TONIO T.
CHUA, Petitioner, versus TOTAL OFFICE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES On February 28, 2000, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper
(TOPROS), INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 152808 | 2005-09-30
DOCTRINE:
 PERSONAL ACTION VIS-À-VIS REAL ACTION
Well-settled is the rule that an action to annul a contract of loan and its accessory
real estate mortgage is a personal action. In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the
recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract or the recovery of
damages. In contrast, in a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real
property, or, as indicated in Section 2 (a), Rule 4 of the then Rules of Court, a real
action is an action affecting title to real property or for the recovery of possession, or for
partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property.
 INDISPENSABE PARTY
The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction.
The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actuations of the court
null and void, because of that court's want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.Thus, whenever it appears to the court in the course
of a proceeding that an indispensable party has not been joined, it is the duty of the
court to stop the trial and order the inclusion of such party.
FACTS:
On December 28, 1999, respondent Total Office Products and Services, Inc.,
(TOPROS) lodged a complaint for annulment of contracts of loan and real estate
mortgage against herein petitioner Antonio T. Chua before the RTC of Pasig City. The
case was raffled to the sala of Judge Pahimna.
The said suit sought to annul a loan contract allegedly extended by petitioner to
respondent TOPROS in the amount of ten million four hundred thousand pesos
(P10,400,000) and the accessory real estate mortgage contract covering two parcels of
land situated in Quezon City as collateral.
Respondent’s Contention:
It appeared on the face of the subject contracts that TOPROS was represented by its
president John Charles Chang, Jr. However, TOPROS alleged that the purported loan
and real estate mortgage contracts were fictitious, since it never authorized anybody,
not even its president, to enter into said transaction.
Petitioner’s Contention:
venue. He contended that the action filed by TOPROS affects title to or possession of
the parcels of land subject of the real estate mortgage. He argued that it should thus
have been filed in the RTC of Quezon City where the encumbered real properties are
located, instead of Pasig City where the parties reside.
RTC Ruling:
On August 9, 2000, Judge Pahimna issued an order denying the motion to dismiss.
She reasoned that the action to annul the loan and mortgage contracts is a personal
action and thus, the venue was properly laid in the RTC of Pasig City where the parties
reside.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but denied.
Hence, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari
alleging that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the
ruling in the case of Pascual v. Pascual regarding the proper venue and consequently
adjudging to be a personal action a civil complaint for the annulment of an allegedly
fictitious contract.
CA Ruling:
The Court of Appeals dismissed said petition. It held that the authorities relied upon by
petitioner, namely Pascual v. Pascual and Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca are
inapplicable in the instant case but the case Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc.
wherein we ruled that an action for the cancellation of a real estate mortgage is a
personal action if the mortgagee has not foreclosed the mortgage and the mortgagor is
in possession of the premises, as neither the mortgagor's title to nor possession of the
property is disputed.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied.
ISSUES:
1. W/N an action to annul a loan and mortgage contract duly alleged as 'fictitious'
for being with absolutely no consideration is a personal action? YES
2. W/N Is John Charles Chang, Jr., the president of TOPROS who allegedly
lacked authority to enter into the disputed contracts of loan and real estate
mortgage, an indispensable party in this case? - NO
HELD:
1. W/N an action to annul a loan and mortgage contract duly alleged as
'fictitious' for being with absolutely no consideration is a personal
action? YES
Well-settled is the rule that an action to annul a contract of loan and its accessory real
estate mortgage is a personal action. In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the
recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract or the recovery of
damages. In contrast, in a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property,
or, as indicated in Section 2 (a), Rule 4 of the then Rules of Court, a real action is an
action affecting title to real property or for the recovery of possession, or for partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property.
In the Pascual case relied upon by petitioner is not applicable to the instant case. Note
that in Pascual, title to and possession of the subject fishpond had already passed to
the vendee. There was, therefore, a need to recover the said fishpond. But in the
instant case, ownership of the parcels of land subject of the questioned real
estate mortgage was never transferred to petitioner, but remained with TOPROS.
Thus, no real action for the recovery of real property is involved. This being the
case, TOPROS' action for annulment of the contracts of loan and real estate
mortgage remains a personal action.
Petitioner's reliance on the Banco Español-Filipino case is likewise misplaced. We held
therein that jurisdiction is determined by the place where the real property is located
and that personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant is nonessential and, in
fact, cannot be acquired. However the instant case bears no resemblance to the Banco
Español-Filipino case. In the first place, this is not an action involving foreclosure of real
estate mortgage. In the second place, none of the parties here is a nonresident. We find
no reason to apply here our ruling in Banco Español-Filipino.
The CA finds that Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. provides the proper
precedent in this case. It was held thereto that the cancellation of the mortgage lots was
a real action affecting title to real property, which should have been filed in the place
where the mortgaged lots were situated. Rule 4, Section 2 (a), of the then Rules of
Court, was applied, to wit:
SEC. 2. Venue in Courts of First Instance. - (a) Real actions. - Actions affecting title to,
or for recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of
mortgage on, real property, shall be commenced and tried in the province where the
property or any part thereof lies.
The Court pointed out in the Hernandez case that with respect to mortgage, the
rule on real actions only mentions an action for foreclosure of a real estate
mortgage. It does not include an action for the cancellation of a real estate
mortgage. Exclusio unios est inclusio alterius. The latter thus falls under the
catch-all provision on personal actions under paragraph (b) of the above-cited
section, to wit:
Thus, Pasig City, where the parties reside, is the proper venue of the action to
nullify the subject loan and real estate mortgage contracts. The Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error in upholding the orders of the Regional Trial Court
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the case on the ground of improper
venue.
2. W/N Is John Charles Chang, Jr., the president of TOPROS who allegedly
lacked authority to enter into the disputed contracts of loan and real
estate mortgage, an indispensable party in this case? - NO
The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction.
The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actuations of the court
null and void, because of that court's want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.Thus, whenever it appears to the court in the course
of a proceeding that an indispensable party has not been joined, it is the duty of the
court to stop the trial and order the inclusion of such party.
A person is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy
or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will
not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does
complete justice between them.
We note that although it is Chang's signature that appears on the assailed real estate
mortgage contract, his participation is limited to being a representative of TOPROS,
allegedly without authority. The document which constitutes as the contract of real
estate mortgage clearly points to petitioner and TOPROS as the sole parties-in-interest
to the agreement as mortgagee and mortgagor therein, respectively. Any rights or
liabilities arising from the said contract would therefore bind only the petitioner and
TOPROS as principal parties. Chang, acting as mere representative of TOPROS,
acquires no rights whatsoever, nor does he incur any liabilities, arising from the
said contract between petitioner and TOPROS. Certainly, in our view, the only
indispensable parties to the mortgage contract are petitioner and TOPROS alone.

SEC. 2 (b) Personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where
the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff
or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.

In the same vein, the action for annulment of a real estate mortgage in the present case
must fall under Section 2 of Rule 4, to wit:

SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or
any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where
he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
VIRGINIA GOCHAN, LOUISE GOCHAN, LAPU-LAPU REAL ESTATE
CORPORATION, FELIX GOCHAN AND SONS REALTY CORPORATION, MACTAN
REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. MERCEDES GOCHAN,
ALFREDO GOCHAN, ANGELINA GOCHAN-HERNAEZ, MA. MERCED GOCHAN
GOROSPE, CRISPO GOCHAN, JR., and MARLON GOCHAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 146089 | 2001-12-13
DOCTRINE:
Where a complaint is entitled as one for specific performance but nonetheless prays for
the issuance of a deed of sale for a parcel of land, its primary objective and nature is
one to recover the parcel of land itself and, thus, is deemed a real action. In such a
case, the action must be filed in the proper court where the property is located.
FACTS:
Respondents were stockholders both Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation and
the Mactan Realty Development Corporation.
Sometime in 1996, respondents offered to sell their shares in the two corporations to
the individual petitioners, the heirs of the late Ambassador Esteban Gochan, for and in
consideration of the sum of P200,000,000.00. Petitioners accepted and paid the said
amount to respondents.
Accordingly, respondents issued to petitioners the necessary "Receipts." They also
executed their respective "Release, Waiver and Quitclaim for any suit, action or
complaint against petitioners for whatever reason or purpose.
In turn, respondents required individual petitioners to execute a "promissory note,
undertaking not to divulge the actual consideration they paid for the shares of stock. For
this purpose, Crispo Gochan, Jr. drafted a document entitled "promissory note" in his
own handwriting and had the same signed by Felix Gochan, III, Louise Gochan and
Esteban Gochan, Jr.
Unbeknown to petitioners, Crispo Gochan, Jr. inserted in the "promissory note" a phrase
that says, "Said amount is in partial consideration of the sale.”
On April 3, 1998, respondents filed a complaint against petitioners for specific
performance and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.
Respondent Contention:
Respondents alleged that sometime in November 1996, petitioner Louise Gochan, on
behalf of all the petitioners, offered to buy their shares of stock, consisting of 254 shares
in the Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation and 1,624 shares of stock in the
Mactan Realty Development Corporation; and that they executed a Provisional
Memorandum of Agreement, wherein they enumerated several properties which are
considered as a consideration for the sale.
They claimed that they are entitled to the conveyance properties, in addition to the
amount of P200,000,000.00, which they acknowledge to have received from petitioners.
Further, respondents prayed for moral damages of P15,000,000.00, exemplary
damages of P2,000,000.00, attorney's fees of P14,000,000.00, and litigation expenses
of P2,000,000.00.
Petitioner’s Answer:
Petitioners filed their answer, raising the following affirmative defenses: (a) lack of
jurisdiction by the trial court for non-payment of the correct docket fees; (b)
unenforceability of the obligation to convey real properties due to lack of a written
memorandum thereof, pursuant to the Statute of Frauds; (c) extinguishment of the
obligation by payment; (d) waiver, abandonment and renunciation by respondent of all
their claims against petitioners; and (e) non-joinder of indispensable parties.
RTC Ruling:
On August 7, 1998, petitioners filed with the trial court a motion for a preliminary
hearing on the affirmative defenses but the trial court denies the said motion because
the matters sought to be preliminarily heard do not appear to be tenable.
For one, the statute of frauds does not apply in this case because the contract which is
the subject matter of this case is already an executed contract. For another, the
contention of the defendants that the claims of the plaintiffs are already extinguished by
full payment thereof does not appear to be indubitable because the plaintiffs denied
under oath the due execution and genuineness of the receipts. Then, still for another,
the contention that the complaint is defective because it allegedly has failed to
implead indispensable parties appears to be wanting in merit because the parties
to the memorandum of agreement adverted to in the complaint are all parties in
this case. Then the matter of payment of docketing and filing fees is not a fatal issue in
this case because the record shows that the plaintiffs had paid at least P165,000.00
plus in the form of filing and docketing fees. Finally, regarding exerting earnest efforts
toward a compromise by the plaintiffs, the defendants cannot say that there is an
absence of an allegation to this effect in the complaint because paragraph 11 of the
complaint precisely states that "before filing this case, earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made."
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the trial court.
Thus filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
CA Ruling:
CA rendered the appealed decision dismissing the petition.
Again, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the CA committed grave and palpable error in finding that the correct
docket fees have been paid? No
2. W/N The action filed is a real action? Yes
HELD:
The rule is well-settled that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fees.

The Court of Appeals found that the complaint was one for specific performance and
incapable of pecuniary estimation. We do not agree.

It is necessary to determine the true nature of the complaint in order to resolve the issue
of whether or not respondents paid the correct amount of docket fees therefor. In this
jurisdiction, the dictum adhered to is that the nature of an action is determined by the
allegations in the body of the pleading or complaint itself, rather than by its title or
heading. The caption of the complaint below was denominated as one for "specific
performance and damages." The relief sought, however, is the conveyance or transfer
of real property, or ultimately, the execution of deeds of conveyance in their favor of the
real properties enumerated in the provisional memorandum of agreement. Under these
circumstances, the case below was actually a real action, affecting as it does title
to or possession of real property.

In the case of Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena,[14] this Court held that a real action
is one where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property or, as indicated in section
2(a) of Rule 4 (now Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), a real action
is an action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property.

It has also been held that where a complaint is entitled as one for specific performance
but nonetheless prays for the issuance of a deed of sale for a parcel of land, its primary
objective and nature is one to recover the parcel of land itself and, thus, is deemed a
real action. In such a case, the action must be filed in the proper court where the
property is located:

In this Court, the appellant insists that her action is one for specific performance, and,
therefore, personal and transitory in nature.

In the case at bar, therefore, the complaint filed with the trial court was in the
nature of a real action, although ostensibly denominated as one for specific
performance. Consequently, the basis for determining the correct docket fees
shall be the assessed value of the property, or the estimated value thereof as
alleged by the claimant. Rule 141, Section 7, of the Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC, provides:

Section 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. - x x x

(b) xxx In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the
estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in
computing the fees.

In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering
that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by
the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required. The promulgation of the
decision in Manchester must have had that sobering influence on private respondent
who thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered by the respondent court. It triggered
his change of stance by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee
as may be ordered.
Spouses PATRICK JOSE and RAFAELA JOSE, petitioners, vs. Spouses HELEN
BOYON and ROMEO BOYON, respondents.
G.R. No. 147369 | 2003-10-23
DOCTRINE:
 Since of summons, especially for actions in personam, is essential for the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the resort to a
substituted service must be duly justified. Failure to do so would
invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.
 It must be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or summons by
publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem. The
first is an action against the thing itself instead of against the defendant's
person; in the latter, an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose is
to subject that individual's interest in a piece of property to the obligation or
loan burdening it.
FACTS:
On July 2, 1998, petitioners Patrick and Rafaela Jose lodged a complaint for specific
performance against respondents Helen and Romeo Boyon to compel them to facilitate
the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale. The action
was lodged before RTC of Muntinlupa which is presided by herein public respondent
Judge N.C. Perello.
On July 21, 1998, judge Perello, through the acting Branch Clerk of Court, issued
summons to the respondents. However substituted service was resorted to by the
process server allegedly because efforts to serve the summons personally to the
respondents failed.
On December 9, 1998, petitioners filed before the trial court an Ex-parte Motion for
Leave of Court to Effect Summons by Publication and public respondent issued grant
it.
Subsequently judge Perello, sans a written motion, issued an Order declaring herein
respondents in default for failure to file their respective answers. As a consequence,
petitioner were allowed to submit their evidence ex-parte.
RTC Ruling:
RTC ruled in favor of the spouses Jose. On its Resolution dated December 1999
Spouses Boyon are directed to execute the necessary document with the effect of
withdrawing the Affidavit of Loss they filed and annotated with the Register of Deeds of
Makati City so that title 'to the parcel of land subject of the Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of the Plaintiffs be transferred in their names.
On January 5, 2000 Helen Boyon, who was then residing in the United States of
America, was surprised to learn from her sister resolution issued by the respondent
court. Respondents then, filed an Ad Cautelam motioning questioning the validity if the
service of summons effected by the court a quo.
However Judge Perello denied the motion on the basis of the defaulted respondents'
supposed loss of standing in court.
On March 29, 2000, the respondent once again raised the issue of jurisdiction of the
trial court via a motion for reconsideration, but was denied.
The petitioners moved for the execution of the controverted judgment which was
granted.
Thereafter, respondents filed before the CA a Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the jurisdiction of the regional trial court
(RTC).
CA ruling:
The CA held that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over respondents because of the
invalid service of summons upon them.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the service of summons is invalid and defective thus the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondents? YES
2. W/N the specific performance filed by the portioner is an action in rem? NO
HELD:
Petitioner’s contention:
They submit that although the case filed before the trial court was denominated as an
action for specific performance, it was actually an action quasi in rem, because it
involved a piece of real property located in the Philippines. They further argue that in
actions quasi in rem involving ownership of a parcel of land, it is sufficient that the trial
court acquire jurisdiction over the res. Thus, the summons by publication, which they
effected subsequent to the substituted service of summons, was allegedly sufficient.
Respondent’s Contention:
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the proceedings in the trial court were
null and void because of the invalid and defective service of summons. According to
them, the Return of Summons issued by the process server of the RTC failed to state
that he had exerted earnest efforts to effect the service of summons. Respondents
contend that when summons is served by substituted service, the return must show that
it was impossible to serve the summons personally, and that efforts had been exerted
toward that end. Thus, noncompliance renders all proceedings relative thereto invalid.
Respondents argue that the case filed before the trial court was an action for specific
performance and, therefore, an action in personam. As such, the summons by
publication was insufficient to enable the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the
persons of respondents.
1. W/N the service of summons is invalid and defective thus the court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondents? YES
since service of summons, especially for actions in personam, is essential for the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the resort to a
substituted service must be duly justified. Failure to do so would invalidate all
subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds."
2. W/N the specific performance filed by the petitioner is an action in rem?
NO

It must be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or summons by

In general, trial courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem. The first is an
service of summons. Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the action against the thing itself instead of against the defendant's person; in the latter, an
Philippines, such service may be done by personal or substituted service. individual is named as defendant, and the purpose is to subject that individual's interest
in a piece of property to the obligation or loan burdening it.
Personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former
cannot be made promptly can the process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof
of service of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for specific
a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state performance directed against respondents. While the suit incidentally involved a
that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is piece of land, the ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue, since
residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of they did not assert any interest or right over it. Moreover, this Court has
the defendant.[7] It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these consistently declared that an action for specific performance is an action in
circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officer's return. The failure to personam.
comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of substituted
service renders the service of summons ineffective. Having failed to serve the summons on respondents properly, the RTC did not
validly acquire jurisdiction over their persons. Consequently, due process
demands that all the proceedings conducted subsequent thereto should be
In the instant case, it appears that the process server hastily and capriciously resorted deemed null and void.
to substituted service of summons without actually exerting any genuine effort to locate
respondents. A review of the records reveals that the only effort he exerted was to go
to No. 32 Ariza Drive, Camella Homes, Alabang on July 22, 1998, to try to serve the
summons personally on respondents. While the Return of Summons states that
efforts to do so were ineffectual and unavailing because Helen Boyon was in the
United States and Romeo Boyon was in Bicol, it did not mention exactly what
efforts -- if any -- were undertaken to find respondents. Furthermore, it did not
specify where or from whom the process server obtained the information on their
whereabouts.

Moreover, the requirements of substituted service of summons and the effect of

noncompliance with the subsequent proceedings therefor were discussed in Madrigal
v. Court of Appeals[13] as follows:

"In a long line of cases, this Court held that the impossibility of personal service justifying
availment of substituted service should be explained in the proof of service; why efforts
exerted towards personal service failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances
attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer's
Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld. It bears stressing that

MARGARITA ROMUALDEZ-LICAROS, petitioner, vs. ABELARDO B. LICAROS,
respondent.
G.R. No. 150656 | 2003-04-29
DOCTRINE:
Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the
country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service in four instances: (1)
when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action
relates to, or the subject of which is property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief
demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any
interest in property located in the Philippines; or (4) when the property of the
defendant has been attached within the Philippines.
In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under any
of three modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by
publication and sending a copy of the summons and order of the court by registered
mail to the defendant's last known address, also with leave of court; or (3) by any other
means the judge may consider sufficient.
FACTS:
Abelardo Licaros (Abelardo) and Margarita Romualdez-Licaros (Margarita) were
lawfully married on December 15, 1968. Out of this marital union were born 2 children,
marital differences, squabbles and irreconcilable conflicts transpired between the
spouses, such that sometime in 1979, they agreed to separate from bed and board.
In 1982, Margarita left for the United States and there, to settle down with her two (2)
children. In the United States, Margarita applied for divorce before the Superior Court
of California, County of San Mateo and was thereafter granted.
On August 17, 1990, Abelardo and Margarita executed an "Agreement of Separation of
Properties". This was followed-up by a petition filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains of the spouses and for the
approval of the agreement of separation of their properties. This was docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 2551. The said petition was granted.
On June 24, 1991, Abelardo commenced Civil Case for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Margarita, based on psychological incapacity. As Margarita was then
residing at 96 Mulberry Lane, Atherton, California, U.S.A., Abelardo initially moved that
summons be served through the International Express Courier Service. The court a quo
denied the motion. Instead, it ordered that summons be served by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, at the
same time furnishing respondent a copy of the order, as well as the corresponding
summons and a copy of the petition at the given address in the United States through
the Department of Foreign Affairs, all at the expense of Abelardo. Respondent was
given sixty (60) days after publication to file a responsive pleading.
On July 15, 1991, Process Server, Maximo B. Dela Rosa, submitted his Officer's Return
that he have served a copy of summons and complaint with annexes upon defendant
Margarita Romualdez-Licaros c/o DFA. (sent by Mail) thru Pat G. Martines receiving
Clerk of Department of Foreign Affairs a person authorized to receive this kind of
process who acknowledged the receipt thereof.
Abelardo was allowed to present his evidence ex-parte. On November 8, 1991, the
Decision was handed down declaring the marriage between Abelardo and Margarita
null and void.
Almost nine (9) years later, on April 28, 2000, Margarita received a letter from a certain
Atty. Valencia informing her that she no longer has the right to use the family name
"Licaros" inasmuch as her marriage to Abelardo had already been judicially dissolved
by the RTC of Makati. Asseverating to have immediately made some verifications and
finding the information given to be true, petitioner commenced the instant petition
alleging that trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for declaration
of marriage because of the improper service of summon to her.
CA Ruling:
The Court of Appeals also rejected Margarita's claim that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to hear and decide the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage for
improper service of summons on her. The case involves the marital status of the parties,
which is an action in rem or quasi in rem. The Court of Appeals ruled that in such an
action the purpose of service of summons is not to vest the trial court with jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, but "only" to comply with due process.
At bar, the case involves the personal (marital) status of the plaintiff and the defendant.
This status is the res over which the Philippine court has acquired jurisdiction. This is
also the kind of action which the Supreme Court had ruled that service of summons may
be served extraterritorially.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the trial has not acquired jurisdiction over the case due to improper
service of summon?
HELD:
Petitioner Contention:
Margarita insists that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over her person in the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage since she was never validly served with
summons. Neither did she appear in court to submit voluntarily to its jurisdiction.
Respondent’s Contention:
On the other hand, Abelardo argues that jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident publication and sending a copy of the summons and order of the court by registered
defendant in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not necessary. The trial and appellate mail to the defendant's last known address, also with leave of court; or (3) by any other
courts made a clear factual finding that there was proper summons by publication means the judge may consider sufficient.
effected through the Department of Foreign Affairs as directed by the trial court. Thus,
the trial court acquired jurisdiction to render the decision declaring the marriage a Applying the foregoing rule, the trial court required extraterritorial service of
nullity. summons to be effected on Margarita in the following manner:

1. W/N the trial has not acquired jurisdiction over the case due to improper x x x, service of Summons by way of publication in a newspaper of general
service of summon? circulation once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, at the same time,
furnishing respondent copy of this Order as well as the corresponding Summons
Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his
and copy of the petition at her given address at No. 96 Mulberry Lane, Atherton,
person.
California, U.S.A., thru the Department of Foreign Affairs, all at the expense of
petitioner
As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines,
The trial court's prescribed mode of extraterritorial service does not fall under the
Philippine courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of
first or second mode specified in Section 15 of Rule 14, but under the third mode.
acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court. But when
This refers to "any other means that the judge may consider sufficient."
the case is one of actions in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. In
such instances, Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the
person of the non-resident defendant is not essential.

Actions in personam and actions in rem or quasi in rem differ in that actions in personam
are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments. On the other hand,
actions in rem or quasi in rem are directed against the thing or property or status of a
person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world.

At the time Abelardo filed the petition for nullity of the marriage in 1991, Margarita was
residing in the United States. She left the Philippines in 1982 together with her two
children. The trial court considered Margarita a non-resident defendant who is not found
in the Philippines. Since the petition affects the personal status of the plaintiff, the
trial court authorized extraterritorial service of summons under Section 15, Rule
14 of the Rules of Court. The term "personal status" includes family relations,
particularly the relations between husband and wife.

Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the
country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service in four instances: (1)
when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action
relates to, or the subject of which is property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief
demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any
interest in property located in the Philippines; or (4) when the property of the
defendant has been attached within the Philippines.

In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under any

of three modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by

ASIAVEST LIMITED, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND ANTONIO
HERAS, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 128803 | 1998-09-25
DOCTRINE:
In an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-resident who does not
voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court, personal service of
summons within the state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over her
person. This method of service is possible if such defendant is physically present in the
country. If he is not found therein, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person
and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him.
On the other hand, in a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the
court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Nonetheless, summons must be served upon
the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely
for satisfying the due process requirements.
FACTS:
The plaintiff Asiavest Limited filed a complaint on December 3, 1987 against the
defendant Antonio Heras praying that said defendant be ordered to pay to the plaintiff
the amounts awarded by the Hong Kong Court Judgment dated December 28, 1984
and amended on April 13, 1987.
On March 3, 1988, the defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss. However, before the court
could resolve the said motion, a fire which partially razed the Quezon City Hall Building
totally destroyed the office of this Court, together with all its records, equipment and
properties.
On July 26, 1988, the plaintiff, through counsel filed a Motion for Reconstitution of
Case Records. The Court granted the said Motion and admitted the annexes attached
thereto as the reconstituted records of this case. Thereafter, the Motion to Dismiss, the
resolution of which had been deferred, was denied by the Court in its Order of October
4, 1988.
On October 19, 1988, defendant filed his Answer. The case was then set for pre-trial
conference. At the conference, the parties could not arrive at any settlement. However,
they agreed on the following stipulations of facts:
1) The defendant admits the existence of the judgment dated December 28, 1984
as well as its amendment dated April 13, 1987, but not necessarily the
authenticity or validity thereof;
2) The plaintiff is not doing business and is not licensed to do business in the
Philippines;
3) The residence of defendant, Antonio Heras, is New Manila, Quezon City.
Asiavest presented only documentary evidence to show rendition, existence, and
authentication of such judgment by the proper officials concerned, it also presented
testimonial and documentary evidence to show its entitlement to attorney’s fees and
other expenses of litigation
On the other hand, the Heras presented two witnesses, namely, Fortunata dela Vega
and Russel Warren Lousich.
Ms. dela Vega’s testified that as the personal secretary of Mr. Heras that no writ of
summons or copy of a statement of claim of Asiavest Limited was ever served in the
office of the Navegante Shipping Agency Limited and/or for Mr. Antonio Heras, and that
no service of the writ of summons was either served on the defendant at his residence
in New Manila, Quezon City.
Mr. Lousich was presented as an expert on the laws of Hong Kong, and as a
representative of the law office of the defendant’s counsel who made a verification of
the record of the case filed by the plaintiff in Hong Kong against the defendant, as well
as the procedure in serving Court processes in Hong Kong.
He attested that defendant was sued on the basis of his personal guarantee of the
obligations of Compania Hermanos de Navegacion S.A. There is no record that a writ
of summons was served on the person of the defendant in Hong Kong, or that any such
attempt at service was made. Likewise, there is no record that a copy of the judgment
of the High Court was furnished or served on the defendant; anyway, it is not a legal
requirement to do so under Hong Kong laws.
RTC’s Ruling:
The trial court held that since the Hong Kong court judgment had been duly proved, it
is a presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties; hence, the party impugning
it had the burden to prove want of jurisdiction over his person. HERAS failed to
discharge that burden. He did not testify to state categorically and under oath that he
never received summons.
ASIAVEST moved for the reconsideration of the decision. It sought an award of judicial
costs and an increase in attorney’s fees. On the other hand, HERAS no longer opposed
the motion and instead appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.
CA Decision:
CA rendered its decision reversing the decision of the trial court and dismissing
ASIAVEST’s complaint without prejudice. It underscored the fact that a foreign judgment
does not of itself have any extraterritorial application. For it to be given effect, the foreign
tribunal should have acquired jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter. If such
tribunal has not acquired jurisdiction, its judgment is void.
ISSUE:
 1. W/N the summon was properly and validly served to Heras? NO (1) substituted service set forth in Section 8;[21]

It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court;
of process upon the defendant are governed by the lex fori or the law of the forum, i.e.,
the law of Hong Kong in this case. HERAS insisted that according to his witness Mr. (3) service by publication, also with leave of court;[22] or
Lousich, who was presented as an expert on Hong Kong laws, there was no valid
(4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient. [23]
service of summons on him. He stated further that under Hong Kong laws:

(a) a writ of summons could be served by the solicitor of the claimant or plaintiff; and
(b) where the said writ or claim was not contested, the claimant or plaintiff was not
required to present proof under oath in order to obtain judgment.
On cross-examination by counsel for ASIAVEST, Lousich testified that the Hong Kong
court authorized service of summons on HERAS outside of its jurisdiction, particularly
in the Philippines. He admitted also the existence of an affidavit of one Jose R.
Fernandez of the Sycip Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan law firm stating that he
(Fernandez) served summons on HERAS on 13 November 1984 at No. 6, 1st St.,
Quezon City, by leaving a copy with HERAS’s son-in-law Dionisio Lopez. On redirect
examination, Lousich declared that such service of summons would be valid under
Hong Kong laws provided that it was in accordance with Philippine laws.
There is, however, nothing in the testimony of Mr. Lousich that touched on the
specific law of Hong Kong in respect of service of summons either in actions in
rem or in personam, and where the defendant is either a resident or nonresident
of Hong Kong. In view of the absence of proof of the Hong Kong law on this
particular issue, the presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called
processual presumption shall come into play. It will thus be presumed that the
Hong Kong law on the matter is similar to the Philippine law. [17]
As stated in Valmonte vs. Court of Appeals,[18]
it will be helpful to determine first whether
the action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem because the rules on service of
summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines apply according to the
nature of the action.
An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability.
An action in rem is an action against the thing itself instead of against the person. [19] An
action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is named as defendant and the purpose
of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the
property.[20]
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for
the court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of
a resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by
personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time,
substituted service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is
temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted
to:
However, in an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-resident who does
not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons
within the state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over her person. This method
of service is possible if such defendant is physically present in the country. If he is not
found therein, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot
validly try and decide the case against him.[25] An exception was laid down in Gemperle
v. Schenker[26] wherein a non-resident was served with summons through his wife, who
was a resident of the Philippines and who was his representative and attorney-in-fact in
a prior civil case filed by him; moreover, the second case was a mere offshoot of the
first case.
On the other hand, in a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the
court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Nonetheless, summons must be served upon
the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for
satisfying the due process requirements. Thus, where the defendant is a non-resident
who is not found in the Philippines and
(1) the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff;
(2) the action relates to, or the subject matter of which is property in the Philippines in
which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest;
(3) the action seeks the exclusion of the defendant from any interest in the property
located in the Philippines; or
(4) the property of the defendant has been attached in the Philippines -- service of
summons may be effected by
(a) personal service out of the country, with leave of court;
(b) publication, also with leave of court; or
(c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.[28]
In the case at bar, the action filed in Hong Kong against HERAS was in
personam, since it was based on his personal guarantee of the obligation of the
principal debtor. Before we can apply the foregoing rules, we must determine first
whether HERAS was a resident of Hong Kong.
Significantly, in the pre-trial conference, the parties came up with stipulations of facts,
among which was that "the residence of defendant, Antonio Heras, is New Manila, Section 18, which allows extraterritorial service on a resident defendant who is
Quezon City." temporarily absent from the country, because even if HERAS be considered as a
resident of Hong Kong, the undisputed fact remains that he left Hong Kong not
We note that the residence of HERAS insofar as the action for the enforcement of the only "temporarily" but "for good.
Hong Kong court judgment is concerned, was never in issue. He never challenged the
service of summons on him through a security guard in his Quezon City residence and "
through a lawyer in his office in that city. In his Motion to Dismiss, he did not question
the jurisdiction of the Philippine court over his person on the ground of invalid service of
summons. What was in issue was his residence as far as the Hong Kong suit was
concerned. We therefore conclude that the stipulated fact that HERAS "is a resident of
New Manila, Quezon City, Philippines" refers to his residence at the time jurisdiction
over his person was being sought by the Hong Kong court. With that stipulation of fact,
ASIAVEST cannot now claim that HERAS was a resident of Hong Kong at the time.

Accordingly, since HERAS was not a resident of Hong Kong and the action
against him was, indisputably, one in personam, summons should have been
personally served on him in Hong Kong. The extraterritorial service in the
Philippines was therefore invalid and did not confer on the Hong Kong court
jurisdiction over his person. It follows that the Hong Kong court judgment cannot
be given force and effect here in the Philippines for having been rendered without
jurisdiction.

Even assuming that HERAS was formerly a resident of Hong Kong, he was no
longer so in November 1984 when the extraterritorial service of summons was
attempted to be made on him. As declared by his secretary, which statement was
not disputed by ASIAVEST, HERAS left Hong Kong in October 1984 "for
good."[40] His absence in Hong Kong must have been the reason why summons
was not served on him therein; thus, ASIAVEST was constrained to apply for
leave to effect service in the Philippines, and upon obtaining a favorable action
on the matter, it commissioned the Sycip Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan law firm
to serve the summons here in the Philippines.

In Brown v. Brown,[41] the defendant was previously a resident of the Philippines.

Several days after a criminal action for concubinage was filed against him, he
abandoned the Philippines. Later, a proceeding quasi in rem was instituted against him.
Summons in the latter case was served on the defendant’s attorney-in-fact at the latter’s
address. The Court held that under the facts of the case, it could not be said that the
defendant was "still a resident of the Philippines because he ha[d] escaped to his
country and [was] therefore an absentee in the Philippines." As such, he should have
been "summoned in the same manner as one who does not reside and is not found in
the Philippines."

Similarly, HERAS, who was also an absentee, should have been served with
summons in the same manner as a non-resident not found in Hong Kong. Section
17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court providing for extraterritorial service will not
apply because the suit against him was in personam. Neither can we apply

BIENVENIDO EJERCITO and JOSE MARTINEZ, Petitioners, versus M.R. VARGAS
CONSTRUCTION, MARCIAL R. VARGAS, Sole Owner, RENATO AGARAO,**
Project Foreman, Respondents.
G.R. No. 172595 | 2008-04-10
DOCTRINE:
A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and
distinct from the personality of the owner of the enterprise. The law does not vest
a separate legal personality on the sole proprietorship or empower it to file or
defend an action in court. Only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized
by law may be parties to a civil action and every action must be prosecuted and
defended in the name of the real parties-in-interest.
FACTS:
On March 2004, the City Government of Quezon City, represented by Mayor Belmonte,
Jr., entered into a construction contract with M.R. Vargas Construction, represented by
Marcial Vargas in his capacity as general manager, for the improvement and concreting
of Panay Avenue. Pursuant to the contract, the business enterprise commenced its
clearing operations by removing the structures and uprooting the trees along the
thoroughfare. Its foreman, Renato Agarao, supervised the clearing operations.
Claiming that the clearing operations lacked the necessary permit and prior
consultation, petitioners Bienvenido Ejercito and Jose Martinez, as well as a certain
Oscar Baria, brought the matter to the attention of the barangay authorities, Mayor
Belmonte Senator. Madrigal, the DENR and the Philippine Coconut Authority.
The efforts of petitioners proved unsuccessful. Hence, on they filed a petition for
injunction before the Quezon City RTC. The petition named "M.R. Vargas Construction
Co., represented by herein Marcial R. Vargas and Renato Agarao," as respondent.
The petition was accompanied with an application for a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction. Thus, the Clerk of Court forthwith issued
summons and notice of raffle. Upon service, they were returned unserved on the ground
that respondent enterprise was unknown thereat.
The petition was subsequently raffled to the sala of Judge Jacob. He issued a TRO
directing respondent enterprise to desist from cutting, damaging or transferring the trees
found along Panay Avenue. On the same day, Agarao was also present in court.
On 23 September 2004, the Mangoba Tan Agus Law Offices filed a special appearance
on behalf of respondent enterprise and moved for the dismissal of the petition as well
as the quashal of the temporary restraining order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over respondent enterprise.
The motion to dismiss the petition and to quash the TRO was heard on 24 September
2004. Before the hearing, a court interpreter showed to respondent enterprise's counsel
a copy of the summons and of the notice of raffle in which appear a signature at the
bottom of each copy, apparently indicating the receipt of the summons. On the mistaken
belief that the summons was received by respondent enterprise, at the hearing of the
motion, its counsel withdrew two of the grounds stated in the motion, to wit, lack of
jurisdiction and irregularity in the raffle of the case.
On 7 October 2004, counsel for respondent enterprise filed a manifestation with urgent
omnibus motion to nullify the proceedings and to cite petitioners and the process server
in contempt of court. He argued that respondent enterprise failed to receive the
summons, alleging that it was herein petitioner Jose Martinez who signed as recipient
thereof as well as of the notice of raffle that was served
RTC Ruling:
RTC nullify the proceedings thus far conducted in the case. Petitioners sought
reconsideration, but the motion was denied.
Thus, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
CA Ruling:
The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration
was also denied.
ISSUE:
1. W/N proper summon was served to respondent M.R Cargas Construction? NO
2. W/N respondent enterprise waived the defense of lack of jurisdiction when its
counsel actively demanded positive action on the omnibus motion? NO
HELD:
1. W/N proper summon was served to respondent M.R Cargas
Construction? NO
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or
the defendant's voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily
submit to the court's jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, any
judgment of the court, which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null
and void. In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the defendant is
the preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the
defendant in person.
Citing the jurisdictional implications of the failure of service of summons, the Court of
Appeals concluded that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by Judge Jacob in
nullifying the proceedings thus far conducted in the case based on the finding that the
summons had not been served on respondent enterprise and that Agarao, despite being
present at the 15 September 2004 hearing, was not authorized to represent respondent
enterprise in said hearing.
At the outset, it is worthy to note that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court found
that summons was not served on respondent enterprise. The Officer's Return stated
essentially that the server failed to serve the summons on respondent enterprise
because it could not be found at the address alleged in the petition. This factual finding,
especially when affirmed by the appellate court, is conclusive upon this Court and
should not be disturbed because this Court is not a trier of facts.
A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and
distinct from the personality of the owner of the enterprise. The law does not vest
a separate legal personality on the sole proprietorship or empower it to file or
defend an action in court. Only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized
by law may be parties to a civil action and every action must be prosecuted and
defended in the name of the real parties-in-interest.
The records show that respondent enterprise, M.R. Vargas Construction Co., is a
sole proprietorship and, therefore, an entity without juridical personality. Clearly,
the real party-in-interest is Marcial R. Vargas who is the owner of the enterprise.
Thus, the petition for injunction should have impleaded him as the party
respondent either simply by mention of his name or by denominating him as
doing business under the name and style of "M.R. Vargas Construction Co." It
was erroneous to refer to him, as the petition did in both its caption and body, as
representing the enterprise. Petitioners apparently realized this procedural lapse when
in the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals and in the instant petition,
M.R. Vargas Construction, Marcial R. Vargas and Renato Agaro were separately named
as individual respondents.
Since respondent enterprise is only a sole proprietorship, an entity without
juridical personality, the suit for injunction may be instituted only against its
owner, Marcial Vargas. Accordingly summons should have been served on
Vargas himself, following Rule 14, Sections 6[36] and 7[37] of the Rules of Court
on personal service and substituted service. In the instant case, no service of
summons, whether personal or substituted, was effected on Vargas. It is well-
established that summons upon a respondent or a defendant must be served by
handing a copy thereof to him in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering
it to him. Personal service of summons most effectively ensures that the notice
desired under the constitutional requirement of due process is accomplished. If
however efforts to find him personally would make prompt service impossible,
service may be completed by substituted service, i.e., by leaving copies of the
summons at his dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein or by leaving the copies at his office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
The modes of service of summons should be strictly followed in order that the court may
acquire jurisdiction over the respondents, and failure to strictly comply with the
requirements of the rules regarding the order of its publication is a fatal defect in the
service of summons. It cannot be overemphasized that the statutory requirements on
service of summons, whether personally, by substituted service or by publication, must
be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any mode of service other than that
prescribed by the statute is considered ineffective.
Agarao was not a party respondent in the injunction case before the trial court. Certainly,
he is not a real party-in-interest against whom the injunction suit may be brought, absent
any showing that he is also an owner or he acts as an agent of respondent enterprise.
Agarao is only a foreman, bereft of any authority to defend the suit on behalf of
respondent enterprise. As earlier mentioned, the suit against an entity without juridical
personality like respondent enterprise may be instituted only by or against its owner.
Impleading Agarao as a party-respondent in the suit for injunction would have no legal
consequence. In any event, the petition for injunction described Agarao only as a
representative of M.R. Vargas Construction Co., which is a mere inconsequentiality
considering that only Vargas, as its sole owner, is authorized by the Rules of Court to
defend the suit on behalf of the enterprise.
Despite Agarao's not being a party-respondent, petitioners nevertheless confuse his
presence or attendance at the hearing on the application for TRO with the notion of
voluntary appearance, which interpretation has a legal nuance as far as jurisdiction is
concerned. While it is true that an appearance in whatever form, without explicitly
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person, the appearance must constitute a positive act
on the part of the litigant manifesting an intention to submit to the court's jurisdiction.
Thus, in the instances where the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the trial court over the
person of the defendant, the parties showed the intention to participate or be bound by
the proceedings through the filing of a motion, a plea or an answer.
2. W/N respondent enterprise waived the defense of lack of jurisdiction
when its counsel actively demanded positive action on the omnibus
motion? NO
It should be noted that when the defendant's appearance is made precisely to object to
the jurisdiction of the court over his person, it cannot be considered as appearance in
court. Such was the purpose of the omnibus motion, as counsel for respondent
enterprise precisely manifested therein that he erroneously believed that Vargas himself
had received the summons when in fact it was petitioner Martinez who signed as
recipient of the summons. Noteworthy is the fact that when the counsel first appeared
in court his appearance was "special" in character and was only for the purpose of
questioning the court's jurisdiction over Vargas, considering that the latter never
received the summons. However, the counsel was shown a copy of the summons where
a signature appears at the bottom which led him to believe that the summons was
actually received by Vargas when in fact it was petitioner Martinez himself who affixed
his signature as recipient thereof. When the counsel discovered his mistake, he lost no
time pleading that the proceedings be nullified and that petitioners and the process
server be cited for contempt of court. Both the trial and appellate courts concluded that
the improvident withdrawal of the defense of lack of jurisdiction was an innocuous error,
proceeding on the undeniable fact that the summons was not properly served on
Vargas.
ROGELIA DACLAG and ADELINO DACLAG (deceased) Substituted by RODEL M.
DACLAG and ADRIAN M. DACLAG, Petitioners, versus LORENZA HABER and
BENITA DEL ROSARIO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 159578 | 2008-07-28
FACTS:
During their lifetime, spouses Candido and Gregoria Macahilig were the owners of
seven parcels of land, all located in Numancia, Aklan. They had seven children, namely:
Dionesio, Emeliano, Mario, Ignacio, Eusebio, Tarcela and Maxima.
On Maxima entered into a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition with the heirs of her deceased
brothers, Mario and Eusebio Macahilig, over the seven parcels of land. The same deed
stated that Dionesio was already deceased but was survived by his daughter, Susana
Briones; Emeliano was out of the country; Ignacio and Tarcela were also both deceased
but were survived by three children each.
One of the properties partitioned in the Deed was a parcel of irrigated riceland in the
name of Maxima which was denominated under a Tax Declaration as "Parcel One."
This Parcel One was divided between Vicenta Macahilig Galvez for the heirs of Mario
Macahilig, who was given the one half southern portion of the land; and Adela Macahilig
for the heirs of Eusebio Macahilig, who got the one half northern portion. The Deed was
notarized by Municipal Judge Ureta. The heirs of Eusebio Macahilig are the herein
respondents.
On March 19, 1982, Maxima executed a Statement of Conformity in which she
confirmed the execution of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and conformed to the
manner of partition and adjudication made therein; that she waived, renounced and
relinquished all her rights to the land adjudicated to all her co-heirs in the deed; and that
she had already sold one parcel before the deed was executed, which was considered
as her advance share. Pedro Divison, Maxima's husband, also affixed his signature to
the Statement of Conformity.
On May 23, 1984, Maxima sold Parcel One to spouses Adelino and Rogelia Daclag
(petitioners)as evidenced by a Deed of Sale. July 17, 1984, an OCT was issued in the
name of petitioner Rogelia M. Daclag by virtue of her free patent application
On December 16, 1991, Elino Macahilig, Adela Macahilig, Conrado Macahilig, Lorenza
Haber and Benita del Rosario (respondents) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Kalibo, Aklan a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership, cancellation of
documents and damages against Maxima and petitioner.
Respondent’s Contention:
Respondents alleged that they were the lawful owners and previous possessors of the
one half northern portion of Parcel One by virtue of a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition;
that since they were all residents of Caloocan City, their land was possessed by their
first cousin, Penicula Divison Quijano, Maxima's daughter, as tenant thereon, as she
was also in possession of the one half southern portion as tenant of the heirs of Mario
Macahilig;
that sometime in 1983, upon request of Maxima and out of pity for her as she had no
share in the produce of the land, Penicula allowed Maxima to farm the land; that without
their knowledge, Maxima illegally sold the entire riceland to petitioners, who are now in
possession of the land.
Petitioner’s Contention:
In their Answer with Cross-Claim, petitioners contended that: petitioner Rogelia had
been the registered owner of the entire riceland since 1984 as evidenced by her OCT;
her title had become incontrovertible after one year from its issuance. That they
purchased the subject land in good faith and for value from co-defendant Maxima who
was in actual physical possession of the property and who delivered and conveyed the
same to the. That also respondents were barred by laches for the unreasonable delay
in filing the case.
They also filed a cross-claim against Maxima for whatever charges, penalties and
damages that respondents may demand from them; and be ordered to pay them
damages for the fraud and misrepresentation committed against them.
Respondents subsequently filed an Amended Complaint, upon learning that petitioners
were issued OCT by virtue of their free patent application, and asked for the
reconveyence of the one half northern portion of the land covered by such title.
RTC Ruling:
RTC declared Maxima in default both in the complaint and cross-claim against her For
failure of Maxima to file an answer.
RTC rendered the deed of sale executed by Maxima in favor of Adelino Daclag and
Rogelia Daclag declared NULL and VOID and respondents. The petitioners are hereby
declared the true and lawful owners.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed their appeal with the CA.
CA Decision:
The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision.
The CA ruled that since Maxima had no right to sell the land as she was not the rightful
owner thereof, nothing was conveyed to petitioners; that a person who acquired
property from one who was not the owner and had no right to dispose of the same,
obtained the property without right of title, and the real owner may recover the same
from him.
Thus, aggrieved petitioner file before the SC for petition for review under rule 45.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the SC may review or resolve factual issues presented in trial court? NO.
Preliminarily, we would like to state the inescapable fact that the Extra-judicial partition
of the estate of Candido Macahilig involving the seven parcels of land was made only
between Maxima and the heirs of her two deceased brothers Mario and Eusebio.
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the decedent left no
will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without
securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by
means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they
disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action for partition. x x x
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section;
but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof.
northern portion of such land was owned by the respondents; that Maxima had no right
to dispose of the land and, thus, she had no right to convey the same.
Petitioners claim that the subject land is a public land, and that petitioners were issued
title over this land in 1984; that respondents did not present any evidence to prove that
the subject land was already a private land prior to their acquisition and the issuance of
a free patent title to them; that the presumption that the subject land was formerly part
of the mass of alienable lands of public domain under the Regalian doctrine, and was
regularly granted to petitioners by way of free patent and certificate of title, remains
incontrovertible in favor of petitioner.
This issue was only raised for the first time in petitioners' Memorandum filed with us.
Well-settled is the rule that issues not raised and/or ventilated in the trial court cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal and cannot be considered for review - to consider
questions belatedly raised tramples on the basic principles of fair play, justice and due
process.

Records do not show that there has been any case filed by the other heirs who had not
participated in the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and were questioning the validity of (Caveat: Di ko talaga magets anong issue dito, di ko gets unsay connect nya sa
such partition. Thus, the resolution of the present case concerns only the issues atong topic.. huhu)
between the parties before us and will not in any way affect the rights of the other heirs
who have not participated in the partition.

The first two issues raised for resolution are factual. It is a settled rule that in the exercise
of the Supreme Court's power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not
normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending
parties during the trial of the case, considering that the findings of facts of the CA are
conclusive and binding on the Court.[10] While jurisprudence has recognized several
exceptions in which factual issues may be resolved by this Court, namely: (1) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the CA went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, could
justify a different conclusion,[11] none of these exceptions has been shown to apply to
the present case and, hence, this Court may not review the findings of fact made by the
lower courts.

We find no cogent reason to depart from the findings of both the trial court and the CA
that Maxima was not the owner of the land she sold to petitioners, and that the one half
DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL ROBERTO LASTIMOSO, ACTING CHIEF
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), DIRECTORATE FOR PERSONNEL AND
RECORDS MANAGEMENT (DPRM), INSPECTOR GENERAL, P/CHIEF SUPT.
RAMSEY OCAMPO and P/SUPT. ELMER REJANO, petitioners,
vs.
P/SENIOR INSPECTOR JOSE J. ASAYO, respondent.
G.R. No. 154243 December 22, 2007
FACTS:
Before the Court is respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the Court
holding that the Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the civilian complaint against respondent and that the latter was accorded
due process during the summary hearing.
Respondent argues that the decision should be reconsidered for the following
reasons:
1. The summary proceeding was null and void because no hearing was conducted;
and
2. The evidence presented at the summary hearing does not prove that respondent is
guilty of the charges against him.
Respondent insists that the summary hearing officer did not conduct any hearing at all
but only relied on the affidavits and pleadings submitted to him, without propounding
further questions to complainant's witnesses, or calling in other witnesses such as PO2
Villarama. It should, however, be borne in mind that the fact that there was no full-blown
trial before the summary hearing officer does not invalidate said proceedings.
In Samalio v. Court of Appeals,1the Court reiterated the time-honored principle that:
Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings
similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through
oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. The standard of
due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of
latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. In other words, it is not legally
objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative agency to
resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary
evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place
of their direct testimony.
The first issue presented by respondent must, therefore, be struck down.
To resolve the second issue, respondent would have the Court re-calibrate the weight
of evidence presented before the summary hearing officer, arguing that said evidence
is insufficient to prove respondent's guilt of the charges against him.
ISSUE:
1. W/N certiorari under rule 65 filed before the trial court is the proper
remedy of the respondent? YES
HELD:
However, it must be emphasized that the action commenced by respondent before the
Thus Regional Trial Court is one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and
as held in People v. Court of Appeals,3 where the issue or question involved affects the
wisdom or legal soundness of the decision – not the jurisdiction of the court to render
said decision – the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari.
Yet, respondent-movant's arguments and the fact that the administrative case against
respondent was filed way back in 1997, convinced the Court to suspend the rules of
procedure.
The general rule is that the filing of a petition for certiorari does not toll the
running of the period to appeal.4
However, Section 1, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules shall be
liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy
and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. In Ginete v. Court of
Appeals5 and Sanchez v. Court of Appeals,6 the Court saw it proper to suspend
rules of procedure in order to promote substantial justice where matters of life,
liberty, honor or property, among other instances, are at stake.
The present case clearly involves the honor of a police officer who has rendered
years of service to the country.
In addition, it is also understandable why respondent immediately resorted to the
remedy of certiorari instead of pursuing his motion for reconsideration of the PNP
Chief’s decision as an appeal before the National Appellate Board (NAB). It was quite
easy to get confused as to which body had jurisdiction over his case. The complaint
filed against respondent could fall under both Sections 41 and 42 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990. Section
41 states that citizens' complaints should be brought before the People's Law
Enforcement Board (PLEB), while Section 42 states that it is the PNP Chief who has
authority to immediately remove or dismiss a PNP member who is guilty of conduct
unbecoming a police officer.
It was only in Quiambao v. Court of Appeals,7 promulgated in 2005 or after respondent
had already filed the petition for certiorari with the trial court, when the Court
resolved the issue of which body has jurisdiction over cases that fall under both Sections
41 and 42 of R.A. No. 6975. The Court held that the PLEB and the PNP Chief and
regional directors have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases filed
against members of the PNP which may warrant dismissal from service, but once a
complaint is filed with the PNP Chief or regional directors, said authorities shall acquire
exclusive original jurisdiction over the case.
With the foregoing peculiar circumstances in this case, respondent should not
be deprived of the opportunity to fully ventilate his arguments against the factual
findings of the PNP Chief. He may file an appeal before the NAB, pursuant to
Section 45, R.A. No. 6925. It is a settled jurisprudence that in administrative
proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied.8 In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada,9 the Court stressed thus:

After all, technical rules of procedure are not ends in themselves but are primarily
devised to help in the proper and expedient dispensation of justice. In appropriate
cases, therefore, the rules may be construed liberally in order to meet and
advance the cause of substantial justice.10

Thus, the opportunity to pursue an appeal before the NAB should be deemed
available to respondent in the higher interest of substantial justice.