512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cruz vs. Catapang

*
G.R. No. 164110. February 12, 2008.

LEONOR B. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. TEOFILA M.

CATAPANG, respondent.

Property; Co­Ownership; A co­owner cannot give valid consent

to another to build a house on the co­owned property, which is an
act tantamount to devoting the property to his or her exclusive use.
—As to the issue of whether or not the consent of one co­owner
will warrant the dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by another
co­owner against the person who was given the consent to
construct a house on the co­owned property, we have held that a
co­owner cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive
use to the prejudice of the co­ownership. In our view, a co­owner
cannot give valid consent to another to build a house on the co­
owned property, which is an act tantamount to devoting the
property to his or her exclusive use.

Same; Same; Giving consent to a third person to construct a

house on the co­owned property will injure the interest of the
coownership and prevent other co­owners from using the property
in accordance with their rights.—Article 486 states each co­owner
may use the thing owned in common provided he does so in
accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a
way as not to injure the interest of the co­ownership or prevent
the other coowners from using it according to their rights. Giving
consent to a third person to construct a house on the co­owned
property will injure the interest of the co­ownership and prevent
other co­owners from using the property in accordance with their
rights.

Same; Same; Alterations; Words and Phrases; None of the

coowners can, without the consent of the other co­owners, validly
consent to the making of an alteration by another person in the
thing owned in common, and alterations include any act of strict
dominion or ownership such as the construction of a house.—
Under Article 491, none of the co­owners shall, without the
consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in
common. It necessarily follows that none of the co­owners can,
without the consent of the other co­

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

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VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 12, 2008 513

Cruz vs. Catapang

owners, validly consent to the making of an alteration by another

person, such as respondent, in the thing owned in common.
Alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership and
any encumbrance or disposition has been held implicitly to be an
act of alteration. The construction of a house on the co­owned
property is an act of dominion. Therefore, it is an alteration
falling under Article 491 of the Civil Code. There being no consent
from all co­owners, respondent had no right to construct her
house on the co­owned property.

Same; Same; Actions; Ejectment; Forcible Entry; Consent of

only one co­owner will not warrant the dismissal of the complaint
for forcible entry filed against the builder.—Consent of only one
coowner will not warrant the dismissal of the complaint for
forcible entry filed against the builder. The consent given by
Norma Maligaya in the absence of the consent of petitioner and
Luz Cruz did not vest upon respondent any right to enter into the
co­owned property. Her entry into the property still falls under
the classification “through strategy or stealth.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Entry into a land effected

clandestinely without the knowledge of the other co­owners could
be categorized as possession by stealth; The one­year period within
which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted
from the date of actual entry to the land but when entry is made
through stealth, then the one­year period is counted from the time
the petitioner learned about it.—The Court of Appeals held that
there is no forcible entry because respondent’s entry into the
property was not through strategy or stealth due to the consent
given to her by one of the co­owners. We cannot give our
imprimatur to this sweeping conclusion. Respondent’s entry into
the property without the permission of petitioner could appear to
be a secret and clandestine act done in connivance with co­owner
Norma Maligaya whom respondent allowed to stay in her house.
Entry into the land effected clandestinely without the knowledge
of the other co­owners could be categorized as possession by
stealth. Moreover, respondent’s act of getting only the consent of
one co­owner, her sister Norma Maligaya, and allowing the latter
to stay in the constructed house, can in fact be considered as a
strategy which she utilized in order to enter into the co­owned
property. As such, respondent’s acts constitute forcible entry.
Petitioner’s filing of a complaint for forcible entry, in our view,

514

514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cruz vs. Catapang

was within the one­year period for filing the complaint. The one­
year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is
generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land.
However, when entry is made through stealth, then the one­year
period is counted from the time the petitioner learned about it.
Although respondent constructed her house in 1992, it was only in
September 1995 that petitioner learned of it when she visited the
property. Accordingly, she then made demands on respondent to
vacate the premises. Failing to get a favorable response,
petitioner filed the complaint on January 25, 1996, which is
within the one­year period from the time petitioner learned of the
construction.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Wilfredo M. Bolito for petitioner.
     Eric P. Triste for respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:
1
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the
2
Decision
dated September 16, 2003 and the Resolution dated June
11, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA­G.R.3 SP No. 69250.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision dated October
22, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 86,4
Taal, Batangas, which had earlier affirmed the Decision
dated September 20, 1999 of the 7th Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC) of Taal, Batangas ordering respondent
to vacate and
_______________

1 Rollo, pp. 53­59. Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia­

Salvador, with Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Jose C. Reyes,
Jr. concurring.
2 Id., at pp. 64­66.
3 Records, pp. 96­101. Penned by Executive Judge Benjamin P.
Martinez.
4 Id., at pp. 67­72. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Pio M. Pasia.

515

VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 12, 2008 515

Cruz vs. Catapang

deliver possession of a portion of the lot co­owned by

petitioner, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows.
Petitioner Leonor B. Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma
Maligaya are the co­owners of a parcel of land covering an
area of 1,435 square meters 5
located at Barangay Mahabang
Ludlod, Taal, Batangas. With the consent of Norma
Maligaya, one of the aforementioned co­owners, respondent
Teofila M. Catapang built a house on a lot adjacent to the
abovementioned parcel of land sometime in 1992. The
house intruded,
6
however, on a portion of the co­owned
property.
In the first week of September 1995, petitioner Leonor
B. Cruz visited the property and was surprised to see a
part of respondent’s house intruding unto a portion of the
co­owned property. She then made several demands upon
respondent to demolish the intruding structure and to
vacate the portion encroaching on their property. The
respondent,7
however, refused and disregarded her
demands. 8
On January 25, 1996, the petitioner filed a complaint
for forcible entry against respondent before the 7th MCTC
of Taal, Batangas. The MCTC decided in favor of
petitioner, ruling that consent of only one of the co­owners
is not sufficient to justify defendant’s construction of the9
house and possession of the portion of the lot in question.
The dispositive portion of the MCTC decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the

defendant or any person acting in her behalf to vacate and deliver
the possession of the area illegally occupied to the plaintiff;
ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff reasonable attorney’s fees
of P10,000.00, plus costs of suit.
_______________

5 Rollo, p. 53.
6 Id.
7 Id., at pp. 53­54.
8 Records, pp. 2­6.
9 Id., at p. 71.

516

516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cruz vs. Catapang
10
SO ORDERED.”

On appeal, the RTC, Branch 86, Taal, Batangas, affirmed

the MCTC’s ruling in a Decision dated October 22, 2001,
the dispositive portion of which states:

“Wherefore, premises considered, the decision [appealed] from is

hereby affirmed in toto.
11
SO ORDERED.”

After her motion for reconsideration was denied by the

RTC, respondent filed a petition for review with the Court
of Appeals, which reversed the RTC’s decision. The Court of
Appeals held that there is no cause of action for forcible
entry in this case because respondent’s entry into the
property, considering the consent given by co­owner Norma
Maligaya, cannot be characterized as one made through
strategy or stealth
12
which gives rise to a cause of action for
forcible entry. The Court of Appeals’ decision further held
that petitioner’s remedy is not an action for ejectment but
an entirely different recourse with the appropriate forum.
The Court of Appeals disposed, thus:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is

hereby GRANTED. The challenged Decision dated 22 October
2001 as well as the Order dated 07 January 2002 of the Regional
Trial Court of Taal, Batangas, Branch 86, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and, in lieu thereof, another is
entered DISMISSING the complaint for forcible entry docketed
as Civil Case No. 71­T.
13
SO ORDERED.”

_______________

10 Id., at pp. 71­72.

11 Id., at p. 101.
 12 Rollo, p. 58.
13 Id., at p. 59.

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VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 12, 2008 517

Cruz vs. Catapang

After petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by

the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated June 11, 2004,
she filed the instant petition.
Raised before us for consideration are the following
issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF

COOWNER NORMA MALIGAYA IS A VALID LICENSE FOR
THE RESPONDENT TO ERECT THE BUNGALOW HOUSE ON
THE PREMISES OWNED PRO­INDIVISO SANS CONSENT
FROM THE PETITIONER AND OTHE[R] CO­OWNER[.]

II.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT, BY HER ACTS, HAS

ACQUIRED EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP OVER THE PORTION
OF THE LOT SUBJECT OF THE PREMISES PURSUANT TO
THE CONSENT GRANTED UNTO HER BY CO­OWNER
NORMA MALIGAYA TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE
14
PETITIONER AND THE OTHER CO­OWNER.

III.

. . . WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT IN FACT

OBTAINED POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION
15
BY MEANS OF SIMPLE STRATEGY.

Petitioner prays in her petition that we effectively reverse

the Court of Appeals’ decision.
Simply put, the main issue before us is whether consent
given by a co­owner of a parcel of land to a person to
construct a house on the co­owned property warrants the
dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by another co­owner
against that person. 16
In her memorandum, petitioner contends that the
consent and knowledge of co­owner Norma Maligaya
cannot defeat the

_______________
 14 Id., at p. 101.
15 Id., at p. 110.
16 Id., at pp. 96­105.

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518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cruz vs. Catapang

action for forcible entry since it is a basic principle in the

law of co­ownership that no individual co­owner can claim
title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in
common until partition. 17
On the other hand, respondent in her memorandum
counters that the complaint for forcible entry cannot
prosper because her entry into the property was not
through strategy or stealth due to the consent of one of the
co­owners. She further argues that since Norma Maligaya
is residing in the house she built, the issue is not just
possession de facto but also one of possession de jure since it
involves rights of coowners to enjoy the property.
As to the issue of whether or not the consent of one
coowner will warrant the dismissal of a forcible entry case
filed by another co­owner against the person who was given
the consent to construct a house on the co­owned property,
we have held that a co­owner cannot devote common
property to his
18
or her exclusive use to the prejudice of the
co­ownership. In our view, a co­owner cannot give valid
consent to another to build a house on the co­owned
property, which is an act tantamount to devoting the
property to his or her exclusive use.
Furthermore, Articles 486 and 491 of the Civil Code
provide:

“Art. 486. Each co­owner may use the thing owned in common,
provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is
intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the
coownership or prevent the other co­owners from using it
according to their rights. The purpose of the co­ownership may be
changed by agreement, express or implied.
Art. 491. None of the co­owners shall, without the consent of
the others, make alterations in the thing owned in common, even

_______________

17 Id., at pp. 108­112.

18 See De Guia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120864, October 8, 2003,
413 SCRA 114, 127.
 519

VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 12, 2008 519

Cruz vs. Catapang

though benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if the

withholding of the consent by one or more of the co­owners is
clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may afford
adequate relief.”

Article 486 states each co­owner may use the thing owned
in common provided he does so in accordance with the
purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to
injure the interest of the co­ownership or prevent the other
coowners from using it according to their rights. Giving
consent to a third person to construct a house on the co­
owned property will injure the interest of the co­ownership
and prevent other co­owners from using the property in
accordance with their rights.
Under Article 491, none of the co­owners shall, without
the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing
owned in common. It necessarily follows that none of the
co­owners can, without the consent of the other co­owners,
validly consent to the making of an alteration by another
person, such as respondent, in the thing owned in common.
Alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership
and any encumbrance or disposition 19
has been held
implicitly to be an act of alteration. The construction of a
house on the co­owned property is an act of dominion.
Therefore, it is an alteration falling under Article 491 of
the Civil Code. There being no consent from all co­owners,
respondent had no right to construct her house on the co­
owned property.
Consent of only one co­owner will not warrant the
dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry filed against
the builder. The consent given by Norma Maligaya in the
absence of the consent of petitioner and Luz Cruz did not
vest upon respondent any right to enter into the co­owned
property. Her entry into the property still falls under the
classification “through strategy or stealth.”

_______________

19 Gala v. Rodriguez, 70 Phil. 124 (1940).

520

520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 Cruz vs. Catapang

The Court of Appeals held that there is no forcible entry

because respondent’s entry into the property was not
through strategy or stealth due to the consent given to her
by one of the co­owners. We cannot give our imprimatur to
this sweeping conclusion. Respondent’s entry into the
property without the permission of petitioner could appear
to be a secret and clandestine act done in connivance with
co­owner Norma Maligaya whom respondent allowed to
stay in her house. Entry into the land effected
clandestinely without the knowledge of the other 20
co­owners
could be categorized as possession by stealth. Moreover,
respondent’s act of getting only the consent of one co­
owner, her sister Norma Maligaya, and allowing the latter
to stay in the constructed house, can in fact be considered
as a strategy which she utilized in order to enter into the
co­owned property. As such, respondent’s acts constitute
forcible entry.
Petitioner’s filing of a complaint for forcible entry, in our
view, was within the one­year period for filing the
complaint. The one­year period within which to bring an
action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date
of actual entry to the land. However, when entry is made
through stealth, then the one­year period is counted
21
from
the time the petitioner learned about it. Although
respondent constructed her house in 1992, it was only in
September 1995 that petitioner learned of it when she
visited the property. Accordingly, she then made demands
on respondent to vacate the premises. Failing to get a
favorable response, petitioner filed the complaint on
January 25, 1996, which is within the one­year period from
the time petitioner learned of the construction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated September 16, 2003 and the Resolution dated June
11,

_______________

20 Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142276, August 14, 2001, 362
SCRA 755, 768.
21 Bongato v. Malvar, G.R. No. 141614, August 14, 2002, 387 SCRA
327, 338; Elaine v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80638, April 26, 1989, 172
SCRA 822.

521

VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 12, 2008 521

 Manila International Airport Authority vs. Powergen, Inc.

2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA­G.R. SP No. 69250 are

REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated October
22, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 86, Taal,
Batangas is REINSTATED. Costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.

     Carpio, Carpio­Morales, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ.,

concur.

Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and

set aside.

Notes.—As co­owners of the properties, each of the heirs

may properly bring an action for ejectment, forcible entry
and detainer, or any kind of action for the recovery of
possession of the subject properties. (Celino vs. Heirs of
Alejo and Teresa Santiago, 435 SCRA 690 [2004])
Every co­owner has absolute ownership of his undivided
interest in the co­owned property and is free to alienate,
assign or mortgage his interest except as to purely personal
rights. (Cabal vs. Cabal, 454 SCRA 555 [2005])

——o0o——

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