57. office of the ombudsman vs de Chavez.

GR No. 172206, Jul 03, 2013

Facts: The BSU-BOR received an Order from Deputy Ombudsman Victor Fernandez directing the former
to enforce the aforementioned Office of the Ombudsman's Joint Decision and Supplemental
Resolution. Thus, herein respondents filed a petition for injunction with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court against the BSU-
BOR. The gist of the petition before the RTC is that the BSU-BOR should be enjoined from enforcing the
Ombudsman's Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution because the same are still on appeal and,
therefore, are not yet final and executory.

On September 26, 2005, the RTC ordered the dismissal of herein respondents' petition for injunction on
the ground of lack of cause of action. Respondents filed their notice of appeal and promptly filed a Motion
for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Injunction with the CA. The CA issued a Resolution
granting respondents' prayer for a temporary restraining order enjoining the BSU-BOR from enforcing its
Resolution.

Thereafter, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a Motion to Intervene and to Admit Attached Motion to
Recall Temporary Restraining Order, with the Motion to Recall Temporary Restraining Order attached
thereto. Respondents opposed said motion and then filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.

Issue: THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT COMMIT ANY GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ISSUING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS.

Ruling: note that for a preliminary injunction to issue, the following essential requisites must concur, to
wit: 1) that the invasion of the right is material and substantial; 2) that the right of the complainant is clear
and unmistakable; and, 3) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage. In the present case, the right of respondents cannot be said to be clear and unmistakable,
because the prevailing jurisprudence is that the penalty of dismissal from the service meted on
government employees or officials is immediately executory in accordance with the valid rule of execution
pending the appeal uniformly observed in administrative disciplinary cases.

58. PROVINCE OF CAGAYAN (Gov. Alvaro Antonio) V JOSEPH LARA

702 SCRA 183
Facts: On September 14, 2007, Lara obtained an Industrial Sand and Gravel Permit [3] (ISAG Permit)
from the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), authorizing him to conduct quarrying operations in a twenty-hectare area situated in
Barangay Centro, Muncipality of Peñablanca (Peñablanca), Cagayan (Permit Area) and extract and
dispose of sand, gravel, and other unconsolidated materials from the Permit Area. For the same purpose,
Lara obtained an Environmental Compliance Certificate[4] (ECC) from the DENR Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB).[5]

On January 3, 2008, Jovy Balisi (Balisi), Lara's representative, went to the Cagayan Provincial
Treasurer's Office (Treasurer's Office) to pay the extraction fee and other fees for Lara's quarrying
operations but she was directed to first secure an Order of Payment from the Environmental and Natural
Resources Officer, petitioner Robert Adap (ENRO Adap). However, when Balisi went to ENRO Adap, the
latter refused to issue an Order of Payment. Despite various pleas from Balisi and Atty. Victorio N.
Casauay (Atty. Casauay), Lara's counsel, ENRO Adap remained adamant with his refusal. This prompted
Atty. Casauay to tender and deposit the amount of P51,500.00 with the Treasurer's Office corresponding
to the said extraction fee and other related fees.[6]

On January 11, 2008, Lara commenced his quarrying operations. Later that day, however, a total of four
trucks loaded with sand and gravel extracted from the Permit Area were stopped and impounded by
several local officials.[7] Consequently, Lara filed an action for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 7049, against the said officials, seeking to enjoin
the stoppage of his quarrying operations. After due proceedings, a writ of preliminary injunction was
issued enabling Lara to restart his business.[8]

Nonetheless, on March 17, 2008, Lara received a Stoppage Order[9] dated March 13, 2008 (Stoppage
Order) this time from Cagayan Governor Alvaro T. Antonio (Gov. Antonio), directing him to stop his
quarrying operations for the following reasons: (a) the ISAG Permit was not in accordance with Republic
Act No. (RA) 7942,[10] otherwise known as the "Philippine Mining Act of 1995," and its implementing rules
and regulations; (b) Lara's failure to pay sand and gravel fee under Provincial Ordinance No. 2005-07;
and (c) [Lara's] failure to secure all necessary permits or clearances from the local government unit
concerned as required by the [ECC].[11] Hence, Lara filed the present action for injunction and damages
with an urgent and ex-parte motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 7077.

In their Answer dated June 10, 2008, petitioners raised the following defenses: (a) the mere issuance of
the ISAG Permit does not give Lara the right to commence his quarrying operations as he still had to
comply with the terms and conditions stated therein; (b) Lara has neither secured all the necessary
permits nor paid the local fees and taxes; and (c) Gov. Antonio was merely performing his duty to enforce
all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the Province of Cagayan pursuant to the provisions
of RA 7160,[12] otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991."[13]

Issue:

The primordial issue raised for the Court's resolution is whether the RTC properly issued the permanent
injunction subject of this case.
Ruling:
It is well-settled that a writ of injunction would issue upon the satisfaction of two (2) requisites, namely: a)
the existence of a right to be protected; and b) acts which are violative of the said right. In the absence of
a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Injunction is
not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where the complainant’s right is doubtful or disputed,
injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a
ground for an injunction.

62. DARCEN V VR GONZALES

695 SCRA 207

Facts:

Mamerto Darcen died, leaving an estate constituting three parcels of land. His heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement
of the Estate with a Waiver, stating that his children are waiving their shares to the property in favor of their mother,
Flora. Flora, without the knowledge of his children, mortgaged the properties to VR Gonzales. Eventually, the Flora
died. When the loan fell due and VR Gonzales was unable to collect payments, it caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the mortgage. Petitioners filed a complaint to assail the foreclosure, arguing that their signature in the waiver was forged
and their mother’s signature in the mortgage contracts were likewise forged. Meanwhile, the parcels of land were sold to
VR Gonzales as the highest bidder. The redemption period lapsed and VR Gonzales’ ownership was consolidated. It
then moved for the issuance of the writ of possession, which was granted by the trial court. The Court affirmed the trial
court, ruling that once the ownership is consolidated after the lapse of the redemption period, it is the ministerial duty of
the trial court to issue the possessory writ. The only exception is when there are adverse claimants, in which case a
hearing will be conducted. However, such exception does not apply in the case at bar as petitioners failed to show how
their claim is adverse to that of their mother (the mortgagor).

Issue:

Whether the RTC erred in issuing the writ of possession

Ruling:

NO

 It is a long-settled rule in extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage that after consolidation of ownership of
the foreclosed property, it is the ministerial duty of the court to issue, as a matter of right, an ex parte writ of
possession to the buyer.
o Under Sec. 7 of Act 3135, possession may be granted to the buyer either (a) within the 1 year redemption
period, upon the filing by the purchaser of a bond, or (b) after the lapse of the redemption period, without
need of a bond.
 If no redemption is made within 1 year from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale,
the purchaser becomes the absolute owner of the property. Thus, the basis of the purchaser’s
right of possession is his ownership of the property.
 The mere filing of an ex parte motion for the issuance of the writ of possession would suffice, and no
bond is required. The ex parte petition for the issuance of the possessory writ is a non-litigious proceeding
and summary in nature.
 Further, a pending action for annulment of mortgage or foreclosure sale does not stay the issuance of the
writ of possession. The trial court need not look into the validity of the mortgage; the purchaser is entitled
to a writ of possession without prejudice to the outcome of the pending annulment case.
 Nonetheless, the ministerial duty of the court to issue an ex parte writ of possession ceases once it appears that
there is a third party in possession of the property, who is a stranger to the mortgage and who claims a right adverse
to that of the debtor/mortgagor.