UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2018

CRIMINAL LAW Volvik as charges d’affaires is diplomatic, he is vested

with blanket diplomatic immunity from criminal suit
(Minucher v. CA, G.R. No. 142396, February 11, 2003).
BOOK I
MALA IN SE VIS-À-VIS MALA PROHIBITA (BAR 1999,
FUNDAMENTAL AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES
2001, 2003, 2005, 2010)
What are the basic maxims in criminal law?
MALA IN SE MALA PROHIBITA
BASIS
1. Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege (There is
There must be a Sufficient that the
no crime when there is no law punishing the
criminal intent. prohibited act was
same) – No matter how wrongful, evil or bad the
done.
act is, if there is no law defining the act, the same
Wrong from its Wrong merely
is not considered a crime.
very nature. because prohibited
by statute.
2. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea (The act
cannot be criminal where the mind is not Generally Generally involves
criminal) – This is true to a felony characterized punished under violation of special
by dolo, but not to a felony resulting from culpa. the RPC. laws.

3. Doctrine of Pro Reo – Whenever a penal law is NOTE: Not all

to be construed or applied and the law admits of violations of special
two interpretations, one lenient to the offender laws are mala
and one strict to the offender, that interpretation prohibita. Even if
which is lenient or favorable to the offender will the crime is
be adopted. punished under a
special law, if the
Actus me invito factus non est meus actus (An act punished is one
4. As to their
act done by me against my will is not my act) which is inherently
concepts
– Whenever a person is under a compulsion of wrong, the same is
irresistible force or uncontrollable fear to do an malum in se, and,
act against his will, in which that act produces a therefore, good faith
crime or offense, such person is exempted in any and the lack of
criminal liability arising from said act. criminal intent are
valid defenses
What is the interplay between the doctrine of Pro Reo unless they are the
and Article 48 (Penalty for complex crimes) of the products of criminal
RPC? (BAR 2010) negligence or culpa.

Following the Doctrine of Pro Reo, crimes under Art. 48 of Mitigating and Such circumstances
the RPC are complexed and punished with a single aggravating are not appreciated
penalty (that prescribed for the most serious crime and circumstances unless the special
to be imposed in its maximum period). The rationale are appreciated law has adopted the
being, that the accused who commits two crimes with a in imposing the scheme or scale of
single criminal impulse demonstrates lesser perversity penalties. penalties under the
than when the crimes are committed by different acts and RPC.
several criminal resolutions (People v. Comadre, G.R. No.
153559, June 8, 2004). (a) Good faith Good faith and lack
(b) lack of of criminal intent
Charges d’affaires Volvik of Latvia suffers from a criminal are NOT valid
psychotic disorder after he was almost assassinated intent; or defenses;
in his previous assignment. One day, while shopping (c) negligence it is enough that the
in a mall, he saw a group of shoppers whom he are valid prohibition was
thought were the assassins who were out to kill him. defenses. voluntarily violated.
He asked for the gun of his escort and shot ten (10)
people and wounded five (5) others before he was Criminal Criminal liability is
subdued. The wounded persons required more than liability is generally incurred
thirty (30) days of medical treatment. What crime or incurred even only when the crime
As to legal
crimes, if any, did he commit? (BAR 2016) when the crime is consummated.
implication
is attempted or
Volvik committed five frustrated murders for the frustrated.
unwounded victims and five frustrated murders for the
wounded victims. Treachery is present since the sudden Penalty is The penalty of the
attack rendered the victims defenseless. The nature of the computed on offender is the same
weapon used in attacking the victims and extent of the the basis of as they are all
wounds sustained by the five victims showed intent to whether he is a deemed principals.
kill. His psychotic condition is not an exempting principal
circumstance of insanity in the absence of showing that offender, or
there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in merely an
accordance with the cognition test. However, he is accomplice or
immune from criminal prosecution. Since the position of accessory.

1 ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2018

 CRIMINAL LAW
Is the crime of technical malversation, punished
under the RPC, mala in se?
The crime of technical malversation, punished under
Article 220 of the RPC, was held to be a crime that is
malum prohibitum. The law punishes the act of diverting
public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a
particular public purpose for another public purpose. The
prohibited act is not inherently immoral, but becomes a
criminal offense because positive law forbids its
commission on considerations of public policy, order, and
convenience. Therefore, good faith and lack of criminal
intent are not valid defenses (Ysidoro v. People, G.R. No.
192330, November 14, 2012).
Is the crime of plunder mala prohibita or mala in se?
It is mala in se, although punishable under special law,
because it is inherently evil, being included among the
heinous crimes punishable with reclusion perpetua to
death and its constitutive crimes are mala in se, such as
malversation of public funds, bribery and monopolies
and combinations (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
148560, Nov. 2, 2001).
Abe, married to Liza, contracted another marriage
with Connie in Singapore. Thereafter, Abe and Connie
returned to the Philippines and lived as husband and
wife in the hometown of Abe in Calamba, Laguna.
What crime if any can Abe be prosecuted? (BAR 1994)
Abe, together with Connie, may be prosecuted for
concubinage under Art. 334 of the Revised Penal Code for
having cohabited as husband and wife.
NOTE: Abe may not be prosecuted for bigamy since the
bigamous marriage was contracted or solemnized in
Singapore, hence, such violation is not one of those where
the Revised Penal Code, under Art. 2 thereof, may be
applied extraterritorially. The general rule on
territoriality of criminal law governs the situation.
The Philippine consul asked his secretary to work
overtime because they were finishing some
important repatriation papers in the embassy. The
said consul asked his secretary to give him a cup of
coffee. The consul asked the secretary to join him.
When the said secretary went to the restroom, the
said consul placed something in the coffee of the
secretary. The secretary felt dizzy and lost
consciousness. The consul then raped her inside his
own office. The said secretary wants to file a case
against the consul. Where shall the secretary file the
case? Is the said consul liable under Philippine laws?
The secretary shall file the case in the Philippines.
Although the crime committed, which is rape, is not in any
way connected with the performance of his official
function, since it was committed inside the Philippine
embassy, Philippine laws will apply. The Philippine
embassy is considered as an extension of the Philippine
sovereignty. So even if the crimes committed is not in any
way connected with the performance of their functions,
but the crime is committed inside the Philippine embassy,
Philippine laws will still apply.
Five Informations charging Francisco Inocencio with
acts of theft allegedly committed in conspiracy with
Ma. Milagros Clemente were filed before the RTC. In
2
the said Informations, it was alleged that Clemente, a
bank officer, fraudulently transferred a million pesos
to Inocencio’s bank account, and the latter later
withdrew the whole amount. The information alleged
conspiracy but only one person is charged. Is the
information valid?
Yes. It is valid, but the court cannot pass verdict on the co-
conspirators who were not charged in the information.
The non-inclusion of the co-conspirator does not
invalidate the Information especially since conspiracy is
not charged as a crime, but is merely alleged as a mode of
committing the crime. In this case, conspiracy is alleged
only as a mode of committing the crime. Ideally, Clemente
and Inocencio should have been indicted together.
However, the non-inclusion of Clemente does not
invalidate the information filed, especially since
conspiracy is not charged as a crime, but is merely alleged
to show how criminal liability was incurred (Inocencio v.
People, G.R. No. 205760, November 09, 2015).
Three cardinal features or main characteristics of
Philippine criminal law (BAR 1998)
1. Generality
GR: Penal laws and those of public security and
safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn
in Philippine territory, subject to the principles of
international law and to treaty stipulations. (Article
14, Civil Code of the Philippines) (BAR 2015)
XPNs:
a. Treaty stipulations and international
agreements, e.g. RP-US Visiting Forces Accord.
b. Laws of Preferential Application, e.g. RA 75
penalizes acts which would impair the proper
observance by the Republic and its inhabitants of
the immunities, rights, and privileges of duly-
accredited foreign diplomatic representatives in
the Philippines. (BAR 2014)
c. The principles of public international law.
d. Members of the Congress are not liable for libel
or slander in connection with any speech
delivered on the floor of the house during a
regular or special session (1987 Constitution, Art.
IV, Sec. 11).
2. Territoriality
GR: The penal laws of the country have force and
effect only within its territory. (BAR 1994)
XPNs: Art. 2 of the RPC (BAR 2000)
1. Should commit and offense while on a
Philippine ship or airship;
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency
note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and
securities issued by the Government of the
Philippine Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the
introduction into these islands of the
obligations and securities mentioned in the
preceding number;
4. While being public officers or employees,
should commit an offense in the exercise of
their functions; or
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2018

5. Should commit any of the crimes against
national security and the law of nations.
3. Prospectivity/Irretrospectivity
GR: Acts or omissions classified as crimes will be
scrutinized in accordance with the relevant penal
laws if these are committed after the effectivity of
those penal laws.
3. Intelligence – means the capacity to know and
understand the consequences and morality of human
acts
NOTE: If there is lack of intelligence, the offender is
exempt from liability.
NOTE: If any of the following requisites is absent,
there is no dolo.

NOTE: Lex Prospicit, Non Respicit means the law
looks forward, never backward.
XPN: Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony,
although at the time of the publication of such laws a
final sentence has been pronounced and the convict
is serving the same (RPC, Art. 22).
Requisites of culpa
1. Criminal negligence on the part of the offender, that
is, the crime was the result of negligence, reckless
imprudence, lack of foresight or lack of skill;
2. Freedom of action on the part of the offender, that is,
he was not acting under duress; and

XPNs to the XPN: The new law cannot be given 3. Intelligence on the part of the offender in performing
the negligent act.
retroactive effect even if favorable to the accused:
When are light felonies punishable?
a. When the new law is expressly made
inapplicable to pending actions or existing
Light felonies are punishable only when consummated,
causes of actions (Tavera v. Valdez, G.R. No. 922,
with the exception of those committed against persons or
November 8, 1902).
property.
b. When the offender is a habitual delinquent as
defined in Rule 5 in Art. 62 of RPC (RPC, Art. 22).
THREE SITUATIONS WHEREIN A PERSON BECOMES
CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR THE RESULTING FELONY
CRIMINAL LIABILITIES AND FELONIES
ALTHOUGH DIFFERENT FROM THAT WHICH HE
INTENDED
INTENTIONAL FELONY VIS-À-VIS NEGLIGENT
FELONY (BAR 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2010)
What are the causes which may produce a result
different from that which the offender intended?
BASIS DOLO CULPA
As to Act is Not malicious 1. Mistake in identity (error in personae) – The
Malice malicious offender intends the injury on one person but the harm
With Injury caused is fell on another. In this situation the intended victim was
deliberate unintentional, it being not at the scene of the crime.
intent. an incident of another
As to intent Example: A, wanting to kill B, killed C instead. (BAR
act performed without
malice. 2003, 2015)

NOTE: There are only two persons involved: the

Has Wrongful act results
As to the actual but unintended victim, and the offender.
intention to from imprudence,
source of the
cause a negligence, lack of
wrong 2. Mistake in blow (aberratio ictus) – A person directed
wrong. foresight or lack of
committed the blow at an intended victim, but because of poor aim,
skill.
that blow landed on somebody else. In aberratio ictus, the
intended victim and the actual victim are both at the
Requisites of dolo scene of the crime.
1. Criminal intent – the purpose to use a particular Example: A, shot at B, but because of lack of precision,
means to effect such result. Intent to commit an act hit C instead. (BAR 1993, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2015)
with malice, being purely a mental process, is
presumed from the proof of commission of an NOTE: There are three persons involved: the
unlawful act. A mental state, hence, its existence is offender, the intended victim, and the actual victim.
shown by overt acts.
3. Injurious consequences are greater than that
NOTE: If there is NO criminal intent, the act is intended (praeter intentionem) – The injury is on the
justified. Offender incurs NO criminal liability. intended victim but the resulting consequence is so grave
a wrong than what was intended. It is essential that there
2. Freedom of action – the voluntariness on the part of is a notable disparity between the means employed or the
the person to commit the act or omission. act of the offender and the felony which resulted.

NOTE: If there is lack of freedom, the offender is
exempt from liability.
This means that the resulting felony cannot be foreseen
from the acts of the offender. (A, without intent to kill,
struck the victim on the back, causing the victim to fall
down and hit his head on the pavement.)

3 ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2018

 CRIMINAL LAW
Example: If A slapped his wife who fell on the ground, her
head hitting the hard pavement rendering her
unconscious and thereafter died, A is liable for parricide.
When he slapped his wife, A was committing a felony, his
wrongful intent is only to cause injury, but the wrongful
act done was greater – the killing of the spouse (Sandoval,
2016).
GR: Praeter intentionem is a mitigating circumstance
particularly covered by paragraph 3 of Art. 13.
XPN: Any person charged under Sec. 4 of the Anti-Hazing
Law (RA 8049) shall not be entitled to the mitigating
circumstance that there was no intention to commit so
grave a wrong.
The three enumerated situations are always the result of
an intentional felony or dolo. These situations do not arise
out of criminal negligence.
Buenamer committed robbery inside a passenger FX
by threatening to shoot the passengers if they do not
give their wallets and cellphones. Bunamer was
successful in taking the things of the passengers. One
of the passengers, Tan, chased Buenamer who
boarded a passenger jeepney in order to escape.
Buenamer boxed Tan when he held on the handle bar
of the jeepney causing him to lose his grip and fall
from the jeepney and thereafter was ran over by the
rear tire of said jeepney and died. Buenamer
contends that he should be given the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong. Is Buenamer entitled for the mitigating
circumstance?
No. This mitigating circumstance addresses itself to the
intention of the offender at the particular moment when
the offender executes or commits the criminal act. This
mitigating circumstance is obtaining when there is a
notable disparity between the means employed by the
accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime
committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the
commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon
used, the mode of attack employed, and the injury
sustained by the victim. (People v. Buenamer, G.R. No.
206227, August 31, 2016)
What is proximate cause?
Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred
(People v. Villacorta, G.R. No. 186412, September 7, 2011).
As a rule, the offender is criminally liable for all the
consequences of his felonious act, although not intended,
if the felonious act is the proximate cause of the felony.
What are the requisites of proximate cause?
1. The direct, natural, and logical cause;
2. Produces the injury or damage;
3. Unbroken by any efficient intervening cause; and
4. Without which the result would not have occurred.
Luis Cruz went to the LRT station, he boarded one of
the coaches bound for Baclaran. While seated, he
happened to read a newspaper left on the seat and
4
noticed that the headlines were about the sinking of
the Super Ferry while on its way to Cebu. He went
over the list of missing passengers who were
presumed dead and came across the name of his
grandfather who had raised him from childhood after
he was orphaned. He was shocked and his mind went
blank for a few minutes, after which he ran amuck
and, using his balisong, started stabbing at the
passengers who then scampered away, with three of
them jumping out of the train and landing on the road
below. All the three passengers died later of their
injuries at the hospital. Is Luis liable for the death of
the three passengers who jumped out of the moving
train? State your reasons.
Yes, Luis is liable for their deaths because he was
committing a felony when he started stabbing at the
passengers and such wrongful act was the proximate
cause of said passengers' jumping out of the train; hence
their deaths. Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code,
any person committing a felony shall incur criminal
liability although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended. In this case, the death of the three
passengers was the direct, natural and logical
consequence of Luis' felonious act which created an
immediate sense of danger in the minds of said
passengers who tried to avoid or escape from it by
jumping out of the train (People v. Arpa, 27 SCRA 1O37;
U.S. vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 497).
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
What is an impossible crime? Can there be an
impossible crime of adultery? (BAR 2015)
An impossible crime is an act which would be an offense
against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means (Art. 4
par. 2).
There is no impossible crime of adultery since this is a
crime against chastity, and not against person or
property, as required by Art. 4 par. 2 of the RPC.
Charlie hated his classmate, Brad, because the latter
was assiduously courting Lily, Charlie’s girlfriend.
Charlie went to a veterinarian and asked for some
poison on the pretext that it would be used to kill a
very sick, old dog. Actually, Charlie intended to use
the poison on Brad. The veterinarian mistakenly
gave Charlie a non-toxic powder which, when mixed
with Brad’s food, did not kill Brad. Did Charlie
commit any crime? If so, what and why? If not, why
not? (BAR 2009)
Charlie committed an impossible crime of murder. His act
of mixing the non-toxic powder with Brad’s food, done
with intent to kill, would have constituted murder which
is a crime against persons, had it not been for the
employment of a means which, unknown to him, is
ineffectual (Art. 4, par. 2, RPC).
Carla, 4 years old, was kidnapped by Enrique, the
tricycle driver paid by her parents to bring and fetch
her to and from school. Enrique wrote a ransom note
demanding P500,000.00 from Carla's parents in
exchange for Carla's freedom. Enrique sent the
ransom note by mail. However, before the ransom
note was received by Carla's parents, Enrique's
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2018
hideout was discovered by the police. Carla was
rescued while Enrique was arrested and
incarcerated. Considering that the ransom note was
not received by Carla's parents, the investigating
prosecutor merely filed a case of "Impossible Crime
to Commit Kidnapping" against Enrique. Is the
prosecutor correct? If he is not correct, can he instead
file a case of grave coercion? (BAR 2014)
The crime committed by Enrique is kidnapping for
ransom. Even before the ransom note was received, the
crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention had
already been committed. The act cannot be considered an
impossible crime because there was no inherent
improbability of its accomplishment or the employment
of inadequate or ineffectual means. The delivery of the
ransom note after the rescue of the victim did not
extinguish the offense, which had already been
consummated when Enrique deprived Carla of her
liberty. The sending of the ransom note would have had
the effect only of increasing the penalty to death under
the last paragraph of Art. 267 (People v. Domasan e.al.,
G.R. No. 95322, March 1, 1993).
Furthermore, kidnapping is a crime against liberty. In an
impossible crime, it is important that the accused
committed an act that would have been a crime against
person or property.
The prosecutor cannot file a case of grave coercion
instead. As discussed above, the crime committed by
Enrique is kidnapping for ransom.
STAGES OF EXECUTION
A felony is consummated when all the elements
necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
present. It is frustrated when the offender performs all
the acts of execution which would produce the felony as
a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it
by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator. It is attempted when the offender
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance
(Valenzuela v. Guittierez, G. R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007).
Jefferson was simply fetching water when Kevin
suddenly hit him on the nape of his neck. Jefferson
complained about this to his landlady, Kevin’s sister,
but the latter simply told him to forgive his brother.
Two hours later, when he resumed fetching water,
Kevin suddenly stabbed Jefferson on the left part of
his face and chest. He was found bleeding by his son-
in-law and was rushed to the hospital. According to
the medical report submitted, the chest wound he
sustained was fatal and could have caused Jefferson’s
death were it not for the timely medical intervention.
What crime is committed by Kevin?
Kevin is liable for frustrated homicide. The essential
element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent
of the offender to kill the victim immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to
kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the courts only
through external manifestations.
In this case, Kevin wielded and used a knife in assaulting
Jefferson. There is also no doubt that the wound on
5 ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2018
Jefferson’s chest would have been sufficient to result to
his death if it were not for the timely medical intervention
(De Guzman, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 178512, November
26, 2014).
COMPLEX CRIMES AND COMPOSITE CRIMES
What is the effect of a compound crime in the
criminal liability of the offender?
The penalty for the most serious crime in its maximum
period shall be imposed.
While Antonew was outside the kitchen of their
house and Marteen in the yard, Alejandrew was
spotted near the vicinity of their house. Suddenly,
Alejandrew threw a grenade towards the cemented
part of the yard. The grenade exploded and Antonew
was hurt in his pelvic area while Marteen, his father,
was fatally hit by a shrapnel causing his death. What
is the criminal liability of Alejandrew?
Alejandrew is liable for murder with frustrated murder.
The act of Alejandrew in throwing a grenade to Marteen
and Antonew is a single act which resulted to the death of
Marteen and the injuries of Antonew. This single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies
which are murder and frustrated murder. Hence, the
crime should be complexed and the penalty of the most
serious crime in its maximum period should be imposed
(People v. Dulay, G.R. No. 194629, April 21, 2014).
Mayor Tawan-Tawan, together with his security
escorts, went home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte, on
board a yellow pick-up service vehicle. At around
3:00 p.m. of the same day, Nelmida, together with his
other co-accused, surreptitiously waited for the
vehicle of the group of Mayor Tawan-Tawan. The
moment the yellow pick-up service vehicle passed by
the aforesaid waiting shed, Nelmida and their co-
accused opened fire and rained bullets on the vehicle
using high-powered firearms killing two security
escorts while injuring others. Nelmida and his co-
accused were charged with double murder with
multiple frustrated murder and double attempted
murder. Are Nelmida and his other co-accused guilty
of the said complex crime?
No. The killing and wounding of the victims were not the
result of a single discharge of firearms by Nelmida and his
co-accused. To note, Nelmida and his co-accused opened
fire and rained bullets on the vehicle boarded by Mayor
Tawan-tawan and his group. As a result, two security
escorts died while five (5) of them were wounded and
injured. The victims sustained gunshot wounds in
different parts of their bodies. Therefrom, it cannot be
gainsaid that more than one bullet had hit the victims.
Moreover, more than one gunman fired at the vehicle of
the victims. As held in People v. Valdez, 304 SCRA 611
(1999), each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of
their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment
at different persons constitute distinct and individual
acts which cannot give rise to a complex crime (People v.
Nelmida, G.R. No. 184500 September 11, 2012).
A group of navy personnel went to a canteen to have
some drinks. At around 10:00 in the evening, they
transferred to a videoke bar, “Aquarius”, where they
continued their drinking session. Shortly thereafter,
a heated argument ensued between Bacosa and
 CRIMINAL LAW

Punzalan. To avoid further trouble, the other navy because conspiracy is not an overt act but a mere
personnel tried to pacify the two and decided to leave preparatory act.
“Aquarius” and return to their camp. Soon after the
navy personnel passed the sentry gate, a maroon Examples: Conspiracy to commit treason,
Nissan van was rushing and zigzagging the road conspiracy to commit rebellion, conspiracy to
towards the group of navy personnel. Punzalan was commit acts like sale, importation and distribution of
recognized as the driver. The van sped away towards
drugs, conspiracy to commit access devise fraud,
the camp and suddenly swerved to the right hitting
the group of the walking navy personnel. Two of the conspiracy to commit terrorism
navy personnel were dead while the others sustained
serious injuries in their body. What is the criminal 2. Conspiracy as a basis of incurring criminal
liability of Punzalan? liability – When the conspiracy is only a basis of
incurring criminal liability, there must be an overt act
Punzalan is guilty of the complex crime of murder with done before the co-conspirators become criminally
attempted murder. When a single act constitutes two or liable. (BAR 1996, 1997, 1998, 2003, 2005)
more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in GR: As long as he appeared in the scene of the crime, he
its maximum period. Punzalan was animated by a single is liable as a co-conspirator.
purpose, to kill the navy personnel, and committed a
single act of stepping on the accelerator, swerving to the XPNs:
right side of the road and ramming through the navy
personnel. The crimes of murder and attempted murder 1. If he is a mastermind, he does not have to be in
are both grave felonies as the law attaches an afflictive the scene of the crime to be co-conspirator.
penalty to capital punishment (reclusion perpetua to 2. If he performs an overt act in the performance of
death) for murder while attempted murder is punished the conspiracy, even if it is not in the scene of the
by prision mayor, an afflictive penalty (People v. crime per se like the driver of a get-away car who
Punzalan, G.R. No. 199892, December 10, 2012). planned the crime as well, or the man who
pressed the button of a remote control bomb and
SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME the bomb exploded a few streets away.
VIS-À-VIS COMPLEX CRIME
Differentiate wheel conspiracy and chain conspiracy
(BAR 2016)
SPECIAL COMPLEX COMPLEX CRIME
CRIME
A “wheel conspiracy” occurs when there is a single
It is the law which The law merely states
person or group (the hub) dealing individually with two
specifies for the crimes two or more grave or less
or more other persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke
that should be combined. grave felonies or an
typically interacts with the hub rather than with another
offense is necessary to
spoke. In the event that the spoke shares a common
commit the other.
purpose to succeed, there is a single conspiracy.
The law provides for a The penalty to be
However, in instances when each spoke is unconcerned
single penalty. imposed will be the most
with the success of the other spokes, there are multiple
serious crime in its
conspiracies.
maximum period.
A light felony committed A light felony committed
A “chain conspiracy”, on the other hand, exists when
in the commission of the would constitute a
there is successive communication and cooperation in
crime is absorbed. separate and distinct
the same way as with legitimate business operations
charge.
between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler
and retailer, and then retailer and consumer (Estrada v.
CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002).
Conspiracy
One night, after escorting his guests outside the
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an house, Allen noticed that garbage was placed in front
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and of his house. Allen, addressing nobody in particular,
decide to commit it. (BAR 1996, 1997, 1998, 2003, complained of the garbage. Jeff and Kevin, thinking
that Allen was addressing his complaint to them,
2005)
were angered and started throwing stones at him.
Allen rushed inside his house to wash his bloody face
Requisites of conspiracy
and to arm himself with a piece of wood. However,
1. Two or more persons came to an agreement; before he was able to retaliate, he was hit by a shovel
by Joriemon. Joseph and Jose held Allen, rendering
2. Agreement concerned the commission of a crime;
him helpless, while Jeff and Kevin stabbed him in the
and
3. Execution of a felony was decided upon. abdomen with a knife. Allen lost consciousness and
was confined in the hospital for nine days. Assuming
that that they were convicted for frustrated murder,
Two kinds of conspiracy
what is the extent of the criminal liability of Jeff,
Kevin, Joriemon, Jose and Joseph?
1. Conspiracy as a crime – mere conspiracy is the
crime itself. This is only true when the law expressly
punishes mere conspiracy, otherwise, the conspiracy They are liable as co-conspirators. Conspiracy
does not bring about the commission of the crime presupposes unity of purpose and unity of action towards
the realization of an unlawful objective among the
accused. Its existence can be inferred from the individual

6
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2018
acts of the accused which, if taken as a whole, are in fact
related and indicative of a concurrence of sentiment. The
chain of events leading to the commission of the crime
adequately established a conspiracy among them. Jeff and
Kevin delivered the initial attack on Allen by stoning him.
Afterwards, Joriemon struck him with a shovel, and,
finally, Joseph and Jose held him so that the others can
stab Allen (Ibañez et al. v. People, G.R. No. 190798, January
27, 2016).
A Starex van driven by Mayor Mitra and an
ambulance driven by Morilla were caught by the
police in a checkpoint with a sack of shabu inside the
two vehicles. The Starex van which was ahead of the
ambulance was able to pass the checkpoint set up by
the police officers. However, the ambulance driven
by Morilla was stopped by police officers and further
examination revealed that the sacks inside the van
contained shabu. Morilla told the police officers that
he was with Mayor Mitra in an attempt to persuade
them to let him pass. This discovery prompted the
operatives to chase the Starex van of Mayor Mitra in
which sacks containing shabu was also discovered. Is
there conspiracy established between Morilla and
Mayor Mitra?
Yes, there is conspiracy. In conspiracy, it need not be
shown that the parties actually came together and agreed
in express terms to enter into and pursue a common v of
the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they
are parts of some complete whole. In this case, the totality
of the factual circumstances leads to a conclusion that
Morilla conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common desire
to transport the dangerous drugs (People v. Morilla,
G.R.No.189833, February 5, 2014).
How is conspiracy proven?
Jurisprudence requires that conspiracy must be proven
as the crime itself. Conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of
the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the
same may be inferred from the conduct of the parties
indicating a common understanding among them with
respect to the commission of the offense. It is not
necessary to show that two or more persons met together
and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the
details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an
illegal objective is to be carried out. The rule is that
conviction is proper upon proof that the accused acted in
concert, each of them doing his part to fulfill the common
design to kill the victim. (People v. Villalba, G.R. No.
207629, October 22, 2014).
XA, YB and ZC planned to rob Miss OD. They entered
her house by breaking one of the windows in her
house. After taking her personal properties and as
they were about to leave, XA decided on impulse to
rape OD. As XA was molesting her, YB and ZC stood
outside the door of her bedroom and did nothing to
prevent XA from raping OD. What crime or crimes did
XA, YB and ZC commit, and what is the criminal
liability of each? (BAR 2004)
The crime committed by XA, YB and ZC is the composite
crime of Robbery with Rape, a single, indivisible offense
under Art. 294(1) of the RPC.
7 ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2018
Although the conspiracy among the offenders was only to
commit robbery and only XA raped CD, the other robbers,
YB and ZC, were present and aware of the rape being
committed by their co-conspirator. Having done nothing
to stop XA from committing the rape, YB and ZC thereby
concurred in the commission of the rape by their co-
conspirator XA.
The criminal liability of XA, YZ and ZC shall be the same.
They are principals in the special complex crime of
robbery with rape, which is a single, indivisible offense,
where the rape accompanying the robbery is just a
component.
Legal effects of implied conspiracy (BAR 1998, 2003)
1. Not all those who are present at the scene will be
considered as conspirators;
2. Only those who participated by criminal acts in the
commission of the crime will be considered as co-
conspirators; and
3. Mere acquiescence to or approval of the commission
of the crime, without any act of criminal
participation, shall not render one criminally liable
as co-conspirator.
CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Pedro is married to Tessie. Juan is the first cousin of
Tessie. While in the market, Pedro saw a man
stabbing Juan. Seeing the attack on Juan, Pedro
picked up a spade nearby and hit the attacker on his
head which caused the latter’s death. Can Pedro be
absolved of the killing on the ground that it is in
defense of a relative? Explain. (BAR 2016)
No. The relatives of the accused for purpose of defense of
relative under Art. 11(2) of the RPC are his spouse,
ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or
adopted brothers or sister, or of his relatives by affinity
in the same degrees, and those by consanguinity within
the fourth civil degree. Relative by affinity within the
same degree includes the ascendant, descendant, brother
or sister of the spouse of the accused. In this case, Juan is
not the ascendant, descendant, brother or sister of Tessie,
the spouse of Pedro. Relative by consanguinity within the
fourth civil degree includes first cousin. But in this case,
Juan is the cousin of Pedro by affinity but not by
consanguinity. Juan, therefore, is not a relative of Pedro
for purpose of applying the provision on defense of
relative.
May the justifying circumstance of self-defense be
invoked at the same time with the exempting
circumstance of accident?
No. Self-defense is inconsistent with the exempting
circumstance of accident, in which there is no intent to
kill. On the other hand, self-defense necessarily
contemplates a premeditated intent to kill in order to
defend oneself from imminent danger (Pomoy v. People,
G.R. No. 150647. September 29, 2004).
In Toledo vs. People, the Supreme Court held that, there is
no such defense as accidental self-defense in the realm of
criminal law. Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1
of the Revised Penal Code necessarily implies a deliberate
and positive overt act of the accused to prevent or repel
an unlawful aggression of another with the use of
 CRIMINAL LAW
reasonable means. The accused has freedom of action. He
is aware of the consequences of his deliberate acts. The
defense is based on necessity which is the supreme and
irresistible master of men of all human affairs, and of the
law. From necessity, and limited by it, proceeds the right
of self-defense. The right begins when necessity does, and
ends where it ends (Toledo v. People, 439 SCRA 94, G.R. No.
158057 September 24, 2004).
Dion and Talia were spouses. Dion always came home
drunk since he lost his job a couple of months ago.
Talia had gotten used to the verbal abuse from Dion.
One night, in addition to the usual verbal abuse, Dion
beat up Talia. The next morning, Dion saw the injury
that he had inflicted upon Talia and promised her
that he would stop drinking and never beat her again.
However, Dion did not make good on his promise.
Just after one week, he started drinking again. Talia
once more endured the usual verbal abuse. Afraid
that he might beat her up again, Talia stabbed Dion
with a kitchen knife while he was passed out from
imbibing too much alcohol. Talia was charged with
the crime of parricide. (BAR 2015)
a. May Talia invoke the defense of Battered Woman
Syndrome to free herself from criminal liability?
Explain.
No, a single act of battery or physical harm committed by
Dion against Talia resulting to the physical and
psychological or emotional distress on her part is not
sufficient to avail of the benefit of the justifying
circumstance of “Battered Woman Syndrome”. The
defense of Battered Woman Syndrome can be invoked if
the woman with a marital relationship with the victim is
subjected to cumulative abuse or battery involving the
infliction of physical harm resulting to physical and
psychological or emotional distress. Cumulative means
resulting from successive addition. In sum, there must be
“at least two battering episodes” between the accused
and her intimate partner and such final episode produced
in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an
imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief
that she needed to use force in order to save her life
(People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004).
b. Will your answer be the same, assuming that
Talia killed Dion after being beaten up a second
time? Explain.
No. Talia can now invoke the defense of Battered Woman
Syndrome to free herself from criminal liability for killing
her husband since she suffered physical and emotional
distress arising from cumulative abuse or battery. Under
Section 26 of R.A.9262, victim survivors of Battered
Woman Syndrome do not incur any criminal or civil
liability despite the absence of the requisites of self-
defense.
Rogelio Delos Reyes—along with Roderick Licayan
and Roberto Lara—were charged with the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom. In his defense, Delos Reyes
argued that he was merely passing by at the crime
scene when one of the co-accused pointed a gun at
him and forced him to guard the victims, hence he is
entitled to the exempting circumstance of
compulsion due to irresistible force. Is the exempting
circumstance of compulsion due to irresistible force
present?
8
No. A person invoking the exempting circumstance of
compulsion due to irresistible force admits in effect the
commission of a punishable act, and must therefore
prove the exempting circumstance by clear and
convincing evidence. Specifically: He must show that the
irresistible force reduced him to a mere instrument that
acted not only without will but also against his will. The
compulsion must be of such character as to leave the
accused no opportunity to defend himself or to escape.
The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present,
imminent and impending; and it must be of such a nature
as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or
serious bodily harm if the act is not done. It is hard to
believe that a person who accidentally discovers kidnap
victims would be held at gunpoint by the kidnappers to
guard said victims (People v. Licayan, et al., G.R. No.
203961, July 29, 2015).
Y, while alighting from his vehicle, was hit by X with
his car. This caused Y to be thrown four meters away
from his jeepney. X was charged with Frustrated
Murder and convicted in the RTC of Frustrated
Homicide. Upon appeal in the CA the crime was
modified to Reckless Imprudence resulting in
Serious Physical Injuries. X contends that the CA
should have appreciated voluntary surrender as a
mitigating circumstance in his favor. Is X’s contention
correct?
No. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
cannot be appreciated in his favor. Paragraph 5 of Article
365, Revised Penal Code, expressly states that in the
imposition of the penalties, the courts shall exercise their
sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed
in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code (Mariano v. People,
G.R. No. 178145, July 7, 2014).
May disregard of age and sex be appreciated in
Robbery with Homicide which is a crime against
property?
No. With respect to disregard of age and sex, the same
may be appreciated only in crimes against persons or
honor. It is not correct to consider this aggravating
circumstance in crimes against property. Besides,
robbery with homicide is principally a crime against
property and not against persons. Homicide is a mere
incident of the robbery, the latter being the main purpose
and object of the criminal (People v. Hernandez, G.R. No.
139697, June 15, 2004).
X, while descending from a curved path, collided with
a motorcycle, thereby killing Y, one of its passengers,
and causing serious physical injuries to the two other
victims. The body of Y was loaded into the vehicle of
X but the latter’s engine would not start; thus, the
body was loaded in a different vehicle. The jack of X
was used to extricate the body of Y from being pinned
under the vehicle of X. X, in his defense, claimed that
it was not his fault that the tricycle swerved in his
direction. X was charged with Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical
Injuries and Damage to Property under Article 365 in
relation to Article 263 of the RPC “with the
aggravating circumstance that accused failed to lend
on the spot to the injured party such help that was in
his hands to give”. Should the court appreciate the
alleged aggravating circumstance?
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2018
No. The aggravating circumstance “that accused failed to
lend on the spot to the injured party such help that was in
his hands to give” should not be appreciated. Verily, it is
the inexcusable lack of precaution or the conscious
indifference to the consequences of the conduct which
supplies the criminal intent in Article 365. The limiting
element in the last paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC,
which imposes the penalty next higher in degree upon the
offender who “fails to lend on the spot to the injured
parties such help as may be in his hands to give”,
according to case law, (a) is dependent on the means in
the hands of the offender, i.e., the type and degree of
assistance that he/she, at the time and place of the
incident, is capable of giving; and (b) requires adequate
proof. X was able to supply the help according to the
extent of his capabilities (Gonzaga v. People, G.R. No.
195671, January 21, 2015).
Roger, the leader of a crime syndicate in Malate,
Manila, demanded the payment by Antonio, the
owner of a motel in that area, of P10, 000 a month as
“protection money". With the monthly payments,
Roger assured that the syndicate would provide
protection to Antonio, his business, and his
employees. Should Antonio refuse, Roger warned
that the motel owner would either be killed or his
establishment would be destroyed. Antonio refused
to pay the protection money. Days later, at around
3:00 in the morning, Mauro, a member of the criminal
syndicate, arrived at Antonio's home and hurled a
grenade into an open window of the bedroom where
Antonio, his wife, and their three year-old daughter
were sleeping. All three of them were killed instantly
when the grenade exploded.
State, with reasons, the crime or crimes that had been
committed as well as the aggravating circumstances,
if any, attendant thereto. (BAR 2008)
By demanding "protection money" under threat and
intimidation that the businessman (Antonio) would be
killed or his establishment destroyed if he would refuse
to pay the protection money, the crime of grave threats is
committed by Roger, the leader of the crime syndicate.
For killing the businessman, his wife and three year-old
daughter, the complex crime of multiple murder was
committed by Mauro, a member of the same crime
syndicate. The killing is qualified by the use of an
explosive (hand grenade). The treachery attending the
killing shall be separately appreciated as another
aggravating circumstance aside from the use of explosive
as the qualifying circumstance.
Other aggravating circumstances which may be
appreciated are:
1. Dwelling, because the killings were committed in the
home of the victims who had not given any
provocation;
2. Nocturnity, considering that the offenders carried
out the killing at around 3:00 AM, indicative of a
deliberate choice of nighttime for the commission of
the crime;
3. Treachery, under Art. 14, par. 16, RPC, mentioned
above, considering that victims were all asleep when
killed; and
4. The offense was committed by a person who belongs
to an organized/syndicated crime group.
9 ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2018
Should the aggravating circumstance of dwelling be
considered if the assailant was outside the house and
the victim was inside?
The aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be
taken into account. Although the triggerman fired the
shot from outside the house, his victim was inside. For
this circumstance to be considered it is not necessary that
the accused should have actually entered the dwelling of
the victim to commit the offense; it is enough that the
victim was attacked inside his own house, although the
assailant may have devised means to perpetrate the
assault. (People v. Sibbu, G.R. No. 214757, March 29, 2017)
Is abuse of superior strength present as an
aggravating circumstance when it is shown that two
accused attack a lone victim?
No. Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there
is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and
the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of
strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor
selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission
of the crime. The fact that there were two persons who
attacked the victim does not per se establish that the
crime was committed with abuse of superior strength,
there being no proof of the relative strength of the
aggressors and the victim. The evidence must establish
that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or
that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage.
To take advantage of superior strength means to
purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the
means of defense available to the person attacked. The
appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends
on the age, size, and strength of the parties (Fantastico v.
Malicse, Sr., G.R. No. 190912, January 12, 2015).
For treachery to be appreciated, is it enough to show
that the attack against the intended victim was
unexpected?
No. The unexpectedness of an attack cannot be the sole
basis of a finding of treachery even if the attack was
intended to kill another as long as the victim’s position
was merely accidental. Treachery as a qualifying
circumstance must be deliberately sought to ensure the
safety of the accused from the defensive acts of the victim.
A finding of the existence of treachery should be based on
“clear and convincing evidence.” Such evidence must be
as conclusive as the fact of killing itself. In this case, no
evidence was presented to show that petitioner
consciously adopted or reflected on the means, method,
or form of attack to secure his unfair advantage (Cirera v.
People, G.R. No. 181843, July 14, 2014).
What are special aggravating circumstances?
Special aggravating circumstances are those which arise
under special conditions to increase the penalty for the
offense to its maximum period, but the same cannot
increase the penalty to the next higher degree. They must
always be alleged and charged in the information, and
must be proves during the trial in order to be
appreciated. Moreover, it cannot be offset by an ordinary
mitigating circumstance (People v. De Leon, G.R. No.
179943, June 26, 2009, citing Palaganas v. People).
e.g.:
 CRIMINAL LAW

1. Quasi-rescidivism (Art. 160, RPC); Means and lawbreaker in and would not
2. Robbery by a band (Art. 295, RPC); ways flagrante delicto otherwise
3. Robbery in an uninhabited place (Art. 300, RPC); commit it, into
4. Commission of a crime by a syndicate; committing the
5. Taking advantage of public position; crime.
6. Complex crimes under Art. 48 of the RPC (People v.
De Leon, G.R. No. 179943, June 26, 2009, citing The This
Palaganas v. People); circumstance is circumstance
7. Use of a loose firearm, when inherent in the no bar to absolves the
commission of a crime punishable under the RPC or prosecution and accused from
other special laws, i.e. homicide, murder (Sec. 29, RA As to criminal conviction of criminal
10591; People v. Salahuddin, G.R. No. 206291, January liability the lawbreaker. liability (People
18, 2016); v. Dante Marcos,
8. Use of dangerous drugs in the commission of a crime G.R. No. 83325,
(Sec. 25, RA 9165). May 8, 1990).

NOTE: While Sec. 25 of RA 9165 expressly

provides that it is a qualifying aggravating PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE
circumstance, it will not be controlling because
the use of dangerous drugs in the commission of What are the kinds of principals?
a crime does not change the nature of the crime
committed. Hence, it is only a special aggravating 1. Principal by direct participation; (BAR 1992, 1994,
circumstance (Campanilla, 2017). 2000, 2014)
2. Principal by induction/inducement; and (BAR 1994,
What are the other two circumstances found in the 2002, 2003)
RPC affecting criminal liability? 3. Principal by indispensable cooperation (BAR 2001,
2013, 2015)
1. Absolutory cause – has the effect of an exempting
circumstance and it is predicated on lack of A asked B to kill C because of a grave injustice done to
voluntariness such as instigation. A by C. A promised B a reward. B was willing to kill C,
not so much because of the reward promised to him
Example: In cases of instigation and in case a relative but because he also had his own long-standing
of a principal is charged as an accessory, he is exempt grudge against C, who had wronged him in the past. If
from criminal liability. C is killed by B, would A be liable as a principal by
inducement?
2. Extenuating circumstances – has the effect of
mitigating the criminal liability of the offender. No. A would not be liable as a principal by inducement
because the reward he promised B is not the sole
Example: In case of infanticide, concealment of impelling reason which made B to kill C. To bring about
dishonor is an extenuating circumstance insofar as criminal liability of a co-principal, the inducement made
the pregnant woman and the maternal grandparents by the inducer must be the sole consideration which
are concerned. Abortion under Art. 258 would also caused the person induced to commit the crime and
mitigate the liability of the pregnant woman if the without which the crime would not have been committed.
purpose is to conceal dishonor but such is not The facts of the case indicate that B, the killer supposedly
available to the parents of the pregnant woman. Also, induced by A, had his own reason to kill C out of a long
in Art. 333, if the person guilty of adultery committed standing grudge.
the offense while being abandoned without
justification, the penalty next lower in degree shall be Laylay convinced AAA to accompany her at a wake at
imposed. Parañaque City. Before proceeding to the wake,
Laylay and AAA went to Bulungan Fish Port along the
ENTRAPMENT VIS-À-VIS INSTIGATION (BAR 1990, coastal road to ask for some fish. When they reached
1995, 2003) the fish port, they proceeded to a Kubuhan, Laylay
suddenly pulled AAA inside a room where a man
BASIS ENTRAPMENT INSTIGATION known by the name "Speed" was waiting. AAA saw
The criminal The idea and "Speed" give money to Laylay and heard "Speed" tell
design design to bring Laylay to look for a younger girl. Thereafter, "Speed"
originates from about the wielded a knife, tied AAA's hands, and raped her. Is
and is already commission of Laylay guilty for the crime of rape as principal by
As to intent in the mind of the crime indispensable cooperation?
the lawbreaker originated and
even before developed in No, Laylay is not a principal by indispensable
entrapment. the mind of the cooperation. To be a principal by indispensable
law enforcers. cooperation, one must participate in the criminal
The law The law resolution, a conspiracy, or unity in criminal purpose and
enforcers resort enforcers cooperation in the commission of the offense by
to ways and induce, lure, or performing another act without which it would not have
means for the incite a person been accomplished. The act of Laylay in convincing AAA
purpose of who is not to go with her until Laylay received money from “Speed”
capturing the minded to who raped AAA, are not indispensable in the crime of
commit a crime rape. Anyone could have accompanied AAA and offered

10

the latter’s services in exchange for money and AAA could
still have been raped (People v. Dulay, G.R. No. 193854,
September 24, 2012).
PD 1612 vis-à-vis Art. 19(1) of the RPC
FENCING
Fencing is limited to
theft and robbery. The
terms theft and robbery
are used as a generic
term to refer to any kind
of unlawful taking, not
just theft or robbery.
Mere possession of There
stolen items creates a presumption of being
presumption of fencing. an accessory.
Fencing is a principal
crime in itself. As such, it
can stand on its own.
There is no need to
prove that one is guilty
of theft or robbery.
REITERACION
It is necessary that the
offender shall have
served out his sentence
for the first offense.
The previous and
subsequent offenses
must not be embraced
by the same Title of the
RPC.
Not always aggravating;
discretion of the court
to appreciate.
Includes offenses under
special law.
A generic aggravating
circumstance.
UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2018
have been convicted
first of the crime
charged.
The penalty is higher Penalty is less than
than the penalty of an that imposed in
accessory. fencing.
ACCESSORY
Malum prohibitum and Malum in se and
Not limited in scope. therefore there is no therefore there is a
need to prove criminal need to prove
intent. criminal intent.
The fence need not be a Natural person only.
natural person but may
be a firm, association,
corporation or
is no partnership or other
organization.
It is necessary to
prove that the
principal committed
the crime. Hence,
before an accessory
could be held liable,
the principal must
MULTIPLE OFFENDERS
RECIDIVISM HABITUAL DELIQUENCY QUASI-RECIDIVISM
Within a period of 10 years
from the date of release or last
conviction of the crimes Felony was committed after
It is enough that a
covered, he is found guilty of having been convicted by final
final judgment has
any of said crimes a third time judgment of an offense, before
been rendered in the
or oftener. beginning to serve sentence or
first offense.
while serving the same.
Requires that the Crimes covered are serious or First and subsequent
offenses be included less serious physical injuries, conviction may or may not be
in the same Title of robbery, theft, estafa and embraced by the same title of
the Code. falsification. the RPC.
Shall be punished by the
It increases the
maximum period of the penalty
penalty to its Shall suffer additional penalty.
prescribed by law for the new
maximum period.
felony.
First crime for which the
offender is serving sentence
Limited to serious or less need not be a crime under the
Felonies under RPC serious physical injuries, RPC but the second crime must
only. robbery, theft, estafa and be one under the RPC.
falsification.
Special aggravating
Extraordinary aggravating circumstance which may be
A generic
circumstance which cannot be offset by special privileged
aggravating
offset by a mitigating mitigating circumstances not
circumstance.
circumstance. by ordinary mitigating
circumstances.
11 ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2018
 CRIMINAL LAW

OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE authorities for purposes of background information

(PD 1829) and not for publication and publishing or
disseminating the same to mislead the investigator
or the court (PD 1829, Sec. 1).
Purpose

NOTE: (1) If any of the acts mentioned herein is penalized

The purpose of the law is to discourage public
by any other law with a higher penalty, the higher penalty
indifference or apathy towards the apprehension and shall be imposed. (2) If any of the foregoing acts are
prosecution of criminal offenders. It is necessary to committed by a public official or employee, he shall, in
penalize acts which obstructs or frustrates or tend to addition to the penalties provided there under, suffer
obstruct or frustrate the successful apprehension and perpetual disqualification from holding public office.
prosecution of criminal offenders.
PENALTIES
PUNISHABLE ACTS Reclusion perpetua v. Life imprisonment (BAR 1994,
2001, 2009)
Any person, who knowingly or willfully obstructs,
impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of RECLUSION LIFE IMPRISONMENT
suspects and the investigation and prosecution of PERPETUA
criminal cases by committing any of the following acts: Pertains to the penalty Pertains to the penalty
imposed for violation imposed for violation of
1. Preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal of the RPC special laws
proceeding or from reporting the commission of any
offense or the identity of any offender/s by means of It has fixed duration It has no fixed duration
bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation,
force or threats; It carries with it It does not carry with it
2. Altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any accessory penalties accessory penalty
paper, record, document, or object, with intent to
impair its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability,
or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or 1. Principal penalties – those expressly imposed by
official proceedings in, criminal cases, or to be used the court in the judgment of conviction.
in the investigation of, or official proceedings in,
criminal cases; (BAR 2005) 2. Accessory penalties – those that are deemed
3. Harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, included in the imposition of the principal penalties.
any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to
believe or suspect, has committed any offense under
existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest,
prosecution and conviction;
4. Publicly using a fictitious name for the purpose of
concealing a crime, evading prosecution or the
execution of a judgment, or concealing his true name
and other personal circumstances for the same
purpose or purposes;
5. Delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by
obstructing the service of process or court orders or
disturbing proceedings in the fiscal's offices, in
Tanodbayan, or in the courts;
6. Making, presenting or using any record, document,
paper or object with knowledge of its falsity and with
intent to affect the course or outcome of the
investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal
cases;
7. Soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any
benefit in consideration of abstaining from,
discounting, or impeding the prosecution of a
criminal offender;
8. Threatening directly or indirectly another with the
infliction of any wrong upon his person, honor or
property or that of any immediate member or
members of his family in order to prevent such
person from appearing in the investigation of, or
official proceedings in, criminal cases, or imposing a
condition, whether lawful or unlawful, in order to
prevent a person from appearing in the investigation
of or in official proceedings in, criminal cases; and
9. Giving of false or fabricated information to mislead
or prevent the law enforcement agencies from
apprehending the offender or from protecting the life
or property of the victim; or fabricating information
from the data gathered in confidence by investigating

12
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2018

COMPUTATION OF PENALTY
PRINCIPAL ACCESSORY PENALTIES
PENALTIES
In computing the proper imposable penalty, what
Capital punishment: 1. Perpetual or temporary are the factors that should be considered?
- Death. absolute disqualification;
2. Perpetual or temporary 1. Prescribed or graduated penalty
Afflictive penalties: special disqualification; 2. Indivisible or divisible penalty
- Reclusion perpetua, 3. Suspension from public 3. Applicability or non-applicability of the
- Reclusion temporal, office, the right to vote Indeterminate Sentence Law
- Perpetual or and be voted for, the
temporary absolute profession or calling; I. PRESCRIBED OR GRADUATED PENALTY
disqualification, 4. Civil interdiction;
- Perpetual or 5. Indemnification; What is the prescribed penalty?
temporary special 6. Forfeiture or confiscation
disqualification, of instruments and The prescribed penalty is that found in Book II of the
- Prision mayor. proceeds of the offense; Revised Penal Code.
and
Correctional 7. Payment of costs. What is the graduated penalty?
penalties:
- Prision correccional, The graduated penalty is the imposable penalty after
- Arresto mayor, taking into consideration certain graduating factors.
- Suspension,
- Destierro. What are the graduating factors?

Light penalties: 1. Stages of execution

- Arresto menor, 2. Nature of participation
- Public censure.
NOTE: For #1 and #2, see table on the application of
Penalties common to Articles 50-57 of the RPC.
the three preceding
classes: 3. Presence of privileged mitigating circumstance
- Fine and Bond to
keep the peace. PRIVILEGED ORDINARY
MITIGATING MITIGATING
APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 50-57 OF THE RPC CIRCUMSTANCE CIRCUMSTANCE
Adjust the penalty by Adjust the penalty by
Consummated Frustrated Attempted degree period
Not subject to the offset Subject to the offset rule
Principals 0 1 2 rule
Accomplices 1 2 3
Accessories 2 3 4 What are the privileged mitigating circumstances
under the RPC?
“0” represents the penalty prescribed by law in defining
1. When the offender is a minor under 18 years of
a crime which is to be imposed on the principal in a
age (RPC, Art. 68); (BAR 2013, 2014)
consummated offense. The other figures represent the
2. When the crime committed is not wholly
degrees to which the penalty must be lowered, to meet
excusable (RPC, Art. 69);
the different situations anticipated by law (Reyes, 2012).
3. When there are two or more mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance,
However, Articles 50 to 57 shall not apply to the following
the court shall impose the penalty next lower to
cases where the law expressly prescribes:
that prescribed by law, in the period that it may
deem applicable, according the number and
a. the penalty for a frustrated or attempted felony; or
nature of such circumstances (RPC, Art. 64, par.
b. to be imposed upon accomplices or accessories (Art.
5); (BAR 1997)
60, RPC).
4. Voluntary release of the person illegally detained
within 3 days without the offender attaining his
What is the penalty for impossible crime?
purpose and before the institution of the
criminal action (RPC, Art. 268, par. 3);
The penalty for impossible crime is arresto mayor, or a
5. Abandonment without justification by the
fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos (Art. 59, RPC).
offended spouse in case of adultery (RPC, Art.
333, par. 3); and
What is the basis for the imposition of the proper
6. Concealing dishonor in case of infanticide (RPC,
penalty for impossible crime?
Art. 255, par. 2).
The court must take into consideration the following:
NOTE: If it is the maternal grandparent who committed
the offense to conceal dishonor, the penalty imposed is
1. the social danger; and
one degree lower. If it is the pregnant woman who
2. the degree of criminality shown by the offender (Art.
committed the offense to conceal dishonor, the penalty
59, RPC).
imposed is two degrees lower. In case of concealing
dishonor by a pregnant woman in abortion, the

13 ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2018

 CRIMINAL LAW

imposable penalty is merely lowered by period and not
by degree, hence, not a privileged mitigating
circumstance.
MINIMUM AGE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
TREATMENT OF CHILD BELOW THE AGE OF
RESPONSIBILITY
(RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630)
Whether the prescribed penalty is single, compound, or
complex, the graduated penalty is single and full penalty.
e.g.
a. Homicide – prescribed penalty is single penalty of
reclusion temporal
1 degree lower is prision mayor
2 degrees lower is prision correccional

CRIMINAL b. Murder – prescribed penalty is compound penalty of

AGE BRACKET TREATMENT reclusion perpetua to death
LIABILITY

15 years old or Exempt. The child shall be 1 degree lower is reclusion temporal
2 degrees lower is prision mayor
below. subjected to a
community-based
c. Treason committed by a resident alien – prescribed
intervention penalty is complex penalty of reclusion temporal to death
program.
1 degree lower is prision mayor
2 degrees lower is prision correccional
Above 15 but Exempt. The child shall be
Second rule: If the prescribed penalty is in period,
below 18, who subjected to a then the graduated penalty is also in period
acted without community-based
discernment. intervention Single period – one full period
program. Compound penalty – composed of two periods
Complex penalty – consists of three periods
Above 15 but Not exempt. Such child shall be e.g.
below 18, who subjected to a a. Technical malversation – the prescribed penalty is
acted with diversion program. single period of prision correccional in its minimum
discernment. period

1 degree lower is arresto mayor in its maximum

NOTE: The exemption from criminal liability in the cases
specified above does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with
existing laws (RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630, Sec. 6).
What are the privileged mitigating circumstances
contemplated under Art. 69 of the RPC?
period
2 degrees lower is arresto mayor in its medium
period
b. Theft – the prescribed penalty is compound period of
prision correccional in its medium period to prision
correccional in its maximum period

1. Incomplete justifying (RPC, Art. 11) and
2. Incomplete exempting (RPC, Art. 12) circumstances,
Provided that the majority of their conditions are present.
For Art. 69 of the RPC to apply, it is necessary that:
1. Some of the conditions required to justify the deed
or to exempt from criminal liability are lacking,
2. The majority of such conditions are nonetheless
present,
NOTE: If there are only two requisites, the
presence of one is already considered as majority.
3. When the circumstance has an indispensable
element, that element must be present in the case
(Regalado, 2007).
RULES ON GRADUATION OF PENALTIES
First rule: Where the graduated penalty is a single full
penalty
Single penalty – one full penalty
Compound penalty – composed of two penalties
Complex penalty – consists of three penalties
1 degree lower is arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum
period
2 degrees lower is arresto mayor in its minimum
period to arrestor mayor in its medium period
c. Simple robbery – the prescribed penalty is complex
period of prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its medium period
1 degree lower is arrestor mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its medium
period
2 degrees lower is destierro in its maximum
period to arresto mayor in its medium period
Third rule: When the prescribed penalty is composed
of a full penalty and penalties with period
e.g.
a. Section 5(b) of RA 7610 – the prescribed penalty is
reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua – the graduated penalty must be a complex
period

14
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2018
1 degree lower is prision mayor in its medium
period to reclusion temporal in its minimum
period
II. DIVISIBLE OR INDIVISIBLE PENALTY
RULES FOR THE APPLICATION OF INDIVISIBLE
PENALTIES (ART. 63, RPC)
What are the indivisible penalties?
1. Reclusion perpetua
2. Death
3. Reclusion perpetua to death (Campanilla, 2017).
First rule: The law prescribes a single indivisible
penalty
Whatever may be the nature or number of aggravating or
mitigating circumstance that may have attended the
commission of the crime, the court shall apply the
prescribed penalty.
e.g.
a. Simple rape – the prescribed penalty is reclusion
perpetua
b. Qualified rape – the prescribed penalty is death
The crime committed is simple rape, and the penalty
is reclusion perpetua. There are two mitigating
circumstances. Can you appreciate the two mitigating
circumstances, to appreciate the special mitigating
circumstance, for purposes of making the penalty one
degree lower?
No, because the special mitigating circumstance
consisting of two mitigating circumstances is found
under Art. 64. There is no special circumstance in Art. 63
of the RPC.
Second rule: The law prescribes two (2) indivisible
penalties
There is only one prescribed penalty consisting of two (2)
indivisible penalties, that is reclusion perpetua to death
for the following crimes under the RPC:
1. parricide (Art. 246);
2. murder (Art. 248);
3. infanticide (Art. 255);
4. kidnapping and serious illegal detention (Art. 267);
5. rape with the use of a deadly weapon (Art. 266-B par.
2);
6. rape by two or more persons (Art. 266-B par. 2);
7. when by reason or on occasion of rape, the victim
becomes insane (Art. 266-B par. 3);
8. when rape is attempted and homicide is committed
(Art. 266-B par. 4);
9. robbery with homicide (Art. 295 par. 1);
10. robbery with rape with the use of a deadly weapon,
or by two or more persons (Art. 295 par. 2).
NOTE: Destructive arson under PD 1613 is also
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
When the penalty is composed of two (2) indivisible
penalties, the following rules shall be observed:
a. When there is only one aggravating
circumstance, the greater penalty shall be
imposed.
15
b. When there is neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be
imposed.
c. When there is a mitigating circumstance and no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty
shall be imposed.
d. If there are both mitigating and aggravating
circumstances present, offset one another, then
apply the rules.
The crime committed is parricide, the penalty is
reclusion perpetua to death. There are two mitigating
circumstances. Can you appreciate the two mitigating
circumstances as special mitigating circumstance for
purposes of graduating the penalty from reclusion
perpetua to death, to reclusion temporal?
No. In People v. Takbobo (G.R. No. 102984, June 30,1993),
it was held that when there are two or more mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance but the
imposable penalties are indivisible in nature, the court
cannot proceed by analogy with the provisions of
paragraph 5 of Article 64 and impose the penalty lower
by one degree. The rule applicable in is found in Article
63, and not in Article 64, of the RPC.
The crime committed is parricide. There are three
(3) aggravating circumstances and two (2) mitigating
circumstances. What is the proper imposable
penalty?
Applying the off-set rule, only one aggravating
circumstance will remain. Thus, the greater penalty
which is death is the proper imposable penalty. However,
because of RA 9346, the penalty will be reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
The crime is parricide. There are two (2) aggravating
circumstance and two (2) mitigating circumstance.
What is the proper imposable penalty?
Applying the off-set rule, no modifying circumstance will
remain. Since there is neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty which is reclusion
perpetua is the proper imposable penalty.
RULES FOR THE APPLICATION OF DIVISIBLE
PENALTIES (ART. 64, RPC)
What are the divisible penalties?
1. Penalty composed of three (3) periods;
2. Penalty not composed of three (3) periods;
3. Complex penalty;
4. Penalty without a specific legal form (Campanilla,
2017).
1. PENALTY COMPOSED OF THREE (3) PERIODS
When the penalty is composed of three (3) periods, the
following rules shall be observed:
a. When there is neither aggravating and no mitigating,
the penalty in its medium period shall be imposed.
b. When there is only a mitigating circumstance, the
penalty in its minimum period shall be imposed.
c. When there is only an aggravating circumstance, the
penalty in its maximum period shall be imposed.
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2018
 CRIMINAL LAW

TABLE SHOWING THE DURATION OF DIVISIBLE PENALTIES AND THE TIME INCLUDED IN EACH OF THEIR
PERIODS

Penalties Time included in Time included in its Time included in its Time included in its
the penalty in its minimum period medium period maximum
entirety

Reclusion temporal From 12 years and 1 From 12 years and 1 From 14 years, 8 months From 17 years, 4
day to 20 years. day to 14 years and 8 and 1 day to 17 years and months and 1 day to
months. 4 months. 20 years.

a. Prision mayor From 6 years and 1 From 6 years and 1 day From 8 years and 1 day to From 10 years and 1
b. Absolute day to 12 years. to 8 years. 10 years. day to 12 years.
disqualification
c. Special temporary
disqualification
a. Prision correccional From 6 months and 1 From 6 months and 1 From 2 years, 4 months From 4 years, 2
b. Suspension day to 6 years. day to 2 years and 4 and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months and 1 day to 6
c. Destierro months. months. years.

Arresto mayor From 1 month and 1 From 1 month to 2 From 2 months and 1 day From 4 months and 1
day to 6 months. months. to 4 months. day to 6 months.

Arresto menor From 1 to 30 days. From 1 to 10 days. From 11 to 20 days. From 21 to 30 days.

The crime committed is homicide, the penalty is
reclusion temporal. The accused is a minor.
a. What is the proper imposable penalty?
Prision mayor because minority is a privileged mitigating
circumstance.
b. Suppose there is an aggravating circumstance
which is disguise?
Prision mayor in its maximum period.
c. Suppose there are two aggravating circumstances.
Will you consider the two aggravating circumstances
for purposes of upgrading the penalty of prision
mayor to reclusion temporal?
No. In the case of People v. Manlolo (G.R. No. L-40778,
January 26, 1989), the Supreme Court, citing Art. 64 par.
6 of the RPC, held that whatever may be the number and
nature of the aggravating circumstances, the courts shall
not impose a greater penalty than that prescribed by law
in its maximum period.
d. Suppose there is neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance?
Prision mayor in its medium period.
e. Suppose there is one mitigating circumstance
which is confession?
Prision mayor in its minimum period.
penalty. Under Art. 64 par. 5 of the RPC, when two or
more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstances are present, the court shall impose the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by law. Further,
since there is other mitigating or aggravating, the penalty
shall be imposed in its medium period. Thus, the proper
imposable penalty is prision correccional in its medium
period.
g. Suppose there are three mitigating circumstances.
Will you consider these three mitigating
circumstances as a special mitigating circumstance
for the purpose of reducing prision mayor to prision
correccional?
The two mitigating circumstances will be appreciated as
special mitigating circumstance for purposes of reducing
prision mayor to prision correccional. Since there is one
remaining mitigating circumstance, the proper period is
minimum period. Thus, the proper imposable penalty is
prision correccional in its minimum period.
h. Suppose there are four mitigating circumstances.
Will you appreciate the special mitigating
circumstance twice?
No. The special mitigating circumstance will be
appreciated only once, even if there are four mitigating
circumstances. It will be appreciated for the purpose of
reducing prision mayor to prision correccional.
Considering the two remaining mitigating circumstances,
it will be used to apply the penalty in its minimum period.
Thus, the proper imposable penalty is prision
correccional in its minimum period.

f. Suppose there are two mitigating circumstance i. Suppose there is a combination of the modifying
which are confession and voluntary surrender? circumstances?

The two mitigating circumstance will be considered as a Apply first the offset rule then consider the remaining
special mitigating circumstance for graduating the modifying circumstances.

16
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2018
If after applying the offset rule, there is still a remaining
of one or two or three aggravating circumstances, then
you will apply the penalty in its maximum period.
If after applying the offset rule, no modifying
circumstance remain, then you will apply the penalty in
its medium period.
If after applying the offset rule, one mitigating
circumstance remains, then you will apply the penalty in
its minimum period.
j. Suppose there are three mitigating circumstances
and one aggravating circumstance. Applying the
offset rule, there are two mitigating circumstances
remaining. Can you appreciate those as a special
mitigating circumstance?
No. Because to appreciate the special mitigating
circumstance, it is important that there are two or more
mitigating circumstance and no aggravating
circumstance (Art. 64, par. 5, RPC). Once you apply the
offset rule, you cannot appreciate the special mitigating
circumstance because the application of the offset rule
presupposes that there is an aggravating circumstance.
2. PENALTY NOT COMPOSED OF THREE (3) PERIODS
(ART. 65, RPC)
Example: The prescribed penalty is prision mayor in its
medium period to maximum period.
How do you compute for its minimum, medium, and
maximum period?
First rule: Divide the time included in the duration of
the prescribed penalty into three (3) equal portions.
Prision mayor in its medium period to maximum period is
8 years and 1 day to 12 years.
In computing, you delete the one (1) day. What will be left
is 8 years and 12 years. Then you subtract 8 years from
12 years, that is 4 years.
Then, divide the 4 years into three (3) equal portions. So,
it will be 1 year and 4 months for each period.
Second rule: Form the period out of the three (3)
equal portions.
8 years + 1 year and 4 months = 9 years and 4 months
9 years and 4 months + 1 year and 4 months = 10 years
and 8 months
10 years and 8 months + 1 year and 4 months = 12 years
Prision mayor in its medium period to maximum period
Minimum period: 8 years and 1 day to 9 years and 4
months
Medium period: 9 years and 4 months and 1 day to 10
years and 8 months
Maximum period: 10 years and 8 months and 1 day to
12 years
17
3. COMPLEX PENALTY (ART. 77, PAR. 1, RPC)
Example: The prescribed penalty for treason committed
by a resident alien under Art. 114 of the RPC is reclusion
temporal to death penalty.
Minimum period: reclusion temporal (the lightest
component
Medium period: reclusion perpetua
Maximum period: death
Suppose there is mitigating circumstance?
Apply the penalty in its minimum period, that is reclusion
temporal.
Suppose there is no modifying circumstance?
Apply the penalty in its medium period, that is reclusion
perpetua.
Suppose there is aggravating circumstance?
Apply the penalty in its maximum period, that is death.
Another example: The crime committed is robbery. The
prescribed penalty is prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its medium period.
Minimum period: prision correccional in its maximum
period (the lightest component)
Medium period: prision mayor in its minimum period
Maximum period: prision mayor in its medium period
Suppose there is mitigating circumstance?
Apply the penalty in its minimum period, prision
correccional in its maximum period.
Suppose there is no modifying circumstance?
Apply the penalty in its medium period, that is prision
mayor in its minimum period.
Suppose there is aggravating circumstance?
Apply the penalty in its maximum period, that is prision
mayor in its medium period.
Another example: The crime committed is sexual abuse
under Sec. 5 of RA 7610. The prescribed penalty is
reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua.
Minimum period: reclusion temporal in its medium
period (the lightest component)
Medium period: reclusion temporal in its maximum
period
Maximum period: reclusion perpetua
4. PENALTY WITHOUT A SPECIFIC LEGAL FORM
Example: The crime committed is intentional mutilation.
The prescribed penalty is reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua.
First rule: Form the maximum period out of the most
severe component
Maximum period: reclusion perpetua
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2018
 CRIMINAL LAW
Second rule: Divide the lightest component into two
(2) equal portions
Reclusion temporal is 12 years and 1 day to 20 years.
In computing, you delete the one (1) day. What will be left
is 12 years and 20 years. Then you subtract 12 years from
20 years, that is 8 years.
Then, divide the 8 years into two (2) equal portions. So, it
will be 4 years for each period.
Third rule: Form the minimum period and medium
period out of the two (2) equal portions
12 years + 4 years = 16 years
16 years + 4 years = 20 years
Minimum period: 12 years and 1 day to 16 years
Medium period: 16 years and 1 day to 20 years
Maximum period: reclusion perpetua
III. APPLICABILITY OR NON-APPLICABILITY OF THE
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW
Explain the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law (ISL). (BAR 2016)
The court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which,
in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, and
the minimum of which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law
(special law), the court shall sentence th2e accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which
shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not ne less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same (Sec. 1, ISL, Act No. 4103 as
amended by Act No, 4225)
The court must, instead of a single fixed penalty, except
where the imposable penalty is one (1) year or less,
determine two penalties, referred to in the ISL as the
“maximum” and “minimum” terms.
If the ISL is applicable, the convict will be sentenced to
an indeterminate sentence that consists of a minimum
term and a maximum term. The moment the convict
serves the minimum term, he may be considered for
parole.
If the ISL is not applicable, the convict will be sentenced
to a straight penalty, which is the imposable penalty in
accordance with the RPC.
When is the ISL not applicable?
The ISL does not apply to:
1. Persons convicted of offenses punished with death
penalty or life imprisonment;
18
NOTE: Reclusion perpetua either as a prescribed or
graduated penalty is included because of RA 9346
which prohibits death penalty. ISL is not applicable
because it is an indivisible penalty and when
reclusion perpetua is imposed, the convict is not
eligible for parole.
2. Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to
commit treason;
3. Those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion,
sedition, or espionage;
4. Those convicted of piracy;
5. Habiqual delinquents;
NOTE: Recidivists are entitiled to avail the ISL.
6. Those who shall have escaped from confinement or
evaded sentence;
NOTE: When the accused escaped from jail while
his case was on appeal, he is not entitled to the
benefits of ISL
7. Those who violated the terms of conditional pardon
granted to them by the Chief Executive;
8. Those whose maximum term of imprisonment does
not exceed one (1) year;
9. Those who upon the approval of the law (Dec. 5,
1933), had been sentenced to final judgment; and
10. Those sentenced to the penalty of destierro or
suspension
NOTE: Included are those sentenced
disqualification or fine because these penalties
are not prison sentence.
What are the rules in imposing a penalty under the
indeterminate sentence law? (BAR 1999, 2005, 2009,
2010, 2013)
When penalty is imposed by RPC:
1. The Maximum Term – is that which in view of the
attending circumstances could be properly
imposed under the RPC.
2. The Minimum Term – is within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC.
Prescribed penalty is what the penalty is without
looking at the circumstances. As opposed to imposed
penalty which takes into account the circumstances.
When penalty is imposed by Special Penal Law (BAR
1994):
1. Maximum Term – must not exceed the maximum
term fixed by said law.
2. Minimum Term – must not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same. (BAR
2003)
Example:
The penalty is prision correccional in its minimum period
and there is confession
a. The judge fixed the penalty to 6 months and 1 day.
The ISL is not applicable because it does not exceed
one year. So the convict should serve a straight
penalty of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional.
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2018
b. The judge fixed the penalty to 1 year and 1 day. The
ISL is applicable because it exceeded one year. Since
the ISL is applicable, you make the 1 year and 1 day
as the maximum term. Then you compute for the
minimum term. The penalty one degree lower to
prision correccional is arresto mayor which is 1
month and 1 day to 6 months – that is the range of
the minimum term.
During Grand Alumni Homecoming of the Bulabog
Elementary School, Ladines suddenly and without
warning approached and stabbed Erwin below the
navel with a machete. Ladines then left after
delivering the blow. At that juncture, Licup also
mounted his attack against Erwin but the latter
evaded the blow by stepping back. Erwin pulled out
the machete from his body and wielded it against
Licup, whom he hit in the chest. Licup pursued but
could not catch up with Erwin because they both
eventually fell down. Erwin was rushed to the
hospital where he succumbed.
The RTC convicted Ladines of homicide, and fixed the
indeterminate penalty of 10 years and one day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and four
months of the medium period of reclusion temporal,
as maximum. The CA affirmed the penalty fixed by the
RTC. Did the lower courts impose the proper penalty?
No. The lower courts could not impose 17 years and four
months of the medium period of reclusion temporal,
which was the ceiling of the medium period of reclusion
temporal, as the maximum of the indeterminate penalty
without specifying the justification for so imposing. They
thereby ignored that although Article 64 of the Revised
Penal Code, which has set the rules "for the application of
penalties which contain three periods," requires under its
first rule that the courts should impose the penalty
prescribed by law in the medium period should there be
neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, its
seventh rule expressly demands that "within the limits of
each period, the courts shall determine the extent of the
penalty according to the number and nature of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the
greater or lesser extent of the evil produced by the
crime."
By not specifying the justification for imposing the ceiling
of the period of the imposable penalty, the fixing of the
indeterminate sentence became arbitrary, or whimsical,
or capricious. In the absence of the specification, the
maximum of the indeterminate sentence for Ladines
should be the lowest of the medium period of reclusion
temporal, which is 14 years, eight months and one day of
reclusion temporal (Ladines vs. People, G.R. No. 167333,
January 11, 2016).
Pinlac was found guilty for violating Section 5(b),
Article III of RA No. 7610, a special law. However, the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals applied
the Indeterminate Sentence Law in fixing the penalty
to be imposed on the accused. Is Indeterminate
Sentence Law applicable to convictions for violation
of a special law?
YES. Notwithstanding the fact that RA 7610 is a special
law, the petitioner in this case may enjoy the benefits of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The ACT No. 4103, as
amended, otherwise known as Indeterminate Sentence
Law provided in Section 1 that: “xxx if the offense is
19
punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum
term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said
law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum
term prescribed by the same.” (Pinlac vs. People, G.R. No.
197458, November 11, 2015)
Dequito was at the gate of Dalupaon Elementary
School watching the graduation ceremony of the high
school students. Espinola then arrived. Later,
however, Dequito saw Hubilla approach Espinola and
stabbed the latter. With Hubilla’s left arm around the
neck of Espinola, Hubilla stabbed Espinola using a
bladed weapon. Dequito aided Espinola as the latter
was already struggling to his feet and later brought
him to the hospital.
The RTC rendered its judgment finding Hubilla guilty
of homicide as charged, and sentenced him to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for four
years and one day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight years and one day of prision
mayor, as maximum. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
Hubilla’s conviction but reduced the sentence to six
months and one day to six years of prision
correccional as minimum, to six years and one day to
twelve years of prision mayor as maximum. On
motion for reconsideration by Hubilla, the CA
sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of six
months and one day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight years and one day of prision
mayor.
Did the CA imposed the correct penalty imposable on
Hubilla, taking into consideration the pertinent
provisions of Republic Act No. 9344, the Revised
Penal Code and Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate
Sentence Law)?
Yes. Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the
penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide. Considering
that Hubilla then a minor at the time of the commission
of the crime, being 17 years, four months and 28 days old
when he committed the homicide on March 30, 2000,
such minority was a privileged mitigating circumstance
that lowered the penalty to prision mayor.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of
the indeterminate sentence should be within the penalty
next lower than the imposable penalty, which, herein,
was prision correccional (i.e., six months and one day to
six years). For the maximum of the indeterminate
sentence, prision mayor in its medium period – eight
years and one day to 10 years – was proper because there
were no mitigating or aggravating circumstances
present. Accordingly, the CA imposed the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of six months and one day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one
day of prision mayor, as maximum.
Is Hubilla’s insistence that the maximum of his
indeterminate sentence of eight years and one day of
prison mayor should be reduced to only six years of
prision correccional to enable him to apply for
probation under Presidential Decree No. 968
tenable?
No. Hubilla’s insistence is bereft of legal basis. Neither the
Revised Penal Code, nor Republic Act No. 9344, nor any
other relevant law or rules support or justify the further
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2018
 CRIMINAL LAW

reduction of the maximum of the indeterminate sentence.
To yield to his insistence would be to impose an illegal
penalty, and would cause the Court to deliberately violate
the law (Hubilla v. People, G.R. No. 176102, November 26,
2014)
Bruno was charged with homicide for killing the 75-
year old owner of his rooming house. The
prosecution proved that Bruno stabbed the owner
causing his death, and that the killing happened at 10
in the evening in the house where the victim and
Bruno lived. Bruno, on the other hand, successfully
proved that he voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities; that he pleaded guilty to the crime
charged; that it was the victim who first attacked and
did so without any provocation on his (Bruno's) part,
but he prevailed because he managed to draw his
knife with which he stabbed the victim. The penalty
for homicide is reclusion temporal. Assuming a
judgment of conviction and after considering the
attendant circumstances, what penalty should the
judge impose? (BAR 2013)
Bruno should be sentenced to an indeterminate sentence
penalty of arresto mayor in any of its period as
minimum to prision correccional in its medium
period as maximum. Bruno was entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-
defense and the presence of at least two ordinary
mitigating circumstances (voluntary surrender and plea
of guilt) without any aggravating circumstance under Art.
69 and 64(5) of the RPC respectively, which lowers the
prescribed penalty for homicide which is reclusion
temporal to prision correccional.
Further Explanation
In this kind of question, the Bar examiner wants you to
determine whether there was self-defense or not. The
problem provides that the defense was able to prove that
it was the man who first attacked Bruno; therefore, there
was unlawful aggression. But there was no provocation
coming from Bruno, therefore, there was a lack of
sufficient provocation. So two elements of self-defense
are present.
No. Even if Bruno killed the said 75 year-old man, there
was no showing in the problem that he disrespected the
age of the man.
Would you consider nighttime as an aggravating
circumstance?
No. Even if the problem says that the crime was
committed at 10 in the evening, it did not say whether the
house was lighted or not. There was also no showing that
the offender deliberately sought nighttime to commit the
crime.
Would you consider dwelling?
No. In the said dwelling both Bruno and the victim are
residing. Therefore, dwelling is not an aggravating
circumstance because both of them are living in the same
dwelling. It cannot be said that when Bruno killed the
man, he disrespected the dwelling of the said man.
Therefore, we have no aggravating circumstance present.
Take note that Bruno was able to prove voluntary
surrender, voluntary plea of guilt, and then we have an
incomplete self-defense — a privileged mitigating
circumstance.
Applying these conclusions, we have two (2) ordinary
mitigating circumstances with one (1) privileged
mitigating circumstance and with no aggravating
circumstance.
How do we compute the penalty?
1. Consider first the Privileged Mitigating Circumstance.
Whenever there is a privileged mitigating
circumstance present, apply it first before computing
the penalty. In this example, since we have
incomplete self-defense, you have to lower the
penalty by one degree because it is a privileged
mitigating circumstance. Thus, it will become prision
mayor.
2. Consider the Ordinary Mitigating Circumstance.

How about the 3rd element of self-defense, reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
the attack, is this present?
The 3rd element of self-defense is absent because based
on the facts proven by Bruno, although it was the man
who attacked Bruno first, he prevailed upon the man
because he made use of a knife and stabbed the man.
While the man attacked Bruno by means of his fist, it is
not reasonably necessary for Bruno to make use of a knife
in killing the man. So what we have is an incomplete self-
defense.
3.
Under paragraph 1 of Article 13, in case of incomplete
self-defense, if aside from unlawful aggression, another
element is present but not all, we have a privileged
mitigating circumstance. Therefore, this incomplete self-
defense shall be treated as a privileged mitigating
circumstance.
The prosecution was able to prove that the man is 75
years old. Would you consider the aggravating
circumstance of disrespect of age?
4. Determine the minimum term of the sentence.
So now, there are two ordinary mitigating
circumstances with no aggravating circumstance.
Article 64 provides that when there are two
mitigating with no aggravating, lower the penalty by
one degree. Therefore, if you lower it by one degree,
it is now prision correccional.
Note: The penalty can be lowered only once no
matter how many the mitigating circumstances are
except for the attendance of a Privileged Mitigating
Circumstance, in which case, it must be considered.
Determine the Maximum Sentence after considering
all mitigating, and aggravating circumstances, if any.
You have already applied everything so it will
become prision correccional in its medium period.
Note: It is in its medium period because when the
penalty does not provide for period, it is
automatically in its medium period save for those
penalties which are indivisible.

20
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2018
You go one degree lower and that is arresto mayor.
Therefore, arresto mayor in its medium period (or any
period in the discretion of the court) is the minimum
term of the sentence.
Macky, a security guard, arrived home late one night
after rendering overtime. He was shocked to see Joy,
his wife, and Ken, his best friend, in the act of having
sexual intercourse. Macky pulled out his service gun
and shot and killed Ken. The court found that Ken
died under exceptional circumstances and
exonerated Macky of murder but sentenced him to
destierro, conformably with Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code. The court also ordered Macky to
pay indemnity to the heirs of the victim in the amount
of P50,000. While serving his sentence, Macky
entered the prohibited area and had a pot session
with Ivy (Joy’s sister). Is Macky entitled to an
indeterminate sentence in case he is found guilty of
the use of prohibited substances? Explain your
answer. (BAR 2007)
No, Macky is not entitled to the benefit of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (R.A. 4103, as amended) for
having evaded the sentence which banished or placed
him on destierrro. Sec. 2 of the said law expressly
provides that the law shall not apply to those who shall
have "evaded sentence".
Alternative Answer: No, because the penalty for use of any
dangerous drug by a first offender is not imprisonment
but rehabilitation in a government center for a minimum
period of six (6) months (Sec. 15, R.A. 9165). The
Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply when the
penalty is imprisonment not exceeding one year.
An agonizing and protracted trial having come to a
close, the judge found A guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of homicide and imposed on him a straight
penalty of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor. The public prosecutor objected to the
sentence on the ground that the proper penalty
should have been TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of reclusion temporal. The defense counsel
chimed in, contending that application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law should lead to the
imposition of a straight penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional only. Who of
the three is on the right track? (BAR 2010)
None of the contentions is correct because the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (R.A. 4103, as amended) has
not been followed.
The imposition of penalty for the crime of homicide,
which is penalized by imprisonment exceeding one (1)
year and is divisible, is covered by the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. The said law is requires that the sentence
in this case should reflect a minimum term for purposes
of parole, and a maximum term fixing the limit of the
imprisonment. Imposing a straight penalty is incorrect.
SUBSIDIARY PENALTY
Subsidiary personal liability is to be suffered by the
convict who has no property with which to meet the fine,
at the rate of one day for each amount equivalent to the
highest minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines
at the time of the rendition of judgment of conviction by
21
the trial court (Art. 39, as amended by R.A. 10159 approved
on April 10, 2012).
Is subsidiary penalty an accessory penalty?
A subsidiary penalty is not an accessory penalty. It is thus
required that it be specifically imposed by the court in its
judgment. It is a penalty imposed upon the accused and
served by him in lieu of the fine which he fails to pay on
account of insolvency. The accused cannot be made to
undergo subsidiary imprisonment unless the judgment
expressly so provides.
Rules on Subsidiary Penalty (Sec. 1, RA 10159)
1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision correctional
or arresto and fine, he shall remain under confinement
until his fine referred in the preceding paragraph is
satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment shall not
exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no
case shall it continue for more than one year, and no
fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the
prisoner.
2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the
subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed six months, if
the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less
grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen days, if for a
fight felony.
3. When the principal penalty imposed is higher than
prision correctional, no subsidiary imprisonment shall be
imposed upon the culprit.
4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed
by confinement in a penal institution, but such penalty is
of fixed duration, the convict, during the period of time
established in the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer
the same deprivations as those of which the principal
penalty consists.
5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may
have suffered by reason of his insolvency shall not relieve
him from the fine in case his financial circumstances
should improve.
NOTE: When the penalty prescribed for the offense is
imprisonment, it is the penalty actually imposed by the
Court, not the penalty provided for by the Code, which
should be the basis in the determination whether or not
subsidiary penalty should be imposed.
THREE-FOLD RULE
What are the three systems of imposition of penalties
in case two or more penalties are imposed on one and
the same accused?
1. Material accumulation system - no limitation
whatever. All the penalties for all violations were
imposed even if they reached beyond the natural
span of human life.
2. Juridical accumulation system - limited to not more
than the three-fold length of time corresponding to
the most severe and in no case exceed 40 years.
3. Absorption system - the lesser penalties are absorbed
by the graver penalties. It is observed in the
imposition of the penalty in complex crimes,
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2018
 CRIMINAL LAW
continuing crimes, and special complex crimes like
robbery with homicide, etc.
What is the Three-Fold Rule?
Three-fold rule means that the maximum duration of a
convict’s sentence shall not be more than three times the
length of time corresponding to the most severe of the
penalties imposed upon him but in no case exceed 40
years.
NOTE: All the penalties, even if by different courts at
different times, cannot exceed three-fold to most severe
penalty.
PROBATION LAW
(AS AMENDED BY R.A. NO. 10707)
Probation
It is a disposition under which a defendant, after
conviction and sentence, is released subject to conditions
imposed by the court and to the supervision of a
probation officer.
NOTE: Probation only affects the criminal aspect of the
case and has no bearing on his civil liability
Who are disqualified to avail the benefits of the
probation law? (BAR 2004)
1. Sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six (6) years; (BAR
1990, 1995, 2002)
2. Convicted of subversion or any crime against the
national security or the public order; (BAR 1991,
1992, 1993)
3. Who have previously been convicted by final
judgment of an offense punishable by imprisonment
of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine
of not less than two hundred pesos;
4. Who have been once on probation under the
provision of this Decree;
5. Who are already serving sentence at the time the
substantive provisions of this Decree became
applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof;
6. If he appeals the judgment or conviction (however see
Colinares v. People, G.R. No. 182748, December 13,
2011); or (BAR 2013)
7. If he is convicted of violation of Election offenses
NOTE: In multiple prison terms, those imposed against
the accused found guilty of several offenses should not be
added up, and their sum total should not be
determinative of his disqualification from probation
since the law uses the word “maximum” not “total” term
of imprisonment (Francisco v. CA, et. Al, G.R. No. 108747,
April 6, 1995).
Arnel Colinares was found guilty of frustrated
homicide by the RTC. On appeal, CA affirmed. On
petition for review, SC ruled that he was only guilty of
attempted homicide, in which the penalty is
“probationable”. Is Colinares now entitled to apply
for probation upon remand of the case to the lower
court, even after he has perfected his appeal to a
previous conviction (frustrated homicide) which was
not “probationable”?
22
Yes. The probation law as amended provides that, “xxx No
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if
the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment
of conviction: Provided, That when a judgment of
conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is
appealed or reviewed, and such judgment is modified
through the imposition of a probationable penalty, the
defendant shall be allowed to apply for probation
based on the modified decision before such decision
becomes final.” The application for probation based on
the modified decision shall be filed in the trial court
where the judgment of conviction imposing a non-
probationable penalty was rendered, or in the trial court
where such case has since been re-raffled. In a case
involving several defendants where some have taken
further appeal, the other defendants may apply for
probation by submitting a written application and
attaching thereto a certified true copy of the judgment of
conviction.
The trial court shall, upon receipt of the application filed,
suspend the execution of the sentence imposed in the
judgment.
This notwithstanding, the accused shall lose the benefit of
probation should he seek a review of the modified decision
which already imposes a probationable penalty.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes
a term of imprisonment or a fine only. The filing of the
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to
appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be
appealable.’’ (R.A. 10707 Section 1, amending Section 4 of
PD No. 968, Approved last November 26, 2015)
Alternative Answer: What is clear is that, had the RTC
done what was right and imposed on Arnel the correct
penalty of two years and four months maximum, he
would have had the right to apply for probation. Arnel did
not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him
to apply for probation. He did not have a choice between
appeal and probation. While it is true that probation is a
mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the right to
such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is
the right to apply for that privilege. If the Court allows
him to apply for probation because of the lowered
penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide whether
or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into
account the full circumstances of his case (Colinares v.
People, G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011).
Meno was convicted by final judgment of the crime of
arbitrary detention and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment by the RTC. On that ground, Bena filed
a petition to disqualify Meno from running for
Punong Baranggay. Meno argued that he was already
granted probation, which effectively restores him all
the civil rights including the right to vote and be
voted for in the elections. The COMELEC En Banc
disqualified Meno citing Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code. Meno argues that the
disqualification under the Local Government Code
applies only to those who have served their sentence
and not to probationers because the latter do not
serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation Law
should allegedly be read as an exception to the Local
Government Code. Is Meno disqualified from running
for public office?
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2018

produces only the opportunity of reformation to

No, Meno is not disqualified from running for public extinction of the the penitent offender.
office. During the period of probation, the probationer is personal effects of
not disqualified from running for a public office because the penalty.
the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is Does not extinguish Does not extinguish the civil
put on hold for the duration of the probation. the civil liability of liability of the offender.
the offender.
The period within which a person is under probation
cannot be equated with service of the sentence adjudged. EXTINGUISHMENT OF
Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the CRIMINAL LIABILITY
grant of probation suspends the execution of the
sentence. During the period of probation, the probationer Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the
court but is merely required to comply with all the 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal
conditions prescribed in the probation order. The penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
Local Government Code (Moreno v. Comelec, G.R. No. offender occurs before final judgment;
168550, August 10, 2006). 2. By service of the sentence;
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the
PARDON VIS-À-VIS PROBATION penalty and all its effects;
4. By absolute pardon;
PARDON PROBATION 5. By prescription of the crime;
Extinguishes Does not extinguish criminal 6. By prescription of the penalty;
criminal liability. liability; merely suspends the 7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided
execution of the sentence. in Article 344 of the RPC.
Includes any crime Exercised individually by the
and is exercised trial court. Criminal Liability is Partially Extinguished:
individually by the 1. By conditional pardon
President. 2. By commutation of the sentence
Merely looks It promotes the correction and 3. By final discharge of probation
forward and rehabilitation of an offender by 4. By parole
relieves the providing him with 5. By good conduct
offender from the individualized treatment;
consequences of an provides an opportunity for the Bayot was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
offense of which he reformation of a penitent the crime of rape committed against AAA, thus
has been convicted. offender which might be less sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
probable if he were to serve a perpetua. CA affirmed the ruling but increased the
prison sentence; and prevent award of indemnity and ordered Bayot to pay AAA
the commission of offenses. moral damages in the amount of P 50,000. During
pendency of his appeal, Bayot died at the prison
hospital, as evidenced by the letter of the Penal
Superintendent to the CA. Did the death of Bayot
Does not work for Those who have not served extinguish both his criminal and civil liability?
the restoration of their sentence by reason of the
the rights to hold grant of probation which Yes, Bayot’s death during the pendency of his appeal
public office, or the should not be equated with before the Court of Appeals extinguished not only his
right of suffrage, service of sentence, should not criminal liability for the crime of rape committed against
unless such rights likewise be disqualified from AAA, but also his civil liability solely arising from or based
are expressly running for a local elective on said crime (or civil liability ex delicto).
restored by means office because the two (2)-year
of pardon. period of ineligibility under Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, specifically
Sec. 40(a) of the Local provides the effect of death of the accused on his criminal,
Government Code does not as well as civil, liability. According to the pertinent
even begin to run (Moreno v. provision, criminal liability is totally extinguished by
Comelec, G.R. No. 168550, death of the convict, as to the personal penalties, and as
August 10, 2006). to pecuniary penalties. Liability is extinguished only
Exercised when the Must be exercised within the when the death of the offender occurs before final
person is already period for perfecting an appeal. judgment. It is already unnecessary to rule on Bayot’s
convicted. appeal. Said appeal was still pending and no final
Being a private act Being a grant by the trial court; judgment had been rendered against him at the time of
by the president, it it follows that the trial court his death (People v. Bayot, G.R. No. 200030, April 18, 2012).
must be pleaded and also has the power to order its
proved by the revocation in a proper case and AAA is the second of five children of Amistoso and
person pardoned. under proper circumstances. BBB. AAA was 12 years old when the rape incident
happened. Amistoso had sexual intercourse against
the will of AAA. Amistoso was charged with statutory
rape. However, the RTC and CA convicted him for
Does not alter the Does not alter the fact that the qualified rape. Insisting upon his innocence,
fact that the accused accused is a recidivist as it Amistoso appealed to the Supreme Court. In a
is a recidivist as it provides only for an Decision dated January 9, 2013, the Supreme Court

23 ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2018

 CRIMINAL LAW
affirmed with modification the judgment of
conviction against Amistoso. However the Court was
belatedly informed that Amistoso had died on
December 11, 2012 at the New Bilibid Prison due to
cardio respiratory arrest. Yet, the Public Attorney’s
Office which represented Amistoso and which was
apparently also unaware of its client’s demise, still
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s
Decision on February 22, 2013. What is the effect of
the death of Amistoso on his criminal and civil
liability pending resolution from Court?
Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code states
that, “Criminal liability is totally extinguished by the
death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as
to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment.” Therefore, the death of the Amistoso pending
appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability,
as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto
is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal case.
Undeniably, Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012
preceded the promulgation by the Supreme Court of its
Decision on January 9, 2013. When Amistoso died, his
appeal before the SC was still pending and unresolved.
The SC ruled upon Amistoso’s appeal only because it was
not immediately informed of his death. Amistoso’s death
on December 11, 2012 renders the SC’s Decision dated
January 9, 2013, even though affirming Amistoso’s
conviction, irrelevant and ineffectual. Moreover, said
Decision has not yet become final, and the SC still has the
jurisdiction to set it aside (People v. Amistoso, G.R. No.
201447, August 28, 2013).
PRESCRIPTION OF CRIMES
One fateful night in January 1990, while 5-year old
Albert was urinating at the back of their house, he
heard a strange noise coming from the kitchen of
their neighbor and playmate, Ara. When he peeped
inside, he saw Mina, Ara’s stepmother, very angry and
strangling the 5-year old Ara to death. Albert saw
Mina carry the dead body of Ara, place it inside the
trunk of the car and drive away. The dead body of Ara
was never found. Mina spread the news in the
neighborhood that Ara went to live with her
grandparents in Ormoc City. For fear of his life, Albert
did not tell anyone, even his parents and relatives,
about what he witnessed. Twenty and a half (20 & ½)
years after the incident, and right after his
graduation in Criminology, Albert reported the crime
to NBI authorities. The crime of homicide prescribes
in 20 years. Can the State still prosecute Mina for the
death of Ara despite the lapse of 20 and 1/2 years?
(BAR 2000)
Yes, the State can still prosecute Mina for the death of Ara
despite the lapse of 20 and ½ years. Under Article 91,
RPC, the period of prescription commences to run from
the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents. In the case at bar,
the commission of the crime was known only to Albert,
who was not the offended party nor an authority or an
agent of an authority. It was discovered by the NBI
authorities only when Albert revealed to them the
24
commission of the crime. Hence, the period of
prescription of 20 years for homicide commenced to run
only from the time Albert revealed the same to the NBI
authorities.
A killed his wife and buried her in the backyard. He
immediately went into hiding in the mountains.
Three years later, the bones of A’s wife were
discovered by X, the gardener. Since X had a standing
warrant of arrest, he hid the bones in an old clay jar
and kept quiet about it. After two years, Z, the
caretaker, found the bones and reported the matter
to the police. After 15 years of hiding, A left the
country but returned 3 years later to take care of his
ailing sibling. Six years thereafter, he was charged
with parricide, but he raised the defense of
prescription.
a. Under the Revised Penal Code, when does the
period of prescription of a crime commence to
run?
b. When is it interrupted?
c. Is A’s defense tenable? Explain. (BAR 2010)
a. Under Art. 91 of the RPC, the period of prescription
commence to run upon discovery of the crime by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agent.
b. It is interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information corresponding to the offense commited
with the prosecutor (Art. 91, RPC), except in cases
falling under the Rules on Summary Procedure and
when filed with the Punong Barangay (Sec. 408 of
Local Government Code.)
c. No, parricide prescribes in 20 years (Art. 90, RPC).
The period of prescription started only when Z
reported the matter to the police, which is equivalent
to 10 years of hiding from the time of reporting to Z.
The period of three years shall not be counted since
he is absent from the Philippines. The filing of the
charge 6 years thereafter is well within the
prescriptive period.
Goyena filed with the City Prosecutor a complaint for
slight physical injuries against Bautista. After
conducting the preliminary investigation, the
prosecutor issued a recommendation for the filing of
information against Bautista. Such recommendation
was approved by the City Prosecutor but the date of
such approval cannot be found in the records. The
Information was, however, filed with the MeTC
of Manila only on June 20, 2000. Bautista sought the
dismissal of the case against him on the ground of the
60-day period of prescription from the date of the
commission of the crime. Has the crime prescribed?
No, the crime has not prescribed. It is a settled rule that
the filing of the complaint with the Fiscal’s office
suspends the running of the prescriptive period. The
Office of the Prosecutor miserably incurred some delay in
the filing the Information but such mistake or negligence
should not unduly prejudice the interests of the State and
the offended party. As held in People vs. Olarte, it is unjust
to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his
control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his
part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite
complaint (People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 168641, April 27,
2007).
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2018
A, while serving sentence for homicide escaped but
was re-arrested, and was sentenced for evasion of
service of sentence. Later on, he was granted absolute
pardon for homicide. He now claims that the pardon
includes the evasion of service since the latter crime
occurred because of Homicide. Is A’s contention
correct?
No. Pardon by the Chief Executive must specify the crime
and does not include those not specified in the pardon.
On June 30, 2004, the Office of the Ombudsman filed
two informations charging Disini in the
Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials
and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act (R.A. No. 3019) in the year 1974 to 1986 for
offering, promising or giving gifts and presents to
Ferdinand Marcos. Disini filed a motion to quash the
informations on August 2, 2004 alleging that the
criminal actions had been extinguished by
prescription, and that the informations did not
conform to the prescribed form. The Sandiganbayan
denied the motion to quash and as well as the motion
for reconsideration that followed afterward. Disini
commenced a special civil action for certiorari once
again alleging the prescription of the charges in the
information. Is Disini’s contention correct?
A: No, the offenses charged in the information have not
yet prescribed. In resolving the issue of prescription, the
following must be considered, namely: (1) the period of
prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time when
the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time
when the prescriptive period is interrupted. The crime of
corruption of public officials is punished by a penalty of
prision mayor in its medium and minimum periods and a
fine not less than three times the value of the gift and
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code states that the period
of prescription for this species of corruption is 15 years
from the date of the discovery of the crime. The
prescriptive period for violation of R.A. No. 3019, as
stated in Section 2 of R.A. No. 3326, is 10 years from the
day of the commission or date of discovery by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents. Therefore,
the prescriptive period for the crime which is the subject
herein, commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992
after the Committee made an exhaustive investigation.
When the complaint was filed in 1997, only five years
have elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet set in.
(Disini v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169823-24, September
11, 2013)
BOOK II
CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY
NOTE: Crimes against National Security and the Law of
Nations are exceptions to the principle of territoriality
under Art. 2, par. 5 of the RPC. Thus, one can be held
criminally liable even if those crimes were committed
outside the Philippine jurisdiction.
How may treason be proved? Explain.
The two ways of proving treason are: (1) by the
testimony of at least two witnesses to the same overt act
(two-witness rule); or (2) confession of guilt made in
open court.
25
The first mode of proving treason is by testimony of at
least two witnesses to the same overt act. There must be
two witnesses that must corroborate each other as to the
overt act performed by the offender. Therefore, Treason
cannot be proven by mere circumstantial evidence. The
law requires that there must be direct evidence.
The second mode of proving treason is by the confession
of guilt made in open court. The confession of guilt must
be judicial confession of guilt made by the accused in
open court. Extrajudicial confession of guilt will not
suffice to bring a conviction in the crime of treason.
In a time wherein the Philippines is involved in a war
with another country, the offender XXX Filipino
citizens, commandeered women for the enemy
troops? Are they liable for treason?
No, the act of commandeering women to the enemies
does not constitute a treasonable act. This act of
commandeering women to the enemies to satisfy the lust
of the enemies is not a treasonable act because whatever
benefits it would give to the enemy in their prosecution
of war would have been trivial imperceptible and
unintentional. (People v. Perez, G.R. No. L-856, April 18,
1949).
NOTE: In treason, the adherence to the enemies by giving
them aid or comfort must materially advance the interest
of the enemy in the conduct of war.
PIRACY VIS-À-VIS MUTINY
PIRACY MUTINY
Offenders are strangers to Offenders are
the vessel. Hence, offenders members of the
are neither passengers nor complement or the
crew members. passengers of the
vessel.
Done with animo Against the authority
furandi/intent to steal and of the commander of
with the intention of the ship.
universal hostility.
Intent to gain is an element Intent to gain is
of piracy. immaterial.
Attack from the outside. Attack from the inside.
A, B, and C hijacked a plane bound to Malaysia. In the
course of the hijack, D, a passenger was shot and
killed. The court charged and convicted them for the
violation of Anti-Hijacking Law and murder. Is the
court correct?
No. The charge should only be RA No. 6235 or violation of
Anti-Hijacking Law. A, B and C should not be charged with
a separate crime of murder because the act of killing a
passenger or complement in a violation of RA No. 6235
will only bring about a higher penalty. Murder should not
be charged separately.
CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE
STATE
Crimes against the fundamental laws of the state may
only be committed by public officers, except Art. 133
Offending the religious feelings which may be committed
by a private individual.
HOWEVER, not all public officers may commit such
crimes. In arbitrary detention and delay in the delivery of
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2018
 CRIMINAL LAW
detained persons to the proper judicial authorities, the
public officers must be charged with the task of arresting
or detaining a person.
In violation of domicile, the public officer must have the
task of serving search warrant or seizure order.
What are the three ways of committing arbitrary
detention? (BAR 2006)
1. By detaining or locking up a person without any legal
cause or ground thereof purposely to restrain his
liberty;
2. By delaying delivery to the proper judicial authority
of a person lawfully arrested without a warrant; and
3. By delaying release of a prisoner whose release has
been ordered by competent authority.
Is there an arbitrary detention even if the offended
party were not kept in an enclosure?
Yes. There is arbitrary detention even if the victims were
not kept in an enclosure. The prevailing jurisprudence on
kidnapping and illegal detention is that the curtailment of
the victim’s liberty need not involve any physical
restraint upon the victim’s person. If the acts and
actuations of the accused can produce such fear in the
mind of the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the
extent that the victim is compelled to limit his own
actions and movements in accordance with the wishes of
the accused, then the victim is, for all intents and
purposes, detained against his will (Astorga v. People, G.R.
No. 154130, October 1, 2003).
TRUE OR FALSE. A policeman who, without a judicial
order, enters a private house over the owner’s
opposition is guilty of trespass to dwelling (BAR
2009).
False. The crime committed by the policeman in this case
is violation of domicile because the official duties of a
policeman carry with it an authority to make searches
and seizure upon judicial order. He is therefore acting
under color of his official authority (Art. 128, RPC).
Policemen Conde, Avenido, Degran, Rufano, and
Balolot, thinking that Galvantes was armed with a
gun, pointed their firearms at him and asked for his
gun. Conde went near Galvantes’ jeep and conducted
search without a search warrant. After a while they
saw the super .38 pistol under the floor mat of the
jeep. Galvante, then, filed complaints before the
Ombudsman. One of the criminal complaint he filed
was warrantless search, would the complaint
proper?
No. The complaint for warrantless search charges no
criminal offense. The conduct of a warrantless search is
not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the RPC or
any other special law. What the RPC punishes are only
two forms of searches which are search warrants
maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those
legally obtained under Art. 129, and searching domicile
without witnesses under Art. 130.
Galvante did not allege any of the elements of the
foregoing felonies in his Affidavit-Complaint; rather, he
accused Conde, Avenido, Degran, Rufano, Balolot of
conducting a search on his vehicle without being armed
26
with a valid warrant. This situation, while lamentable, is
not covered by Articles 129 and 130 of the RPC. The
remedy of petitioner against the warrantless search
conducted on his vehicle is civil in nature under Article
32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil
Code (Galvante v. Casimiro, G.R. No. 162808, April 22,
2008).
What are the prohibited acts constituting violation of
domicile?
1. Entering any dwelling against the will of the owner
thereof;
2. Searching papers or effects found therein without
previous consent of such owner; and
3. Refusing to leave the premises having
surreptitiously entered said dwelling, and after
being required to leave the same.
While a “pabasa” was going on at a municipality in the
Province of Tarlac, Reyes and his company arrived at
the place, carrying bolos and crowbars, and started to
construct a barbed wire fence in front of the chapel.
The chairman of the committee in charge of the
“pabasa” persuaded them to refrain from said acts. A
verbal altercation then ensued. The people attending
the “pabasa” left the place hurriedly in confusion and
the “pabasa” was discontinued until after
investigation. Reyes and his company, in their
defense claim that the land where the chapel is built
belongs to the Clemente family, of which they are
partisans. Are the accused guilty of the crime under
Art. 133?
No, Art. 133 of the RPC punishes acts “notoriously
offensive to the feelings of the faithful.” The construction
of a fence, even though irritating and vexatious to those
present, is not an act as can be designated as “notoriously
offensive to the faithful.”In this case, the accused were
acquitted of a violation of Art. 133 of the RPC but they
were found guilty of a violation of Art. 287 of the RPC for
the circumstances showed that their acts were done in
such a way as to vex and annoy the parties who had
gathered to celebrate the “pabasa” (People v. Reyes, et al.,
G.R. No. L-40577, August 23, 1934).
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
What is the theory of absorption in rebellion?
Whenever in the course of committing rebellion, murder,
homicide, arson, physical injuries, other common crimes
are committed, and these common crimes are
furtherance to, incident to, in connection with rebellion,
they are considered as absorbed in the crime of rebellion.
Only one charge of rebellion should be charged against
the offender.
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2018

BASIS REBELLION (ART. 133) TERRORISM (RA 9372) COUP D’ ETAT (ART. 133-A)

National security and

Crime Against Public order Public order
law of nations

Overthrow the Unlawful demand

Diminish inherent powers of the
Purpose government (political against the government
state (political crime)
crime) (need not be political)

Through predicate
crimes and by Need not be through force and
How committed Through violence widespread and violence, can be by threat,
extraordinary panic and intimidation, strategy or stealth
fear

Number of people Multitude of people Can be singly or a lot Can be singly or a lot

Public officers only; unless

Offenders Private or public officers Private or public officers
private individuals conspire

Yes, absorbs predicate

Generally, yes. Murder, Yes, but must be related to
crimes like rebellion,
Ability to absorb rape, robbery absorbed. political purpose. Rape not
coup d’etat, murder. Use
common crimes Use of loose firearms absorbed. Use of loose firearms
of loose firearms
absorbed. absorbed.
absorbed.

Conspiracy and Conspiracy and proposal Only conspiracy is Conspiracy and proposal
proposal punished punished punished

Inciting Inciting punished Not punished Not punished

All continuing crime

Accomplices are
Accomplices No accomplices No accomplices
punished

house and that of others but also in the death and

As a result of the killing of SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, Elias
Lovedioro was charged with and subsequently found
guilty of the crime of murder. On appeal, Lovedioro
claims that he should have been charged with the
crime of rebellion, not murder as, being a member of
the NPA, he killed Lucilo as a means to or in
furtherance of subversive ends. The Solicitor
General, opposing appellant’s claim, avers that it is
only when the defense had conclusively proven that
the motive or intent for the killing of the policeman
was for "political and subversive ends" will the
judgement of rebellion be proper. Between the
appellant and the Solicitor General, who is correct?
The Solicitor General is correct. It is not enough that the
overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose and
overt acts are essential components of the crime. With
either of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion
legally does not exist. If no political motive is established
and proved, the accused should be convicted of the
common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion,
motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an
organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion
would not, by and of itself, suffice (People v. Lovedioro,
G.R. No. 112235, November 29, 1995).
Appellant, with about twenty armed men and Huk
Commander Torio, raided and attacked the house of
Punzalan, his political adversary and incumbent
Mayor of Tiaong, Quezon, with automatic weapons,
hand grenades, and bottles filled with gasoline. The
raid resulted not only in destruction of Punzalan’s
injuries to a number of civilians. The CFI found
appellant guilty of the complex crime of rebellion
with multiple murder, among others. Was the lower
court correct?
No. The accused is guilty of sedition, multiple murder and
physical injuries, among others. The purpose of the raid
and the act of the raiders in rising publicly and taking up
arms was not exactly against the Government and for the
purpose of doing the things defined in Article 134 of the
Revised Penal code under rebellion. The raiders did not
even attack the Presidencia, the seat of local Government.
Rather, the object was to attain by means of force,
intimidation, etc. one object, to wit, to inflict an act of hate
or revenge upon the person or property of a public
official, namely, Punzalan was then Mayor of Tiaong.
Under Article 139 of the same Code this was sufficient to
constitute sedition (People v. Umali, et. al., G.R. No. L-5803,
November 29, 1954).
What is the nature of sedition?
Sedition is a violation of the public peace or at least such
a course of measures as evidently engenders it, yet it does
not aim at direct and open violence against the laws, or
the subversion of the Constitution. It is an offense not
directed primarily against individuals but to the general
public peace; it is the raising of commotions or
disturbances in the State, a revolt against legitimate
authority (People v. Perez, G.R. No. L-21049, December 22,
1923).

27 ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2018

 CRIMINAL LAW
What are the elements of the second form of Direct
Assault?
1. Offender:
a. Makes an attack,
b. Employs force,
c. Makes a serious intimidation, or
d. Makes a serious resistance.
2. Person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent;
3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority
or his agent:
a. Is engaged in the performance of official duties,
or that he is assaulted
b. On occasion of such performance;
4. The offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a
person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his
duties; and
5. There is no public uprising.
NOTE: The force employed on an agent of a person in
authority, to constitute direct assault must be of a serious
character. Whereas the force employed on a person in
authority need not be serious.
As the town president failed to pay their salaries, the
accused, accompanied by four armed men, went to
the house of the former and compelled him by force
to leave and go to the Presidencia. The accused kept
the town president there confined until the relatives
of the latter had raised enough money to pay what
was due the accused and the armed men as salaries.
What crime did the accused commit?
The facts constitute the crime of direct assault. There is
no public uprising when the accused, accompanied by
armed men, compelled by force the town president to go
with them to proceed to the municipal building and
detained him there. By reason of detaining the town
president, the accused inflicted upon a public officer an
act of hate or revenge. This is one of the objects of
sedition, which is essentially what the accused intended
to attain (U.S. v. Dirain, G.R. No. 1948, May 5, 1905).
A, a lady professor was giving an examination. She
noticed B, one of the students, cheating. She called the
student’s attention and confiscated his examination
booklet, causing embarrassment to him. The
following day, while the class was going on, the
student, B, approached A and without any warning,
slapped her. B would have inflicted further injuries
on A had not C, another student, come to A’s rescue
and prevented B from continuing attack. B turned his
ire on C and punched the latter. What crime or
crimes, if any, did B commit? Why? (BAR 2002)
B committed two (2) counts of direct assault: one for
slapping the professor, A, who was then conducting
classes and thus in the exercise of her authority; and
another one for the violence on the student C, who came
to the aid of the said professor.
By express provision of Article 152, teachers and
professors of public and duly authorized private schools,
colleges and university in the in the actual performance
of their professional duties or on the occasion of such
performance are deemed person-in-authority for
purpose of the crime of direct assault and of resistance
and disobedience. And any person who comes to the aid
of the person in authority shall be deemed an agent of a
person in authority. Accordingly, the attack on C is, in the
28
eyes of law, an attack on an agent of a person in authority,
not just the attack on the student.
During election time, Isko was found in possession of
an unlicensed firearm. Arrested, he was charged with
(1) violation of the COMELEC gun ban, and (2) illegal
possession of unlicensed firearm. During the
arraignment for the violation of COMELEC gun ban, he
pleaded not guilty. However, during the arraignment
for illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm, he
filed a motion to quash the information arguing that
he cannot be charged of illegal possession of
unlicensed firearm because the law says that you can
only be charged of the offense provided that no other
crime is committed by the person arrested. Is his
contention correct?
No, his contention is wrong. When the law says, “provided
that no other crime is committed by the person arrested”,
the word “committed” means that there is already a final
determination of guilt — a final conviction of guilt based
on a successful prosecution or judicial admission. In this
case, he was not yet convicted, he was only being
prosecuted. Therefore both cases can proceed. However,
the moment he is convicted of violation of the COMELEC
gun ban, he should be acquitted of illegal possession of
unlicensed firearm (Celino, Sr. v. People, G.R. No. 170562,
June 29, 2007).
Who are deemed to be persons in authority and
agents of persons in authority?
Persons in authority are those directly vested with
jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of
some court or government corporation, board, or
commission. Barrio captains and barangay chairmen are
also deemed persons in authority.
Agents of persons in authority are persons who by
direct provision of law or by election or by appointment
by competent authority, are charged with maintenance of
public order, the protection and security of life and
property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman,
barangay leader and any person who comes to the aid of
persons in authority.
In applying the provisions of Arts. 148 and 151 of the
RPC, teachers, professors and persons charged with the
supervision of public or duly recognized private schools,
colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual
performance of their professional duties or on the
occasion of such performance, shall be deemed persons
in authority.
Sydeco, the cook and the waitress in his restaurant
were on the way home when they were signalled to
stop by Police Officers who asked Sydeco to open the
vehicle’s door and alight for a body and vehicle
search. When Sydeco opened the vehicle window, he
insisted on a plain view search, obviously irked by
this remark, one of the policemen told him he was
drunk, pointing to three empty beer bottles in the
trunk of the vehicle. The Officers then pulled Sydeco
out of the vehicle and brought him to the Ospital ng
Maynila where they succeeded in securing a medical
certificate under the signature of one Dr. Harvey
Balucating depicting Sydeco as positive of alcoholic
breath, although no alcohol breath examination was
conducted. Sydeco was detained and released only in
the afternoon of the following day when he was
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2018
allowed to undergo actual medical examination
where the resulting medical certificate indicated that
he has sustained physical injuries but negative for
alcohol breath. Is Sydeco criminally liable for any
crime?
No. It is fairly clear that what triggered the
confrontational stand-off between the Police Officers, on
one hand, and Sydeco on the other, was the latter’s refusal
to get off of the vehicle for a body and vehicle search
juxtaposed by his insistence on a plain view search only.
Sydeco’s twin gestures cannot plausibly be considered as
resisting a lawful order. He may have sounded boorish or
spoken crudely at that time, but none of this would make
him a criminal.
It remains to stress that he has not, when flagged down,
committed a crime or performed an overt act warranting
a reasonable inference of criminal activity.
The two key elements of resistance and serious
disobedience punished under Art. 151 of the RPC are: (1)
That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the
performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the
offender; and (2) That the offender resists or seriously
disobeys such person or his agent. There can be no
quibble that the officer and his apprehending team are
persons in authority or agents of a person in authority
manning a legal checkpoint. But surely Sydeco’s act of
exercising one’s right against unreasonable searches to
be conducted in the middle of the night cannot, in context,
be equated to disobedience let alone resisting a lawful
order in contemplation of Art. 151 (Sydeco v. People, G.R.
No. 202692, November 12, 2014).
Manny killed his wife under exceptional
circumstances and was sentenced by RTC Dagupan of
destierro during which he was not allowed to enter
Dagupan City. While serving sentence, Manny went to
Dagupan City to visit his mother. Later, he was
arrested in Manila. Did Manny commit any crime?
(1998 BAR)
Yes, Manny committed the crime of evasion of service of
sentence when he went to Dagupan City, which he was
prohibited from entering under his sentence of destierro.
A sentence imposing the penalty of destierro is evaded
when the convict enters any of the place/places he is
prohibited from entering under the sentence or come
within the prohibited radius. Although destierro does not
involve imprisonment, it is nonetheless a deprivation of
liberty.
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
How is forgery committed? (BAR 2008)
Forgery is committed:
1. By giving to a treasury or bank note or any
instrument payable to bearer or to order mentioned
therein, the appearance of a true and genuine
document; or
2. By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting, or altering by
any means the figures, letters, words, or sign
contained therein. (Art. 163, RPC)
In falsification of public documents, is it necessary
that there be the idea of gain or intent to injure a
third person?
29
No. In falsification of public or official documents, it is not
necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the
intent to injure a third person because in the
falsification of a public document, what is punished is the
violation of the public faith and the destruction of the
truth as therein solemnly proclaimed (Galeos v. People,
G.R. Nos. 174730-37, February 9, 2011).
NOTE: In falsification of private document, intent to
cause damage to a third person is material.
A counterfeited the signature of B but what he
entered in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of B
are all true. Since there was no damage to the
government, did he commit a crime?
Yes. In falsification of a public document, it is immaterial
whether or not the contents set forth therein were false.
What is important is the fact that the signature of another
was counterfeited. In a crime of falsification of a public
document, the principal thing punished is the violation of
public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein
solemnly proclaimed. Thus, intent to gain or injure is
immaterial. Even more so, the gain or damage is not
necessary (Caubang v. People, G.R. No. L-62634 June 26,
1992).
Can falsification be committed by omission?
Yes. In the case of People v. Dizon, an assistant
bookkeeper who, having bought several articles for
which he signed several chits, intentionally did not record
in his personal account most of the said chits and
destroyed them so that he could avoid paying the amount
thereof was held guilty of falsification by omission.
Is there a complex crime of estafa through
falsification of a private document?
None. The fraudulent gain obtained through deceit in
estafa, in the commission of which a private document
was falsified is nothing more or less than the very damage
caused by the falsification of such document.
Petitioner Ursua was asked by his counsel to get a
copy of the complaint from the Office of the
Ombudsman. Petitioner told Oscar Perez, the law
firm’s messenger, that he feels uncomfortable asking
for a copy of the complaint since he is one of the
respondents. Perez told petitioner that the latter can
go there as “Oscar Perez”. At the Office of the
Ombudsman, petitioner registered in the logbook as
“Oscar Perez”. Loida Kahulugan gave him a copy of
the complaint to which petitioner acknowledged as
“Oscar Perez”. However, Loida learned that the
person is not “Oscar Perez” but in fact Cesario Ursua.
Is the act of petitioner of using the name “Oscar
Perez” a violation of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 (Anti-Alias
Law)?
No. Petitioner’s writing of the name “Oscar Perez” in an
isolated transaction is not the act contemplated under
Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142. The use of a fictitious name or a
different name belonging to another person in a single
instance without any sign or indication that the user
intends to be known by this name in addition to his real
name from that day forth does not fall within the
prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.
Petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2018
 CRIMINAL LAW
Ombudsman as “Oscar Perez,” which was not his own
name and he did so while merely serving the request of
his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which the
petitioner was a respondent. Hence, the use of “Oscar
Perez” is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no
evidence showing that he had used or was intending to
use that name as his second name in addition to his real
name (Ursua v. CA, G.R. No.112170, April 10, 1996).
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS
X, an 11 year-old girl, had sexual intercourse with her
18 year-old boyfriend Y. They performed the act in a
secluded vacant lot. Unknown to them, there was a
roving policeman at that time. Hence, they were
arrested. What crime did they commit?
The sexual intercourse with the girl constitutes statutory
rape. Though the act was carried out in a public place,
criminal liability for grave scandal cannot be incurred.
NOTE: For grave scandal to apply, the highly scandalous
conduct should not fall within any other article of the
RPC. Thus, this article provides for a crime of last resort.
CRIMES COMMITTED
BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
Define malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance.
(BAR 2016)
MALFEASANCE MISFEASANCE NONFEASANCE
Performance of Improper Omission of
some act which performance of some act which
ought not to be some act which ought to be
done. might be performed.
lawfully done.
Governor A was given the amount of P10 million by
the Department of Agriculture for the purpose of
buying seedlings to be distributed to the farmers.
Supposedly intending to modernize the farming
industry in his province, Governor A bought farm
equipment through direct purchase from XY
Enterprise, owned by his kumpare B, the alleged
exclusive distributor of the said equipment. Upon
inquiry, the Ombudsman discovered that B has a
pending patent application for the said farm
equipment. Moreover, the equipment purchased
turned out to be overpriced. What crime or crimes, if
any, were committed by Governor A? (BAR 2016)
Governor A committed the crimes of: (1) technical
malversation; and (2) violations of Sections 3(e) and (g)
of RA 3019.
Governor A committed technical malversation under Art.
220 of the RPC. The amount of P10M granted by the
Department of Agriculture to Governor A, an accountable
public officer, is specificially appropriated for the
purpose of buying seedlings to be distributed to the
farmers. Instead, Governor A applied the amount to
aquire modern farm equipment through direct purchase
from XY Enterprise owned by his kumpare. The law
punishes the act of diverting public funds earmarked by
law or ordinance for a specific public purpose to another
public purpose; hence, the liability for technical
malversation.
30
Governor A can also be held liable for violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019. All the elements are present. “Through
manifest partiality” in favoring his kumpare, Governor A
did not hold a public bidding and directly purchased the
farm equipment from his kumpare. Further, Governor A’
actions caused undue injury to the government as well as
the farmers who were deprived of the seedlings. His acts
likewise gave his kumpare, a private party, the
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference, to the
exclusion of other interested suppliers.
The act by Governor A is also a violation of Section 3(g) of
RA 3019 for entering a contract on behalf of the
government which is manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same.
The public prosecutor has to render his resolution on
a case filed before their office. While the investigating
public prosecutor was already drafting his
resolution, the respondent in the said case arrived. A
close door talk took place between the two wherein
the respondent offered the public prosecutor P2M in
exchange for the dismissal of the case filed against
the respondent. The public prosecutor accepted the
P2M. Later, by reason of the bribe money given to
him, the prosecutor issued a resolution dismissing
the said case for lack of probable cause.
a) What crime/crimes is/are committed by the public
prosecutor?
The public prosecutor is liable for direct bribery under
Article 210. First, he is a public officer. Second, the said
public prosecutor accepted a bribe money in the amount
of P2M in connection with the performance of a criminal
act which has a connection with his official function.
Hence, he is liable for Direct Bribery.
The public prosecutor is also liable for Dereliction of Duty
in the Prosecution of Offenses under Art. 208. By reason
of the P2M given to him by the respondent, the public
prosecutor actually rendered the said resolution
dismissing the case despite his knowledge that the
offender had actually committed the crime. He is a public
officer who has the duty to prosecute and he knows the
commission of the crime, yet he did not cause the
prosecution of the offender. He did so with malice and
deliberate intent to favor the violator of the law because
of the bribe money given to him. So in this case the public
prosecutor is liable for two crimes: (1) Direct Bribery and
(2) Dereliction of Duty in the Prosecution of Offenses.
b) Without direct bribery, dereliction of duty in the
prosecution of offenses will not be committed. Are
you going to complex these crimes considering that
one is a necessary means to commit the other?
No. Art. 210 prohibit the complexity of crimes. Under Art.
210, the liability of direct bribery shall be in addition to
the liability attaching to the public officer for the
commission of the crime agreed upon.
X a police officer, was conducting a patrol in an area
when he noticed a man hiding behind a mango tree.
He saw that the man was intently looking at the house
across the street. When the gate of the house opened
just as when a car was about to leave the house, the
man immediately boarded his motorcycle, went near
the said gate and thereafter repeatedly shot the
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2018
driver of the car which resulted to the instant death
of the latter. The man in the motorcycle got away. The
police officer chased him and was able to arrest him.
However, the man in the motorcycle said, “If you
allow me to leave, I’ll give you P500, 000.00.” The
police officer accepted the money and allowed him to
leave. What crime if any is committed by the said
police officer?
The police officer is liable for qualified bribery under Art.
211-A. The police officer is a public officer in charge with
the enforcement of the law and he resisted to arrest a
person who has committed a crime punishable by
reclusion perpetua and/or death. The police officer did
not arrest the said man because of the P500, 000.00 given
to him.
X has been appointed as the new head of LTO. During
his first day in office, Y visited him. Y talked to X and
after their exchange of pleasantries, the visitor left.
When Y left, he also left a small gift box on top of the
table of X containing a key to a new car and a note that
the car is in the parking space at the basement of the
building. X went to the basement and used the car. Is
X liable for any crime?
X is liable for indirect bribery under Art. 211 because he
is a public officer and he accepts a gift by reason of his
office. Y, the visitor, does not require him to do anything;
it was merely given to him because he was newly
appointed as the LTO Chief. His acceptance brings about
the consummation of indirect bribery.
In the abovementioned cases, what is/are the
criminal liability of the person giving the bribe?
They are liable for corruption of public officials under Art.
212. It is committed by any person who shall have made
the offers or promises or given the gifts or presents in the
consummation of direct or indirect bribery.
Melda, who is the private secretary of Judge Tolits
Naya, was persuaded by a litigant, Jumbo, to have his
case calendared as early as possible for a
consideration of P500, 000.00. May she be held
criminally liable for this accommodation? (BAR
1990)
The answer would depend/be qualified by the
implication of the phrase “to have his case calendared as
early as possible".
If the phrase is interpreted as an unjust act and in
violation of the rule to give priority to the older cases,
then she would be liable under direct bribery for an act
which does not constitute a crime but is unjust. He may
also be held liable under Section 3(e) of RA. 3019, the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended: “x x x
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits".
If you interpret the phrase as a non-violation of the rules
and regulations then he can only be held liable for direct
bribery.
What will be the criminal liability of Melda if she
volunteered to persuade Judge Tolits Naya to rule in
Jumbo’s favor without asking any consideration?
(BAR 1990)
31
Melda is not criminally liable because the act of
volunteering to persuade is not a criminal act. It is the act
of persuading that is considered a criminal act. The act
does not fall under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code
on Direct Bribery nor does it fall under Article 211 of the
RPC on Indirect Bribery. Neither does it fall under the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Section 3(a) of RA.
3019 refers to acts of persuading another public official
to violate rules and regulations.
Don Gabito, a philanthropist, offered to fund several
projects of the Mayor. He opened an account in the
Mayor’s name and regularly deposited various
amounts ranging from P500,000.00 to P1 Million.
From this account, the Mayor withdrew and used the
money for constructing feeder roads, barangay
clinics, repairing schools and for all other municipal
projects. It was subsequently discovered that Don
Gabito was actually a jueteng operator and the
amounts he deposited were proceeds from his
jueteng operations. What crime/s were committed?
Who are criminally liable? Explain. (BAR 2005)
Don Gabito is liable for Corruption of Public Officials
under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code for having
given the amounts that were deposited in an account
which he opened in the Mayor’s name for no reason but
the public position or office held by the Mayor;
The Mayor is liable for Indirect Bribery for accepting such
money deposited in his account by using them when they
were given to him for no other reason except for his
public position as a Mayor and Violation of Rep. Act 6713
(Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees) and for receiving such gift from
someone who may be affected by the functions of his
office.
Accused Hernandez served a Mission Order against
Takao Aoyagi, a Japanese national. There were
complaints against Aoyagi for being suspected as a
Yakuza big boss, a drug dependent and an
overstaying alien. To prove his innocence, Aoyagi
gave his passport to Hernandez as guarantee for his
appearance at a BID hearing. In a meeting outside the
BID Office, accused Hernandez allegedly demanded 1
million pesos for the return of Aoyagi’s passport.
Because of such demand, an entrapment operation
was made. In a meeting to return Aoyagi’s passport,
Hernandez immediately left after the payment was
made to his co-accused. Is the act of direct bribery
committed even though his act of returning the
passport is not a crime?
Yes. The second kind of direct bribery was committed by
the accused. Accused was convicted under the second
kind of direct bribery, which contained the following
elements: 1) the offender was a public officer, 2) who
received the gifts or presents personally or through
another, 3) in consideration of an act that did not
constitute a crime, and 4) that act related to the exercise
of official duties. First, there is no question that the
offense was committed by a public officer. Hernandez
extorted money from the Aoyagi spouses for the return of
the passport and the promise of assistance in procuring a
visa. Second, the offenders received the money as payoff,
which Acejas received for the group. Third, the money
was given in consideration of the return of the passport,
an act that did not constitute a crime. Fourth, both the
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2018
 CRIMINAL LAW
confiscation and the return of the passport were made in
the exercise of official duties. (Acejas III v. People, G.R. No.
156643, June 27, 2007).
Torres was the principal of a high school. The school’s
collection and disbursing officer prepared 3 checks
representing the teachers’ and employees’ salaries
and other compensation for the months of January to
March, 1994 in the total amount of P196,654.54.
Torres signed the three (3) checks and encashed
them. However, he never returned to the school to
deliver the money and contends that a group of
armed men took the encashed checks from him. The
RTC convicted Torres of the crime of malversation of
public funds. He appealed his case. May Torres be
properly convicted based on the information which
clearly charged him with intentional malversation
and not malversation through negligence, which was
the actual nature of malversation for which he was
convicted by the RTC?
Yes. To sustain a charge of malversation, there must
either be criminal intent or criminal negligence, and while
the prevailing facts of a case may not show that deceit
attended the commission of the offense, it will not
preclude the reception of evidence to prove the existence
of negligence because both are equally punishable under
Article 217 of the RPC. Even when the Information
charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation
through negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence
ultimately proves the mode of commission of the offense.
The dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only a
modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the
mode charged differs from mode proved, the same
offense of malversation is involved and conviction
thereof is proper (Torres v. People, G.R. No. 175074,
August 31, 2011).
Major Cantos was assigned to supervise the
disbursement of funds for the PSG personnel and to
perform other finance duties. He placed the money in
a duffel bag and kept it inside the steel cabinet in his
office. One day, he inspected the steel cabinet and
discovered that the duffel bag which contained the
money was missing. He was found liable by the RTC
for malversation. Major Cantos contends that he
could not be liable for malversation for mere failure
to produce the funds does not necessarily mean that
he misappropriated the same. Is he liable for
malversation of public funds?
Yes. The presumption in Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, states that the failure of a public officer
to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property
with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, is prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing fund or property to personal use. The
presumption is, of course, rebuttable. Accordingly, if
petitioner is able to present adequate evidence that can
nullify any likelihood that he put the funds or property to
personal use, then that presumption would be at an end
and the prima facie case is effectively negated. In this
case, however, petitioner failed to overcome this prima
facie evidence of guilt (Cantos v. People, G.R. No. 184908,
July 3, 2013).
Elizabeth is the municipal treasurer of Masinloc,
Zambales. On January 10, 1994, she received, as
32
municipal treasurer, from the Department of Public
Works and Highways, the amount of P100,000.00
known as the fund for construction, rehabilitation,
betterment, and improvement (CRBI) for the
concreting of Barangay Phanix Road located in
Masinloc, Zambales, a project undertaken on
proposal of the Barangay Captain. Informed that the
fund was already exhausted while the concreting of
Barangay Phanix Road remained unfinished, a
representative of the Commission on Audit
conducted a spot audit of Elizabeth who failed to
account for the P100,000.00 CRBI fund. Elizabeth,
who was charged with malversation of public funds,
was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan of that charge
but was nevertheless convicted, in the same criminal
case, for illegal use of public funds. On appeal,
Elizabeth argued that her conviction was erroneous
as she applied the amount of P50,000.00 for a public
purpose without violating any law or ordinance
appro-priating the said amount for any specific
purpose. The absence of such law or ordinance was,
in fact, established. Is the contention of Elizabeth
legally tenable? Explain. (BAR 1996)
Elizabeth’s contention that her conviction for illegal use
of public funds (technical malversation) was erroneous,
is legally tenable because she was charged for
malversation of public funds under Art. 217 of the
Revised Penal Code but was convicted for illegal use of
public funds which is defined and punished under Art.
220 of said Code. A public officer charged with
malversation may not be validly convicted of illegal use
of public funds (technical malversation) because the
latter crime is not necessarily included nor does it
necessarily include the crime of malversation. From the
facts, there is no showing that there is a law or ordinance
appropriating the amount to a specific public purpose.
As a matter of fact, the problem categorically states that,
“the absence of such law or ordinance was, in fact,
established." So, procedurally and substantially, the
Sandiganbayan’s decision suffers from serious infirmity.
COA Auditor Florence L. Paguirigan examined the
year-end reports involving the municipal officials of
Alfonso Lista, Ifugao and during the course of her
examination, she came across a disbursement
voucher for P101,736.00 prepared for Lumauig, a
former mayor of the municipality, as cash advance
for the payment of freight and other cargo charges for
12 units of motorcycles supposed to be donated to
the municipality. Despite the full efforts of COA,
letters informing him of the unliquidated cash
advance were not sent because of the address of the
same cannot be obtained. Lumauig admitted having
obtained the cash advance of P101,736.00 during his
incumbency as municipal mayor of Alfonso Lista,
Ifugao. This amount was intended for the payment of
freight and insurance coverage of 12 units of
motorcycles to be donated to the municipality by the
City of Manila. However, instead of motorcycles, he
was able to secure two buses and five patrol cars. He
claimed that it never came to his mind to settle or
liquidate the amount advanced since the vehicles
were already turned over to the municipality. Can
Lumauig be held liable for the crime of failure of
accountable officer to render account?
Yes, Lumauig can be held liable with the crime of failure
of accountable officer to render account under Art. 218.
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2018
To be liable for such crime, the following requisites must
be present: (1) that the offender is a public officer,
whether in the service or separated therefrom; (2) that
he must be an accountable officer for public funds or
property; (3) that he is required by law or regulation to
render accounts to the Commission on Audit, or to a
provincial auditor; and (4) that he fails to do so for a
period of two months after such accounts should be
rendered. The law does not state that there must first be
a demand for an officer to be held liable. Therefore, he is
liable to such crime (People v. Lumauig, G.R. No. 166680,
July 7, 2014).
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
What are the essential elements of parricide as to
relationship?
The relationship of the offender with the victim must
be:
1. Legitimate, except in the case of parent and child;
2. In the direct line; and
3. By blood, except in the case of a legitimate spouse.
Explain and illustrate the stages of execution of the
crime of homicide, taking into account the nature of
the offense, the essential element of each of the stages
of execution and the manner of committing such
intentional felony as distinguished from felony
committed through reckless imprudence. (BAR
2012)
Elements of the crime
Homicide as an intentional felony has three stages,
attempted, frustrated and consummated.
In whatever stages homicide is committed, intent to kill
must be established for being an indispensible element
thereof. However, if the victim died as a consequence of
wounds caused by an act committed with malice, intent
to kill is conclusively presumed and the crime committed
is consummated homicide. Because of this conclusive
presumption, lack of intent to kill is not a defense in
consummated homicide.
NOTE: In consummated homicide, the accused may prove
lack of intent to kill for purpose of appreciating the
mitigating circumstance of praeter intentionem.
But if the victim did not die as a consequence of wounds
caused by an act committed with malice, intent to kill
must be established beyond reasonable doubt. If intent to
kill is proven, the crime committed is frustrated or
attempted homicide. If intent to kill is not proven, the
crime committed is physical injuries. Thus, lack of intent
to kill is a defense in attempted or frustrated
homicide.
Nature of the crime
If the offender with intent to kill attempted to inflict or
inflicted non-mortal wounds upon the victim, he already
directly commenced an overt act to commit homicide.
Hence, the crime committed is attempted homicide if he
failed to inflict mortal wounds upon the victim by reason
of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. If the offender with intent to kill
inflicted mortal wounds upon the victim, he already
33
performed all acts of execution which would produce the
homicide as a consequence.
If death is not produced despite the mortal character of
the wounds due to causes independent of the will of the
offender, the crime committed is frustrated homicide.
If death is produced, the crime committed is
consummated homicide. In this situation, all the
elements necessary for execution and accomplishment of
homicide are present if the victim dies due to the wounds
inflicted by the offender with the intent to kill.
Intentional felony and culpable felony
Homicide regardless of stages must be committed with
malice (general intent) and intent to kill (specific intent).
Even if there is no intent to kill and evil intent, the
offender is liable for culpable felony if the victim dies or
was injured as a result of the recklessness of the former.
If there is no intent to kill, evil intent and recklessness on
the part of the accused, he is not liable for his intentional
act, which caused the death of or injury upon the victim
because of the exempting circumstance of accident.
Cite five (5) factors in ascertaining intent to kill.
(1) Means used by the malefactors;
(2) Nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by
the victim;
(3) Conduct of the malefactors before, during, or
immediately after the killing of the victim; and
(4) Circumstances under which the crime was
committed;
(5) Motive of the offender; and
(6) Words he uttered at the time of inflicting the injuries
on the victim (De Guzman, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 178512
November 26, 2014).
Villostas went to a nearby videoke bar to buy
cigarettes. Once inside the bar, he was stabbed by
Olarte, Ario and Pasquin on different parts of his
body. When Villostas was rushed to the hospital,
where he was treated and the doctor testified that all
the injuries suffered by Villostas were fatal and
would cause his death were it not for the timely
medical attention given to him. Is Olarte, Ario, and
Pasquin guilty of Frustrated Homicide?
A: Yes. All the elements of frustrated homicide are
present. First, their intent to kill is manifested by the
weapon used which is a pointed sharp object. Second, the
victim suffered numerous fatal wounds, but he did not die
due to the timely medical assistance given to him. Third,
none of the qualifying circumstances for murder is
present (Olarte vs. People, G.R. No. 197731 July 06, 2015).
Leyble was waylaid and shot with firearms by the
group of Etino. Etino only fired a single shot at close
range, but did not hit any vital part of the victim’s
body. It appears that he did not sustain any fatal
injury as a result of the shooting, considering that he
and his companions even went in pursuit of
petitioner after the incident. RTC found petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
frustrated homicide, to which the CA affirmed. Is the
ruling correct? Is the use of firearm sufficient to
prove intent to kill?
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2018
 CRIMINAL LAW
NO. It cannot be reasonably concluded that petitioner's
use of a firearm was sufficient proof that he had intended
to kill the victim, after all, it is settled that ''Intent to kill
cannot be automatically drawn from the mere fact that
the use of firearms is dangerous to life." Rather, "Animus
interficendi must be established with the same degree of
certainty as is required of the other elements of the crime.
The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the
absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent
beyond reasonable doubt. When the intent to kill is
lacking, but wounds are shown to have been inflicted
upon the victim, as in this case, the crime is not frustrated
or attempted homicide but physical injuries only (Etino
vs. People, G.R. No. 206632, February 14, 2018).
State the rules for the application of the
circumstances which qualify the killing to murder.
1. That murder will exist with any of the circumstances.
2. Where there are more than one qualifying
circumstance present, only one will qualify the
killing, with the rest to be considered as generic
aggravating circumstances.
3. That when the other circumstances are absorbed or
included in one qualifying circumstance, they cannot
be considered as generic aggravating.
4. That any of the qualifying circumstances enumerated
must be alleged in the information.
On his way to buy a lotto ticket, a policeman suddenly
found himself surrounded by four men. One of them
wrestled the police officer to the ground and
disarmed him while the other three companions who
were armed with a hunting knife, an ice pick, and a
balisong, repeatedly stabbed him. The policeman
died as a result of the multiple stab wounds inflicted
by his assailants. What crime or crimes were
committed? Discuss fully. (BAR 1995)
All the assailants are liable for the crime of murder,
qualified by treachery, (which absorbed abuse of
superior strength) as the attack was sudden and
unexpected and the victim was totally defenseless.
Conspiracy is obvious from the concerted acts of the
assailants. Direct assault would not complex the crime, as
there is no showing that the assailants knew that the
victim was a policeman; even if there was knowledge, the
fact is that he was not in the performance of his official
duties, and therefore there is no direct assault.
Note: The suddenness of the attack would not, by itself,
suffice to support a finding of treachery. However, where
proof obtains that the victim was completely deprived of
a real chance to defend himself against the attack, as in
the instant case, thereby ensuring its commission
without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest
provocation on the part of the victim, the qualifying
circumstance of treachery ought to and should be
appreciated. Verily, what is decisive is that the attack was
executed in a manner that the victim was rendered
defenseless and unable to retaliate (People of the
Philippines v. Soriano, G.R. No. 216063, June 5, 2017).
Dagami concealed Bugna’s body and the fact that he
killed him by setting Bugna’s house on fire. What
crime or crimes did Dagami commit?
A. Murder, the arson being absorbed already
B. Separate crimes of murder and arson
C. Arson, the homicide being absorbed already
34
D. Arson with murder as a compound crime
A, B and C are members of SFC Fraternity. While
eating in a seaside restaurant, they were attacked by
X, Y and Z members of a rival fraternity. A rumble
ensued in which the above-named members of the
two fraternities assaulted each other in confused and
tumultuous manner resulting in the death of A. As it
cannot be ascertained who actually killed A, the
members of the two fraternities took part in the
rumble and were charged for death caused in a
tumultuous affray. Will the charge prosper? (2010
BAR)
No, the charge of death caused in a tumultuous affray will
not prosper. In death caused by tumultuous affray under
Art. 251 of the RPC, it is essential that the persons
involved did not compose groups organized for the
common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other
reciprocally. In this case, there is no tumultuous affray
since the participants in the rumble belong to organized
fraternity.
State the effects of the reclassification of rape into a
crime against person (BAR 1993)
1. The procedural requirement of consent of the
offended party to file the case is no longer needed
because this is now a public crime, unlike when it was
still classified as a crime against chastity; and
2. There is now an impossible crime of rape because
impossible crimes can only be committed against
persons or property.
Note: Resistance is not an element of rape, and the
absence thereof will never be tantamount to consent on
the part of the victim. Besides, in rape committed by a
relative, such as a father, as in this case, moral influence
or ascendancy takes the place of violence (People vs.
Bandoquillo, G.R. No. 218913, February 07, 2018).
A rape victim has no burden to prove that she did all
within her power to resist the force or intimidation
employed upon her. As long as the force or intimidation
present, whether it was more or less irresistible is beside
the point. Though a man puts no hand on a woman, yet if
by the use of mental and moral coercion and intimidation,
the accused so overpowers her mind out of fear that as a
result she dared not resist the dastardly act inflicted on
her person, accused is guilty of the crime imputed to him
(People of the Philippines v. Gabriel, G.R. No. 213390,
March 15, 2017).
AJ, a medical student, was a boarder in the house of
Mr. and Mrs. M who had a good-looking 25-year old
retarded daughter with the mental age of an 11-year
old girl. One day when the couple were out, Perlita,
the retarded daughter, entered AJ’s room, came near
him and started kissing him. He tried to avoid her.
But she persisted. They had sexual intercourse. This
was repeated every time Perlita’s parents were out
until Perlita got pregnant. Mr. and Mrs. M filed a
complaint of rape against AJ who claimed that it was
Perlita who seduced him that Perlita was intelligent,
clearly understood what she was doing, and that
since Perlita was already 25 years old and did not
herself filed the complaint, her parents had no
personality to file the complaint for rape. How would
you resolve the case? (1987 BAR)
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2018
The contention of AJ cannot be sustained. Sexual
intercourse with Perlita, who is a mental retardate,
although 25 years old but with a mental age of 11 years
old girl is rape. She is the same class as a woman deprived
of reason or otherwise unconscious. Since she is suffering
from an incapacity, being incompetent on account of her
mental age, the parents have the right to file the
complaint for rape.
Note: The crime of rape is committed when the offended
party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious.
Physical force, threat or intimidation is not necessary, for
the simple reason that an unconscious and extremely
intoxicated woman, cannot freely and voluntarily give
her consent to engaging in sexual intercourse (People vs.
Caga, G.R. No. 206878, August 8, 2016).
XXX (then a 10 year-old boy) requested his mother to
pick up Ricalde at McDonald’s Bel-Air, Sta. Rosa.
Ricalde, then 31 years old, is a distant relative and
textmate of XXX. After dinner, XXX’s mother told
Ricalde to spend the night at their house as it was
late. He slept on the sofa while XXX slept on the living
room floor. It was around 2:00 a.m. when XXX awoke
as "he felt pain in his anus and stomach and
something inserted in his anus." He saw that Ricalde
"fondled his penis." When Ricalde returned to the
sofa, XXX ran toward his mother’s room to tell her
what happened. He also told his mother that Ricalde
played with his sexual organ. XXX’s mother armed
herself with a knife for self-defense when she
confronted Ricalde about the incident, but he
remained silent. She asked him to leave. Is Ricalde
guilty of the crime of rape?
Yes, all the elements of rape is present in the case at bar.
Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also
known as "instrument or object rape," "gender-free
rape," or "homosexual rape." Any person who, under any
of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his
penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of
another person. The gravamen of rape through sexual
assault is "the insertion of the penis into another person’s
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into
another person’s genital or anal orifice’’ (Ricalde v.
People, G.R. No. 211002, January 21, 2015).
AAA, a 67-year-old woman, was fast asleep when Bill
covered her mouth, threatened her with a knife and
told her not to scream because he will have sexual
intercourse with her. Thereafter, he removed AAA’s
underwear. However, his penis was not yet erected so
he toyed with AAA’s sexual organ by licking it. He
then made his way up and tried to suck AAA’s tongue.
Once done, Bill held his penis and inserted it to AAA’s
vagina. In his defense, bill argued that during the
entire alleged incident AAA never reacted at all. Is Bill
guilty of rape?
Yes, Bill is guilty of rape. AAA was already 67 years of age
when she was raped in the dark by Bill who was armed
with a knife, a woman of such advanced age could only
recoil in fear and succumb into submission. In any case,
with such shocking and horrifying experience, it would
not be reasonable to impose upon AAA any standard form
of reaction. Different people react differently to a given
situation involving a startling occurrence (People v.
Jastiva, G.R. No. 199268, February 12, 2014).
35
One night while AAA was sleeping, XXX hugged her
and kissed her nape and neck. He then undressed
AAA and went on top of her and held her hands.
Afterwards, he parted AAA’s legs and then tried to
insert his penis into her vagina. XXX’s penis touched
AAA’s vagina but he stopped as soon as AAA’s cry got
louder. He then threatened AAA not to disclose the
incident. What crime is committed?
XXX is guilty of attempted rape. Without showing of such
carnal knowledge, XXX is guilty only of attempted rape.
Mere touching cannot be considered as slight
penetration. Since XXX did not succeed in inserting his
penis in AAA’s female organ he cannot be convicted of
consummated rape. Slightest penile penetration is
necessary (People v. Pareja, G.R. No. 188979, September 5,
2012).
Cruz and his wife employed AAA and BBB to help
them in their plastic and glassware business during a
town fiesta in La Union. After fixing the wares in
order for display they went to bed inside the tents.
Less than an hour passed, AAA was awakened with
Cruz on top of her mashing her breast and touching
her vagina. AAA fought back and was able to free
herself from Cruz. She went out to seek for help. Is
Cruz guilty for the crime of attempted rape?
No, Cruz is not guilty of attempted rape. The intent to
commit rape must be inferred from overt acts directly
leading to rape. In embracing AAA and touching her
vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his intent to
lie with her. The lack of evidence showing his erectile
penis being in the position to penetrate her when he was
on top of her deterred any inference about his intent to
lie with her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness and lust
for her (Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 166441, October 8, 2014).
CRIMES AGAINST
PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY
Anniban and Lerio are neighbors. Lerio entered the
house of Anniban, laid down beside the infant child of
Anniban and began chatting with her. Lerio then told
Anniban that she would take the infant outside to
bask him under the morning sun but the latter
refused. A few minutes later, Anniban realized that
Lerio and her child were no longer in the house. After
searching, Anniban found her infant child, Lerio’s
boyfriend, and Lerio on board a vessel. Lerio,
together with co-accused were charged with
Kidnapping of a Minor. Are they liable as charged?
Yes. The following are the elements of kidnapping under
Art. 267, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code:
1. The offender is a private individual;
2. He kidnaps or detains another, or in any other
manner deprives the latter of his or her liberty;
3. The act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and
4. The person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female
or a public officer.
Norada and Seva made a plan to kidnap Ray Truck. On
the appointed day, Accused Villanueva fetched
Reggie Pacil and Ray Truck in the house of Pacil in
Valladolid but only Reggie Pacil came. Ray Truck
remained in the house of Reggie Pacil in Valladolid.
The non-appearance of Ray Truck made them change
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2018
 CRIMINAL LAW
their plan. They decided to just kidnap Reggie Pacil
as they were convinced that Rey Truck will pay
ransom for his release. However no ransom was
made and they have killed Pacil. Is there kidnapping?
None, The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual
deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with the intent
of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the
imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his
liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of
time." The totality of the prosecution's evidence failed to
sufficiently establish the offense of kidnapping in this
case. There was no concrete evidence whatsoever to
establish, or from which it can be inferred that accused
and his cohorts intended to actually deprive the victim of
his liberty for some time and for some purpose. There
was also no evidence that they have thoroughly planned
the kidnapping of the victim. There was lack of motive to
resort in kidnapping the victim for they were bent to
kidnap his friend Truck (People v. Norada, et. Al., G.R. No.
218958, December 13, 2017).
Sexy boarded a taxi on her way home from a party.
Because she was already tipsy, she fell asleep. Pogi,
the taxi driver, decided to take advantage of the
situation and drove Sexy to a deserted place where he
raped her for a period of two (2) weeks. What crime
did Pogi commit? (BAR 2014)
Pogi committed the special complex crime of Kidnapping
and Serious Illegal Detention with Rape.
All the elements of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention are present. Pogi, a private individual,
kidnapped and detained Sexy by bringing her to a
deserted place. Said detention is illegal and is serious
because it lasted for more than 3 days and the victim is a
female.
The special complex crime of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention with Rape resulted because Sexy, the
victim of the kidnapping and detention, was raped as a
consequence of the detention. (Article 267, last par., RPC)
Since it is a special complex crime, regardless of the
number of times the victim had been raped, there is only
one single indivisible offense of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention with Rape.
While walking alone on her way home from a party,
Mildred was seized at gun point by Felipe and taken
on board a tricycle to a house some distance away.
Felipe was with Julio, Roldan, and Lucio, who drove
the tricycle.
At the house, Felipe, Julio, and Roldan succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with Mildred against her
will and under the threat of Felipe's gun. Lucio was
not around when the sexual assaults took place as he
left after bringing his colleagues and Mildred to their
destination, but he returned everyday to bring food.
For five days, Felipe, Julio and Roldan kept Mildred in
the house and took turns in sexually assaulting her.
On the 6th day, Mildred managed to escape; she
proceeded immediately to the nearest police station
and narrated her ordeal.
36
What crime/s did Felipe, Julio, Roldan, and Lucio
commit and what was their degree of participation?
(BAR 2013)
Felipe, Julio, Roldan and Lucio are all liable for the special
complex crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention with Rape. It was sufficiently proved that the 4
accused kidnapped Mildred and held her in detention for
5 days and carnally abused her. Since it is a special
complex crime, no matter how many times the victim had
been raped, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping
and serious illegal detention with rape. The composite
acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense with only
one penalty. It is illegal detention and not forcible
abduction since it was evident that the intent was to
detain the victim.
As to the degree of their participation, Felipe, Julio,
Roldan and Lucio are all liable as principals. There was
implied conspiracy as they acted toward a single criminal
design or purpose(People v. Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No.
186417, July 27, 2011). Although Lucio was not around
when the sexual assaults took place, there is complicity
on his part as he was the one who drove the tricycle at the
time the victim was seized and he returned everyday to
bring food and report the news to his conspirators.
Paz Masipag worked as a housemaid and yaya of the
one-week old son of the spouses Martin and Pops
Kuripot. When Paz learned that her 70 year-old
mother was seriously ill, she asked Martin for a cash
advance of P1,000.00 but Martin refused. One
morning, Paz gagged the mouth of Martin’s son with
stockings; placed the child in a box; sealed it with
masking tape and placed the box in the attic. Later in
the afternoon, she demanded P5,000.00 as ransom
for the release of his son. Martin did not pay the
ransom. Subsequently, Paz disappeared. After a
couple of days, Martin discovered the box in the attic
with his child already dead. According to the autopsy
report, the child died of asphyxiation barely three
minutes after the box was sealed. What crime or
crimes did Paz commit? Explain. (BAR 2005)
Paz committed the special complex crime of kidnapping
with homicide under Art. 267, RFC as amended by R.A.
7659. Under the law, any person who shall detain another
or in any manner deprive him of liberty and the victim
dies as a consequence is liable for kidnapping with
homicide and shall be penalized with the maximum
penalty. In this case, notwithstanding the fact that the
one-week old child was merely kept in the attic of his
house, gagged with stockings and placed in a box sealed
with tape, the deprivation of liberty and the intention to
kill becomes apparent. Though it may appear that the
means employed by Paz was attended by treachery
(killing of an infant), nevertheless, a separate charge of
murder will not be proper in view of the amendment.
Here, the term "homicide" is used in its generic sense and
covers all forms of killing whether in the nature of
murder or otherwise. It is of no moment that the evidence
shows the death of the child took place three minutes
after the box was sealed and the demand for the ransom
took place in the afternoon. The intention is controlling
here, that is, ransom was demanded.
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
Can there be a crime of robbery with attempted rape?
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2018
The crime cannot be a complex crime of robbery with
attempted rape under Article 48, because a robbery
cannot be a necessary means to commit attempted rape;
nor attempted rape, to commit robbery (People v.
Cariaga, C.A., 54 O.G. 4307).
What is the criminal liability of a person who, on the
occasion of a robbery, kills a bystander by accident?
The person is liable for robbery with homicide because
the Revised Penal Code punishes the crimes as only one
indivisible offense when a killing, whether intentional or
accidental, was committed by reason or on occasion of a
robbery (Art. 294[1], RPC; People v. Mabasa, 65 Phil. 568
[1938]).
What is essential for a conviction for the crime of
robbery with homicide?
What is for the prosecution to establish the offender’s
intent to take personal property before the killing,
regardless of the time when the homicide is actually
carried out. In cases when the prosecution failed to
conclusively prove that homicide was committed for the
purpose of robbing the victim, no accused can be
convicted of robbery with homicide (People v. Chavez, G.R.
No. 207950, September 22, 2014).
Conspiracy in Robbery with Homicide
Fernandez opened the gate of Anna Leizel Trading
without first checking who was knocking outside
thereby allowing Paris and his companions to freely
enter the premises. Thereafter, Paris and his
companions purposely proceeded directly to the
room occupied by the victim Salvador. Paris and his
companions did not harm Fernandez despite the
latter having already recognized or seen their faces,
instead, they went looking for Salvador who was then
asleep and killed him. Fernandez directed Paris and
his companions to the office of Anna. Fernandez did
not offer any resistance nor attempted to help
Salvador. Fernandez did not do anything after seeing
Paris and his companions leave Anna's office
carrying a bag, interestingly, he waited for more than
three hours before informing his employers about
the incident. Is Fernandez guilty of Robbery with
Homicide?
YES. When there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of
all. Thus, "when homicide is committed by reason or on
the occasion of robbery, all those who took part as
principals in the robbery would also be held liable as
principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery
with homicide although they did not actually take part in
the killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored
to prevent the same." In the present case, both Fernandez
and Paris were co-conspirator who are guilty of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide (People
vs. Paris, G.R. No. 218130, February 14, 2018)
Cclepto went alone to a high-end busy shop and
decided to take one of the smaller purses without
paying for it. Overcame by conscience, she decided to
leave her own purse in place of the one she took. Her
act was discovered and Clepto was charged with theft.
She claimed that there was no theft, as the store
suffered no injury or prejudice because she had left a
purse in place of the one she took. Comment on her
37
defense. (BAR 2014)
The defense of Clepto has no merit. Theft is already
consummated from the moment Clepto took possession
of one of the smaller purses inside a high-end shop,
without paying for it. She took the personal property of
another, with intent to gain, without the consent of the
latter. Damage or injury to the owner is not an element of
theft, hence, even if she left her purse in lieu of the purse
she took, theft is still committed.
When is the crime of theft qualified?
1. If theft is committed by a domestic servant;
2. If the theft is committed with grave abuse of
confidence;
NOTE: If the offense is to be qualified by abuse of
confidence, the abuse must be grave, like an accused
who was offered food and allowed to sleep in the
house of the complainant out of the latter’s pity and
charity, but stole the latter’s money in his house
when he left the place.
3. If the property stolen is a motor vehicle, mail matter
or large cattle;
4. If the property stolen consist of coconuts taken from
the premises of a plantation;
5. If the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or
fishery; or
6. If property is taken on the occasion of fire,
earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other
calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
Madam X, a bank teller, received from depositor
Madam Y, a check payable to cash in the amount of P1
million, to be deposited to the account of Madam Y.
Because the check was not a crossed check, Madam X
credited the amount to the account of her good
friend, Madam W, by accomplishing a deposit slip.
Seven (7) days after, Madam X contacted her good
friend, Madam W and told her that the amount of P1
million was wrongfully credited to Madam W, thus,
Madam X urged Madam W to withdraw the amount of
P1 million from her account and to turn over the
same to MadamX. As a dutiful friend, Madam W
readily acceded. She was gifted by Madam X with an
expensive Hermes bag after the withdrawal of the
amount. What crime/s, if any, did Madam X and
Madam W commit? Explain. (BAR 2014)
Madam X committed the crime of Qualified Theft under
Article 310, RPC. When Madam X, a bank teller, received
the check payable to cash in the amount of P1million for
deposit to the account of Madam Y, what was transferred
to her was merely the physical or material possession
thereof. Hence, her subsequent misappropriation of the
amount shall constitute theft, qualified by grave abuse of
confidence. There is grave abuse of confidence because
the relationship of guardianship, dependence, and
vigilance between the depositor and the bank created a
high degree of confidence between them which Madam X,
as the bank teller representing the bank, abused.
What does fraud and deceit in the crime of estafa
mean?
In Alcantara v. CA, the Court, citing People v. Balasa,
explained the meaning of fraud and deceit, viz.:
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2018
 CRIMINAL LAW
Fraud in its general sense is deemed to comprise anything
calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and
concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty,
trust, or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to
another, or by which an undue and unconscientious
advantage is taken of another. It is a generic term
embracing all multifarious means which human
ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by one
individual to secure an advantage over another by false
suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all
surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way
by which another is cheated.
Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact
whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading
allegations, or by concealment of that which should have
been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive
another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury
(Lateo v. People, G.R. No. 161651, June 8, 2011).
Separate charges for estafa and illegal recruitment
It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted
separately of illegal recruitment under Republic Act No.
8042, in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court explicated in People v. Cortez and Yabut that: In
this jurisdiction, it is settled that the offense of illegal
recruitment is malumprohibitum where the criminal
intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction,
while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of
the accused is crucial for conviction.
Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not
bar conviction for offenses punishable by other
laws. Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2(a) of
Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a
conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor
Code. It follows that one’s acquittal of the crime of estafa
will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa (People v.
Ochoa, G.R. No. 173792, August 31, 2011).
Solina met with seven (7) people and gave the
impression that she had the capability to facilitate
applications for employment as factory workers in
Japan in lieu of a fee amounting to Php20, 000.00.
These people believed Solina paid the said amount,
however no such promise materialized and the
money taken as a fee was never returned. Is Solina
guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale
as well as estafa under Article 315 par. 2 (a) of the
RPC?
Yes, Solina is guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment in
large scale as well as estafa under Article 315 par. 2 (a) of
the RPC. It is settled that a person may be charged and
convicted separately of illegal recruitment under R.A.
8042 and estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC.
In this case all the elements of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale are present: (1) the offender
has no valid license or authority required by law to
enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and
placement of workers; (2) the offender undertakes any of
the activities within the meaning of “recruitment and
placement” under Article 13 (b) 14 of the Labor Code, or
any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article
34 of the said Code (now Section 6 of R.A. 8042); and (3)
38
the offender committed the same against three (3) or
more persons, individually or as a group.
Likewise Solina is also liable for estafa under Article 315
(2) (a) of the RPC when she defrauded the private
complainants into believing that she had the authority
and capability to facilitate applications for employment
as factory workers in Japan in lieu of a fee amounting to
Php20, 000.00 in which the complainants complied with
resulting to their own damage and prejudiced when such
promise for employment never materialized (People v.
Solina, G.R. No. 196784, January 13, 2016).
Ernesto Pideli, assisted his brother, Wilson, and his
business partner, Placido Cancio, in purchasing
construction materials for a project by allowing them
to use his credit line in Mt. Trail Farm Supply and
Hardware (MTFSH). At the completion of their
project, the business partners Wilson and Cancio
heeded to the advice of Ernesto that their net income
of P130, 000.00 should be applied first to settle their
balance to MTFSH, and they entrusted the entire
amount to Ernesto, with express instructions to pay
MTFSH and deliver the remaining balance to them.
Afterwards, Ernesto refused to give Cancio his share
in the net income despite the latter’s repeated
demands. Is Ernesto guilty of Theft or Estafa?
Ernesto is guilty of Theft, not Estafa. The Court has
consistently ruled that not all misappropriation is estafa.
The principal distinction between the two crimes is that
in theft, the thing is taken while in estafa, the accused
receives the property and converts it to his own use or
benefit. However, there may be theft even if the accused
has possession of the property. If he was entrusted only
with the material or physical or de facto possession of the
thing, his misappropriation of the same constitutes theft,
such as in the case at bar, but if he has the juridical
possession of the thing, his conversion of the same
constitutes embezzlement or estafa (Pideli v. People, G.R.
No. 163437, February 13, 2008).
Carganillo was alleged to have entered a Kasunduan
with Teresita Lazaro, a rice trader in Nueva Ecija.
Teresita gave the accused 132,000.00 pesos for the
purpose of buying palay to be delivered on or before
Nov. 28, 1998 to Lazaro Palay Buying Station. In their
Kasunduan, the parties agreed that for every kilo of
palay bought, the petitioner shall earn a commission
of twenty centavos (P0.20). But if no palay is
purchased and delivered on November 28, the
petitioner must return the P132, 000.00 to Teresita
within one (1) week after November 28. However, no
palay was received on the agreed day and the
132,000.00 was never returned. Then Teresita made
oral and written demands to the petitioner for the
return of the P132, 000.00 but her demands were
simply ignored. Is Carganillo guilty of the crime of
estafa?
Yes. All elements of estafa are present. First, that money,
goods or other personal property is received by the
offender in trust or on commission, or for administration,
or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same. The petitioner received
in trust the amount of P132,000 from Teresita for the
purpose of buying palay. Second, that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender, or denial on his part of such
receipt. There was misappropriation when petitioner
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2018

failed to conform in their Kasunduan, not delivering the CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
agreed palay nor returning the 132,000 for such failure of
delivery of palay. Third, that such misappropriation or ELEMENTS OF ELEMENTS OF
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another. The ADULTERY CONCUBINAGE
acts of petitioner were to the prejudice of Teresita. Lastly,
that there is demand by the offended party to the 1. To convict a woman 1. Man must be married;
offender. Teresita demanded for the return of the for adultery, it is
P132,000 and this was shown in her oral and written necessary: 2. He committed any of
demands to the petitioner (Carganillo v. People, G.R. No. a. That she is a the following acts:
182424, September 22, 2014). married woman; a. Keeping a
and mistress in the
Madarang went to Villanueva’s residence and was b. That she unites conjugal
able to sell to Villanueva five sets of jewelry. in sexual dwelling;
Villanueva made out nine checks, eight of which were intercourse with b. Having sexual
postdated for the payment of such jewelries. a man not her intercourse,
Madarang received the checks because of husband. under scandalous
Villanueva’s assurance that they would all be circumstances,
honored upon presentment. However, the drawee 2. To convict a man for with a woman
bank paid only one of the eight postdated checks adultery, it is who is not his
since the remaining checks were dishonored on necessary: wife; or
account of insufficient funds and account closed. Is a. That he had c. Cohabiting with
Madarang liable for estafa? actual her in any other
intercourse with place.
Yes. All the elements are present, in which the first a married
element was admitted by Villanueva, who confirmed that woman; and 3. As regards the
she had issued the checks to b. That he commits woman, she must
Madarang in exchange for the jewelry she had purchased. the act with the know him to be
There is no question that Madarang accepted the checks knowledge that married.
upon the assurance of Villanueva that they would be said woman is
funded upon presentment. The second element was married.
likewise established because the checks were dishonored
upon presentment due to insufficiency of funds or NOTE: Adultery as to the
because the account was already closed. The third male sexual partner of
element was also proved by the showing that Madarang the married woman.
suffered prejudice by her failure to collect from
Villanueva (People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 163662, AAA was about to enter the school campus with her
February 25, 2015). friend when Cayanan, her brother-in-law, arrived on
a tricycle and pulled AAA towards the tricycle. She
Sato, through fraudulent misrepresentations, was tried shouting but Cayanan covered her mouth.
able to secure the signature and thumbmark of Cayanan brought AAA to a dress shop to change her
Manolita Gonzales on a Special Power of Attorney clothes since she was in her school uniform, and later
where his daughter is made attorney-in-fact and sold to a Jollibee outlet. Afterwards, he brought her to his
four valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City. Estafa sister’s house and raped her inside a bedroom. AAA
under Art 315 (3) was filed against him in the RTC. told her mother and brother of the incident and she
Sato moved for the quashal of the Information was shown to be suffering from depressive symptoms
claiming that under Art 332, his relationship with and presence of sexual abuse. Cayanan interposed
Manolita Gonzales, his mother-in-law, was an the sweetheart defense and presented two love
exempting circumstance. Is Sato exempted from letters supposedly written by AAA. The RTC and CA
criminal liability under Art 332 for the complex convicted Cayanan of Forcible Abduction with
crime of estafathrough falsification of public Qualified Rape. Is Cayanan guilty for the crime of
documents? forcible abduction with qualified rape?
No, Sato is not exempted from criminal liability under Art No, Cayanan should only be liable for qualified rape.
332 for the complex crime of estafa through falsification Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the
of public documents. The absolutory cause under Art 332 real objective of the accused is to rape the victim. In this
is meant to address only simple crime of theft, swindling, case, circumstances show that AAA’s abduction was with
and malicious mischief. When the offender resorts to an the purpose of raping her (People v. Cayanan, G.R. No.
act that breaches the public interest in the integrity of 200080, July 18, 2014).
public documents as to violate the property rights of a
family member, he is removed from the protective mantle
of the absolutory cause under Art 332 (Intestate Estate of CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL STATUS
Manolita Gonzales, G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010).
A contracted a second marriage while having a
subsistent and valid first marriage. The first
marriage was declared void ab initio. Subsequently, A
was charged with the crime of Bigamy. A contends that
the information on Bigamy must be quashed on the
ground that there was a declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage prior to the filing of the action. Is
the contention of A correct?

39 ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2018

 CRIMINAL LAW
No, the contention of A is wrong. It has been clarified in
the Family Code and has been held in a number of cases
that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a
valid subsequent marriage can be contracted. What
makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he
contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage. xxx Well settled is the
rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender
upon the commission of the offense and from that instant,
liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by
law and that the time of filing of the criminal complaint or
information is material only for determining prescription
(People v. Odtuhan, G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013).
Vitangcol married Alice Eduardo and begot 3
children. After some time Alice began hearing rumors
that her husband was previously married to another
woman named Gina Gaerlan. Such marriage was
supported by a marriage contract registered with the
NSO. This prompted Alice to file a criminal complaint
for bigamy against Vitangcol. In his defense,
Vitangcol alleges that he already revealed to Alice
that he had a “fake marriage” with his college
girlfriend Gina and that there is a Certification from
the Office of the Civil Registrar that there is no record
of the marriage license issued to Vitangcol and his
first wife Gina which makes his first marriage as void.
Is Vitangcol liable of the crime of bigamy?
Yes, Vitangcol is liable of the crime of bigamy. Bigamy
consists of the following elements: (1) that the offender
has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage had
not yet been legally dissolved or in case his or her spouse
is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second
or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity. In this case, all the elements of bigamy are
present, since Vitangcol was still legally married to Gina
when he married Alice. His defense of Certification from
the Office of the Civil Registrar implying that there is no
record of the marriage license issued to Vitangcol and his
first wife Gina will not lie since marriages are not
dissolved through mere certifications by the civil
registrar. Hence, Vitangcol is still considered to be legally
married to Gina when he married Alice and is not
exculpated from the bigamy charged (Vitangcol v. People,
G.R. No. 207406, January 13, 2016).
Maine was validly married to Liko on June 1, 2015.
Liko, however, died a month after the celebration of
their marriage. Three months after the death of her
husband, Maine found another love of her life in the
name of Darney. They eventually fell in love with
each other. Darney married Maine on October 3,
2015. Is Maine liable for any crime?
No. R.A. 10655 (March 13, 2015) decriminalized the act
of premature marriage. Article 1 of the said law provides
that “without prejudice to the provisions of the Family
Code on paternity and filiation, Article 351 of Act No.
3815, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code,
punishing the crime of premature marriage committed
by a woman, is hereby repealed.”
CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
True or false. In the crime of libel, truth is an absolute
defense. (BAR 2010)
40
False. Article 361 of the RPC provides that proof of truth
shall be admissible in libel cases only if the same imputes
a crime or is made against a public officer with respect to
facts related to the discharge of their official duties, and
moreover must have been published with good motives
and for justifiable ends. Hence, "truth" as a defense, on its
own, is not enough.
X was charged with the crime of libel. In his defense
he contended that he should not be liable for the
crime of libel because there is no malice in fact
proven by the prosecution since he is merely a
responding urban poor leader acting as counsel,
defending a member of an association under threat of
ejectment from her dwelling place, and thus should
be considered as privileged communication. X also
contends that there is no proper publication since the
libelous remarks were only made in a private
correspondence. Are the contentions of X correct?
X is criminally liable of the crime of libel. When the
imputation is defamatory, the prosecution need not
prove malice on the part of X (malice in fact) for the law
already presumes that his imputation is malicious
(malice in law). There is publication when that same
letter was furnished to all those concerned. A written
letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as
privileged when it is published and circulated among the
public (Buatis v. People, G.R. No. 142509, March 24, 2006).
Alexis filed an action for damages arising from libel
and defamation against Alejandro on account of a
published letter containing the following:
This is to notify you and your staff that one ALEXIS
"DODONG" C. ALMENDRAS, a brother, is not vested with
any authority to liaison or transact any business with
any department, office, or bureau, public or otherwise,
that has bearing or relation with my office, mandates
or functions. xxx.
Noteworthy to mention, perhaps, is the fact that Mr.
Alexis “Dodong” C. Almendras, a reknown blackmailer,
is a bitter rival in the just concluded election of 1995
who ran against the wishes of my father, the late
Congressman Alejandro D. Almendras, Sr. He has
caused pain to the family when he filed cases against
us, his brothers and sisters, and worst, against his own
mother.
I deemed that his act of transacting business that
affects my person and official functions is malicious in
purpose, done with ill motive and part of a larger plan
of harassment activities to perforce realise his egoistic
and evil objectives. May I therefore request the
assistance of your office in circulating the above
information to concerned officials and secretariat
employees of the House of Representatives. x xx
Alejandro in his defense insists that he has the legal,
moral, or social duty to make the communication, or
at least, had an interest to protect, being then a
Congressman duty-bound to insulate his office and
his constituents from the dubious and mistrustful
pursuits of his elder brother. Moreover, the letters
were also not meant to be circulated or published.
They were sent merely to warn the individuals of
respondent’s nefarious activities, and made in good
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2018
faith and without any actual malice. Is Alejandro
guilty of Libel?
Yes. Under Article 354, every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if true, if no good
intention and justifiable motive is shown. As an exception
to the rule, the presumption of malice is done away with
when the defamatory imputation qualifies as privileged
communication.
In order to qualify as privileged communication under
Article 354, Number 1, the following requisites must
concur:
1. The person who made the communication had a
legal, moral, or social duty to make the
communication, or at least, had an interest to protect,
which interest may either be his own or of the one to
whom it is made;
2. The communication is addressed to an officer or a
board, or superior, having some interest or duty in
the matter, and who has the power to furnish the
protection sought; and
3. The statements in the communication are made in
good faith and without malice.
Alejandro’s contention that he has the legal, moral or
social duty to make the communication cannot be
countenanced because he failed to communicate the
statements only to the person or persons who have some
interest or duty in the matter alleged, and who have the
power to furnish the protection sought by the author of
the statement. A written letter containing libelous matter
cannot be classified as privileged when it is published and
circulated among the public.
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
What is reckless imprudence?
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without
malice, doing or falling to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing of failing
to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
What is simple imprudence?
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution
displayed in cases in which the damage impending to be
caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
Y while alighting from his vehicle was hit by X with
his car. This caused Y to be thrown four meters away
from his jeepney. X was charged with frustrated
murder and convicted in the RTC of frustrated
homicide. Upon appeal in the CA, the crime was
modified to reckless imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries. X contends that he is not liable for
such crime because he lacked criminal intent; that he
was not negligent in driving his pick-up truck; and
that the CA should have appreciated voluntary
surrender as a mitigating circumstance in his favor.
Is X’s contention correct?
The contention of X is wrong. To constitute the offense of
reckless driving, the act must be something more than a
41
mere negligence in the operation of the motor vehicle, but
a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is
required. The fact that Y’s body was thrown four (4)
meters away from his jeep showed that X was driving his
pick-up at a fast speed when he overtook the jeep of Y.
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
cannot be appreciated in his favor. Paragraph 5 of Article
365, Revised Penal Code, expressly states that in the
imposition of the penalties, the courts shall exercise their
sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed
in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code (Mariano v. People,
G.R. No. 178145, July 7, 2014).
X, while descending from a curved path, collided with
a motorcycle, killing Y, one of its passengers, and
causing serious physical injuries to the two other
victims. The body of Y was loaded to the vehicle of X
but the latter’s engine would not start; thus the body
was loaded in a different vehicle. The jack of X was
used to extricate the body of Y from being pinned
under the vehicle of X. X, in his defense, claimed that
it was not his fault that the tricycle swerved in his
direction. X was charged with Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical
Injuries and Damage to Property under Article 365 in
relation to Article 263 of the RPC “with the
aggravating circumstance that accused failed to lend
on the spot to the injured party such help that was in
his hands to give”. Should the court appreciate the
alleged aggravating circumstance?
No. The aggravating circumstance “that accused failed to
lend on the spot to the injured party such help that was in
his hands to give” should not be appreciated. Verily, it is
the inexcusable lack of precaution or conscious
indifference to the consequences of the conduct which
supplies the criminal intent in Article 365. The limiting
element in the last paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC,
which imposes the penalty next higher in degree upon the
offender who “fails to lend on the spot to the injured
parties such help as may be in his hands to give.”
According to case law, the following must be present to
constitute the offense: (a) is dependent on the means in
the hands of the offender, i.e., the type and degree of
assistance that he/she, at the time and place of the
incident, is capable of giving; and (b) requires adequate
proof. X was able to supply the help according to the
extent of capabilities (Gonzaga v. People, G.R. No. 195671,
January 21, 2015).
SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS
DRUGS ACT
Dimas was arrested after a valid buy-bust operation.
Macario, the policeman who acted as poseur-buyer,
inventoried and photographed ten (10) sachets of
shabu in the presence of a barangay tanod. The
inventory was signed by Macario and the tanod, but
Dimas refused to sign. As Macario was stricken with
flu the day after, he was able to surrender the sachets
to the PNP Crime Laboratory only after four (4) days.
During pre-trial, the counsel de oficio of Dimas
stipulated that the substance contained in the sachets
examined by the forensic chemist is in fact
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Dimas
was convicted of violating Section 5 of RA 9165. On
appeal, Dimas questioned the admissibility of the
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2018
 CRIMINAL LAW
evidence because Macario failed to observe the
requisite "chain of custody" of the alleged "shabu"
seized from him. On behalf of the State, the Solicitor
General claimed that despite non-compliance with
some requirements, the prosecution was able to
show that the integrity of the substance was
preserved. Moreover, even with some deviations
from the requirements, the counsel of Dimas
stipulated that the substance seized from Dimas was
shabu so that the conviction should be affirmed.
Rule on the contention of the State. (BAR 2016)
The contention of the state is meritorious. The rule is
settled that failure to strictly comply with Section 21(1),
Article II of RA 9165 does not necessarily render the
accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated
from him inadmissible. The most important factor is the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized item. Moreover, the issue of non-compliance with
Section 21 of RA 9165 cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal (People v. Badilla, G.R. No. 218578, August 31,
2016).
Tiburcio asked Anastacio to join their group for a
“session.” Thinking that it was for a mahjong session,
Anastacio agreed. Upon reaching Tiburcio’s house,
Anastacio discovered that it was actually a shabu
session. At that precise time, the place was raided by
the police, and Anastacio was among those arrested.
What crime can Anastacio be charged with, if any?
Explain your answer. (BAR 2007)
Anastacio may not be charged of any crime. Sec. 7 of
Republic Act No. 9165 on the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs of 2002 punishes employees and visitors of a den,
dive or resort where dangerous drugs are used in any
form. But for a visitor of such place to commit the crime,
it is a requisite that he “is aware of the nature of the place
as such and shall knowingly visit the same.” These
requisites are absent in the facts given.
After receiving reliable information that Dante Ong, a
notorious drug smuggler, was arriving on PAL Flight
NO. PR 181, PNP Chief Inspector Samuel Gamboa
formed a group of anti-drug agents. When Ong
arrived at the airport, the group arrested him and
seized his attache case. Upon inspection inside the
Immigration holding area, the attache case yielded 5
plastic bags of heroin weighing 500 grams. Chief
Inspector Gamboa took the attache case and boarded
him in an unmarked car driven by PO3 Pepito Lorbes.
On the way to Camp Crame and upon nearing White
Plains corner EDSA, Chief Inspector Gamboa ordered
PO3 Lorbes to stop the car. They brought out the
drugs from the case in the trunk and got 3 plastic
sacks of heroin. They then told Ong to alight from the
car. Ong left with the 2 remaining plastic sacks of
heroin. Chief Inspector Gamboa advised him to keep
silent and go home which the latter did. Unknown to
them, an NBI team of agents had been following them
and witnessed the transaction. They arrested Chief
Inspector Gamboa and PO3 Lorbes. Meanwhile,
another NBI team followed Ong and likewise arrested
him. All of them were later charged. What are their
respective criminal liabilities? (BAR 2006)
Chief Inspector Gamboa and PO3 Pepito Lorbes who
conspired in taking the attache case are liable for the
following crimes defined under RA. 9165: (a) Sec. 27 for
42
misappropriation or failure to account for the confiscated
or seized dangerous drugs. (b) Sec. 4 in relation to Sec.
3(ee) for their acts as protector/coddler of Dante Ong
who imported drugs.
In addition, by allowing Ong to escape prosecution for
illegal importation or illegal transportation of dangerous
drugs, where the penalty is life imprisonment to death,
they are also liable for qualified bribery under Art. 211-A
of the Revised Penal Code.
With respect to Dante Ong, he is guilty of illegal
importation of dangerous drugs under Sec. 4, R.A. 9165,
if PR 181 is an international flight. If PR 181 is a domestic
flight, he is liable for violation of Sec. 5, RA. 9165 for
illegal transportation of dangerous drugs.
Who are subject to confirmatory drug test under
Section 15 of R.A. 9165?
A person apprehended or arrested who are to be subject
of confirmatory drug test cannot literally mean any
person apprehended or arrested for any crime. The
phrase must be read in context and understood in
consonance with R.A. 9165. Section 15 comprehends
persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed
under Article II of the law. In this case, the accused
appellant was arrested in the alleged act of extortion,
hence, the drug test conducted to him despite his
objection is rendered illegal and is therefore
inadmissible. Since the drug test was the only basis for his
conviction, the Court ordered the acquittal of the accused
(Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014).
Is coordination with the PDEA an indispensable
requirement before police authorities may carry out
a buy-bust operation?
Coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable
requirement before police authorities may carry out a
buy-bust operation. While it is true that Republic Act No.
9165 requires the NBI, PNP and the Bureau of Customs to
maintain "close coordination with the PDEA on all drug
related matters," the provision does not make PDEA’s
participation a condition sine qua non for every buy-bust
operation. A buy-bust operation is just a form of an in
flagrante arrest sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of the Court, which police authorities may rightfully
resort to in apprehending violators of Republic Act No.
9165 in support of the PDEA. A buy-bust operation is not
invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA
(People v. Balaquiot, G.R. No. 206366, August 13, 2014).
A and his fiancee B were walking in the plaza when
they met a group of policemen who had earlier been
tipped off that A was in possession of prohibited
drugs. Upon seeing the policemen and sensing that
they were after him, A handed a sachet containing
shabu to his fiancee B, telling her to hide it in her
handbag. The policemen saw B placing the sachet
inside her handbag. If B was unaware that A was a
drug user or pusher or that what was inside the
sachet given to her was shabu, is she nonetheless
liable under the Dangerous Drugs Act? (BAR 2002)
No, B will not be criminally liable because she is unaware
that A was a drug user or pusher or of the content of the
sachet handed to her by A, and therefore the criminal
intent to possess the drug in violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act is absent. There would be no basis to impute
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2018
criminal liability to her in the absence of animus
possidendi.
Estipona Jr. was charged with violation of Sec. 11 of
RA 9165. On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to
Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea
and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of
Sec. 12 of RA 9165, with a penalty of rehabilitation in
view of his being a first-time offender and the
minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his
possession being a first-time offender. Prosecution
moved for the denial of the motion arguing that it is
prohibited by express provision of Sec. 23, RA 9165.
May Estipona, Jr. plead guilty for a lesser offense?
Yes. The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure is now the Supreme Court’s exclusive
domain and no longer shared with the Executive and
Legislative departments. The other branches encroaches
upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders
that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the
procedural rules promulgated by the Court.
Plea bargaining is rule of procedure. In this jurisdiction,
plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby
the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval." There is give-and-take negotiation common in
plea bargaining. The essence of the agreement is that
both the prosecution and the defense make concessions
to avoid potential losses. Considering the presence of
mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining
neither create a right nor take away a vested right.
Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing
right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing
rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard
or infraction of them.
Sec. 23 of RA 9165 prohibiting plea bargaining in drug
related cases is unconstitutional (Estipona v. Lobrigo, G.R.
No. 226679, August 15, 2017).
What is the "chain of custody" requirement in drug
offenses? (BAR 2016)
To establish the chain of custody, the prosecution must
show the movement of the dangerous drugs from its
confiscation up to its presentation in court. The following
links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-
bust situation are:
1. The seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer;
2. The turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
3. The turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal
drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and
4. The turnover and submission of the marked illegal
drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
After laboratory examination of the seized sachets of
marijuana by the forensic chemist, the PNP Crime
Laboratory agreed to turn over custody of the seized
items to an unnamed receiving person at the City
Prosecutor's Office before they were submitted as
43
evidence to the trial court. Is there compliance to the
fourth link in the chain of custody?
NO. The fourth link is the turnover and submission of the
marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to
the court. It should be emphasized that the City
Prosecutor's Office is not, nor has it ever been, a part of
the chain of custody of seized dangerous drugs. It has
absolutely no business in taking custody of dangerous
drugs before they are brought before the court (People
vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 219955, February 05, 2018, Del
Castillo, J.).
What is the primary purpose of establishing the chain
of custody?
Compliance with the chain of custody requirement
ensures the integrity of confiscated, seized, and/or
surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in four (4)
respects:
1. The nature of the substances or items seized;
2. The quantity (e.g., weight) of the substances or items
seized;
3. The relation of the substances or items seized to the
incident allegedly causing their seizure; and
4. The relation of the substances or items seized to the
person/s alleged to have been in possession of or
peddling them.
Compliance with this requirement forecloses
opportunities for planting, contaminating, or tampering
of evidence in any manner.
By failing to establish identity of corpus delicti indicates
a failure to establish an element of the offense of illegal
sale of dangerous drugs. It follows that this non-
compliance suffices as a ground for acquittal.
In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited
drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if there is a
persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity
of the prohibited drug must be established with moral
certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of
possession or sale are present, the fact that the substance
illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the same
substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be
established with the same degree of certitude as that
needed to sustain a guilty verdict (People v. Dela Cruz, G.R.
No. 205821 October 1, 2014).
The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of
an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support
a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item
was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit
would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness’ possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to
the next link in the chain. Thus, if the prosecution failed
to present the testimony of a police inspector who had
the only keys to the evidence locker where the sachet of
shabu, the unbroken chain of custody was not established
and the accused must be acquitted (People v. Abetong,
G.R. No. 209785, June 4, 2014).
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2018
 CRIMINAL LAW
May the defense of non-compliance to chain of
custody rule be raised for the first time on appeal?
When an accused raises the issue of non-compliance by
the police officers with Sec. 21 of the IRR of R.A. 9165
particularly the lack of physical inventory of the seized
specimen and the non-taking of photograph thereof on
appeal after the CA rendered a decision, the Court must
uphold his conviction. Cabrera should have raised the
said issue before the trial court. Truly, objection to
evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
When a party desires the court to reject the evidence
offered, he must so state in the form of an objection.
Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for
the first time on appeal (People v. Cabrera, G.R. No.
190175, November 12, 2014).
Is the delay in the turn-over of the dangerous drugs
to the PNP Crime Laboratory decisive in the
prosecution for violation of dangerous drugs act?
Yes. When there was delay in the turn-over of the corpus
delicti to the PNP Crime Laboratory as it was alleged that
the date the illegal sachet was seized falls on a Friday and
therefore the PNP Crime Laboratory was closed, it
appears that said date falls on a Wednesday, not on a
Friday, conviction must be immediately set aside. It must
be emphasized that in criminal prosecutions involving
illegal drugs, the presentation of the drugs which
constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the
necessity of proving with moral certainty that they are
the same seized items (People v. Sumili, G.R. No. 212160,
February 4, 2015).
Is the presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs
case essential for the conviction of an accused?
No. The presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs
case is not essential for the conviction nor is it
indispensable for a successful prosecution because his
testimony would be merely corroborative and
cumulative. The informant’s testimony is not needed if
the sale of the illegal drug has been adequately proven by
the prosecution (People v. Amansec, 662 SCRA 574,
December 14, 2011).
Based on an information from an informant, a buy-
bust operation was constituted. The police officers
occupied different positions in order to observe their
informant who was also the poseur buyer. The
transaction between the informant and accused
Andaya was made and thereafter, the prearranged
signal signifying consummation of the transaction
was given. The police officers approached the two
and arrested them. The accused was charged with
illegal sale of drugs but he contends that the non-
presentation during the trial of the confidential
informant who was the poseur buyer was adverse to
the prosecution, indicating that his guilt was not
proved beyond reasonable doubt. Is the presentation
of informant necessary in the prosecution for illegal
sale of dangerous drugs?
As a rule, it is not necessary for the State to present the
informant during the trial for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs. However, in this case, the confidential informant
was not a police officer but he was designated to be the
poseur buyer himself. The State did not present the
confidential informant/poseur buyer during the trial to
describe how exactly the transaction between him and
44
Andaya had taken place. There would have been no issue
against failure to present the confidential
informant/poseur-buyer except that none of the
members of the buy-bust team had directly witnessed the
transaction, if any, between Andaya and the poseur buyer
due to their being positioned at a distance at the moment
of the supposed transaction.
The presentation of the confidential informants as
witnesses for the Prosecution in those instances could be
excused because there were poseur buyers who directly
incriminated the accused. In this case, however, it was
different, because the poseur buyer and the confidential
informant were one and the same. Without the poseur
buyer's testimony, the State did not credibly incriminate
Andaya (People v. Andaya, G.R. No. 183700, October 13,
2014).
Is the non-presentation of the forensic chemist in
illegal drugs case a sufficient cause for acquittal?
NO. The failure of the prosecution to present the forensic
chemist to testify on how the seized items were handled
and taken into custody is not fatal to the admissibility of
the seized drugs and its paraphernalia. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized drugs (People v. Galicia,
G.R. No. 218402, February 14, 2018).
A police officer surreptitiously placed a marijuana
stick in a student’s pocket and then arrested him for
possession of marijuana cigarette. What crime can
the police officer be charged with? (BAR 2012)
a. None, as it is a case of entrapment
b. Unlawful arrest
c. Incriminating an innocent person
d. Complex crime of incriminating an innocent person
with unlawful arrest
NOTE: The correct answer is not included in the choices.
The correct answer is “planting of evidence.”
Section 29 of R.A. 9165, The Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, specifically punishes the act of
planting dangerous drugs. Section 29 provides that any
person who is found guilty of “planting” any dangerous
drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical,
regardless of quantity and purity, shall suffer the penalty
of death.
Section 3(cc), R.A. 9165 defines planting of evidence as
the willful act of any person of maliciously and
surreptitiously inserting, placing, adding or attaching,
directly or indirectly, through any overt or covert act,
whatever quantity of any dangerous drug and/or
controlled precursor and essential chemical in the
person, house, effects or in the immediate vicinity of an
innocent individual for the purpose of implicating,
incriminating or imputing the commission of any
violation of R.A. 9165.
Two vehicles were suspected to be used for
transportation of dangerous drugs. The Starex van
driven by Mayor Mitra was able to pass the
checkpoint, however, the ambulance driven by
Morilla was stopped for it was noticed that there
were several sacks inside the van. Upon inquiry,
Morilla said that the sacks contained narra wooden
tiles. But the police officers requested for further
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2018
inspection where it was noticed that white crystalline
granules were scattered on the floor. At the request
of the police officers to open the sacks, Morilla said
that he was with Mayor Mitra to let him pass. Upon
inspection, the contents of the sacks turned out to be
sacks of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. It
was also found that the van driven by Mayor Mitra
contains the same. Accused was charged with illegal
transport of dangerous drugs. Morilla contends that
his mere act of driving a vehicle containing
dangerous drugs is not sufficient to convict him. Is his
contention meritorious?
No. Mere act of driving is sufficient to convict Morilla of
the crime charge. “Transport”, as used under the
Dangerous Drugs Act, means “to carry or convey from one
place to another.” It was well-established during trial that
Morilla was driving the ambulance following the lead of
Mayor Mitra, who was driving a Starex vangoing to
Manila. The very act of transporting methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu is malum prohibitum since it is
punished as an offense under a special law. The fact of
transportation of the sacks containing dangerous drugs
need not be accompanied by proof of criminal intent,
motive or knowledge (People v. Morilla, G.R. No. 189833,
February 5, 2014).
PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor, both wearing civilian
clothes, were conducting anti-drug surveillance
operations. While they were in front of a sari-sari
store, accused Laylo approached them and asked,
“Gusto mong umiskor ng shabu?” PO1 Reyes replied,
“Bakit mayroon ka ba?” Laylo then brought out two
plastic bags containing shabu and told the police
officers, “Dos (P200.00) ang isa.” Upon hearing this,
the police officers introduced themselves as cops.
PO1 Reyes immediately arrested Laylo. A laboratory
examination was conducted which found the
recovered items positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. Is there a
crime committed even though the sale of illegal drugs
was not consummated?
Yes. The crime committed was attempted illegal sale of
drugs punishable under Section 26(b) of R.A. 9165. The
elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of
drugs are – first, identity of the buyer and seller; second,
the object, and the consideration; and third, the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment. The policemen were
the poseur-buyers and the appellant was the seller. The
substance contained in the plastic sachets which were
found to be positive for shabu as the object, and the
consideration, which is P200.00 for each sachet, was
made known by the appellant. However, the sale was
interrupted when the poseur-buyers introduced
themselves to the appellant; hence, the crime was not
consummated. The appellant already commenced by
overt acts the commission of the intended crime by
showing the substance to both of the policemen but did
not perform all the acts of execution which would
produce such crime by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance. Such cause
or accident is when the policemen introduced themselves
and the sale was immediately aborted. Hence, appellant
is guilty of attempted sale of dangerous drugs (People v.
Laylo, G.R. No. 192235, July 6, 2011).
ANTI-GRAFT AND
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
45
Cite an example of an act which constitute as graft
and corrupt practices and state the elements
constituting the crime.
Sec. 3 (e) Causing any undue injury to any part including
the government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence.
The elements are as follows:
1. The said offender is public officer who performs
official, administrative or judicial functions
2. That said official acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence
3. The said official caused any undue injury to any
party, including the government, or gave any private
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in
the discharge of his official functions.
How many crimes are mentioned in this example?
There are two (2) crimes mentioned. The SC said that the
law used the disjunctive word “or”, hence two crimes are
mentioned under Section 3(e) — (1) Causing any undue
injury to any party; (2) Giving any private party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.
Q. Atty. David, President of the Eastern Samar
Chapter of the IBP sent a letter to the Office of the
Ombudsman, praying for an investigation into the
alleged transfer of then Mayor Francisco Adalim, an
accused in a criminal case for murder, from the
provincial jail of Eastern Samar to the residence of
then Governor Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. The NBI filed a
Report recommending the filing of criminal charges
against Governor Ambil, Jr. for violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as amended). It was alleged that the
detention prisoner Mayor Adalim was released from
jail and allowed to stay at Ambil’s residence for a
period of 85 days, without any court order
authorizing such transfer. Thus, Ambil in the
performance of his official functions, had given
unwarranted benefits and advantages to detainee
Mayor Francisco Adalim to the prejudice of the
government. Ambil admitted the allegations in the
information. They argued, however, that Adalim’s
transfer was justified considering the imminent
threats upon his person and the dangers posed by his
detention at the provincial jail. This threat was that
of Akyatan's gesture of raising a closed fist at Adalim.
Can Ambil Jr. be held liable?
Yes. Without a court order, Ambil and Apelado
transferred Adalim and detained him in a place other
than the provincial jail. The latter was housed in much
more comfortable quarters, provided better
nourishment, was free to move about the house and
watch television. Ambil readily extended these benefits
to Adalim on the mere representation of his lawyers that
the mayor's life would be put in danger inside the
provincial jail (Ambil Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
175457, July 6, 2011).
Mayor Fuentes received a report from Chief of Police
that Valenzuela (owner of Triple A) was engaged in
smuggling and drug trading. With these reports, he
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2018
 CRIMINAL LAW
refused to sign Triple A’s Business Permit despite
Triple A’s payment of renewal fees, submission of
Police Clearance certifying that Valenzuela had no
derogatory records and all municipal officers
signified their approval thereto. Does Mayor Fuentes’
act of issuing business permits to all applicants
except to Valenzuela constitute manifest partiality
and bad faith?
Yes, there is manifest partiality and bad faith. There is
“manifest partiality” when there is a clear, notorious, or
plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or
person rather than another. There is “evident bad faith” if
it connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and
patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral
obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse
motive or ill will. It is a state of mind which is
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some
motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purpose.
Mayor Fuentes should have acted upon illegal activities of
Valenzuela and it was shown in the records that Mayor
Fuentes issued permits to other businesses of Valenzuela
but it is only Triple A’s permit which was not approved,
and also law enforcement agencies exonerated
Valenzuela from these illegal activities. Hence, Mayor
Fuentes’ belated action in not approving the said
business permit because of Valenzuela’s alleged
involvement in illegal activities speaks of evident bafd
faith and manifest partiality. (Roverto P. Fuentes vs. People
of the Philippines, GR 186421, April 17, 2017)
Who are public officers? (BAR 1999)
Public Officers are persons who, by direct provision of the
law, popular election or appointment by competent
authority, take part in the performance of public
functions in the Government of the Philippines, or
perform in said Government or in any of its branches
public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate
official, of any rank or class. (Art. 203, RPC)
What pre-conditions are necessary to be met or
satisfied before preventive suspension may be
ordered? (BAR 1999)
The pre-conditions necessary to be met or satisfied
before a suspension may be ordered are: (1) there must
be proper notice requiring the accused to show cause at
a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered
suspended from office pursuant to R.A. 3019, as
amended; and (2) there must be a determination of a
valid information against the accused that warrants his
suspension.
An administrative case and a violation of R.A. 3019
was filed against a public officer. Insofar as the
violation of RA 3019 is concerned, the public officer
was placed under preventive suspension for 90 days.
And then thereafter, the Office of the Ombudsman
placed him again under preventive suspension on
account of the administrative case. The public officer
contended that since he has already been placed
under preventive suspension in the RA 3019 case, he
can no longer be placed under preventive suspension
in the administrative case. Is the contention of the
public officer correct?
No. It is clear that criminal and administrative cases are
distinct from each other. The settled rule is that criminal
and civil cases are altogether different from
46
administrative matters, such that the first two will not
inevitably govern or affect the third and vice versa. Verily,
administrative cases may proceed independently of
criminal proceedings. Criminal actions will not preclude
administrative proceedings, and vice-versa, insofar as the
application of the law on preventive suspension is
concerned (Villaseor v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180700,
March 4, 2008).
Mayor Demaala was re-elected the mayor of Pasig
City and was charged with violations of RA 3019 for
acts allegedly committed in her previous term as
mayor. Mayor Demaala was arraigned and pleaded
not guilty and contested the preventive suspensions
sissued against her, because she argued that her re-
election rendered such preventive suspension for
acts conducted in her previous term invalid. Is Mayor
Demaala’s contention tenable?
No, Preventive Suspension was proper to prevent Mayor
Demaala from committing further acts of malfeasance in
the office. it stated further that Mayor Demaala’s re-
election to office does not necessarily prevent her
suspension. Pending prosecutions for violations of RA
3019 committed by an elective official during one term
may be the basis for his suspension in a subsequent term
should he be re-elected to the same position or office. It
was also held that by Mayor Demaala’s arraignment, she
recognized the validity of the Informations against her
rendering the issuance of order of suspension as a matter
of course. (Lucena Demaala vs Sandiganbayan, GR No
173523, February 19, 2014)
May a public officer charged under Section 3(b) of
Republic Act No. 3019 [“directly or indirectly
requesting or receiving any gift, present, share,
percentage or benefit, for himself of for any other
person, in connection with any contract or
transaction between the government and any other
party, wherein the public officer in his official
capacity has to intervene under the law”] also be
simultaneously or successively charged with direct
bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code?
Explain. (BAR 2010)
Yes, a public officer charged under Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) may also be
charged simultaneously or successively for the crime of
direct bribery under Art. 210 of the Revised Penal Code
because two crimes are essentially different and are
penalized under distinct legal philosophies. Violation of
Sec. (b) of RA 3019 is a malum prohibitum, the crime
under Art. 210 of the Code is a malum in se. There is no
double jeopardy if a person is charged simultaneously or
successively for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 and the
Revised Penal Code (Merendillo v. People, G.R. Nos.
142369-70, April 13, 2007).
During the audit report conducted by the COA
Regional Office it was found out that the accused
herein, Venancio Nava, succeeded in persuading
seven (7) school division superintendents to use the
allotment for the purchase of Science Laboratory
Tools and Devices (SLTD) for the calendar year 1990.
However, the said money was supposed to be used for
the improvement of the school facilities, and it is
required that in buying school materials, it must
undergo an effective public bidding. Nava persuaded
his school division superintendents to ignore the
circular requiring public bidding as allegedly, time
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2018
was of the essence in making the purchases and if not
done before the calendar year 1990, the funds
allotted will revert back to the general fund.
Furthermore, COA found out that the contract that
was entered into by Nava sellers exceeded the
prevailing market price ranging from 56% to 1,175%
based on the mathematical computation done by the
COA audit team. The loss of the government was said
to be in the amount of PHP 380,013.60. Nava was
charged therefore with the violation of Section 3(g) of
R.A. No. 3019 for entering on behalf of the
government in any contract or transaction manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or
not the pubic officer profited or will profit thereby. Is
the suit vested with merit?
Yes, the suit is with merit. In order to be liable for such,
the following elements must be present: (i) the accused is
a public officer; (ii) the public officer entered into a
contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
(iii) the contract or transaction was grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government. In this
case, Nava is a public officer, who approved the
transactions on behalf of the government, which thereby
suffered a substantial loss (Nava v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 160211, August 28, 2006).
The Mayor of an LGU, along with several local
government officials through their official duties,
purchased on various occasions, through personal
canvass, from ZARO Trading, a total of 142,612 pieces
of "walis ting-ting” at either P25 per piece or P15 per
piece. The said purchases were made without the
required public bidding, and were overpriced. Can
the local government officials be held liable for
entering a contract which is disadvantageous to the
government on account of failure to conduct public
bidding, and alleged overpricing based on the
unsigned quotation from a walis ting-ting supplier
alone?
No. Given the factual milieu of this case, the subject
contracts would be grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government if characterized by
an overpriced procurement. However, the gross and
manifest disadvantage to the government was not
sufficiently shown because the conclusion of overpricing
was erroneous since it was not also adequately proven. In
finding that the walis ting-ting purchase contracts were
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government, the Sandiganbayan relied on the COA's
finding of overpricing which was, in turn, based on the
special audit team's report. Notably, however, the
evidence of the prosecution did not include a signed price
quotation from the walis ting-ting suppliers of Parañaque
City. Effectively, the prosecution was unable to
demonstrate the requisite burden of proof, in order to
overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of
petitioners (Caunan v. People, G.R. No. 182001-04,
September 2, 2009).
Dr. Chow, a government doctor, failed to submit his
Daily Time Record (DTR) from January to March
2000 and did not get approval of his sick leave
application for April because of evidence that he was
actually moonlighting elsewhere. Thus, the medical
Director caused the withholding of his salary for the
periods in question until he submitted his DTRs in
May 2000. Can Dr. Chow prosecute the medical
47
director for causing him undue injury in violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
A. Yes, since the medical Director acted with evident
bad faith.
B. No, since the medical director has full discretion in
releasing the salary of government doctors.
C. Yes, since his salary was withheld without prior
hearing.
D. No, since Dr. Chow brought it upon himself, having
failed to submit the required DTRs.
ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR
CHILDREN ACT
What are the three phases of the "Battered Woman
Syndrome"?
The three (3) phases of the "Battered Woman Syndrome"
are: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute
battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving, or non-
violent phase (People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January
15, 2004).
BBB and AAA had a relationship when the latter was
still raising her first child, CCC, born from a previous
relationship. During the relationship with BBB, AAA
bore two more children namely, DDD and EEE. To
legalize their relationship, BBB and AAA married in
civil rights and thereafter, the birth certificates of the
children, including CCC’s, was amended to change
their civil status to be legitimated by virtue of the said
marriage. However, there were fights and arguments
which caused them to have strained relationship that
lead them to the filing of a case under the VAWC.
Pending the Court’s deliberation of the instant case,
BBB filed a Manifestation and Motion to Render
Judgment Based on a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA). BBB alleges that on July 29, 2013, he and AAA
had entered into a compromise anent the custody,
exercise of parental authority over, and support of
DDD and EEE. Is the case a proper subject of a
compromise agreement?
No. The instant petition is not a proper subject of a
compromise agreement. The law explicitly prohibits
compromise on any act constituting the crime of violence
against women. Thus, in Garcia v. Drilon, the Court
declared that: Violence, however, is not a subject for
compromise. xxx A process which involves parties
mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is
somehow at fault. (BBB,* v. AAA*, G.R. No. 193225,
February 9, 2015).
Sharica Mari Go-Tan and Steven Tan were married.
Barely six years into the marriage, Go-Tan filed a
Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Protective Order (TPO) against Tan and her parents-
in-law before the RTC. She alleged that Tan, in
conspiracy with her parents-in-law, were causing
verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her.
Can the parents-in-law be considered as conspirators
and be included in the petition for issuance of a TPO?
Yes. While Section 3 of R.A. 9262 provides that the
offender must be related or connected to the victim by
marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the
principle of conspiracy under the RPC (Go-Tan v. Tan, G.R.
No. 168852, September 30, 2008).
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2018
 CRIMINAL LAW
Del Socorro and Van Wilsem got married in 1990 in
Holland. They were blessed with a son. However, in
1995, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a
Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of
Holland. Van Wilsem made a promise to provide
monthly support for their son. Del Socorro and their
son went back to the Philippines. Since the arrival of
Del Socorro and their son to the Philippines, Van
Wilsem never gave support to their son.
Consequently, Van Wilsem came to the Philippines
and remarried. All of the parties are presently living
in Cebu City. Thereafter, Del Socorro sent a letter
demanding support to Van Wilsem. Is Van Wilsem
liable under R.A. 9262?
Yes, Van Wilsem may be made liable under Section 5(e)
and (i) of R.A. No. 9262. The deprivation or denial of
financial support to the child is considered an act of
violence against women and children (Del Socorro v. Van
Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014).
NOTE: In Republic v. Yahon (G.R. No. 201043, June 16,
2014), the trial court directed Armed Forces Of The
Philippines Finance Center to automatically deduct a
percentage from the retirement benefits of S/Sgt. Charles
Yahon, and to give the same directly to his wife Daisy
Yahon as spousal support in accordance of the permanent
protection order issued for his violation of the Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
Despite the provision of exemption of funds provided in
P.D. No. 1638, the Court held that Sec. 8(g) of R.A. 9262,
being a later enactment, should be construed as laying
down an exception to the general rule that retirement
benefits are exempt from execution.
SPECIAL PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AGAINST CHILD
ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION ACT
On July 1, 2004, Jet Matulis, a pedophile, gave P1,
000.00 to Sherly, an orphan and a prostitute, and
brought her to a motel. He inserted a rusty and
oversized vibrator into her vagina with such force
that she bled profusely. Jet panicked and fled. Sherly
was brought to the hospital and died a few days later
because of shock caused by hemorrhage. If Sherly
were a minor when she died, what is/are the liability
of Jet Matulis? (BAR 2005)
The crimes of homicide and child abuse in violation of
R.A. 7610 (Special Protection of Children against abuse,
exploitation, discrimination and for other purposes), are
committed by Jet Matulis, provided Sherly is not less than
12 years old. If Sherly was less than 12 years old then, the
crime committed by Matulis is rape (through sexual
assault) with Homicide, a special complex crime under
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.
Bongalon was charged for the crime of child abuse
under Sec. 10 (a) of R.A. 7610. Bongalon allegedly
physically abused and/or maltreated Jayson (12
years old) with his palm hitting the latter at his back
and by slapping said minor hitting his left cheek and
uttering derogatory remarks to the latter’s family. On
his part, Bongalon denied having physically abused
or maltreated Jayson but only confronted him when
the latter threw stones at her daughters, calling them
as “Kimi” and for burning one of his daughter’s hair.
Did Bongalon acts amounted to child abuse under
R.A. 7610?
48
No. When Bongalon struck and slapped Jayson, he did not
do so with the intention to debase the child’s “intrinsic
worth and dignity” or to humiliate or embarrass him.
Rather, Bongalon did so at the spur of the moment and in
anger which only indicated his being overwhelmed by his
fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor
daughter. Not every instance of laying of hands on a child
constitutes the crime of child abuse under Republic Act
No. 7610. The Court explained that a person can only be
punished for child abuse when there’s an intention to
debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and
dignity of the child as a human being (People v. Bongalon,
G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013).
NOTE: The elements of the offense of child abuse are:
(a) minority of the victim;
(b) acts complained of are prejudicial to the development
of the child-victim; and
c) the said acts are covered by the pertinent provisions of
R.A. No. 7610 and P.D. No. 603 (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No.
179090, June 5, 2009).
Mabunot (accused) and Shiva (victim) were
classmates. Mabunot, under the influence of alcohol,
entered the classroom and strangled, boxed, and
twisted the arms of his classmates. Mabunot boxed
Shiva leaving a fractured rib. Mabunot avers that Sec.
10(a), Art VI, RA 7610 only penalizes acts of child
abuse which are not covered by the RPC and insists
that the acts complained of should fall under Art 265
(Slight Physical Injuries) which imposes a lighter
penalty. Is the single and unintended act of boxing
Shiva while Mabunot was engaged in a fist fight with
another falls within the definition of child abuse
under RA 7610?
Yes. the single and unintended act of boxing Shiva while
Mabunot was engaged in a fist fight with another falls
within the definition of child abuse under RA 7610 as RA
7610 is intended to “provide special protection to
children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation and discrimination and other conditions,
prejudicial to their development.” Child abuse referee to
the infliction of physical or psychological injury, cruelty,
or neglect, sexual abuse or exploitation of a child. Physical
injury includes but it is not limited to lacerations,
fractured bones, internal injuries or other bodily hard
suffered by the child. Shiva was only 14 years old when
she received the blow which fractured her rib. being a
child, she is under the protective mantle of RA 7610,
which punishes the maltreatment of a child, whether the
same is habitual or not. Moreover, the IRR of RA 7610
refers the fractured bones as falling within the coverage
of physical injuries, which may be inflicted to a child,
rendering the accused liable for RA 7610. (Jester
Mabunot vs People of the Philippines, GR 204659, Sept.
19, 2016)
AAA, 14 year old boy, went to a beach resort together
with Pinlac to attend a fraternity initiation rites. After
succumbing to Pinlac’s persuasion to drink alcohol
and smoke marijuana, AAA lost control of himself and
while in a daze, stupor, or near total
unconsciousness, Pinlac isolated AAA from his
companions and other fraternity recruits, forcibly
disrobed AAA, and performed oral sex on him by
sucking his penis until he ejaculated. Is Pinlac liable
for violation of RA 7610?
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2018
Yes, Pinlac is liable for violation of RA 7610. The State had
satisfactorily established the following elements
constitutive of the offense charged: "(1) the accused
commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse;
and (3) the child, whether male or female, is below 18
years of age." In this case AAA was 14 years old when he
was subjected to sexual abuse. Pinlac’s act in disrobing
the minor AAA, who was then under the influence of
illegal drugs and liquor after he was made to take them
by Pinlac, and thereafter, sucking AAA's penis, is clearly a
lascivious conduct performed by Pinlac on AAA. (Nicanor
Pinlac vs People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197458,
November 11, 2015)
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT
What are Status Offenses?
Status offenses refer to offenses which discriminate only
against a child, while an adult does not suffer any penalty
for committing similar acts. These shall include curfew
violations; truancy, parental disobedience and the like
(Sec. 4[r], RA 9344).
Michael was 17 years old when he was charged for
violation of Sec. 5 of R.A. 9165 (illegal sale of
prohibited drug). By the time he was convicted and
sentenced, he was already 21 years old. The court
sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and a fine of P500,000. Michael applied for
probation but his application was denied because the
probation law does not apply to drug offenders under
R.A. 9165. Michael then sought the suspension of his
sentence under R.A. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and
Youth Welfare Code. Can Michael avail of the
suspension of his sentence provided under this law?
(BAR 2013)
The benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer apply
to Michael. The suspension of sentence lasts only until as
provided for by the law, the offender reaches the
maximum age and thus, could no longer be considered a
child for purposes of applying R.A. 9344. However, he
shall be entitled to the right of restoration, rehabilitation
and reintegration in accordance with the law to give him
the chance to live a normal life and become a productive
member of the community. Accordingly, Michael may be
confined in an agricultural camp and other training
facility in accordance with Section 51 of R.A. 9344 (People
v. Sarcia, GR No. 169641, September 10, 2009).
Can the provisions of R.A. 9344 be given retroactive
application?
Yes. Under Sec 68 of R.A. 9344, persons who are already
convicted or are serving sentence but who were minors
at the time of the commission of the crime, shall be given
retroactive application of the law.
Does Sec. 38 of R.A. 9344 providing for a suspended
sentence apply even to child in conflict with the law
who has committed a heinous crime?
Yes, according to the SC, such provision of R.A. 9344 does
not distinguish as to the nature of the crime committed
49
by the offender, therefore, taking into consideration the
rule in Statutory Construction, that when the law does
not distinguish, neither should the court distinguish
(People v. Sarcia G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009).
NOTE: The ruling in People v. Sarcia was reiterated
inPeople v. Mantalaba where the SC held that while
Section 38 of R.A. 9344 provides that suspension of
sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict
with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more
at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section
40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence
until the child reaches the maximum age of 21. In finding
the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant for
violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, the RTC imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua as mandated in Section 98
of the same law. A violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165
merits the penalty of life imprisonment to death;
however, in Section 98, it is provided that, where the
offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life
imprisonment to death provided in the same law shall be
reclusion perpetua to death. Basically, this means that the
penalty can now be graduated as it has adopted the
technical nomenclature of penalties provided for in the
Revised Penal Code (People v. Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227
July 20, 2011).
HUMAN SECURITY ACT OF 2007
A bus full of children from the province went to
Manila to have an excursion. Before the children
were able to alight from the bus, here comes X in full
battle gear, with all kinds of guns and ammunitions
and at gunpoint, he told the conductor to open the
bus. X hostaged the children. Thereafter, X posted
cartolinas on the glass windows of the bus. These
cartolinas contained his demands to the government.
Later after 12 hours of negotiation, X gave in and so X
was arrested and was charged based on a valid
complaint with violation of R.A. 9372. He was
however acquitted. Can the State still prosecute X for
the crime of serious illegal detention and for
violation of R.A. 10591 for having in his possession
various unlicensed firearms?
No. Because under Sec 49 of R.A. 9372, it is provided that
when a person has been prosecuted under a provision of
R.A. 9372, upon a valid complaint or information or other
formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain
a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the
charge, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
case shall be a bar to another prosecution for any offense
or felony which is necessarily included in the offense
charged under R.A.9372.
ANTI-TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ACT
Loko advertised on the internet that he was looking
for commercial models for a TV advertisement.
Ganda, a 16-year-old beauty, applied for the project.
Loko offered her a contract, which Ganda signed. She
was asked to report to an address which turned out
to be a high-end brothel. Ganda became one of its
most featured attractions. What is Loko’s liability, if
any? What effect would Ganda’s minority have on
Loko’s liability? (BAR 2014)
Loko is liable of the crime of Trafficking in Persons under
R.A.9208. He recruited, offered and hired Ganda by
means of fraud or deception for the purpose of
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2018
 CRIMINAL LAW

exploitation or prostitution. By means of deceit, i.e., in the
guise of making her a commercial model, Loko recruited
Ganda for the purpose of prostitution.
Ganda’s minority is a qualifying circumstance. Under
Section 6, R.A.9208, when the trafficked person is a child,
the crime committed is Qualified Trafficking in Persons,
penalized by life imprisonment.
the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is
dishonored by the drawee bank (Sec. 1, par. 2, BP 22)
NOTE: Where the check is drawn by a corporation,
company or entity, the person or persons who
actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer
shall be liable under this Act (Sec. 1, par. 3, BP 22)

Where should a case for a violation of B.P. 22 be filed?

ANTI-FENCING LAW
It is well settled that violations of BP 22 cases are
True or False. In a prosecution for fencing under P.D. categorized as transitory or continuing crimes,
1612, it is a complete defense for the accused to prove meaning that some acts material and essential thereto
that he had no knowledge that the goods or articles and requisite in their consummation occur in one
found in his possession had been the subject of municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In
robbery. (BAR 2000) such cases, the court wherein any of the crime's essential
and material acts have been committed maintains
False. Fencing is committed if the accused “should have jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the
known” that the goods or articles had been the subject of first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the
theft or robbery. Mere possession of the stolen goods other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or
gives rise to the prima facie presumption of fencing. transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality
or territory where the offense was in part committed.
Arlene is engaged in the buy and sell of used
garments, more popularly known as"ukay- B.P. 22 VIS-À-VIS ESTAFA
ukay." Among the items found by the police in a raid
of her store in Baguio City were brand-new Louie B.P. 22 ESTAFA
Feraud blazers. Arlene was charged with "fencing."
Malum prohibitum. Malum in se.
Will the charge prosper? Why or why not? (BAR
Crime against public Crime against property.
2010)
interest.
Deceit is not required. Deceit is an element.
No, a charge of “fencing” will not prosper. “Fencing” is
Punishes the making or The act constituting the
committed when a person, with intent to gain for himself
drawing of any check offense is postdating or
or for another, deals in any manner with an article of
that is subsequently issuing a check in payment
value which he knows or should be known to him to have
dishonored, whether of an obligation when the
been derived from proceeds of theft or robbery (Sec.2, PD
issued in payment of an offender has no funds in the
1612). Thus, for a charge of fencing to prosper, it must
obligation or to merely bank or his funds deposited
first be established that a theft or robbery of the article
guarantee an therein were not sufficient
subject of the alleged “fencing” has been committed- a
obligation. to cover the amount of the
fact which is a wanting in this case.
check.
It is the issuance of a
It should be noted that the suspect is engaged in the buy
check, not the non-
and sell of used garments, which are in the nature of
payment of obligation
personal property. In civil law, possession of personal or
which is punished.
movable property carries with it a’ prima facie
presumption of ownership. The presumption of “fencing” Violated if check is Not violated if check is
arises only when the article or item involved is the issued in payment of a issued in payment of a pre-
subject of a robbery or thievery (Sec. 5, PD 1612). pre-existing obligation. existing obligation.
Damage is not required. Damage is required.
BOUNCING CHECKS LAW Drawer is given 5 Drawer is given 3 days to
banking days to make make arrangements for
Who are the persons liable under B.P. 22? arrangements of payment after receipt of
payment after receipt of notice of dishonor.
1. Any person who makes or draws and issues any check notice of dishonor.
to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time
of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or A and B agreed to meet at the latter’s house to discuss
B’s financial problems. On his way, one of A’s car tires
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
blew up. Before A left the meeting, he asked B to lend
check in full upon its presentment, which check is him money to buy a new spare tire. B had temporarily
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for exhausted his bank deposits leaving a zero balance.
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been Anticipating, however a replenishment of his account
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, soon, B issued a postdated check with which A
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop negotiated for the new tire. When presented, the
payment; (Sec. 1, par. 1, BP 22) check bounced for lack of funds. The tire company
filed a criminal case against A and B. What would be
2. Any person who having sufficient funds in or credit the criminal liability, if any, of each of the two
accused? Explain. (BAR 2003)
with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and
issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to A, who negotiated the unfunded check of B in buying a
maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the new tire for his car, may only be prosecuted for estafa if
check if presented within a period of 90 days from he was aware at the time of such negotiation that the

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 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2018
check has no sufficient funds in the drawee bank;
otherwise, he is not criminally liable.
B, who accommodated A with his check, may
nevertheless be prosecuted under B.P. 22 for having
issued the check, knowing at the time of issuance that he
has no funds in the bank and that A will negotiate it to buy
a new tire, i.e. for value. B may not be prosecuted for
estafa because the facts indicate that he is not actuated by
intent to defraud in issuing the check negotiated.
Obviously, B issued the postdated check only to help A.
Criminal intent or dolo is absent.
Campos obtained a loan from FWCC. In return, she
issued post-dated checks to FWCC as security for the
loan. Fourteen of these checks were dishonored
when presented to the bank. FWCC filed cases for
violation of B.P. 22. After her arraignment, she did
not attend any of her hearings hence, she was tried in
absentia. She was held guilty for violation of B.P.22.
She claims she did not receive any notice of dishonor.
Further, she made subsequent arrangements for
payments of the obligation to FWCC, which is
tantamount to good faith. Is Campos liable for B.P.22?
Yes, Campos is liable for B.P.22. Sec. 2 of B.P.22 creates a
presumption of insufficiency of funds. When she made
subsequent arrangements for payments of the obligation
to FWCC, this statement was a confirmation that she
actually received the required notice of dishonor from
FWCC (Campos v. People & FWCC, G.R. No 187401,
September 17, 2014).
Castor used the checks given to him by Lim as
payment for the delivery of printing materials, but
later asked Lim to “stop payment” as the printing
materials were delivered too late. Later, Badiee sent
two demand letters to Lim and subsequently filed a
complaint against Lim before the Office of the
Prosecutor for violation of B.P.22. After one month
from receipt of the demand letters and after
receiving the subpoena, Lim issued a replacement
check, and Badiee was able to encash the said
replacement check. Six months after the payment of
the bounced checks, two Informations were filed
against Lim for violation of B.P.22. Is he liable for
violation of B.P.22?
No, the fact that the issuer of the check had already paid
the value of the dishonored check after having received
the subpoena, should have forestalled the filing of the
Information in court (Lim v. People, G.R. No. 190834,
November 26, 2014).
NOTE: The Supreme Court issued SC Administrative
Circular No. 13-2001 which clarified the application of
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 concerning the
penalty for violation of B.P. 22.
In Saguitguit v. People (G.R. No. 144054, June 30, 2006), the
Supreme Court explained:
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-
2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty,
but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the
penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.
The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the
possibility of imprisonment for violations of B.P. Blg. 22. Neither
does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.
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Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of
preference in the application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg.
22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and
the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact
without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should
be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say,
the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the
imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the
Judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate
penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be
deemed a hindrance.
It is, therefore, understood that:
1. Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove
imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations of B.P. Blg.
22;
2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound
discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar
circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition
of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice or
whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate
the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order,
or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice;
3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to
pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the
Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.”
ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT, AS AMENDED
A is the driver of B’s Mercedes Benz car. When B was
on a trip to Paris, A used the car for a joy ride with C
whome he is courting. Unfortunately, A met an
accident. Upon his return, B came to know about the
unauthorized use of the car and sued A for qualified
theft. B alleged that A took and used the car with
intent to gain as he derived some benefit or
satisfaction from its use. On the other hand, A argued
that he has no intent of making himself the owner of
the car as he in fact returned it to the garage after the
joy ride. What crime or crimes, if any, were
committed? (BAR 2016)
The crime committed by A is carnapping. The unlawful
taking of motor vehicles is now covered by the Anti-
Carnapping Law, and not by the provisions on qualified
theft or robbery. The concept of carnapping is the same
as that of robbery and theft.
In this case, A took the car without the consent of B with
intent to temporarily deprive him of the car. Although the
taking was “temporary” or for a “joy ride”, the Supreme
Court in People v. Bustinera sustains as the better view
that which holds that when a person, either with the
object of going to a certain place, or learning how to drive,
or enjoying a free ride, takes possession of a vehicle
belonging to another, without the consent of its owner, he
is guilty of theft because by taking possession of the
personal property belonging to another and using it, his
intent to gain is evident since he derives therefrom utility,
satisfaction, enjoyment and pleasure.
A postal van containing mail matters, including
checks and treasury warrants, was hijacked along a
national highway by ten (10) men, two (2) of whom
were armed. They used force, violence and
intimidation against three (3) postal employees who
were occupants of the van, resulting in the unlawful
taking and asportation of the entire van and its
contents. If you were the public prosecutor, would
you charge the ten (10) men who hijacked the postal
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2018
 CRIMINAL LAW
van with violation of Presidential Decree No. 532,
otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law of 1974? Explain your answer.
(BAR 2012)
No. If I were the public prosecutor, I would charge the ten
men of violation of R.A. 10883, The Anti-Carnapping Act.
All the elements of carnapping are present. (1) there was
actual taking of a motor vehicle, the postal van; (2) the
postal van belonged to another; (3) the taking was done
with intent to gain; and (4) the taking was done without
the consent of the owner and with force, violence and
intimidation against the 3 van employees who were
occupants thereof.
It is not highway robbery under P.D. 532 because there
was no showing that the 10 men were a band of robbers
organized for the purpose of committing robbery
indiscriminately. What was shown is one isolated
hijacking of a postal van, hence, carnapping.
If you were the defense counsel, what are the
elements of the crime of highway robbery that the
prosecution should prove to sustain a conviction?
The elements of highway robbery under P.D. 532 are:
1. That there is unlawful taking of property of another;
2. That said taking is with intent to gain;
3. That said taking is done with violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things or other
unlawful means; and
4. That it was committed on any Philippine highway.
NOTE: To sustain a conviction for highway robbery, the
prosecution must prove that the accused were organized
for the purpose of committing robbery indiscriminately.
If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is
only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four
armed men (People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 104461, February
23, 1996; Filoteo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 79543,
October 16, 1996).
ARSON UNDER THE RPC
IN RELATION TO ANTI-ARSON LAW
The laws on arson in force today are P.D. 1613 and Article
320 as amended of the Revised Penal Code. Consequently,
simple arson is governed by P.D. 1613 while destructive
arson is governed by the Revised Penal Code.
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from
Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness
of the criminal offender.
Macabando was found on the road holding a lead pipe
and breaking bottles. That same night, a fire broke
out in Macabando’s house. Those living nearby tried
to call for help and stop the fire but were prevented
by the owner of the house who stood outside his
house and fired several gun shots in the air. He also
threatened to kill anyone who would try to put out
the fire. In the process, other residential homes were
also destroyed. The Bureau of Fire Protection
conducted an investigation and the results revealed
that the fire was intentionally started in the
Macabando’s home. The Regional Trial Court found
Macabando guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
destructive arson, punishable under Article 320 of
the RPC. The CA affirmed the RTC judgment in toto.
52
Macabando contends that the crime committed is
only simple arson. Is he correct?
Yes, Macabando is correct. Simple arson contemplates
the malicious burning of public and private structures,
regardless of size not punished under destructive arson.
In this case, he burned his own house and other
residential homes.
There are two elements required for simple arson: first,
there is intentional burning; and second, what is
intentionally burned is an inhabited house or
dwelling. The Court held that both elements were
sufficiently proven in court. All property destroyed in the
fire were his own house and several other inhabited
homes. Based on the facts, the burning was clearly
intentional (People v. Macabando, G.R. No. 188708, July 31,
2013).
Diego and Pablo were both farmers residing in
Barangay Damayan. On one occasion, Diego called
Pablo to come down from his house in order to ask
him why he got his (Diego’s) plow without
permission. One word led to another. Diego, in a fit of
anger, unsheathed his bolo and hacked Pablo to
death. Pablo’s 9-year old son, Mario, who was inside
the house, saw the killing of his father. Afraid that he
might also be killed by Diego, Mario covered himself
with a blanket and hid in a corner of the house. To
conceal the killing of Pablo, Diego brought Pablo’s
body inside the house and burned it. Mario was also
burned to death. What crime or crimes did Diego
commit? (BAR 1989)
Diego committed two crimes (1) homicide for the death
of Pablo and (2) the special complex crime of arson with
homicide as provided in PD 1613 for the burning of the
house and the death of Mario.
The hacking of Pablo to death is homicide, the killing not
being attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of
murder. It was killing in the course of a quarrel.
The burning of the house to conceal the killing of Pablo is
a separate crime. Were it not for the death of Mario, this
separate offense would have been arson. But inside the
house unknown to Diego, was Mario, the resulting crime
is under PD No. 1613, because the death resulted from
the arson. If by reason or on the occasion of the arson,
death results, the offense is the special complex crime of
arson with homicide (Sec. 5, P.D. 1613, which expressly
repealed Art. 320 and, People v. Paterno, L-2665, March 6,
1950).
If Diego knew that Mario was inside the house when he
set it on fire, the crime committed, instead of arson,
would be murder, with the use of fire as the qualifying
circumstance.