PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S

ASSOCIATION vs. CELEDONIO AGRAVA

G.R. No. L-12426. February 16, 1959.

FACTS:
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled an
examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before
the Philippines Patent Office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers
and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said
examination. The petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examination sand is licensed
by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing is duly qualified
to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent Director’s holding an
examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.The
respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent cases “ does not involve entirely or purely
the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as a
matter of actual practice so as to include engineers and other individuals who passed the
examination can practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time he
is holding tests, this is the first time that his right has been questioned formally.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of
patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office,
the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their
applications for patent, their opposition thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases.
Moreover, the practice before the patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other
laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the
law of evidence and procedure. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation
in court but also embraces all other matters connected with the law and any work involving the
determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore, the law
provides that any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the
director. Thus, if the transactions of business in the Patent Office involved exclusively or mostly
technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a
court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the
case.
Lupangco vs. CA (G.R. No. 77372)

Facts:

On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued
Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees," to all those applying for
admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy:

No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive
any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or
the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar
institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day including examination
day.

Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of
the Rules and Regulations of the Commission.

On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in
accountancy schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all
others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for injunction
with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain
the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court had
no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of October 21,
1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent
commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be
unconstitutional. Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, an appeal with the
Court of Appeals. The petition was granted.

Issue:

Whether or not Resolution No. 105 is constitutional.

Held:

CA stated as basis its conclusion that PCS and RTC are co-equal branches. They relied heavily on the case
of National Electrification Administration vs. Mendoza where the Court held that a Court of First
Instance cannot interfere with the orders of SEC, the two being a co-equal branch.

SC said the cases cited by CA are not in point. It is glaringly apparent that the reason why the Court ruled
that the Court of First Instance could not interfere with the orders of SEC was that this was provided for
by the law. Nowhere in the said cases was it held that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over
all other government agencies. On the contrary, the ruling was specifically limited to the SEC. The
respondent court erred when it place he SEC and PRC in the same category. There is no law providing for
the next course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the PRC. What is clear
from PD No. 223 is that PRC is attached to the Office of the President for general direction and
coordination. Well settled in our jurisprudence the view that even acts of the Office of the President
may be reviewed by the RTC. In view of the foregoing, SC rules that RTC has jurisdiction to entertain the
case and enjoin PRC from enforcing its resolution.

As to the validity of Resolution No. 105, although the resolution has a commendable purpose which is to
preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations, the resolution is unreasonable in that an
examinee cannot even attend and review class, briefing, conference or the like or receive hand-out,
review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center. The
unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even
without ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations.

Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees’ right to
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they
should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations specially if the steps they take are lawful.

Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools
concerned. PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers believe
would best enable their enrollees to pass the examination. Unless the means and methods of instruction
are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers
may not be stopped from helping out their students.

The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure
examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. What is needed to be done by the respondent is
to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there.

The decision of the CA was REVERSE and SET ASIDE.

 CIR vs. Fortune Tobacco

September 28, 2011 G.R. No. 180006

Facts: Prior to January 1, 1997, the excises taxes on cigarettes were in the form of ad valorem taxes,
pursuant to Section 142 of the 1977 National Internal Revenue Code (1977 Tax Code). Beginning
January 1, 1997, RA 8240 took effect and a shift from ad valorem to specific taxes was made. A
portion of Section 142(c) of the 1977 Tax Code, as amended by RA 8240, reads in part:

“The specific tax from any brand of cigarettes within the next three (3) years of effectivity of this
Act shall not be lower than the tax [which] is due from each brand on October 1, 1996.

xxx

The rates of specific tax on cigars and cigarettes under paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) hereof, shall
be increased by twelve percent (12%) on January 1, 2000.”

To implement the 12% increase in specific taxes mandated under Section 145 of the 1997 Tax Code
and again pursuant to its rule-making powers, the CIR issued RR 17-99, which reads partly:

“Provided, however, that the new specific tax rate for any existing brand of cigars [and] cigarettes
packed by machine, distilled spirits, wines and fermented liquors shall not be lower than the excise
tax that is actually being paid prior to January 1, 2000.”

Pursuant to these laws, respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation paid in advance excise taxes and
filed an administrative claim for tax refund with the CIR for erroneously and/or illegally collected
taxes in the amount of P491 million.

In its decision, the CTA First Division ruled in favor of Fortune Tobacco and granted its claim for
refund. The CTA First Divisions ruling was upheld on appeal by the CTA en banc. The CIR’s motion
for reconsideration of the CTA en banc’s decision was denied in a resolution.

Issue: Whether or not Section 1 of RR 17-99 is an unauthorized administrative legislation on the

part of the CIR.

Ruling: Yes. The proviso in Section 1 of RR 17-99 clearly went beyond the terms of the law it was
supposed to implement, and therefore entitles Fortune Tobacco to claim a refund of the overpaid
excise taxes collected pursuant to this provision.

The rule on uniformity of taxation is violated by the proviso in Section 1, RR 17-99. Uniformity in
taxation requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike
both in privileges and liabilities. Although the brands all belong to the same category, the proviso in
Section 1, RR 17-99 authorized the imposition of different (and grossly disproportionate) tax rates.
It effectively extended the qualification stated in the third paragraph of Section 145(c) of the 1997
Tax Code that was supposed to apply only during the transition period. In the process, the CIR also
perpetuated the unequal tax treatment of similar goods that was supposed to be cured by the shift
from ad valorem to specific taxes.

The Court further said that the omission in the law in fact reveals the legislative intent not to adopt
the higher tax rule. It appears that despite its awareness of the need to protect the increase of
excise taxes to increase government revenue, Congress ultimately decided against adopting the
higher tax rule.


LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO,AGRICULTURAL
MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondents.

FACTS: The nature of the case is the consolidation of two separate petitions for review filed by
Department of Agrarian Reform and Land Bank of the Philippines, assailing the Court of Appeal’s
decision, which granted private respondents' petition for Certiorari and Mandamus.
Pedro Yap, Heirs of Emiliano Santiago, Agricultural Management and Development Corporation
or AMADCOR (private respondents) are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and
subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(RA 6657). Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation
and payment of compensation for their land, private respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition
questioning the validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 6 (1992) and No. 9 (1990), and sought to compel
the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just
compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts
respectively "earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to
allow them to withdraw the same. The Supreme Court referred the petition to CA for proper determination
and disposition. The CA found the following facts undisputed:
Respondents argued that Admin. Order No. 9 (1990) was issued in grave abuse of discretion
amounting excess in jurisdiction because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu
of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the
land before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. DAR and
the Landbank merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their names as
landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the property, the compensation
must be deposited in cash or in bonds. On the other hand, petitioner DAR contended that Admin Order
No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657.
The issuance of the "Certificate of Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial compliance with
Section 16(e) of RA 6657. Landbank averred that the issuance of the Certificates of Deposits is in
consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority where the
words"reserved/deposited" were also used.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in declaring as null and void DAR Admin Order No. 9 (1990) insofar
as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or in bonds
2. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that private respondents are entitled as a matter of right to
the immediate and provisional release of the amounts deposited in trust pending the final
resolution of the cases it has filed for just compensation.

RULING: 1. NO. Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 provides:

Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. (e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with
an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance
with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register
of Deeds to issue a TCT in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
It is explicit that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does
it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. There is no ambiguity in
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit". The conclusive
effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed
or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative
enactment.
The function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the
purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus
confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulations
cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment, forsettled is the rule that administrative
regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy
between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails.

2. YES. To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their
behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation (P
1,455,207.31 Pedro L. Yap/ P 135,482.12 Heirs of Emiliano Santiago/ P 15,914,127.77 AMADCOR), and
notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an
oppressive exercise of eminent domain. It is unnecessary to distinguish between provisional
compensation under Section 16(e) and final compensation under Section 18 for purposes of exercising
the landowners' right to appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both situations is the same; the
landowner is deprived of the use and possession of his property for which he should be fairly and
immediately compensated. Wherefore, petition is denied for lack of merit. Appealed decision is
affirmed.
Philippines Today, Inc v NLRC

G.R. No. 112965 January 30, 1997

FACTS:

Petitioner Philippines Today, Inc (PTI) is the owner of the Philippine Star, a daily newspaper of
national and international circulation, while the individual petitioners are officers and members of the
board of directors of PTI. On the other hand, Private Respondent Felix R. Alegre, Jr was employed by PTI
as a senior investigative reporter of the Philippine Star and later on became the chief investigative
writer and to the publisher.

Respondent Alegre filed a request for a 30 day leave of absence effective on the same date,
citing the advice of his personal physician for him to undergo further medical consultations abroad. Four
days later, he wrote a "Memorandum for File" which includes the following statements:

“It has never occurred to me that, in my acceptance of the invitation from no less than the
publisher himself, to join him at the Philippines Today, Inc., and the STAR Group of Publications, I was
unwittingly signing my own death warrant as well. The insults he had later on hurled at my person, the
malicious innuendoes he had spread around, casting doubts on my personal and professional integrity,
had mercilessly torn at my soul, causing metaphysical death.”……

“By and large, all that I got are the twin demons of a civilized, unconscionable society:
ECONOMIC INJUSTICE and PROFESSIONAL SABOTAGE.”…..

“When push comes to a shove . . . anything or everything comes crashing down. I'M HAVING IT ALL!”…..

“Thank you for everything. God bless.”

Respondent Alegre received a reply from Petitioner Belmonte, the chairman of the board stating therein
that the Board decided to accept the former’s resignation. Alegre thereafter wrote Belmonte expressing
surprise over the acceptance of his “resignation” because according to him no such move, however
implicit it may be, and no such letter has ever been made by him. As a result of the aforementioned
facts, Alegre accused petitioners of illegal dismissal.

Counsel for the petitioners on the other hand, explained that the acceptance of Alegre's resignation was
a collective decision of the board of directors since "nobody in his right mind would write a
memorandum of the sort he wrote and still not resign. To them, the memorandum was tantamount to a
resignation even if Mr. Alegre did not say so in so much words."

Alegre filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioners, the labor arbiter dismissed said
complaint and held that while it be said that nothing therein mentions about resigning from his position
as Assistant to the Publisher, a perusal of the letter as a whole shows that the intention of the
complainant was to resign from his post.
On appeal by Alegre, the above decision was set aside by the NLRC adopting the definition in Black's Law
Dictionary of resignation as a "formal renouncement or relinquishment of an office," it held that the
Respondent did not resign as there was no actual act of relinquishment to constitute complete and
operative resignation. The NLRC further held that the Respondent was constructively dismissed without
just cause because Alegre did not intend to resign but the board interpreted it as tantamount to
resignation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Memorandum for File of Respondent Alegre addressed to Petitioner
Belmonte constitutes a letter of resignation.

HELD:

After a thorough scrutiny of the Memorandum for File of Respondent Alegre and a careful deliberation
on the peculiar circumstances attendant to its writing and the antecedent, contemporaneous and
subsequent actions of private respondent, the SC hold that said memorandum juridically constituted a
letter of resignation.

The SC said that there is merit in the findings and conclusions drawn by the labor arbiter. They are more
in accord with prudence, common sense and sound judgment. The labor arbiter correctly deduced from
Alegre's memorandum and attendant actuations that he resigned. In contrast, the NLRC was too strict in
its interpretation of what constitutes "resignation." It adhered literally to the dictionary meaning of the
word without relating it to the peculiarity of the factual circumstances surrounding the case. Courts and
quasi-judicial bodies, in the exercise of their functions and in making decisions, must not be too
dogmatic as to restrict themselves to literal interpretations of words, phrases and sentences. A
complete and holistic view must be taken in order to render a just and equitable judgment.

In addition, respondent Alegre is a highly confidential employee who holds his job at the pleasure of his
employer or, stated otherwise, for as long as he enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer.
Corollarily, he likewise must repose trust and confidence in his employer or, at the very least, his
immediate superior. But any superior hurled with invectives from a confidential employee, much more
one occupying a managerial position at the same time, will definitely lose trust and confidence in the
latter. And there can be no way to interpret such letter other than as a withering of trust and confidence
by the employee in his boss. The use of offensive language can only mean expression of disloyalty and
disrespect. It renders the writer unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position. It is
beyond human nature to expect two persons with underlying mistrust in each other to continue to work
together effectively, not to say, harmoniously.
JUDGE TOMAS C. LEYNES, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), HON.
GREGORIA S. ONG, DIRECTOR, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and HON. SALVACION
DALISAY, PROVINCIAL AUDITOR, respondents.

Facts:

1. Petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes was formerly assigned to the Municipality of Naujan,
Oriental Mindoro as the sole presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court. He received:
a. Salary and representation and transportation allowance (RATA) from the SC
b. A monthly allowance of P944 from the local funds of of Naujan starting 1984

2. On March 15, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan, through Resolution No. 057, sought the
opinion of the Provincial Auditor and the Provincial Budget Officer regarding any
budgetary limitation on the grant of a monthly allowance by the municipality to petitioner
judge.
a. On May 7, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan unanimously approved Resolution No. 101
increasing petitioner judge’s monthly allowance from P944 to P1,600 starting May
1993.
b. In 1994, the Municipal Government of Naujan again provided for petitioner judge’s
P1,600 monthly allowance in its annual budget which was again approved by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Office of Provincial Budget and Management of
Oriental Mindoro.

3. On February 17, 1994, Provincial Auditor Salvacion M. Dalisay sent a letter to the
Municipal Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan directing them:
a. To stop the payment of the P1,600 monthly allowance or RATA
b. To require the immediate refund of the amounts previously paid to the judge.

4. She opined that the Municipality of Naujan could not grant RATA to petitioner judge in
addition to the RATA the latter was already receiving from the Supreme Court based on
Section 36, RA No. 7645, General Appropriations Act of 1993, stating that: “No one
shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one source.”

5. Petitioner judge appealed to COA Regional Director Gregoria S. Ong.

a. COA Reg Dir Ong upheld the opinion of Provincial Auditor Dalisay
b. She added that Resolution No. 101 failed to comply with Section 3 of Local Budget
Circular No. 53 outlining the conditions for the grant of allowances to judges and
other national officials or employees by the local government units, particularly “That
similar allowances/additional compensation are not granted by the national
government to the officials/employees assigned to the LGU.”

6. Petitioner judge appealed the unfavorable resolution of the Regional Director to the
Commission on Audit.
a. Disallowance of the payment of the P1,600 monthly allowance to petitioner was
issued. Thus he received his P1,600 monthly allowance from the Municipality of
Naujan only for the period May 1993 to January 1994.
 7. On September 14, 1999, the COA issued its decision affirming the resolution of Regional
Director Gregoria S. Ong. It ruled that:
a. The conflicting provisions of Section 447, Par. (1) (xi) of the Local Government Code
of 1991 (that the finances of the municipality allow the grant thereof) and
Section 36 of the General Appropriations Act of 1993 [RA 7645] (No one shall be
allowed to collect RATA from more than one source) have been harmonized by
the Local Budget Circular No. 53 dated 01 September 1993 (provided that similar
allowance/additional compensation are not granted by the national
government to the official/employee assigned to the local government unit),
issued by the Department of Budget and Management pursuant to its powers under
Section 25 and Section 327 of the Local Government Code;
b. The subject SB Resolution No. 101 dated 11 May 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Naujan, Oriental Mindoro is null and void;
c. The Honorable Judge Tomas C. Leynes, being a national government official is
prohibited to receive additional RATA from the local government fund.

8. Petitioner judge filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the COA. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner judge was entitled to receive the additional allowances
granted to him by the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, in addition to that provided by
the Supreme Court.

HELD:

The Court ruled in favor of petitioner judge.

a. An administrative circular cannot supersede, abrogate, modify or nullify a statute. A

statute is superior to an administrative circular, thus the latter cannot repeal or amend it.
 In the present case, NCC No. 67, being a mere administrative circular, cannot
repeal a substantive law like RA 7160.

b. Repeal of statutes by implication is not favored, unless it is manifest that the legislature
so intended. The legislature is assumed to know the existing laws on the subject and
cannot be presumed to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.
 There was no other provision in RA 7645 from which a repeal of Section
447(a)(1)(xi) of RA 7160 could be implied.

c. The presumption against implied repeal becomes stronger when one law is special and
the other is general. (Generalia specialibus non derogant or a general law does not
nullify a specific or special law)
 The reason for this is that the legislature, in passing a law of special character,
considers and makes special provisions for the particular circumstances dealt
with by the special law.
d. The General Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 7645), being a general law, could not have, by
mere implication, repealed Section 447(a)(1)(xi) of the Local Government Code (R.A.
No. 7160).

 In this case, RA 7160 (the LGC of 1991) is a special law which exclusively deals
with local government units (LGUs), outlining their powers and functions in
consonance with the constitutionally mandated policy of local autonomy.
 RA 7645 (the GAA of 1993) was a general law which outlined the share in the
national fund of all branches of the national government.
 Therefore, RA 7645 being a general law, could not have, by mere implication,
repealed RA 7160. Rather, RA 7160 should be taken as the exception to RA
7645 in the absence of circumstances warranting a contrary conclusion.

e. In construing NCC No. 67, force and effect should not be narrowly given to isolated and
disjoined clauses of the law but to its spirit, broadly taking all its provisions together in
one rational view.
 Because a statute is enacted as a whole and not in parts or sections, one part is
as important as the others, the statute should be construed and given effect as a
whole. A provision or section which is unclear by itself may be clarified by
reading and construing it in relation to the whole statute.
 Taking NCC No. 67 as a whole, what it seeks to prevent is the dual collection of
RATA by a national official from the budgets of “more than one national agency.”


 NCC No. 67 applies only to the national funds administered by the DBM, not the
local funds of the LGUs to prevent the much-abused practice of multiple
allowances, thus standardizing the grant of RATA by national agencies. By no
stretch of the imagination can NCC No. 67 be construed as nullifying the power
of LGUs to grant allowances to judges under the Local Government Code of
1991. It applies only to the national funds administered by the DBM, not the local
funds of LGUs.

f. To rule against the power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges will threaten the
principle of local autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution.
 The power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges and leaving to their discretion
the amount of allowances they may want to grant, depending on the availability
of local funds ensures the genuine and meaningful local autonomy of LGUs.

g. Section 3, paragraph (e) thereof is invalid.

 Section 3, paragraph (e) of LBC No. 53, by outrightly prohibiting LGUs from
granting allowances to judges whenever such allowances are (1) also granted by
the national government, or (2) similar to the allowances granted by the national
government, violates Section 447(a)(1)(xi) of the Local Government Code of 1991.

h. An ordinance must be presumed valid in the absence of evidence showing that it is not in
accordance with the law.
 The resolution of the Municipality of Naujan granting the P1,600 monthly allowance
to petitioner judge fully complied with the law. Therefore, valid.
People of the Phils v Que Po Lay
CITATION: 94 Phil 640 | GR No. 6791, March 29, 1954

FACTS:

The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and US
money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as required
under Circular No. 20.

Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette only on Nov.
1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay.

Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central
Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to suffer 6 months
imprisonment, pay fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become
effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties.

HELD:

It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and regulations of
the Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be published before
becoming effective. This is based on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published for the people to
be officially and specifically informed of such contents including its penalties.

Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de
oficio.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the
law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia
legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The
word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if
the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance
and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of

due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application
which have not been published have no force and effect.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as
to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature
may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous
publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any
bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires
act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be
directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their
dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding
unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure
and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or
cut unless the naked blade is drawn.