Você está na página 1de 11


Blandina Hilado vs Jose Gutierrez David


In April 1945, Blandina Hilado filed a complaint to have some deeds of sale annulled against Selim Assad. Attorney
Delgado Dizon represented Hilado. Assad was represented by a certain Atty. Ohnick.

In January 1946, Atty. Vicente Francisco replaced Atty. Ohnick as counsel for Assad and he thenafter entered his
appearance in court.

In May 1946 or four months later, Atty. Dizon filed a motion to have Atty. Francisco be disqualified because Atty.
Dizon found out that in June 1945, Hilado approached Atty. Francisco to ask for additional legal opinion regarding
her case and for which Atty. Francisco sent Hilado a legal opinion letter.

Atty. Francisco opposed the motion for his disqualification. In his opposition, he said that no material information
was relayed to him by Hilado; that in fact, upon hearing Hilado’s story, Atty. Francisco advised her that her case will
not win in court; but that later, Hilado returned with a copy of the Complaint prepared by Atty. Dizon; that however,
when Hilado returned, Atty. Francisco was not around but an associate in his firm was there (a certain Atty. Federico
Agrava); that Atty. Agrava attended to Hilado; that after Hilado left, leaving behind the legal documents, Atty. Agrava
then prepared a legal opinion letter where it was stated that Hilado has no cause of action to file suit; that Atty.
Agrava had Atty. Francisco sign the letter; that Atty. Francisco did not read the letter as Atty. Agrava said that it was
merely a letter explaining why the firm cannot take on Hilado’s case.

Atty. Francisco also pointed out that he was not paid for his advice; that no confidential information was relayed
because all Hilado brought was a copy of the Complaint which was already filed in court; and that, if any, Hilado
already waived her right to disqualify Atty. Francisco because he was already representing Assad in court for four
months in the said case.

Judge Jose Gutierrez David ruled in favor of Atty. Francisco.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Francisco should be disqualified in the said civil case.

HELD: Yes. There already existed an attorney-client relationship between Hilado and Atty. Francisco. Hence, Atty.
Francisco cannot act as counsel against Hilado without the latter’s consent.

As ruled by the Supreme Court, to constitute an attorney-client relationship, it is not necessary that any retainer
should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward
undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles
of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional
employment must be regarded as established.

Further: An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor-when
he is listening to his client’s preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as
when he is drawing his client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s cause in open court.
Anent the issue of what information was relayed by Hilado to Atty. Francisco: It does not matter if the information
relayed is confidential or not. So long as the attorney-client relationship is established, the lawyer is proscribed from
taking other representations against the client.

Anent the issue that the legal opinion was not actually written by Atty. Francisco but was only signed by him: It still
binds him because Atty. Agrava, assuming that he was the real author, was part of the same law firm. An information
obtained from a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is information imparted to the firm, his associates or
his employers.

Anent the issue of the fact that it took Hilado four months from the time Atty. Francisco filed his entry of appearance
to file a disqualification: It does not matter. The length of time is not a waiver of her right. The right of a client to
have a lawyer be disqualified, based on previous atty-client relationship, as counsel against her does not prescribe.
Professional confidence once reposed can never be divested by expiration of professional employment.

2. Mercado vs. Vitriolo

Facts: Rosa Mercado is seeking for the disbarment of Atty. Julito Vitriolo as he allegedly maliciously filed a criminal
case for falsification of public documents against her thereby violating the attoyrney client privilege. It appears that
Vitriolo filed a case against complainant as she apparently made false entries in the certificate of live birth of her
children. More specifically she allegedly indicated that she is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez when in fact
her real husband is Ruben Mercado. Mercado claims that by filing the complaint the attorney client privilege has
been violated. Mercado filed a case for Vitriolos disbarment.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated the rule on privileged communication between attorney-client when
he filed the criminal case for falsification

Held: No. The evidence on record fails to substantiate complainants allegations. Complainant did not even specify
the alleged communication disclosed by the respondents. All her claims were couched in general terms and lacked
specificity. Indeed the complaint failed to attend the hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony from the
complainant as to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged by respondent without her consent, it
would be difficult if not impossible to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged communication.
Such information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication between attorney
and client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney client privilege. The burden of proving that the privilege
applies is placed upon the party asserting the privilege.

3. Ma Luisa Hadjula vs Atty Madianda

Facts: Complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as they both worked at the BFP (Bureau of
Fire Protection). Complainant claimed that she approached respondent for some legal advice and in the course of
their conversation, she disclosed personal secrets and produced copies of marriage certificate, baptismal certificate
etc. However, respondent refused to have her as client and instead directed her to a lawyer friend.

Complainant filed criminal and disciplinary actions against respondent – in relation to the alleged demand for a
cellular phone by the respondent to grant complainant’s as the latter was part of BFP promotion board
COUNTER COMPLAINT was filed by the respondent based on the information she received from complainant when
the latter tried to seek legal services from her. (Anti graft and corruption; Immoral conduct )

Issue: Whether the act of respondent in using the information she acquired from complainant when the latter tried
to seek legal advice from her was a violation of the rule on confidentiality.

Ruling: Yes! The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable
lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions
circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer,
respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate confidential information acquired or revealed during legal
consultations. The fact that one is, at the end of the day, not inclined to handle the clients case is hardly of
consequence. Of little moment, too, is the fact that no formal professional engagement follows the consultation.
Nor will it make any difference that no contract whatsoever was executed by the parties to memorialize the

What at bottom is before the Court is two former friends becoming bitter enemies and filing charges and counter-
charges against each other using whatever convenient tools and data were readily available.

4. Toledo v. Kallos (None)


Facts: Petitioner was the legal counsel of Bengson Commercial Building Inc. (BCBI) when the latter filed an action
against GSIS to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure of its real estate and chattel mortgages, which were used to secure
a loan of P4.25M that it had taken out with the GSIS.

The RTC ruled in favor of respondent BCBI, prompting GSIS to appeal. The CA affirmed the RTC's ruling and ordered
GSIS to reimburse BCBI the amount of P2,760,000 as rentals earned by one of its properties (The Regent Theater).
Atty. Armovit sought the execution thereof.

Subsequently however, BCBI directed Armovit not to take part in the execution proceedings and ignored his billings
(supposedly 20% contingent fee (P552,000) of the amount (P2,760,000) recovered by BCBI). Armovit thus moved for
the entry of an attorney's lien in the case records, but he later on withdrew this due to ongoing efforts to amicably
settle with BCBI. The Court approved the withdrawal, and directed the parties to faithfully comply with their duties.

However, BCBI only paid Armovit the amount of P300,000, which the Court nonetheless deemed to be faithful
compliance with its obligation. Armovit's MR and appeal to the CA were both denied, thus prompting an appeal to
the Supreme Court. The SC granted it, upholding Armovit's claim for the balance of P252,000 more, pursuant to the
contingent fee agreement. Particularly, the body of its decision stated that a claim for 20% of all recoveries is not
unreasonable, while the fallo ordered the payment of P252,000 to petitioner.

The bone of contention in this case is the amount of the contingent fee petitioner firm is entitled to. After the SC
granted its appeal, petitioner filed with the RTC an Omnibus Motion praying for a final assessment of its attorney's
fees to be computed at 20% of the value of all of BCBI's recovered properties (not just the rental arrearages paid to
it). In short, Armovit is claiming more than the original amount of P552,000.
Both the RTC and the CA denied the said motion, prompting petitioner to file the present Petition and or Motion for
Execution (of the SC's decision granting the contingent fee) with a joint petition for certiorari.

Issue/s: w/n the lower courts erred in ruling that the petitioner's attorney's fees are limited to 20% of rental
arrearages ONLY, excluding the rest of the recoveries made by BCBI

Held: NO, the petition is dismissed. The fallo of the SC's decision ordered the payment of the sum of P252,000,
nothing more, nothing less. Petitioner's claim in excess of this amount relies on the statement in the body of the
decision that "we do not find Atty. Armovit's claim for twenty percent of all recoveries to be unreasonable."
However, an order of execution is based on the dispositive portion, not on the body, of the decision. When there is
a conflict between the dispositive portion and the body of the judgment, it is the former that prevails over the latter.

6. Licudan v Court of Appeals

 Atty. Teodoro Domalanta was the counsel of his sister and brother-in-law. He represented them in two
civil cases and in both, he obtained judgment in favor of his clients.
 He filed a petition for Attorney’s Lien with Notification to his Clients which provided that:
o He is entitled to own 97.5 sq.m of his client’s share of the lot in question
o He shall have usufructuary right for 10 years of his client’s share of the lot in question
o All the damages accruing to his client if for the undersigned counsel
 A series of hearings were made and the trial court ruled in favor of the lawyer.
 10 months after, the heirs of the lawyer’s (deceased) clients filed a motion to set aside the orders of the
trial court.
 The lawyer stressed the fact that the payment of the professional services was pursuant to a contract
which could no longer be disturbed as it has already been implemented and since then had become final
 CA ruled in favor of the lawyer, dismissing the appeal of the petitioners.
 Instant petition: The petitioners now fault the respondent court for its failure to exercise its inherent
power to review and determine the propriety of the respondents’ lawyer’s fees
 They also accuse their lawyer of having committed an unfair advantage or legal fraud by virtue of the
Contract for Professional Services devised by him.
 According to the petitioners, they may have won the cases (where the lawyer represented them) but
would lose the entire property won in the litigation to their lawyer.
o They would be deprived of their house and lot and the recovered damages since everything
would just go to lawyer’s fees.
o Furthermore, a portion of the land that they would recover would still go to lawyer’s fees since it
pertains to the lawyer’s son by way of usufruct for 10 years.

Issues: W/N the attorney’s fees in this case is reasonable, being in the nature of contingent fees

Held: No. The attorney’s fees in this case is unconscionable and unreasonable.
a. The instant petition is granted, and the Court of Appeals’ decision reversed and set aside.
b. Atty. Domalanta is awarded reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of P20,000.

 The contract relating to the lawyer’s fees entered into by Domalanta and his clients cannot become final
as it pertains to a contingent fee which is always subject to the supervision of the Court with regard to its
reasonableness (Section 13, Canon of Professional Ethics).
o Under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall charge only fair and
reasonable fees
 Considering the extent of the services rendered, the case the lawyer handled was just a simple case if
partition and no special skill nor any unusual effort was required.
o There is no doubt, then, that Atty. Domalanta took advantage of the situation to promote his
own personal interests.
o There should never be an instance where a lawyer gets as attorney’s fees the entire property
involved in the litigation. It is unconscionable for the client to lose everything he won to the fees
of his own lawyer
 The practice of law is a profession rather than a trade.
o The Courts have the responsibility to guard against the charging of unreasonable and excessive
fees by lawyers for their services as counsels
o A lawyer shall at all times uphold integrity and dignity in the legal profession

7. Roldan v. CA (None)

8. None

9. Masmud v. NLRC


 Evangelina Masmud's (Evangelina) husband, the late Alexander J. Masmud (Alexander), filed a
complaint against First Victory Shipping Services and Angelakos (Hellas) S.A. for non-payment of
permanent disability benefits, medical expenses, sickness allowance, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorneys fees. Alexander engaged the services of Atty. Rolando B. Go, Jr. (Atty. Go)
as his counsel.
 In consideration of Atty. Go's legal services, Alexander agreed to pay attorneys fees on a contingent
basis, as follows: twenty percent (20%) of total monetary claims as settled or paid and an additional
ten percent (10%) in case of appeal. It was likewise agreed that any award of attorneys fees shall
pertain to respondents law firm as compensation.
 Alexander's money claims was granted by the NLRC
 Atty. Go moved for the execution of the NLRC decision, which was later granted by the LA. Upon
motion of Atty. Go, the surety company delivered to the NLRC Cashier, through the NLRC Sheriff,
the check amounting to P3,454,079.20. Thereafter, Atty. Go moved for the release of the said
amount to Evangelina.
 Out of the said amount, Evangelina paid Atty. Go the sum of P680,000.00.
 Dissatisfied, Atty. Go filed a motion to record and enforce the attorneys lien alleging that
Evangelina reneged on their contingent fee agreement. Evangelina paid only the amount of
P680,000.00, equivalent to 20% of the award as attorneys fees, thus, leaving a balance of 10%,
plus the award pertaining to the counsel as attorneys fees.
 Evangelina manifested that Atty. Gos claim for attorneys fees of 40% of the total monetary award
was null and void based on Article 111 of the Labor Code; and maintains that Article 111 of the
Labor Code is the law that should govern Atty. Go's compensation as her counsel.

 Whether Atty. Go's compensation is under the ordinary concept of attorneys fees governed by
Sec. 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court or under the extraordinary concept governed by Article 111
of the Labor Code.


 Two concepts of attorneys fees:

o Ordinary sense: attorney's fees represent the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer
by his client for the legal services rendered to the latter
o Extraordinary sense: attorney's fees may be awarded by the court as indemnity for
damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party, such that, in any of the
cases provided by law where such award can be made
 The court applies the ordinary concept of attorneys fees
 Contrary to Evangelinas proposition, Article 111 of the Labor Code deals with the extraordinary
concept of attorneys fees. It regulates the amount recoverable as attorney's fees in the nature of
damages sustained by and awarded to the prevailing party. It may not be used as the standard in
fixing the amount payable to the lawyer by his client for the legal services he rendered.
 Article 111 of the Labor Code provides:
o ART. 111. Attorney's fees. (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages the culpable party
may be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of the wages
 Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court should be observed in determining Atty. Go's
 The retainer contract between Atty. Go and Evangelina provides for a contingent fee.
 The Court finds nothing illegal in the contingent fee contract between Atty. Go and Evangelina's
 Considering that Atty. Go successfully represented his client, it is only proper that he should
receive adequate compensation for his efforts.
 The fact that a lawyer plays a vital role in the administration of justice emphasizes the need to
secure to him his honorarium lawfully earned as a means to preserve the decorum and
respectability of the legal profession.

10. Jasper Rodica vs Atty. Manuel Lazaro et al, AC No. 9259, August 23, 2012

"The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindicative principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons."


This is a disbarment complaint filed by Rodica against the respondent Atty. Lazaro on grounds of gross and
serious misconduct, deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral conduct and violation of the Code of Professional

On May 5, 2011, William Strong was arrested and detained by the Bureau of Immigration for allegedly being
involved in an international gang and conspiracy in Brazil on fraud involving the creation of hundreds of
dollars in illegal securities. Strong requested his friend Philip Apostol to look for a lawyer. Apostol
recommended the Lazaro Law Office represented by Atty. Manuel Lazaro and his associates who initially
declined but later accepted to handle the deportation case.
Strong initiated giving the information that his deportation case may be due to the complaint filed by his
live-in partner Jasper Rodica before the RTC against the Hillview Marketing Corporation for recovery and
possession and damages involving a property they have in Boracay which is represented by Atty. Tan. Rodica
was represented by Atty. Ibutnande in this case. Apparently, Rodica claimed that Atty. Manuel met with
Atty. Tan to discuss the settlement package on the deportation case they filed against Strong on the
condition that Rodica withdraws her complaint from the RTC of Cebu.

On May 25, 2011 the Bureau of Immigration rendered a judgment deporting Strong to leave the country.
On June 6, 2011 Rodica filed before the RTC a motion to withdraw her complaint against Hillview. Rodica
now alleges that after Strong was deported and withdrawing the case before the RTC, she was deceived by
Atty Manuel et al for over settlement of 7 million which was allegedly extorted from her after
misrepresenting that the withdrawal of the case before the RTC is only a part of the settlement package.

It appears on the record that Atty. Espejo, an associate of the Lazaro Law office helped in drafting the
Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration after Rodica pleaded him to prepare
the motion and was requested further to indicate the name of the Lazaro Law Office including the name of
Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle to give more weight on the pleading. Rodica promised Atty. Espejo to talk
to Atty. Manuel about it. The case before the RTC was actually dismissed on March 29, 2011 for failure to
show cause of action but a motion for reconsideration was filed by Rodica.

Whether or not the allegations of Rodica merit the disbarment of the respondents.


The court ruled that Rodica failed to overcome the presumption of innocence of the respondents. As a
general rule, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant to clearly prove the allegations made against them. The required quantum of proof is
preponderance of evidence which is an evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

On Rodica's claim with regards to the settlement package, the court find it without merit because she
withdrew her complaint only after the deportation of Strong. It was also evident on record that the said
case was already dismissed even before the deportation case was filed only she filed a motion for
reconsideration. Therefore, it cannot be said that her withdrawal of the complaint is a settlement
consideration regarding the deportation case of Strong. Moreover, Strong is not a party to the case she filed
before the RTC therefore there is no connection between these 2 cases.

There was sufficient preponderance of evidence that was presented that the cause of her withdrawal of
the complaint is to facilitate the sale of her property in Boracay. According to Atty. Espejo who helped
Rodica draft the motion for withdrawal of the complaint, the said withdrawal is for the purpose of selling
her property to Apostol. Apostol further corroborated that he told Rodica he is willing to purchase the
property once it is free from any pending case. Rodica promised him to work on the termination of the
pending case attached to the property to make the sale.

On her claim to have paid 7 million to Atty. Manuel et al, she failed to substantiate such claim despite
showing off withdrawals from her bank account certain amount of money after failing to prove that the
said amount was paid to the respondents. Moreover, the court held that Rodica is not a client of Lazaro
Law Office. They merely handled the deportation case of Strong.

As for Atty. Espejo, the court found him to have aided Rodica for misrepresenting before the court that she
was aided by the Lazaro Law Office when in fact she is not. Atty. Espejo explained that Rodica assured him
to talk to Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle about including their name on the pleading but she did not do so.
Atty. Espejo should have known better that Atty. Ibutnande was the counsel on record on the case before
the RTC and therefore it is not his duty to prepare said pleading. He also should have known that all
pleadings before the court are acted based on merit or the lack of it and not by the name of the law firm.
However, the court give due recognition on the fact that Atty. Espejo expressed remorse on his conduct
and made a sincere apology to the RTC for wrongly employing the name of the Lazaro Law Office and that
he was newly admitted to the Bar in 2010, the court find it proper to give him a warning to become more
prudent on his actuation in the practice of his profession.

The complaint for disbarment was dismissed.

12. Research and Services Realty vs. CA


Atty. Manuel Fonacier was hired by petitioner when the Carreons and a certain Patricio C. Sarile instituted before
the RTC of Makati City an action against the petitioner for rescission of the Joint Venture Agreement which provided

Petitioner shall undertake to develop, subdivide, administer, and promote the sale of the parcels of land owned by
the Carreons

The proceeds of the sale of the lots were to be paid to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) for the landowner's
mortgage obligation, and the net profits to be shared by the contracting parties on a 50-50 basis.

While case was pending, the petitioner, without the knowledge of the private respondent, entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) 5 with another land developer, Filstream International, Inc. (hereinafter
Filstream). Under this MOA, the former assigned its rights and obligations under the Joint Venture Agreement in
favor of the latter for a consideration of P28 million, payable within twenty-four months.

March 31, 1993: petitioner terminated services of Fonacier

Petitioner had already received 7 million from Filstream

Upon knowing the existence of the MOA, Fonacier filed an action to recover the sum of P700,000.00 as his contingent
fee in the case even if he had no participation in the negotiation and preparation thereof.

Issue: proper fee?

Held: No, excessive and unreasonable

P600,000.00 attorney's fees, whether on contingent basis or quantum meruit, is excessive and unreasonable.

Lawyer’s contribution was merely to ask for suspension or postponement of proceedings

13. Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo, and Africa v. Eastern Telecommunications Philippines Inc


 Petitioner was awarded attorney’s fees worth P26,350,779.91

 handled the case for its client Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Makati, though its services were terminated in midstream and the client directly compromised the
case with the adverse party.

o Petitioner was a partner of San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San Agustin (SAGA)

 Handled case from the very beginning till 1988

 SAGA was later dissolved and Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa (RADA) was formed

o RADA was retained as counsel but such retainer agreement was subsequently terminated

 ETPI entered into a compromise agreement when it ended the services of petitioner and through the effort
of ETPI's new lawyers, the law firm Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc and De los Angeles.

Issue: WON RADA was entitled to amount they were claiming for services rendered

Held: NO, but they were entitled to attorney’s fees nevertheless


 attorney-client relationship between petitioner and respondent no longer existed during its culmination by
amicable agreement

 To award the attorneys' fees amounting to 15% of the sum of One Hundred Twenty Five Million Six Hundred
Seventy One Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Six Pesos and Four Centavos (P125,671,886.04) plus Fifty
Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) paid by PLDT to ETPI would be too unconscionable.

 "In any case, whether there is an agreement or not, the courts shall fix a reasonable compensation which
lawyers may receive for their professional services. "

REMANDS the case to the court of origin for the determination of the amount of attorney's fees to which petitioner
is entitled.
Recovery of attorney's fees on the basis of quantum meruit is authorized when

(1) there is no express contract for payment of attorney's fees agreed upon between the lawyer and the client;

(2) when although there is a formal contract for attorney's fees, the fees stipulated are found unconscionable
or unreasonable by the court; and

(3) when the contract for attorney's fee's is void due to purely formal defects of execution;

(4) when the counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able to finish the case to its conclusion;

(5) when lawyer and client disregard the contract for attorney's

14. Concept Placement Resources Inc. v. Funk (None)

15. Viray v. Sanicas

DOCTRINE: Refusal and failure to render an accounting and return the money after demand made by the client raises
the presumption that he converted it to his own use. The unjustified withholding of the funds also warrants the
imposition of disciplinary action against him.

FACTS: Viray engaged the services of Atty. Sanicas in a labor case against Lopez. Lopez, in that case, was ordered to
pay Viray a total amount of 189, 491.60.

Atty. Sanicas received payments from Lopez on behalf of Viray on nine separate occasions for almost 3 months
without informing Viray or even giving him an accounting thereon. An alias writ of execution was issued for the
payment of the award due to Viray. During the implementation for such writ, Viray found out that Atty. Sanicas had
already collected 95,000.

Viray claims that Atty. Sanicas misrepresented that he was authorized to receive payments in his behalf. Viray made
several demands to remit to him the amount of 95,000 less attorney’s fees of 20,000. But Atty. Sanicas ignored
these. Viray then filed a complaint in the barangay but the summons was ignored by Atty. Sanicas Atty. Sanicas
argues that he is authorized to receive the money and entitled to receive the amounts because of an agreement
with Viray that he would be receiving additional attorneys fees and be reimbursed for expenses incurred in the
duration of his service.

ISSUE: Whether or notAtty. Sanicas is guilty of gross misconduct for his failure to promptly account to his client the
funds received in the course of his professional engagement and return the same upon demand.

HELD: Yes, refusal and failure to render an accounting and return the money after demand made by the client raises
the presumption that he converted it to his own use. The unjustified withholding of the funds also warrants the
imposition of disciplinary action against him. There is no proof of the agreement between the parties with regard to
the authority to receive the money. But even present this proof, the same does not exempt him from his duty or
informing his client the amounts he received in the course of his employment. The fiduciary nature of the
relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for the money or the property
received for or from the client. He is obliged to render a prompt accounting of all the property and money he has
collected for his client. Atty. Sanicas’ failure to immediately account for and return the money when due and upon
demand violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity and moral soundness, and warrants
the imposition of disciplinary action.

16. Cheryl E. Vasco-Tamaray, Complainant, v. Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis, Respondent | A.C. No 10868, 26 January


Complainant filed a complaint affidavit before the IBP on 30 July 2007, alleging the respondent filed, on her behalf,
a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage without her consent and forged her signature on the Petition. She
also alleged that the respondent signed the said Petition as “Counsel for the Petitioner.” referring to the
complainant. The complainant stated the respondent was not her counsel but that of her husband, Leomarte Regala


Whether or not the respondent violated the canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).


By pretending to be the counsel of the complainant, the respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR. For
allowing the use of petition with the forged signature of the complainant, the respondent violated Rule 7.03, Canon
7 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the CPR.

Other acts of the respondent that violated Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the CPR are as follows: engaging in a scuffle inside
court chambers; openly doubting paternity of the complainant’s son; hurling incentives at a Clerk of Court; harassing
occupants of a property; using intemperate language; and engaging in an extramarital affair.

The Supreme Court fin the respondent guilty of violating the following provisions of the CPR: Rule 1.01, Canon 1;
Rule 7.03, Canon 7; Rule 10.01, Canon 10; and Canon 17. Violation against Rule 15.03, Canon 15 by the respondent
was dismissed. The respondent was disbarred and her name removed from the Roll of Attorneys.