Legal Research 2

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Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall
take effect one year after such publication.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public
concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders,
letters of implementations and administrative orders. The Solicitor General,
representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending
that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any
law or statute becomes valid and enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in
the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of
the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application
of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive
to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he
had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. The very first clause of
Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The
word ―shall‖ therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That
duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on
matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity. The publication of
presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement
of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court
declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been
published have no force and effect.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April
24, 1985. Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a
rule, it was not so when it was ―otherwise ‖ as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately
upon their approval.
ISSUES:
LOVELLA FE MADELO-TACDER, Ph.D

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1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability

and laws which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general

circulation.
HELD:
The clause ―unless it is otherwise provided ‖ refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any
event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the
law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous
publication. ―Laws‖ should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit
there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on
the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as
an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the
public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some
of the people only, and not to the public as a whole. All statutes, including those
of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the
law. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in
the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The
Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or
modify it if it finds it impractical. The publication must be made forthwith, or at
least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz: Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun
instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their
existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full
disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
DE ROY VS COURT OF APPEALS

157 SCRA 757
FACTS:
The firewall of a burned out building owned by Felisa De Roy collapsed and
destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of Luis Bernal resulting in
injuries and even to the death of Bernal’s daughter. De Roy claimed that Bernal
had been warned prior hand but that she was ignored.
In the RTC, De Roy was found guilty of gross negligence. She appealed but
the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC. On the last day of filing a motion for
reconsideration, De Roy’s counsel filed a motion for extension. It was denied by
the CA. The CA ruled that pursuant to the case of Habaluyas Enterprises vs
Japzon (August 1985), the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a
motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.
De Roy’s counsel however argued that the Habaluyas case should
not be applicable because said ruling was never published in the Official
Gazette.
ISSUE:Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the
Official Gazette before they can be binding.

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HELD:
No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in
the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their
becoming effective. It is bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice
to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have
been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in the advance reports of
Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law journals.
ACAAC V AZCUNA, JR.

GR NO. 187378, SEPTEMBER 30, 2013
SUMMARY. The petitioners filed an action praying for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order, injunction, and damages against the respondents, alleging that
they have prior vested rights to occupy and utilize Capayas Island, while also
assailing the validity of the subject ordinance adopted by the respondents that
prohibits entry and building of structures in the disputed property. The case was
about the validity of the subject ordinance as questioned by the petitioners, based
on grounds of adoption without public consultation, publication, and approval by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
MAIN DOCTRINE. In accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an

ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of
evidence showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in their
enactment. We also have a right to assume that officials have done that which the
law requires them to do, in the absence of positive proof to the contrary.
FACTS:
 The petitioner, Ramonito O. Acaac, was the founder of the NGO called
PETAL. PETAL built cottages on Capayas Island, which it rented out to the
public and became the source of livelihood of its beneficiaries.
 On April 11 and May 20, 2002, respondents Mayor Melquiades D. Azcuna, Jr.
and Building Official Marietes B. Bonalos issued separate Notices of Illegal
Construction against PETAL, ordering it to stop all illegal activities on the
island due to the absence of a building permit. There was a third and final
notice sent on July 8, 2002 but the same remained unheeded.
 On the same date, the Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez Jaena adopted a
subject ordinance, which prohibited the entry of any entity and the
construction of any structures in the area of Capayas Island which Mayor
Azcuna, Jr, adopted on July 12, 2002. On August 23, 2002, a Notice of
Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL directing it to remove the
structures it built since it was a violation of the subject ordinance.
 On October 29, 2002, petitioners filed an action against the respondents
before the RTC alleging that they have prior vested rights to occupy and
utilize Capayas Island, while also assailing the validity of the subject
ordinance on the grounds that it was adopted without public
consultation, it was not published in a newspaper of general
circulation, and it was not approved by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
 On November 26, 2004, the RTC declared the subject ordinance as
invalid/void on the same grounds that the petitioners laid down.

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 On the contrary, according to the CA, the subject ordinance was deemed
approved upon failure of the SP to declare the same invalid within 30 days.
It also gave credence to the respondent that the subject ordinance was
posted and published and that public consultations were conducted before
the subject ordinance was passed.
 The CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on March 9, 2009.
Thus, the instant petition.
ISSUES: Whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and enforceable against
petitioners
HELD:
Yes. Section 56 of the LGC (d) provides that, “if no action has been taken by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan within 30 days after submission of such an ordinance
or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore
valid.” In this case, petitioners maintain the subject ordinance cannot be deemed
approved through the mere passage of time. It, however, bears to note that more
than 30 days have already elapsed from the time the subject ordinance was
submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for review by the Sangguniang Bayan.
Hence, it should be deemed approved and valid pursuant to Section 56 (d) of the
Local Government Code. While Sec. 59 of Republic Act No. 7160 or “The Local
Government Code” required the main features of ordinances duly enacted or
adopted be published in a newspaper of general circulation, Petitioners failed to
present any evidence to show that no publication of the subject ordinance was
made. In accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance,
their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of evidence
showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in their
enactment. Likewise, petitioners had the burden of proving their own allegation,
which they, however, failed to do. All told, the Court finds on reversible error
committed by the CA in upholding the validity of the subject ordinance.
Art. 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
Atienza vs Brillantes 243 SCRA 32

Topic: Retroactive effects of law
SF: An administrative case was filed by herein complainant against Judge

Brilliantes of MTC, Manila. Complainant alleges that he has two children with De
Castro who stays in Makati, Manila in the house he bought and stayed while he is
in Manila. Sometime in 1991 he saw Respondent Judge sleeping on his bed,
upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent was cohabiting with De
Castro. Complainant further alleged that respondent was married to a certain
Zenaida Ongkiko and begot five children.
In reply respondent alleged that the complainant was not married to De Castro, he
also denied having been married to Zenaidaongkiko, however admitted
having five children with her. He stated that the marriage between him
and Ongkiko was not valid since there was no marriage license and
further claimed that when he married De Castro he believed in all good
faith of it’s intent and purpose.
Issue: Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code that required nullity of

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previous marriage for purpose of remarriage shall apply?
Held: As a general rule provided in Article 4 of the NCC: Laws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
Ratio Dicidendi: Article 40 of the Family Code provides that a Judicial Declaration
of Nullity is required before a party can enter into second marriage however the
said Code took effect only on August 3, 1988 and the marriages that respondent
contracted was 1965 and 1991 however the provisions of this code shall apply
regardless of the date of the marriage, besides under Article 256 of the Family
Code, said Article is given “retroactive effects in so far as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws”
this is particularly true with Article 40 which is a rule of Procedure, herein
respondent has not shown any vested rights that was impaired by
the application of Article 40 ti his case.
*The ratio decidendi is "the point in a case which determines the judgment"[1] or
"the principle which the case establishes"
An ex post facto law (Latin for "from after the action" or "after the fact"), also
called a retroactive law, is a law that retroactively changes the legal
consequences (or status) of actions that were committed, or relationships that
existed, before the enactment of the law. In criminal law, it
may criminalize actions that were legal when committed; it may aggravate
a crime by bringing it into a more severe category than it was in when it was
committed; it may change the punishment prescribed for a crime, as by adding
new penalties or extending sentences; or it may alter the rules of evidence in
order to make conviction for a crime likelier than it would have been when the
deed was committed. Conversely, a form of ex post facto law commonly called
an amnesty law may decriminalize certain acts or alleviate possible punishments
(for example by replacing the death sentence with lifelong imprisonment)
retroactively. Such laws are also known by the Latin term in mitius.
A law may have an ex post facto effect without being technically ex post facto.
For example, when a law repeals a previous law, the repealed legislation is no
longer applicable to situations to which it previously was, even if such situations
arose before the law was repealed. The principle of prohibiting the continued
application of such laws is called Nullum crimen, nullapoena sine
praevialegepoenali, especially in European Continental systems.
Some common-law jurisdictions do not permit retroactive criminal legislation,
though new precedent generally applies to events that occurred before the
judicial decision. Ex post facto laws are expressly forbidden by the United States
Constitution in Article 1, Section 9, Clause 3. In some nations that follow
the Westminster system of government, such as the United Kingdom,ex post
facto laws are technically possible, because the doctrine of parliamentary
supremacy allows Parliament to pass any law it wishes. In a nation with an
entrenched bill of rights or a written constitution, ex post facto legislation
may be prohibited.
Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA)
DOCTRINE: ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond
for marriages solemnized during the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases

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commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage
cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or
confession of judgment.
ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OR
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE: A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that the grounds for
declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved. No
judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be
allowed.
CARLOS vs.FELICIDAD SANDOVAL aka FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS

FACTS:
 Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left 6
parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan
De Dios Carlos.
 During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to
TEOFILO in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. TEOFILO
undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir,
petitioner JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS.
 Eventually, the first 3 parcels of land were transferred and registered in the
name of Teofilo. Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner.
 On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents
Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death,
Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent FELICIDAD
and co-respondent, TEOFILO II.
 In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents and subsequently,
the parties submitted and caused the approval of a partial COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT. Under the compromise, the parties acknowledged their
respective shares in the parcels of land.
 In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action against the respondents
and in his complaint, he asserted that the marriage between his late
brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the
absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his
deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of
respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
 But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved
for summary judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the
justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage. Respondents also
submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II.
 RTC’s RULING: The RTC rendered summary judgment in favor of petitioner:
(a) Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos null and void ab initio; (b) Teofilo S.
Carlos II is not the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late
Teofilo E. Carlos; and (c) adjudged petitioner as owner of the parcels of land
 The CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and remanding the case to
the court of origin for further proceedings.
ISSUE:Whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a

judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit
of a trial? – NO
RULING:

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The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved.

Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is
confession of judgment disallowed.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC [Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages – 3/15/2003] provides that:
SEC. 17. Trial. -
(1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case.
No delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except
as to matters involving property relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of
marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the Court excluded actions for nullity or annulment
of marriage from the application of summary judgments.
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its
lawful right and duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not
terminated by the declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists
between the parties. The State should have been given the opportunity to present
controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the
prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage
when the public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence.
Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor
has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down before the court
is not fabricated.
Only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will
ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings
for declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression
of evidence.
ANITA CHENG, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES WILLIAM SY and TESSIE SY, Respondents.
FACTS:
 Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the RTC, Branch 7, Manila against respondent
spouses William and Tessie Sy for issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) for P300,000.00 each,
in payment of their loan, both of which were dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn
against a closed account.
 Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner, on January 20, 1999, filed against respondents two (2)
cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
Branch 25, Manila.
 On March 16, 2004, the RTC, Branch 7, Manila dismissed the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to
prove the elements of the crime. The Order dismissing Criminal Case contained no declaration as to the
civil liability of Tessie Sy. On the other hand, the Order in Criminal Case of William Sy contained a
statement, "Hence, if there is any liability of the accused, the same is purely ‘civil,’ not criminal in nature."
 Later, the MeTC, Branch 25, Manila, dismissed, on demurrer, the BP Blg. 22 cases in its Order on account
of the failure of petitioner to identify the accused respondents in open court. The Order also
did not make any pronouncement as to the civil liability of accused respondents.
 On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against respondents before the RTC, Branch 18, Manila, a
Complaint for collection of a sum of money with damages based on the same loaned amount
ofP600,000.00 covered by the two PBC checks previously subject of the estafa and BP Blg. 22
cases.

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 In the assailed Order the RTC, Branch 18, Manila, dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction,ratiocinating that the civil action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 with damages was
already impliedly instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of Section 1, paragraph (b) of Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The herein petitioner argues that since the BP Blg. 22 cases were filed on January
20, 1999, the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure promulgated on December 1, 2000 should not
apply, as it must be given only prospective application.
ISSUE:WON Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and Supreme Court
Circular No. 57-97 on the Rules and Guidelines, that criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action, shall be given prospective effect.
HELD:
NO.
It is now settled, that rules of procedure apply even to cases already pending at the time of their
promulgation. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights does not preclude
their retroactive application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural
laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally
objectionable.
The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
Hence, the rule is that upon the filing of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases against respondents, where the
petitioner has not made any waiver, express reservation to litigate separately, or has not instituted the
corresponding civil action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 and damages prior to the
criminal action, the civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal cases.
Therefore, during the pendency of both the estafa and the BP Blg. 22 cases, the action to recover the civil
liability was impliedly instituted and remained pending before the respective trial courts.
HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON v. ELVIN CHAN.

G.R. No. 157547. February 23, 2011
FACTS:On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) an information charging the late
Eduardo Simon (Simon) with a violation of BP 22, docketed as Criminal Case No.
275381 entitled People v. Eduardo Simon.
More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan
commenced in the MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the
principal amount of P336,000.00, coupled with an application for a writ of
preliminary attachment (docketed as Civil Case No. 915-00).
On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary

attachment, which was implemented on August 17, 2000 through the sheriff
attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon.
On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to
charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages
On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simons urgent motion to dismiss with
application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages,
On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simon the urgent
motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond
for damages. The MTC cites the grounds of litis pendentia and that the
case for sum of money is one based on fraud and hence falling under
Article 33 of the Civil Code, still prior reservation is required

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Chans motion for reconsideration was denied as well as his appeal with the RTC.
On the CA, Chan's appeal was granted.
ISSUE:Whether or not Chan's civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded
check (Civil Case No. 915-00) was an independent civil action.
RULING:
NO. There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from
the issuance of an unfunded check prohibited and punished under Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22).
This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which relevantly provides: "The
criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include
the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately
shall be allowed."
Supreme Court Circular 57-97 also provides that: "1. The criminal action for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the
corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately
shall be allowed or recognized."
Simon V. Chua
G.R. No. 157547 February 23, 2011
Lessons Applicable: Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no vested rights
in the rules of procedure.
Laws Applicable:
FACTS:
December 1996: Eduard Simon issued a check to Elvin Chan a Landbank Check
dated December 26, 1996 worth P336,000.00
December 26, 1996: It was dishonored due to account closed.
After a formal demand, Simon filed for preliminary attachmen - MeTC in Pasay
City issued a writ of preliminary attachment.
Simon filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia because there is
already a charge of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 - granted by the MeTC
Chan appealed to the CA - reversed and set aside the decision of the MeTC
ISSUE:W/N the case should be dismissed due to litis pendentia because the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil actions
which became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this case renders
Chan's civil action to recover as an independent civil action
HELD:YES. Reversa CA and reinstate MeTC

Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no vested rights in
the rules of procedure. xxx
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the offended private party defrauded and empty-

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handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her only the remedy,
which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil
suit. To do so may leave the offended party unable to recover even the face value
of the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense
of the payee. The protection which the law seeks to provide would, therefore, be
brought to naught. However, there is no independent civil action to recover the
value of a bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22. Applying Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court, effective December 1, 200 that the criminal action for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed
DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez (different facts): issuance of a
bouncing check may result in two separate and distinct crimes of estafa and
violation of BP 22, the procedures for the recovery of the civil liabilities arising
from these two distinct crimes are different and non-interchangeable
In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt to reserve his right to file a
separate civil action, or may institute an independent action based on fraud
pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code
In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the Court has adopted a policy to
prohibit the reservation or institution of a separate civil action to claim the civil
liability arising from the issuance of the bouncing check.
ADORACION CAROLINO (SPOUSE AND IN SUBSTITUTION OF THE DECEASED JEREMIAS A. CAROLINO),

Petitioner,
VS
GEN. GENEROSO SENGA, AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP), et al,
Respondent.
FACTS:
 On December 1, 1976, Jeremias A. Carolino, petitioner's husband, retired from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) with the rank of Colonel pursuant to the provisions of Sections 1(A) and 10 of Republic
Act (RA) No. 340,4 as amended. He started receiving his monthly retirement pay in the amount of
P18,315.00 in December 1976 until the same was withheld by respondents in March 2005.
 On June 3, 2005, Jeremias wrote a letter addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff asking for the reasons of the
withholding of his retirement pay. In a letter reply, the, Pension and Gratuity Officer of the AFP Finance
Center, informed Jeremias that his loss of Filipino citizenship caused the deletion of his name in the alpha
list of the AFP Pensioners' Payroll effective March 5, 2005; and that he couldavail of re-entitlement to his
retirement benefits and the restoration of his name in the AFP Pensioners' Masterlist Payroll by complying
with the requirements prescribed under RA No. 9225, or the Dual Citizenship Act.
 It was also mentioned that termination of retirement benefits of pensioner of the AFP could be done
pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 16388, which was signed in 1979, effectively
repealed RA No. 340, as amended, which provides that, “the name of a retiree who loses his Filipino
citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon such loss.”
It being in consonance with the policy consideration that all retirement laws inconsistent with the
provisions of PD No. 1638 are repealed and modified accordingly.
 Petitioner contends that her husband's retirement from the active service in 1976 was pursuant to the
provisions of RA No. No. 340 as PD No. 1638 was not yet in existence then, and there was nothing in RA
No. 340 that disqualifies a retired military personnel from receiving retirement benefits after acquiring
foreign citizenship.
ISSUE:WON PD No. 1638 shall be applied retroactively.
HELD:
NO. PD NO. 1638 shall not be applied retroactively.

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PD No. 1638 was signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos on September 10, 1979. Under Article 4
of the Civil Code, it is provided that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. It is
said that the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have formally
given that effect to some legal provisions; that all statutes are to be construed as having only prospective
operation, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly
declared or is necessarily implied from the language used; and that every case of doubt must be resolved
against retrospective effect. These principles also apply to amendments of statutes.
PD No. 1638 does not contain any provision regarding its retroactive application, nor the same may be implied
from its language. In fact, Section 36 of PD No. 1638 clearly provides that the decree shall take effect upon its
approval. As held in Parreno v. COA, there is no question that PD No. 1638, as amended, applies prospectively.
Since PD No. 1638, as amended, is about the new system of retirement and separation from service of military
personnel, it should apply to those who were in the service at the time of its approval. Conversely, PD No. 1638
is not applicable to those who retired before its effectivity in 1979. The rule is familiar that after an act is
amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to such
amendment.
Moreover, Section 27 of PD No. 1638 specifically provides for the retirees to whom the law shall be applied, to
wit:
Section 27. Military personnel retired under Sections 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12 shall be carried in the retired list of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. The name of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from
the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon such loss, (emphasis supplied)
Notably, petitioner's husband did not retire under those above-enumerated Sections of PD No. 1638 as he
retired under RA No. 340.
Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.
ROBERTO G. FAMANILA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Spc. Fmr. Seventh Division) and BARBERSHIP MANAGEMENT LIMITED and NFD
INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS, INC. Respondents.
FACTS:
 In 1989, respondent NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. hired the services of petitioner Roberto G.
Famanila as Messman for Hansa Riga, a vessel registered and owned by its principal and co-respondent,
Barbership Management Limited.
 On June 21, 1990, while Hansa Riga was docked at the port of Eureka, California, U.S.A. and while
petitioner was assisting in the loading operations, the latter complained of a headache. Petitioner
experienced dizziness and he subsequently collapsed. Upon examination, it was determined that he had a
sudden attack of left cerebral hemorrhage from a ruptured cerebral aneurysm. Petitioner underwent a
brain operation and he was confined at the Emmanuel Hospital in Portland, Oregon, U.S.A. On July 19,
1990, he underwent a second brain operation.
 Owing to petitioner’s physical and mental condition, he was repatriated to the Philippines. He was
thereafter examined at the American Hospital in Manila where the examining physician, Dr. Patricia
declared that he "cannot go back to sea duty and has been observed for 120 days, he is being declared
permanently, totally disabled."
 Thereafter, authorized representatives of the respondents convinced him to settle his claim
amicably by accepting the amount of US$13,200. Petitioner accepted the offer as evidenced by
his signature in the Receipt and Release. His wife, Gloria Famanila and one Richard Famanila,
acted as witnesses in the signing of the release.

12
 Petitioner then filed a complaint with the NLRC which praying for an award of disability benefits, share in
the insurance proceeds, moral damages and attorney’s fees. Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Voltaire A.
Balitaan dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription.
 Petitioner appealed the decision with the NLRC, on the grounds Petitioner claims that he did not sign the
Receipt and Release voluntarily or freely because he was permanently disabled and in financial
constraints. These factors allegedly vitiated his consent which makes the Receipt and Release void and
unenforceable.
 However, NLRC found the appeal appeal to be without merit and ordered its dismissal. Consequently, the
motion for reconsideration was also denied by the NLRC, petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari.
Subsequently, CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE:WON the quitclaim contract signed by the petitioner is valid.
HELD:
YES. The quitclaim and waiver signed by the petitioner is valid.
It is true that quitclaims and waivers are oftentimes frowned upon and are considered as ineffective in barring
recovery for the full measure of the worker’s right and that acceptance of the benefits therefrom does not
amount to estoppel. The reason is plain. Employer and employee, obviously do not stand on the same footing.
However, not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily
entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be
disowned simply because of change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled
from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of the settlement areunconscionable on its face, that the
law will step in to annul the questionable transaction.
But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he
was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be
recognized as a valid and binding undertaking, as in this case.
To be valid and effective, waivers must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms, leaving no doubt as to the
intention of those giving up a right or a benefit that legally pertains to them. The SC reviewed the terms and
conditions contained in the Receipt and Release and they found the same to be clear and unambiguous. The
signing was even witnessed by petitioner’s wife and one Richard T. Famanila.
GUY V. CA
502 SCRA 151
G.R. NO. 163707 SEPTEMBER 15, 2006
PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
1. The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of the estate of Sima Wei
(a.k.a. Rufina Guy Susim). Private-respondents Karen and Kamille alleged that
they are the acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died intestate.
The minors were represented by their mother Remedios Oanes who filed a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration before the RTC of Makati City.
2. Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with his surviving spouse,
filed for the dismissal of the petition alleging that his father left no debts hence,
his estate may be settled without the issuance of letters administration. The
other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss alleging that the certification of non-
forum shopping should have been signed by Remedios and not by counsel.
3. Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and waived by
reason of a Release of Claim or waiver stating that in exchange for
financial and educational assistance from the petitioner, Remedios and
her minor children discharged the estate of the decedent from any and all
liabilities.

13
4. The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental
motion ruling that the mother is not the duly constituted guardian of the minors
hence, she could not have validly signed the waiver. It also rejected the
petitioner's objections to the certificate of non-forum shopping. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the orders of the lower court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:Whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents

from claiming their Successional Rights?
RULING:
Not having been authorized by the court, the release or waiver is therefore void.
Moreover, the private-respondents could not have waived their supposed right as
they have yet to prove their status as illegitimate children of the decedent. It
would be inconsistent to rule that they have waived a right which, according to
the petitioner, the latter do not have. Private respondents cannot be bar from
claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, waiver must be couched
clearly and in unequivocal terms to leave no doubt with regards to the intention of
a party in giving up a right or benefit legally pertains to. Waiver cannot be
attributed to a person if it not explicitly and clearly evinces intent to abandon a
right. This case has no waiver of hereditary rights.
CONSUNJI VS CA
FACTS:
On May 9, 1991, private respondent Maria Juego filed in the Pasig Regional Trial
Court a complaint for damages against petitioner for the death of her husband
Jose juego. Jose was employed by petitioner as a construction worker. While
working on November 2,1990, Jose fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower in
Pasig. He died. Maria availed of the death benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
Petitioner is claiming that she can no longer recover damages under the Civil
Code because her prior availment of the benefits forms the State Insurance Fund.
The trial court and CA decided in favor of Maria.
ISSUE: Can the receipt of benefits under the Workman’s Compensation Law
preclude the recovery of damages under the Civil Code?
RULING/DOCTRINE:
The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by
election. Hence, the rule that a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery
under the Labor Code and prosecute an ordinary course of action under the Civil
Code. The claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is deemed to have waived the
other.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is an act of

understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights,
but chooses not to assert them. It must be generally shown by the party
claiming a waiver that the person against whom the waiver is asserted
had at the time knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of the
party’s rights or of all material facts upon which they depended. Where
one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it

14
can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be
established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.
A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a
right exists and has adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent
decision.
Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived,
with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and
intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the evidence.
That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the
basis for the exception.
Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
Thornton vs. Thornton (2004)

FACTS:
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August
28, 1998 in Manila. They have a daughter named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco
Thornton. After 3 years, respondent wanted to return to her old job as a “GRO” in a
nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. Petitioner admonished
respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her carefree ways. On
December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter without
notifying her husband. She told the servants that she was bringing their daughter
to Basilan Province.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Family Court in Makati
City but was dismissed the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to
find the respondent and their daughter. However, he did not find them there. The
barangay office issued a certification that the respondent is no longer living
there. Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus in the CA which
could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country. It was
denied because of lack of jurisdiction over the case. According to the CA, RA 8369
(Family Courts Act of 1997) impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 (granted CA
with jurisdiction to issue a writ of HC WON in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
ISSUE:WON RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129.
HELD:NO. CA did not lose its jurisdiction to issue writs of HC involving the custody
of minors. There is nothing in RA 8369 which revoked it of such jurisdiction. The
word “exclusive” cannot be construed as automatic foreclosure of the
jurisdiction of other courts over HC cases involving minors. The
jurisdiction of the CA and Family Court in the case at bar is concurrent.
The Family Court can issue writs of HC enforceable only within its
territorial jurisdiction. On the other hand, the CA can issue the same writ
enforceable throughout the Philippines in cases where the territorial
jurisdiction for the enforcement of the writ cannot be determined with certainty.

15
Literal interpretation of the word “exclusive” will result in grave injustice.

Implied repeals are not favoured. Provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent
that it revoked the CA and SC’s jurisdiction to issue writs of HC relating to
custody of minors. RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7902 and BP 129.
Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
PESCA VS PESCA
GR NO. 136921
APRIL 17, 2001
FACTS: Petitioner Lorna Pesca, then a student, and respondent Zosimo Pesca, a
seaman, got married March 1975 after a whirlwind courtship. Their union begot 4
children. However, in 1988, petitioner noticed that her husband was emotionally
immature and irresponsible. Respondent became violent. On March 1994,
respondent assaulted petitioner. Petitioner filed a complaint and respondent was
convicted by the MTC of Caloocan for slight physical injuries and sentenced to 11
days of imprisonment. Petitioner filed before the RTC for the declaration of nullity
of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity.
On November 1995, RTC decided in favour of the petitioner. CA reversed the
decision of the trial court, stating that petitioner had failed to establish that
(1) respondent showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be
incognitive of the basic marital covenant as provided in Article 68 of the Family
Code
(2) that incapacity is grave,
(3) preceded the marriage and
(4) is incurable
(5) that such incapacity is psychological
(6) that the root cause has been identified medically/clinically
(7) that it has been proven by an expert
(8) that such incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Petitioner argued that the
doctrine enunciated in Santos v. CA (promulgated on January 1995), as well as the
guidelines set out in Republic v. CA and Molina (February 1997) should have no
retroactive application. Petitioner further argues, the application of the Santos
and Molina dicta should at least only warrant a remand of the case to the trial
court for further proceedings and not its dismissal.
ISSUE:Whether or not the doctrine enunciated in the Santos and Molina cases
apply to the case at bar (psyco incap to sya)
RULING:The Court held that the “doctrine of stare decisis” ordained in Article 8 of
the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law
shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the legal
maxim – “legis interpretado legis vim obtinet” – that the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.
The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted
and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the
statute was enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of the Court finds itself
later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to

16
be applied prospectively in favour of the parties who have relied on the old
doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith (“lex prospicit, non
respicit”). Petitioner utterly failed, both in her allegations and in her evidence to
prove psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent.
HELD: Petition is DENIED.
LEGIS INTERPRETATIO LEGIS VIM OBTINET-
“The construction of law obtains the force of law.”
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC.

FACTS:
- On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises, Inc. filed an application with the
RTC for Judicial confirmation of title over two parcels of land namely Lot No. 3068
and Lot No. 3077 located at Brgy. Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
- On December 13, 2001, the RTC issued the Order finding the respondent’s
application for registration sufficient in form and substance.
- On June 4, 2002, LLDA filed its opposition to the respondent’s application for
registration, stating that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are not part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. Likewise, the petitioner, Republic of the
Philippines, filed its opposition and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
- According to the testimonies of the respondent’s witnesses, the respondent
purchased the said lots from Conrado Salvador and Bella Mijares in 1989. The
respondent also presented the following documents: (1) Deed of Absolute Sale
dated August 28, 1989 executed by Salvador and Mijares in favor of the
respondent; (2) survey plans of the subject properties; (3) technical descriptions
of the subject properties; (4) Geodetic Engineer’s Certificate; (5) tax declarations
of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 for 2002; and (6) certifications dated December 17,
2002, issued by Corazon D. Colamno, Senior Forest Management Specialist of the
DENR, attesting that the said lots form part of the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain.
- On the other hand, LLDA presented testimonies from Engineers employed by
LLDA. LLDA alleged that the respondent’s application for registration should be
denied because the said lots are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain as it pointed out Section 41 (11) of R.A. No. 4850 that lands
surrounding the Laguna de Bay located at and below the reglementary elevation
of 12.50 meters are public lands which form part of the bed of the said lake.
Furthermore, Engr. Magalonga, who serves as a testifier for the opposition,
claimed that he found that the elevations of the said lots are below 12.50 meters.
ISSUE:Whether or not the Ruling of Tan Properties be applied
HELD:Doctrine: (NCC 8– Judicial Decisions)

- Respondent claims that the Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, which was
promulgated on June 26, 2008, must be applied prospectively, asserting
that decisions of the Court form part of the law of the land and, pursuant
to Article 4 of the Civil Code, laws shall have no retroactive effect. The
respondent points out that its application for registration of title to the
subject properties was filed and was granted by the RTC prior to the
Court’s promulgation of its ruling in T.A.N. Properties.

17
- Court does not agree.

- Notwithstanding that the respondent’s application for registration was filed and
granted by RTC prior to the Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, the
pronouncements in that case may be applied to the present case; it is not
antithetical to the rule of non-retroactivity of laws pursuant to Article 4 of the
Civil Code.
- It is elementary that the interpretation of a law by this Court constitutes part of
that law from the date it was originally passed, since this Court’s construction
merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted
law carried into effect.
- “Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law, but
consists merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre-exisiting one.”

18
Art. 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.
PEOPLE vs RITTER
G.R. No. 88582.
March 5, 1991. GUTIERREZ, JR., J
FACTS:Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the crime of rape with homicide
involving a young girl of about 12 years old who had been allegedly raped and who
later died because a foreign object left inside her vaginal canal. When arraigned,
the accused pleaded "Not Guilty". Thereafter, the case was set for trial on the
merits. The trial court rendered a decision convicting the appellant of such crime.
ISSUE:Whether SC should affirm the conviction of the accused rendered by the

lower court?
RULING:Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm a judgment of

conviction only if the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, it behooves us to exert the most painstaking effort to examine the records
in the light of the arguments of both parties if only to satisfy judicial conscience
that the appellant indeed committed the criminal act. Before the conviction is
affirmed, we must first follow the rule as stated in the case of Urbano vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court (157 SCRA 1 [1988]) to wit: “xxx The rule is that the
death of the victim must be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a
criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must
convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. xxx” We cannot convict on
anything less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. The protections of the Bill of
Rights and our criminal justice system are as much, if not more so, for the
perverts and outcasts of society as they are for normal, decent, and law-abiding
people. The requirement of proof which produces in an unprejudiced mind moral
certainty or conviction that the accused did commit the offense has not been
satisfied. The established facts do not entirely rule out the possibility that the
appellant could have inserted a foreign object inside Rosario's vagina. This object
may have caused her death. It is possible that the appellant could be the guilty
person. However, the Court cannot base an affirmance of conviction upon mere
possibilities. Suspicions and possibilities are not evidence and therefore should
not be taken against the accused. (People v. Tolentino, supra) The appellant
certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public
policy (see Article 21 Civil Code). The appellant has abused Filipino children,
enticing them with money. The Court deplores the lack of criminal laws which will
adequately protect street children from exploitation by pedophiles, pimps, and,
perhaps, their own parents or guardians who profit from the sale of young bodies.
The provisions on statutory rape and other related offenses were never intended
for the relatively recent influx of pedophiles taking advantage of rampant poverty
among the forgotten segments of our society. We have to acquit the
appellant because the Bill of Rights commands us to do so. We, however,
express the Court's concern about the problem of street children and the
evils committed against them. Something must be done about it. HELD:
The appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant is
ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.

19
SILVERIO VS REPUBLIC
Posted by kaye lee on 3:00 AM
G.R. No. 174689 October 22 2007 [Change of name or sex]
FACTS:
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio having undergone a sex reassignment surgery,
sought to have his first name changed from Rommel to Mely, and his sex from
male to female. Trial court granted his petition. CA, however, upon appeal filed by
the Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG, reversed the trial court decision,
holding that there is no law allowing the change of entries of either name or sex in
the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rommel's first name and sex be changed on the ground of sex
reassignment.
RULING:No. There is no law authorizes the change of entry as of sex and first
name through the intervention of sex reassignment surgery. Article 376 of the
Civil Code as amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law), together with Article 412
of the same Code, change of name or sex in the birth certificate is allowed by the
courts so long as clerical or typographical errors are involved.
Changes sought by Silverio will have serious legal and public policy
consequences. To grant this petition filed by Silverio will greatly alter the laws on
marriage and family relations. Second, there will be major changes in statutes
that underscore the public policy in relation to women.
A.M. No. 53-MJ (January 31. 1974)

Corpus vs. Cabaluna
FACTS:
Lourdes Corpus was declared the owner of two parcels of land located in Barrio
Bugang Municipality of Alimodian on September 5, 1955 by the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on February 26, 1963.
On July 30, 1963, Adriano Camarista executed deed of sale to the Cabalfin couple
and the document was ratified by Municipal Judge of Alimodian, Mr. Cipriano P.
Cabaluna, Jr., for the cadastral land 1762, which apparently was the same land
litigated in the civil case of Corpus.
Corpus charged Judge Cabaluna with having committed “gross fraud” for ratifying
a deed of sale of cadastral land 1762 despite the Judge’s supposed knowledge of
the pendency of the civil case before the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:Whether or not the ratification of the deed of sale by the respondent makes
him guilty of “gross fraud”.
RULING:For the charge of “gross fraud” to prosper there is need of clear and
convincing evidence that respondent knew that one of the parcels
involved in civil case 2843 and adjudicated to complainant was the same
property which he awarded o the Cabalfin couples in the cadastral
proceeding: such evidence is, however, wanting in the record of this case.
Fraud is serious charge which cannot be lightly inferred from allegations
or circumstances surrounding a particular situation, but must be
supported by clear and convincing proof.

20
Complainant’s failure to bring out that the respondent was cognizant of the
relation of the property involved in the civil case to the land applied for in the
cadastral proceeding, shows that the respondent could not have connived with
the claimant Camarista and/or the Cabalfins in causing the approval of the latter’s
claim over the land in question to the prejudice of the rights of the complainant.
The respondent was exonerated and the charge was dismissed.
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.
PILAPIL v IBAY-SOMERA
174 SCRA 653
FACTS:On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina and the

respondent to the case, and Erich Geiling, a German national, were married at
Friedenweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. After about three and a half
years of marriage, Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in
Germany in January 1983 while Pilapil filed an action for legal separation, support
and separation of property before RTC of Manila in January 23, 1983 where it is
still pending as a civil case. On January 15, 1986, the local Court of Germany
promulgated a divorce decree on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.
The custody of the child,Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was granted to petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery alleging
that, while still married to respondent, petitioner had an affair with a certain
William Chia and Jesus Chua sometime in 1982 and 1983 respectively. The
respondent city fiscal approved a resolution directing the filing of two complaints
for adultery against petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion in both
criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings
thereon. Respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment but before
such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the suspension of proceedings. On
September 8, 1987, respondent judge denied the motion to quash and also
directed the arraignment of both accused. Petitioner refused to be arraigned and
thus charged with direct contempt and fined.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent’s adultery charges against the
petitioner is still valid given the fact that both had been divorced prior to the filing
of charges.
HELD:The law provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the
person who can legally file the complaint should only be the offended spouse. The
fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country in 1983, is
admitted. According to Article 15 of the Civil Code, with relation to the status of
Filipino citizens both here and abroad, since the legal separation of the petitioner
and respondent has been finalized through the courts in Germany and the RTC in
Manila, the marriage of the couple were already finished, thus giving no
merit to the charges the respondent filed against the petitioner. Private
respondent, being no longer married to petitioner holds no legal merit to
commence the adultery case as the offended spouse at the time he filed
suit in 1986. The temporary restraining order issued in this case was made
permanent.

21
Garcia vs Recio
(G.R. No. 138322)
Foreign Law – Divorce
FACTS:Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson an Australian

citizen, on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989 a decree of divorce dissolving the
marriage was issued by the Australian Family Court. On June 26, 1992, respondent
became an Australian citizen. Subsequently, respondent entered into marriage
with petitioner a Filipina on January 12, 1994. Starting October 22, 1995,
petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of
their marriage. On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Responded contended that his prior
marriage had been validly dissolved by a decree of divorce obtained in Australia
thus he is legally capacitated to marry petitioner. The trial court rendered the
decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent dissolved and
both parties can now remarry. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:Whether or not the divorce obtained by respondent in Australia ipso facto

capacitated him to remarry.
HELD:The SC remanded the case to the court a quo to receive evidence. Based on
the records, the court cannot conclude that respondent who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen was legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Neither
can the court grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage null and void on
the ground of bigamy. After all it may turn out that under Australian law he was
really capacitated to marry petitioner as result of the divorce decree. The SC laid
down the following basic legal principles; a marriage between two Filipino cannot
be dissolved even by a divorce decree obtained abroad because of Articles 15 and
17 of the Civil Code.
Quita vs Court of Appeals

December 22, 1998
FACTS OF THE CASE:Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both
Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941. They got divorce in San
Francisco on July 23, 1954. Both of them remarried another person. Arturo
remarried Bladina Dandan, the respondent herewith. They were blessed with six
children.
On April 16, 1972, when Arturo died, the trial court was set to declared as to who
will be the intestate heirs. The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs Escano case held
that the divorce acquired by the petitioner is not recognized in our country.
Private respondent stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the
light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Rommillo Jr that aliens who obtain divorce abroad
are recognized in the Philippnes provided they are valid according to their
national law. The petitioner herself answered that she was an American citizen
since 1954. Through the hearing she also stated that Arturo was a Filipino
at the time she obtained the divorce. Implying the she was no longer a
Filipino citizen.
The Trial court disregarded the respondent’s statement. The net
hereditary estate was ordered in favor the Fe D. Quita and Ruperto, the
brother of Arturo. Blandina and the Padlan children moved for
reconsideration. On February 15, 1988 partial reconsideration was granted

22
declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of
the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the other half to Fe Quita.
Private respondent was not declared an heir for her marriage to Arturo was
declared void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous
marriage to petitioner. Blandina and her children appeal to the Court of Appeals
that the case was decided without a hearing in violation of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Blandina’s marriage to Arturo void ab initio.
2. Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary as surviving
spouse of Arturo.
HELD:
No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe D. Quita
at the time of their divorce is relevant to this case. The divorce is valid here since
she was already an alien at the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid in
their country’s national law.
Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo. She cannot be the
primary beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving spouse of Arturo.
ELMAR O. PEREZ, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 162580 January 27, 2006
FACTS:Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig twice

on May 16, 1968. The marriage produced four children. Several years later, the
couple encountered marital problems that they decided to obtain a divorce from
the Dominican Republic. Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily executed a
Special Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge of the First Civil Court of San
Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce
action under its laws.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia
in the United States and both lived as husband and wife until October 2001. Their
union produced one offspring.
During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the
court in the Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan
and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan
was deemed void under Philippine law. On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition
for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily with the RTC of Quezon City.
ISSUE:Whether or not Perez has a legal interest in the matter of litigation required
of a would-be intervenor in Tristan’s petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage with his wife?
RULING:
No, Perez has no legal interest. When petitioner and Tristan married on
July 14, 1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree
that Tristan and Lily obtained from the Dominican Republic never
dissolved the marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws relating
to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad. Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will

23
be governed by Philippine laws with respect to his or her family rights and duties,
or to his or her status, condition and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless
of whether he or she was married here or abroad initiates a petition abroad to
obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in
getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such
absolute divorce. Petitioner’s claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their
marriage was celebrated abroad lacks merit. Thus, petitioner never acquired the
legal interest as a wife upon which her motion for intervention is based.
SAN LUIS V. SAN LUIS

FEBRUARY 6, 2007
(Under Property Regimes of Unions Without Marriage)Two consolidated cases:
Edgar San Luis v. Felicidad San Luis, Rodolfo San Luis v. Felicidad San Luis
BACKGROUND:
The case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo San Luis.
During his lifetime Felicisimo contracted three marriages. From the first marriage
contracted in 1942 he had six children, two of whom are the petitioners in this
case. His first wife died in 1963 and his second marriage to an American citizen
ended in the wife getting a divorce in 1971. In 1974 Felicismo married Felicidad,
the respondent in this case, in the USA. They had no children but lived together
for 18 years until Felicismo died in 1992.
After Felicisimo’s death, Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and filed a petition for letters of administration. The children of
Felicisimo from his first marriage opposed this on the grounds that Felicidad is
only a mistress, the second marriage to the American wife subsisting. The
petitioners claimed that Article 26, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code cannot be
given retroactive effect to validate the bigamous marriage because it would
impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children (Article 256 of the
Family Code).
ISSUE/HELD/RATIO:
Does the respondent Felicidad have legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration? YES.
Even if the Court does not apply Article 26, Par. 2 of the Family Code, there
is sufficient jurisprudential basis in the case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. [oo nalang
kung di niyo maalala ito, guys] where it was held that a Filipino spouse should no
longer be considered married if the alien spouse validly obtains a divorce outside
of the Philippines. [Remember that in Van Dorn the Court applied the nationality
principle in Article 15 of the Civil Code] Indeed, in cases like Quita v. Dandan and
Republic v. Orbecido III [again, kung di niyo maalala, oo nalang, haha] it was
pointed out that Par. 2, Article 26 of the Family Code traces its origins to the
ruling in Van Dorn. However, since Felicidad failed to present the necessary
evidence to prove the divorce decree (recall Garcia v. Recio: copy of the law, final
decree of absolute divorce) as well as her marriage solemnized in
California, the case is remanded to the trial court for further reception of
evidence.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry
Felicidad, Felicidad still has legal personality to file the petition for letters
of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of the
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

24
Sec. 2, Rule 79 provides (in part) that a petition for letters of administration must
be filed by an interested person. Felicidad qualifies as an interested person with
direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their 18-year cohabitation. If
she proves the validity of the divorce but fails to prove her marriage, she may be
considered a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. If she fails to prove the
validity of both the divorce and the marriage, Article 148 of the Family Code would
apply. Article 148 states that couples who are incapacitated to marry but still live
together as husband and wife have co-ownership over properties acquired during
their cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions.
LAVADIA VS. HEIRS OF LUNA

FACTS:
 ATTY. LUNA,
 a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the law firm Sycip
Law Offices
 at that time when he was living with his first wife, herein Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he married in a civil ceremony
conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Parañaque and later
solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel,
Bulacan.
 they begot seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan
Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda,
Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio
Luna.
 After almost 2 decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA
eventually agreed to live apart from each other and agreed to
separation of property, to which end, they entered into a written
agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT", whereby they agreed to live separately and to
dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.
 ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from
the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court
of First Instance of Dominican Republic.
 on the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this
time with SOLEDAD.
 Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines
and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
 ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named LUPSICON where ATTY. LUNA
was the managing partner.
 ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty.
Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a portion of the office condominium unit as
their office. The said law firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN.
 After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including
the lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over
by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of the first marriage.
 The CA promulgated decision, holding and ruling EUGENIA, the first
wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter’s death
on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY.
LUNA in the Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior
marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino
citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction.

25
ISSUE:
Whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia)
had validly dissolved the first marriage following the nationality rule laid down by
Art 15.
HELD:
Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the time of his death.
RATIO:
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized
in the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the
solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The
Civil Code continued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine
laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living
abroad. Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case by
virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of
Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10, 1947 until
the present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized
in the Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has
remained even under the Family Code,16 even if either or both of the spouses are
residing abroad.17 Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions under
our laws have beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies
against such defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity of
the marriage and the annulment of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto.
Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first
marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule,
however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the
marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his
death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which
characterizes marriage as an inviolable social institution,19 and regards it as a
special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman for the
establishment of a conjugal and family life.20 The non-recognition of absolute
divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the
marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the
extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the death of
either spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided bylaw. For as long as this
public policy on marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving
the marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and
enforcement in this jurisdiction.
NOVERAS V NOVERAS
GR NO 188289
FACTS:David and Leticia Noveras are US citizens who own properties in

the USA and in the Philippines. They have 2 children, Jerome and Jena.
Leticia states that sometime in 2003, David abandoned his family to live
with his mistress. Further, she states that David executed an affidavit where he

26
renounced all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties in the
Philippines. After learning of the extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for
divorce before the Superior Court of California. Upon issuance of the judicial
decree of divorce in June 2005, the US properties were awarded to Leticia. Leticia
then filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal property before the RTC of
Baler, Aurora. The RTC regarded the petition for judicial separation of conjugal
property as a petition for liquidation of property since the spouses’ marriage has
already been dissolved. It classified their property relation as absolute community
because they did not execute a marriage settlement before their marriage
ceremony. Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of
processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because the court cannot
take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any proof of
their national law. The court awarded the properties in the Philippines to David,
subject to the payment of the children’s legitimes. Upon Leticia’s appeal to the
CA, the CA ruled that the Philippine properties be divided equally between the
spouses and that both should pay their children P520k. David argues that the
Court should have recognized the California judgment that awarded him the
Philippine properties and that allowing Leticia to share in the PH properties is
tantamount to unjust enrichment considering she already owns all the US
properties.
ISSUES:Whether the marriage between David and Leticia has been dissolved
HELD:No. the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed
the bond of marriage between the parties. Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the
record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by:
(1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody thereof. Such publication must be authenticated by a seal of a
consular official. Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must
state that the copy is a correct copy of the original. The attestation must be
under the official seal of the attesting officer. Based on the records, only the
divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to prove its
authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not
presented. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the
parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in
proceeding directly to liquidation.
ORION SAVINGS BANK VS. SHIGEKANE SUZUKI

G.R. NO. 205487, NOVEMBER 12, 2014
FACTS:
 Respondent Shigekane Suzuki, a Japanese national, met with Ms. Helen
Soneja to inquire about a condominium unit and a parking slot at Cityland
Pioneer, Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang, a Korean
national.
 Soneja informed Suzuki that Unit No. 536 [covered by Condominium
Certificate of Title (CCT) No. 18186] and Parking Slot No. 42
[covered by CCT No. 9118] were for sale. Soneja likewise assured
Suzuki that the titles to the unit and the parking slot were clean.
 After payment of the price of the unit and parking slot, Kang then
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale. Suzuki took possession of the

27
condominium unit and parking lot, and commenced the renovation of the
interior of the condominium unit.
 Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver the
titles to the properties, which were then allegedly in possession of
Alexander Perez (Perez, Orion’s Loans Officer) for safekeeping. Despite
several verbal demands, Kang failed to deliver the documents.
 Suzuki later on learned that Kang had left the country, prompting Suzuki to
verify the status of the properties. He learned that CCT No. 9118
representing the title to the Parking Slot No. 42 contained no annotations
although it remained under the name of Cityland Pioneer. Despite the
cancellation of the mortgage to Orion, the titles to the properties remained
in possession of Perez.
 Suzuki then demanded the delivery of the titles. Orion, through Perez,
however, refused to surrender the titles, and cited the need to consult
Orion’s legal counsel as its reason.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Korean Law should be applied in conveying the conjugal
property of spouses Kang?
RULING:
In the present case, the Korean law should not be applied. It is a universal
principle that real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the
country or state where it is located. Thus, all matters concerning the title and
disposition of real property are determined by what is known as the lex loci rei
sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title can pass from one
person to another, or by which an interest therein can be gained or lost.
On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed
principally by the national law of the spouses. However, the party invoking the
application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign
law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge cannot
take judicial notice of a foreign law.
Matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be
governed by Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal nature of the
property shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean
law on the conjugal ownership of property. It merely attached a "Certification
from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea" to prove the existence of Korean Law.
This certification, does not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the
property for there is no showing that it was properly authenticated.
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach
or processual presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not
pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that foreign law is
the same as Philippine Law.
Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to' Hyun Sook
Jung" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang. In other words, the
import from the certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the
properties as they are registered in his name alone, and that he is married
to Hyun Sook Jung. There is no reason to declare as invalid Kang’s
conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal consent.
It is undisputed that notwithstanding the supposed execution of the
Dacion en Pago on February 2, 2003, Kang remained in possession of the

28
condominium unit. In fact, nothing in the records shows that Orion even bothered
to take possession of the property even six (6) months after the supposed date of
execution of the Dacion en Pago. Kang was even able to transfer possession of
the condominium unit to Suzuki, who then made immediate improvements
thereon.

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1

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

LOVELLA FE MADELO-TACDER, Ph.D

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability

2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general

DE ROY VS COURT OF APPEALS

LOVELLA FE MADELO-TACDER, Ph.D

ACAAC V AZCUNA, JR.

MAIN DOCTRINE. In accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an

LOVELLA FE MADELO-TACDER, Ph.D

Atienza vs Brillantes 243 SCRA 32

SF: An administrative case was filed by herein complainant against Judge

LOVELLA FE MADELO-TACDER, Ph.D

previous marriage for purpose of remarriage shall apply?

LOVELLA FE MADELO-TACDER, Ph.D

CARLOS vs.FELICIDAD SANDOVAL aka FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS

ISSUE:Whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a

LOVELLA FE MADELO-TACDER, Ph.D

The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved.

ANITA CHENG, Petitioner,

LOVELLA FE MADELO-TACDER, Ph.D

HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON v. ELVIN CHAN.

On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary

LOVELLA FE MADELO-TACDER, Ph.D

HELD:YES. Reversa CA and reinstate MeTC

LOVELLA FE MADELO-TACDER, Ph.D

ADORACION CAROLINO (SPOUSE AND IN SUBSTITUTION OF THE DECEASED JEREMIAS A. CAROLINO),

ISSUE:WON PD No. 1638 shall be applied retroactively.

LOVELLA FE MADELO-TACDER, Ph.D

ROBERTO G. FAMANILA, Petitioner,

LOVELLA FE MADELO-TACDER, Ph.D

ISSUE:WON the quitclaim contract signed by the petitioner is valid.

LOVELLA FE MADELO-TACDER, Ph.D

ISSUE:Whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents

Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is an act of

LOVELLA FE MADELO-TACDER, Ph.D

Thornton vs. Thornton (2004)

ISSUE:WON RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129.

LOVELLA FE MADELO-TACDER, Ph.D

Literal interpretation of the word “exclusive” will result in grave injustice.

LOVELLA FE MADELO-TACDER, Ph.D

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Ruling of Tan Properties be applied

HELD:Doctrine: (NCC 8– Judicial Decisions)

LOVELLA FE MADELO-TACDER, Ph.D

- Court does not agree.

LOVELLA FE MADELO-TACDER, Ph.D

ISSUE:Whether SC should affirm the conviction of the accused rendered by the

RULING:Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm a judgment of

LOVELLA FE MADELO-TACDER, Ph.D

A.M. No. 53-MJ (January 31. 1974)

LOVELLA FE MADELO-TACDER, Ph.D

FACTS:On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina and the

LOVELLA FE MADELO-TACDER, Ph.D

FACTS:Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson an Australian

ISSUE:Whether or not the divorce obtained by respondent in Australia ipso facto

Quita vs Court of Appeals

LOVELLA FE MADELO-TACDER, Ph.D

ELMAR O. PEREZ, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig twice

LOVELLA FE MADELO-TACDER, Ph.D

SAN LUIS V. SAN LUIS