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INTRODUCTION
Criteria. This involves evaluating an ontology in terms of a set of criteria that can
be applied to discriminate between viable and non-viable metaphysical projects.
One can acknowledge and accept the necessity of such an evaluation, both to
avoid tautologous self-validation and to come to grips with the real. Many criteria
can be extracted from current discussions, but a common core shared by most, if
not all, rival systems of thought include immanence, pluralism, realism, and
testability.
Thought-images. Thought does not only make use of images to give it concrete
illustrations or applications, but is also organised in terms of certain overarching
images that give form and plausibility to its exercise in a particular epoch.There are
two influential images of thought that have given rise to diverse contemporary
metaphysical research programmes in Continental Philosophy: the quantum image
and the performance image. These are articulated in opposition to the dominance
of the structuralist image.
Pluralism and relativism. Zizek and Latour are realist pluralists, their most recent
thought is devoted to providing a realist grounding for truths and for truth-saying
that respects the immanence of truths while avoiding relativism. Laruelle, on the
other hand, is a relativist: his thought is a fall back into the democratic relativism of
“all thoughts are equal”. In a word, testability is abandoned in favor of the reductive
application of the criterion of equality.
Vice and virtue. Laruelle elaborates a radical critique of philosophy based on his
own particular form of virtue epistemology. He identifies the vice of philosophical
“sufficiency” as invalidating the pretension of contemporary philosophy to come to
terms with immanence, but we shall see that he is himself unable to propose a
virtuous alternative.
Performance. The performance image of thought can generate its own criterion, in
order to give automatic and tautologous self-validation to its preferred metaphysical
research programme. In Laruelle’s case, the idealist criterion of performativity (or
something supposedly being so just because one declares it so) replaces the
scientific criterion of testability in his “non-philosophy” research programme.
Enunciative sufficiency. In this view, performance alone is not enough, and the
attempt to make it suffice is idealist. In contrast, Laruelle’s general procedure is to
denounce “sufficiency” at the level of content, but at the level of enunciative form he
and his followers proposes replacement criteria that they then try to make suffice.
Performativity can only be seen as a positive criterion when its use is non-
foundational. A foundational use of performativity is one that makes, or purports to
make, something true by the mere fact of its being enounced. This idealist appeal
to performativity is the principal vice of democratic relativism.
Such is the case for the scientism of Laruelle, which hesitates between the
sufficiency of reductive scientism (science legitimates his theses in the last
instance) and performative scientism (science legitimates his theses by the
declaration their scientificity).
Laruelle’s work claims to give us a “science of philosophy”, but the only proof he
offers of this structuralist claim is performative: the repeated enunciation of the
scientific, or non-philosophical, character of the texts. This claim, in Laruelle’s use
of it, is not testable.
Laruelle poses important questions, but his answers are useless. The questions
can be turned back on him with devastating consequences for the evaluation of his
adhesion to his own criteria.
His demand for new uses of conceptual material is inspiring, but he does not go
very far in that direction. Despite his promotion of the revisionary semantics of
quantum hermeneutics and the relativist pragmatics of performance his own
dramatizations are poor and graceless.
1) PERFORMATIVE PERFORMANCE
The form of Laruelle’s acts of enunciation is performative, while the form of their
enunciative content is one of performance, irrespective of the specific enunciated
content. I wish to briefly consider the performance image, before turning, in the
major part of this essay, to the quantum image.
Laruelle maintains that the author has “few privileges” (in French “sans beaucoup
de privilèges”, literally “without a lot of privileges”) compared to the reader. This is
an incoherent affirmation. He begins by the superposition of reader and author (in
accordance with his quantum image), but then concedes some privileges to the
“author” as determining the explanation of the book in the last instance (in
accordance with Laruelle’s version of the structuralist image).
“each titled paragraph is often a new throw of the dice and a new beginning, the
text as a whole can seem like a kaleidoscope of renewed fractal views of our
problem. This is to say that a certain degree of aleatory reading is possible (…)
even recommended” (8).
Yet this infernal superposition is still quantum and cannot definitively delimit,
enclose, and contain any content. Quantum “leakage” can and does occur, even in
Hell. Similarly, one must remember that in Deleuze and Guattari’s expression
“ligne de fuite”, the word “fuite” means flight or escape, but also leakage. In other
words, despite Laruelle’s critique of Deleuze (a critique that Deleuze himself had
already made of his own work prior to his collaboration with Guattari) there is a
quantum communality between them.
Laruelle and Deleuze agree on the need to go outside, to escape from Hell, and
they also agree on the immanent means.
“There is only one way of getting outside the circles of Hell, and that is to
transform them by their collision into means of escape, not to climb up the
interior of a Platonic chimney but to cross the ford by leaping from one rock to
another” (ibid, 9).
The monist sufficiency of this declaration (“only one way”) is another case of
author’s privilege, as can be seen in Laruelle’s exclusion of escape by climbing
up a “Platonic chimney”. This is an ironic reference to Badiou’s method, which
climbs from the Hell of finitude by means of a Platonic hierarchy of transfinite
cardinals. This alternative means of escape from the circles of Hell is detailed in
Badiou’s recently published THE IMMANENCE OF TRUTHS (“L’Immanence
des vérités”, 2018). Laruelle excludes the Platonic chimney without any
argument, by fiat, as dictated by his privilege.
Thus, we can speak of the dangers not only of scientism, but also of politicism,
religionism and aestheticism:
“The conditions of intellectual experiment are here no longer the classical ones,
where the subject was naturally plunged into the relatively simple universes, after
all, of philosophy, science, religion, and art” (PHILOSOPHIE NON-STANDARD, 8).
The books in this trilogy contain Laruelle's analysis, from a “non-standard” point of
view, of the various reductive "principles of sufficiency" (according to an extended
understanding, sufficiency is not only philosophical and mathematical, but also
artistic, theological, and political). He identifies them as the source of the normative
evaluations associated with the various reductionisms.
In his search for a quantum thought Laruelle wants to free the quantum mode of
thinking from its mathematical expression, that he finds reductive. In physics, fully
formalized mathematical expressions such as Schrödinger’s equation are not
present at the moment of paradigmatic invention. Rather, they come from a post-
revolutionary moment of return to order (which of course is necessary and
desirable).
In contrast the physicist Niels Bohr often used a more intuitive strategy of thought
(influenced by Kierkegaard), declaring that an exclusively mathematical approach
would be too limiting and premature. Similarly, I think that Laruelle is trying to
capture the quantum heuristic behind its mathematical formulation.
“Given its very special object, it [i.e. non-philosophy] will have to bend itself to a
difficult exercise, one scandalous both for the physicists: using quantum schemas
without mathematical sufficiency, and for the philosophers: using philosophical
schemas without their sufficiency” (PHILOSOPHIE NON-STANDARD, 13).
The determining Last Instance can only be understood in terms of genericity and of
quanticity, i.e. in terms of under-determination and of in-determination. Strictly, the
"last" instance is first, or pre-primary. It is only in closed, simple, classical universes
that “determination in the last instance” takes on the meaning of determinism by an
ultimate foundational level. In contrast, Laruelle’s non-standard philosophy applies
to open, complex, non-classical universes. It is a democratic thought, in which
freedom has (pre-)primacy. This is the lesson of his “quantum deconstruction”.
In his talk about the “conciliation between science and philosophy under generic
conditions” (PHILOSOPHIE NON-STANDARD, 72) Laruelle maintains a certain
ambiguity about primacy, as he wants both to keep a scientific reference and to
de-mathematicize scientific notions such as the quantum, in order to turn them into
stylistic approaches, rather than retaining them as substantial functions. So, there
is a transfer of meaning here, but Laruelle claims that this is not a metaphor.
One way of explaining Laruelle’s seemingly paradoxical position would be to say
that it is rather the mathematization that is metaphorical, as the style of thought
came first. This would be to claim that science in the making (or generic science)
has primacy (or what he calls “pre-priority”) whereas the function (whether it is
mathematically expressed or not) belongs to determinate sciences, or to science
made.
"There is only one way to escape from the circles of Hell, and that is to
transform them by their collision into means of escape" (PHILOSOPHIE NON-
STANDARD, 11).
When Laruelle does not talk about Deleuze’s philosophy directly this allows it to
permeate all of his work as a Deleuzian undulation. When Laruelle does refer to
Deleuze’s thought explicitly it is transformed into a particle and rejected.
In this quote from the first introduction to NON-STANDARD PHILOSOPHY we can
see the Deleuzian tenor of Laruelle’s non-standard philosophy, Laruelle’s “Hell” by
superposition of closed circles is the equivalent of Deleuze and Guattari’s “Black
Hole”, itself a construct of superposition. There is the same desire, in both
philosophies, to escape from such enclosure and the same means are employed:
transformation by collision and undulation (Laruelle), transformation by encounter
and variation (Deleuze and Guattari).
Over and over we see Laruelle’s massive indebtedness to Deleuze combined with
a fierce and damning critique. Laruelle famously said in an interview “Laruelle does
not exist”, to refute accusations of solipsistic mastery. The conclusion that we may
draw is that Deleuze too does not exist.
However, even this affirmation was borrowed from Deleuze and Guattari’s
RHIZOME, where they declare that their own existence is not a determinate state of
affairs: “Not a matter of reaching the point where one no longer says I, but the point
where saying I or not no longer has any importance”.
Overturning Plato’s elitist “Let no one ignorant of geometry enter here”, Laruelle
democratically declares “Anyone who is ignorant of geometry can enter here”
(10) but warns that they must “be ready to grapple with a formalism that is
conceptual rather than mathematical”. Such a “conceptual formalism” is to be
met without fear, and we are invited to “let go at the very heart of the work" (10,
italics in the original) and to "stop fantasizing over the difficulties".
This is what Laruelle calls the “paradox of non-philosophy”. The aim is the
simplicity of lived openness, but in order to combat closed thinking and living a
certain degree of semantic complexity is necessary:
"In order to rid itself of philosophical sufficiency … it must mobilize a whole
complex ... apparatus, make its operations visible by a type of precision entirely
other than the phenomenological" (10).
We cannot, Laruelle warns us, dissolve our problems easily and quickly by mere
contemplation, we need to arrange conceptual collisions, but only by letting go and
"floating".
Can the principle of sufficiency that reigns over a discipline be overcome from
within that discipline itself? Laruelle's critique of the principle of philosophical
sufficiency, as expressed in his non-philosophy, seemed to come from a position
outside philosophy. Only retroactively did he come to understand that he was not
situated in some radical other to philosophy, but rather that he was operating on
the basis of a “non-standard” philosophy. “Non-” is not the same as “exo-“, nor
“ex-“.
Laruelle calls Badiou “philo-rigid”. (Note: This epithet echoes the recurrent critique
of various public figures, most famously of the socialist candidate Lionel Jospin
before the Presidential elections of 2002, as “psycho-rigid”). He contrasts Badiou’s
set theoreticism with his own quantum approach. Once again Laruelle is arguing
from privilege. He privileges physics over mathematics, quantum mechanics over
set theory, and his own quantizing over Badiou’s infinitizing.
Further, this privileging limits his critique to the Badiou of BEING AND EVENT, the
first volume of his speculative saga. The Badiou of LOGICS OF WORLDS makes
use of category theory, and so he too has “quantized” himself. Sometimes Badiou
still appeals to set theory as a unique foundational level of thought. But this is not
always the case. This set theoretical exceptionalism and foundationalism is less
and less a trait of his pronouncements as Badiou deepens and extends his
reflection.
2) an internal overcoming, from the inside of philosophy (even if the nature of this
inside undergoes substantive revision) as Laruelle maintains now with his non-
standard philosophy.
The same twofold path can be found in mathematics, where sufficiency may be
overcome externally by metaphoric extension and extrapolation, which is Laruelle’s
path, or by internal relativization and extension, in the constitution for example of
non-standard mathematical theories.
Laruelle must now decide between clinging to his former “philo-rigid” style, based
on his privilege in the last instance, which is still prevalent in his non-philosophy,
and embracing a new “philo-undulatory” style, as is called for by his more recent
"non-standard" philosophy. This second option would force him to abandon or to
transform a lot of his former certainties. In particular, his readings of Deleuze and
Badiou, which are brilliant in their polemical reductions, are philo-rigid and need
to be complemented by a more undulatory hermeneutics.
I read Zizek’s texts with Laruelle's non-philosophy in mind, even though neither
discusses the other. Each adds something to the understanding of the other. In
particular, Laruelle's emphasis on the far-reaching consequences of his "quantum
thought" allows us to see that Zizek's repeated use of quantum physics is not just
one example amongst many others, but is of central importance. The different
interpretative options that each adopts allow us to see more clearly what is at
stake in each option and their possible coherence or conflict.
Zizek, like Laruelle, is a non-standard philosopher. In particular, like Laruelle, he
turns to quantum physics for a model of non-standard thinking. However, Zizek's
use of quantum physics is very different from Laruelle's, in that Zizek’s thought
privileges the disparatous pluralist aspects of quantum theory, whereas Laruelle
privileges quantum uniformity, called by him "unilaterality". Laruelle's thought is
one of ultimate convergence (a form of monism), resumed under the name of
"determination in the last instance". In contrast, Zizek's thought favours disparity,
divergence and "over-determination".
Slavoj Zizek makes use of quantum physics as model, but he does not maintain
that it is the only valid model. He acknowledges that Badiou's use of set theory
and category theory achieves similar goals.
Laruelle is not a pluralist about the choice of models. In his book ANTI-BADIOU
he requires us to choose between quantum and set theory. This is in accord with
the uniqueness hypothesis, or rather the two axioms of uniqueness that subtend
Laruelle's thought, namely:
Axiom 1: there is only one way out of the sufficiency of philosophy: Laruelle’s
non-philosophy,
Axiom 2: there is only one non-standard philosophy and Laruelle is its thinker.
Zizek does not discuss Laruelle’s thought explicitly, but he constantly rejects
“standard” solutions, and he describes his own ideas as “non-standard”. He
outlines a critical analysis of the use that Ray Brassier makes of Laruelle's key
concept of "determination in the last instance". For Zizek the big problem with
Laruelle, Brassier, and their epigones is scientism and what he calls "direct
naturalization".
Perhaps behind the explicit alliance of Zizek and Badiou mentioned above there
is an implicit rivalry founded on a divergence of interpretative style. Zizek is to
Niels Bohr (qualitative approach) as Badiou is to Paul Dirac (formalist approach).
Zizek lists four features that according to him characterize both the quantum
universe and the symbolic universe: the actuality of the possible, knowledge in the
real, the delay of registration, and retro-activity. The key feature for the discussion
here is Zizek's use of the concept of non-causal "retro-activity", which is in direct
contradiction with Laruelle's idiosyncratic notion of unilaterality, that he imports
arbitrarily into his deployment of quantum thought.
Zizek also differs from Laruelle in that he separates the notions of over-
determination and determination in the last instance. He assigns superposition/
coherence to the side of over-determination and disparity and collapse/de-
coherence to that of determination in the last instance.
here quantum physics enters: what makes it so ‘spooky’ is not its radical
heterogeneity with regard to our common sense, but rather its uncanny
resemblance to what we consider specifically human – here, effectively, one is
tempted to say that quantum physics ‘deconstructs’ the standard binary opposition
of nature and culture (DISPARITIES, 48-49).
Zizek gives primacy to the quantum model not because it is the most
fundamental level following the descending line of reductions and of efficient
causality, but because it is the most "deconstructed" model, and thus formally
closer to human subjectivity. The sort of causality that Zizek is emphasizing
here is a formal causality, where the "highest" (or most distant) abstractions are
inscribed in the real itself. In other words, Zizek is arguing for a realist
interpretation of quantum concepts.
This formal analogy between quantum physics and subjectivity means that the
formal causality is operative not only at the "base" or sub-microscopic level but
equally at every succeeding level. Real emergence from one level to another, that
cannot be explained by reduction to lower levels, is only possible because of the
ontological incompleteness that is best described by quantum mechanics (at the
present moment).
Zizek does not fetishize quantum mechanics the way Laruelle does. He remarks
that the question of which theory best describes the transition from the
paradoxical incomplete "proto-reality" to constituted manifest reality is an
empirical question:
"Therein resides the strength of decoherence theory: it endeavors to articulate the
purely immanent way a quantum process engenders the mechanism of its
‘observation’ (registration). Does it succeed? It is up to the science itself to
provide an answer" (DISPARITIES, 53).
Open exchange. Laruelle and the Laruelleans are the most hostile to such open
discussion, and they maintain a near impenetrable wall of jargon based on
Laruelle's idiosyncratic and obfuscatory definitions of terms. To these disciples
the idea that Laruelle's thought could usefully be considered a "metaphysical"
research programme comparable with that of Latour or Zizek is unthinkable,
because they define "metaphysics" in a way that suits their grandiose claims of
being the only ones to get outside metaphysics.
Jargon. Here I have been obliged to use Popper's jargon in order to let us see
through Laruelle's jargon and to take it down a peg. Sometimes one is forced to
fight jargon with jargon. I would never try to give an account of a text that replaces
the original and exempts one from reading it. However, my hypothesis is that if
you are reading these texts and you have difficulty understanding them, or if you
find them problematic in ways that are difficult to articulate, this sort of analysis
will help you out.
Bibliography