Hindawi

Journal of Petroleum Engineering

Volume 2017, Article ID 3174636, 7 pages
https://doi.org/10.1155/2017/3174636

Research Article
Analysis and Comparison of Long-Distance Pipeline Failures

Lianshuang Dai,1,2 Dongpo Wang,1 Ting Wang,3 Qingshan Feng,2 and Xinqi Yang1
1
School of Materials Science and Engineering, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
2
PetroChina Pipeline Company, Langfang, Hebei 065000, China
3
PetroChina Pipeline R&D Center, Langfang, Hebei 065000, China

Correspondence should be addressed to Dongpo Wang; wangdp@tju.edu.cn

Received 20 February 2017; Revised 17 April 2017; Accepted 3 May 2017; Published 25 May 2017

Academic Editor: Merv Fingas

Copyright © 2017 Lianshuang Dai et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License,
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

The analysis results of long-distance oil and gas pipeline failures are important for the industry and can be the basis of risk analysis,
integrity assessment, and management improvement for pipeline operators. Through analysis and comparison of the statistical
results of the United States, Europe, the UK, and PetroChina in pipeline failure frequencies, causes, consequences, similarities,
and differences of pipeline management, focusing points and management effectiveness are given. Suggestions on long-distance
pipeline safety technology and management in China are proposed.

1. Introduction 2.1. PHMSA. Failure data of all pipelines in the US is updated

It is important to maintain high-pressure oil and gas pipeline
systems safety and reliability, because the products are haz-
ardous and may result in fire, explosion, and poisoning and
lead to significant economic losses, casualties, and environ-
mental pollution [1–3]. By collecting and analyzing the failure
data, pipeline operators can find out the causes of failure
events and understand the weak point in pipeline manage-
ment which is significant for pipeline risk identification,
integrity assessment, risk mitigation, and accident prevention
[4–6].
Statistical results of the US, Europe, the UK, and Petro-
China in pipeline failure frequencies, causes, and conse-
quences are comparatively analyzed. Similarities and dif-
ferences of pipeline management are given. Suggestions on
long-distance pipeline safety technology and management in
China are proposed.
to show the recent 20 years’ statistical results and detailed
information by PHMSA. Significant incidents of onshore
pipelines (for liquid, only crude oil and refined and/or
petroleum product are involved; for gas, only transmission
line is involved) are filtered from the database and calcu-
lated for the failure frequencies in this paper. Significant
incidents are those including any of the following condi-
tions:
(1) Fatality or injury requiring in-patient hospitalization.
(2) $50,000 or more in total costs, measured in 1984
dollars.
(3) Highly volatile liquid releases of 5 barrels or more or
other liquid releases of 50 barrels or more.
(4) Liquid releases resulting in an unintentional fire or
explosion.

2. Analysis and Comparison
Failure statistical results of PHMSA in the US [7], EGIG
in Europe [8], UKOPA in UK [9], and PNGPC in China
on long-distance pipeline failure frequencies, causes, and
consequences are comparatively analyzed. Table 1 shows the
pipeline types that the analysis involves.
2.1.1. Failure Frequency. Figure 1 shows that from 2004 to
2015, failure frequencies of oil pipelines in the US vary
between 0.4 times/kkm⋅yr and 0.6 times/kkm⋅yr, which is
slightly increasing in the last 5 years as seen in the trend line.
As for the natural gas pipelines shown in Figure 2, the number
goes up from 0.04 times/kkm⋅yr to 0.14 times/kkm⋅yr with
vibration.
2 Journal of Petroleum Engineering

Table 1: Mediums included in the statistical data.

Pipeline Medium
NO. Organization/Company
Crude Oil Product Oil Natural Gas
1 PHMSA ✓ ✓ ✓
2 EGIG ✓
3 UKOPA ✓
4 PNGPC ✓ ✓ ✓

0.7 35
0.6 30 15
24
0.5 25 3%
25 6% 107
0.4 20
6% 25%
0.3 15 26
0.2 10
6%
0.1 5
0 0
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

64
15%
Mileage
Failure frequency 96
Failure frequency trend line 22%
75
Figure 1: Mileage and failure frequency for oil pipelines. 17%

0.16 80 Corrosion Other outside force damage

0.14 70 Pipe/weld material failure Incorrect operation
0.12 60 Equipment failure Others
0.1 50 Excavation damage Natural force damage
0.08 40
0.06 30 Figure 3: Oil pipelines causes.
0.04 20
0.02 10
0 0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

5
2%
Mileage
Failure frequency 15
Failure frequency trend line 6%
20 56
Figure 2: Mileage and failure frequency for gas pipelines. 8% 24%

20
9%
2.1.2. Failure Causes. Based on the statistical results from
2010 to 2015, which includes 432 oil pipeline failures and
238 gas pipeline failures, all of which are flagged as sig- 27
nificant incidents in the database, the top 3 causes for oil 11% 52
pipeline failures are corrosion, pipe/weld material failure, and 22%
equipment failure, while those of gas pipeline failures are
pipe/weld material failure, excavation damag, and corrosion 43
(see Figures 3 and 4). 18%
Table 2 listed the causes and subcauses categorized by
PHMSA.
Pipe/weld material failure Natural force damage
Excavation damage Other outside force damage
(1) Corrosion. For liquid pipelines, corrosion is the most Corrosion Others
important factor for failure, while, for gas pipelines, corrosion Equipment failure Incorrect operation
is the top 3 of all failure factors. Among those, external
corrosion usually accounted for more than 60%, mainly Figure 4: Gas pipelines causes.
Journal of Petroleum Engineering 3

Table 2: Causes and sub-cause categried by PHMSA.

NO. Causes Sub-causes

Corrosion
1 Galvanic Corrosion, Stray Corrosion, Microbiological Corrosion, Selective
External Corrosion
Seam Corrosion, . . .
Internal Corrosion Corrosive Commodity, Acid Water, Microbiological Corrosion, Erosion, . . .
Pipe/Weld Material Failure
2 Construction, Installation or Fabrication Related Weld Quality, Mechanical Damage in the Field, . . .
Original Manufacturing Related Weld Quality, Manufacturing Defect, . . .
Environmental Related Stress Corrosion Cracking, Deformation Related Cracking, . . .
Excavation Damage
Excavation Practices not Sufficient, Locating Practices not Sufficient,
Operator’s Contractor (Second Party)
Previous Damage, . . .
3 Excavation Practices not Sufficient, Locating Practices not Sufficient,
Third Party One-call Notification Practices not Sufficient, One-call Notification Center
Error, . . .
Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity One-call Notification Practices not Sufficient, Previous Damage, . . .
4 Natural Force Damage Earth Movement, Heavy Rains/Floods, Lighting, Temperature, . . .
Damage by Operator or Operator’s Contractor, Pipeline or Equipment
5 Incorrect Operation
Overpressure, Equipment not Installed Properly, . . .
6 Other Outside Force Damage Damage by Cars, Boats, Nearby Industry or Fire/Explosion, . . .

galvanic corrosion, while internal corrosion is mainly of 70 1800

microbiological corrosion. 60 1600
1400
50
(2) Pipe/Weld Material Failure. If the failure incidents for oil 1200
40 1000
and gas pipelines are analyzed together, pipe/weld material
30 800
failure is the top 1 factor. For subcauses that are analyzed, con-
20 600
struction related (including field welded girth weld, backfill 400
dent, etc.) accounts for more than 50%. 10 200
0 0
(3) Excavation Damage. Excavation damage is another impor-
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
tant cause for oil and gas pipeline failures in the US, which
accounts for 15% for oil pipeline failures and 22% for natural
Fatalities (oil & gas)
gas pipeline failures. Among those, the third party excavation Injuries (oil & gas)
damage accounts for the largest percentage, mainly due to Property loss (oil & gas) (million dollars)
the usage of one-call (excavation call system) system and the
insufficient excavation practices. Figure 5: Failure consequences in the US reported by PHMSA.

(4) Natural Force Damage. In this cause, earth movement and

heavy rain/flood are the main factors.
2.1.3. Failure Consequences. During 2004 to 2015, numbers
of casualties and property loss caused by pipeline accidents
in the US did not vary significantly, except the peak value
in 2010 (see Figure 5), which is because of the rupture fire of
the Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s pipeline and rupture
leakage of Enbridge 6B crude oil pipeline.
The property loss includes estimated cost of public
and nonoperator private property damage, product released
intentionally or unintentionally, operator’s property damage
and repairs, operator’s emergency response, and environmen-
tal remediation.
2.2. EGIG. Up to 2013, the total length of EGIG gas pipeline
becomes 144 kkm. The objective of EGIG is to collect and
present data on loss of gas incidents in order to present
the safety performance of the European gas transmission
network to the general public and authorities.
The required criteria for an incident to be recorded in the
EGIG database are the following:
(1) The incident must lead to an unintentional gas release.
(2) The pipeline must fulfil the following conditions:
(a) to be made of steel,
(b) to be onshore,
(c) to have a maximum operating pressure higher
than 15 bar,
(d) to be located outside the fences of the gas
installations.
4 Journal of Petroleum Engineering

0.6

Percentage of ruptures that ignited (%)

100
Failure frequency per 1000 km·yr

1 of 1 1 of 1
90
0.5
80
0.4 70 2 of 3

60
0.3 50 1 of 2 1 of 2

4 of 10
40 5 of 13
0.2 1 of 3 2 of 6
30
0.1 20 1 of 6

10 1 of 23
1 of 25 1 of 25
0 0
1 of 28
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

d < 5㰀㰀

5㰀㰀 ≤ d < 11㰀㰀

11㰀㰀 ≤ d < 17㰀㰀

17㰀㰀 ≤ d < 23㰀㰀

23㰀㰀 ≤ d < 29㰀㰀

29㰀㰀 ≤ d < 35㰀㰀

35㰀㰀 ≤ d < 41㰀㰀

41㰀㰀 ≤ d
Year [—]

External interference
Construction defect/material failure
Ground movement Diameter (inches)
Corrosion p ≤ 35 bar
Hot tap made by error 35 bar < p ≤ 55 bar
Other and unknown p > 55 bar
Figure 6: Failure frequencies of different causes by EGIG. Figure 8: Ignited failures analysis by EGIG.

8% 0.007
0.0061
0.006
13%
Percentage of incident (%)

35% 0.005 0.0046

4% 0.004

0.003
0.0023
16% 0.002
0.0015 0.0015
0.001 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008

24% 0
Employees/ Causing Fighting Public
contractors
External interference Hot tap
Corrosion Ground movement Injuries
Construction Other/unknown Fatalities
Defects/material failures Figure 9: Casualties’ analysis by EGIG.
Figure 7: Failure causes by EGIG.

2.2.3. Failure Consequences. According to statistical results,

2.2.1. Failure Frequency. From 1970 to 2013, the primary
failure frequencies for the entire period (up to the year) per
cause keep decreasing (See Figure 6).
In 2013, the primary failure frequency over the entire
period (1970–2013) was equal to 0.33 per kkm⋅yr. This is
slightly lower than the failure frequency of 0.35 per kkm⋅yr
reported in the 8th EGIG report (1970–2010). The primary
failure frequency over the last five years was equal to 0.16 per
kkm⋅yr, showing an improved performance over recent years.
in period of 1970–2013, only 5.0% of the gas releases
recorded in the EGIG database ignited. Gas releases from
large diameter pipelines at high pressure have ignited more
frequently than smaller diameter pipelines at lower pressure
(see Figure 8).
The highest fatality and injury rate can be found among
the people who are directly involved in causing the incident.
Eight cases (0.61%, total 1309) caused fatalities among the
people causing the incident (see Figure 9).

2.2.2. Failure Causes. Top 3 causes for gas pipeline failures in 2.3. UKOPA. Up to 2014, the total length of UKOPA pipeline
EGIG are external interference, corrosion, and construction becomes 22.4 kkm. A product loss incident is defined in the
defects/material failure (see Figure 7). context of this report as
Journal of Petroleum Engineering 5

1.4 Table 3: Ignited failures analysis by UKOPA.

1.2 Affected
Frequency per 1000 km·yr

Cause Of Fault Hole Diameter Class

1 Component
Pipe Seam Weld Defect 0–6 mm
0.8
Full Bore and Above
Pipe Ground Movement
0.6 (18󸀠󸀠 Diameter pipe)
0.4 Pipe Girth Weld Defect 6–20 mm
0.2
Pipe Unknown 6–20 mm
Pipe Pipe Defect 0–6 mm
0
Pipe Unknown 40–110 mm
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
Pipe Lightning Strike 0–6 mm
Year [—] Bend Internal Corrosion 0–6 mm
Overall average up to year Bend Pipe Defect 6–20 mm
Moving 5-year average

Figure 10: Average failure frequencies by UKOPA.

60000 25
50000 20
0.06
40000
Frequency per 1000 km·yr

0.05 15
30000
0.04 10
20000
0.03
10000 5
0.02
0.01 0 0
2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015
0
Ground movement

Girth weld defect

Other

Pipe defect

Seam weld defect

Unknown
External interference
External corrosion

Internal corrosion

Mileage (km)
Leakage number (times)

Figure 12: Mileage and failure numbers for PNGPC pipelines.

Cause 2.3.3. Failure Consequences. There were 9 out of 192 (4.7%)

1962–2014
2010–2014
product loss incidents that resulted in ignition. However,
there is no obvious conclusion, as shown in Table 3.
Figure 11: Failure causes by UKOPA.
2.4. PNGPC. Up to 2015, the total length of PNGPC long-
distance pipeline becomes 53 kkm. Failure data were filtered
(1) an unintentional loss of product from the pipeline, in order to be comparable with other countries. Only unin-
(2) within the public domain and outside the fences of tentional leakages for crude oil, refined oil, and natural gas
installations, for transmission lines are counted here.
(3) excluding associated equipment (e.g., valves, com- 2.4.1. Failure Frequency. Failure frequency has increased
pressors) or parts other than the pipeline itself. before 2011 and decreased in recent 5 years (see Figures 12 and
13).
2.3.1. Failure Frequency. From 1962 to 2014, altogether 192
leakages have been recorded. The overall failure frequency
2.4.2. Failure Causes. During 2006 to 2015, altogether 134
over the period 1962 to 2014 is 0.219 incidents per kkm⋅yr,
leakages have been recorded, among which, illegal tap,
while in the previous report this figure was 0.223 incidents per
manufacturing defects, and construction quality are the top
kkm⋅yr (covering the period from 1962 to 2013). The overall
3 causes (see Figure 14).
trend continues to show a reduction in failure frequency (see
Figure 10). (1) Illegal Tap. With the enhancement of legislation, failure of
this cause has a significant downward trend.
2.3.2. Failure Causes. The top 3 failure causes of UKOPA
are external corrosion, external interference, and girth weld (2) Manufacturing Defect. The majority of failures belong-
defects (see Figure 11). ing to this cause are due to spiral weld defects, which is
6 Journal of Petroleum Engineering

1 1
0.9 0.9
0.8
0.7 0.8
0.6 0.7
0.5
0.6
0.4
0.3 0.5
0.2 0.4
0.1
0 0.3
2006–2010

2007–2011

2008–2012

2009–2013

2010–2014

2011–2015
0.2
0.1
0

2006–2010

2007–2011

2008–2012

2009–2013

2010–2014

2011–2015
Oil pipeline
Gas pipeline
Oil & gas pipeline
PHSMA
Figure 13: Average failure frequencies by PNGPC. PNGPC

Figure 15: Compared failure frequencies for oil pipelines.

4% 1%
7%

0.2
0.18
0.16
9%
0.14
0.12
0.1
0.08
10%
0.06
0.04
0.02
50% 0
2006–2010

2007–2011

2008–2012

2009–2013

2010–2014

2011–2015
19%

PHSMA UKOPA
Illegal tap Third party PNGPC EGIG
Manufacturing defect Natural force damage
Construction quality Incorrect operation Figure 16: Compared failure frequencies for gas pipelines.
Corrosion

Figure 14: Failure causes by PNGPC.

causes damage on the pipes. As third party constructions

mostly happen in the economically active regions, conse-
significantly decreasing as the manufacturing quality im- quences are relatively serious.
proved and the vintage pipelines abandoned.

(3) Construction Quality. This mainly includes girth weld
defects, gouges, and dents. As the decreasing of illegal
tap and manufacturing defects and also the well-controlled
corrosion, construction quality becomes the top concerned
factor in China now.
(4) Corrosion. As for the abandonment of old pipelines
and all kinds of control methods, including periodic in-line
inspection, corrosion is not as serious as before. However,
pin-hole corrosions still cause failures, which are hardly
detected by MFL.
(5) Third Party. This is mainly due to the supervision escap-
ing, with unauthorized construction of third party, which
3. Analysis Result Comparisons
Investigation and referring to foreign related failure statistics
can provide good experience for domestic pipeline operators,
while figuring out their own management level for continu-
ous improvement.
3.1. Failure Frequencies. Compared with the failure frequen-
cies (5 years’ moving average) at home and abroad in the past
10 years, the value of PNGPC’s oil pipelines is higher than that
of the US, while that of PNGPC’s gas pipeline is roughly at the
same level compared to the US and slightly lower than the
European (see Figures 15 and 16).
Journal of Petroleum Engineering 7

3.2. Failure Causes Acknowledgments

(1) Illegal Tap. Restricted by the current situation of China’s
social and economic development, this cause becomes
China’s top 1 factor of pipeline failure during the last 10 years,
which rarely happens in the US and Europe. However, with
the strengthening of legislation and publicity, the frequency
is significantly reduced.
Preparation of this paper was supported by the PNGPC; this
is gratefully acknowledged by coauthors Dongpo Wang, Ting
Wang, Qingshan Feng, and Xinqi Yang. Thanks are also due
to numerous past and present colleagues for insights and
helpful discussions.

(2) Pipe/Weld Material Failure (Manufacturing Defect and References

Construction Defect). This factor leads to a higher proportion
of failures both at home and abroad. With the promotion of
technology and quality management, defects on pipe bodies
can be effectively controlled. However, due to various con-
straints, it is difficult to guarantee the construction quality.
Hence, girth weld defects, dents, gouges, and other defects
will still exist to certain degrees.
(3) Corrosion. As for the abandonment of vintage pipelines
and the promotion of integrity management, corrosion fail-
ures are effectively controlled, which is still one of the main
factors of failures generally.
(4) Third Party. Failures due to this factor always occur in
economically active areas between urban and rural both
at home and abroad. As for pipeline patrolling in the US
and Europe is not as timely and intensive as in China, the
proportion of failure caused by this factor is slightly higher
than that of China.
3.3. Failure Consequences. Compared with foreign countries,
failure consequence data is quite deficient in China. Only the
consequences of serious pipeline accidents will be recorded,
including casualties, economic losses, and leakage.
4. Conclusions and Suggestions
As for the concern from government and public on pipeline
safety in China, management has been significantly improved
by operators. Consequently, frequency of pipeline failures is
decreasing. According to the statistical results, PNGPC is not
very far compared with foreign countries. There are still some
aspects both in technology and in management that should be
improved, such as quality of manufacture and construction of
pipeline and third party monitoring.
[1] P. Hopkins, “Transmission pipelines: how to improve their
integrity and prevent failures,” in Pipeline Technology, Proceed-
ings of the 2nd international pipeline technology conference, R.
Denys, Ed., vol. 1, pp. 683–702, 1995.
[2] W. Y. Zheng, “Stress corrosion cracking of oil and gas pipelines
in near neutral pH environment: Review of recent research,”
Energy Materials: Materials Science and Engineering for Energy
Systems, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 220–226, 2008.
[3] T. Wang, W. Xuan, X. Wang et al., “Overview of oil and gas
pipeline failure database,” in Proceedings of International Con-
ference on Pipelines and Trenchless Technology, ICPTT 2013, pp.
1161–1167, chn, October 2013.
[4] H. L. Li, X. W. Zhao, and L. K. Ji, “Oil and gas pipeline failure
analysis and integrity management,” Testing - Physical Volume,
pp. 24–31, 2005.
[5] R. Singh, Pipeline Integrity Handbook: Risk Management and
Evaluation, vol. 51, Gulf Professional Publishing, UK, 2014.
[6] C. R. F. Azevedo, “Failure analysis of a crude oil pipeline,” Engi-
neering Failure Analysis, vol. 14, no. 6, pp. 978–994, 2007.
[7] PHMSA, http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/reports/safety/PSI
.html. 2015.
[8] EGIG, “9th report of the gas pipeline incidents of european gas
pipeline incident data group,” 2015.
[9] UKOPA, “UKOPA pipeline product loss incidents and faults
report (1962–2014),” 2015.

Nomenclature
PHMSA: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration
EGIG: European Gas Pipeline Incident Data
Group
UKOPA: United Kingdom Onshore Pipeline
Operators’ Association
PNGPC: PetroChina Natural Gas & Pipeline
Company.

Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest
regarding the publication of this paper.
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