding costs incurred by the countries themselves – have dropped from around US$
300K to US$150-200K. Reduction in costs has been attributed to an increased capacity
within the Secretariat to conduct reviews without overly relying on consultants and
therefore promoting the institutionalization of the process. In addition, the length of the
review missions has also been reduced. However, there is no assessment available on
how this decrease has affected the quality of the reviews.

Recommendations

22. Confirm the status of the APRM as a Specialised Agency of the AU.

23. For the APRM to effectively “track implementation and oversee monitoring and
evaluation in key governance areas of the continent”, there is a need to strengthen the
monitoring capacity of the Secretariat.

7
Op cit. pg 16-17
8
APRM Strategic Plan 2016-2020, para 63
9
The AfDB is the only Strategic Partner that has finalized a financial agreement with the APRM Secretariat to the
tune of US$2.8 to promote lessons sharing and peer exchanges around corporate governance. Other partners have
also pledged support and are currently negotiating project support agreements. These are the EU Commission under
the Pan African Programme funding window (4 million euro as per 2020), Norway (US$100-150K) and GIZ for a
project on elections monitoring (150K Euro)
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
Page 24

24. Deepen the (peer) review process. This could be done at different levels. First,
the APRM could diversify the type of reviews undertaken by using its full mandate to
provide specific thematic reviews at the request of member states. Second, in addition
to the peer review at the Head of State and Government level, which remains politically
critical, peer review could be considered at subsidiary levels during the review process.
Third, strengthen the monitoring tools to mine data that could strengthen the content of
the report submitted to the APR Forum for its annual discussion so as to promote a
more focused peer review and to allow the identification of possible bottlenecks where
countries could be further supported.

25. Speed up the process of developing working modalities between the APRM and
the AU PSC. To ensure efficiency, however, it will be important to also clarify and
streamline the respective roles of the different institutional actors operating in the
area of governance; especially within the AUC. A clearer distinction between the
respective roles of the APRM, AUC DPA and AUC PSD would be important.

26. Finance the APRM adequately. In addition to calling on member states to meet
their financial obligations, the APRM could also be integrated in the budget of the AU in
order to specifically finance the operational costs to consolidate the gains made in the
last 2 years in terms of the capacity of the Secretariat.
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
Page 25

THE AU COMMISSION

1. Assembly Decision 635 contains six key decisions related to the AU

Commission:

 The Commission should initiate, without delay, a professional audit of

bureaucratic bottlenecks and inefficiencies that impede service delivery and
the recommendations thereof;

 The Commission’s structures should be re-evaluated to ensure that they

have the right size and capabilities to deliver on the agreed priorities; and

 A fundamental review of the structure and staffing needs of the

organization, as well as conditions of service, should be undertaken to
ensure alignment with agreed priority areas;

 The Commission’s senior leadership team should be lean and performance-

oriented;

 The election of the Chairperson of the AU Commission should be enhanced

by a robust, merit-based, and transparent selection process;

 The Deputy Chairperson and Commissioners should be competitively

recruited, in line with best practice and appointed by the Chairperson of the
Commission, to whom they should be directly accountable, taking into
account gender and regional diversity, amongst other relevant
considerations;

 The Deputy Chairperson role should be reframed to be responsible for the

efficient and effective functioning of the Commission’s administration.

I. Background

2. The January 2017 Building a More Relevant African Union Report identified four
major challenges facing the African Union (AU):

 The AU is highly fragmented with too many focus areas;

 The AU’s complicated structure and limited managerial capacity lead to

inefficient working methods, poor decision-making and a lack of
accountability;

 The AU is neither financially independent nor self-sustaining, relying

instead on partner funding for much of its financing;
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
Page 26

 Coordination between the African Union and the RECs is limited.

3. In order to address the above challenges, the Report made a number of key
recommendations that were adopted by the AU Assembly in Decision 635 and will guide
the AU right-sizing process:

Focus on key priorities with continental scope

 The African Union should focus on a fewer number of priority areas, which
are by nature continental in scope, such as political affairs, peace and
security, economic integration (including the Continental Free Trade Area),
and Africa’s global representation and voice;

 There should be a clear division of labour and effective collaboration

between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs),
the Regional Mechanisms (RMs), the Member States, and other continental
institutions, in line with the principle of subsidiarity.

Realigning African Union institutions in order to deliver against those priorities

 NEPAD should be fully integrated into the Commission as the African

Union’s development agency, aligned with the agreed priorities and
underpinned by an enhanced results-monitoring framework;

4. The strategic direction provided by the above decisions can be summarized as

follows:

 The Assembly’s direction on prioritization should inform the right-sizing

process;

 Decisions on the division of labour should be taken into account when

reviewing the existing mandate and functions of the AU Commission;

 The right-sizing and fundamental review of the structure and staffing needs
should be aimed at addressing the bureaucratic bottlenecks and
inefficiencies identified in the audit;

 The transformation of NEPAD into the AU’s Development Agency should be

taken into account in the right-sizing process as there will be an impact on
existing departmental mandates and functions in both the AU Commission
and the NEPAD Agency.
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
Page 27

II. Implementation Arrangements

Guiding Principles

5. The following principles will guide the right-sizing process:

 Business continuity will be ensured during the implementation of the right-

sizing process

 Transparency and Integrity

 Regular stakeholder engagement and consultation

 Regular communication and outreach

 Value for money and Results

Implementation Process

6. The process will be implemented in five phases:

7. The right-sizing process will prioritize AUC Service and core planning
departments in the first phase as follows:

 Phase 1: Preparation of roadmap with timelines and key milestones. Update

relevant Policy Organs on the process and timelines.

 Phase 2a: Completion of the restructuring of the Administration Human

Resources & Management Departments based on a Management Decision
following Executive Council Decision 899 (XXVIII). This is already
underway.

 Phase 2b: Development of Proposals and Options for right-sizing remaining

Service Departments, e.g. PBFA, Office of the Legal Counsel and Office of
the Secretary General, Strategic Planning Department, etc.

 Phase 3a: Development of Proposals and Options for right-sizing Policy

Departments in line with Assembly decisions on prioritization and NEPAD
transformation.

 Phase 3b: Development of Options for right-zing Bureaus of the

Chairperson and the Deputy Chairperson
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
Page 28

 Phase 4: Consultation on the Proposals & Options with the relevant PRC
Sub-Committees/Executive Council.

 Phase 5a: Presentation of the Proposals and Options to the Bureau of the
Assembly

 Phase 5b: Presentation of Proposals & Options to the January 2018

Summit.

Co-ordination & Implementation Approach

8. The Reform Implementation Unit will be responsible for overall co-ordination of

the process and the following delivery approach is proposed:

 A High-level Panel (HLP) made up of members representing the 5 AU

Regions (1 per region will be established to guide the process)

 Consultations with the PRC sub-committees for Administration, General

Supervision and Budget and Structures.

 An implementation roadmap with key milestones, targets and timelines will

be prepared by August 2018 to guide the process. The roadmap will be
shared with AU Policy Organs.

 Technical assistance to support the implementation process will be brought

in as required.

 A Retreat of the Executive Council to consider draft proposals,

recommendations and decisions on the reform of the Commission.

Expected Outcomes

 A high performing efficient and effective African Union Commission that is

able to deliver on agreed continental priorities

 An African Union Commission that is able to attract and retain the best
quality staff

 High performing, motivated and committed staff delivering to the highest

standards
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
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AU Commission Leadership Selection

Issues and Options

I. Background

1. The reform of the AU Commission is one of the central elements of the AU’s
institutional reform process.

2. Over the years a significant amount of diagnostic work on the functioning of the
Commission has been undertaken with a view to developing recommendations on how
to improve overall efficiency and effectiveness. Much of this has consistently identified
the following key institutional challenge: weak accountability and management,
exacerbated by the poor delineation of roles and responsibilities and the absence of
clear delegation of authorities at the political and management levels.

3. As section III below illustrates, the challenge is not related to the poor articulation
of roles and responsibilities. Real and meaningful accountability requires the means to
ensure compliance with respect to roles, responsibilities, reporting lines and authorities.

4. The African Union Commission’s current leadership selection model has not
succeeded in establishing the right accountability, performance and management
framework for the AU Commission and the Union as a whole. This has unfortunately
resulted in a number of organizational dysfunctionalities including overall policy
fragmentation and incoherence; the erosion of departmental performance and
effectiveness and a severe loss of staff morale and motivation.

1. Assembly Decision 635

5. In order to enhance overall performance, accountability and institutional

effectiveness of the AU Commission, the Assembly took the following decisions with
respect to the role, function and recruitment of the Commission’s senior leadership:

 The Commission’s senior leadership team should be lean and performance-

oriented;

 The election of the Chairperson of the AU Commission should be enhanced

by a robust, merit-based, and transparent selection process;

 The Deputy Chairperson and Commissioners should be competitively

recruited, in line with best practice and appointed by the Chairperson of the
Commission, to whom they should be directly accountable, taking into
account gender and regional diversity, amongst other relevant
considerations;
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
Page 30

 The Deputy Chairperson role should be reframed to be responsible for the

efficient and effective functioning of the Commission’s administration.

2. Roles and Mandates of the African Union Senior Leadership

6. The roles and functions of the senior leadership are clearly articulated in Article 7
of the Statutes of the Commission and state that the functions and responsibilities of the
political leadership of the Commission as follows:

7. The functions and responsibilities of the Chairperson shall be:

 Chief Executive Officer;

 Legal representative of the Union; and,
 Accounting Officer of the Commission.

8. Article 8, the functions of the Chairperson shall be to, inter alia:

 Appoint the staff of the Commission in accordance with the provisions of

Article 18 of this Statute; and
 Assume overall responsibility for the administration and finances of the
Commission.

9. In Article 9, the Deputy Chairperson shall, in the discharge of his or her

responsibilities, be accountable to the Chairperson. He/She shall have, inter alia, the
following functions:

 Assist the Chairperson in the exercise of his/her functions;

 Exercise the functions delegated to him/her by the Chairperson of the
Commission; and
 Shall be in charge of the administration and finances of the Commission.

10. Article 11 states that the Commissioners shall be responsible for the
implementation of all decisions, policies and programmes in respect of the portfolios for
which they have been elected, and be accountable to the Chairperson.

3. The current leadership selection formula and process

11. Article 9(i) of the Constitutive Act provides that the Assembly shall appoint the
Chairperson of the Commission and his or her deputy or deputies and Commissioners
of the Commission and determine their function and terms of office.

12. In practice, the Assembly only elects the Chairperson and the Deputy
Chairperson. The election of the Commissioners has been delegated to the Executive
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
Page 31

Council. Following the election of Members of the Commission by the Executive

Council, the Council forwards the names of the successful candidates to the Assembly
which appoints the Members of the Commission.

13. The process for electing the leadership of the Commission derives from the July
2002 Rules of Procedure of the Assembly. It states that the Assembly shall elect a
Chairperson and a Deputy Chairperson of commensurate leadership qualities and a
good track record in government, parliament, international organizations or other
relevant sectors of society and eight Commissioners drawn equally from the five regions
of the Union and chosen on the basis of gender parity for a four-year tenure which may
be renewable only once.

14. The current process for the selection of Members of the Commission involves a
regional pre-selection process in which each region nominates 2 candidates. Each
region determines the nomination modalities for its candidates. Candidates selected at
the regional level become part of the continental pool. Article 14 of the Statutes of the
Commission provides that a Ministerial panel consisting of two representatives from
each region, assisted by a team of independent consultants, shall be established for the
central selection exercise. The panel is responsible for submitting a shortlist of
candidates for election by the Executive Council.

4. Issues and Challenges

Summary of Progress Report on the Review of the Rules of Procedure of the Policy
Organs of the Union EX.CL/914(XXVII) Rev1

15. The January 2012, Executive Council decision EX.CL/Dec.688 (XX) on the
Report of the Ministerial Panel on the Election of Members of the Commission adopted
at its Twentieth Ordinary Session requested the Commission to ‘review the whole
process of elections of Members of the Commission with a view to addressing the
challenges, gaps and new developments in order to strengthen it, including through the
review of existing rules and procedures’. Some have criticized the process for a lack of
rigor and failing to take into account the ranking of candidates. There have also been
calls for the qualification and experience requirements for the Chairperson, Deputy
Chairperson and Members of the Commission to be strengthened.

16. Weak compliance with candidature submission deadlines (currently 3 months

before the election) the lack of continuity created by a simultaneous elections were also
identified as key challenges. The lack of a performance appraisal system for the senior
leadership has also been identified as a critical weakness. For officials seeking re-
election there is currently no institutionalized system of appraisal. A proposal was
submitted to the Assembly by the Executive Council EX.CL/713(XX), paragraph 15(iv)
but has not been endorsed.
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
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Summary of Adedeji Audit findings

17. The Chairperson, the Deputy and the eight Commissioners are simultaneously
elected to specific portfolios and assume office at the same time. The 2007 Adedeji
Audit described the relationship at senior leadership level to be at best dysfunctional
with overlapping portfolios, unclear authority and responsibility lines and expectations.

18. The Adedeji Report concluded that failure to address this problem would be
detrimental and costly to the AU. The report observed that: The Commission is the
Organ which, in the final analysis, will make the difference to the credibility,
effectiveness and efficiency of the Union in its quest for political and economic
integration; and summarized the key challenges as follows:

 The lack of operational clarity as to the lines of authority. Despite the

provisions of Article 7 of the Statutes of the Commission that make it
absolutely clear that the Chairperson is the Chief Executive Officer, the
election with designated portfolios of the Commissioners by the Assembly
has led to the belief that they have a complete mandate to manage their
portfolios and that at best, their relationship with the Chairperson is one of
primus inter pares. The simultaneous election of the Chairperson, Deputy
Chairperson and the eight Commissioners further compounded the
situation;

 The fundamental lack of a full comprehension of the power, the function, the
authority and the responsibilities of the principal actors. The determination
of portfolios a priori by the Assembly has not helped the situation;

 As the Chief Executive Officer, the Chairperson is best placed to rationalize

the portfolios in consultation with the Chairperson of the Assembly and
thereafter assign them among the Commissioners. Whenever necessary,
the Chairperson can redeploy the Commissioners; and

19. While these observations were made as far back as 2007, no specific actions
were taken to address the matter. As a result, the deep-rooted accountability and
management challenges have persisted and adversely affected the smooth functioning
of the subsequent Commissions and the AU in general.
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
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5. Legal Provisions

20. There have been questions as to whether the Reform Decisions on the
recruitment of the Deputy Chairperson and Commissioners are in compliance with the
Constitutive Act. The relevant provisions of the Constitutive Act are as follows:

 Under Article 9 (1) (i) of the powers and functions of the Assembly, the
Chairperson of the Commission and his or her deputy or deputies and
Commissioners of the Commission are appointed by the Assembly who also
determine their functions and terms of office;

 Article 9(2) also provides that the Assembly made delegate any of its
powers and functions to any organ of the Union;

21. In summary, as per the Assembly’s recent decision to delegate its budget
adoption powers to the Executive Council. A similar delegation of powers, in this case to
the African Union Commission, with powers to be exercised by the Chairperson of the
Commission as Head of this Organ, could also be envisaged. No changes to the
Constitutive Act would be required. An amendment of Rules and Procedures and
Statutes of the Commission would be required.

6. Benchmarking against other international organizations

22. For quick comparison, Annex 2, provides a summary review of the recruitment
and selection processes for senior leadership in the following organisations:

 United Nations
 European Union
 African Development Bank
 Association of South East Asian Nations

7. What principles will guide the recruitment and selection process?

23. The following key principles will guide the recruitment and selection process:

 Regional and gender diversity

 Attracting and retaining Africa’s top talent
 Accountable and effective leadership and management
 Transparent and merit-based recruitment
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
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8. Enhancing the pre-selection process

24. This is a top priority and will be done by establishing a formal competency based
assessment process managed by an independent recruitment firm to replace the
existing regional pre-selection process provided for in Article 13 of the Statutes of the
Commission. The objective will be to generate a ranked pool of pre-qualified candidates
from which a final selection can be made under either of the options presented in
section 10.

What will be the basis for assessing applicants?

25. Recruitment will be based on an assessment of applicants’ suitability against job

profiles for the Deputy Chairperson and Commissioners that will be developed with
clearly defined skills and competencies. Central to this will be ensuring that the
leadership selection and appointments are premised on the need to develop and
strengthen well integrated leadership teams. This will involve reviewing current job
descriptions and preparing new job profiles and competency requirements. This should
include both generic leadership skills and competencies and expert, thematic skills in
relation to the specific job profile.

How will we ensure that AU Commission attracts Africa’s top talent for its leadership
positions?

26. A This will be informed by a benchmarking of other comparable institutions will

be undertaken to ensure that the AU Commission’s remuneration and benefits package
is competitive and can attract and retain a high-performing leadership team.

Who will manage the recruitment and selection process?

27. An independent global recruitment firm appointed to develop a candidate short

list drawn from each of the 5 regions that meet the skills and competency requirements
for the leadership positions.

28. Consideration should be given to establishing a database to facilitate early

identification and selection of potential senior leaders. This system is used to recruit
senior leadership positions within the United Nations.

How will candidates be assessed for suitability?

29. Candidates will be assessed through an initial review of job applications and cvs.
Shortlisted candidates will be invited to a Leadership Assessment Centre which will
assess candidates against the skills and competency criteria established for the
leadership posts. Successful candidates will be shortlisted for the final interview stage.
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
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9. Options for the selection of the senior leadership

30. Following Decision 635 on the need for a competitive recruitment process to be
instituted for the Deputy Chairperson and Commissioners positions, two options are
proposed:

Option 1 (Decision 635): Similar to the approach adopted for the United Nations
Secretariat, a competency based assessment and shortlisting of candidates to
generate a ranked selection pool from which Deputy Chairperson,
Commissioners are selected and nominated by the Chairperson of the
Commission and appointed by the Assembly. The Chairperson will also assign
portfolios to the Commissioners, have the powers to redeploy and terminate
employment.

Implications for the selection timelines:

 The advertisement of the Deputy Chairperson and Commissioners posts

would start in July of the year preceding the election of the Chairperson of
the Commission;

 The election of the Chairperson would take place in January;

 The shortlist of candidates would be presented to the Chairperson of the

Commission in February and he would proceed to appoint Commissioners
and assign their portfolios in March;

 The whole Commission would assume office in March.

Option 2 (Enhancing the current selection process): Similar to the approach

adopted by the European Union, a competency based assessment and
shortlisting of candidates to generate a ranked selection pool from which
Commissioners are elected by the Executive Council and appointed by the
Assembly. The assignment of portfolios to be left to the Chairperson of the
Commission who will also have powers to redeploy and terminate.

Implications for the selection timelines:

 The advertisement of the Deputy Chairperson and Commissioners posts

would start in July of the year preceding the election of the Chairperson of
the Commission;
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
Page 36

 The shortlist of candidates would be presented to the Executive Council in

January;

 The election of the Chairperson and Commissioners would take place in

January;

 The Chairperson of the Commission would proceed to appoint the Deputy

Chairperson and Commissioners and assign their portfolios in March. The
Chairperson of the Commission would retain the right to terminate contracts
in consultation with the Executive Council.
FINANCING THE UNION
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
Page 35

I. Summary

1. Good progress is being made four out of six of the reform-related financing
decisions have been implemented ahead of the scheduled timeline. Since January
2018, the main effort has been on operationalizing the new budget process and the
golden rules that were adopted in the January 2018 Summit. As a result of the
application of the golden rules, the 2019 AU budget process has, for the first time,
generated a credible budget. The first joint sitting of F15 Experts and the PRC Sub-
committee to review the AU budget is currently underway. As a result of this process,
the 2019 Union budget has been reduced by 10% compared to the 2018 budget.

2. Options for a new scale of assessment for 2019-2021 have been prepared in line
with AU Ministers of Finance recommendation that ‘caps’ and ‘minima’ be introduced to
improve overall burden-sharing, and to avoid risk concentration, among Member States
with respect to their annual contributions. On sanctions, the initial proposals for
reinforcing the existing sanctions regime for non-payment of contributions have been
reviewed. The Ministerial Committee on the Scale of Assessment and Contributions
requested the Commission to further strengthen the proposals and re-submit. On the
revenue side, 23 countries are now at various stages of implementation of the 0.2%
levy. Since 2017, AU Member States have contributed a total of $45.5m to the Peace
Fund.

II. Key AU Assembly Financing Decisions

3. Between 2015 and 2017, the African Union Assembly of Heads of State and
Government took a number of key decisions on Financing the Union. These are
summarised below:

 The Addis Ababa January 2015 Assembly/AU/Dec.561(XXIV) and

Johannesburg June 2015 Assembly decisions on
Financing Assembly/AU/Dec.578(XXV) directed that Member States would
fund 100% of the operational budget, 75% of the program budget and 25%
of the peace support operations budget.

 The July 2016 Kigali Assembly decision Assembly/AU/Dec.605 (XXVII) to

(a) implement a 0.2% levy on all eligible goods imported into the Continent
to finance the African Union’s operational, program and peace support
operations budgets starting from the year 2017 (b) to establish a Committee
of Ministers of Finance comprising ten Member States, representing the five
(5) regions to participate in the preparation of the annual budget, and (c) to
implement all aspects related to the operationalization of the AU Peace
Fund, in particular the legal, operational and financial rules and regulations.
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
Page 36

 The January 2017 Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.635(XXVIII) called for the full

implementation of the Kigali Decision without undue delay and also decided
as follows: (a) The Committee of Ten Finance Ministers should assume
responsibility for oversight of the African Union budget and Reserve Fund
(b) develop a set of ‘golden rules’, establishing clear financial management
and accountability principles, (c) The current scale of contributions should
be revised based on the principles of ability to pay, solidarity, and equitable
burden-sharing, to avoid risk concentration, and (d) the sanctions regime
should be strengthened.

 The January 2017 Decision Assembly/AU/Dec. 635(XXVIII) also directed

that after funding the budget of the African Union and the Peace Fund, the
balance of the proceeds of the 0.2% AU levy on eligible imports, the
Committee of Ten Finance Ministers should look into placing surplus in a
Reserve Fund for continental priorities as decided by the Assembly.

III. Rationale

4. The need for financial reforms that ensure accountability and results is just as
critical for the AU as the need for adequate resourcing of the Union, and must be
tackled with the same urgency. The financing and budget reform decisions taken by the
African Union (AU) Assembly between 2015 and 2017 are therefore intended to deliver
the following key objectives:

 Financial autonomy and reduced dependency;

 Prudent management of resources and improved accountability;

 Timely and predictable payment of all Member State assessed contributions

to the African Union based on the principles of ability to pay, solidarity, and
equitable burden-sharing, to avoid risk concentration;

 Predictable and sustainable financing of the AU’s operational peace and

security activities through the revitalization of the AU Peace Fund and the
pursuit of strategic partnerships.

IV. Progress to date

(a) Golden rules for financial and budget management

5. The ‘golden rules’ for the proper management of the AU’s finances were
considered by the Committee of Finance Ministers in January 2018 and adopted by the
AU Assembly in the same month. These are currently being translated into AU policy
and procedures and will also be reflected in the AU’s updated Financial Rules and
Procedures.
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
Page 37

(b) Enhanced budget oversight by Ministers of Finance

6. Two key decisions at the January 2018 Summit: First, the adoption of the AU
budget has been delegated to the Executive Council which will review the AU budget in
a joint sitting of Foreign Ministers and Ministers of Finance every June/July. Second, the
Committee of Finance Ministers (F15) budget oversight role has been defined and
enables the F15 to provide stronger technical oversight of the AU budget in
collaboration with relevant Organs. The Assembly recognized that there was an urgent
need for the AU to improve the credibility of its budget, strengthen financial
management capacity and accountability and demonstrate value for money and results
to its Member States. A key focus for the F15 has been ensuring the preparation of a
credible budget based on revenue forecasts and capacity to spend (based on the
application of the golden rules). As a result of this process, the 2019 Union budget has
been reduced by 10% compared to the 2018 budget.

(c) Implementation of the 0.2% levy on eligible imports

7. 23 AU Member States have reported that they are at various stages of

implementation of the 02% levy decision. Of these, 13 Member States have actually
started collecting the funds.

8. There is flexibility built into the implementation of the 0.2%. This is in line with
Rule 33 of the Assembly Rules of Procedure, based on which the Kigali Financing
Decision is categorized as a Directive.

An AU Directive binds Member States to the objectives to be achieved while leaving

national authorities with the power to determine the form and the means to be used for
their implementation.

9. Member States, therefore, have the ability to determine the appropriate form and
the means they will use to implement the 0.2% decision in line with their national and
international obligations. It is for this reason that Member States that are, for example,
members of the World Trade Organization have implemented the 0.2% levy without
contravening their international trade obligations.

(d) Operationalizing the Peace Fund

10. The January 2018 Summit the AU Assembly adopted the Peace Fund instrument
based on the governance and management structure endorsed by the Peace and
Security Council, Executive Council and AU Assembly in 2017.
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
Page 38

11. As at May 2018, AU Member States have contributed just over $45.5m to the
Peace Fund. This represents the largest amount of money Member States have ever
contributed to the Peace Fund since it was established in 1993. The AU Member State
collection target for 2018 is $65m.

12. The target is to have the full $400m Peace Fund endowment in place by 2021.
The Peace Fund will enable the AU to drive its own peace and security agenda on the
basis of its own assessment of the problems and its own determination of the
appropriate solutions.

Deliverables for the July 2018 Summit

(a) Revising the Scale of Assessment

13. 48% of the AU’s budget is dependent on the contributions of only 5 Member
States. This also presents clear risks to the stability of the budget. It is for this reason
that the August 2017 meeting of the Ministers of Finance recommended the introduction
of ‘caps’ and ‘minima’ to our existing scale of assessment in order to improve overall
burden-sharing and reduce risk.

14. The proposals for a revised scale of assessment have been presented to the
Scale of Assessment and Contributions Committee.The current scale of assessment
expires in 2018, and a new one has been proposed:

1) The new Scale of Assessment takes into account the following principles:

a) Ability to pay;
b) Equitable burden sharing (avoiding over-reliance on a few countries);
c) Solidarity;
d) Ownership and sustainability;
e) Seamless implementation by all.

2) Four Options have been proposed for the new Scale:

Option 1 – Based on the principle of pure Capacity to Pay. (Measured on the basis of
Member States’ national income or product, adjusted for external debt burden and an
allowance for low per capita income due to large population. No ceiling or floor rates
are applied).

Option 2 – By Tiers where Tier 1 collectively share 40 per cent of the AU budget while
the remaining 60 per cent are proportionally distributed among the rest of the
membership in Tiers 2 and 3 on the basis of capacity to pay.
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
Page 39

Option 3 – By Tiers where Tier 1 collectively share 40 per cent of the AU budget while
the remaining 60 per cent are proportionately distributed among the rest of the
membership in Tiers 2 and 3 on the basis of capacity to pay. A minimum rate (or floor)
is applied so that no Member State would contribute less than $200,000 to the AU
budget.

Option 4 – By Tiers where Tier 1 collectively share 40 per cent of the AU budget while
those in Tier 2 proportionately share 35 per cent and the Tier 3 countries proportionately
allocate 25 per cent to the AU budget.

(b) Strengthening the sanctions regime for non-payment of contributions.

15. AU Member States contributions are frequently not made on time. Proposals for
how to strengthen the existing regime have been presented to the Scale of Assessment
and Contributions Committee. The weaknesses identified in the current sanctions
regime include:

a) Member States can avoid sanctions by paying a portion of their assessed

contributions as long as it does not amount to a cumulative arrears of two
(2) years;

b) There is no agreed outline prescribing a schedule and timetable for

payment of assessed contribution;

c) Although contributions are due as from 1st January of the financial year,
most Member States do not pay on time;

d) Unpredictability of revenue since Member States have up to two years to

default before the first set of sanctions kick in. This has an adverse impact
on program implementation and budget execution.

16. In order to address the weaknesses above, the following are proposed:

Matrix Proposal on Arrears

Period of Arrears Current Proposal

Short Term 2 Years 1 Years
Intermediate Term None 6 Months
Long Term 5 Years 2 Years

i) All countries are expected to pay their annual contributions in full;

 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
Page 40

ii) Countries in arrears for more than a year should not expect to be
considered for future assistance from any of the Union’s budgets. It would
preclude attendance at the Assembly of Heads of State and Government
Sessions;

iii) In addition countries in arrears shall also be deprived of the right to be a

member of a Bureau of any Organ of the Union, have its candidatures in
international system endorsed by the Executive Council, offer to host any
Organ, Institution or Office of the Union, Right to be a member of a Bureau
of any Organ of the Union; have its nationals participate in electoral
observation missions, human rights observation missions, etc.;

iv) Any country that is in arrears should immediately enter into negotiations
with the African Union Commission to agree specific arrangements on
settlements;

v) The money received will be applied first to a country’s current assessed

contribution and then to the most recent arrears;

vi) Eligibility to attend Heads of Government meetings would be preserved so

long as the country met its current contributions and adheres to the plan for
payment of arrears. Default on either count would result in immediate
reinstatement of member in arrears status and this would not be lifted until
all arrears were cleared and current contributions paid;

vii) The Chairperson of the African Union Commission would in each case
undertake prior consultations with the governments concerned in order to
confirm that the measures outlined above would be applied;

viii) Since the contributions are due from 1st January of the financial year,
Member States should be required to remit a minimum of 15% of their
assessed contribution every quarter; and

ix) Any member state that has not paid 75% of its arrears shall be placed
under sanctions.
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
Page 1

ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTIVE DIVISION OF LABOUR

BETWEEN THE AFRICAN UNION, REGIONAL ECONOMIC
COMMUNITIES AND CONTINENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

ISSUES PAPER

I. Context

1. In January 2017, the African Union Assembly of Heads of State and

Government took a decision on the Institutional Reform of the African Union. One of
the key priorities identified by the AU Assembly is the need for a clear division of
labor and effective collaboration between the African Union, the Regional Economic
Communities (RECs), the Regional Mechanisms (RMs), the Member States, and
other continental institutions (COs), in line with the principle of subsidiarity and
complementarity.

2. During the January 2018 AU Summit, initial findings were presented in the
Progress Report on the Implementation of the AU Institutional Reform process. More
detailed proposals and recommendations on the division of labor are expected at the
July 2018 Summit.

3. This paper provides an overview of the division of labor within the context of
Africa’s integration agenda; summarises the key issues and challenges associated
with establishing an effective division of labour in order to drive Africa’s integration
agenda forward, and presents a roadmap to establishing an effective division of
labour by July 2019.

What do we mean by division of labour?

4. It is important to clarify, at the outset, what is meant by establishing a clear

division of labour between RECs, RMs, COs and Member States. Establishing an
effective division of labour is not about dividing up sectors or areas of responsibility.
It is rather about delineating responsibilities within each area or sector of integration
based on subsidiarity, comparative advantage, cost/burden sharing and proximity to
the people. In other words, the AU, RECs, COs and Member States will work
together in every area of integration but within a framework of clearly delineated
responsibilities based on respective competencies.

5. For example, the AU should set the strategic direction, develop harmonized
continental agendas, policies, texts, standards, coordination, lead resource
mobilization for continental actions and be responsible for monitoring, evaluation and
accountability) while the RECs undertake to do the actual implementation, regional
coordination, enforcement of member States compliance and feedback/reporting of
progress. The approach may differ slightly depending on the areas of integration.
COs would assist in capacity building at the REC, Member State levels, provide
specialized technical assistance, financing, and project design and implementation
support services. Member States would mainstream integration programmes in their
national development plans and strategies and ensure their implementation. Member
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
Page 2

States will also embark on the popularization of the African Union to all of their
citizens.

6. Ten preliminary remarks on the issue of the division of labour between the
AU, RECs, Member States and continental organizations such as AfDB and ECA on
the basis of the principle of subsidiarity:

i) The AU is an Inter-governmental Organization (IGO), established and

governed by a treaty (the Constitutive Act) that binds Member States to
the Union;

ii) Each of the eight RECs recognized by AU is also an IGO, established

and governed by a treaty that binds its Member States to the Union;

iii) Each of these treaties defines the areas of competence of the organs of
each IGO (AU and RECs);

iv) The RECs are not members of the AU;

v) Under these circumstances, it is worth considering the legal basis of a

division of labour between the AU and the RECs according to the
principle of subsidiarity and complementarity;

vi) As much as it is necessary to define a division of labour between the AU

and Member States on the one hand, and the RECs and their Member
States on the other, it is equally necessary to clarify the legal basis of a
division of labour between the AU and the RECs, according to the
principle of subsidiarity;

vii) In the case of the European Union, the principle of subsidiarity easily
applies because there are no sub-regional organizations in between the
European Union and the Member States, as is the case with regard to
the RECs in Africa. The EU is a couple whereas AU has three levels of
decision making (Union, REC, Member States) two of which (Union
and RECs) are governed by different treaties;

viii) The two legal instruments underpinning the relationship between the AU
and the RECs in terms of a division of labour are the 2002 Protocol and
the 2009 Memorandum of Understanding;

ix) At the end of the ongoing consultations between the AU and the RECs,
and in order to make decisions that are mutually binding, it will be
necessary to revisit the two legal instruments mentioned above with a
view to strengthening them. To this end, there is the need to clearly spell
out the exclusive areas of competence of the Union, as well as those of
the RECs, the Regional Mechanisms (RMs),the Member States and the
other continental institutions such as AfDB and ECA. Similarly, it will be
necessary to specify the competitive competences or shared
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
Page 3

competences between the AU, the RECs, Member States and the other
continental institutions; and,

x) In so doing, the contours of a division of labour between the African

Union, the RECs, Member States and continental organizations, such as
the AfDB and ECA can be clearly drawn.

Why is establishing a clear division of labour so important?

7. The need for a clear division of labour is important because it leads to optimal
allocation of scarce resources in implementing integration programmes. Any
sustainable economic cooperation is founded, among other things, on the principle of
allocation of resources in a fair and equitable manner so as to ensure that benefits
are equitably shared, On the basis of this principle, it can be affirmed that an
integration or cooperation institution can be fully operational on any project or
programme only if all its Member States are, at almost equivalent levels, directly
concerned by the project or programme. In other words, since all programmes and
projects may not involve - and therefore interest – all the member states, there is the
possibility and even the need to categorize these programmes and activities
according to their optimal geographical dimension or the RECs of each region.
Rationalization of integration programmes should therefore be carried out on a basis
of shared competence between the regional communities and the other continental
integration institutions.

II. Background

8. Regional integration leading to the creation of an African Economic

Community has been a vision of African leaders since the early years of
independence. The leadership of the new independent Africa realized earlier on that
political freedom goes in tandem with full economic powers. It was therefore
important to the leadership that continental economic integration is achieved. The
leadership also believed that economic synergy could be gained from economic
integration as the economic advantage of a whole regional community is greater
than the sum of the economic advantage of its separate member states. The need
for economic integration is also propelled by the global economic architecture, with
the formation of regional blocks across all the continents, borderless globalisation,
advances in information and communication technology and multilateral trade
negotiations under the WTO among others.

9. The main drivers for African economic integration are linked to several factors.
First, creating a common market for the 55 individual African countries should lead to
economies of scale to make countries competitive. Second, wider trading and
investment environment could enhance trade in the regional markets. Third,
integration provides a framework for African countries to cooperate in developing
regional public goods and common services.

10. In the last two decades, African leaders have rekindled their goal of
establishing a continental African Economic Union. The 1980 Lagos Plan of Action
(LPA) of the then Organization of African Unity (OAU) emphasizes a greater need for
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
Page 4

a pan-African programme of economic cooperation and integration. The leadership

of the continent again re-echoed their commitment of an integrated Africa and
followed up the LPA with the proclamation of the 1991 Abuja Treaty, which calls for
the establishment of the African Economic Community.

11. Under the framework of the Abuja Treaty, Africa would become an economic
union by 2027, with a common currency, full mobility of the factors of production and
free trade among African countries. To achieve this vision, Article Six of the Treaty
lays down a timetable for the process of integration, or the creation of an African
Economic Community (AEC) be carried out over a period of 34 years (1994-2027), in
six different stages of different duration. However, the Sirte Declaration of 9.9.99 and
the Constitutive Act, which transformed the OAU into the African Union, find the
timeframe for the Abuja Treaty too long and calls for the speeding up of the
integration agenda

III. Achievements of the AU/RECs in the context of the Abuja Treaty

12. Africa is making some progress in its attempts to integrate. However, the
results are mixed. Based on the timetable of the Abuja Treaty, the continent is
currently in the beginning of the fourth stage with the launch of the AfCFTA and
where most of the RECs (free trade areas and custom unions) are is consistent with
the tenets of the Abuja Treaty. However, a number of challenges have constrained
acceleration towards the creation of the AEC. These challenges include the financing
gap for the development agenda of the continent; huge debt over-hangs of African
countries; and economic and political governance.

13. The level of integration in Africa today varies highly within and across RECs
and throughout the various dimensions of integration as depicted in Table1-9.10 The
Table EAC is the only REC that has achieved a Single Market and very close
creating a zone of free movement. COMESA and ECOWAS are at the Customs
Union stage and working towards a single market. ECOWAS is the only REC that
has achieved full movement of persons. SADC and ECCAS are only at the FTA level
and are yet to launch the Custom Union. IGAD, CENSAD and AMU are lagging far
behind. It has to be noted that COMESA, EAC and SADC have agreed to create a
free trade zone spanning the three RECs.

Table 1 : Status of regional economic integration by REC

Freedom of Economic and
Customs Free Trade Single
REC movement protocol Monetary
Union Area Market
implemented Union
EAC ✔ ✔ ✔ 3 out of 5 ✖
Burundi and Rwanda
COMESA ✔ ✔ ✖ have committed to ✖
the Protocol
WAEMU
ECOWAS ✔ ✔ ✖ All 15
(8 countries)

10
The tables 1 is from Assessing Regional Integration in Africa VIII: Bringing The Continental Free
Trade Area About, 2017.
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
Page 5

SADC ✖ ✔ ✖ 7 out of 15 ✖
CEMAC
ECCAS ✖ ✔ ✖ 4 out of 11
(6 countries)
CEN-
✖ ✖ ✖ Unclear ✖
SAD

IGAD ✖ ✖ ✖ No protocol ✖

AMU ✖ ✖ ✖ 3 out of 5 ✖

14. In addition to the above, the role of Infrastructure is also extremely important
for the deepening of integration on the continent. It is equally important for achieving
inclusive and sustainable development goals enshrined in Agenda 2063 and the
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Despite the efforts of the RECs, NPCA
and the AUC, the continent faces acute deficits of road infrastructure, ICT, and
energy deficits both in terms of access and quality.

15. Despite the progress made by the RECs, Africa faces a number of challenges
including the following in advancing its integration agenda. This include variable
levels of political will, lack of predictable and sustainable financing, overlap and
duplication of integration groupings and multiplicity of Membership. The fear of loss
of sovereignty. Uneven implementation of compensation mechanisms; inadequate
Infrastructure, and a poor macroeconomic and financial environment.

IV. The division of labour between the AU, RECS and COs

16. The issue of division of labour between the AU, RECs and RMs has been the
subject of numerous studies and debates over several decades. There is broad
agreement that the number of RECs and RMs should be rationalized and
harmonized. There is consensus that the current situation of overlapping mandates,
duplication and wasted resources and dispersed impact at the level of the AU, RECs
and RMs is a matter of deep concern and needs to be resolved. There is also
consensus that the principle of subsidiarity and the Abuja Treaty should provide the
basis for developing any framework for an effective division of labour.

17. Most stakeholders agree that the AU should provide overall strategic
leadership to the RECs and other continental institutions. This would include:

 Taking the lead in co-ordinating the development of overall continental

policies and priorities;

 Developing continental norms and standards;

 Leading on the follow up, monitoring and overall reporting of the

implementation of agreed continental priorities; and

 Co-ordinating the development of Common African Positions and their

articulation.
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18. Despite the high levels of consensus on the above issues, forging an effective
division of labour has proven extremely difficult.

19. However, this allocation of roles would not be cast in stone; in particular,
transport, communications and energy policies could be implemented within the
framework of common or linked programmes of the AU/RECs/RM, either directly or
through specialized institutions, taking into account the level of funding required.
Furthermore, the continental and regional institutions would retain the right of
initiative in all cases and in all areas of cooperation where they are in a position to
move faster or further than the continental community, without prejudice to any
strengthened cooperation activities undertaken between two or more States.

What are the barriers to establishing and maintaining an effective division of labour?

20. The absence of a system of joint planning, joint financing and joint
engagement with Member States and partners at the level of the AU, RECs and RMs
means that there is no practical means of enforcing any agreement on division of
labour. The fact that the AU, RECs and RMs plan separately, budget separately and
mobilize resources separately accounts for the high levels of overlap, duplication and
wastage.

21. Given the above, some have argued that the only effective way to enforce
compliance with any agreed division of labour is to agree on the following:

 The development of a Continental Medium Term Plan, aligning AU-REC

priorities;

 The development of a Continental Financing Plan for the Medium Term

Plan (including budget lines for the AU, RECs, RMs and other
continental institutions);

 Joint Engagement with Member States and Partners;

 Monitoring and reporting to be provided by the AUC at the Annual

AU/REC/RM Co-ordination Meeting. Each REC/RM will also provide
regular progress reports to inform the preparation of the consolidated
AU-REC-RM Report;

 A robust co-ordination mechanism to support the delivery of the above.

In this regard, the decision to have a June/July Co-ordination Meeting
dedicated to AU-REC Co-ordination issues will go a long way in
improving overall co-ordination.

V. Establishing an Effective Coordination Structure for an effective

Division of Labour

22. The current ways of working among the AU, RECs and COs do not enable
meaningful collaboration and partnership. RECs are not well integrated into the
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policy and decision-making processes of the Union. Their role remains marginal at
best. There is a need to reset the established ways of working based on new
principles and rules of engagement. The establishment of the new June/July Co-
ordination Meeting bringing together the Bureau of the AU Assembly, REC Chairs,
AU Commission and Chief Executives and continental organizations presents an
opportunity to reset this relationship.

23. Division of labour will be effective if there are clear established guidelines for
the efficient implementation of agreed arrangements through coordination and
harmonization of policies and activities. Coordination requires an agreement
between AU and RECs and COs to adjust their policies according to broad
objectives of the AU. Harmonization of activities would also require that Member
States, through AU/RECs, adopt regional legislation, codification, unification and
standards, which are applied and enforced by member States. Hence a DoL will
have to be negotiated among parties (AUC/RECs/Cos) and formalized through
protocols ratified by the AU Summit.

24. Coordination and harmonization are central to deepening the continent’s

integration agenda given that there are RECs memberships that overlap, while their
actions are interdependent. Efficient coordination and harmonization through DoL
will eliminate duplication, conflicting effects, reduce identical administrative burdens
and costs.

25. The current coordination mechanism governing the coordination between AU

and RECs/RM is established through Protocols. The 1998 Protocol on Relations
between the AEC and the RECs clearly identified the lead roles to be played by
Member States in the RECs configurations, and the AEC. The OAU Secretariat was
to be the Secretariat of the Community, and following the transition to the African
Union, the African Union Commission (AUC) is now responsible for the execution of
the duties and mandates for the OAU/AEC Secretariat. 1998 Protocol has since
been replaced by a protocol signed in 2008. The new protocol makes provision for
important organs of the AU that are linked to RECs such as the STCs and
ECOSOCC. Based on the 2008 Protocol, liaison offices were established at the AUC
for each REC. Furthermore, each REC is expected to establish a national
integration structure in each of its Member States. In the Protocol, the RECs are also
urged to invite their Member States to designate the same coordinating Ministries for
the implementation of the Abuja Treaty.

26. Despite the good intentions of the 2008 protocol there is no coherence in the
decisions and activities of the AU as they relate to the RECs. There are no follow-
ups and implementation mechanisms for the effective harmonisation of the
integration process throughout the continent at the REC levels in spite of several
attempts to that effect. Member States have generally also not incorporated
integration strategies into their programmes, policies and institutions. The
involvement of key non-state actors such as the private sector, civil society,
academia and the public at large is limited.

27. The January 2017 Reform Decision and the establishment of a June/July Co-
ordination Meeting focused on the economic integration agenda and bringing
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
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together the Bureau of the AU Assembly, REC Chairs and Chief Executives of the
RECs, AfDB and UNECA, provides an opportunity to revisit and strengthen the
existing co-ordination arrangements. This will ensure the annual meeting becomes
an effective forum for driving the integration agenda forward and maintaining an
effective division of labour.

VI. Way Forward

Objectives

28. During this phase we will engage with the RECs, continental organizations,
and other stakeholders to explore the feasibility of these and other ideas with a view
to developing (a) proposals and recommendations that address the practical barriers
to establishing an effective division of labour, and (b) a roadmap for the
establishment of a clear division of labour between the AU, RECs and continental
organizations based on the identification of the following:

 The principles that should govern any established division of labour;

 The decisions and instruments required to establish an effective division

of labour;

 The institutional requirements (financing, capacities) required to

establish an effective division of labour;

 The modalities for ensuring compliance with the agreed division of

labour;

 The co-ordination arrangements required to ensure the division of labour

is effective;

 The monitoring and evaluation arrangements required to ensure the

division of labour remains effective.

Ways of Working

29. A Senior Officials Expert Group AUC/RECs/AfDB and ECA will be tasked with
driving forward this roadmap. A Panel of Senior Resource Persons drawn from the
five AU regions will also be constituted to provide experts inputs and review
emerging proposals and recommendations.

VII. Roadmap

Phase 1: May – July 2018

 Meeting with the AUC, NEPAD, REC, AfdB and UNECA Chief
Executives: A meeting with Chief Executives will be convened in May
2018. The meeting will capture the views and recommendations of the
Chief Executives and serve to enrich the Draft Issues Paper and
 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
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Roadmap;

 Finalization of Report for Submission to the July Summit: An interim

report will be submitted (including the roadmap for the delivery of the
final proposal in January 2019) for the Assembly’s consideration at the
July 2018 Summit as part of the overall Progress Report on the AU
Institutional Reform Implementation process.

Phase 2: July – September 2018

 Review of the level of alignment and coherence of continental and

regional medium term plans and development of proposals and
recommendations on how to establish joint planning arrangements;

 Review of overall financing arrangements for continental and regional

medium term plans and development of a joint financing plan;

 Development of proposals and recommendations on how to establish a

coherent partnership approach;

 Review and Assessment of existing Co-ordination Arrangements and

development of proposals and recommendations on establishing co-
ordination arrangements that ensure an effective division of labour;

 Development of proposals to enhance overall monitoring and review

arrangements;

 Review of existing legal instruments and decisions on division of labour

and preparation of Draft decisions and legal instruments.

Phase 3: October - December 2018

 Presentation of proposals and recommendations to Chairperson of the

Commission, REC, AfDB and UNECA Chief Executives;

 Feedback and revision of proposals;

 Preparation of decisions and legal texts (where applicable) for January

2019 AU Summit.

Phase 4: January – July 2019

 Establishment of new AU-REC-COs co-ordination arrangements;

 Preparation of harmonised continental and regional medium term plans;

 Preparation of joint financing strategy;

 Assembly/AU/2(XXXI)
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 Establishment of monitoring and evaluation system;

 Preparation of first June/July Co-ordination Summit level Meeting of the

Bureau of AU Assembly, REC Chairs, AU Chairperson, REC Chief
Executives, AfDB and UNECA.