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Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. v NCDA
G.R. No. 194561, Sept. 14, 2016, Third Division
Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. and Northern Luzon Drug
Corporation, petitioners
National Council on Disability Affairs; DOH; DOF; BIR; DILG; DSWD,
respondents
Facts:
On March 24, 1992, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7277, the "Magna Carta for
Disabled Persons," was passed into law. The law defines "disabled
persons", "impairment" and "disability." On April 30, 2007, Republic Act
No. 94427 ("Magna Carta for Persons with Disability") was enacted
amending RA 7277. Specifically, Sec. 32 of RA 9442 granted the PWDs a
20% discount on the purchase of medicine (upon submission as proof of
his/her entitlement thereto: ID issued by mayor or brgy. captain, passport,
or transportation discount fare ID from the National Council for the
Welfare of Disabled persons) and a tax deduction scheme was adopted
wherein covered establishments may deduct the discount granted from
gross income based on the net cost of goods sold or services rendered.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9442 (Sec. 6 Rule IV
pertains to Other Privileges and Incentives, including the purchase of
medicine) was jointly promulgated by several government agencies.
On April 23, 2008, the NCDA issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1,
Series of 2008, prescribing guidelines which should serve as a mechanism
for the issuance of a PWD Identification Card (IDC) which shall be the basis
for providing privileges and discounts to bonafide PWDs. On December 9,
2008, the DOF issued Revenue Regulations No. 1- 2009 prescribing rules
and regulations to implement R.A. 9442 relative to the tax privileges of
PWDs and tax incentives for establishments granting the discount. On May
20, 2009, the DOH issued A.O. No. 2009-0011 specifically stating that the
grant of 20% discount shall be provided in the purchase of branded
medicines and unbranded generic medicines from all establishments
dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of the PWDs.
On July 28, 2009, petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition with
application for a TRO/WPI before the CA to annul and enjoin the
implementation of the 5 laws abovementioned (in bold). On July 26, 2010,
the CA rendered a Decision upholding the constitutionality of RA 7277 as
amended, as well as the assailed administrative issuances.
Issues:
WON the CA erred in ruling the PWD discount as a valid exercise of police
power instead of an invalid exercise of the power of eminent domain
(because it fails to provide just compensation to petitioners)
WON the assailed laws violate the due process clause
WON the definition of “disabilities” under the assailed laws are vague,
ambiguous, and unconstitutional
WON the PWD discount violates the equal protection clause
Ratio:
We deny the petition.
The CA is correct when it applied by analogy the case of Carlos Superdrug
Corporation et al. v. DSWD, et al. wherein We pronounced that Sec. 4 of
RA 9257 which grants 20% discount on the purchase of medicine of senior
citizens is a legitimate exercise of police power. Police power is the power
of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property. On the other hand, the power of eminent
domain is the inherent right of
the state (and of those entities to which the power has been lawfully
delegated) to condemn private property to public use upon payment of
just compensation. In the exercise of police power, property rights of
private individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state. A
legislative act based on the police power requires the concurrence of a
lawful subject and a lawful method.
The priority given to PWDs finds its basis in the Constitution (Sec. 6 Art XII
and Sec. 11 Art XIII). Thus, the Declaration of Policy (Sec. 2) of RA 7277
recognizes that disabled persons are part of the Philippine society, to
whom the Senate shall give full support for the improvement of their total
well-being and their integration into the mainstream of society. The State
shall adopt policies ensuring the rehabilitation, self-development and self-
reliance of disabled persons. Hence, the PWD mandatory discount on the
purchase of medicine is supported by a valid objective or purpose. As in
the case of senior citizens, the discount privilege to which the PWDs are
entitled is actually a benefit enjoyed by the general public to which these
citizens belong. The means employed in invoking the active participation
of the private sector, in order to achieve the purpose or objective of the
law, is reasonably and directly related. Also, the means employed to
provide a fair, just and quality health care to PWDs are reasonably related
to its accomplishment, and are not oppressive, considering that as a form
of reimbursement, the discount extended to PWDs in the purchase of
medicine can be claimed by the establishments as allowable tax
deductions.
The three documents (see above) mentioned in Sec. 32 of RA 7277 as
amended by RA 9442 to entitle one to the discount must be read with its
IRR. NCDA A.O. No. 1 provides the reasonable guidelines in the issuance of
IDCs to PWDs as proof of their entitlement to the privileges and incentives
and fills the details in the implementation of the law. Petitioners'
insistence that Part IV (D) of said AO is void because it allows allegedly
non-competent persons like teachers, heads of establishments and heads
of NGOs to confirm the medical condition of the applicant is misplaced. It
must be stressed that only for apparent disabilities can the teacher (a
“school assessment” for students) or head of a business establishment (a
“certificate of disability” for employees) validly issue the mentioned
required document because, obviously, the disability is easily seen or
clearly visible. It is, therefore, not an unqualified grant of authority for the
said nonmedical persons as it is simply limited to apparent disabilities. On
the other hand, nonapparent disabilities can only be validated by a
licensed private or government physician, and a medical certificate has to
be presented in the procurement of an IDC. Therefore, the provision
complies with the standards of substantive due process.
Aside from the definitions of a "person with disability" or "disabled
persons" under RA 7277 as amended by RA 9442 and its IRR, NCDA A.O.
No. 1 specifies that IDs shall be issued to those with the following
conditions: psychosocial, chronic illness, learning, mental, visual,
orthopedic, speech and hearing conditions. This includes persons suffering
from disabling diseases resulting to the person's limitations to do day to
day activities as normally as possible such as but not limited to those
undergoing dialysis, heart disorders, severe cancer cases and such other
similar cases resulting to temporary or permanent disability. Similarly,
DOH A.O. No. 2009-0011 defines the different categories of disability. In
the instant case, We do not find the aforestated definition of terms as
vague and ambiguous. Settled is the rule that courts will not interfere in
matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of the government
agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the
special and technical training and knowledge of such agency.
With respect to RA 9442, its expressed public policy is the rehabilitation,
self-development and
self-reliance of PWDs. Persons with disability form a class separate and
distinct from the other citizens of the country. Indubitably, such
substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of
the law. Thus, Congress may pass a law providing for a different treatment
to persons with disability apart from the other citizens of the country.
Held:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
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dated July 26, 2010, and the Resolution dated November 19, 2010, in CA-
GR. SP No. 109903 are AFFIRMED. All concur.
SLDC v. DSWD
SOUTHERN LUZON DRUG CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. THE
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT, et
al. Respondents
G.R. No. 199669
April 25, 2017
FACTS:
The case at bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision
of the Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition for prohibition filed
by Southern Luzon Drug Corporation (petitioner) against the Department
of Social Welfare and Development , the National Council for the Welfare
of Disabled Persons (now National Council on Disability Affairs or NCDA),
the Department of Finance and the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(collectively, the respondents), which sought to prohibit the
implementation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise
known as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003" and Section 32 of
R.A. No. 9442, which amends the "Magna Carta for Disabled Persons,"
particularly the granting of 20% discount on the purchase of medicines by
senior citizens and persons with disability (PWD), respectively, and
treating them as tax deduction. which dismissed the petition for
prohibition filed by Southern Luzon Drug Corporation (petitioner) against
the Department of Social Welfare and Development , the National Council
for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (now National Council on Disability
Affairs or NCDA), the Department of Finance and the Bureau of: Internal
Revenue (collectively, the respondents), which sought to prohibit the
implementation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise
known as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003" and Section 32 of
R.A. No. 9442, which amends the "Magna Carta for Disabled Persons,"
particularly the granting of 20% discount on the purchase of medicines by
senior citizens and persons with disability (PWD),: respectively, and
treating them as tax deduction due to the reason that claiming it affects
the profitability of their business.
The petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
drugstore operation in the Philippines while the respondents are
government' agencies, office and bureau tasked to monitor compliance
with R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, promulgate implementing rules and
regulations for their effective implementation, as well as prosecute and
revoke licenses of erring establishments.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Petition for Prohibition may be filed to question the
constitutionality of a law;
2. Whether or not the case constitute stare decisis
3. Whether or not the 20% Sales Discount for Senior Citizens PWDs does
not violate the petitioner’s right to equal
protection of the law
4. Whether or not the definitions of Disabilities and PWDs are vague and
violates the petitioners right to due process of law
RULING:
1. Yes. Prohibition may be filed to question the constitutionality of a law.
Generally, the office of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and
oppressive exercise of authority and is directed against proceedings that
are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is the remedy to prevent inferior
courts, corporations, boards, or persons from usurping or exercising a
jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by the law.
This is, however, not the lone office of an action for prohibition. In Diaz, et
al. v. The Secretary of Finance, et al., prohibition was also recognized as a
proper remedy to prohibit or nullify acts of executive officials that amount
to usurpation of legislative authority. And, in a number of jurisprudence,
prohibition was allowed as a proper action to assail the constitutionality of
a law or prohibit its implementation.
2. No. The Court agrees that the ruling in Carlos Superdrug does not
constitute stare decisis to the instant case, not because of the petitioner's
submission of financial statements which were wanting in the first case,
but because it had the good sense of including questions that had not
been raised or deliberated in the former case of Carlos Superdrug, i.e.,
validity of the 20% discount granted to PWDs, the supposed vagueness of
the provisions of R.A. No. 9442 and violation of the equal protection
clause.
3. Yes. The subject laws do not violate the equal protection clause. The
equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to
those persons falling within a specified class. If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one
class may be treated and regulated differently from another." For a
classification to be valid, (1) it must be based upon substantial distinctions,
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law, (3) it must not be
limited to existing conditions only, and (4) it must apply equally to all
members of the same class.
4. No. The definitions of "disabilities" and "PWDs" are clear and
unequivocal. Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 7277, the precursor of R.A. No. 94421
defines "disabled persons" as follows:
(a) Disabled persons are those suffering from restriction or different
abilities, as a result of a mental, physical or sensory impairment, to
perform an activity in the manner or within the range considered normal
for a human being[.]
On the other hand, the term "PWDs" is defined in Section 5.1 of the IRR of
R.A. No. 9442 as follows:
5.1. Persons with Disability are those individuals defined under Section 4 of
[R.A. No.] 7277 [or] An Act Providing for the Rehabilitation, Self-
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Development and Self-Reliance of Persons with Disability as amended and
their integration into the Mainstream of Society and for Other Purposes.
This is defined as a person suffering from restriction or different abilities,
as a result of a mental, physical or sensory impairment, to perform an
activity in a manner or within the range considered normal for human
being. Disability shall mean (1) a physical 1or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more psychological, physiological or anatomical
function of an individual or activities of such individual; (2) a record of such
an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment.
In view of the foregoing disquisition, Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 9257
and Section 32 of Republic Act No. 9442 are hereby declared
CONSTITUTIONAL.
SPARK NOT FOUND
MMDA V. GARIN
Facts: The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O.
Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) by MMDA
and his driver's license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara
Street, Binondo, Manila, on August 1995.
Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent
addressed a letter to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting
the return of his driver's license, and expressing his preference for his case
to be filed in court.
Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint with
application for preliminary injunction, contending that, in the absence of
any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924
grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their
licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the
deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution.
The respondent further contended that the provision violates the
constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative
authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified —
and therefore unlimited — fines and other penalties on erring motorists.
The trial court rendered the assailed decision in favor of herein
respondent.
Issue:
1. WON MMDA, through Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 could validly
exercise police power.
HELD: Police Power, having been lodged primarily in the National
Legislature, cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not
possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may
delegate this power to the president and administrative boards as well as
the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units
(LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative
powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local
Government Code of 1991. 15 A local government is a "political
subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has
substantial control of local affairs." 16 Local government units are the
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police
power through their respective legislative bodies.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local
government units. With the passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995,
Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and
administrative region" and the administration of "metro-wide" basic
services affecting the region placed under "a development authority"
referred to as the MMDA. Thus: The MMDA is, as termed in the charter
itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose
of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious
delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are
administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter
itself
* Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the "Functions and Powers of
the Metro Manila Development Authority." The contested clause in Sec.
5(f) states that the petitioner shall "install and administer a single ticketing
system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of
violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or non-moving
in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the
enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of Rep.
Act No. 4136 and P.D. No. 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding," and that
"(f)or this purpose, the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and
regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may
deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units,
duly licensed security guards, or members of non-governmental
organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to
such conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose."
Chavez v. Romulo
Facts:
Petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to enjoin the
implementation of the “Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on
the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence” (Guidelines)issued by
respondent Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr., Chief of the Philippine National
Police (PNP).Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom
a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the DILG to reconsider the
implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his request was
denied. Thus, he filed the present petition impleading public respondents
Ebdane, as Chief of PNP; Alberto G. Romulo, as Executive Secretary; and
Gerry L. Barias, as Chief of the PNP-Firearms and Explosives Division.
Issues:
1.whether respondent Ebdane is authorized to issue the assailed
Guidelines;
2. whether the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a valid exercise of
police power?;
Ruling:
1.Authority of the PNP Chief
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It is true that under our constitutional system, the powers of government
are distributed among three coordinate and substantially independent
departments: the legislative, the executive and the judiciary. Each has
exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme
within its own sphere. The power to make laws – the legislative power – is
vested in Congress. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional
and void, on the principle that “delegata potestas non potest delegari” –
“delegated power may not be delegated.”The rule which forbids the
delegation of legislative power, however, is not absolute and inflexible. It
admits of exceptions.
An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the legislative
body to delegate its licensing power to certain persons, municipal
corporations, towns, boards, councils, commissions, commissioners,
auditors, bureaus and directors. Such licensing power includes the power
to promulgate necessary rules and regulations. Act No. 1780 delegated
upon the Governor-General (now the President) the authority (1) to
approve or disapprove applications of any person for a license to deal in
firearms or to possess the same for personal protection, hunting and
other lawful purposes; and (2) to revoke such license any time. Further, it
authorized him to issue regulations which he may deem necessary for the
proper enforcement of the Act. By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975, the
PNP absorbed the Philippine Constabulary (PC). Consequently, the PNP
Chief succeeded the Chief of the Constabulary and, therefore, assumed
the latter’s licensing authority.
Section 24 thereof specifies, as one of PNP’s powers, the issuance of
licenses for the possession of firearms and explosives in accordance with
law. This is in conjunction with the PNP Chief’s “power to issue detailed
implementing policies and instructions” on such “matters as may be
necessary to effectively carry out the functions, powers and duties” of the
PNP.
2.Police Power
At any rate, assuming that petitioner’s PTCFOR constitutes a property
right protected by the Constitution,
the same cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the
reach of the State’s police power. All property in the state is held subject
to its general regulations, necessary to the common good and general
welfare.
The Court laid down the test to determine the validity of a police measure,
thus:(1) The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require the exercise of the police power; and (2) The
means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that
the basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society.
Owing to the proliferation of crimes, particularly those committed by the
New People’s Army (NPA), which tends to disturb the peace of the
community, President Arroyo deemed it best to impose a nationwide gun
ban. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the issuance of the assailed
Guidelines is the interest of the public in general. The only question that
can then arise is
whether the means employed are appropriate and reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly oppressive.
In the instant case, the assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit
possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of
firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to carry their
firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This
is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated,
necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon
to hunt for their victims; they do not wait in the comfort of their homes.
With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for criminals to
roam around with their guns. On the other hand, it would be easier for the
PNP to apprehend them. The petition is hereby DISMISSED.
National Development Corporation vs Philippine Veterans Bank
Facts: The particular enactment in question is Presidential Decree No.
1717, which ordered the rehabilitation of the Agrix Group of Companies to
be administered mainly by the National Development Company. The law
outlined the procedure for filling claims against the Agrix Companies and
created a claims committee to process these claims. Especially relevant to
this case, and noted at the outset, is section 4(1) thereof providing that
“all mortgages and other liens presently attaching to any of the assets of
the dissolved corporations are hereby extinguished.” Earlier, the Agrix
Marketing Inc. had executed in favor of private respondent Philippine
Veterans Bank a real estate mortgage dated July 7, 1978 over three
parcels of land situated in Los Baños, Laguna. During the existence of the
mortgage, Agrix went bankrupt. It was the expressed purpose of salvaging
this and the other Agrix companies that the aforementioned decree was
issued by President Marcos. A claim for the payment of its loan credit was
filed by PNB against herein petitioner, however the latter alleged and
invoked that the same was extinguished by PD 1717.
Issue: Whether or not Philippine Veterans Bank as creditor of Agrix is still
entitled for payment without prejudice to PD 1717.
Held: Yes. A mortgage lien is a property right derived from contract and so
comes under the protection of Bill of rights so do interests on loans, as
well as penalties and charges, which are also vested rights once they
accrue. Private property cannot simply be taken by law from one person
and given to another without just compensation and any known public
purpose. This is plain arbitrariness and is not permitted under the
constitution.
The court also feels that the decree impairs the obligation of the contract
between Agrix and the private respondent without justification. While it is
true that the police power is superior to the impairment clause, the
principle will apply only where the contract is so related to the public
welfare that it will be considered congenitally susceptible to change by the
legislature in the interest of greater number.
Our finding in sum, is that PD 1717 is an invalid exercise of the police
power, not being in conformity with the traditional requirements of a
lawful subject and a lawful method. The extinction of the mortgage and
other liens and of the interest and other charges pertaining to the
legitimate creditors of Agrix constitutes taking without due process of law,
and this is compounded by the reduction of the secured creditors to the
category of unsecured creditors in violation of the equal protection clause.
Moreover, the new corporation being neither owned nor controlled by the
government, should have been created only by general and not special
law. And in so far as the decree also interferes with purely private
agreements without any demonstrated connection with the public
interest, there is likewise an impairment of the obligation of the contract.
Eminent Domain
Association of Small Landowners v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343
(1989)
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These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e.,
Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and
Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian
reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform
program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who
are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the
case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA
3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to
provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution
among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for
landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228,
declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and
providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as
well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O.
No. 229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was
also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657,
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably
changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them
suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought
exception from the land distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657.
The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands
whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their
landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to
distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves
have shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be
exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to
a different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD
27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground that these laws already valuated their
lands for the agrarian reform program and that the specific amount must
be determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay
averred that this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides
that only courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also
violated due process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken
for public use without just compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may
be paid for their land in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay
averred that just compensation has always been in the form of money and
not in bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program,
must be in terms of cash.
4. Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of Police
power or Power of Eminent Domain.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a
different class exempt from the agrarian reform program. Under the
law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things
similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in
these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated
must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities
imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong to a different
class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share
the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a
substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly
visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on
this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in
providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and
respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused
to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that
Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian
reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power
lodged in the courts. However, there is no law which prohibits
administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just compensation. In
fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the
landowner and the government – even without judicial intervention so
long as both parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation
through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention
is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that, the just
compensation determined by an administrative body is merely
preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just
compensation by an administrative body, then it can go to court and the
determination of the latter shall be the final determination. This is even so
provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the
decision may bring the matter to the court of proper
jurisdiction for final determination of just
compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept
in traditional exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is
a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will require
billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash – if
everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient money
hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for
just compensation.
4. Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there
are traditional distinction between the police power and the power of
eminent domain, property condemned under police power is noxious or
intended for noxious purpose, the compensation for the taking of such
property is not subject to compensation, unlike the taking of the property
in Eminent Domain or the power of expropriation which requires the
payment of just compensation to the owner of the property expropriated.
Reyes v. NHA, 395 SCRA 494 (2003)
Facts: Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed complaints for
the expropriation of sugarcane lands belonging to the petitioners. The
stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the
Dasmariñas Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who
 6

were relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court suspension the Sang. Panlungsod of Cebu passed a resolution and 2
rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots and the ordinances (all about the lot 1029). Ord. No. 1843 likewise appropriated
payment of just compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment the amount of 6, 881, 600 for the payment of subject land; this was
of the lower court. approved by the Mayor.

A few years later, petitioners contended that respondent NHA violated the ISSUE: Whether or not the exercise of eminent domain is valid in the case
stated public purpose for the expansion of the at bar.
Dasmariñas ResettlementProject when it failed to relocate the squatters
HELD: NO, it is NOT VALID. The foundation of the right to exercise
from the Metro Manila area, as borne out by the ocular inspection
eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of public
conducted by the trial court which showed that most of the expropriated
character. Govt. may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private
properties remain unoccupied. Petitioners likewise question the public
property should be expropriated. In this case, there was no showing at all
nature of the use by respondent NHA when it entered into a contract for
why petitioners’ property was singled out for expropriation by the city
the construction of low cost housing units, which is allegedly different
ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or selection.
from the stated public purpose in the expropriation proceedings. Hence, it
Ordinance no. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of petitioners’
is claimed that respondent NHA has forfeited its rights and interests by
property as the site of a socialized housing project. Moreover, under RA
virtue of the expropriation judgment and the expropriated properties
7279, private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of
should now be returned to herein petitioners.
socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings may be
resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition are exhausted. Thus,
the ordinance in question is likewise null because: (1) it is repugnant to
Issue: Whether or not the judgment of expropriation was forfeited in the
the pertinent provisions of RA 7279 and 7160 (LGC); (2) the precipitate
light of the failure of respondent NHA to use the expropriated property for
manner in which it was enacted was plain oppression masquerading as
the intended purpose but for a totally different purpose.
pro-poor ordinance; (3) the fact that the land was singled out manifests
partiality against petitioners; (4) it failed to show that there was
reasonable relation bet. the end sought and the means adopted.
Held: The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent NHA.
Accordingly, petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of
the eminentdomain provision of the Constitution by contending that the
contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use. It is
now settleddoctrine that the concept of public use is no longer limited to
traditional purposes. The term "public use" has now been held to be
synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and
"public convenience." Thus, whatever may be beneficially employed for
the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use."

In addition, the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban
development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later
sold to private homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment and
service companies, and other private concerns. Moreover, the
Constitution itself allows the State to undertake, for the common
good and incooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of
urban land reform and housing which will make at affordable
cost decent housing andbasic services to underprivileged and
homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. The
expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized housing for
the marginalized sector is in furtherance of social justice.

City of Mandaluyong v. Aguilar, 350 SCRA 487 (2001) NOT FOUND

LAGCAO V. LABRA

October 13, 2004 | Corona, J.

FACTS: The case is about the validity of Ordinance No. 1843 authorizing
the mayor of Cebu City to initiate expropriation proceedings for the
acquisition of lot (1029) of petitioners Diosdado, Doroteo and Ursula
Lagcao.

In 1964, Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu, one of
which is the lot 1029. 1965, petitioners purchased said lot on installment
but in late 1925, these 210 lots reverted to the Province of Cebu. The
latter tried to annul sale which resulted to the filing of the case of the
petitioners. RTC and CA ruled in their favor and as such a deed of sale was
executed and a TCT was issued in their favor. When they tried to take
possession of the land, they found out that it was occupied by squatters.
Thus, they instituted ejectment proceedings which was later on granted
by the MTCC and affirmed by RTC. However, Mayor Garcia wrote letters
requesting the deferment of the demolition since the city was still looking
for a relocation site for the squatters; this was granted. During the