Landmark case

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELICIANO F. WYCOCO

[G.R. No. 140160. January 13, 2004]

FACTS:
Feliciano F. Wycoco is the registered owner of a 94.1690 hectare unirrigated and
untenanted rice land in line with CARP. Wycoco voluntarily offered to sell the land to DAR for
Php14.9 million. In arriving at the valuation of Wycoco’s land, the trial court took judicial notice
of the alleged prevailing market value of agricultural lands in Ecija without apprising the parties
of its intention to take judicial notice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the market value should have been taken judicial notice of without the
requirement of hearing.

HELD:

NO.

Inasmuch as the valuation of the property of Wycoco is the very issue in the case at bar,
the trial court should have allowed the parties to present evidence thereon instead of practically
assuming a valuation without basis.

While market value may be one of the bases of determining just compensation, the
same cannot be arbitrarily arrived at without considering the factors to be appreciated in arriving
at the fair market value of the property e.g., the cost of acquisition, the current value of like
properties, its size, shape, location, as well as the tax declarations thereon. Since these factors
were not considered, a remand of the case for determination of just compensation is necessary.

The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution especially
where the case involves a vast tract of land. Care must be taken that the requisite notoriety
exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the
usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise
acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be
disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the
judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual
knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action.[34]
 Latest case:

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY

vs SPOUSES EDMUNDO MIRANDA and JULIE MIRANDA
[G.R. No. 187917 January 19, 2011]

FACTS:

Respondents, spouses Edmundo Miranda and Julie Miranda, applied for and obtained a
credit accommodation from petitioner Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank). The
real estate mortgage executed on August 27, 1996 was thus amended to increase the principal
amount of loan secured by the mortgage. Subsequently, respondents obtained additional loans
from Metrobank. The additional loans were secured by mortgage[6] over lands situated in
Dubinan and Mabini, Santiago, Isabela.

Respondents encountered difficulties in paying their loans. They requested for a longer
period to settle their account and further requested for the restructuring of their loans, which
requests Metrobank granted. Respondents then signed Promissory Notes.

On August 25, 2000, Metrobank sent respondents a demand letter[12] to settle their
overdue account inclusive of interest and penalties; otherwise, the bank would initiate the
necessary legal proceedings x x x, without further notice. Respondents, however, failed to settle
their account. Consequently, Metrobank caused the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale of
the mortgaged properties. The Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Santiago City sold the
mortgaged properties at public auction to Metrobank, as the highest bidder.

Claiming that the extrajudicial foreclosure was void respondents filed a complaint for
Nullification of the Foreclosure Proceedings and Damages with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order/Injunction with the RTC of Santiago City.

On June 16, 2006, the RTC rendered a decision annulling the extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings. The RTC reviewed the records of the foreclosure proceedings and found no proof
of publication of the sheriffs notice of sale; there was no affidavit of publication attached to the
records. This fatal defect, it held, invalidated the auction sale and the entire foreclosure
proceedings.

Metrobank filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it on July 31, 2006.
Metrobank then appealed to the CA, faulting the RTC for annulling the foreclosure
proceedings. On June 30, 2008, the CA dismissed Metrobank’s appeal and affirmed the
decision of the RTC.

Hence,this petition.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC and CA exceeded its authority in taking cognizance of the
records of the extrajudicial proceedings since Metrobank asserts that it did not give its consent
to the trial courts examination of the records of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings.

HELD:

No.

As a rule, courts do not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other
proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same
judge. This rule, however, is not absolute.

In Juaban v. Espina[33] and G Holdings, Inc. v. National Mines and Allied Workers Union
Local 103 (NAMAWU),[34] we held that, in some instances, courts have also taken judicial notice
of proceedings in other cases that are closely connected to the matter in controversy. These
cases may be so closely interwoven, or so clearly interdependent, as to invoke a rule of judicial
notice.

The RTC, therefore, acted well within its authority in taking cognizance of the records of
the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, and the CA cannot be faulted for sustaining the RTC.