JURISDICTION
6713, Revised Penal Code, and the Civil Service
G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of
the UP-Cebu. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada
on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year
term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000. On
September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives,
registered with the SEC the Office of the Student Regent Foundation,
Inc. (OSRFI).3 One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of
the Vinzons Hall Annex.4 President Estrada gave P15,000,000.00 to
the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The
source of the funds, according to the information, was the Office of the
President. The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to
materialize.5 The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong,
and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa
U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state
university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public
Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.6 The
Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother
Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa and filed the case to the
Sandiganbayan.7 Petitioner moved to quash the information. She
claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over
the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student
regent. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for lack of merit.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied with finality.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an
estafa case? (2) Whether or not petitioner is a public officer with Salary
Grade 27?
DOCTRINE: (1) Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 which defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan reads: “Other offenses or felonies
whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this
section in relation to their office.” (2) While the first part of Section 4(A)
covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part
specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not
be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of
law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.
RATIONALE:
(1) The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should
receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion.33 Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be
expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect
contemplated by the legislature.34 Evidently, from the provisions of
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office.
Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply
subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by
public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to
their office.
(2) Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even if
she does not have a salary grade 27, as she is placed there by
express provision of law.44 Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly
vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors
or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan
pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of
trustees of a non-stock corporation.45 By express mandate of law,
petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Garcia vs Sandiganbayan
GR 165835
Petition for certiorari: Forfeiture of Ill-gotten/unexplained wealth
FACTS
1. On 27 September 2004, Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas,
filed a complaint against petitioner for violation of provisions in the
Republic Act No.
Law. Petitioner’s wife Clarita Depakakibo Garcia, and their three sons,
Ian Carl, Juan Paolo and Timothy Mark, all surnamed Garcia, were
impleaded in the complaint for violation of R.A. No. 1379 insofar as
they acted as conspirators, conduits, dummies and fronts of petitioner
in receiving, accumulating, using and disposing of his ill-gotten wealth.
2. On the same day, 27 October 2004, the Republic of the
Philippines filed before the Sandiganbayan, a Petition with Verified
Urgent Ex Parte Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment against petitioner, his wife, and three sons, seeking the
forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties.
3. It was alleged that the Office of the Ombudsman, after
conducting an inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation in criminal
cases, has determined that a prima facie case exists against Maj. Gen.
Garcia and the other respondents therein who hold such properties for,
with, or on behalf of, Maj. Gen. Garcia, since during his incumbency as
a soldier and public officer he acquired huge amounts of money and
properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer and his other lawful income, if any.
4. The corresponding writ of preliminary attachment was
subsequently issued on 2 November 2004 upon the filing of a bond by
the Republic.
5. On 17 November 2004, petitioner (as respondent a quo) filed
a Motion to Dismiss in Civil Case No. 0193 on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over forfeiture proceedings under
R.A. No. 1379. On even date, petitioner filed the present Petition,
raising the same issue of lack jurisdiction on the part of the
Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the forfeiture
proceedings under RA 1379; and,
WON the Office of the Ombudsman has authority to investigate, initiate
and prosecute such petitions for forfeiture.
RULING:
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceedings
under RA 1379 by virtue of an implied repeal. PD 1486 grants
exclusive jurisdiction and authority to Sandiganbayan and the Chief
Special Prosecutor, hence the Courts of First Instance and Solicitor
General cannot exercise concurrent jurisdiction or authority over such
cases.
The office of the Ombudsman has authority to investigate, initiate and
prosecute such petitions
after 25 Feb 1986 by virtue of the passing of PD 1606 expressly
repealing PD 1486 and the subsequent passing of related PDs such as
PD 1607, 1630, 1860, 1861. The office of the Ombudsman was
officially created by RA 6770 vesting its powers to investigate, initiate
and prosecute such petitions for forfeiture.
Hence, the petition was dismissed.
Mohammad Ali vs.Hon. Garchitorena
Facts:
Petitioner 2Lt. Arnel Escobal is a member of the Intellegence Group of
the PNP. On March 1990, while he was conducting a surveillance
operation on drug trafficking he somehow got involved in a shooting
incident resulting to the death of Rodney Nueca. Thereafter, petitioner
was arrested and tried in the RTC of Naga City Branch 21. Petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss the case
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case reiterating that since he
committed the crime in the performance of his duty, the
Sandiganbayan has the exclusive jurisdiction over his case. Thus, the
case was transferred to the Sandiganbayan. However, respondent
Justice Garchitorena which is the presiding justice of the case ordered
the return of the records and that the case be remanded back to its
court of origin, RTC 21.
Petitioner then filed a certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the presiding Justice of the Sandigan bayan committed
a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in remanding the case back to the RTC?
Held:
No. According to the Supreme Court under P.D. 1606 as amended by
R.A. 7975, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation
to his office but occupies a position corresponding to the salary grade
below 27, the RTC or MTC as the case may be, shall have the
exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
Here, the petitioner is occupying a position equivalent to a Police
Senior Inspector which has a salary grade of 23 falling short to the
requirement of the law, givingthe RTC the exclusive jurisdiction over
the case.
PEOPLE vs.HENRY T. GO,
Nature: Petition for review on Certiorari assailing the Resolution of the
Third Division of the Sandiganbayan (SB) which quashed the
Information filed against herein respondent for alleged violation of
Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Doctrines:
• The death of one of two or more conspirators does not
prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors.—Indeed, it is not
necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for
conspiracy. If two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act
done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of
law, the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor.
This means that everything said, written or done by any of the
conspirators in execution or furtherance of the common purpose is
deemed to have been said, done, or written by each of them and it
makes no difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or
insane at the time of trial. The death of one of two or more conspirators
does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors. Thus, this
Court held that: x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One
person cannot conspire alone. The crime depends upon the joint act or
intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person
cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of
a co-conspirator does not remove the bases of a charge for
conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.
• The avowed policy of the State and the legislative intent to
repress “acts of public officers and private persons alike, which
constitute graft or corrupt practices,” would be frustrated if the death of
a public officer would bar the prosecution of a private person who
conspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.—The
Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State and the
legislative intent to repress “acts of public officers and private persons
alike, which constitute graft or corrupt practices,” would be frustrated if
the death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a private
person who conspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft
Law.
Ramiscal vs. Sandiganbayan
. On motion for reconsideration, the trial court adhered to its ruling that it
Facts:
Jose S. Ramiscal Jr., Julian Alzaga, Manuel Satuito, Elizabeth Liang
and Jesus Garcia were charged with Malversation through Falsification
of Public Documents before the Sandiganbayan. The Information
alleged that Ramiscal, et. al. misappropriated and converted the
amount of P250,318,200.00 for their personal use from the funds of
AFP-RSBS.Ramiscal filed with the Sandiganbayan an “Urgent Motion
to Declare Nullity of Information and to Defer Issuance of Warrant of
Arrest.” He argued, that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over
the case because the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. The said Urgent
Motion was later adopted by Alzaga and Satuito. The Urgent Motion
was denied by the Sandiganbayan. Ramiscal, et. al. filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. In a Resolution issued, the Sandiganbayan sustained
Ramiscal, et. al.’s contention that the AFP-RSBS is a private entity.
Hence, it reconsidered its earlier Resolution and ordered the dismissal
of their criminal case. Upon denial of its Motion for Reconsideration,
the prosecution filed the present special civil action for certiorari with
the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the AFP-RSBS is not a government entity.
Held:
No, the AFP-RSBS is a government entity. It was created by
Presidential Decree 361. Its purpose and functions are akin to those of
the GSIS and the SSS, as in fact it is the system that manages the
retirement and pension funds of those in the military service. Members
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police are expressly excluded from the coverage of The GSIS Act of
1997. Therefore, soldiers and military personnel, who are incidentally
employees of the Government, rely on the administration of the AFP-
RSBS for their retirement, pension and separation benefits. Its
enabling law further mandates that the System shall be administered
by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines through an
agency, group, committee or board, which may be created and
organized by him and subject to such rules and regulations governing
the same as he may, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
National Defense, promulgate from time to time. Moreover, the
investment of funds of the System shall be decided by the Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with the approval of the
Secretary of National Defense. The funds of the AFP-RSBS, except for
the initial seed money, come entirely from contributions and that no
part thereof come from appropriations. While it may be true that there
have been no appropriations for the contribution of funds to the AFP-
RSBS, the Government is not precluded from later on adding to the
funds in order to provide additional benefits to them. The above
considerations indicate that the character and operations of the AFP-
RSBS are imbued with public interest. As such, we hold that the same
is a government entity and its funds are in the nature of public funds.
People Power vs. Benipayo
Facts:
Photokina Marketing Inc. filed an affidavit complaint for libel against
respondent Benipayo, COMELEC Chairman, for allegedly being the
one alluded to by the respondent in his speech at UP Diliman which
was published in Manila Bulletin issues.
Said speech is as follows: “Now, they are at it again, trying to
hoodwink us into contract that is so grossly disadvantageous to the
government that it offends common sense to say that it would be worth
the 6.5 billion-peso price tag.”
Arguing that he’s an impeachable officer, respondent questioned the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Prosecutor of QC. City prosec. Still filed
an information for libel against him.
Respondent, for his part, moved for the dismissal of the case on the
assertion that the trial court had no jurisdiction over his person for he
was an impeachable officer and thus, could not be criminally
prosecuted before any court during his incumbency; and that,
assuming he can be criminally prosecuted, it was the Office of the
Ombudsman that should investigate him and the case should be filed
with the Sandiganbayan.
Trial court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction considering that
the alleged libel was committed by respondent in relation to his office
when he delivered speech in his official capacity as COMELEC Chair.
Accordingly, it was the Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction over the
case to the exclusion of all other courts.
was not vested with jurisdiction to hear the libel case.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent committed the crime of libel in relation to his
office and that the trial court is correct in saying that it has no
jurisdiction over the case?
HELD:
Criminal and civil actions for damages in cases of written defamations
shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the RTC to the
exclusion of all other courts. A subsequent enactment of a law defining
the jurisdiction of other courts cannot simply override, in the absence
of an express repeal or modification, the specific provision in the RPC
vesting in the RTC, as aforesaid, jurisdiction over defamations in
writing or by similar means. The grant to the Sandiganbayan of
jurisdiction over offenses committed in relation to (public) office, similar
to the expansion of the jurisdiction of the MTCs, did not divest the RTC
of its exclusive and original jurisdiction to try written defamation cases
regardless of whether the offense is committed in relation to office. The
broad and general phraseology of Section 4, Presidential Decree No.
1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, cannot be construed to
have impliedly repealed, or even simply modified, such exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the RTC.
Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC
without qualification, it is unnecessary and futile for the parties to argue
on whether the crime is committed in relation to office. Thus, the
conclusion reached by the trial court that the respondent committed the
alleged libelous acts in relation to his office as former COMELEC chair,
and deprives it of jurisdiction to try the case, is, following the above
disquisition, gross error.
Lacson vs Executive Secretary
Issue: Whether or not jurisdiction of the court is determined by
evidence and not allegation?
Held: No. The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or information and once
it is shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case.
Hence, it’s elementary rule that the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, and not
by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.
ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, petitioner vs The Honorable HARRIET O.
Doctrines: “The crime of rape with homicide imputed to the petitioner
was not connected with the discharge of his functions as municipal
mayor nor that there is an "intimate connection" between the offense
and his office. It follows that the said crime, being an ordinary offense,
is triable by the regular courts and not the Sandiganbayan.”
“The rule is that if the accused objects to the jurisdiction of the court
over his person, he may move to quash the information, but only on
that ground. If, as in this case, the accused raises other grounds in the
motion to quash, he is deemed to have waived that objection and to
have submitted his person to the jurisdiction of that court.”
“The issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest, against a person
invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny
him the right to be released because of such defect.”
FACTS: Seven Informations of Rape with Homicide were filed against
Mayor Antonio L. Sanchez of Calauan Laguna and six other persons in
connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing
of Allan Gomez.
Acting on the request of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission, the
panel of State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice conducted a
preliminary investigation. Sanchez was not present but he was
represented by Atty. Brion. An “invitation” issued by PNP Commander
Rex Piad was also served on Sanchez and he was immediately taken
to Camp Vicente Lim. Sanchez was placed on “arrest status” upon the
positive identification by Centeno and SPO3 Malabanan that Sanchez
was the principal in the rape-slay case. The respondent prosecutors
conducted an inquest upon Sanchez’ arrival, with Atty. Panelo as his
counsel. After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez
in connection with a criminal case for violation of RA 6713. The
Informations for Rape with Homicide were filed in RTC Laguna and
warrants of arrest were issued against all of the accused. The venue of
the case was then transferred to Pasig, Metro Manila upon the
expressed apprehension of the Secretary of Justice.
Sanchez filed a Motion to Quash on the following grounds: 1) he was
denied the right to present evidence at the preliminary investigation; 2)
only the Ombudsman had the competence to conduct the
investigation; 3) his warrantless arrest is illegal and the court has
therefore not acquired jurisdiction over him, 4) he is being charged with
seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons; 5) the
informations are discriminatory because they do not include Teofilo
Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia; and 6) as a public officer, he can be
tried for the offense only by the Sandiganbayan.
The Motion to Quash was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: 1) WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case. 2)
WON the unlawful arrest of the accused resulted in the failure to
acquired jurisdiction over his person.
HELD: 1) NO. The crime of rape with homicide does not fall under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as it obviously does not fall under
paragraph (1), which deals with graft and corruption cases. Neither is it
covered by paragraph (2) because it is not an offense committed in
relation to the office of the petitioner. There is no direct relation
between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the
petitioner's office as municipal mayor because public office is not an
essential element of the crime charged. The offense can stand
independently of the office. Moreover, it is not even alleged in the
information that the commission of the crime charged was intimately
connected with the performance of the petitioner's official functions to
make it fall under the exception laid down in People v. Montejo. In that
case, a city mayor and several detectives were charged with murder
for the death of a suspect as a result of a "third degree" investigation
held at a police substation.The Court held that, although public office is
not an element of the crime of murder in abstract, the offense therein
charged is intimately connected with their respective offices and was
perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or
irregular, of their official functions. Indeed they had no personal motive
to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not
held their aforesaid offices.
2) NO. Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all, we
find that the trial court still lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the petitioner. The rule is that if the accused objects to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, he may move to quash the
information, but only on that ground. If, as in this case, the accused
raises other grounds in the motion to quash, he is deemed to have
waived that objection and to have submitted his person to the
jurisdiction of that court. The Court also adverts to its uniform ruling
that the filing of charges, and the issuance of the corresponding
warrant of arrest, against a person invalidly detained will cure the
defect of that detention or at least deny him the right to be released
because of such defect.
RULE 110 – Prosecution of offences
Antipakuto vs Sorongon
Facts:
Jimenez(Petitioner) is the president of Unlad Shipping and
Management Corporation a local manning agency, while Antzoulatos,
Alamil, Gaza and Avgoustis are the respondents herein and are some
of the listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services Inc, a local
manning agency
Aug. 19, 2013, Petitioner files a complaint affidavid with the office of
the prosecutor of Mandaluyong city against the respondents for
syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment.
Respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their joint counter-affidavit
and denying the complaint. Avgoustis and Alamil did not submit any
counter affidavit.
An Information for the said crime was filed before the RTC-
Mandaluyong.
Dec. 4, 2004 the prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the information
and respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their comment to the
opposition however the judge denied the motion as it found existence
of probable cause and issued warrants agains the respondents.
Respondent Alamil filed a motion for judicial determination of probable
cause to defer the enforcement of the warrants or arrest.
Petitioner filed his opposition with the motion to expunge, contending
that Alamil being a fugitive from justice had no standing to seek any
relief and that the RTC found probable cause.
Respondent filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Umali for being
biased or partial. The said judge voluntarily inhibit herself and the case
was re-raffled to Judge Sorongon.
On April 3, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, stressing
the existence of probable cause to prosecute the respondents.
On April 26, 2006 moved to expunge the motion for being prohibited
pleading since the motion did not have any conformity from the city
prosecutor.
In its May 10, 2006 order, the RTC denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, finding that the petitioner merely reiterated arguments
in issues that had been finally decided.
On May 30, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the
petitioner’s notice of appeal since the public prosecutor did not
authorize the appeal and the petitioner had no civil interest in the case
On June 27, 2006, the petitioner filed his comment to the motion to
expunge, claiming that, as the offended party, he has the right to
appeal the RTC order dismissing the case; the respondents’ fraudulent
acts in forming TMSI greatly prejudiced him.
Issue: WoN the Petitioner has the legal personality to assail the
dismissal of the case
Held: No. It is well settled that the real party in interest is the People of
the Philippines and is represented by the prosecutors. All criminal
actions commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. In appeals of
criminal cases before the Court of Appeals and before this Court, the
Office of the Solicitor General is the appellate counsel of the People;
The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the
Office of the Solicitor General can represent the People in criminal
proceedings pending in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court
PEOPLE VS VALDEZ
FACTS:
On March 1, 2000, at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, Estrella
Sayson, (Estrella) was at the canteen (which also includes a jai alai
betting station) located at 77 Corregidor Street, Bago Bantay, Quezon
City. Estrella was preparing for the celebration of the birthday of her
second husband, Wilfredo Lladones, which was held later in the
evening. Estrella’s son, the deceased Moises Sayson, a former
policeman, and his wife, Susan Sayson (Susan) owned the said
canteen and managed the betting station. At about 9:00 o’clock in the
evening, Estrella’s other sons Joselito Sayson (Joselito) and Ferdinand
Sayson (Ferdinand) arrived at the canteen to greet their stepfather.
Estrella’s family and other visitors ate and enjoyed themselves at the
party.
At about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, the celebration was interrupted
with the arrival of Eduardo and Edwin, who alighted from a motorcycle
in front of the jai alai fronton. Eduardo and Edwin asked the jai alai
teller, Jonathan Rubio (Jonathan), to come out. Jonathan was then
attending to customers who were buying jai alai tickets. Moises
approached Eduardo and Edwin and tried to reason with them. Estrella
saw Eduardo and Edwin armed with guns. She tried to prevent Moises
from going near Edwin and Eduardo. Moises did not heed his mother’s
warning. He went out and advised Eduardo and Edwin not to force
Jonathan to go out of the fronton. Estrella then heard one of the
accused-appellants threaten Moises with the words “Gusto mo unahin
na kita?” Moises replied “huwag.” Successive shots were thereafter
heard. Moises fell and was continuously fired upon even after he was
sprawled on the ground. Ferdinand immediately approached the scene
to help his brother Moises. Ferdinand, however was shot on the left
temporal portion of his head and fell. Somebody told Joselito to run
away, but he was hit at the back while running. Joselito fell on a burger
machine. After shooting the Sayson brothers, Eduardo and Edwin
escaped from the scene of the crime (p. 10, TSN, February 6, 2001).
The RTC convicted the two accused of three counts of murder and
sentenced them to suffer reclusion perpetua for each count of murder.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the convictions.
In this appeal, PO2 Valdez assails the credibility of the State’s
witnesses by pointing to inconsistencies and weaknesses in their
testimonies; challenges the finding of conspiracy between the accused;
and contends that the State did not establish the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution sufficiently established the
qualifying circumstance of treachery.
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
it is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty of three
homicides, instead of three murders, on account of the informations
not sufficiently alleging the attendance of treachery.
Treachery is the employment of means, methods, or forms in the
execution of any of the crimes against persons which tend to directly
and specially insure its execution, without risk to the offending party
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. It
encompasses a wide variety of actions and attendant circumstances,
the appreciation of which is particular to a crime committed. Corollarily,
the defense against the appreciation of a circumstance as aggravating
or qualifying is also varied and dependent on each particular instance.
Such variety generates the actual need for the State to specifically
aver the factual circumstances or particular acts that constitute the
criminal conduct or that qualify or aggravate the liability for the crime in
the interest of affording the accused sufficient notice to defend himself.
It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal
charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the
actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information.28 In People v.
Dimaano,29 the Court elaborated: For complaint or information to be
sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place
wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title
of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the
particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere
conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the
crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or
omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient
to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not
accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every
element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts
and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be
determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the
specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime
in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his
defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
Miguel vs Sandiganbayan
Facts:
• Then Vice Mayor Mercelita M. Lucido and other local officials
of Koronadal City, South Cotabato filed a letter-complaint with the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao charging the petitioner, among
others, with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, in connection with the
consultancy services for the architectural aspect, the engineering
design, and the construction supervision and management of the
proposed Koronadal City public market.
• In a resolution, the Ombudsman found probable cause
against the petitioner and some private individuals for violation of R.A.
No. 3019 and against the petitioner alone for Falsification of Public
Document under Article 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code. It filed
the corresponding informations with the Sandiganbayan. The
information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
o That on 10 January 1995 or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in the Municipality of Koronadal, South Cotabato, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the [petitioner], a
high ranking public officer in his capacity as former Municipal Mayor of
Koronadal, South Cotabato, and as such while in the performance of
his official functions, committing the offense in relation to his office,
taking advantage of his official position, conspiring and confederating
with the private [individuals] xxx acting with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
give unwarranted benefits and advantages to said [accused], by
inviting them to participate in the prequalification of consultants to
provide the Detailed Architectural & Engineering Design and
Construction Supervision and Management of the proposed Koronadal
Public Market, without causing the publication of said invitation in a
newspaper of general circulation, thereby excluding other consultants
from participating in said prequalification.
• On motions separately filed by two of the petitioner’s co-
accused, the Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation. Later, the petitioner, through
counsel, followed suit and orally moved for a reinvestigation, which the
Sandiganbayan likewise granted. The Sandiganbayan gave the
petitioner ten (10) days within which to file his counter-affidavit with the
OSP.
• Later, Prosecutor Ruiz asked the Sandiganbayan for the
arraignment and trial of the petitioner and of the other accused private
individuals.
• After several extensions sought and granted, the petitioner
filed a Motion to Quash and/or Reinvestigation for the criminal cases
against him. The Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner’s motion
because of the pending OSP reinvestigation – this, despite the OSP’s
earlier termination of the reinvestigation for the petitioner’s continuous
failure to submit his counter-affidavit. The petitioner did not question
the denial of his motion.
• The petitioner was arraigned; he pleaded not guilty in both
criminal cases. Later, the OSP filed a Motion to Suspend [the
petitioner] Pendente Lite. On June 27, 2005, the petitioner filed his
"Vigorous Opposition" based on the "obvious and fatal defect of the
[i]nformation" in failing to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits
and advantages was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence.
• On January 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the
assailed resolution suspending the petitioner pendente lite.
• On February 2, 2006, the petitioner moved for
reconsideration of his suspension order and demanded for a pre-
suspension hearing. The Sandiganbayan denied his motion, prompting
him to file this certiorari petition to challenge the validity of his
suspension order.
• The petitioner bewails the lack of hearing before the
issuance of his suspension order. Citing Luciano, et al. v. Hon.
Mariano, etc., et al. he claims that nowhere in the records of the case
can one see any order or resolution requiring the petitioner to show
cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered
suspended. For the petitioner, the requirement of a pre-suspension
hearing can only be satisfied if the Sandiganbayan ordered an actual
hearing to settle the defect in the information.
Issue:
• Whether the absence of an actual pre-suspension hearing
renders invalid the suspension order against the petitioner.
Ruling:
• Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process
requirement, when an accused public official is given an adequate
opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against the
mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then an accused would
have no reason to complain that no actual hearing was conducted.
• It is well settled that to be heard does not only mean oral
arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings,
has been accorded, no denial of procedural due process exist.
• In the present case, the petitioner (i) filed his Vigorous
Opposition (to the OSPs Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite),
and after receiving an adverse ruling from the Sandiganbayan, (ii)
moved for reconsideration of the suspension order issued against him,
and (iii) filed a Reply to the OSPs Opposition to his plea for
reconsideration. Given this opportunity, we find that the petitioners
continued demand for the conduct of an actual pre-suspension hearing
based on the same alleged defect in the information, which we have
found wanting has legally nothing to anchor itself on.
• Lest it be forgotten, Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reinforces
the principle enshrined in the Constitution that a public office is a public
trust. In light of the constitutional principle underlying the imposition of
preventive suspension of a public officer charged under a valid
information and the nature of this suspension, the petitioners demand
for a trial-type hearing in the present case would only overwhelmingly
frustrate, rather than promote, the orderly and speedy dispensation of
justice.
PEOPLE VS SORIA
Facts: A complaint for rape was filed against the respondent for
allegedly raping her minor daughter, AAA. The information indicated
the offense as rape by sexual intercourse as defined by the Revised
Penal Code. However, respondent as his defense invoked that as the
father of the child he will not be able to do the imputed act and the
case was tainted with bad faith on the part of the victim’s mother not
having a good relationship with the respondent. During the course of
the proceedings and examination of the witness, it was found out that
the identification of the victim by the respondent was in reliance to her
brother’s statement that he saw that it was their father who committed
the act. The medico legal was also presented with the findings that the
hymen of the victim is intact. These statements were invoked by the
defense to question the findings of the trial court of the offense
charged which was later affirmed by the appellate court, hence, this
appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the offense was properly charged.
Held: No. The following are the elements of rape by sexual
assault:
(1) That the offender commits an act of sexual assault;
(2) That the act of sexual assault is committed by any of the
following means:
(a) By inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal
orifice; or
(b) By inserting any instrument or object into the genital or anal
orifice of another person;
(3) That the act of sexual assault is accomplished under any of
the following circumstances:
(a) By using force and intimidation;
(b) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or
(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; or
(d) When the woman is under 12 years of age or demented.
In the instant case, it was clearly established that appellant
committed an act of sexual assault on “AAA” by inserting an
instrument or object into her genital. We find it inconsequential that
“AAA” could not specifically identify the particular instrument or
object that was inserted into her genital. What is important and
relevant is that indeed something was inserted into her vagina. To
require “AAA” to identify the instrument or object that was
inserted into her vagina would be contrary to the fundamental
tenets of due process. It would be akin to requiring “AAA” to
establish something that is not even required by law. [Moreover,
it might create problems later on in the application of the law if
the victim is blind or otherwise unconscious.] Moreover, the
prosecution satisfactorily established that appellant accomplished
the act of sexual assault through his moral ascendancy and
influence over “AAA” which substituted for violence and
intimidation. Thus, there is no doubt that appellant raped “AAA”
by sexual assault.
The failure of “AAA” to mention that her panty was removed prior to
the rape does not preclude sexual assault. We cannot likewise
give credence to the assertion of appellant that the crime of rape
was negated by the medical findings of an intact hymen or absence
of lacerations in the vagina of “AAA”. Hymenal rupture, vaginal
laceration or genital injury is not indispensable because the same
is not an element of the crime of rape. “An intact hymen does not
negate a finding that the victim was raped.” Here, the finding of
reddish discoloration of the hymen of “AAA” during her medical
examination and the intense pain she felt in her vagina during and
after the sexual assault sufficiently corroborated her testimony that
she was raped.
Likewise undeserving of credence is appellant’s contention that his
wife merely instigated “AAA” to file the charge of rape against him
in retaliation for his having confronted her about her illicit affair
with another man. This imputation of ill motive is flimsy
considering that it is unnatural for appellant’s wife to stoop so low
as to subject her own daughter to the hardships and shame
concomitant with a prosecution for rape, just to assuage her hurt
feelings. It is also improbable for appellant’s wife to have dared
encourage their daughter “AAA” to publicly expose the dishonor of
the family unless the rape was indeed committed.
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
Desi Tomas was charged in court for perjury when she falsely declared
under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping. Tomas filed a
motion to quash citing that the Makati MTC has no jurisdiction as the
document was submitted and used in Pasay and that there was no
crime committed as not all of the elements of perjury was present.

The lower courts denied the motion saying that Makati has jurisdiction
as it was notarized there and ruled that she was sufficiently charged
with perjury.

ISSUE: Whether, in a crime of perjury, the proper venue is where it

was notarized or where it was used.

RULING:

The SC ruled that Makati was the right venue.

The SC cites Rule 110, Sec. 15 of the Rules of Court where it was
stated that criminal action shall be instituted where the offense was
committed or where any of its essential elements occurred.

The SC, one-by-one stated the elements of perjury and provided that
Tomas did all things in Makati, thus making Makati the right venue for
the case.