Case Title Republic of the Philippines vs. Vda.

De Castellvi
G.R. no. L-20620
Main Topic Eminent Domain and Requisits
Other Related Topic None
Date: August 15, 1974

DOCTRINES
1. Eminent Domain
The requisites for taking are:
1. The expropriator must enter a private property;
2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;
3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;
4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected; and
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner
and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

FACTS:

In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a
lease agreement over a land in Pampanga with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis.
Before the expiration of the contract of lease on June 1956 the Republic sought to renew the same but
Castellvi refused. When AFP refused to vacate the leased premises after the termination of
contract, Castellvi wrote a letter to the Chief of Staff demanding that the property be vacated in 30 days for
they had decided to subdivide the property to sell to the general public; hereafter, the Chief of Staff
answered her saying that it was difficult for the army to vacate the premises in view of the
permanent installations and other facilities and worth Php 500,000.00 and there is no recourse
to acquire her property other than expropriation proceeding to be recommended to the
president. Castellvi then brought suit to eject the Phil Air Force from her property. While the
ejectment case was pending, the Republic instituted an expropriation proceeding the Republic was placed in
possession of the lands on Aug. The trial court appointed 3 Commissioners to determine the actual
fair market value of the lands sought to be expropriated. The Commissioners recommended
unanimously that the lowest price was Php 10 per square meter for both the lands of Castellvi
and Toledo – Gozun. But the D e f e n d a n t s c o n t e n d e d t h a t i t s h o u l d b e a r e 1 5 p e r s q u a r e
m e t e r , o n o n e h a n d , t h e R e p u b l i c averred that the fair market value of the lands of the appellees was
P.20 or at P2000 per hectare, as the lands in the year 1949 were valued at such

ISSUE:
Whether or not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just
compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property that year .

The requisites for taking are:

1. The expropriator must enter a private property;
2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;
3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;
4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected; and
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner
and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Only requisites 1, 3 and 4 are present. It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s
property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947
when the republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof.

Requisite number 2 is not present according to the Supreme Court, “momentary” when
applied to possession or occupancy of real property should be construed to mean “a limited
period” -- not indefinite or permanent. The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one
year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the property, under the lease, is
temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that the Republic, through AFP, constructed
some installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that the entry into the lant
was transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from year to year by consent
of the owner of the land. By express provision of the lease agreement the republic, as
lessee, undertook to return the premises in substantially the same condition as at the time
the property was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the intention of the lessee was
to occupy the land permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of permanent
improvements. But this “intention” cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the
lease contract.

The 5th requirement is also lacking. In the instant case the entry of the Republic into the
property and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her
of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Cstellvi remained as owner, and was
continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal of the lease
contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease contract whereby the Republic
undertook to return the property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was
Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic was
bound to pay, and had been paing, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the time when
it filed the complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.

It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property for purposes of eminent
domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced
to occupy the property as lessee thereof, and that the just compensation to be paid for the
Castellvi’s property should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of
that year. The lower court did not commit an error when it held that the “taking” of the
property under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case.

Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, “just compensation” is to be determined as of

the date of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of
the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for
eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of
the complaint.