Rosario A. Gatus vs. Quality House, Inc.

and Christopher Chua

GR No. 156766 Apr 16, 2009 Brion, J.

Facts:
Petitioner Rosario A. Gatus started her employment as an assembler with respondent Quality
House, Inc. on July 14, 1987. The respondent company placed her under preventive suspension
on July 1, 1997, through a notice, because of the incident that occurred on 30 June 1997
involving petioner’s husband, Ferdinand Gatus, and co-employee, Leonilo Echavez.

Petitioner submitted her explanation in response to the respondent company, providing that she
was experiencing difficulties in her work, caused by her co-employees Shelly, Rene and Nilo
Echavez, due to her trade union activities. She claimed that she was being harassed by the three,
especially Nilo Echavez, because she did not join the Philippine Association of Free Labor
Unions (PAFLU). She narrated that the harassment and humiliation persisted to the point of
becoming unbearable; she was left with no recourse but to tell her husband about her workplace
problems. This made her husband mad.

Petiotioner filed a complaint for illegal suspension and damages against and subsequently after
her dismissal, charges of unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal, with claims for moral and
exemplary damages.

The respondents' Reply narrated the infractions the petitioner committed during her employment
that showed her continuing poor work attitude, and for which she received the penalties of
reprimand and two suspensions.

Labor Arbiter Potenciano S. Cañizares, Jr. dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The arbiter
found no substantial evidence that showed that the respondents committed unfair labor practice,
and that her dismissal was for a just cause under the Labor Code. The NLRC affirmed the labor
arbiter's ruling.

Petitioner secured a motion for reconsideration from NLRC, which referred the case to Labor
Arbiter Luis D. Flores. Arbiter Flores, who submitted a report recommending the petitioner's
reinstatement, with full backwages and without loss of seniority rights. The NLRC found the
report to be supported by the facts and the law and, on this basis, reversed its earlier decision.

The respondents sought relief from the CA by way of a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
The CA ruled that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it reinstated the petitioner and awarded her monetary benefits.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner's termination from employment is valid.
Ruling:
Yes, petioner’s termination from employment is valid. The CA correctly reversed the NLRC.

Beyond providing mere motivation, petitioner was even at the scene of the attack and actively
prodded her husband to continue with the attack. This is a form of participation shows her to be
unfit to continue working for her employer. Her admitted grievances translated into the concrete
act of violence performed against her supervisor, who represented her employer. Undoubtedly,
her continued employment would cause undue strain in the workplace. The petitioner's
transgression merits the penalty of dismissal. It is, at the very least, a serious misconduct of a
grave and aggravated character that directly violated the personal security of another employee
due to an employment-related cause.

We have settled in Perez v. PT&T that, “in cases of termination for a just cause, an employee
must be given "ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself." Thus, the opportunity to
be heard afforded by law to the employee is qualified by the word "ample" which ordinarily
means "considerably more than adequate or sufficient.”. Moreover, an employee's right to be
heard in termination cases under Article 277(b) as implemented by Section 2(d), Rule I of the
Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code is satisfied not only by a formal face to face
confrontation but by any meaningful opportunity to controvert the charges against him and to
submit evidence in support thereof. Petitioner was not denied due process.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs against
the petitioner. SO ORDERED.