FLOW ASSURANCE AND FLOWLINES

FLOW ASSURANCE INPUT TO

COMPUTATIONAL PIPELINE MONITORING STRATEGIES

DOCUMENT NUMBER

EMDC-EDE-S-FR-0061-0001

Rev. Rev. Revision

Prepared Reviewed Approved
No. Date Description
A 03/31/05 Issued for review. SAW GMR
B 08/01/05 Added acoustic sensor experience. SAW GMR
0 08/23/06 Issued for use. SAW GMR MFC
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

1. INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1
1.1 Project Overview ..................................................................................................................1
1.2 Study Objectives ..................................................................................................................1

2. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................................1
2.1 Conclusions .........................................................................................................................1
2.2 Recommendations ...............................................................................................................2

3. RELEASE DETECTION OVERVIEW ...........................................................................................2

3.1 Cist and Schutz Overview ....................................................................................................2
3.2 Stuart and Barrufet Overview...............................................................................................4
3.3 Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) Overview ...............................6
3.4 Leak Detection Summary.....................................................................................................7

4. BRIEF REVIEW OF STANDARDS ...............................................................................................7

4.1 API RP 1130 ........................................................................................................................7
4.2 API RP 1149 ........................................................................................................................7
4.3 API RP 1155 ........................................................................................................................8
4.4 CSA-Z662-03 .......................................................................................................................8
4.5 Standards Summary ............................................................................................................8

5. PIPELINE INTEGRITY PHILOSOPHY .........................................................................................8

6. ESSO FIELD TRIALS ...................................................................................................................8

6.1 Jet Oil Pipeline .....................................................................................................................9
6.2 Fawley White Oil Network ..................................................................................................10

7. STATISTICAL PROCESS CONTROL........................................................................................10

8. HARDWARE SENSORS.............................................................................................................11

9. SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................................12

10. REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................13

11. ACRONYMS ...............................................................................................................................13

12. GLOSSARY ................................................................................................................................13

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TABLE OF FIGURES
Page
Figure 3.2-1 – Classification of Release Detection Methods ....................................................................5

LIST OF TABLES
Page
Table 3-1.1 - Comparison of Key Attributes of Different Leak Detection Methods ...................................4
Table 6-1: Test Results for Data Collected between 12th and 16th Oct 1998........................................10

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Project Overview

ExxonMobil projects are implementing software leak detection systems known as computational
pipeline monitoring (CPM) systems. The CPM system with the best performance during the release
testing done by Esso UK is being specified on various projects. However, an independent review is
desired to determine if a general strategy for all projects within ExxonMobil is warranted.

1.2 Study Objectives

This position paper will summarize CPM technologies primarily from a hydraulics viewpoint and review
the following topics:

• What is the driver for CPM technology?

• What are the functional requirements of a CPM?
• What technology should be used in single phase liquid pipelines?
• What technology should be used in single phase gas pipelines?
• What technology should be used in multiphase pipelines?
• What areas need further study?

This position paper is not a comprehensive review of local regulations or standards that may be
applicable to pipeline integrity systems. Additionally, standards and regulations regarding
instrumentation, sensors, and related infrastructure that support a CPM are not explicitly covered by
this paper.

2. SUMMARY

2.1 Conclusions

• There are US regulatory requirements for a pipeline integrity strategy in high consequence areas
(HCA) due to National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigations. The amendments to the
US Code of Federal Regulations (49 CFR Part 195) became effective as early as 2001. The
regulation covers all onshore pipelines and offshore pipelines in high consequence areas. Both
single phase liquid and multiphase pipelines are covered. Similar requirements can be found in
other regulations such as the Technical Rules for Pipelines (Germany).
• A pipeline integrity strategy in high consequence areas is required for single phase gas pipelines
under 49 CFR Part 192, Subpart O as of February 15, 2004.
• Computational pipeline monitoring (CPM) systems are not explicitly required in the latest
amendments to 49 CFR Part 195 or 49 CFR Part 192. The US Department of Transportation’s
(DOT) interpretation is that there are many ways to detect leaks other than CPMs. However,
mandated risk analyses of high consequence areas may conclude that a CPM is needed. If so
CPMs are covered under 49 CFR Part 195 or 49 CFR Part 192, whichever is more stringent.
• CPM technology is only one component of a comprehensive strategy for pipeline integrity as
required by the corporate Operational Integrity Management System (OIMS).
• Statistical process control (SPC) philosophy as promulgated by Shewhart and later researchers
(Deming, Juran) provides the only qualified way to date within ExxonMobil for improving the
robustness of software leak detection systems (CPMs).
• Tracer technologies and other hardware solutions provide a promising way to reduce the release
detection thresholds in pipelines.

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2.2 Recommendations

• CPMs that use typically available sensors (pressure, temperature, and flow rate) without SPC
technology are not recommended for any pipeline.
• Operating companies that replace or install new CPMs without SPC technology should benchmark
results against systems that embed SPC in their CPM.
• CPMs with SPC methodologies are recommended for single phase liquid and single phase gas
pipelines. A release detection threshold of <1% of flow is achievable. Lower thresholds require
hardware solutions. Particular systems may not be able to achieve the release detection <1% of
flow due to distance between sensors.
• CPMs that use typically available data (pressure, temperature, and flow rate) cannot detect
releases in multiphase pipelines with thresholds less than 1% of flow.
• If CPMs are required for multiphase pipelines, a release detection thresholds of <1% of flow is
possible using hardware solutions . Each application should be evaluated and qualified prior to
installation to insure that project specific requirements are met.
• CPMs for deepwater pipelines need to be qualified under ExxonMobil’s Technology Qualification
Management System (TQMS) prior to deployment.
• Compositional changes in outlet conditions need to be tested under simulated and field conditions
to determine its viability as a release detection mechanism.

3. RELEASE DETECTION OVERVIEW

Leak detection is a colloquial term that refers to release detection. A release detection system can be
classified in a variety of ways. Three classification methods are presented in the following sections.

3.1 Cist and Schutz Overview

The following overview comes from “State of the Art for Pipe & Leak Detection”, Report DE-FC26-
01NT41317 by Cist and Schutz. In turn, the information has been synthesized from an article titled
“Designing a Cost Effective and Reliable Pipeline Leak Detection System” by Jun Zhang.

Release detection may be grouped into the following categories:

Biological
People or animals are trained to detect leaks using one or more of the primary senses.

Temperature Change
Temperature sensors such as an optical time domain reflectometer are used to detect changes of
temperature in the soil.

Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR)

GPR detects buried pipeline leaks by detecting changes in the surrounding soil's electrical properties.
GPR can have difficulties in detecting electrical properties changes in wet, clay soils.

Acoustic Devices
The noise generated by a leak can be detected by acoustic sensors along a pipeline.

Sampling Devices
Vapor sensors can be deployed to detect leaks. If a tracer is used, small leaks can theoretically be
detected in a small amount of time.

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Negative Pressure
A leak generates a transient pressure wave that is propagated through the pipeline.

Flow or Pressure Change

Flow or pressure changes above a given threshold are alarmed as potential leak situations.

Mass or Volume Balance

The difference in flow measurements at inlet and outlet conditions is compared to determine if a
potential leak is occurring.

Dynamic Model Based System

A model based systems compares a prediction of how the pipeline should perform against actual
measurements.

Pressure Point Analysis (PPA)

Based on the assumption that the pressure in the line drops due to a leak. An appropriate decrease in
the mean value of a pressure measurement generates a leak alarm.

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Table 3-1.1 - Comparison of Key Attributes of Different Leak Detection Methods

Work
Location False Maintenance Cost
Leak Through 24 Hour
Method Estimate Alarm Requirement (Capital +
Sensitivity Operational Availability
Available Rate (Expertise) Operating)
Changes
Biological Yes Yes Yes No Low Medium High

Temperature
Yes Yes Yes No Medium Medium High
Change

Ground
Penetrating Yes Yes Yes No Medium Medium High
Radar
Acoustic Yes Yes No Yes High Medium Medium
Sampling Yes Yes Yes No Low Medium High

Negative
Yes Yes No Yes High Medium Medium
Pressure

Flow Change No No No Yes High Low Low

Mass Balance No No No Yes High Low Low

Dynamic Model Yes Yes Yes Yes High High High

Pressure Point
Yes No No Yes High Medium Medium
Analysis

The performance of each method varies considerably depending on the vendors, pipeline operating
conditions and quality of the hardware/instrumentation system available. Examination of Table 3-1.1
shows that no method meets all the criteria. In particular, false alarms – warnings not related to
releases - appear to be a common problem for all the techniques except the biological and sampling
methods that cannot monitor a pipeline continuously.

3.2 Stuart and Barrufet Overview

The following is taken from Report 1435-01-99-CA-31003 “Worldwide Assessment of Industry Leak
Detection Capabilities for Single & Multiphase Pipelines” prepared by Stuart and Barrufet for the
Minerals Management Service. Their objective was to identify technologies applicable to deepwater
and arctic single and multiphase operation. They conclude that a combination of techniques (pressure
loss, mass balance, and hardware are needed to detect a range of releases. They did not consider
false alarms.

Figure 3-2.1 shows how Stuart and Barrufet classified release detection technologies. Many of the
categories are similar to Cist and Schutz. However, Stuart and Barrufet classified technologies based

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on whether or not typical sensors available in normal operations (rate, pressure, and temperature) are
used or whether special sensors are required.

Figure 3.2-1 – Classification of Release Detection Methods

Stuart and Barrufet’s conclusions are as follows:

• For subsea applications, PSL (pressure safety low) combined with mass/volume balances are the
best available technologies.
• For arctic applications, the pressure point analysis (PPA) method combined with hardware or
software method is the best available technology.
• Novel technologies developed in the defense or telecommunication industries are being applied to
release detection.
• More than one release detection method is employed for special applications such as: where the
exterior of the pipe can not be directly inspected in environmentally sensitive areas where a release
could pose a severe threat to people.
• CPMs with conventional material balance methods are most widely used. Material balance
methods are supplemented with friction/pressure loss (momentum balance) methods.
• Special hardware based methods are capable of detecting trace amounts of hydrocarbons that can
mitigate risks of a small release (<1%) and are complementary to the conventional technologies.
• A Pressure Safety Low (PSL) will not detect some release sizes and locations.
• Multiphase metering currently has limited application for release detection due to the poor and
variable accuracy of these devices. They can provide some value for high pressure and other select
applications.
• Release detection via compositional changes in the outlet fluid shows promise and should be
investigated further.
• Published “best case” detection limits have often found their way into regulations, and may not be
achievable due to the design/operational constraints on a given system.
• CPM system claims and capabilities should be independently verified.

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• Modeling results indicate that in relation to single-phase transmission pipelines the size of leak
detectable by mass balance and pressure drop methods is reduced in multiphase flowlines and is
highly flow pattern dependent. Some types of hardware based methods, however, are not
significantly degraded by multiphase flow and should be utilized in addition to conventional methods
for subsea and arctic flowlines.
• There is a need for large-scale experiment and field demonstration projects in the area of
multiphase leak detection. Also of interest is the combination of continuous and batch approaches
for hardware based diffusion/dispersion methods. Application of array pressure and temperature
sensors also appears promising.

The results of multiphase modeling by Stuart and Barrufet are consistent with ExxonMobil experience
with single and multiphase technologies. More work internally will be required before the CPM
recommendations for deepwater systems can be accepted.

3.3 Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) Overview

The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation’s overview is limited to crude oil transmission
pipelines only. It is presented as an example where local regulations are more stringent that the
governing federal regulation. It sets a requirement that the best available technology (BAT) be used as
required by Alaska State Regulation 18 AAC 75.425(e)(4). The main requirements include:

• If technically feasible, the continuous capability to detect a daily discharge equal to not more than
one percent of daily throughput;
• Flow verification through an accounting method, at least once every 24 hours
• For a remote pipeline not otherwise directly accessible, weekly aerial surveillance, unless precluded
by safety or weather conditions.

Proven technology alternatives must be identified and ranked based on the following criteria which are
used to determine the best available technology:

• Availability;
• Transferability;
• Effectiveness;
• Cost;
• Age and Condition;
• Compatibility;
• Feasibility; and
• Environmental Impacts.

The document groups leak detection systems into two main categories:

• External (direct) systems detect product releases outside of the pipeline. This includes patrols or
fiber optic type systems.
• Internal (inferential) systems or computational pipeline monitoring (CPM) use instruments to monitor
pipeline parameters and infer leak conditions and locations via models.

The document identified pre-qualified vendors who were tested. Section 3 covers in a textual format
similar issues as in Table 3-1.1. However, Section 4 discusses leak detection evaluation without
making any specific recommendations.

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3.4 Leak Detection Summary

Many other sources could be referenced. However, the three selected summaries give slightly different
points of view that allow some general conclusions to be inferred.

• Vendors need to be pre-qualified before field trials are conducted

• No one system or technology appears to meet all criteria perfectly
• CPM systems tend to show high rates of false alarms
• Multiple systems or technologies based on different physical principles may be necessary to
achieve high reliability in all desired situations
• In general, multiphase systems under ideal conditions cannot meet the same leak detection
thresholds as single phase systems without assistance from hardware systems.

4. BRIEF REVIEW OF STANDARDS

4.1 API RP 1130

API RP 1130 discusses CPM or software leak detection systems for liquid pipelines. On July 6, 1999,
the U.S. Department of Transportation Office of Pipeline Safety required all operators of hazardous
liquids pipelines using computational pipeline monitoring (CPM) systems to use API RP 1130 under 49
CFR Part 195. The Minerals and Management Service (MMS) has regulations in 30 CFR 250 Subpart
J that mandate use of 49 CFR Part 195. The publication focuses on the design, testing,
implementation, and operation of a CPM. Appendix C contains a summary of different technologies:

• Line balance
• Volume balance
• Modified volume balance
• Compensated mass balance
• Real time transient model
• Pressure/flow monitoring
• Acoustic/negative pressure wave
• Statistical analysis

RP 1130 discusses the effect of SCADA and instrumentation on system performance briefly. Pipeline
controller training is also covered in brief. RP 1130 references RP 1149 and RP 1155 and includes
them as part of RP 1130.

4.2 API RP 1149

API RP 1149 discusses uncertainties and their effect of leak detectability. API RP 1149 can be used to
predict pipeline release detection performance. In particular, the effects of instrument uncertainty on
release detection thresholds can be assessed. RP 1149 provides a quick way to estimate
performance of a mass balance type system based on specific pipeline parameters and
instrumentation.

The shortcomings of RP 1149 include the following:

• Most applicable to steady state scenarios vs. transient scenarios

• Only mass balance techniques are considered
• Results can vary based on the coefficients used to determine uncertainty

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4.3 API RP 1155

API RP 1155 provides an evaluation methodology for CPM or software based systems. It is used to
compare actual system performance of various technologies during field trials. RP 1155 benefits a
project by providing a standard format for pipeline characterization, using field data, and predicting
performance. Furthermore, operational procedures to enhance the system can be identified in
advance. The primary downside to RP 1155 is that test execution can be costly if many vendors are
involved.

4.4 CSA-Z662-03

The Canadian standard CSA-Z662-03, Appendix E has a recommended practice for leak detection.
This appendix is not a mandatory part of the standard but is written in mandatory language to
accommodate anyone wishing to use it. CSA-Z662-03 is referenced by regulatory bodies such as the
Alberta Energy and Utilities Board. Appendix E includes sampling times, maintenance, testing,
employee training, audit procedures, and certain computations (i.e. material balance) that need to be
computed.

4.5 Standards Summary

The standards reviewed to date specify how to qualify leak detection systems but do not provide
guidance on preferences. While preferences would not be expected or desired in standards, operating
companies need practical ways to shortlist technologies and vendors. What is clear is that even if a
preferred solution is recommended that alternative technologies need to be tested to provide
assurances to regulatory bodies that alternative technologies have been considered.

5.PIPELINE INTEGRITY PHILOSOPHY

Any pipeline integrity system must meet the following minimum functional requirements:

• Follow OIMS (ExxonMobil Operations Integrity Management System)

• Meet regulatory requirements, codes, and standards
• Follow ExxonMobil Engineering Global Practices
• Meet or exceed SHE, operability, and quality objectives
• Achieve high reliability / service factor

Some requlatory requirements include the ability to continuously detect a leak <1% of daily throughput.
This should be possible for single phase or dense phase operated pipelines using CPM methods. CPM
systems for detecting multiphase flow leaks probably will be unable to meet the <1% of flow criteria
unless they are augmented by hardware based systems.

If non-release or false alarms are included in the high reliability / service factor category, CPM based
systems would fail this functional requirement. The high alarm rate of CPM based systems could be
augmented by hardware or alternate methods to confirm CPM based alarms.

6. ESSO FIELD TRIALS

The following information is based on Esso UK’s field trials. Typical methods used for leak detection at
Esso UK included

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• Line balance – measures volumes in and out

• Line break – notes pressure and flow trends expected from a line break
• Operator amendable alarms – the operator sets the upper and lower limits on flow and pressure
• Manual line – operator manually records hourly readings and calculates the difference

The objective of the field trial was to test commercial systems with the following characteristics:

• Minimize false alarms

• Detect all but the smallest leaks
• Detect leaks in a reasonable time
• Determine leak location within an acceptable error
• Implemented in other fields
• Provide answers with a high confidence factor
• Provide solution with an acceptable cost
• Exhibit robust operation
• Tested under Esso specified controlled conditions

The field tests include both normal pipeline operations and leak trials. Leaks at different locations were
introduced by the use of road tankers and pre-fabricated orifice plates. Four orifice diameters are
included: 2.5 mm, 3.1 mm, 6.35 mm (¼ inch) and 12.7 mm (½ inch).

6.1 Jet Oil Pipeline

The first tests were run in an offline mode for a 10 inch line. The Jet Fuel Pipeline runs from Fawley to
West London Terminal (106 km). Flow, pressure, temperature and density measurements are available
at Fawley and West London. Esso provided two sets of data: leak-free data (11 days) and data with
leaks (5 days). The first set was used to tune the leak detection to guarantee that no false alarms were
raised. The second set was used to test if commercial software could actually detect the unknown leaks
and provide estimates of the size and location.

The 'blind' tests detected seven leaks of different sizes and locations. In particular, a leak appeared to
have started during shut-in and another when the pipeline was start-up. The best system performance
is shown in Table 6.1. Six of the leaks were detected within a few minutes and the transient leak was
detected in 23 minutes.

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Table 6-1: Test Results for Data Collected between 12th and 16th Oct 1998

6.2 Fawley White Oil Network

The second set of tests was run in a real time mode. The network consists of 10 and 12 inch lines that
cover 225 km. In total eighteen controlled leaks were generated over this five day period. The leaks
are categorized as follows:

• Seven leaks during normal steady-state operation (+/-10% change).

• Four leaks during transient operating conditions,
• Seven leaks during shut-in operation (no flow).

The following results have been achieved from these tests:

• The smallest leaks detected were 2 m3/h (0.2% of the flow meter range) This took 12 minutes
during transient shut-in condition.
• A 3 m3/h (0.3% of the flow meter range) leak was detected in 61 minutes during transient conditions
when flow and pressure were varying.
• The shortest detection time was 1 minute that was for a shut-in leak of 24 m3/h
• The largest leak generated was 29 m3/h (2.9% of flow meter range). This leak was accompanied by
transient operating conditions and it took 5 minutes for the best software to alarm the leak.
• The leak rate estimates were very accurate compared with the volume of product collected by Esso.
• False alarm rates for the best performing system were an order of magnitude less than for the next
best performing system.

7. STATISTICAL PROCESS CONTROL

The best performing system during the Esso UK trials uses multiple methods as categorized by RP
1130: modified volume balance, pressure and flow monitoring, and statistical analysis. The use of
multiple methods would be expected to improve the performance of the system. However, the major
benefit comes from the implementation of statistical process control.

Statistical quality control is a collection of tools or metrics that are essential in quality improvement.
The technology of statistical quality control is defined as those methods that are used in measuring,
monitoring, controlling, and improving quality. The field was invented in the 1920’s by Bell Labs

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researcher Dr. Walter Shewhart. His methods and improvements made by subsequent researchers
were implemented widely during World War II industrial operations.

While quality may be hard to define, statistical process control (SPC) is the application of these same
methods for the reduction in variability in processes. The basic plots used in SPC are:

• Histogram
• Pareto chart – a bar chart used to rank the causes of a problem
• Cause-and-effect diagram – a chart - also called a Fishbone diagram – used to organize the various
potential causes of a problem
• Defect concentration diagram – a sketch or PFD of a process that shows the most likely causes or
variables that control or affect a process
• Control chart – a chart with upper and lower limits that determines whether the process is free from
assignable causes or known effects.
• Scatter diagram – an x-y plot showing the relationship between two variables
• Check sheet

SPC is usually implemented in an environment that follows Demings’ 14 point plan to form a holistic
approach to process improvement. Chapter 16 in the Applied Statistics book by Montgomery and
Runger explains in more detail statistical process control theory and how Demings’ philosophy is
usually coupled with SPC. The key to making SPC work is identifying assignable or known causes and
relating assignable causes to patterns on a control chart. Hence, pattern recognition is needed to
identify and eliminate known causes.

A particular control chart used in the best leak detection algorithm during the Esso UK tests involves
SPRT or the sequential probability ratio test. SPRT theory was introduced in 1947 by Abraham Wald in
Sequential Analysis as a means to rapidly classify samples in real time into groups.

The essence of SPRT is to provide an optimal way in an information theory sense to determine
binomial pass/fail criteria. The Neyman-Pearson lemma concludes that a likelihood ratio test is the
most appropriate test for comparing simple hypotheses. Wald (1947) showed that SPRT was optimal
when sequentially sampling data. A CPM system using SPRT continually calculates the probability that
a release situation exists vs. a no release situation. The equations used in the best performing system
can be found in the Tindell and Zhang paper on the Esso field trials.

8. HARDWARE SENSORS

Information theory can help us to discern what can and cannot be detected given certain information.
However, the basic principles of release detection using typically available data (pressure, temperature,
flow rate) cannot help us in multiphase flow where flow regime can mask pressure and temperature
trends. As indicated by Stuart and Barrufet, a leak detection threshold of 2% or higher may be
possible. Other types of leaks may be missed altogether. Different physical principles that are less
sensitive to flow regime changes are needed.

Acoustic systems detect low frequency signals generated by a leak. Esso Australia and other
companies have implemented hardware systems that use acoustic sensors to detect leaks. Petrobras
(2002) has tested and implemented acoustic systems in onshore and offshore pipelines. While
acoustic systems may be more costly that typical CPMs, they are able to quickly detect releases with a
threshold sensitivity of 1% of flow or less. Moreover, certain systems are able to detect releases with
low false alarm rates.

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If a multiphase pipeline requires leak detection, the following caveats should be noted:

• Both the Petrobras experience and ExxonMobil experience indicate that acoustic sensor systems
will not work in low pressure systems.
• Acoustic systems may require sensors at closer intervals than might normally be provided to detect
the releases.
• The Cist and Schutz summary indicates that acoustic systems exhibit high rates of false alarms and
cannot account for operational changes. Any particular system that is recommended should be
scrutinized to understand when the system will fail to report a release and accept the limitations of
the system or work with the vendor to improve performance.

9. SUMMARY

This study concludes the following based on the differing overviews and the field trials to date:

• Regulations do not explicit call for computational pipeline monitoring (CPM). However, regulations
usually require risk analysis studies where a CPM may be necessary to detect a desired threshold
rupture.
• No single CPM technology is able to satisfy all criteria simultaneously. A series of technologies
(hardware and CPM) are needed to achieve both rapid release detection and small volume
thresholds (substantially less than 1%).
• Standards exist for specifying, testing, and evaluating CPMs. However, due to many vendors and
competing claims, more guidance is necessary for ExxonMobil operating companies.
• Information theory - specifically statistical process control (SPC) - is able to improve the
performance of CPM systems.
• CPMs are generally specified for liquid systems due to the potential for a spill whereas gas systems
normally do not have CPMs as gas is dispersed in the air. However, both pipelines would normally
have sensors (pressure, temperature, flow rate) that make it easy to determine computationally
whether or not a release is suspected. Since the hardware will be in place and the associated cost
of software is small, CPMs for all single phase pipelines make sense.

The following recommendations are made based on literature surveys, field trials, and a critical
assessment of the current state of CPM technology from a hydraulics viewpoint:

• CPMs that use typically available sensors (pressure, temperature, and flow rate) without SPC
technology are not recommended for any pipeline.
• Operating companies that replace or install new CPMs without SPC technology should benchmark
results against systems that embed SPC in their CPM.
• CPMs with SPC methodologies are recommended for single phase liquid and single phase gas
pipelines. A release detection threshold of <1% of flow is achievable. Lower thresholds require
hardware solutions. Particular systems may not be able to achieve the release detection <1% due
to distance between sensors.
• CPMs that use typically available data (pressure, temperature, and flow rate) cannot detect
releases in multiphase pipelines with thresholds less than 1% of flow.
• If CPMs are required for multiphase pipelines, a release detection thresholds of <1% of flow is
possible using hardware solutions. Each application should be evaluated and qualified prior to
installation to insure that project specific requirements are met.
• CPMs for deepwater pipelines need to be qualified under ExxonMobil’s Technology Qualification
Management System (TQMS) prior to deployment.

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• Compositional changes in outlet conditions need to be tested under simulated and field conditions
to determine its viability as a release detection mechanism.

10. REFERENCES

1. State of the Art for Pipe & Leak Detection, David B Cist and Alan E Schutz, Report DE-FC26-
01NT41317 for the Department of Energy, November 30, 2001.
2. Worldwide Assessment of Industry Leak Detection Capabilities for Single & Multiphase Pipelines,
Stuart L. Scott and Maria A. Barrufet, Report for Contract 1435-01-99-CA-31003, Task Order 18133
for the Minerals Management Service, August 6, 2003.
3. Technical Review of Leak Detection Technologies for Crude Oil Transmission Pipelines, Volume I,
Holly Hill, Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation.
4. Computational Pipeline Monitoring for Liquid Pipelines, API RP 1130, 2nd Edition, November 2002.
5. Pipeline Variable Uncertainties And Their Effects on Leak DetectabiIity, API RP 1149, November
1993
6. Evaluation Methodology for Software Based Leak Detection Systems, API RP 1155, 1st Edition,
February 1995.
7. Oil and Gas Pipeline Systems, Appendix E, Recommended Practice for Leak Detection, Canadian
Standard CSA-Z662-03.
8. Pipeline Leak Detection: The Esso Experience, Bruce Tindell and Jun Zhang, Pipelines 2002, 11th -
13th June 2002, NEC, Birmingham, UK.
9. Applied Statistics and Probability for Engineers, Douglas C Montgomery and George C Runger, 3rd
Edition, John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
10. Sequential Analysis, Abraham Wald, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1947.
11. Leak Detection Systems for Multiphase Flow – Moving Forward, Renan M. Baptista and Carlos H.
W. Mouna, International Pipeline Conference 2002, September 29-October 3, 2002, Alberta,
Canada.
12. Communication with T. Salles, EMDC Operations Advisor.

11. ACRONYMS

CPM – Computation Pipeline Monitoring (inferential or software systems)

CFR – US Code of Federal Regulation
DOT – US Department of Transportation
HCA – High consequence area – an area defined by the potential impact of a commodity release or
pipeline rupture.
NTSB – US National Transportation Safety Board
SPC – Statistical process control as defined by Shewhart

12. GLOSSARY

These definitions come from API RP 1130 unless otherwise noted.

Commodity release or release: A loss of fluid from the pipeline. Within the context of this publication,
a commodity release when referenced to leak rate, must be above the leak threshold of the particular

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CPM system and pipeline. Other industry terms are product release or pipeline leak operating
condition.
Computational pipeline monitoring (CPM): An algorithmic monitoring tool that alerts the pipeline
controller to respond to a detectable pipeline hydraulic anomaly (perhaps both while the pipeline is
operating or shut-in), which may be indicative of a commodity release.
False alarm: A commonly misused term in the context of CPM systems to refer to alarms that are not
caused by an actual commodity release or other emergency or unusual operating condition.
Hydraulic anomaly: An unusual condition on the pipeline or abnormal operating condition that is
explainable through the systems hydraulics.
Inference engine: A part of the CPM system that accumulates data, performs calculation (e.g., line
hydraulics) and provides outputs to the alert algorithm.
Leak: a colloquial term that refers to a release (not in RP 1130)
Pipeline rupture: In the context of Computational Pipeline Monitoring (CPM), a rupture is a pipeline
leak that releases a large quantity of the pipe’s contents. A rupture will occur when there is a significant
breach of the pipe wall or major loss of containment of the product within the pipe. It may also be
characterized by registering a differential far larger than system noise in some measured/trended
values on the SCADA system, and the rupture will cause an immediate impairment to the operation of
the pipeline. The size of a pipeline rupture is difficult to define as indicated in the explanation that is
provided in Appendix B of RP 1130.
SCADA: An acronym for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, the technology that makes it
possible to remotely monitor and control pipeline facilities.
Sensitivity: A composite measure of the size of a leak that a CPM system is capable of detecting and
the time required for the system to issue an alarm in the event that a commodity release of that size
should occur. This term is fully defined and discussed in API RP 1155.
Single phase: A fluid state, either liquid or gaseous, based upon commodity, vapor pressure, pipeline
pressure and temperature.

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