THE TYPES OF LEGITIMATE DOMINATION

From Economy and Society, vol. 1

(1) Domination and Legitimacy

Domination: the probability that certain specific commands will be obeyed by a given group
of persons. Every genuine form of domination (authority) implies a minimum of voluntary
compliance, that is, an interest in obedience.

Obedience: the action of the person obeying follows in essentials such a course that the
content of the command may be taken to have become the basis of action for its own sake.

The rule over large numbers of people requires a staff, a special group which can be trusted to
execute the commands and policies.

There may be various motives for obedience by a staff to the “chief”. (economic motives,
material interests, affectual ties, etc.

**But more importantly, there is another element, the belief in legitimacy of domination.

Therefore, Weber distinguishes between types of domination according to the kind of claim to
legitimacy made by each.
(The legitimacy of a system of control has not only “ideal” significance, but also has definite
relations to the legitimacy of property.)
(That subjection to military authority discipline is “involuntary” while that to the discipline of
the factory is voluntary does not alter the fact that the latter is also a case of subjection to
authority.)

Weber makes clear here that he doesn’t consider as domination, the situation in which a
person can exert economic power because of some monopolistic position.

2. The Three Pure Types of Authority

[the following are “ideal types”, or also “pure types”. For Weber, an ideal-type is like a
“model.” By using ideal types, we can see how much specific historical cases fit a certain
model (ideal type), or how much it strays from it. ]

There are three pure types of legitimate domination. In each the validity of the claims to
legitimacy may be based on:

(1) Rational grounds – resting on an established belief in the legality of enacted rules and
the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal
authority)
In this case, obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order, and to the
persons exercising that authority by virtue of the formal legality of their commands.
(2) Traditional grounds – resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial
traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them (traditional
authority)
 Obedience is owed to the person of the chief who occupies the traditionally sanctioned
position of authority and who is bound by tradition.

(3) Charismatic grounds – resting on the devotion to the exceptional heroism and
character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or
ordained by him (charismatic authority)
Obedience is owed to the charismatic leader by virtue of personal trust in his revelation,
his heroism or his exemplary qualities.

However, Weber points out that historically, none of these ideal types of domination were
found in pure form. (e.g. the case of Nazism – Hitler was a charismatic leader, but
Germany also had rational-legal authority.)

THE STATE (from “Politics as a Vocation”)

What is politics? The leadership or the influencing of the leadership, or a political

association, of a state.
What is a state? The state should be defined, not in terms of its ends, but the specific
means peculiar to it
 the use of physical force
“A state is a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate
use of physical force within a given territory…. The state is considered the sole source of
the ‘right’ to use violence. Hence, ‘politics’ … means striving to share power or striving to
influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state.”

A person active in politics strives for power either as a means for serving other aims, ideal
or egoistic, or as ‘power for power’s sake.’

“The state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of

legitimate (i.e. considered legitimate) violence. If the state is to exist, the dominated must
obey the authority claimed by the powers that be.”

(The following notes do not pertain to your reading assignments or my lectures. But I include
them because they are relevant for a discussion about nations and nationalism.)

STRUCTURES OF POWER (from From Max Weber, Gerth and Mills)

The Prestige and Power of the ‘Great Powers’

All political structures use force, but they differ in the extent to which they use or threaten to
use force against other political organizations. They can be more or less ‘isolationist’, or more
or less ‘expansive’.

[Here, by political structure, Weber denotes nation-states and empires]

Why do political structures want to expand and to wage war against others?
To attain prestige, or honor, through expansion of power (In a similar fashion to the status
groups within a society, there might be an order of honor among different political structures.)
Prestige of power: glory of power over other communities, expansion of power, not
necessarily always through incorporation and subjection.

The ‘Great Powers’ in the early 20th century (European imperialist powers): bearers of power
prestige; they are expansive powers; they aim at expanding the territories of their political
communities by the use, or threat to use of force.

The Economic Foundations of ‘Imperialism’:

The territorial expansion or political unification (as in Germany) of ‘Great Powers’ is not
always economically motivated.

Thus, political unification may lead to economic unification (Germany), or economically

determined market relations might lead to political unification.

Historically, desire for trade (need to export to foreign territories, or need to import from
them), has lead in some cases to territorial expansion. But the opposite direction of causality
has also occurred (political integration of a country leads to more trade).

In the case of what Weber calls “imperialist” capitalism, subjugation of foreign peoples, their
enslavement, their exploitation as labor, is very profitable for certain groups in an imperialist
society (tax farmer, state creditors, suppliers to the state, overseas traders, colonial capitalists).

In modern societies (such as the European imperialist powers), the polity (the state) provides
the army with the arms. Therefore, the procurement of arms is itself a profitable business for
creditors which lend money to the state, for industrialists which make weapons, for banks
which finance war loans.
 Because states provide armies with weapons, wars have a capitalist nature. Thus,
capitalists make profit out or war, regardless of whether it is lost or won.

Although the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat usually have “pacifist” (anti-war) interests,
these inclinations may change easily. The “masses” may either be lured by “emotional
influences” (nationalism – see below), or because they might expect some gain out of a
victorious war.
THE NATION

This emotional influence does not have an economic basis, but is based on “sentiments of
prestige.”

**The prestige of power (see above) can be transformed into other special forms of prestige,
and especially into the idea of the “nation.” [There is a parallel between “nation” as a form of
prestige, and status groups.]

The concept of nation cannot easily be defined, because it does not boil down to any common
empirical qualities of the members of a political community.
**Rather, it pertains to a specific “sentiment of solidarity” in the face of other groups. [again,
there is a parallel to status groups] Thus, this concept belongs in the sphere of values.

What is a nation?
It is not identical with the “people of a state”, that is, the membership of a polity.
It is not necessarily a community speaking the same language.
It can be associated with the religious association of a community, but doesn’t have to be.
It doesn’t have to be based on “common blood.” However, it entails an idea about ‘common
descent’ and some kind of homogeneity.
A group of people, who weren’t considered to constitute a nation a generation ago, might now
be considered one. So, nationhood might be “attained.”

Weber says that one could construct an “ideal type” for what the nation, or “common
sentiments” constitute. But he stops short of doing it.

***The idea of the nation is related to “prestige interests” for the advocates of a nation.
“The significance of the ‘nation’ is usually anchored in the superiority, or at least the
irreplaceability, of the culture values that are to be preserved and developed only through the
cultivation of the peculiarity of the group.”
**In so far as there is at all a common object lying behind the obviously ambiguous term
‘nation,’ it is apparently located in the field of politics.

Weber’s definition of nation: a community of sentiment which manifests itself in a state of its
own; hence, a nation is a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own.