Roberto Soriano vs. Atty.

Manuel Dizon
AC 6792
January 25, 2006

FACTS: Atty. Manuel Dizon was driving his car under the influence of liquor
when along Abanao Street, Baguio City, a taxi driver overtook him. Incensed,
Dizon tailed the taxi, pulled it over, and berated Roberto Soriano, the taxi driver,
and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, Soriano forced open his door,
causing Dizon to fall to the ground. Soriano tried to help Dizon get up, but the
latter was about to punch him so Soriano punched Dizon first to fend off an
impending attack. Soriano prevented another attempt by Dizon to hit him. Dizon
went back to his car and got his revolver with the handle wrapped in a
handkerchief. As Soriano was handing Dizon’s eyeglasses, which he just picked up
from the pavement, Dizon fired and shot him. Soriano fell on the thigh of the
accused, and the latter merely pushed him out and sped off. The bullet hit Soriano’s
neck and lacerated his carotid artery. According to the doctors who treated him, he
would have died if not for the timely medical assistance. Soriano sustained spinal
cord injury causing the left side of his body to be paralyzed, disabling him for his
job as a taxi driver.

Dizon was eventually convicted for frustrated homicide but was allowed probation,
conditioned on payment of civil liabilities. However, four years after judgment was
rendered, Dizon has not yet fulfilled his civil obligation.

Soriano filed complaint before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP for
Dizon’s disbarment. The Commissioner of the CBD recommended that respondent
be disbarred for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and
for violating Rule. 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
IBP adopted the recommendation of the CBD and sent their resolution to the
Supreme Court for review.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the crime of frustrated homicide committed by Atty. Dizon
involved moral turpitude.
2. Whether or not Atty. Dizon’s guilt warrants his disbarment.
HELD:
1. The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the CBD that the crime of
frustrated homicide committed by Atty. Dizon involved moral turpitude. The
court defined moral turpitude as “everything which is done contrary to
justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in
the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society
in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” Moral
turpitude was shown when Atty. Dizon shot a taxi driver for no justifiable
reason. His act definitely did not constitute self-defense. It was he who was
the aggressor because he first tried to punch Soriano. The latter was merely
defending himself when he counterpunched Dizon. Moreover, Dizon’s act
was aggravated with treachery when he shot Soriano when the latter was not
in a position to defend himself. Soriano was handing Dizon’s eyeglasses,
which he just picked up, when he was shot. Furthermore, Dizon tried to
escape punishment by wrapping the handle of his gun in handkerchief in
order not to leave fingerprints on the gun used. Dizon’s violent reaction to a
simple traffic incident indicated his skewed morals.

2. The Supreme Court held that Dizon also violated Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that “A lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.” Dizon failed to obey the laws of the land through his illegal
possession of an unlicensed firearm. He failed to respect legal processes
through his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities, the condition for his
probation.

Dizon also violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,

which provides that “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.” Dizon’s violation was exhibited when he
tried to reach an out-of-court settlement with the family of Soriano but when
the negotiations failed, he made it appear as if it was the family who
approached him to get a referral to a neurosurgeon. In addition, Dizon
fabricated a story that it was Soriano and two other persons who mauled
him. According to the three doctors who examined Dizon, his injuries were
so minor that his allegation was so improbable.

The court ruled that the appalling treachery and brazen dishonesty of
respondent clearly showed his unfitness to continue as a member of the bar.
Membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree
of good moral character, which is not only a condition precedent to
admission, but also a continuing requirement for the practice of law. While
the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that
disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would
accomplish the end desired, the court held that meting out a lesser penalty
would be irreconcilable with the lofty aspiration that every lawyer be a
shining exemplar of truth and justice. Atty. Dizon was disbarred.
In Re: Felipe Del Rosario
August 12, 2012

FACTS: Felipe Del Rosario took the bar in 1925 for the second time and he failed.
He again took it in 1926 and he failed again. In 1927, he filed a motion before the
Supreme Court in which he alleged that there was a mistake in the computation of
his exam results in the 1925 bar exams. He was then admitted to the bar.

HOWEVER, a subsequent investigation by the city fiscal uncovered that Del

Rosario, together with one Juan Villaflor – a former employee of the Supreme
Court, falsified some documents to make it appear that Del Rosario actually passed
the 1925 bar exams. The two were subsequently charged with falsification.
Villaflor was convicted as he pleaded guilty but Del Rosario was acquitted for lack
of evidence. The fiscal however recommended Del Rosario to surrender his
certificate of attorney.

ISSUE: Whether or not the recommendation by the fiscal is correct.

HELD: Yes. The mere fact that Villaflor was convicted proves that Del Rosario is
unworthy of the certificate of attorney. The crime which Villaflor is proven guilty
of has benefited only Del Rosario and it is impossible that the latter has no
knowledge of this illegal machination.

But shouldn’t the Supreme Court just allow Del Rosario to take the bar exams
again?

No. The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted everyone who
demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound
discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which
merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a
disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an
officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to
permit him to hold himself out as a duly authorized member of the bar.
Nunez v Ricafort (382 SCRA 381)
Facts:
An administrative complaint was by Soledad Nuñez, a septuagenarian represented
by her attorney-in-fact Ananias B. Co, Jr., seeking the disbarment of Atty. Romulo
Ricafort on the ground of grave misconduct.
Sometime in October 1982, Soledad authorized Atty. Ricafort to sell her two
parcels of land located in Legazpi City for P40,000. She agreed to the lawyer 10%
of the price as commission. Atty. Ricafort succeeded in selling the lots, but despite
Soledad’s repeated demands, he did not turn over the proceeds of the sale. This
forced Soledad to file an action for a sum of money before the RTC, Quezon City.
The court rendered its decision ordering the Atty. to pay Soledad the sum of
P16,000 as principal obligation, with at the legal rate from the date of the
commencement of the action.
An appeal to the CA was made. However, the appeal was dismissed for failure to
pay the required docket fee within the reglementary period despite notice.
Soledad filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution. But it appears
that only a partial satisfaction of the P16,000 judgment was made, leaving P13,800
unsatisfied. In payment for the latter, Atty. issued four postdated checks but was
dishonored because the account against which they were drawn was closed.
Hence, Soledad was forced to file four criminal complaints for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 before the MTC, Quezon City.
In a joint affidavit, Atty. Ricafort admitted having drawn and issued said four
postdated checks in favor of Soledad. Allegedly believing in good faith that said
checks had already been encashed by Soledad, he subsequently closed his checking
account in China Banking Corporation, Legazpi City, from which said four checks
were drawn. He was not notified that the checks were dishonored. Had he been
notified, he would have made the necessary arrangements with the bank.
The court required Atty. to comment on the complaint. But he never did despite the
favorable action on his three motions for extension of time to file the comment. His
failure to do so compelled Soledad to file a motion to cite Atty. in contempt on the
ground that his strategy to file piecemeal motions for extension of time to submit
the comment “smacks of a delaying tactic scheme that is unworthy of a member of
the bar and a law dean.”
The IBP findings show that the Atty. had no intention to “honor” the money
judgment against him. It recommended that Atty. be declared “guilty of misconduct
in his dealings with complainant” and be suspended from the practice of law for at
least one year and pay the amount of the checks issued to the complainant.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings
with complainant.
Held:
YES. There is a blatant violation of Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
By violating Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.
diminished public confidence in the law and the lawyers. Instead of promoting
such confidence and respect, he miserably failed to live up to the standards of the
legal profession.
His act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for
money judgment rendered by the trial court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends
of justice. His failure to make good the checks despite demands and the criminal
cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 showed his continued defiance of judicial
processes, which he, as an officer of the court, was under continuing duty to
uphold.
To further demonstrate his very low regard for the courts and judicial processes, he
even had the temerity of making a mockery of the court’s generosity to him. We
granted his three motions for extension of time to file his comment on the
complaint in this case. Yet, not only did he fail to file the comment, he as well did
not even bother to explain such failure notwithstanding our resolution declaring
him as having waived the filing of the comment. To the SC, Atty. openly showed a
high degree of irresponsibility amounting to willful disobedience to its lawful
orders.
Atty. Ricafort then knowingly and willfully violated Rules 12.04 and 12:03 of
Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility stating that:
Lawyers should avoid any action that would unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse court processes; and that lawyers, after
obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, should not let
the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for their
failure to do so.
The SC indefinitely suspended Atty. Ricafort from the practice of law and directed
to pay Soledad P13,800.
In re: 2003 Bar Examinations
B.M. No. 1222, February 4, 2004.

Per Curiam

FACTS:

On September 22, 2003, there was a rumored leakage in the bar examination on the
Mercantile Law subject. Investigation was lead back to the office of Atty. Marcial
O.T. Balgos, then Mercantile Law Examiner, where the leakage started. Allegedly,
Atty. Danilo de Guzman (assistant lawyer in the firm of Balgos and Perez) stole a
copy of Atty. Balgos’ file on Mercantile Law with the proposed test items, and the
former sent it to some members of the Beta Sigma Lambda Fraternity.

ISSUE:

WON Atty. Balgos and Atty. de Guzman are guilty of gross misconduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar.

RULING:

Yes. De Guzman abetted cheating or dishonesty by his fraternity brothers in the

examination, which is violative of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, as well as Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the Bar. As for Atty. Balgos’
negligence, if he had taken those simple precautions to protect the secrecy of his
papers, nobody could have stolen them and copied and circulated them. The
integrity of the bar examinations would not have been sullied by the scandal.
Alfredo Bon vs. Atty. Victor S. Ziga and Atty. Antonio A. Arcangel, A.C. No.
5436, May 27, 2004

Facts:
According to the complainant, the Bons signed the Waiver and Quitclaim
because of Atty. Ziga’s representation that the document was merely a withdrawal
of a previously executed Special Power of Attorney. As it turned out, however, the
document was a waiver in favor of Ziga of all the properties which the Bons
inherited from their parents and predecessors-in-interest.

Atty. Arcangel’s part, he explained that assuming that he notarized the

Waiver and Quitclaim in the absence of the signatories, his act is merely a violation
of the Notarial Law but not a ground for disbarment. He further avers that he was
able to talk to Maria Bon and Rafael Bon-Canafe, both co-signatories to the
document, over the phone. Maria Bon and Rafael Bon-Canafe allegedly declared
that they signed the Waiver and Quitclaim. The two, in fact, personally delivered
the document for notarization in his office. Thus, he posits that there was
substantial compliance with the Notarial Law since a notary public’s primordial
undertaking is merely to ensure that the signatures on a document are genuine. As
long as they are so, the notary public can allegedly take the risk of notarizing the
document although the signatories are not present.

Issue: Whether or not Respondents fraudulently executed the Waiver and

Quitclaim.

Held:
Atty. Ziga, on his part, is not culpable. The fact that Amalia and Angelina
Bon are both high school graduates, while Teresa Bon is a college graduate makes
it difficult to believe that they were deceived into thinking that the contents of the
Waiver and Quitclaim, which is plainly worded, were other than what they
themselves could have easily ascertained from a reading of the document. The
complaintagainst him is thus, dismissed for lack of merit.
 Atty. Arcangel, however, in notarizing the Waiver and Quitclaim without
requiring all the persons who executed the document to personally appear before
him and acknowledge that the same is their free act and deed, manifestly breached
his duty as a notary public.

Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested

with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document
into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith
and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large
must be able to rely upon the acknowledgement executed by a notary public and
appended to a private instrument. For this reason, notaries public must observe
with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance
would be undermined.
GONZALES VS RAMOS
A.C. No. 6649 /June 21, 2005

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts:

Complaint for disbarment filed by Marina C. Gonzales (P) against Atty. Calixto
B. Ramos (C) because of the latter’s alleged misconduct in notarizing a Deed of
Absolute Sale involving the complainant.

C’s allegation: there was a sale wherein, C and his husband allegedly sold a
piece of land with a building thereon to spouses Henry and Mila Gatus. Due to the
execution of the Deed of Sale, the Sps Ramos’ TCT was cancelled and a new one
was issued in the name of Sps Gatus. C maintained that they (C and his husband)
never appeared before the respondent to acknowledge the Deed of Sale.

P’s defense: At first, he was hesitant to notarize the document because he did
not see the complainant sign the same, but due to Francisco’s insistence and
knowing them personally, he eventually notarized the deed.
Respondent compared the signatures of Marina C. Gonzales on the Deed of
Absolute Sale with her other signatures in his files, the spouses Gonzales being his
clients from way back. Convinced that the signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale
was indeed the signature of complainant Marina C. Gonzales, respondent notarized
the Deed of Absolute Sale on March 27, 1996.
During the mandatory conference before the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the IBP, the respondent admitted that the complainant never appeared before him to
affirm the genuineness and authenticity of her signature in the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated March 27, 1996.
Commission on Bar Discipline and IBP ruled against C (suspension).
Ruling: Affirmed CBP and IBP.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed
the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before
the said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.
The presence of the parties to the deed making the acknowledgment will enable the
notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant. A notary
public is enjoined from notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. The function
of a notary public, is among others, to guard against any illegal deed.[14]
 By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, the respondent converted the
Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private document into a public document. Such act
is no empty gesture. The principal function of a notary public is to authenticate
documents. When a notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of a
document under his hand and seal, he gives the document the force of evidence.
Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring documents to be acknowledged before a
notary public, in addition to the solemnity which should surround the execution
and delivery of documents, is to authorize such documents to be given without
further proof of their execution and delivery. A notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and
the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgement executed before
a notary public and appended to a private instrument. Hence, a notary public must
discharge his powers and duties, which are impressed with public interest, with
accuracy and fidelity.[15]
The respondent’s act of notarizing the acknowledgment of a deed of sale even
if one of the signatories therein did not personally appear before him clearly falls
short of the yardstick of accuracy and fidelity referred to above. The respondent
himself admitted his professional shortcomings when he said that all he did to
ascertain the authenticity of the signature of the complainant was to compare her
signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale with her other signatures on pleadings on
file with him. Such conduct of the respondent runs contrary to the express
wordings of the acknowledgment in the deed of sale which provides:
The respondent’s act of notarizing the document despite the non-appearance of
one of the signatories should not be countenanced. His conduct, if left unchecked,
is fraught with dangerous possibilities considering the conclusiveness on the due
execution of a document that our courts and the public accord to notarized
documents. Respondent has clearly failed to exercise utmost diligence in the
performance of his functions as a notary public and to comply with the mandates
of law.
As a lawyer, respondent breached the Code of Professional Responsibility. By
notarizing the questioned deed, he engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.[17] He also committed falsehood and misled or allowed the Court
to be misled by any artifice.[18]
CASTANEDA V. AGO

Facts: Castaneda filed a replevin suit against Ago to recover certain machineries.
Judgment was rendered in favor of Castaneda. Levy was made to Ago’s house.
Writ of possession of Ago’s house was also issued in favor of Castaneda. Ago filed
a writ of preliminary injunction against the writ of possession and sale of his house
based on the fact that his wife wasn’t impleaded and the house was part of their
conjugal partnership. (Apparently they only set up this defense after a lot of
motions and delays. Hence this cause of action is already barred by laches. The
case has been going on for 14 years already)

Issue: WON the act of counsel is valid.

Held: The Court condemns the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,
far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use
them to subvert the very ends of justice. Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn
public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has
allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict
instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of
technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of
truth and moral justice. A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and
honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do
not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his
client's position, as in the case at bar. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client,
ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack
of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his
bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and
temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of
justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.
MUNICIPALITY OF PILILLA, RIZAL vs. COURT OF
APPEALSREGALADO, J.:

Facts: Atty. Felix E. Mendiola served as counsel for the Municipality of Pililia in a
collection suit for unpaid business taxes, storage permit fee, mayor’s permit fee,
sanitary inspection fee, and the cost of the suit against private respondent
Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC). The municipality won in the trial court,
and when PPC elevated the case to the Supreme Court, the SC affirmed the
aforesaid judgment. The judgment became final and executory and the records
were remanded to the trial court for execution.

In connection with the execution of said judgment, Atty. Felix E. Mendiola filed a
motion in behalf of the municipality for the examination of defendant corporation's
gross sales for the years 1976 to 1978 and 1984 to 1991 for the purpose of
computing business tax. Defendant corporation filed a manifestation that Pililla
Mayor Nicomedes Patenia received from it the sum of P11,457,907.00 as full
satisfaction of the above-mentioned judgment of the Supreme Court, as evidence
by the release and quitclaim documents executed by said mayor. The RTC denied
the municipality's motion for examination and execution of judgment on the
ground that the judgment had already been satisfied.

It was when the case was only when the case was brought before to the CA that
respondent PPC filed a motion questioning Atty. Mendiola's authority to represent
petitioner municipality. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for having
been filed by a private counsel in violation of law and jurisprudence, but without
prejudice to the filing of a similar petition by the Municipality of Pililla through
the proper provincial or municipal legal officer.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Mendiola can represent the Municipality of Pilila

Held: No. The Court of Appeals is correct in holding that Atty. Mendiola has no
authority to file a petition in behalf of and in the name of the Municipality of
Pililla. Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Section 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial

subdivisions in litigation. — The provincial fiscal shall represent the
province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court,
except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court
or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in question is a party
adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality or
 municipal district in the same province. When the interests of a provincial
government and of any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial
fiscal shall act on behalf of the province.

When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other

political subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by
its council.

Only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or
municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality's
authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where
the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. The fact that the provincial fiscal
was disqualified to handle the municipality's case must appear on record. In the
case, there is nothing in the records to show that the provincial fiscal is disqualified
to act as counsel for the Municipality of Pililla on appeal, hence the appearance of
herein private counsel is without authority of law.

The submission of Atty. Mendiola that the exception is broad enough to apply to
situations where the provincial fiscal refuses to handle the case cannot be
sustained. The fiscal's refusal to represent the municipality is not a legal
justification. A fiscal cannot refuse to perform his functions on grounds not
provided for by law without violating his oath of office. Instead of engaging the
services of a special attorney, the municipal council should request the Secretary of
Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who
has declined to handle and prosecute its case in court. It should also be noted that
the lack of authority of Atty. Mendiola, was even raised by the municipality itself
in its comment and opposition to said counsel's motion for execution of his lien,
which was filed by the office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal in behalf of said
municipality.

The contention of Atty. Mendiola that private respondent cannot raise for the first
time on appeal his lack of authority to represent the municipality is untenable. The
legality of his representation can be questioned at any stage of the proceedings.
Also, even assuming that the representation of the municipality by Atty. Mendiola
was duly authorized, said authority is deemed to have been revoked by the
municipality when the latter, through the municipal mayor and without said
counsel's participation, entered into a compromise agreement with PPC.

WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED for lack of merit and the judgment
of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
 In re Luis B. Tagorda (1929) (card and letter)

Doctrine: • The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.

Facts: Luis B. Tagorda was an attorney who was elected as the third member of the
provincial board of Isabela. He admits that prior to his election, he made use of a
card2 written in Spanish and Ilocano, which contains a list of tasks he may
undertake as a notary public, and a lawyer, as well as a general invitation to consult
with him for free. Tagorda also admits that after he was elected into office, he
wrote a letter3 to one of his hometown”s barrio lieutenants. The letter basically
informed the recipient of Tagorda”s intention to continue residing in Echague,
despite having to attend board sessions in Ilagan, in order that he may continue to
serve his hometown as a notary public and lawyer. The letter subtly offered
information regarding Tagorda”s office hours, together with an express request that
the recipient spread the word as to his willingness to accept land registration cases
for a fee of P3.00 per title. The government, through the provincial fiscal of
Isabela, together with the Attorney-General, brought this matter to the attention of
the Court.

Issue: 1. W/N Tagorda”s actions constitute malpractice

Held/Ratio: 1. YES. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act

No. 2828 expressly provides that the practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally, or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. This is in accord with the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by
the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canon 27 of the said document provides
that a well-merited reputation serves as a lawyer”s most effective form of
advertisement.
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME
“SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO".
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME
“SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO.”
July 30, 1979

Facts:
Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died
on May 5, 1975 and by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died
on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names
of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away.
Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former
partner when permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken
that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use. They also contend
that no local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner’s name in a
professional firm’s name; there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least
in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm
necessarily identifies the individual members of the firm.
Issue:
WON the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the name of the
partners who already passed away in the name of the firm? NO

Held:
In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation, the SC
said:
The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the
relations between attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the
canons of professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a
remote degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are
accordingly advised to drop the names of the deceased partners from their firm
name.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue
advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer
without connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch.
Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm’s
reputation established by deceased partners.
The court also made the difference from the law firms and business corporations:
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or
association for a particular purpose. … It is not a partnership formed for the
purpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding property.” Thus, it has been
stated that “the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is
improper.
We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite
to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a
matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of
adjudication as a juridical custom.
Petition suffers legal and ethical impediment.
Dacanay vs Baker & McKenzie et al
August 2, 2012

FACTS: In November 1979, Atty. Vicente Torres sent a letter to one Rosie
Clurman, represented by Atty. Adriano Dacanay, asking Clurman to release some
shares to Torres’ client. The letterhead contained the name “Baker & McKenzie”.
Dacanay denied Clurman’s liability and at the same time he asked why is Torres
using the letterhead “Baker & McKenzie”, a foreign partnership established in
Chicago, Illinois. No reply was received so Dacanay filed an administrative
complaint enjoining Torres from using “Baker & McKenzie”.

Later, Torres said that he is an associate of the law firm Guerrero & Torres; that
their law firm is a member of Baker & McKenzie; that the said foreign firm has
members in 30 cities all over the world; that they associated with them in order to
make a representation that they can render legal services of the highest quality to
multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and
investment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the use of a foreign law office name is allowed.

HELD: No. Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in
the Philippines. Such use of foreign law firm name is unethical therefore Torres
and his law firm are enjoined from using “Baker & McKenzie” in their practice of
law.
Director of Religious Affairs vs Estanislao Bayot
July 30, 2012

FACTS: In June 1943, Bayot advertised in a newspaper that he helps people in

securing marriage licenses; that he does so avoiding delays and publicity; that he
also makes marriage arrangements; that legal consultations are free for the poor;
and that everything is confidential. The Director of Religious Affairs took notice of
the ad and so he sued Bayot for Malpractice.

Bayot initially denied having published the advertisement. But later, he admitted
the same and asked for the court’s mercy as he promised to never repeat the act
again.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bayot is guilty of Malpractice.

HELD: Yes. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that
“the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.” The advertisement he caused
to be published is a brazen solicitation of business from the public. .” It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises
his wares. The Supreme Court again emphasized that best advertisement for a
lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust. But because of Bayot’s plea for leniency and his promise and
the fact that he did not earn any case by reason of the ad, the Supreme Court
merely reprimanded him.
JOSE P. UY and RIZALINA C. UY, Complainants, v. HON. JUDGE
TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, Respondent
A.M. No. RTJ-91-766. April 7, 1993.

The Case:
JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, Metro Manila, is charged 1 with gross
incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct in a complaint
filed on 15 November 1991 with the Office of the Court Administrator by the
spouses Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy, relative to Special Proceedings No. 335-V-
88 for settlement of the estate of the late Ambrocio C. Pingco

Facts:
The records show that on 21 November 1988, a certain Herminia R. Alvos,
claiming to be a niece of Paz Ramirez, surviving spouse of the late Ambrocio C.
Pingco, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela a petition for settlement
of the estate of Ambrocio C. Pingco. Respondent Judge appointed said Herminia R.
Alvos special administratrix under Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.
Counsel for the special administratrix filed an urgent motion stating that
sometime in February 1978 two (2) parcels of land belonging to the late Ambrocio
C. Pingco and his wife covered by TCT Nos. 7537 and 75101 had been sold to
complainants Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy who registered the sale with the
Register of Deeds of Manila in February 1989. Consequently, counsel requested
the court to direct the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela to "freeze any transaction
without the signature of Herminia Alvos" involving the properties covered by TCT
Nos. B-15345 to B-15352, B-15354 to B-15359, TCT Nos. T39565, T-50276, T-
52754, T-220168, TCT. Nos. T-7537 and 75101. Respondent Judge granted the
motion. The Register of Deeds of Valenzuela reported to the court informing the
latter that a deed of absolute sale executed by the spouses Ambrocio C. Pingco and
Paz Ramirez dated 9 December 1978 was filed with the Register of Deeds,
describing therein fifteen (15) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. B-15345 to B-
15352, B-15354 to B-15359, and B-163276; that, by virtue of the deed of sale, new
transfer certificates of title were issued in the name of complainants Jose P. Uy and
Rizalina C. Uy, except for TCT No. B-163276 which could not be located in the
Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City; that TCT Nos. T-50276 and 52754 were still
registered in the name of Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez, and, that the status
of TCT Nos. T-39565 and T-220168, which were with the Registry of Deeds of
Caloocan, could not yet be determined. Counsel for the special administratrix filed
with the court an urgent motion to cancel the titles issued in the name of Jose P. Uy
stating that the latter was able to register the titles in his name in February 1989
through fraud, and the signatures of the vendors on the deed of sale were forged.
Respondent Judge ordered the cancellation of the titles and the reinstatement of the
names of the spouses Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez or the issuance of new
titles in their names.
Complainant Jose P. Uy filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to annul
the Order of 7 June 1989 of respondent Judge, with prayer for a temporary
restraining order enjoining the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela from implementing
the Order of 7 June 1989, and that respondent Judge be restrained from further
proceeding against him. The Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari
and prohibition of complainants and set aside the Order of 7 June 1989 of
respondent Judge, and enjoined her from proceeding against complainant Jose P.
Uy in the intestate proceedings. MR was filed by Alvos but the same was denied.
Alvos then filed with Us a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, docketed as G.R. No. 91092.
On 6 February 1990, respondent Judge approved a project of partition dated
18 August 1990 submitted by Special Administratrix Herminia R. Alvos, together
with Paz Ramirez (surviving spouse of Ambrocio C. Pingco) and Alicia
Alinsunurin. On 4 February 1991, respondent Judge granted the ex-parte petition
of the Special Administratrix for approval of the deed of absolute sale of the
parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. B-15350, B-15351, B-15348 and B-15349.
Instead of complying with the Decision of the Court of Appeals, respondent Judge
directed the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela to comply with her own Order of 16
January 1991 cancelling the titles of the Pingcos and ordering the issuance of new
titles in accordance with the project of partition she obstinately approved.
On 8 March 1991, in G.R. No. 91092, We affirmed the Decision of the Court
of Appeals which annulled and set aside the Order of 7 June 1989 of respondent
Judge. Thus —
"We find no merit in the petition. Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court simply
provides that a person who is suspected of having in his possession property
belonging to an estate, may be cited and the court may examine him under oath on
the matter. Said section nowhere gives the court the power to determine the
question of ownership of such property. Furthermore, the declaration of nullity of
the sale of a parcel of land under administration and the consequent cancellation
of the certificate of title issued in favor of the vendee, cannot be obtained through
a mere motion in the probate proceedings over the objection of said vendee over
whom the probate court has no jurisdiction. To recover the property, an
independent action against the vendee must be instituted in the proper court"
(citing Tagle, Et. Al. v. Manalo Et. Al., 105 Phil 1124).

On 2 April 1991, respondent Judge, in utter disregard of Our Resolution of

March 1991, granted the ex-parte petition of the Special Administratrix for
approval of the deed of absolute sale of properties covered by TCT Nos. B-15345
and B-15346 of the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela and reiterated the rationale of
her questioned Order of 4 February 1991. On 29 April 1991, undaunted by her
reversal by the Court of Appeals and this Court, and in blatant disobedience to
judicial authority, and established precedents and jurisprudence, respondent Judge
again granted an ex-parte petition of the Special Administratrix for approval of
another deed of absolute sale covering three (3) more parcels of land originally
titled in the name of complainant Jose P. Uy, to wit: TCT Nos. B-15347, B-15355
and B-15356.
In their complaint, the spouses Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy claimed that
despite the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 28 September 1989 and the
pendency of the petition for review by way of certiorari before this Court,
respondent Judge continued issuing various orders resulting in the issuance of new
titles to the properties in the name of persons stated in the project of partition, to
the damage and prejudice of complainants and that even after this Court had
affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent Judge had no
jurisdiction to entertain further proceedings concerning the ownership of the
properties, respondent Judge still, in an attempt to defeat the proscription imposed
by higher judicial authority, issued, orders approving the sale of the properties to
the further prejudice of complainants.
In her comment, respondent Judge alleges that the filing of the complaint
against her is merely to harass her. While she admits that her Order of 7 June 1989
was annulled and set aside by the Court of Appeals, which annulment was affirmed
by this Court, she argues that no temporary restraining order was issued and that
before the Decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated her Order of 7 June
1989 was already complied with by the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela. She
further contends that even as she was prohibited from proceeding against
complainants herein, the Court of Appeals did not order the reversion of the titles
to them.
Issue:
Whether or not the contention of respondent judge is meritorious.
Ruling:
No. We are far from persuaded by respondent Judge.
Time and again We emphasize that the judge is the visible representation of
law and justice from whom the people draw their will and awareness to obey the
law. For the judge to return that regard, the latter must be the first to abide by the
law and weave an example for the others to follow. The judge should be studiously
careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law. 6 To fulfill this mission, the
judge should keep abreast of the law, the rulings and doctrines of this Court. 7 If
the judge is already aware of them, the latter should not deliberately refrain from
applying them, otherwise such omission can never be excused. Every judge should
be cognizant of the basic principle that when questions arise as to ownership of
property alleged to be part of the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some
other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such questions
cannot be determined in the courts of administration proceedings. The trial court,
acting as probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which
must be submitted to the trial court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. 9 The
failure of respondent judge to apply this basic principle indicates a manifest
disregard of well-known legal rules.
Elementary in our statutory law is the doctrine that when title to land has
already been registered and the certificate of title thereto issued, such Torrens title
cannot be collaterally attacked because the issue on the validity of the title can only
be raised in an action instituted expressly for the purpose. Corollary to this is the
constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of his property without due
process of law. In cancelling the titles of complainants over their properties on
mere motion of a party and without affording them due process, respondent Judge
violated her sworn obligation to uphold the law and promote the administration of
justice. It has been held that if the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as
if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
The foregoing transgressions of respondent Judge are further aggravated by
her refusal to abide by the Decision of the Court of Appeals annulling her Order of
7 June 1989 which directed the cancellation of the titles of complainants. She was
in fact specifically enjoined from proceeding against them, yet, despite this
Decision, respondent Judge skill authorized the subsequent transfer or alienation to
other persons of properties titled in the name of complainants to the detriment of
the latter. This utter disrespect for the judgment of a higher court constitutes grave
misconduct prejudicial to the interest of the public, the bench and the bar. The
absence of a temporary restraining order or an order from the Court of Appeals to
revert the titles to complainants is not sufficient justification for respondent Judge
to issue subsequent orders contrary to the appellate court’s proscription. Certainly,
respondent Judge is fully aware that the necessary consequence of the appellate
court’s decision is to put back the complainants to their former status prior to the
issuance of the annulled order. Consequently, the Order of 7 June 1989 being void
and of no effect, the ownership of the properties subject of the settlement
proceedings remains vested in complainants and will continue to be so until
declared void in an appropriate proceeding, not in the intestate proceedings before
respondent Judge. Thus, an order from the appellate court that will revert the titles
to complainants is not necessary as it is already implied from its decision annulling
the questioned cancellation.
OMAR P. ALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent.
A.C. No. 4018. March 8, 2005

FACTS: This is a verified petition for disbarment filed against Atty. Mosib Ali
Bubong for having been found guilty of grave misconduct while holding the
position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City. It appears that this disbarment
proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by complainant
against respondent, which was initially investigated by the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction;
indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT); and manipulating
the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for
violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the records that the Baudali
Datus are relatives of respondent. The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in
favor of respondent, absolved respondent of all the charges brought against him.
The case was then forwarded to the DOJ for review, then SoJ Franklin Drilon
exonerated respondent of the charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in the
custody of documents, but held guilty of grave misconduct for his imprudent
issuance of TCT and manipulating the criminal case for violation of the Anti-
Squatting Law instituted against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the latter’s co-
accused. As a result of this finding, former President FVR issued AO No. 41
adopting in toto the conclusion reached by Secretary Drilon. Respondent
questioned said AO before this Court through a petition for certiorari, mandamus,
and prohibition claiming that the Office of the President did not have the authority
and jurisdiction to remove him from office and insisted that respondents violated
the laws on security of tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the
administrator of the LRA committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he
abdicated his authority to resolve the administrative complaint against him (herein
respondent), but was dismissed for failure on the part of petitioner to sufficiently
show that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
questioned order. Respondent MR was denied with finality. On the disbarment
proceeding, complainant claims that it has become obvious that respondent had
proven himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of an attorney and that
he poses a serious threat to the integrity of the legal profession. Respondent
maintains that there was nothing irregular with his issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in
the name of the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law and jurisprudence
support his stance that it was his ministerial duty, as the Register of Deeds of
Marawi City, to act on applications for land registration on the basis only of the
documents presented by the applicants. In the case of the Bauduli Datus, nothing in
the documents they presented to his office warranted suspicion, hence, he was
duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their favor. Respondent also insists that he
had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal complaint for violation of the
Anti-Squatting Law and explains that his participation in said case was a result of
the two subpoenas duces tecum issued by the investigating prosecutor who
required him to produce the various land titles involved in said dispute. The IBP
commenced the investigation of this disbarment suit. On 23 February 1996,
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez denied the order relative to the transfer of
venue of this case and penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of
Deeds of Marawi City. The finding of Grave Misconduct on the part of respondent
by the Office of the President was fully supported by evidence and as such carries
a very strong weight in considering the professional misconduct of respondent in
the present case. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved, with
modification, which pertained solely to the period of suspension from the practice
of law from a five-year suspension to a two-year suspension to be proper. On 17
January 2003, respondent MR was denied as by that time, the matter had already
been endorsed to this Court.

ISSUE: WON respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while
he was in the employ of the government.

RULING: We resolve this question in the affirmative. The Code of Professional

Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the
government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules
governing the conduct of lawyers shall apply to lawyers in government service in
the discharge of their official tasks. Thus, where a lawyer’s misconduct as a
government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to
show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on
such grounds. Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government
office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he committed
as a government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his
misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the legal profession. In
the case at bar, respondents grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the
President and subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a
lawyer. By taking advantage of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City
and employing his knowledge of the rules governing land registration for the
benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only
to perform the functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the
bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter.
It reads: Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public
position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere
with his public duties. Respondents conduct manifestly undermined the people’s
confidence in the public office he used to occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of
the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of
the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.
As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainants daughter, requesting
for the withdrawal of this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as
proceedings of this nature cannot be interrupted or terminated by reason of
desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or
failure of the complainant to prosecute the same. As we have previously explained
in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos: A case of suspension
or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the
record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven.
This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for
suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant
is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for
the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons
unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his
conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the
attention of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and
has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the
proper administrative of justice. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A.
Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys.
Fortunato Suarez vs Servillano Platon
August 4, 2012

FACTS: In May 1935, Atty. Fortunato Suarez was riding a train on his way to
Calauag, Tayabas. Apparently he was very vocal and he was despising the abuses
made by government officers. Incidentally, Lieutenant Vivencio Orais was aboard
the train. Orais arrested Suarez and charged him with sedition. Orais however later
moved for the dismissal of the case upon the instruction of his superior. Thereafter,
Suarez filed a case against Orais for arbitrary detention. Provincial Fiscal Ramon
Valdez moved for the dismissal of the case due to insufficiency of evidence. Suarez
asked Valdez to inhibit and later asked for a special prosecutor to take his place as
he alleged that Valdez does not have the courage to prosecute the case. Valdez was
then replaced by special prosecutor Jacinto Yamzon who also found that there is
insufficient evidence to prosecute the case. Eventually, the case was dismissed by
Judge Servillano Platon on the ground that there is insufficiency of evidence.
Suarez appealed the dismissal of the case but his appeal was denied on the ground
that mandamus is the proper remedy. Hence, Suarez filed this Mandamus case to
compel Platon to reinstate the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be reinstated.

HELD: No. The fiscals are well within their rights not to push through with the
case if they find the evidence to be insufficient. The prosecuting officer is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite
sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape
or innocence shall suffer.
PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered
financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to
Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its
current account with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to
recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution declaring
GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors,
creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of
GENBANK’s assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid.
Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the
assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by
RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover
the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies.
Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for
reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG
issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them by
taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former Pres.
Marcos. The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their
counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify
respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It
was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively
intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently acquired by
respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking Corporation.
The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers from accepting
“engagement” or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the said service. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
denyting PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the
existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as
SolGen and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs
recourse to this court assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
respondent Mendoza. The prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.”

HELD

The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03.
Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he
acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents et.al. before the
Sandiganbayan. However there is still the issue of whether there exists a
“congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from
representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of “matter” and
the metes and bounds of “intervention” that he made on the matter. Beyond doubt
that the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case
at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s
liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila. The
Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to
liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that
“drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations
and laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the
scope of the term “matter” and cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had
nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He
also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of
the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the
jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks.
Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to
respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while SolGen is an
intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil case of
sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”. The applicable
meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics is that it is an act of
a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. The evil sought
to be remedied by the Code do not exist where the government lawyer does not act
which can be considered as innocuous such as “ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract
principles of law.” The court rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not
significant and substantial. He merely petitions that the court gives assistance in
the liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of justice
but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In
such a proceeding the role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator
protecting the interest of government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.
Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “ A
lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ, should
not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any matter which he
has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.”
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a
vehicle to promote or advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure on
certain matters in which he intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03 makes this
restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held public office.” A plain
reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who once served in the
government and 2. relates to his accepting “engagement or employment” in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the service.