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Calling Dr.

Robot
Dec 21, 2018 SAMI MAHROUM

As in many other economic sectors, artificial-intelligence applications in medicine seem


to hold unlimited promise. But to realize AI’s full potential in diagnosis, records
management, hospital operations, and other areas of medicine, innovators and
regulators alike must heed the lessons of past technological revolutions that failed.

PARIS – Unintended consequences in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) tend to make for
lively headlines, such as when Microsoft introduced a Twitter chatbot that quickly
began spewing racist slurs. But whether it is a case of Google’s image-recognition
algorithm labeling black people as “gorillas” or Tesla’s autonomous vehicles killing their
drivers, AI’s controversies have yet to dampen its appeal.

As AI applications multiply, so, too, will the reported failures, leading eventually to a public
and regulatory backlash. Nowhere is this truer than in health care, where investment in AI
reached an all-time high in the second quarter of 2018. From alleged medical-device
failures in Canada and Europe to recent concerns about the performance of IBM’s Watson
Health, the risks of adopting new technologies in the health-care sector are clear.

But AI also promises to revolutionize the management of health records and patient risk,
diagnosis, hospital operations, and other areas of medicine. It is little wonder, then, that the
global AI health-care market is expected to surpass $34 billion by 2025. And public
support for the use of AI in health care is already high across a broad range of countries. In
the United States, for example, 53,000 patient-monitoring devices – each gathering data for
AI-driven predictive analytics – were in use by the end of 2017. That number is expected to
reach 3.1 million by 2021 – an annual growth rate of 176%.

Obviously, such rapid growth in the use of AI will have far-reaching implications for the
health-care market. But it will also have important social and political consequences. The
more people come to rely on AI-driven solutions, the more they will demand a say in how
these technologies are developed and deployed.

A UNIQUE INNOVATION ENVIRONMENT

Technology has been at the heart of health care since antiquity. In just the past few decades, it
has played a pivotal role in improving human wellbeing and extending the average lifespan.
For most people, it is difficult to imagine a world without x-rays, magnetic resonance
imaging, ultrasounds, portable defibrillators, pacemakers, laser surgery, cochlear implants,
and artificial organs, even though most of these technologies are relatively new.

Yet, despite the familiarity of many health technologies, the health-care sector is actually a
peculiar place for new innovations to grow. Given that most of the products and services
introduced in health care have a direct effect on human lives, the risks and costs of failure
have always been high.

Moreover, the prospective users of new health technologies will almost always be health-care
practitioners who are constrained by their own limited knowledge, as well as by ethical codes
and regulations. Health care, after all, is understandably more regulated and regimented than
any other sector. And this regulatory landscape is further complicated by the fact that rules
and standards can differ from country to country, and sometimes even within countries.

The entry of new players has also added to the complexity of the health-care market.
Traditional technology companies such as GE, Philips, and Siemens have long been present
in the sector, but now they are competing with tech giants like Apple, Amazon, Google, and
Microsoft, each of which is developing new AI applications.

FROM DIFFUSION TO DISILLUSION

As with any product-development plan, a key indicator of success is rapid uptake by end
users. To achieve that, the big tech companies are actively pursuing marketing strategies that
tend to overpromise the benefits of AI products, while understating the risks of failure.
Implicit in their best-case scenarios is an emphasis on originality over reliability. But while
novelty may well appeal to enthusiastic early adopters of run-of-the-mill consumer products,
it has less purchase in health care. Most patients are reluctant to serve as guinea pigs.

The enthusiastic early adopter is a well-known concept in


innovation studies – a field pioneered by the American
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Though the early-adopter approach is a high-risk strategy


that puts the future of a product in the hands of amateurs, technology companies entering the
health-care sector have embraced it. But it is not obvious that the same rules apply here. As
licensed health-care providers, early and late adopters are all already operating at the same
relative skill level and within the same confines.

In fact, in 2001, the British gynecologist J.W. Scott arguedthat innovations in health and
medicine often follow a different path, now known as “Scott’s Parabola.” According to Scott,
novel medical techniques – often following the emergence of new technologies – can gain
currency among medical practitioners and become the new standard treatment very quickly
on the back of initially positive feedback. But with time, reports of failures or potential
drawbacks begin to emerge, thus reversing the process. As negative headlines begin to pile
up, the initial benefits are forgotten, and the public turns against the treatment altogether.

IBM’s “Watson for Oncology” has followed a similar pattern. After initially showing great
promise, the supercomputer was found to have delivered “multiple examples of unsafe and
incorrect treatment recommendations.” The other technology companies now rushing to the
market with their own AI applications should heed that precedent, lest they, too, succumb to
Scott’s Parabola.
Another cautionary tale comes from the medical-device industry, where eager practitioners
and aggressive marketers have created an environment of irrational exuberance. For example,
research shows that between 2006 and 2013, the practitioners and hospitals that were most
overconfident in adopting implantable cardiac defibrillators (ICDs) had higher mortality rates,
and were thus quicker to scale back their use of the technology.

ADOPTION METHODS

Generally, for an innovation to gain currency over the long term, prospective users need to be
intimately acquainted with how it functions. Only then can they determine how it compares to
existing technologies, what skills and infrastructure it requires, and whether it is compatible
with professional values and codes of ethics. Making such determinations, however, requires
firsthand experimentation and a close accounting of costs and benefits. So, how should AI
developers and health-care regulators proceed?

There is no easy answer, because a wide range of overlapping factors can determine how, and
at what pace, technological innovations are adopted. In the case of health care, such factors
include financial incentives, labor-market conditions, the relative skill level of credentialed
practitioners in a given setting, and the overarching regulatory regime for medical
technologies.

For example, a 2011 study in Health Policy found that hospitals where providers receive a
lump-sum fee for all services provided to a patient in a given Diagnosis-Related Group
(DRGs) show “higher levels of technology diffusion” than hospitals that do not. On the other
hand, in the absence of such constraints, providers might still adopt new technologies to stand
out among the crowd, while passing the costs along to the end payer. Similarly, physicians
who are reimbursed on the basis of performance might also have an incentive to embrace new
efficiency- or outcome-enhancing innovations.

Complicating matters further is the fact that AI could be adopted not just by physicians and
hospitals, but also by digital health-care platforms, insurance companies and payers,
individual patients, and many other groups. But whether AI is used for diagnostics, treatment,
coordination of care, or various business-side purposes, the paradox of Scott’s Parabola
remains: fast and wide diffusion does not mean a product will succeed, and could even work
against it in the event of a negative backlash.

Regardless of how fast machines become, humans will always need time to understand how
new AI applications work and what effect they are having on their operating environment. If
an organization adopts a technology prematurely or in haste, it runs a greater risk of
encountering errors and malfunctions. And if the costs appear to be outweighing the benefits,
the technology may have to be abandoned altogether.

THE TORTOISE STRATEGY

Another risk AI developers face is “suboptimal lock-in.” If an eager technology company


rushes a minimally viable AI tool to market, it runs the risk of becoming forever associated
with a suboptimal level of performance. In this case, the first-mover strategy will have
backfired, by enabling latecomers with more developed products to gain the upper hand.

Given this possibility, technology companies developing


health-care AI applications would do well to learn from
APOCALYPSE pharmaceutical companies, which tend to take a longer,
TRUMP slower route to market. They should take the time to work
with what economist Eric von Hippel calls “lead users.”
Dec 24, 2018 ELIZABETH These are users “whose present strong needs will become
DREW thinks the president's
general in a marketplace months or years in the future.”
recent behavior has triggered a
sense that America is spinning Lead users can play the role of co-designers, guiding the
out of control. development of a new technology or service from its
minimally viable stage to that of a finished product.

To harness this dynamic, the government of Singapore


recently introduced a “regulatory sandbox” to facilitate
innovation in the delivery of health-care services over
telemedicine platforms. The program allows lead users (in
this case service providers) to engage with potential
beneficiaries (patients) in a transparent, safe regulatory
8
environment. Likewise, the government of Abu Dhabi has
introduced guidelines, and thus legal clarity, for the
deployment of AI-based products and services in the
health-care sector.

Yet these examples are the exceptions. Generally speaking, governments have been slow to
develop a legal and regulatory framework to shepherd new AI applications from development
to deployment, despite the fact that many countries are pursuing national AI strategies ,
some of which even targethealth care as a high-priority sector.

Specifically, the OECD estimates that just half of its member states have national policies to
ensure that data from electronic health records is accessible to clinicians and used to monitor
disease outbreaks, facilitate research, and improve patient safety. This represents a major
wasted opportunity. With smart regulation, governments can help build public trust in AI
applications and provide clear minimal parameters for designing “whole products.” In the
absence of a forward-looking regulatory framework, otherwise promising solutions may
flame out early.

REINING IN THE REVOLUTION

In 1989, Regina Herzlinger of Harvard Business School argued that a potential revolution in
health care had failed as a result of mismanagement. At the time, “profound changes in
technology, in population characteristics, and in social expectations” had led many to believe
that the US health-care system could be transformed for the better.

But those leading the revolution, Herzlinger writes, “were so blinded by the vision of the
dazzling new world they hoped to forge that they neglected the details of management that
would breathe life into their vision.” Like some in AI today, they overestimated the rewards
of new applications, while discounting the potential costs.

Fortunately, those leading the AI revolution in health care still have time to adjust course. To
that end, they should adopt a demand-driven approach to innovation, so that lead users are
involved directly in the design and testing of solutions under quasi-clinical conditions. This
strategy would ensure that users’ needs are actually being met, while preventing the Icarus-
like rise and fall of new AI applications predicted by Scott’s Parabola.

Finally, governments, too, must step up as regulators. The medical-device failures of recent
years should serve as a wake-up call. Before the AI revolution gains further momentum, we
need stricter standards and a system for monitoring the effects of new technologies on
individual and public health. Otherwise, the opportunity to reform a sector that desperately
needs it will be lost once again.

SAMI MAHROUM
Writing for PS since 2012
17 Commentaries

Sami Mahroum is Senior Lecturer at INSEAD, an advisor to the Future Society's AI Initiative, a
member of the WEF Regional Strategy Group for the Middle East and North Africa, and Non-Resident
Fellow at The Lisbon Council. He is the author of Black Swan Start-ups: Understanding the Rise of
Successful Technology Business in Unlikely Places.

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