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What is This?
Introduction
t
One of the most ambitious projects to be undertaken in the still disputed academic
area of ’cultural studies’ has been the connecting of the study of linguistic forms with
the study of social structure, processes and behaviour.’ The relationship between
society and language or, more broadly, symbolic structures, has long been an im-
portant element of social and anthropological research, but the new emphasis is one
which seeks to obtain a precision of socio-cultural analysis in keeping both with the
’scientific’ levels of systematic investigation achieved by modern linguistics and,
quite often, the ’scientific’ ambitions of much radical social theory. The system of a
particular language and the system of the particular society which uses it are seen to
be in an important, mutually determining relationship-such that linguistic study of
a certain kind offers inroads into an understanding of a society and its characteristic
processes. Linguistic paradigms have also been used in the study of a whole range of
cultural phenomena, including those not previously thought of as having directly
linguistic dimensions, such as photography, dress and aspects of social behaviour and
organisation. A widened meaning of ’language’ has emerged.
Many of the researchers who have addressed themselves to this broadly socio-
linguistic enterprise (as well as work in sociolinguistics from a social science base
there has been a range of structuralist, semiotic and literary critical influences) have
had resort at some point or other to the notion of ’code’, which they have used with
varying degrees of emphasis and according to a number of definitions. In this article
I propose to examine some of the problems of these usages, concentrating on dominant
tendencies within the area of cultural studies/communication studies.
Codes
Although ’code’ is widely used in general speech and writing to indicate levels of
rule-system ranging from the closure of the morse-code (a tight set of correlations)
to the relative openness and generality of a code of norms or of conduct (which might
at times be describable as the unspoken and implicitly organised tendencies of
behavioural propriety) in the area of linguistic social research something close to the
idea of a set of rule-governed operations is usually indicated by the term. That is to
say, the usage points towards something closer to the morse-code than to the normal
Centre for Communication Studies, Liverpool University.
1
Many examples could be given of the centrality of the approach but perhaps Hall (1973) is most
illustrative:
’My purpose is to suggest that, in the analysis of culture, the inter-connection between societal
structures and processes and formal or symbolic structures is absolutely pivotal.’
appear to be closer to code of manners than to morse code, though there is frequently
assumed to be a high level of systemic inter-connection at work, as I shall discuss
later.
A number of introductory texts in the area slide around this issue rather confidently,
as if code suggested a spectrum of relatively unproblematic systemic states and that
the shift from semaphore to social behaviour was purely one of degree. It is true that
matters of degree enter into the question of how the production of human and social
meanings is variously organised and controlled but that is not to say that they are
’mere’ matters of degree or that they do not require careful differentiation. In fact,
most confusions in cultural code theory seem to be due less to the researchers artfully
abusing the term as to their falling victims to its general imprecision when on its own
and its wide range of meanings in specialised contexts.
The concept ’code’ has entered communications and cultural studies in Britain
through three rather distinct lines of research:
( i ) The technological paradigms of much early work on ’communication theory’,
paradigms in which the terms ’encoding’ and ’decoding’ are borrowed from infor-
mation theory and telecommunications and indicate the conversion of ’message’ into
’signal’ and the reverse (Shannon and Weaver, 1949). This usage is still operative in
many models and perspectives seeking a unified (and therefore often highly abstract)
general theory of communication. Combined with genetic and psychological per-
spectives, it is present also in the influential work of Bateson ( i 95 i ) and Wilden ( i 9~2).
(2) The class-specific, sociolinguist theories of Basil Bernstein and his fellow
researchers, notably those at the University of London Institute of Education. Here
code is defined as ’frame of consistency’ and ’social structuring of meanings’ (Bern-
stein, i 97 i ). In a development of the concept (Hasan, 1973), codes are seen to be
related to the ’semantic structure of a message’ both as this is determined by ’social
relationships’ and as it, in turn, determines those ’varieties of language’ which are in
fact the ’verbal realizations’ of the codes, here described primarily as ’codes of be-
haviour’. The categories ’restricted’ and ’elaborated’ are, of course, the code forms
most often referred to in this research tradition. Widely influential in education, the
Initially, these different ’meaning systems’ appear to be identified as the sound and
visual tracks of a television programme, tracks which operate both independently
(horizontally) and in combination (vertically). Later in the piece, however, code is
used in a broader, richer sense
Connotational and ideological codes are therefore at work, organising the elements of the
message, as well as those codes which enable the broadcaster, literally to ’get a meaning across’.
Callaghan accomplishes this by explicitly signalling, and then openly playing with, the fact that
two codes are at work-the political code (hard opposition and attack) and the ’Parliamentary
Debate’ code (rudeness is a sort of polite game).
Callaghan is later said to block the intervention of the studio chairman by resorting to
a gambit invoking the idea of the responsibilities of the politician-a ploy which the
researchers see as an appeal ’in the name of a ’higher duty’-(a more powerful code)’.
It is clear, I think, from these examples alone that the linguistic levels, the degrees
of systematicity and the kinds of organising influence of the ’codes’ variously indicated
in the paper are difficult to subsume within a single, unifying concept of codification.
From the extract above, it is hard to judge the status of the parenthesized glosses-
are they elements of, or summaries of, the respective codes? If the latter, just how
useful is it to call ’hard opposition and attack’ the ’political code’? If the former,
what are the codic relationships involved and on what specific political set of gener-
ating principles do they systematically depend? Although initially the term seems to
promise the mapping of highly structured and socially determined systems of lin-
guistic behaviour it quite soon becomes used to denote the inflection of any utterance
in the televised discussion towards this or that rhetorical strategy and to denote, too,
the principles and policies which the strategies are used to articulate and uphold (the
’code’ of the broadcaster consisting presumably of arguments adducing professional
broadcasting values, the ’codes’ of the politician being variously grounded in notions
of public responsibility and representative authority as these are interpreted through
party perspectives).
However, it is in the nature of all linguistic systems ’Which employ codes, that more than one
reading can potentially be produced: that more than one message-structure can be constructed
(my italics).
( i 972b) follows Barthes and Eco by setting out to show how various levels of coding
operate to constitute the meaning (in its structured complexity) of a specific photo-
graph. He theorises the notion of code level used in the ’unity’ paper with the
comment _
Thus, whereas the codes which ’cover’ the signifying function of the linguistic sign at the
denotative level are relatively closed ’sets’, from which quite tightly constructed rules of
transformation can be generated: codes of connotation, constructed over and above the denoted
sign, are necessarily cultural, conventionalised, historical.
Hall, again following Barthes (1972) refers to the latter area as one of ’second-order’
meanings. A few pages later, he notes in a partial re-working of the same point, that
... denotative codes are relatively ’closed’, connotative codes are relatively ’open’. Connotative
codes are tight enough to generate meanings of their own, but these codes do not produce one
invariant meaning-they tend to delimit meanings zvithin a preferred ralige or hori~on.
However, in a rather confusing way, Hall then goes on to see the preferred range of
the connotational level, which he calls ’this polysemy’, as the field within which a
further preferring operation (operated by codes of preferencing within the text?)
secures a narrower ’dominant reading among the variants’-a closure of the (ap-
So it is argued that the ’more or less systematized’ clusterings do not qualify for the
term ’code’-a notion which is reserved for the ’basic conventional systems’ from
which the ’subcodes’ operate as a sort of fine-tuning of meaning, related to social
contexts and specific areas of discourse (Eco discusses, among other subcodes, the
aesthetic subcode, the erotic subcode and the montage subcode). Nevertheless, Eco
is still tempted to use ’code’ in ways which seem to conflict with his earlier definition,
suggesting at one point that ’the conventions at the basis of gastronomic choices ...
form a code’ without specifying just how these satisfy the definitional criteria previ-
ously argued for. Moreover, it is clear that his offered distinction is not directly
parallel to connotation/denotation nor to Hall’s comments on ’second-order’ (and, ,
English translation of his paper). Hall re-works the idea of ’aberrant decoding’ in
terms of political and class-related behaviour in contemporary society; in terms of a
theory of ideological reproduction. Using a terminology taken from Frank Parkin’s
work on social meaning systems (Parkin, I97I ), work which suggests how it is that
differing versions of the same behaviour or communication can be ’read’ as a result
of differing interpretative frames generated by differing socio-economic locations,
Hall suggests that
It is possible for the reader to decode the message of the photo in a wholly contrary way, either
because he does not know the sender’s code or because he recognises the code in use but
chooses to employ a different code (italics in original).
case, the willed employment of a code known to be different from the one ’preferred’,
seems to be more a case of ’double decoding’ than anything close to Eco’s idea of
aberrance, since a conscious, cognitive shift follows the recognition, by the reader, of
’preferred codes’ at work and this shift involves a meta-level of interpretation-an
active, aware reading against the rhetorical grain of the text as that grain is ’realized’
at the lower level of reading. There are problems, in both cases, concerning the nature
of meaning production/transmission and the levels of consciousness involved-and
these problems are rather blurred over by the manner in which ’code’ is used.
If, to use Hall’s illustration, a newspaper reader chooses to interpret the photo-
graph (of a policeman being kicked in the face by an anti-Vietnam-war demonstrator)
within an interpretative framing developed from the belief, say, that ’the cause of
anti-Vietnam war demonstrators is a just and legitimate one in our society; the
forces of law and order are performing here a repressive political function’, how does
this interpretation get made? How does the general attitude (a political code?) deter-
mine or combine with the lower-level interpretative procedures by which such
things as facial expressions, aggressive postures, the ’civic’ resonances of the con-
frontation (regardless of the particular attitudinal versions of these) get ’read off’?
What is critical here is the degree of variation and independence of specific inter-
pretative processes, their reliance on common cultural ground at certain levels of
operation, including much denotative work, and their differences-as interpretative
procedures-at ’higher’ levels of cultural connotation. One should not exclude the
possibility that middle-range variations may in some cases be subsumed within the
same higher level interpretative frame (thus, for instance, a general deploring of
violence against the agency of civil ’law and order’ could be mediated through a
variety of different positions on, say, the role of the police in public demonstrations,
the legitimacy of such demonstrations and the legitimacy of the United States’s
operations in Vietnam).
Hall’s complex typology, a treatment of the successive levels of signification at
which a cultural text is ’worked’ or ’inscribed’, perhaps commits him to an ambitiously
wide range of reference for the idea of ’coding’. It refers at one level to the photograph
as ’iconic sign’, one employing ’formal-denotative codes’ and moves through a
number of levels of more or less technical/professional ’work’ (news production,
retouching, cropping, page composition etc.) until it makes contact with the culturally
expressive meaning-systems at the ’ideological level’-the level at which Parkin’s
typology is taken up to aid the mapping of differentially realized (’taken’) meaning.
This layering of the analysis upwards to the ideological level does not mean that
culturally informed decisions are not taking place at the more fundamental levels of
’working the sign’ however, as Hall reminds us. Nevertheless, the overall structuration
which Hall suggests by his notion of determining ’codes’ is not brought out in the
analysis with the degree of systemic inter-relatedness which the theoretical preface
to his article promises.
I have traced Hall’s use of code in cultural analysis, both as a theory and as an analytic
tool in specific research, in relation to the work of Eco. In choosing to discuss work on
the photograph I hope to have provided a context in which the consideration of
’codes’ can be pushed one stage further back to primary concepts, since the question
of whether the photograph is a ’coded’ form at all has been examined, with differing
conclusions, both by Roland Barthes, perhaps the most influential of the continental
semioticians, and, in a critical commentary on Barthes, by Hall.
One of the difficulties of talking about a ’visual language’ in respect of photography
is the lack of anything equivalent to the denotative vocabulary and regularised
syntax of natural language. Before discussing the arguments of Barthes and Hall in
this respect, it might be useful to offer an example of the sort of problems that can
arise as a result of this difficulty. Such an example is afforded by Camargo (1974) in
which there is developed an ’ideological analysis’ of a Daily Telegraph magazine cover.
The cover shows an expensively but conservatively dressed man and woman standing
some distance apart with two identically dressed children, a child on the right-hand
side of each adult. Moreover, symmetry is further emphasised in that each adult holds
a child by the left hand. At the left ’heel’ of the man sits a dog. Behind them is a
terraced pathway and behind that, dominating the upper half of the frame, is a
castle. Having earlier told us, as a general point, that ’denotative meanings are given
by the code whilst the connotative meanings are given by subcodes’ (here, following
Eco) Camargo argues that ’The denotative meaning of this picture is: the couple,
their children and their castle (home).’ As many of my students have pointed out,
therc is some difficulty in finding ’denotative’ evidence of the possessive (’their
children’, ’their home’) in the photograph. Anyway, what would such evidence look
like? What seems to have happened is that Camargo has ’read off’ possession at the
‘connotative level’ (and I would certainly not wish to argue against this particular
visual registering of the culturally ’obvious’) and then incorporated (rendered back)
these significations into her theorisation of the denotative. The use of denotative/
connotative differentiation in the cultural analysis of visual texts needs perhaps to
retain some flexibility and sense of dialectical relation if it is to avoid problems such
as this; problems which frequently follow from too rigid an attempt at applying a
natural language model. This returns us to some of the more provocative theoretical
considerations on photography of Barthes.
In a widely-cited though quite often misunderstood paper, Rhetoric of The Image
(1971), Barthes refers to the ’absolutely analogic’ nature of the photographic com-
ponent of an advertisement for Panzani pasta. ivhat he has to say about this has a
general relation to much of my earlier discussion of codification
The photograph implies, without doubt, a certain arrangement of the scene (framing, reduction,
flattening) but this event is not a transformation (as a coding might be). The equivalence
appropriate to a true system of signs is lost and a quasi-identity is posed. In other words,
the sign of this message is no longer drawn into an established reserve i.e. it is not coded, and
we are dealing with the paradox (to which we will return) of a message zvithout code.
photograph (framing, distance, lighting, focus, filter etc.) all belong in effect to the plane of
connotation; everything happens as if there was at the beginning (even Utopian) a brute
photo (frontal and clear) on which man disposed, thanks to certain techniques, signs drawn
from a cultural code.
So Barthes here distinguishes between cultural codes and the special case of the
photograph’s denotative method, which he earlier contrasts to the culturally con-
stituted, transformative activity of drawing.
It is understandable that the passage has raised a few problems. The less than
satisfactory remark, given the main thesis concerning ’objectivity’, about the absence
of the codes ’reinforcing the myth’ of photographic naturalism (is Barthes arguing
here that such naturalism is an illusion?) and the shift to flourishingly dramatic
hyperbole at the end are characteristic of a style which frequently cultivates enigma at
just those moments when the diligent reader is seeking to follow the argument
between the insights. There is also the question-it may be one of translation-of the
relationship of ’analogue’ to ’analogic code’, since Barthes talks of the latter at one
stage in his paper and it would be difficult to argue that the photograph’s ’message
without a code’ was, in fact, the product of an ’analogic code’ without being perversely
unhelpful even by the standards of Barthesian playfulness.
Just how ’natural’ Barthes thinks photographic denotation to be, allowing for his
decidedly whimsical phrasings, has worried some commentators on his paper.
Trevor Millum, in an introduction to the Birmingham Centre translation of the piece,
remarks:
surely the pictorial message is coded in the photograph no less than in the sketch? Does not the
camera itself carry out the coding? Otherwise why is it that children, and members of cultures
unfamiliar with photography, have to learn to interpret photos?
Millum goes on to comment that a refusal of the notion of the uncoded photograph
allows ’the photo (to) be replaced within the mainstream of semiological thought.’
However, he hardly engages with the argument (nor perhaps has space to do so) in
the detail needed to refute Barthes’ claims. The suggestion that the ’camera itself’
carries out the coding is not sufficiently clear as a proposition to do more than its
immediate function of rhetorical questioning-in fact, if anything it tends to suggest
that ’mechanical’ level of operations referred to by Barthes himself. Similarly, though
the point about ’learning to interpret’ photographs is clearly relevant, the central
factors to be borne in mind here are, I imagine, precisely ’reduction’, ’flattening’ and
’framing’ together with other, related qualities-characteristics which Barthes
allows as interventionary moments in the production of the ’resemblance’ but which
he disallows as grounds for talking of ’codification’. Moreover Barthes himself, in the
course of his paper, draw our attention to the child’s learning to ’read’ that something
is a picture.
Stuart Hall, in an essay on documentary journalism, The Social Eye of Picture Post
(1972a), takes issue at greater length with Barthes’ line of argument (as well as
Barthes, he cites Aletz, Pasolini and Bazin as being at least half-supporters of ’index-
ical’ theories). Like Millum, Hall stresses the importance of regarding the photograph
as a product of codes, if unique and complex ones. Hall is concerned specifically
with the components of the ’rhetoric of visual exposition’ employed by the Picture
Post, noting particularly layout, captioning and characteristic content. He contrasts
the modern colour supplement (photographic romanticism) with the Post’s use of
’realist’ black and white and notes that we are not dealing ’with &dquo;natural&dquo; versus
&dquo;conventional&dquo; photography but with two different codes’ (italics in original). Yet
This is perhaps a more qualified position on the issue of ’society as discourse’ than
many researchers in the field would adopt-the shift from ’on the model of’ to ’itself
be’ is crucial and is not always signalled quite so clearly.
Conclusions
I have suggested throughout this paper that many researchers have been unclear in
their use of the term ’code’ in studies of human communication and that, whether
deriving from a positivistic technological model or from the hypotheses of semiology
(sometimes less hypotheses than presumptions), the term often seems to offer more
tions’ and hermeneutics as ’system of implicit, latent and purely contingent signs’
(Guiraud, 1975) and endeavouring to redefine code in ’tighter’ or ’looser’ terms.3
Guiraud suggests a process by which ’looser’ sign patterns acquire a consensual
legitimacy and directness of reference to the point where they have ’the status of a
technical code’.
Many uses of the term are almost metaphorical in that, rather than positing con-
figurations at some linguistic level of organisation with attendant and important
ideas of ~ ~c/~//~’, they suggest a conventional ordering ’of some sort’ and serve
to emphasise the fact that cultural meanings are achieved in relation to other cultural
3 once recent move towards a ’loosening’ can be discerned in Eco (1979). In an argument concerning
the educational use of television, Eco notes that
One is led to assume that under the umbrella term of codes and sub-codes, one is not only gathering
something similar tothe verbal, lexical or grammatical competence but also something more
akin to rhetorical competence (p. 19).
He goes on to argue that ’rhetorical competence’
cannot be made explicit in the format of a set of grammatical rules but resides rather in the format
of a storage of previous texts (p. 19).
From the context, it is clear that this is more an argument about the acquisition of competence than one
about the possibilities for its a1lalysis and I refer the reader to the article as a wholc for an understanding
of Eco’s notion of the ’textual’ as distinct from the ’grammatical’.
present use do not deliver what is promised and sometimes obscure what it is a prime
intention of any cultural research to make clear-that is, how social meanings get
made.
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