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Project:
Final Element Configurations
Customer:
Siemens
Spring House, PA
USA
The document was prepared using best effort. The authors make no warranty of any kind and shall not be liable in
any event for incidental or consequential damages in connection with the application of the document.
© All rights reserved.
Management summary
This report summarizes the results of safety analyses on two final element configurations. In
both configurations an analog output on the PCS7 controls a digital valve positioner which
controls the air supply to the air-operated ball valve. Using the PCS7, partial valve stroke testing
of the air-operated ball valve is performed frequently.
In the first configuration an analog output of the PCS7 controls the digital valve positioner which
controls the air supply to the pneumatic actuator that activates the ball valve. In addition a digital
output of the S7F safety PLC controls a solenoid which is piped in series with the air supply
going to the actuator. In this configuration, the safety function part of the final element
configuration consists of the generic 3-way solenoid and the generic air-operated ball valve. The
PCS7 and digital valve positioner are not part of the safety function.
In the second configuration an analog output of the PCS7 controls the digital valve positioner
which controls the air supply to the pneumatic actuator that activates the ball valve. A relay is in
line with the analog output from the PSC7 to the digital valve positioner and can interrupt the
analog output signal. The relay is controlled by a digital output on the S7F safety PLC. For this
configuration, the safety function part of the final element configuration consists of the relay,
digital valve positioner and generic air-operated ball valve.
For the two final element configurations the average Probability of Failure on Demand (PFDAVG),
and Mean Time To Fail Spurious (MTTFS) are calculated for various proof test intervals. The
results are shown in Table 1.
Table 1 Final Element Configuration with Solenoid
PFDAVG
Proof Test Interval
Configuration with solenoid Configuration with relay
-3
1 year 6.27·10 3.89·10-3
2 years 1.13·10-2 6.98·10-3
3 years 1.62·10-2 1.01·10-2
4 years 2.11·10-2 1.31·10-2
5 years 3.09·10-2 1.93·10-2
This configuration with the generic 3-way solenoid has a Safe Failure Fraction of 67.0% and a
Mean Time To Fail Spurious (MTTFS) of 30 years.
The final element configuration using the generic relay to interrupt the analog signal to the
digital valve controller has a Safe Failure Fraction of 72.3% and a MTTFS of 35 years.
These results must be considered in combination with PFDAVG values of other devices of a
Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) in order to determine suitability for a specific Safety Integrity
Level (SIL).
S7F Safety
PLC
PCS7
S
Digital
valve Pneumatic
I/A Actuator
positioner
Solenoid
Ball
valve
In the second configuration (see Figure 2) an analog output of the PCS7 controls the digital
valve positioner which controls the air supply to the pneumatic actuator that activates the ball
valve. A relay is inline with the analog output from the PSC7 to the digital valve positioner and
can interrupt the analog output signal. The relay is controlled by a digital output on the S7F
safety PLC. For this configuration, the safety function part of the final element configuration
consists of the relay, digital valve positioner and generic air-operated ball valve.
S7F Safety
PLC
PCS7 relay
Digital
I/A valve Pneumatic
positioner Actuator
Ball
valve
2.1 Assumptions
The following assumptions were made during the reliability analysis of the final element
configurations:
• The application is de-energize-to-trip, i.e. the safety function’s action is to de-energize
the relay or the solenoid, which removes air from the actuator which causes the valve to
close
• The frequency at which the digital valve positioner performs a partial valve stroke is an
order of magnitude greater than the demand frequency. Therefore the partial valve
stroke can be considered an automatic self-diagnostic for the final element configuration
• To the digital valve positioner “clean air” is supplied per manufacturers instructions
• Online repair of all devices in the final element configurations takes 8 hours
• Startup of the process after a nuisance trip takes 24 hours
• The following proof test interval have been considered: 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years,
and 5 years
A comparison of the final element configuration with relay and the final element configuration
with solenoid is shown in Figure 3.
3.50E-02
3.00E-02
2.50E-02
Probability
2.00E-02
Conf i gur at i on wi t h s ol enoi d
Conf i gur at i on wi t h r el ay
1.50E-02
1.00E-02
5.00E-03
0.00E+00
0 1 2 3 4 5
Years
Type A component “Non-Complex” component (using discrete elements); for details see
7.4.3.1.3 of IEC 61508-2
Type B component “Complex” component (using micro controllers or programmable logic);
for details see 7.4.3.1.3 of IEC 61508-2
5.1 Liability
exida.com prepares safety analysis reports based on methods advocated in International
standards. Failure rates are obtained from a collection of industrial databases. exida.com
accepts no liability whatsoever for the use of these numbers or for the correctness of the
standards on which the general calculation methods are based.
5.2 Releases
Version: V1
Revision: R1.0
Version History: V1, R1.0: Released to Siemens; October 1, 2004
Authors: William M. Goble – Rachel Amkreutz
Review: V0, R1.0: Iwan van Beurden (exida.com); October 1, 2004
Release status: released
Device λDD [hr-1] λDU [hr-1] λSD [hr-1] λSU [hr-1] Source
The failure rates for the digital valve positioner and the generic air operated ball valve reflect
partial valve stroke testing at a high frequency (more than 10 times the demand rate) and a
partial valve stroke testing coverage of 70%.
Overall failure rates for the final element configuration that consists of the generic 3-way
solenoid and generic ball valve:
λSD = 1.65·10-07 [hr-1]
λSU = 2.20·10-6 [hr-1]
λDD = 5.60·10-07 [hr-1]
λDU = 1.44·10-06 [hr-1]
The Safe Failure Fraction (SFF) for this configuration is 67.0%
Overall failure rates for the final element configuration that consists of the generic relay, digital
valve positioner and the generic ball valve:
λSD = 1.65·10-07 [hr-1]
λSU = 1.60·10-06 [hr-1]
λDD = 5.60·10-07 [hr-1]
λDU = 8.90·10-07 [hr-1]
The Safe Failure Fraction (SFF) for this configuration is 72.3%