1 Placer v.
Villanueva
Placer v. Villanueva
In relation to the assassination of the representative of Masbate and his security escorts, the
MTC of Masbate, after the presentation of affidavits and answers of the prosecution’s
witnesses, concluded that probable cause existed for issuance of a warrant of arrest against
Vicente Lim and company. When the hearing of the case was transferred to Makati RTC and
upon petition of spouses Lim for transmission of initial records of the preliminary
investigation, the respondent Judge concluded that probable cause existed due to the
declaration made by two competent officers – the MTC of Masbate and the Fiscal.
Facts:
1. The Congressman of the municipality of Masbate, Masbate (Moises Espinos, Sr.)
and his security escorts (Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro and
Artemio Fuentes) were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. One security escort
(Dante Siblante) survived the assassination plot but suffered a gunshot wound.
2. After an investigation of the incident, the designated investigator (Harry Tantiado
of the PC Criminal Investigation Service at Camp Bagong Ibalon, Legazpi City) filed
an amended complaint accusing Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate,
Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor
C. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated
murder.
3. The Municipal Trial Court of Masbate, upon weighing the affidavits and answers
given by the witnesses for the prosecution during the preliminary investigation in
searching questions and answers, concluded that a probable cause had been
established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the Lim, et.al. The
recommended amount for bail of each of the accused was Php 200,000.00. Except
for Cabarles, all of the accused posted bail.
4. The Fiscal (Antonio Alfane), a month after the entire records of the case (261
pages) were transmitted, issued a resolution which affirmed the finding of a prima
facie case against Lim, et.al. but differed in the designation of the crime. He ruled
that all of the accused should not only be charged with Multiple Murder with
Frustrated Murder, but for a case of murder for each of the killing of the four
victims and a physical injuries case for inflicting gunshot wound on the buttocks of
Siblante. Said Fiscal filed with the RTC of Masbate four separate informations of
murder against the 12 accused with a recommendation of no bail.
5. The hearing of the case, due to the verified petition filed by Lim with the SC, was
transferred to the RTC of Makati, Branch 56 (under Judge Nemesio Felix). The Lims
filed with the said court motions and manifestations, which include, among others,
issue an order for transmission of the initial records of the preliminary investigation
conducted in Masbate. These were denied by the respondent court for lack of
merit.
6. Felix said that there exists probable cause that the “offense of multiple murder was
committed… affirmed upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor... Considering that
both the two competent officers to whom such duty was entrusted by law have
Case Digests: Searches and Seizures • Mark Justin Mooc
declared the existence of probable cause, each information is complete in form and
substance, and there is no visible defect on its face…”
Issue: Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on
the prosecution’s certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists
Ruling:
1. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise
of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate (from Section 6, Rule 112
of the Rules of Court). Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the
face of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscal’s certification and require the submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid
him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause.
2. The 1988 Amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (effective on
October 1, 1988) did not restore the authority of conducting preliminary
investigations to Judges of RTC; said amendments did not in fact deal at all with the
officers or courts having authority to conduct preliminary investigations. This does
not mean, however, that RTC judges also lost the power to make a preliminary
examination for the purpose of determining whether probable cause exists to
justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest or search warrant. Such power, is as
much a duty as it is a power, has been and remains vested in every judge by the
provision of the Bill of Rights securing the people against unreasonable searches
and seizures, thereby placing it beyond the competence of mere Court Rule or
Statute to revoke.
3. The distinction must be made clear: while an RTC judge may no longer conduct
preliminary investigations to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground for the
filing of a criminal complaint or information, he retains the authority, when such a
pleading is filed with his court, to determine whether there is probable cause
justifying the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It might be added that this distinction
accords, rather than conflicts, with the rationale of salta, because both law and
rule, in restricting judges the authority to order arrest, recognize the function to be
judicial in nature.
4. Preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an
investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the
information or it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is
executive in nature, and part of the prosecution’s job. The second kind of
preliminary investigation, which is more properly called preliminary examination, is
judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge.
Soliven v. Makasiar
The President of the Philippines filed a complaint for libel against the petitioners, who were
the publisher and columnist of the Philippine Star, based on the following statement in
2 Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687
Beltran's column of Oct. 12, 1987 totle "The Nervous Officials of the Aquino Administration":
"If you recall, during the August 29 coup attempt, the President hid under her bed while the
firing was going on - perhaps the first Commander-in-Chief to do so."
Facts:
1. In this case, upon the issue raised by petitioner Beltran, the constitutional provision
on the issuance of warrants of arrest was called for an interpretation. Beltran
wrote in the Philippine Star that “during the August 29 coup attempt, the President
hid under her bed while the firing was going on.” Due to this, the President filed a
libel complaint against petitioners.
2. Beltran argues that the addition of the word “personally” after the word
“determined” and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to
issue warrants to “other responsible officers as may be authorized by law.” This
interpretation convinced him that the Constitution now requires the judge to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest.
Issue: Whether or not Beltran’s constitution rights were violated when the respondent RTC
judge issued a warrant of arrest without personally examining the complainant and the
witnesses to determine probable cause
Ruling:
1. The judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of
the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. Instead, he
shall (a) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted
by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause,
he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause. This procedure should be followed, otherwise judges would be
unduly laden with the preliminary examinations and investigation of criminal
complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before
their courts.
2. In making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded from
relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the
reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge’s
sound discretion.
Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687
Roan’s house was searched by virtue of a search warrant and the said search was performed
by military authorities. During their search, the authorities found a Colt Magnum revolver
and 18 live bullets which they confiscated and served as bases for the charge of illegal
Case Digests: Searches and Seizures • Mark Justin Mooc
possession of firearms. However, the application of said search warrant was based on the
accounts of two witnesses. The applicant did not have personal knowledge of said firearm.
Facts:
1. A search warrant was issued by respondent judge (Gonzales) on May 10, 1984.
Application for the said search warrant was personally filed by PC Capt. Mauro
Quillosa. Together with Quillosa were two witnesses (Esmael Morada and Jesus
Tohilida), who presented to respondent judge their respective affidavits. The
application was not yet subscribed and sworn to, as such respondent Judge
proceeded to examine Quillosa on the contents of the application to ascertain if he
knew and understood the same. Afterwards, Quillosa subscribed and swore the
said application before respondent.
2. Petitioner’s (Josefino Roan) house was searched two days after the issuance of the
search warrant. The said search was performed by military authorities. Despite
none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered, the officers who
conducted the search found one Colt Magnum revolver and 18 live bullets which
they confiscated. The said items served as bases for the charge of illegal
possession of firearms against the petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not a search warrant be annulled on the ground that it violates the privacy
of one person’s house
Ruling/Decision:
1. To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be
determined by the judge or some authorized officer after examining the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. There must be a specific
description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to prevent
arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the warrant. Probable cause, as described by
Judge Escolin in Burgos v. Chief of Staff, refers to “such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be searched.” The probable cause must refer to only one
specific offense.
2. The applicant (Capt. Quillosa) was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on
the basis of mere hearsay and not of information personally known to him as
required by settled jurisprudence.
3. It is axiomatic that the magistrate must be probing and exhaustive, not merely
routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The
examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must
make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application.
4. Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this
case, it was not because: (a) there was no valid search warrant; and (b) absent such
a warrant, the right thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the
3 People v. Bolasa y Nakoboan
military officers who entered the petitioner’s premises had no right to be there and
therefore had no right to seize the pistol and bullets.
People v. Bolasa y Nakoboan
Three police officers (Salonga, Carizon and Arenas) peeped through a small window and saw
a man and a woman repacking suspected marijuana, as they were informed by an
anonymous caller. The police officers entered the house and introduced themselves as police
officers and thereupon confiscated the tea bags and some paraphernalia. After the
examination of the tea bags, it was confirmed that same contained marijuana.
Facts:
1. PO3 Dante Salonga and PO3 Albert Carizon were informed by an anonymous caller
that a man and woman were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house in Sta.
Brigida St., Karuhatan, Valenzuela. Together with SPO1 Fernando Arenas, they
proceeded immediately to the house of the suspects. As they walked toward their
quarry’s (prey) lair, the three were accompanied by their unnamed informer.
2. When they reached the house, they “peeped through a small window and saw one
man and a woman repacking suspected marijuana.” They entered the house and
introduced themselves as police officers to the occupants and thereupon
confiscated the tea bags and some paraphernalia. Examination of the tea bags by
NBI Forensic Chemist confirmed the suspicion that the tea bags contained
marijuana. As such, Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto delos Reyes were charged with
violation of Sec. 8, Art. II of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).
3. Both denied on the witness stand ownership over the confiscated tea bags and
drug implements.
4. delos Reyes claimed that he and his wife were merely tenants in Bolasa’s house
and at the time he was arrested he had just arrived from work. He added that
when he learned that Bolasa was repacking marijuana inside their room, he
immediately ordered her to leave. As for Bolasa, she claimed that she was about to
leave the house when she met a certain “Rico” and conversed with him for some
time.
5. The trial court, upon finding the version of the prosecution to be plausible,
convicted both accused Bolasa and delos Reyes.
6. On appeal, Bolasa asserted that the search in her residence was illegal as her arrest
preceding it was illegal. She argued that the marijuana seized from her could not
be properly used as evidence against her. Together with delos Reyes, Bolasa said
that PO3 Carizon was not among the arresting officers, as such Carizon had no
personal knowledge regarding the conduct of the arrest and the search thus
making his testimony hearsay.
Ruling:
1.An arrest is lawful even in the absence of a warrant: (a) when the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in
his presence; (b) when an offense has in fact been committed and he has
Case Digests: Searches and Seizures • Mark Justin Mooc
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it; and,
(c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another. The manner by which accused were apprehended does
not fall under any of the above-enumerated categories. From the above, the arrest
is illegal.
2. It cannot be said that the objects were seized in plain view. First, there was no
valid intrusion. As already discussed, accused were illegally arrested. Second, the
evidence later on found to contain marijuana was not inadvertently discovered.
The police officers intentionally peeped first through the window before they saw
and ascertained the activities of accused-appellants inside the room. In like
manner, the search cannot be recognized as a search of a moving vehicle, a
consented warrantless search, a customs search or a stop and frisk; it cannot even
fall under exigent and emergency circumstances, for evidence at hand is deprived
of any such showing.
3. It indicates that the apprehending officers should have conducted first a
surveillance considering that the entities and address of the suspected culprits
were already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the
existence of probable cause for arresting accused, they (the police) should have
secured a search warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest and seizure. The arrest
being illegal ab initio, the accompanying search was likewise illegal. Every evidence
obtained during the illegal search cannot be used against accused; hence, they
were acquitted.
People v. Alunday
Alunday was found to have planted, cultivated and cultured marijuana fruiting tops and have
in his possession an M16 Rifle without any written authority or permit. He was rendered a
decision of conviction for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act, but was acquitted for reasonable
doubt for violating PD 1866. Alunday contended however that he was arrested without
warrant and his warrantless arrest does not fall under the circumstances contemplated by
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court.
Facts:
1. Accused (Ricardo Alunday alias “Kayad”), “without being authorized by law, and
with intent to plant and cultivate,… unlawfully and feloniously” planted, cultivated
and cultured marijuana fruiting tops weighing more than 750 grams. Said
marijuana fruiting tops had an estimated value of Php 10 million. For this, he was
charged with violation of Section 9 of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).
2. Alunday was likewise additionally charged with violation of PD 1866 for he was
found to have possessed an M16 Rifle without any written authority or permit
previously acquired from authorities to carry or transport the said firearm.
3. The RTC found Alunday guilty of violating RA 6425 while he was acquitted for
violating PD 1866 for reasonable doubt. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
4 People v. Cruz
4. Accused, in his appeal, assailed his conviction for being improper and illegal,
asserting that the court a quo never acquired jurisdiction over his person because
he was arrested without a warrant and that his warrantless arrest was not done
under any of the circumstances enumerated in Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985
Rules of Court. He insisted that the arresting officers had 3 months within which to
secure a warrant from the time they received the information about an existing
marijuana plantation in Mount Churyon, Sadanga in May 2000 until they effected
arrest on August 2000. Also, he contended that the arresting officers’ failure to
secure a warrant can never be justified by the urgency of the situation.
Ruling:
1. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides that a peace officer or a private
person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his
presence; (b) when an offense has in fact been committed and he has reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) when
the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
2. Section 5(a) refers to arrest in flagrante delicto. In flagrante delicto means caught
in the act of committing a crime. This rule, which warrants the arrest of a person
without warrant, requires that the person arrested has just committed a crime, or
is committing it, or is about to commit an offense, in the presence or within view of
the arresting officer.
3. In the case at bar, the information was received by the Intelligence Section of the
Provincial Office of the Mountain Province in May 2000 while the accused was
arrested during the police raid at the plantation at Mount Churyon, Sadanga on
August. This is so because the arrest was effected only after a series of validations
conducted by the team to verify or confirm the report that indeed a marijuana
plantation existed at the area, which was confirmed on August 2. During the day of
the arrest (August 3), the arresting team of SPO1 Saipen proceeded to the
marijuana plantation and Saipen saw Alunday personally cutting and gathering
marijuana plants. Therefore, his arrest was legal because he was caught in
flagrante delicto.
4. It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid
information has been filed, the accused arraigned, trial commenced and
completed, and a judgment of conviction rendered against him. He raised the
additional issue of irregularity of his arrest only during his appeal to the SC. He is,
therefore, deemed to have waived such alleged defect by submitting himself to the
jurisdiction of the court by his counsel-assisted plea during his arraignment; by his
actively participating in the trial and by not raising the objection before his
arraignment.
Case Digests: Searches and Seizures • Mark Justin Mooc
People v. Cruz
Members of the CRIG nabbed two persons who were to sell a stolen car. After the carnap
suspects were brought to the police headquarters, they led the CRIG team to the place where
other members of the carnap gang were waiting. The accused, Cruz, was found to have
possessed a calibre .38 paltik revolver, one live ammunition and a hand grenade in his clutch
bag. He was charged with the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. He
contended however that the PC officers had no warrant of arrest and that the said firearm
and explosive were found when they (carnap gang) were being arrested for “carnapping” and
not for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
Facts:
1. Eight members of CRIG, led by Lt. Noel Manabat, stationed at Camp Bagong Diwa
acted on an intelligence information that on noon of May 9, 1986 a stolen car was
to be sold in Magallanes, Makati. The team nabbed Romeo Fernandez and Joey
Flores and brought them to headquarters where they were questioned.
2. The two carnap suspects led the CRIG team to 61 Mabituan St., Masambong, QC
where they alleged the other members of the carnap gang were waiting for their
shares of the proceeds from the sale of a vehicle.
3. A calibre .38 paltik revolver, one live ammunition and a hand grenade, contained in
a clutch bag, were found near accused (Reynaldo Cruz alias Rene Hapon). For this
reason, he was charged with the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition. He denied ownership or possession of the firearm and hand grenade,
as well as the bag which contained the said items. He claimed that the bag and its
contents belonged to Joey Flores and was “planted” by PC operatives.
4. Cruz contended that the firearm and explosive in question cannot be used as
evidence against him since the PC officers had no warrant of arrest when they
entered the apartment, in violation of his constitutional rights. Moreover, he
contended that the unlicensed firearm and explosive were found when they
arrested the accused and his companions for “carnapping” and not for illegal
possession of firearm ammunition.
Ruling:
1. The police officers failed to comply with the strictures laid down by the Court for
police officers to follow in a custodial investigation especially in the waiver of
constitutional rights made without the assistance or even in the presence of
counsel.
Harvey v. Santiago
Harvey, together with Sherman and Del Elshout, were alien pedophiles and were caught to
have possessed articles/instruments indicating that they were engaged in child prostitution.
Prior to the apprehension, members of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation
performed close surveillance in Pagsanjan, Laguna. Petitioners questioned the validity of
their detention due to the violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
5 Bache Co. [Phil], Inc. v. Ruiz
Facts:
1. Petitioners (Andrew Harvey, 52, John Sherman, 72, Adriaan Van Del Elshout, 58)
were among the 22 alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three of close
surveillance by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation agents in
Pagsanjan, Laguna. They were the only ones who have chosen to face deportation.
2. Seized during petitioners’ apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos
of suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious (lustful) poses as well as boys and
girls engaged in the sex act. There were also posters and other literature
advertising the child prostitutes.
3. Based from the operation report on Harvey and Sherman dated February 29, 1988,
Harvey was found together with two young boys while Sherman was found with
two naked boys inside his room. Meanwhile, Del Elshout, the “after mission
report” dated February 27, 1988, revealed that there were two children ages 14
and 16 which subject readily accepted having been in his care and live-in for quite
sometime.
4. Deportation proceedings were instituted against the petitioners for being
undesirable aliens under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, being
pedophiles who are inimical to public morals, public health and public safety.
5. On April 4, 1988, petitioners availed of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. They
question the validity of their detention on the ground that, among others,
respondent (Miriam Santiago) violated Section 2, Article III prohibiting
unreasonable searches and seizures since the CID agents were not clothed with
warrants of arrest, search and seizure as required by said provision.
Ruling:
1. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed by Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution is available to all persons, including aliens,
whether accused of crime or not. One of the constitutional requirements of a valid
search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon probable cause.
2. An arrest may be effected by a peace officer or even a private person, even without
warrant, when the offense has, in fact, been committed and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. In
this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after
close surveillance for three months during which period their activities were
monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of
the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant.
3. That petitioners were not caught in the act does not make their arrest illegal. They
were found with boys in their respective rooms, the one with Sherman being
naked. Under those circumstances, the CID agents had reasonable grounds to
believe that petitioners had committed pedophilia.
Case Digests: Searches and Seizures • Mark Justin Mooc
Bache Co. [Phil], Inc. v. Ruiz
Misael Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter seeking issuance for a search
warrant against Bache Co. [Phil.] for violation of Section 46(a) of the NIRC and authorizing his
Revenue Examiner, de Leon, to make and file the application of search warrant. The
respondent judge, since he was hearing a certain case that moment when de Leon arrived the
following day, requested his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of de Leon and his
witness and, after his hearing of the case and the reading of the stenographer’s notes of the
depositions taken, asked the de Leon’s witness to take the oath. Three days later, the agents
of BIR served the warrant and seized 6 boxes of documents.
Facts:
1. On February 24, 1970, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Misael Vera) wrote a
letter addressed to respondent (Judge Vivencio Ruiz), requesting the issuance of a
search warrant against petitioners for violation of Section 46(a) of the National
Internal Revenue Code and authorizing his Revenue Examiner (Rodolfo de Leon) to
make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter.
2. The following day, de Leon and his witness (Arturo Logronio) went to the CFI of
Rizal, bringing with them: (a) respondent Vera’s letter-request, (b) application for
search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by de Leon, (c) an affidavit of
respondent Logronio subscribed before de Leon, (d) a deposition in printed form of
Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed, and (e) a
search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by respondent Judge.
3. Since the Judge was hearing a certain case, he (Ruiz) instructed his Deputy Clerk of
Court to take the depositions of de Leon and Logronio. After the session’s
adjournment, he (Ruiz) asked Logronio to take the oath. Prior to Logronio’s
swearing in, the stenographer, upon Ruiz’ request, read to him her stenographic
notes.
4. He signed de Leon’s application for search warran and Longonio’s deposition. After
which, the search warrant was signed and accordingly issued.
5. Three days later, the BIR agents served the search warrant at petitioners’ offices.
Petitioners’ lawyers protested the search warrant on the ground that no formal
complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. Despite this, the
agents proceeded with their search which yielded six boxes of documents.
Ruling:
1. Respondent Judge failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.
The examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, required
by the said constitutional provision and by Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court, should be conducted by the judge himself and not by
others. In the case at bar, no personal examination was conducted by respondent
Judge of the complainant and his witness. While it is true that the complainant’s
application for search warrant and the witness’ printed-form description were
subscribed and sworn to before Ruiz, the latter (Ruiz) did not ask any question
6 Prudente v Dayrit
whose answers could possibly be the basis for determining whether there exists
probable cause. It was precisely on account of the intention of the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention to make it a duty of the issuing judge to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. More so, the reading of the
stenographic notes to respondent judge did not constitute sufficient compliance
with the constitutional mandate the rule; for by that manner, respondent judge did
not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the complainant and his
witness, and to propound initial and follow-up questions which the judicial mind,
on account of its training, was in the best position to conceive.
2. The search warrant cannot be issued for more than one specific offense. This is in
compliance to Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which provides that no
search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized. A search
warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or when
the description expresses a conclusion of fact by which the warrant officer may be
guided in making the search and seizure; or when the things described are limited
to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being
issued.
Prudente v Dayrit
On a Saturday, the respondent Judge Dayrit issued a search warrant as applied for by
Dimagmaliw. Dimagmaliw believed that petitioner, Prudente, had in his possession firearms
and ammunitions found in the ground and second floors of Polytechnic University of the
Philippines. The search warrant was enforced the following day. Found in the drawer of a
cabinet inside the washroom of Dr. Prudente’s office was a bulging brown envelope with 3
live fragmentation hand grenades, each wrapped with old newspapers.
Facts:
1. Petitioner (Nemesio Prudente) was implicated for having violated PD 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms). As alleged by P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw when he
applied for a search warrant in the sala of Judge Abelardo Dayrit of the RTC Manila,
Prudente may be found at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines where he
was keeping and concealing firearms, explosive, handgrenades and ammunition,
specifically at the (a) Offices of the Department for Military Science and Tactics at
the ground floor and other rooms at the ground floor and (b) Office of the
President , Dr. Nemesio Prudente at PUP, 2nd floor and other rooms at the 2nd floor.
2. Dimagmaliw believes that a search warrant should be issued to enable him or any
agent of the law to take possession and bring to the court the following properties:
(a) M16 armalites with ammunitions, (b) .38 and .45 caliber handguns and pistols,
(c) explosives and handgrenades, and (d) assorted weapons with ammunition.
3. On the same day (October 31, 1987), the respondent Judge (Dayrit) issued search
warrant. The following day (Sunday), with some 200 West Police Department
operatives, the search warrant was enforced.
Case Digests: Searches and Seizures • Mark Justin Mooc
4. Meanwhile, a member of the searching team (Ricardo Abando) alleged in his
affidavit that he found in the drawer of a cabinet inside the washroom of Dr.
Prudente’s office a bulging brown envelope with 3 live fragmentation hand
grenades separately wrapped with old newspapers.
5. Petitioner however moved to quash the search warrant on grounds that (a) the
complainant’s lone witness (Lt. Florenio Angeles) had no personal knowledge of the
facts which formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant, (b)
examination of the said witness was not in the form of searching questions and
answers, (c) the search warrant was a general warrant for the reason that it did not
particularly describe the place to be searched and that it failed to charge one
specific offense, and (d) the search warrant was issued in violation of Circular No.
19 of the SC in that the complainant failed to allege under oath that the issuance of
the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent.
Ruling:
1. For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause which is to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The probable cause
must be in connection with one specific offense and the judge must, before issuing
the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath, the complainant and any witness he may produce, on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements
together with any affidavits submitted.
2. As held in Alvarez v. CFI, the true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to
warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in a manner
that perjury could be charged thereon and the affiant be held liable for damage
caused. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the applicant for search warrant, and/or his witnesses, not of the
facts merely reported by a person whom one considers reliable. Tested by the
above standard, the allegations of the witness do not come up to the level of facts
of his personal knowledge so much so that he cannot be held liable for perjury for
such allegations in causing the issuance of the questioned search warrant.
3. The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended. In the case at bar, the application for search warrant and the search
warrant itself described the place to be searched as the premises of PUP, and had
specified the offices of the said university. The designation of the place to be
searched sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction that a search
warrant must be particularly describe the place to be searched, even if there were
several rooms at the ground floor and second floor of PUP.
4. Applicant’s failure to state under oath the urgent need for the issuance of the
search warrant, his application having been filed on a Saturday, rendered the
questioned warrant invalid for being violative of SC Circular 19 which provides that:
7 Guanzon v. De Villa
applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays shall
likewise be taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the court having
jurisdiction of the place to be searched, but in such cases, the applicant shall certify
and state the facts under oath to the satisfaction of the judge that the issuance is
urgent.
Guanzon v. De Villa
The military and police officers conducted “Areal Target Zonings” or “saturation drives” in
Metro Manila, specifically on places where the subversives, as pinpointed by said authorities,
were hiding. During these saturation drives, police and military units cordon an area of more
than one residence and sometimes the whole barangay or areas of barangays, without any
search warrant or warrant of arrest. Petitioners claimed that said saturation drives followed
a common pattern of human rights abuses, as such, sought for its stoppage.
Facts:
1. The petitioners, who are of legal age, bona fide residents of Metro Manila, and
taxpayers and leaders in their respective communities, sought to prohibit the
military and police officers from conducting “Areal Target Zonings” or “saturation
drives” in Metro Manila.
2. Petitioners claim that on various dates from March 5, 1987 till November 3 of the
same year, various saturation drives were conducted by the respondents. Added
by the petitioners, that these “saturation drives” are in critical areas pinpointed by
the military and police as places where the subversives are hiding. The arrests
ranged from 7 persons (July 20, Bankusay, Tondo) to 1,500 (November 3, Lower
Maricaban, Pasay City) and that same followed a common pattern of human rights
abuses like police and military units, without any search warrant or warrant of
arrest, cordon an area of more than one residence and sometimes whole barangay
or areas of barangay in Metro Manila, from the dead of the night or early morning
hours and residents are herded as cows with men ordered to strip down to their
briefs and examined for tattoo marks and other imagined marks.
Ruling:
1.There appears to have been no impediment to securing search warrants or
warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or individuals roused from
sleep were arrested. There is no strong showing that the objectives sought to be
attained by the “areal zoning” could not be achieved as the rights of the squatter
and low income families are fully protected. Where a violation of human rights
specifically guaranteed by the Constitution is involved, it is the duty of the court to
stop the transgression and state where even the awesome power of the state may
not encroach upon the rights of the individual.
2. Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or military may go
in force to the combat areas, enter affected residences or buildings, round up
suspected rebels and otherwise quell the mutiny or rebellion without having to
secure search warrants and without violating the Bill of Rights.
Case Digests: Searches and Seizures • Mark Justin Mooc
3. A show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of the people are
protected and not violated. A blanket prohibition such as that sought by the
petitioners would limit all police power to one on one confrontation where search
warrants and warrants of arrest against specific individuals are easily procured.
Pita v. Court of Appeals
In an Anti-Smut Campaign, members of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila seized and
confiscated along the sidewalks of Manila publications, magazines and other reading
materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent. One of said publications is
“Pinoy Playboy” whose co-editor and publisher is Pita. Said materials were burned in public
along U-Belt.
Facts:
1. Pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of Manila (Ramon
Bagatsing) on December 1 and 3, 1983, members of the Metropolitan Police Force
of Manila seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and
peddlers along Manila sidewalks magazines, publications and other reading
materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent. The said materials
included “Pinoy Playboy” whose co-editor and publisher is the petitioner (Leo Pita).
The said materials were burned in public along the University Belt along CM Recto
Avenue, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of
various student organizations.
2. Petitioner, on December 7, 1983, prayed for issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and the superintendent of the Western Police
District of Manila (Narciso Cabrera), restraining them and their agents from
confiscating Pinoy Playboy magazines or from preventing the sale of the said
magazine for it, according to Pita, is a decent, artistic, and educational magazine.
3. Five days laters, petitioner filed an urgent motion for issuance of a TRO against
indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of the said magazine pending
hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction.
4. In opposing petitioner’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction, Mayor
Bagatsing pointed that during the anti-smut campaign, the materials confiscated
belonged to the magazine stand owners and peddlers, who voluntarily surrendered
their reading materials and that petitioner’s establishment was not raided.
5. The trial court denied the motion for a writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed
the case for lack of merit. On appeal to the CA, RTC’s decision was affirmed.
Ruling:
1. It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant,
otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to challenge. Pertinent
provisions state that the search must have been incident to a lawful search, and
the arrest must be on account of a crime committed. In the case at bar, no party
has been charged, nor are such charges being readied against any party.
8 Valmonte v. De Villa
2. The Court rejected the argument that “there is no constitutional nor legal provision
which would free the accused of all criminal responsibility because there had been
no warrant” and that “violation of penal law must be punished.” For starters, there
is no accused here to speak of, who out to be punished. Second, to say that the
respondent Mayor could have validly ordered the raid (as a result of an anti-smut
campaign), without a lawful search warrant because, in his opinion, “violation of
penal laws” has been committed, is to make the respondent Mayor judge, jury and
executioner rolled into one.
Valmonte v. De Villa
The NCR-District Command established checkpoints in various points of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. According to petitioner, who had been subjected to checkpoint once, the checkpoints
caused worries among the residents of Valenzuela, especially the possibility of getting
harassed.
Facts:
1. Activated through LOI 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, the NCR
District Command sought to conduct security operations within its area of
responsibility and peripheral areas for the purpose of establishing an effective
territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere
conducive to the social, economic and political development of the NCR. As part of
its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various
parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
2. Petitioner (Ricardo Valmonte), together with the Union of Lawyers and Advocates
for People’s Rights, contended that said checkpoints caused worries among the
residents of Valenzuela, including the possibility of getting harassed. Aside from
the possibility of getting harassed, residents worry of their safety due to the
arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the
checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular
searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a
search warrant and/or court order.
3. On July 9, 1988, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan
(Benjamin Parpon) was gunned down (not killed) allegedly by members of the
NCRDC manning the checkpoint for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to
the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off in spite of warning shots fired in the
air.
4. Petitioners (Valmonte and ULAP) contended that the said checkpoints give the
respondents (De Villa) a blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures
without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution. Valmonte
has claimed that he had gone thru said checkpoints where he was stopped and his
car subjected to search/check-up without a court order or search warrant.
Ruling:
Case Digests: Searches and Seizures • Mark Justin Mooc
1. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their
routine checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners’
right against unlawful searches and seizures, or other rights. Petitioner’s general
allegation that he had been stopped and searched without a search warrant by the
military manning the checkpoints, without stating the details of the incidents which
amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not
sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of
Valmonte’s right against unlawful search and seizure.
2. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal
right, and could be invoked only by those whose rights have been infringed or
threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search
and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a
consideration of the circumstances involved.
3. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is
to be resolved according to the facts of each case. When the officer merely draws
aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds or
simply looks into a vehicle or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute
unreasonable search.
4. Between the inherent right of the State to protect its existence and promote public
welfare and an individual’s right against a warrantless search, which is reasonably
conducted, the former shall prevail.
People v. Burgos
Burgos was alleged to be a member of the NPA. In his possession, one homemade revolver
was found. He claimed that there was no valid warrant to effect search.
Facts:
1. Ruben Burgos was convicted for the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms in
Furtherance of Subversion. In his possession was found one homemade revolver,
calibre .38, make Smith and Wesson. Said firearm was issued to and used by
Burgos at Tiguman Digos, Davao de Sur by Alias Commander Pol of the NPA in the
performance of his subversive tasks such as the recruitment of new members to
the NPA and collection of contributions from the members.
2. Burgos, in his own account, claimed to have been torture and physical agony for he
repeatedly refused to accept said firearm as his. He was undressed, with only
blindfold, hot water poured in his body and over his private parts.
3. In his appeal to the SC, he claimed that there was no valid warrant to effect search
in his house; thus, making him liable for the crime of illegal possession.
Ruling:
1. Based on the statement given by Cesar Masamlok (a former NPA), when the police
authorities went to Burgos’ house, they did not have any warrant of arrest or
search warrant with them.
9 People v. Malmstedt
2. Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113 which states that “[w]hen the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his
presence,” no search warrant or warrant of arrest is needed to make the arrest
valid. Moreover, said offense must be committed in his presence or within his
view. In the case at bar, there is no such personal knowledge in this case for
whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers came entirely from
the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was
given by the Burgos’ wife. And, at the time of Burgos’ arrest, he was not in actual
possession of any firearm or subversive document neither was he committing any
act which could be described as subversive. In fact, he was plowing his field at the
time of the arrest.
3. The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and
any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or
rule which allows exceptions to the requirements of warrants of arrest is strictly
construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a
warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. The
court cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its
application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe
upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving
of full protection.
4. The questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents were obtained in
violation of Burgos’ constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures; this, making said articles inadmissible as evidence.
People v. Malmstedt
On Malmstedt’s way from Sagada to Angeles City, the police boarded the bus where he was
riding. A bulge was spotted on Malmstedt’s waist and, when opened, 4 suspicious-looking
objects wrapped in brown packing tape were found. When said objects were opened, the
wrapped objects turned out to be hashish, a derivative of marijuana. Moreover, in each of his
bags, teddy bears contained hashish.
Facts:
1. On May 11, 1989, the Commanding Officer (Capt. Alen Vasco) of the First Regional
Command (NARCOM) ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at
Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province. Said checkpoint was for the
purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region and was
prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, the Commanding
Officer received an information that a Caucasian (Mikael Malmstedt) coming from
Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.
2. In the afternoon of same day, the bus where Malmstedt was riding was stopped.
Malmstedt was on his way to Angeles City and would then proceed to Manila to
catch his flight out of the country two days later. In the bus, 2 NARCOM officers
(Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan) boarded the bus and announced that they were
Case Digests: Searches and Seizures • Mark Justin Mooc
members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. Said officers
started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus where the
accused was seated.
3. Galutan noticed a bulge on Malmstedt’s waist. He suspected that said bulge was a
gun, thus he asked for the latter’s passport and other identification papers to which
he (Malmstedt) failed to comply. For failure to comply with presenting passport
and identification papers, Galutan required Malmstedt to bring out whatever it was
that was bulging on his waist. It turned out that the bulging object was a pouch
bag and when Malmstedt opened the said bag as ordered, the officer noticed 4
suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape. When opened, the
wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
4. Malmstedt was invited for questioning outside. But before leaving the bus, he
stopped to get 2 travelling bags. The officers, upon Malmstedt’s alighting from the
bus, got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear, having bulges, was found in
each bag. After the bags were opened, it was then that Malmstedt presented his
passport.
5. Malmstedt was brought to the headquarters of NARCOM at Camp Dangwas, La
Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers
opened the teddy bears and found to contain hashish.
6. An information was filed against Malmstedt for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972. Malmstedt raised the issue of illegal search of his personal effects.
Ruling:
1. There are exceptions where a search may be made pursuant to a lawful arrest
which need not to obtain a search warrant. These circumstances include: (a) when
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to
commit an offense, in the presence of a peace officer or a private person; (b) when
the offense was committed and the peace officer/private person has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
institution/place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another. In the case at bar, accused was searched and arrested while
transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was actually being committed by the
accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his
personal effects falls squarely under the first circumstance provided by the law
which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
2. The acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag
and in opening one of the wrapped objects inside said bag as well as the two travel
bags containing 2 teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by
Malmstedt’s own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport,
and by the information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of
the ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to search even without warrant,
10 People v. Lo Ho Wing (alias Peter Lo), Lim Cheng Huat (alias Antonio Lim) and Reynaldo Tia
in the light of such circumstance, would be to sanction impotence and
ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
People v. Lo Ho Wing (alias Peter Lo), Lim Cheng Huat (alias Antonio Lim) and Reynaldo Tia
Reynaldo Tia, “a deep penetration agent” of the SOG, reported of his undercover activities on
the suspected criminal syndicate led by Lo and Lim. Moreover, Tia informed his superior
regarding their return to the country. Upon arrival in the Philippines, Lo and Tia rode in one
taxi cab while Lim rode in another. They were pursued by the members of the NARCOM and
were stopped. With permission of Lo and Tia, a tin can of tea was taken out of the red travel
bag and, upon examination by the PC-INP Crime Laboratory, contained metamphetamine.
Petitioner contend that a warrant was needed.
Facts:
1. The Special Operations Group received a tip from one of its informers about an
organized group engaged in the importation of illegal drugs, smuggling of
contraband goods and gunrunning. As part of the operations, the recruitment of
confidential men and “deep penetration agents” was carried out to infiltrate the
crime syndicate. One of those recruited was Reynaldo Tia.
2. Tia was introduced to Lim Cheng Huat (Antonio Lim) where the latter expressed a
desire to hire a male travel companion for his business trips abroad. Tia offered his
services and was hire. Together with Lim, Tia, in one of the meetings in China, was
introduced to Lo Ho Wing (Peter Lo) whom tia found out to be the person he was
to accompany to China in lieu of Lim.
3. As “deep penetration agent,” Tia regularly submitted reports of his undercover
activities on the suspected criminal syndicate to Capt. Luisito Palmera, head of
Oplan Sharon 887 – the group created in order to bus the suspected syndicate. Tia
informed Palmera of their return to the Philippines after they (Lo and Tia) left for
Hong Kong.
4. Upon arrival in the Philippines, they were met by Lim. After Lim and Lo finished
their conversation, Lo hailed a taxicab. Lo and Tia boarded the taxicab while Lim
followed in another taxi cab. Meanwhile, the operatives of the NARCOM (Narcotics
Command), having been notified by Palmera, stationed themselves in strategic
places around the arrival area. Upon seeing Lo and Tia leave the airport, the
operatives followed them. Along Imelda Avenue, the car of the operatives
overtook the taxicab ridden by Lo and Tia and cut into its path which forced the taxi
driver to stop. The other tax cab carrying Lim, however, sped away but was later
caught on Retiro Street, Quezon City.
5. Going back to Lo and Tia, the operatives approached the taxicab and asked the
driver to open the baggage compartment. Three pieces of luggage were retrieved
from the back compartment of the vehicle. The operatives requested from Lo and
Tia permission to search their luggage. A tin can of tea was taken out of the red
travel bag owned by Lo. A certain Sgt. Cayabyab, one of the operatives, pried the
lid open, pulled out a paper tea bag from the can and pressed it in the middle to
feel its contents. Some crystalline white powder resembling crushed aluminium
Case Digests: Searches and Seizures • Mark Justin Mooc
came out of the bag. The sergeant then opened the tea bag and examined its
content more closely. He had the three travel bags opened for inspection. From
the red travel bag, 6 tin cans were found, including the one previously opened and
nothing else was recovered from the other bags.
6. The tea bag contained metamphetamine after examination by the PC-INP Crime
Laboratory. One of metamphetamine’s derivatives is metamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu/poor man’s cocaine).
7. The three were charged with violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
8. Lo contends that the search and seizure was illegal. He contends that the officers
concerned could very well have procured a search warrant since they had been
informed of the date and time of arrival of the accused at the NAIA well ahead of
time. Moreover, as claimed by Lo, the fact that the search and seizure in question
were made on a moving vehicle does not automatically make the warrantless
search fall within the coverage of exceptions of the necessity of a valid warrant to
effect search.
Ruling:
1. The search and seizure supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. As set
forth in Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, there are at least 3 well-recognized
exceptions, namely: (a) a search incidental to an arrest, (b) a search of a moving
vehicle, and (c) seizure of evidence in plain view. In the case at bar, there is a clear
showing that the search in question, having been made in a moving vehicle, does
not need a valid warrant to effect search.
2. A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of
the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
Yee Sue Kuy v. Almeda
A search warrant was issued, upon application by Almeda and presentation of Estrada as
witness, to effect search and seizure of store and premises of Sam & Sing Co., which is owned
by petitioner. Said search and seizure was in connection to petitioner’s activities of lending
money at usurious rates.
Facts:
1. Respondent (Mariano Almeda), chief agent of the Anti-Usury Board, applied for a
search warrant to command any peace officer to search during day time the store
and premises occupied by Sam Sing & Co., situated at Sagay, Occidental Negros as
well as the person of the said company, and to seize the documents, notebooks,
lists, receipts and promissory notes. Said search warrant was issued by the justice
of peace of Sagay, Occidental Negros on the same day, May 5, 1938, after taking
the testimony of Jose Estrada, a special agent of the Anti-Usury Board.
2. The said search warrant was to effect search and seizure of articles in connection
with Sam Sing & Co.’s activities of lending money at usurious rates of interest, in
violation of law.
11 Pasion vda. De Garcia v. Locsin
3. The search warrant was enforced on the same day, at 10:30 a.m. by Almeda,
Estrada, two internal revenue agents and two members of the Philippine Army.
Immediately after the search and seizure, Almeda filed a return with the justice of
peace of Sagay with a request that the office of the Anti-Usury Board be allowed to
retain possession of the articles seized for examination, pursuant to Section 4, Act
4109.
4. Petitioner contended that the search warrant is illegal because the warrant was
issued 3 days ahead of the application and Estrada’s affidavit is insufficient, and
that seizure of the articles by means of a search warrant for the purpose of using
them as evidence in the criminal case against the petitioners, is unconstitutional
because the warrant becomes unreasonable and amounts to a violation of the
constitutional prohibition against compelling the accused to testify against himself.
Ruling:
1. On the first contention, that is, issuance of search warrant 3 days prior to
application, is not supported.
2. The criticism of petitioners that the search warrant in question was not issued in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by Section 1, Paragraph 3 of Article III of
the Constitution and of section 97, General Order 58 is unfounded. As a matter of
fact, the strict observance of such formalities was followed. The applicant Almeda,
in his application, swore that “he made his own personal investigation and
ascertained that Sam Sing & Co. is lending money without license, charging
usurious rate of interest and is keeping, utilizing and concealing in the store and
premises, occupied by it documents, notebooks, lists, receipts, promissory notes
and book of accounts and records. Moreover, witness Estrada, in his testimony
before the judge, swore that he knew Sam Sing & Co. and its activities because he
personally investigated the victims who secured loans from Sam Sing & Co.
3. The description of the articles seized, as given in the search warrant, is likewise
sufficient. Where, by the nature of the goods seized, their description must be
rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would
mean that no warrant could issue.
4. Neither can there be objection to the fact that the objects seized from petitioners
were retained by the agents of the Anti-Usury Board, instead of being turned over
to the justice of the peace of Sagay, for the reason that the custody of said agents
is the custody of the issuing officer/court, the retention having been approved by
the latter.
Pasion vda. De Garcia v. Locsin
De Garcia’s person, house or store were subjected to a search by virtue of a search warrant.
Said search was performed, together with the PC, by the agent of the Anti-Usury Board. Due
to the confinement of petitioner due to an illness, the agent showed the search warrant to
petitioner’s bookkeeper. Seized were two packages of records and a locked-filing cabinet
containing several papers and documents.
Case Digests: Searches and Seizures • Mark Justin Mooc
Facts:
1. An agent of the Anti-Usury Board (Mariano Almeda) obtained from the justice of
peace of Tarlac a search warrant commanding any officer of the law to search the
person, house or store of petitioner at Victoria, Tarlac for “certain books, lists,
chits, receipts, documents and other papers relating to her activities as usurer.”
2. On the same date (November 10, 1934), Almeda, together with the captain of the
Philippine Constabulary, went to petitioner’s office in Victoria, Tarlac. After
showing the search warrant to petitioner’s bookkeeper (Alfredo Salas), and without
the presence of petitioner who was ill and confined at the time, Almeda proceeded
with the warrant’s execution. Two packages of records and a locked filing cabinet
containing several papers and documents were seized. Said papers and documents
were kept for a considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury Board and were
turned over by it (the Board) to the fiscal who filed 6 separate criminal cases
against petitioner for violation of the Anti-Usury Law.
3. After the seizure, petitioner demanded the return of the documents seized.
Moreover, the legality of the search warrant was challenged by the petitioner twice
(January 7 and June 4, 1937).
Ruling:
1. Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and
for a search warrant to be valid, (a) it must be issued upon probable cause; (b) the
probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant
or any other person; (c) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must
examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the
applicant may produce; and (d) the warrant issued must particularly describe the
place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. In the case at bar, the
existence of probable cause was determined not be the judge himself but by the
applicant.
2. The constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right which may be waived. The waiver may be either express or implied.
It is well-settled that to constitute a waiver of constitutional right, it must appear
that: (a) right exists, (b) persons involved had knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right, and (c) said person had an actual
intention to relinquish said right. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable
searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except
the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in
his/her behalf. In the case at bar, she could not have objected because she was
sick and was not present when the warrant was served upon. Moreover, upon
knowing of the seizure of some of her documents and papers, she had sent her
lawyers to the office of the Anti-Usury Board to demand the return of the
documents seized. The failure on the part of the petitioner and her bookkeeper to
resist or object to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied
12 Burgos v. Chief of Staff
waiver of constitutional right, rather it is merely a demonstration of regard for the
supremacy of the law.
Burgos v. Chief of Staff
The newspaper offices of “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” were searched, and office and
printing macines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in
printing, publication and distribution of said newspapers, among others, were seized. The
premises were padlocked and sealed, which resulted to the newspapers’ discontinuance.
Facts:
1. Jose Burgos, Jr. is publisher-editor of the “We Forum” newspaper. Together with
the “Metropolitan Mail” office, “We Forum” newspaper office was seized searched,
and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and
other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of said newspapers
as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature. Said
articles were to be alleged to be in the possession and control of Burgos.
2. The search warrant was issued by Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, issued last December 7,
1982. The application for the warrant was done by Col. Rolando Abadilla,
Intelligence Officer of the PC Metrocom. Said application was accompanied by the
Joint Affidavit by members of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group
(Alejandro Gutierrez, Pedro Tango), both of whom were under Col. Abadilla and
conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for
the warrant.
3. The search was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan
dailies thus generating public interest. As a consequence of the search and seizure,
said premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing
and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.
Ruling:
1.When the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or
editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at
bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification,
stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is
intending to publish. Mere generalization would not suffice. Thus, the broad
statement in Abadilla’s application that petitioner “is in possession or has in his
control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publication, committing
the offense of subversion punishable under PD 885 as amended” is a mere
conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft
of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause,
said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.”
2. Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court enumerates the personal properties that
may be seized under a search warrant, namely: (a) property subject of the offense,
(b) property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds/fruits of the offense, and (c)
property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. Said
Case Digests: Searches and Seizures • Mark Justin Mooc
rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him
for under subsection (b), one of the properties that may be seized is stolen
property. Stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose
possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore,
is of no consequence and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant
is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized, as
petitioner was alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized under
the warrants.
Corro v. Lising
Corro is the publisher and editor of the Philippine Times, whose offices were subjected to
search and seizure of items and articles that were used and being used as instruments and
means of committing the crime of inciting to sedition.
Facts:
1. Petitioner (Rommel Corro) is publisher and editor of the Philippine Times.
2. Upon application filed by Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo of the PC-Criminal Investigation
Service, respondent (RTC Judge Esteban Lising) issued a search warrant on
September 29, 1983, authorizing the search and seizure of: (a) printed copies of
Philippine Times, (b) manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication in the Philippine
Times, (c) newspaper dummies of the Philippine Times, (d) subversive documents,
articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets, banners, and (e) typewriters,
duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines, video
machines and tapes. Said items/articles were used and being used as instrument
and means of committing the crime of inciting to sedition (Article 142).
3. On November 6, 1984, petitioner filed an urgent motion to recall warrant and to
return documents/personal properties alleging, among others that said seized
properties were not in any way connected with the offense of inciting to sedition
and that the documents/papers seized has been rendered moot and academic due
to the findings of the Agrava Board – having exclusive jurisdiction to determine the
facts and circumstances behind the killing of Ninoy Aquino – that a military
conspiracy was responsible for Ninoy Aquino’s slaying. Said motion was denied by
respondent.
Ruling:
1. Probable cause, as defined in Burton v. St. Paul, M&M. Ry. Co., is constituted by
“such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances, as will warrant a cautious
man in the belief that his actions, and the means taken in prosecuting it, are legally
just and proper.” Thus, an application for search warrant must state with
particularity the alleged subversive materials published or intended to be
published by the petitioner.
2. A search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit
13 Olaes v. People
the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search
warrant – to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles
should they should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may
not be committed.
3. The statement of Col. Castillo in his affidavit state that they have “found that the
said publication in fact foments distrust and hatred against the government of the
Philippines and its duly constituted authorities,” together with Lt. Ignacio’s
statement that said periodical “contains articles tending to incite distrust and
hatred for the Philippine Government,” is a mere conclusion of law and would not
satisfy the requirements of probable cause.
Olaes v. People
Olaes was indicted for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He was believed to have in
his possession marijuana dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited
and exempt narcotics preparations.
Facts:
1. Adolfo Olaes was believed to have in his possession marijuana dried
stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and exempt
narcotics preparations; thus, indicting petitioners of violation of RA 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Acts of 1972) despite failure to pinpoint specific section of same.
2. Petitioners challenged the admission of evidence seized by virtue of an allegedly
invalid warrant issued on March. More so, petitioners claimed that the search
warrant issued by the judge is unconstitutional because it did not indicate the
specific offense the petitioners have supposedly committed; thus, making no valid
finding of probable cause as a justification for the issuance of the said warrant in
conformity with the Bill of Rights.
Ruling:
1. Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is
no question at all of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis
for the finding of probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies the
requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the description to be made
of the “place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” Thus, the
articles seized under the challenged search warrant were admitted as evidence.
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. CA
Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc, together with other enterprises, were subjected to search by
virtue of 6 search warrants, having been applied for by a particular Atty. Gatmaytan. PADS
Task Force issued said search warrants.
Facts:
Case Digests: Searches and Seizures • Mark Justin Mooc
1. The PADS Task Force through State Prosecutor Jose Rosales issued 6 search
warrants against Karamfil Import-Export Co, Inc., P&B Enterprise Co., Inc.,
Philippine Veterans Corporation, Philippine Veterans Development Corporation,
Philippine Construction Development Corporation, Philippine Lauan Industries
Corporation, Inter-Trade Development, Amelili U. Malaquiok Enterprises and Jaime
P. Lucman Enterprises. Said search warrants were issued upon application by Atty.
Napoleon Gatmaytan of the Bureau of Customs and a deputized member of the
PADS Task Force, together with the affidavit of Josefin M. Castro, an operative and
investigator of the PADS Task Force.
2. Respondents questioned whether the PADS Task Force is “such other responsible
officer” allowed/countenanced by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants of
search and seizures. The RTC, therefore, declared the said search warrants as null
and void, and eventually denied reconsideration. In disposing of the petition, the
said court found the material issues to include: (a) competency of RTC to act on
petition filed by the petitioners, (b) validity of the search warrants issued by the
respondent State Prosecutor, and (c) whether the petition has become moot and
academic because all the search warrants sought to be quashed had already been
implemented and executed.
3. On appeal, PADS was upheld. The CA declared that the PADS Task Force is a quasi-
judicial body, making it co-equal with the RTC. However, on motion for
reconsideration by Karamfil, the CA reversed itself.
Ruling:
1. The PADS, as stated in the task force’s organic act PD 1936 as amended by PD 2002,
was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions to try and decide claims and
execute its judgment. It is the President’s arm called upon to combat the vie of
“dollar salting” or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange. It is rather
tasked by the PD to handle the prosecution of such activities but nothing more.
Thus, not being a quasi-judicial body, it cannot be considered co-equal or
coordinate with RTC.
2. Under the 1887 Constitution, the powers of arrest and search are exclusive upon
judges. The incident, which happened during the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution, had become moot and academic.
3. When the 1973 Constitution spoke of “responsible officer” to whom the authority
to issue arrest and search warrants may be delegated by legislation, it did not
furnish the legislator with the license to give that authority to whomsoever it
pleased. It is to be noted that the Charter qualified that the officer himself must be
“responsible.” The Court takes “responsibility,” as used by the Constitution, to
mean not only skill and competence but more significantly, neutrality and
independence comparable to the impartiality presumed of a judicial officer. Thus,
a prosecutor falls short to be considered having possessed the latter qualities. The
implied exclusion of prosecutors under the 1973 Constitution was founded on the
requirements of due process, specifically the assurance to the respondent of an
14 Salazar v. Achacoso
unbiased inquiry of the charges against him prior to the arrest of his person or
seizure of his property.
4. The Court agreed that the PADS Task Force is meant to exercise prosecutorial
powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached “judge”
to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search.
Salazar v. Achacoso
Salazar’s properties in her residence and dance studio were seized by virtue of a search
warrant issued by the POEA.
Facts:
1. Petitioner (Hortencia “Horty” Salazar) was charged by a Rosalie Tesoro wth the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. According to Tesoro, after she
surrendered her PECC Card to petitioner, she promised her of “booking” in Japan.
However, after 9 months, Tesoro was still in the Philippines and was never able to
travel to Japan, and that her PECC card was not released by Salazar.
2. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent a telegram to petitioner.
Respondent requested the petitioner before him being a part of POEA Anti-Illegal
Recruitment Unit. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no
license to operate a recruitment agency, administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a
closure and seizure order, numbered 1205.
3. The Director of POEA Licensing and Regulation (Atty. Estelita Espiritu) issued an
order designation Atty. Marquez, Atty. Abara and Atty. Vistro as members of the
team tasked to implement the Closure and Seizure Order rendered by Achacoso.
After proceeding to petitioner’s residence, the team, assisted by Mandaluyong
policemen and mediamen, went to Hannalie Dance Studio, which petitioner
operated.
4. Before entering Hannalie Dance Studio, the team served said order on a certain
Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. When
required to show credentials, Salazar was unable to produce any. The team
confiscated assorted costumes when they chanced upon 12 talent performers
practicing a dance number. The confiscation was duly receipted for by Mrs.
Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Salazar.
5. Petitioner, through a letter to POEA, requested that the personal properties seized
at her residence be returned.
Issue: Whether the POEA validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article
38 of the Labor Code.
Ruling:
1. Under the present Constitution, it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search
and arrest. It was declared that mayors may not exercise this power, neither by a
mere prosecuting body. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and
Case Digests: Searches and Seizures • Mark Justin Mooc
undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may
order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for purpose of deportation.
2. Section 38(c), as amended by PD 1920 and 2018, bestowed to the Minister of Labor
the power to recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal
recruitment. More so, PD 1920 gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure
power. That, the Minister of Labor and Employment has the power to cause the
arrest and detention of such non-licensee or nonholder of authority if after proper
investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national
security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers.
Meanwhile, PD 2018 bestowed upon the Minister of Labor search and seizure
powers. However, the decrees in question stood as dying vestiges of authoritarian
rule in its twilight moments. Thuss, the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may
no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Article 38(c) of the Labor Code is
declared unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
Stonehill v. Diokno
42 search warrants were issued by judges, upon application by officers of government. 29
out of the 42 search warrants were intended for the corporations and offices which the
petitioners were affiliated with; the rest were intended for their residences. Petitioners were
charged for violating the Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Law, Internal Revenue and
RPC. In the performance of the search warrants, several items were seized including books of
accounts, financial records and documents showing all business transactions.
Facts:
1. A total of 42 search warrants were issued against petitioners and/or corporations
of which they were officers by several judges upon the application of the officers of
government (Diokno as Secretary of Justice, Jose Lukban as Acting Director of NBI,
among others). Said search warrants directed any peace officer to search the
persons of petitioners (Harry Stonehill, Robert Brooks, John Brooks, Karl Beck)
and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize
and take possession of personal property, which includes: books of accounts,
financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit
and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers). Said items/articles are “the
subject of the offense, stolen or embezzled and proceeds/fruits of the offense” or
“used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense,” which is
violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue, and the
RPC.
2. Petitioners contend that the search warrants are null and void for: (a) they do not
describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized. (b) cash
money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized, (c) the warrants were
issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases
filed against them, (d) the searches and seizures were made illegally, and (e) the
15 Papa v. Mago
documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that
issued the warrants.
3. Respondents, in their answer, alleged that the contested search warrants are valid
and have been issued in accordance with law, that the defects of said warrants, if
any, were cured by petitioners’ consent, and that the effects seized are admissible
in evidence against petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the
aforementioned searches and seizures.
Ruling:
1. In deciding this case, the Court split the documents, papers, and things seized into
two major groups: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned
corporations and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners.
2. With regard to the first group, i.e., those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations, petitioners have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made pursuant thereof. It is
for the reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate
and distinct from the personality of petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares
of stock or of the interest and whatever office they may hold. The legality of the
seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired and
that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot
be availed of by third parties. Petitioners may not validly object to the use of
articles seized from the offices as evidence against them since the right to object to
the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to corporation to
whom the seized effects belong and may not be invoked by the corporate officers
in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
3. As for the second group, i.e., those found and seized in petitioners’ residences, said
items/articles cannot be used as evidence against them. None of the requirements
laid down by the Constitutional provision (that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judges in the manner set forth in said
provision, and that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized)
has been complied with in the contested warrants. No specific offense has been
alleged in said applications for the said applications stated that the persons
concerned have violated Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue and RPC. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued
the warrants to have found existence of probable cause. More so, the
applications did not allege any specific act performed by petitioners.
4. The constitutional provision on searches and seizures seek to outlaw general
warrants. More so, no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense.
5. Respondents, citing Moncado v. People’s Court, maintained that, despite the
unconstitutionality of the searches and seizures, the items/articles seized are
admissible in evidence against petitioners. However, said doctrine is abandoned.
6. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary both to the letter and spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. (The non-
Case Digests: Searches and Seizures • Mark Justin Mooc
exclusionary rule is that established in Moncado v. People’s Court. ) To be sure, if
the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable
cause of the commission of a given crime by a party against whom the warrant is
intended, there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the
requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such
competent evidence, then it is not possible for the judge to find that there is
probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The
only possible explanation for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of
the commission of a crime. But, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence
of evidence to establish a probable cause.
7. The search warrants of petitioners’ residences (group 2) are null and void. As for
the warrants in 29 places, offices and other premises (group 1), they are valid.
Papa v. Mago
Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized member of the Bureau of Customs,
together with Alagao and other elements of the counter-intelligence unit, seized 9 bales of
goods from two trucks. Said items, according to an information, were misdeclared and
undervalued. The cargo owner, respondent in this case, claimed that the MPD seized said
goods without a search warrant.
Facts:
1. Petitioner Martin Alagao (head of the counter-intelligence unit of the MPD), having
received a reliable information that a certain shipment of personal effects were
allegedly misdeclared and undervalued and were to be released from the customs
zone of the port of Manila, conducted surveillance of said zone. With him were
petitioner Ricardo Papa, the Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized member
of the BOC, and other elements of the counter-intelligence unit. The information
which reached Alagao specified that said misdeclared and undervalued items were
loaded on two trucks.
2. The trucks left the gate where Alagao’s group conducted surveillance. However,
such trucks were later intercepted. The load of the two trucks consisted of 9 bales
of goods.
3. The cargo was owned by Remedios Mago while the truck was owned by Valentin
Lanopa. In their petition in the CFI of Manila, they claimed that the MPD seized the
goods without search warrant issued by a competent court, and that Papa denied
the request of Mago’s counsel that the bales be not opened and the goods not
examined.
4. The respondent judge issued an order restraining petitioners from opening the
nine bales in question. However, some bales were already opened by examiners of
the BOC when the restraining order was received.
5. Respondent contended that, since the inventory of the goods seized did not show
any article of prohibited importation, such articles should be released upon her
posting of the bond to be determined by court. Petitioners contended however
that most of the goods, as shown in the inventory, were not declared and were
16 Nolasco v. Cruz-Paño
thus subject to forfeiture. Respondent judge issued an order releasing the good
upon the filing of the bond in the amount of Php 40,000.00 to which the
respondent complied with.
Issue: Is there a need to procure a warrant before search be made?
Ruling:
1. The Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the
purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are
actually in possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had
previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and
forfeiture proceedings. In the case at bar, the moment the BOC actually seized the
goods in question, the BOC acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of
enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts.
2. Petitioner Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure
without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs
Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes
persons having police authority under Section 2203 to enter, pass through or
search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling
house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk,
package or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine
any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or
prohibited articles.
Nolasco v. Cruz-Paño
Aguilar-Roque is accused of rebellion. On August 6, 1984, she was arrested together with
Nolasco. 30 minutes after her arrest, the vicinity where she was arrested was likewise
searched. During said search, 431 items were seized and the person in-charge of the
premises, Tolentino, was arrested. Petitioners assert that the search warrant partake of a
general warrant; thus, said items cannot be admitted as evidence.
Facts:
1. One of the petitioners (Aguilar-Roque) was accused of the Rebellion of Military
Commission No. 25. She was arrested on August 6, 1984, 11:30 AM by a
Constabulary Security Group (CSG). Arrested with Roque was Nolasco. 30 minutes
later, elements of the CSG searched the premises at 239-B Mayon St., Quezon City.
During the said search, one of the petitioners Tolentino, who was the person in-
charge of the premises, was arrested. 428 documents and written materials were
seized, together with a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes.
2. Three hours prior to the search, Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG applied for
a search warrant from Judge Paño to be served on 239-B Mayon St., Quezon City.
Said place was determined to be the leased residence of Aguilar-Roque after
almost a month of “round the clock surveillance.” Said warrant was issued in
Case Digests: Searches and Seizures • Mark Justin Mooc
proceedings entiled “PP v. Mila Aguilar-Roque, Accused, Search Warrant No. 80-84
for rebellion.” This is known to be the Search Warrant Case.
3. Nolasco, Aguilar-Roque and Tolentino wre charged for subversion/rebellion and/or
conspiracy to commit rebellion/subversion.
4. Petitioners, on December 12, prayed in a Motion to Suppress filed with MTC Judge
Santos that the items (total of 431) be returned to them. Such motion was denied
by Judge Santos on the ground that the validity of the Search Warrant had to be
litigated in the Search Warrant Case.
5. Petitioners assert that the search warrant is void because it is a general warrant
since it did not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the
search and seizure and that probable cause had not been properly established for
lack of searching questions.
Ruling:
1. The items enumerated in the search warrant were vaguely described and not
particularized. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to
what items might be lawfully seized this giving the officers of the law discretion
regarding what articles they should seize. Therefore, it is in the nature of a general
warrant and thus infringes the constitutional mandate requiring particular
description of the things to be seized.
2. Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the search warrant and although,
ordinarily, the articles seized under an invalid search should be returned, they
cannot be ordered returned in the case at bar, for some searches may be made
without warrant. As declared in Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a
person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the crime. Said
provision is confined to search, without a search warrant of a person who had been
arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or
premises where the arrest was made can also be searched without a search
warrant. In the latter case, “the extent and reasonableness of the search must be
decided on its own facts and circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the
application of general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to what
constitutes the extent of the place or premises which may be searched. What must
be considered is the balancing of the individual’s right to privacy and the public’s
interest in the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals.”
3. Roque –charged with rebellion which is a crime against public order, a warrant for
her arrest had not been served for a considerable period of time, arrested within
the general vicinity of her dwelling, and search of her dwelling was made within a
half hour of her arrest – did not need a search warrant for the possible effective
results in the interest of public order.
Posadas v. CA
Petitioner was walking within the premises of Rizal Memorial Colleges when he was spotted
by 2 members of the INP. He was spotted carrying a buri bag and, according to the INP
17 People v. de Lara
members, was acting suspiciously. When he was approached by the officers who duly
identified themselves as members of the INP, petitioner attempted to flee but was stopped.
The buri bag, when checked, contained a calibre .38 gun, ammunitions for a .38 calibre and a
.22 calibre gun, and a smoke grenade.
Facts:
1. Petitioner was caught during the surveillance of members of the Integrated
National Police (Ursicio Ungab and Umbra Umpar) on October 16, 1986 at about 10
in the morning. He was caught in Magallanes St., Davao Citym within the premises
of Rizal Memorial Colleges. Petitioner was carrying a buri bag and “was acting
suspiciously,” as described by the two members of the INP.
2. When they approached petitioner, they identified themselves as members of the
INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but was thwarted. The two officers checked the
buri bag and found: 1 caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with serial no. 770196, 2
rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke grenade, and 2 live
ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun.
3. Petitioner was brought to the headquarters and was asked to show the necessary
license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession,
but correspondingly failed to do so. He was convicted for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions.
4. Petitioner contends however that, there being no lawful arrest or search or seizure,
the items which were confiscated from his possession were inadmissible as
evidence against him.
Ruling:
1. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that, among
others, an arrest is lawful even without a warrant should a person has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in the presence of a
peace officer or a private person. In the case at bar, the officers did not know what
the petitioner had committed or was actually committing; thus, it does not justify
an arrest without a warrant. However, the search thereat in the case at bar is more
reasonable than warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police
checkpoints. The search done by the officers was effected on the basis of a
probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously
and attempted to flee with the buri bag. There was a probable cause that he was
concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police
officers to inspect the same.
2. It is too much to require police officers to search bags in the possession of the
petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose.
Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.
People v. de Lara
Surveillance was conducted on December 15 and 17, 1986 and January 8, 1987 on the vicinity
where de Lara was captured on January 9. One of the team to execute the buy-bust
Case Digests: Searches and Seizures • Mark Justin Mooc
operation acted as the poseur-buyer. Replying to the question of de Lara, said poseur-buyer
ordered 2 foils and handed the marked Php 20 bill. When de Lara, after handing the two foils
to the poseur-buyer, sensed the presence of the police, he ran inside the house. He was
pursued by the poseur-buyer and, when subdued by the operatives, de Lara admitted that he
kept prohibited drugs in his house and even showed a plastic containing prohibited drugs.
Facts:
1. On January 9, 1987, after surveillance of the vicinity of Garrido and Zamora Sts. At
Sta. Ana, Manila last December 15 and 17 of 1986, and January 8, 1987, a six-man
team was formed in order to execute a buy-bust operation against de Lara and his
group. A certain Pfc. Martin Orolfo, Jr. acted as the poseur-buyer.
2. Orolfo and the confidential informant proceeded to the house of de Lara where he
was seen standing outside. The informant introduced Orolfo as an interested
buyer of marijuana, to which de Lara asked how much he (Orolfo) would buy.
Responding to the question, Orolfo answered two foils handing at the same time
the marked Php 20 bill. de Lara placed the money in the right pocket in his pants,,
went inside and minutes later came back with the two foils.
3. When de Lara handed the two foils, he sensed the presence of the police; thus, he
tried to retrieve the two foils from Orolfo to which the latter prevented him from
doing so. He ran inside the house, with Orolfo in pursuit. When he was subdued,
de Lara admitted that he kept prohibited drugs in his house and even showed the
arresting officers a blue plastic bag with white lining containing prohibited drugs.
Orolfo made a receipt of the articles seized.
4. de Lara was convicted of violation of Sec. 4, Article II of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972). In his appeal, he questioned the legality of his arrest and seizure of
prohibited drugs found in his house.
Ruling:
1. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedures enumerates
situations when an arrest may be lawful even without a warrant. Two of said
situations applicable to the case are: (a) that when the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense in the
presence of a peace officer/private person, and (b) that when an offense has in fact
just been committed and the peace officer/private person has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. In the case at
bar, de Lara was caught red-handed in delivering two tin foils of marijuana to
Orolfo. Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of the buy-bust
operation, the policemen were not only authorized but were also under obligation
to apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest. Furthermore,
surveillance on the illegal activities of de Lara was already conducted by the police
as early as December 15 and 17, 1986.
2. The policemen’s entry into the house of appellant without a search warrant was in
hot-pursuit of a person caught committing an offense in flagrante. The arrest that
followed the hot-pursuit was valid.
18 People v. de Gracia
3. Moreover, the seizure is valid. The seizure of the plastic bag containing prohibited
drugs was the result of appellant’s arrest inside his house. A contemporaneous
search may be conducted upon the person of the arrestee and the immediate
vicinity where the arrest was made.
People v. de Gracia
There was a coup d’ etat staged from November 30 to December 9, 1989. A surveillance was
conducted on the night of November 30 till the early morning of December 1 on Eurocar Sales
Office located in EDSA. The surveillance team was attacked by five men coming from the
Eurocar building. On December 5, the building was raided and de Gracia, together with the
janitors of the building, was caught. Found in his possession were high-powered firearms,
ammunitions and explosives.
Facts:
1. From November 30 to December 9, 1989, there was a coup d’ etat staged by
elements of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement – Soldiers of the Filipino
People (RAM-SFP). Various government establishments and military camps in
Metro Manila were bombarded by the RAM-SFP with their “tora-tora” planes.
2. On the night of November 30, 1989 until the early morning of the next day, Major
Efren Soria of the Intellience Division conducted a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales
Offices at EDSA, together with his team. They were informed that said
establishment were being occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a
communication command post. One member of Soria’s team (S/Sgt. Henry
Aquino) conducted a surveillance on foot when the crowd gathered near the
Eurocar Office watching the on-going bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo and
from said crowd, a group of five men walked towards the car of the surveillance
team. When the vehicle sped away, the group of five men fired at the team which
resulted in the wounding of a team member (Sgt. Sagario).
3. On December 5, 1989, a searching team led by F/Lt. Virgilio Babao, together with
the elements of the 16th Infantry Battalion led by Col. Delos Santos, raided the
Eurocar Sales Office and found ammunitions and explosives. A member of the
team, Sgt. Obenia, who was the first one to enter the building, saw de Gracia
holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. de Gracia was arrested,
together with the janitors of the building. They were made to sign an inventory,
written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding
team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to
them, there was so much disorder considering that Camp Aguinaldo was being
mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity
of the Eurocar Office, aside from the fact that courts were consequently closed.
4. Rolando de Gracia was charged with two separate informations for illegal
possession of ammunition and explosive in furtherance of rebellion and for
attempted homicide. Found in their possession were 5 bundles of dynamites, 6
cartons of M16 ammunition at 20 per carton and 100 bottles of MOLOTOV bombs.
Case Digests: Searches and Seizures • Mark Justin Mooc
de Gracia was convicted for the first crime (furtherance of rebellion) but was
acquitted of the second (of attempted homicide).
Ruling:
1. It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were
not armed with a search warrant at that time. Said search was prompted by
intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM_-
SFP. Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein
the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar
Office. When the military operatives raided the place, the occupants refused to
open the door despite requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the military
to break into the office. The Eurocar Sales Office is neither a gun store nor an
armory or arsenal; instead, it was primarily and solely engaged in the sale of
automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and
explosives could not be justifiably or colorably explained. In addition, there was
general chaos and disorder at that time. The courts in the surrounding areas wre
obviously closed with the building and houses deserted. Under said circumstances,
the case at bar falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a
warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives had reasonable
ground to believe that a crime was being committed after taking into account the
facts. More so, there is more than sufficient probable cause warrant their action.
Under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply
for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The judge himself manifested
that when the raid was conducted his court was closed. Under such urgency and
exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
2. As enunciated in Umil, et.al v. Ramos, “[t]he arrest of persons involved in the
rebellion… is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to
quell the rebellion than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court
for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure
in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest…
Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or
capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces or
any other milder acts but really in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The
arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves
the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities.”