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Research has shown that traditional academic honor codes are generally associated
with lower levels of student academic dishonesty. Utilizing data obtained from stu-
dents at 21 colleges and universities, this study investigated the influence of modified
honor codes, an alternative to traditional honor codes, that is gaining popularity on
larger campuses. It also tested the model of student academic dishonesty previously
suggested by McCabe and Treviño in a more diverse sample of campuses. Results
suggest that modified honor codes are associated with lower levels of student dishon-
esty and that the McCabe and Treviño model appears to be reasonably robust.
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KEY WORDS: academic integrity; cheating; honor codes.
INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 1990, McCabe and Treviño (1993) conducted a study of aca-
demic dishonesty among undergraduate students at 31 institutions of higher edu-
cation across the country. That initial study has lead to a variety of outcomes:
increased media attention focused on the issue of student dishonesty, the forma-
tion of the Center for Academic Integrity (now based at Duke University with
an institutional membership of almost 300 schools), and several additional stu-
dent and faculty surveys. The original study, and a replication of that study
conducted in 1995 (McCabe and Treviño, 1997), examined the relationship be-
tween academic dishonesty and factors that comprise what may be labeled “the
Donald L. McCabe, Rutgers University–Newark. Linda Klebe Treviño, The Pennsylvania State
University. Kenneth D. Butterfield, Washington State University.
Address correspondence to: Donald L. McCabe, Faculty of Management, Rutgers University–
Newark, 111 Washington Street, Newark, NJ 07102-3027; dmccabe@andromeda.rutgers.edu.
357
0361-0365/02/0600-0357/0 2002 Human Sciences Press, Inc.
358 MCCABE, TREVIÑO, AND BUTTERFIELD
cheating culture” that develops on a campus (e.g., McCabe and Treviño, 1993).
These studies have largely focused on traditional academic honor codes as a pow-
erful influence in preventing academic dishonesty on college campuses. Other
contextual factors found to be important include student perceptions of peer behav-
ior, student perceptions of the faculty’s understanding and acceptance of the
academic integrity policies that exist on campus, student perceptions of the over-
all effectiveness of these policies, student perceptions of the certainty of being
reported for cheating, and student perceptions of the severity of campus penal-
ties for cheating. Of these, perception of peers’ behavior appears to be the single
most important contextual influence on academic dishonesty (McCabe and Tre-
viño, 1993).
Other than McCabe and Treviño, few studies have examined the issue of
academic integrity in multicampus designs. (Bowers, 1964, and Davis, Grover,
Becker, and McGregor, 1992, are two notable exceptions.) An important feature
of the present study, conducted in the fall of 1999 on 21 campuses, was the fact
that the schools participating in this study differed in substantive ways from the
campuses that participated in the McCabe and Treviño (1993, 1997) project. On
average, the schools in this current project were larger (a mean undergraduate
enrollment of 6,959 vs. 3,576), less selective (1145 mean SAT for admitted
students vs. 1301), and had a smaller percentage of students living on campus
(48% vs. 82%). In addition, 30 of the 31 schools in the McCabe and Treviño
project (97%) were private, compared to 13 of the 21 schools participating in
the present study (62%). Thus, the first objective of the current analysis was to
test the robustness of the McCabe and Treviño model in this new, substantively
different sample. Second, we introduce a new factor into this stream of re-
search—the concept of a modified honor code—and discuss its implications for
academic dishonesty. In particular, we examine the relationship between aca-
demic dishonesty and various contextual influences in three different academic
environments: traditional honor code environments, modified honor code envi-
ronments, and environments that do not have an honor code. To our knowledge,
this is the first quantitative examination of the modified honor code strategy.
Modified honor code strategies, as we discuss later, may have important impli-
cations for the higher education community. While traditional academic honor
codes have been shown to be effective in reducing student dishonesty, they are
generally found on smaller campuses. As noted by McCabe and Pavela (2000),
“[c]onventional wisdom suggests it is more difficult to develop and nurture a
strong sense of campus community at large universities—an important founda-
tion on which an honor code tradition can be built.” As we discuss, however,
the research examined here suggests modified codes may be an effective strat-
egy for bringing at least some of the benefits of traditional codes to these larger
campuses.
HONOR CODES 359
the perception of peers’ behavior was the most influential contextual variable, suggest-
ing that social learning theory may be particularly useful for understanding academic
dishonesty behavior among college students. The strong influence of peers’ behavior
may suggest that academic dishonesty not only is learned from observing the behavior
of peers, but that peers’ behavior provides a kind of normative support for cheating.
. . . Thus, cheating may come to be viewed as an acceptable way of getting and staying
ahead. (1993, p. 533)
McCabe and Treviño (1993, 1997) also examined the relationship between
academic dishonesty and perceived understanding and acceptance of the aca-
demic integrity policies on campus. Perceived student understanding and accep-
tance of campus polices is important simply because it is unlikely that students
will follow a policy that they either do not understand or which they believe is
unfair or ineffective. McCabe and Treviño found a strong relationship between
academic dishonesty and perceived understanding/acceptance of policy. How-
ever, McCabe and Treviño (1993) have suggested that the extent to which an
institution’s policy is understood and accepted by faculty may also be an impor-
tant influence on student behavior. For example, one issue they identify is the
reluctance of many faculty “to follow institutional policies when they observe a
student cheating” (p. 536). Instead, as demonstrated by Jendrek (1989) and Nuss
(1984), some faculty prefer to deal with such issues one-on-one with students.
Anecdotal comments from students suggest such faculty generally tend to be
more lenient than the formal judicial policy on campus, and any penalty meted
out by such a faculty member generally does not appear on a student’s academic
record, an important consideration for most students. Thus, lack of acceptance
and adherence to the institution’s policy by faculty may lead to more cheating.
Dalton (1985) has also noted that research suggests moral example is a
HONOR CODES 361
We would also expect McCabe and Treviño’s earlier findings on the relation-
ship between academic dishonesty and the enforcement of a campus’s judicial
policies or code to continue to be supported. Relying on the premise of deter-
rence theory (Gibbs, 1975) “that for misconduct to be inhibited, wrongdoers
must perceive, first, that they will be caught and second, that severe penalties
will be imposed for the misconduct” (McCabe and Treviño, 1993, p. 526), Mc-
Cabe and Treviño hypothesized the existence of an inverse relation between
academic dishonesty and the perceived certainty of being reported for cheating
by a peer. Tittle and Rowe (1973) had previously demonstrated that the threat
of being caught and punished deterred cheating among college students, and
McCabe and Treviño (1993, 1997) also reported support for this relation. In Kohl-
bergian terms, many students may simply be operating at a preconventional level
of moral development. They are obeying rules to avoid punishment, not out of
consideration of the rights of others or some higher level of thinking (Evans,
Forney, and Guido-DiBrito, 1998). Thus, their behavior is likely to be influ-
enced by how likely it is that inappropriate behaviors will be detected and pun-
ished. In the college setting, especially on campuses with strong academic honor
codes, being reported by a peer is one important way in which a student’s academic
dishonesty may be uncovered.
Zimring and Hawkins (1973) have used deterrence theory to argue that the
greater the severity of the penalties for a particular act the less likely individuals
will be to engage in that act—the potential consequences simply outweigh the
potential reward. Both McCabe and Treviño (1993, 1997) and Michaels and
Miethe (1989) have provided evidence that this relationship holds in the instance
of academic dishonesty—that is, student cheating is deterred by strong penal-
ties. Kohlberg’s arguments about behavior at the preconventional level also sug-
gest such a relationship.
362 MCCABE, TREVIÑO, AND BUTTERFIELD
Hypothesis 5a: Modified honor codes are associated with higher levels of aca-
demic dishonesty compared to schools with a traditional academic honor code.
Hypothesis 5b: Modified honor codes are associated with lower levels of aca-
demic dishonesty compared to schools with no academic honor code.
METHODOLOGY
As detailed earlier, the 1999 survey included 21 schools that spanned a spec-
trum of size, residential character, and admissions policies. All of these schools
were participating in the first phase of a project conducted by the Center for
Academic Integrity to help schools more effectively assess the state of academic
integrity on their campuses and develop programs to improve it. Schools self-
selected into this study and included eight private institutions with strong, tradi-
tional academic honor codes, three large public institutions and one private insti-
tution with modified honor codes, and nine schools with no honor code—four
private schools and five public, one of which is a 2-year community college.
The eight private schools with traditional honor codes had a mean enrollment
of 4,746 undergraduates, a mean SAT score for admitted applicants of 1181,
and a majority of students (56%) live on campus. The nine schools without
honor codes were comparable in size (5,523) but significantly less selective
(mean SAT of 1081), and a majority of students (59%) live off campus. The
one private and three public institutions with modified honor codes were dramat-
ically larger in size on average (14,620), had a mean SAT of 1210, and a major-
ity of students (58%) live off campus.
In all three surveys, a random sample of sophomores, juniors, and seniors
were mailed a questionnaire that asked a variety of questions about student
perceptions of academic integrity on their campuses, including their perceptions
about campus policies, faculty reactions to instances of suspected cheating, and
cheating among their peers. Students were also asked about their own instances
of academic dishonesty. While every effort was made to ensure complete ano-
nymity for participants in each of these surveys, self-report and social desirabil-
ity bias likely have influenced student responses to some degree. Student reluc-
tance to discuss their own behavior was also a likely contributor to the relatively
modest response rates obtained in these surveys—38% in 1990, 36% in 1995,
29% in 1999. The 1999 response may also have been influenced by the rela-
tively lower degree of researcher control in this self-selected sample of schools.
For example, three schools participating in the survey provided virtually no on-
campus follow-up, and two of these schools had response rates of less than
20%. The only other school with a response rate of less than 20% was one
where the survey distribution was initially mishandled, and a second survey was
conducted within a response rate of 24%.
In the 1990 and 1995 surveys there was a response bias in favor of women
HONOR CODES 365
vs. men and code vs. no code schools; this was again the case in 1999. Based
on enrollment data, we would have expected 60% of our respondents to be
female, while in reality 67% were. The response rate at schools with some form
of academic honor codes was 32% vs. 24% at schools with no code. As noted
by McCabe and Treviño (1993) in discussing this issue in their 1990 survey,
“(t)he primary effect of this bias toward honor code institutions and women is
to understate the actual level of cheating in the overall sample, because the
results indicate that cheating is less prevalent in each of these groups” (p. 529).
Measures
Honor Code
As in the 1990 and 1995 surveys, a simple dummy variable approach was used
to denote the presence or absence of an explicit honor code. The nine schools
in our sample not employing an academic honor code were assigned a value of
0 for the code variable. The three large public universities and one private uni-
versity employing modified academic honor codes were assigned a value of 1
and the eight private universities employing traditional academic honor codes
were assigned a value of 2. The decision on how to classify schools utilized the
definitions offered earlier. Traditional code schools were those displaying at
least two (and typically three) of the four characteristics delineated by Melendez
(1985): unproctored exams, the use of a pledge, a judiciary with a high level of
student involvement, and a nontoleration policy. The four schools classified as
modified code schools fell short of this definition but, as discussed earlier,
clearly had strong integrity policies in place and allowed for a high level of
student involvement. All 21 of the schools participating in this project agreed
with our classification of their policy.
Our assignment of an interval scale for code suggests that modified codes fall
midway between no code and traditional honor code environments. While we
have no research to support this conclusion, Kerlinger (1973) has suggested “we
can with considerable assurance often assume equality of interval” when dealing
with scales that are basically ordinal, as long as we are “constantly alert to the
possibility of gross inequality of intervals” (pp. 440–441). We will be alert to
this possibility by comparing all analyses that use this interval scale to identical
analyses that include only the traditional code and no code schools.
Of course, such an approach is not problem free. At least some campuses that
highlight academic integrity as a priority, and that provide students an opportu-
nity to participate in the judicial process, would not describe their efforts as a
modified code approach. In addition, while an institution may espouse values
centering on academic integrity and student involvement, it may be hard to
judge whether these values are actually enacted on that campus. In the research
366 MCCABE, TREVIÑO, AND BUTTERFIELD
described here, however, this is a minimal problem since we are very familiar
with the efforts to enhance academic integrity on the four campuses we have
described as modified code schools. Not only do these efforts clearly distinguish
these schools from the no code schools in our sample, all 21 schools in our
sample are in basic agreement with the coding of schools we have employed
here. Of course, arguing that a modified code approach on every campus will
be intermediate between a traditional code and no code campus is more prob-
lematic. However, as the modified code approach becomes more refined, a more
robust classification scheme is likely to emerge.
Academic Dishonesty
The dependent variable used in this analysis was a composite measure of self-
reported cheating containing eight different items concerned with cheating on
both tests/exams and written work. Four of these items relate to cheating on
tests/exams (copying from another student with their permission, copying from
another student without their permission, using unpermitted crib or cheat notes,
and helping someone else to cheat on a test/exam), while four items relate to
cheating on written work (copying material almost word for word from any
source and turning it in as your own work, fabricating or falsifying a bibliogra-
phy, turning in work done by someone else, and copying a few sentences with-
out footnoting them). For each item, a student was asked to record the number
of times he or she had engaged in that behavior. While the response scale varied
slightly across the different surveys, we were able to reduce all responses to the
1999 response categories of never, once, and more than once. This 8-item scale
had a Cronbach’s alpha of .750 in the 1999 survey. However, as McCabe and
Treviño (1993, 1997) have discussed, this composite measure of academic dis-
honesty is highly skewed and violates the assumptions of statistical normality.
To address this issue, a log transformation of the academic dishonesty variable
has been employed in previous surveys and was also used in this analysis.
RESULTS
As detailed in the top half of Table 1, at the 17 traditional code and no code
campuses participating in the 1999 survey, the relationships between academic
dishonesty and all five of the contextual variables examined were significant at
p < 0.001, and thus Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 4 were supported.
368 MCCABE, TREVIÑO, AND BUTTERFIELD
The second half of Table 1 details the same relationships for the entire sam-
ple, including the modified code schools. Once again, all of the relationships
between academic dishonesty and our contextual variables are significant at p <
0.001, and Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 4 continue to be supported.
Table 2 shows the results for the regression of the perceived certainty of
being reported, the perceived severity of penalties, perceived understanding/ac-
ceptance of polices, and perception of peers’ behavior on the academic dishon-
esty variable. Analyses were performed for each code condition as detailed in
Table 2, and the regression model is significant in each case (p < 0.001), ex-
plaining between 14% and 19.6% of the variance in academic dishonesty. Per-
ception of peers’ behavior makes the most significant contribution to the regres-
sion models, again suggesting the strong role the perception of peers’ behavior
plays in understanding student decisions concerning academic integrity. Per-
ceived certainty of being reported is also significant in the regression model
under all three code conditions. Perceived severity of penalties is not significant
in these analyses, and the perceived understanding/acceptance of policy is sig-
nificant only in the traditional code model (p < 0.05).
A regression of all five independent study variables on academic dishonesty
was performed for the 1990, 1995, and 1999 surveys, and the results are summa-
rized in Table 3. The last column in Table 3 is the regression model for all three
surveys combined. As discussed earlier, the 1999 data in these analyses includes
only the 17 traditional code and no code campuses to eliminate any concern
about our use of an interval scale for code. However, a comparable analysis
using the full 1999 sample provides essentially the same results.
Table 4 shows the means and standard deviations of all study variables for
each code condition. Of particular interest, it shows that that the level of aca-
demic dishonesty at schools with modified honor codes is intermediate in value
between schools with traditional honor codes and those with no code. As pre-
dicted in Hypothesis 5a, a simple t test shows that the level of academic dishon-
esty at modified code schools is significantly greater than that at schools with
traditional codes (t = 3.136, p < .01) and as predicted in Hypothesis 5b, a simple
t test shows academic dishonesty is significantly lower at modified code schools
than at schools with no honor code (t = 4.651, p < .001).
DISCUSSION
Key Findings
In this study, we found that the level of academic dishonesty is highest at
colleges that do not have honor codes, is moderate at modified code institutions,
and is lowest at schools with traditional honor codes. The 1999 regression mod-
TABLE 1. Intercorrelations of Study Variables—1999 Survey
HONOR CODES
Intercorrelations
Variable N M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
No Code and Traditional Code Schools
1. Existence of an honor code 1625 1.04 1.00 —
2. Perceived certainty of being caught 1602 2.13 0.74 .35 —
3. Perceived understanding of policy 1559 11.98 2.45 .22 .35 —
4. Perceived severity of penalties 1579 3.16 0.74 .21 .21 .59 —
5. Perception of peers’ behavior 1620 1.43 0.50 −.25 −.25 −.24 −.18 —
6. Log(academic dishonesty) 1587 0.99 0.10 −.22 −.24 −.15 −.12 .41 —
Including Modified Code Schools
1. Existence of an honor code 2248 1.03 0.85 —
2. Perceived certainty of being caught 2216 2.09 0.71 .31 —
3. Perceived understanding of policy 2152 11.69 2.52 .19 .27 —
4. Perceived severity of penalties 2176 3.03 0.82 .17 .19 .61 —
5. Perception of peers’ behavior 2241 1.42 0.49 −.22 −.27 −.16 −.09 —
6. Log(academic dishonesty) 2188 0.99 0.10 −.18 −.22 −.10 −.07* .42 —
*Significant at p < .01. All other correlations are significant at p < .001.
369
370
TABLE 2. Regression of Perception of Peers’ Behavior, Perceived Certainty of Being Reported, Perceived Understanding
and Acceptance of Policy, and Perceived Severity of Penalties on Academic Dishonesty—by Existence of an Honor Code
TABLE 3. Regression of Perception of Peers? Behavior, Code, Perceived Certainty of Being Reported,
Perceived Understanding and Acceptance of Policy, Perceived Severity of Penalties, and Existence
of an Honor Code on Academic Dishonesty—1990, 1995, and 1999
Combined
1990 1995 1999 Surveys
Variable β p β p β p β p
Perception of peers’ behavior 0.32 .0001 0.32 .0001 0.35 .0001 0.32 .0001
Existence of an honor code −0.17 .0001 −0.09 .0001 −0.09 .0006 −0.14 .0001
Perceived certainty of being reported −0.07 .0001 −0.08 .0001 −0.11 .0001 −0.07 .0001
Perceived understanding of policy −0.06 .0001 −0.09 .0001 −0.02 .6124 −0.07 .0001
Perceived severity of penalties 0.05 .0003 0.02 .3194 −0.01 .8253 0.03 .0018
F 315.4 175.9 72.0 547.5
Degrees of freedom 5, 5562 5, 3720 5, 1488 5, 10789
Adjusted R2 0.2202 0.1901 0.1921 0.2020
371
372 MCCABE, TREVIÑO, AND BUTTERFIELD
Variable N M SD N M SD N M SD
els show that perceptions of peers’ behavior had the most influence under all
three code conditions, and the perceived certainty of being reported was also a
significant influence in each condition. Perceived understanding/acceptance of
policy had a significant influence only in the traditional code model, and per-
ceived severity of penalties was not significant under any code condition. How-
ever, the combined results across all three studies (1990, 1995, 1999) revealed
significant relationships between academic dishonesty and all five of the contex-
tual variables tested (perceptions of peers’ behavior, existence of some form of
honor code, perceived certainty of being reported, perceived severity of penal-
ties, and perceived understanding/acceptance of policy).
CONCLUSION
This study offers empirical evidence that modified honor codes can effec-
tively reduce cheating behavior on college campuses—at least compared to no
code environments. Although not as effective as traditional honor codes, modi-
fied codes represent a viable alternative for large, public institutions where im-
plementing a traditional honor code may not be a realistic option.
The findings also indicate that the model first suggested by McCabe and
Treviño (1993) in their 1990 study seems to be relatively robust. The regression
results from all three surveys show relatively strong and consistent support for
the relationship between academic dishonesty and perception of peers’ behavior.
The existence of an honor code and perceived certainty of being reported also
make significant contributions to the total variance explained in all three studies.
Perceived understanding/acceptance of policies (p < .001) makes a small but
significant (p < 0.001) contribution to the overall regression model in the 1990
and 1995 surveys but not in 1999. Perceived severity of penalties of policies
makes a small but significant contribution in the 1990 survey but not in the
1995 or 1999 surveys. All five independent variables make a significant contri-
376 MCCABE, TREVIÑO, AND BUTTERFIELD
bution to the regression model in the combined analysis, although the perceived
severity of penalties contributions is quite small.
This research also suggests that college administrators, faculty, and students
in all three types of environments must do more to address the issue of academic
integrity. Institutional leaders need to highlight the issue of academic integrity
as an important institutional priority. In particular, this study suggests that initia-
tives should focus on training students to be role models of good behavior,
developing a strong environment of honor (supported by some form of code),
and to a lesser degree, demonstrating to students that cheating behavior will be
caught and reported. These variables were shown to be significantly related to
cheating behavior across three different studies and across three different honor
code contexts.
However, although these studies have increased understanding of the factors
that influence cheating behavior, they have accounted for only about 20% of
the total variance. Additional research is clearly needed to identify other influen-
tial factors. One area deserving further study, which has received only modest
attention here, is the role faculty play in a student’s decision to engage or not
to engage in academic dishonesty. McCabe (1993) has shown that faculty in
code and no code environments show significant variations in the way they
address the issue of academic dishonesty in their courses, and it is likely these
differences account for at least some of the variation in students’ attitudes about
academic integrity and their resulting behavior. McCabe and Pavela (1997) have
suggested a variety of ways in which faculty in any environment, code or no
code, can reduce both the motivation and opportunities that students might have
to engage in academic dishonesty—for example, clarifying more carefully their
expectations for individual assignments, challenging academic dishonesty when
it occurs, and fostering an environment of trust in the classroom. Cizek (1999)
suggests effective proctoring and careful seating of students during tests are
among the most important approaches to effective classroom management of
academic dishonesty. He has also distilled the suggestions of Jacobs and Chase
(1992), Kibler and Patterson (1988), and Moss (1984) into a “top ten” list of
other classroom strategies, including such initiatives as designing good tests,
using varied assessment formats, maintaining test security, and knowing the
test takers. Most of these suggestions are just good common sense, but student
comments suggest that many faculty do not employ these strategies in their
courses.
Although it does not help to explain the variations in behavior between code,
modified code, and no code environments, anecdotal comments offered by fac-
ulty suggest perhaps the most effective strategy for reducing academic dishon-
esty among college students is to address this issue with students long before
they get to college. While one might be tempted to suggest that faculty are
simply shifting the blame elsewhere, there is much empirical evidence to sup-
HONOR CODES 377
port their concern. In particular, surveys of high school students suggest a grow-
ing disenchantment with the academic process. For example, recent results from
the American Freshman Survey conducted by UCLA (Sax, Astin, Korn, and
Mahoney, 1999) show an increasing level of “academic disengagement” among
today’s entering college freshmen: “A record-high 39.9 percent of freshmen report
feeling frequently ‘bored in class,’ [and] . . . a record-low 31.5 percent of fresh-
men say they spent six or more hours a week studying or doing homework in
their last year of high school” (p. 3). In addition, one quarter of these freshmen
expect to work full time while in college and almost one third report feeling
“frequently overwhelmed by all I have to do.” In light of these findings, we
probably should not be surprised that four out of five top performing students
admit they have cheated on academic work while in high school and that almost
half of these students believe a decline in social and moral values is the biggest
problem facing their generation today (Who’s Who Among American High
School Students, 1998).
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