Heidegger on Nature

Author(s): DAVID E. COOPER

Source: Environmental Values, Vol. 14, No. 3, Nature and Continental Philosophy (August
2005), pp. 339-351
Published by: White Horse Press
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Heidegger on Nature

DAVID E. COOPER

DepartmentofPhilosophy
ofDurham
University
50 OldElvet
DurhamDH1 3HN
Email:D.E.Cooper@durham.ac.uk

ABSTRACT

The primary purposeof thepaperis thebroadlyexegeticalone of explaining

andconnecting Heidegger'smanyremarks, madein severaldifferent contexts
ofenquiry, on nature.
The threemaincontexts arethoseofontology, scientific
methodology, and technology.AftershowinghowHeidegger'scentraltheses
I argue,in thefinalsection,that
in thesecontextsare relatedto one another,
hisobservations methodarepivotal.Unlessthesearesecured,his
on scientific
furtherclaimsaboutontologyandtechnology lose theiressentialsupport.

KEYWORDS

nature,
Environment, science,technology,
Heidegger

CONTEXTS OF ENQUIRY

Tomanyreaders ofEnvironmentalValues,Martin
Heidegger ( 1889-1976) iswell
knownas almosttheonlytwentieth centuryphilosopher oftheveryfirst rank
tohaveaddressedtheissueofwhathe called'thedevastation oftheearth'and
henceto havebeenconcerned withnaturein thesense,roughly, ofthenatural
environment. His voluminous however,
writings, engagewithmanyotherissues
subsumableundertheheadingof 'philosophy he is a
ofnature'.In particular,
maincriticnotonlyofwhatheseesas ourprevailing attitudes
towards thenatural
environment, butofthepredominant conceptionofnatureinthemodern world.
andexplainhiscriticisms,
In thispaper,I hopeto identify andto demonstrate
theclose connections betweenthemwhichHeideggercertainly tookthereto
be. Onlyin thefinalsectiondo I venture this
beyond broadlyexegeticalaim,
in a
arguing, way Heideggernever, faras I know,explicitly
that as does,that
centraltohiswholecritiqueis hisphilosophy ofthenaturalsciences.

Values14(2005):339-51
Environmental
HorsePress
© 2005TheWhite

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340
DAVID E. COOPER

The mainexegeticalaimmaybe a relatively modestone,butitis noteasy

to execute.Heideggerwrotea greatdeal aboutnature, oftenin an inimitably
densestyle,andthereoccurimportant shifts inhisthinking aboutnature. What
complicates the matter most,however, is that Heidegger discusses the topic(s)
ofnatureina variety ofcontexts ofenquiry. Itis important tosortoutthesedif-
ferent enquiries, relatedthoughHeideggerhimself certainly takesthemtobe. I
shalllabelthethreemaincontexts in whichHeidegger'sremarks aremadethe
ontological, and
methodological, technological ones.
Whenenquiring intonaturein thefirst, ontological, context, Heidegger's
concernis withthekindofbeingthatnature possessesandhowthisdiffers from
thekindenjoyedby,say,humanbeingsor artefacts. Forourpurposes,littleor
nothing is lost,I think, byconstruing thisenquiry intothebeingofnatureas one
intoconceptions ofnature - inparticular, intothequestionofwhich,outofmany
conceptions ofnature thathaveflourished overthecenturies, is the'primordial'
or fundamental one, and which 'derivative' or secondary. Heidegger'scentral
claim, in thiscontext, is that the currently prevailing conception ofnature- the
dominant that
interpretation, is, of the kind of being it has - is derivative, not
'primordial'.
Inthesecond,methodological, context, Heidegger's concern iswiththestatus
andself-understanding ofthenaturalsciences,especiallyofphysics,whichhe
regardsas paradigmatic of thesesciencesin moderntimes.He is concerned,
inparticular, toquestionthefamiliar perception that,invirtueoftheirmethod,
thenaturalsciencesare,or one daywillbe, providing a uniquelytrueaccount
ofhownaturefundamentally, andindependently ofanyhumanperspective, is.
Heidegger's central claim in this connection is that the sciences do nothing of
thesort.Rather, sciencerepresents only 'one way ... in which all that is presents
itself(QCT 156).
In thefinal,technological, context, Heidegger'sconcernis to exposewhat
he takestobe theprevailing way in which, inmodernity, natureis 'revealed'to
us. 'Technology' is hisnameforthis'wayofrevealing'.His mainclaimsinthis
contextarethatthiswayofrevealingis a peculiarly partialandimpoverished
one, and that,worsestill,it represents a 'monstrous' and 'supremedanger',
in
beingresponsible, effect, for an increasing 'devastation oftheearth'andfor
ourcontemporary 'distress'(QCT 26ff).
Whiletheseareverydifferent contexts ofenquiry, itis clearthatHeidegger
regards them - and the main points he makes in connection witheach- as inti-
mately related. It he
is, argues, because a fundamental, 'primordial' conception
ofnaturehasbeen'forgotten' andsubordinated toa quitedifferent, 'secondary'
one thatthecurrent self-understanding of thesciences,as arbiters of howna-
turetrulyis,has beenmadepossible.Boththis'forgetfulness' andtheensuing
prestige ofthescientific conception oftheworldhave,in turn,servedtofoster
the'monstrous', technological wayofrevealingnature.Butthetraffic is two-
way.The current hegemony of thetechnological wayof revealingreinforces

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 341
HEIDGEGGER ON NATURE

thenaturalsciences'ownunderstandingofwhattheyachieve,andthis,inturn,
guaranteesa morecomplete'forgetfulness'
ofthatprimordial notionofnature
thathas succumbedto thederivative
one assumedbythesciences.
Inthefollowing I elaborate
sections, onthemainpointsthatHeidegger makes
ineachcontext ofenquiry,
comment morefullyon theconnections hediscerns
betweenthesepointsand,finally,arguethatit is his reflections
on thestatus
ofthenaturalscienceswhicharepivotalsince,unlessthesearewelltaken,the
claimshe makesintheothertwocontexts lose all ormuchoftheirgrounding.

CONCEPTIONS OF NATURE

Inwritingsstretching overfortyyears,Heidegger consistently maintainsthatthe

modernconception ofnature,
whichhasbecomeincreasingly entrenched since
itsoriginsin theworksofGalileoandDescartes,is a derivative or 'privative'
one- theresultofa severeabstraction fromconceptions closertooureveryday
experience ofandengagement withtheworld.Thismodernconception is that
ofnatureas resextensa,as a 'world-stuff' - as, forexample,'matter endowed
withforce'.(See, especially,BT 122ff.)Whileaccountsof matterand force
mayhavebecomemoresophisticated sincetheseventeenth century,thegen-
eralpictureis stilltheCartesianoneofnatureas a complexofmaterial entities
behavingin accordancewith'laws ofnature'or,at anyrate,reliablestatistical
regularities.
For Heidegger, theentrenchment of thisconception is no accident,and is
notdue,simply, tothestrikingpredictive andexplanatory successesofthesci-
encesthatembraceit.Itis theresult, rather, ofanepistemological turntakenby
Descartesand mostlaterphilosophers thatprivilegesa certaintypeof human
understanding - knowledgein the'spectator sense'(BP 276): thekindof un-
derstanding,thatis,whichis obtainedthrough detached, objectiveobservation
and analysisand which,at a sophisticated level,takestheformof theories.
Withthisturn, itis inevitable
thatunderstanding ofnatureshouldbe construed
as theoretical
knowledgeofan objective,material realmstanding overagainst
us spectatingsubjects.
InBeingand Time,Heideggerdescribestheworldornatureso construed as
something 'present-at-hand', andarguesthatitis parasiticon a quitedifferent
modeofunderstanding theworld,as something 'ready-to-hand' or'equipmental'
(BT 97). Because itis parasitic,themodernconception cannot,as itschampi-
ons maintain, be thefundamental or 'primordial' one. This primary modeof
understanding is an intelligent
'coping'or 'engaging'withthingsin so faras
theyare significant in ourpracticalactivities.For example,ourprimary un-
derstanding of a hammeris notthatofthemerespectator, at an object
staring
withsuch-and-such propertiesof size, shapeand colour,butthe'concernful'
of an
understanding agent for whom thehammer playsa rolein activitieslike

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342
DAVID E. COOPER

building.The worldas we experienceit in everydaylifeis, in effect, a giant

of a of
complex 'equipment', totality 'significance', in which thevarious items
we encounter - hammers, nails, tables and so on - owe their not
identity onlyto
theirrelationstooneanother, butultimately tohumanpurposesandendeavours.
The worldas 'world-stuff' or materialsubstanceis a notionwe arriveat only
'later',when we stand back fromourengagedactivities and 'stopandstare'at
thethingsaroundus.
Butwhatofthenatural, as againsttheartefactual, world?ForHeidegger, the
constituents ofnature, are
too, originally experienced or encountered as 'equip-
ment',ready-made equipment, as itwere- thewood,forexample,as a forest
oftimber, andthesouthwindinrelationto activities likefarming (as a signof
rain,say,or a threat to a crop).Moregenerally, 'ourconcerndiscoversnature
as havinga certaindirection' relativeandrelevant toourpracticalprojects(BT
100). The natural environment must first be experienced as itis bythefanner,
forester orhunter beforeitcanbecomeanobjectofdetached, spectatorial enquiry
forthebiologistorzoologist.Thispriority of'concernful', engagedexperience,
itis important tostress,is not,forHeideggera merelyempirical matter. Unless
things like hammers, trees or winds first'litup' for us as significant entities in
relationtoourpractices, they would not be 'accessible' to and
thought enquiry
(BT 122).The greaterroroftheCartesianprivileging ofa spectatorial viewof
theworldandnatureis thatitignoreshowtheseeverbecameaccessibletothe
spectator. Natureas itdisplaysitselftothespectator mustalreadyhavedisplayed
itselfin a quitedifferent modefortheretobe anything to spectate.
In Beingand Time,then,twoconceptions of nature,a 'primordial' and a
'privative' one, are described: nature as a of
totality ready-made 'equipment',
andnatureas a 'world-stuff' setoveragainstdetachedhumancognition. In fact
a thirdconception briefly popsup when Heidegger refers to 'the nature which
"stirsandstrives", whichassailsandenthralls us' (BT 70). Heideggeris aware,
surely,thatthesedescriptions scarcelyapplytonatureeitheras so muchready-
madeequipment or as 'matterendowedwithforce'.It is not,however,until
severalyearslaterthatHeidegger returns toandelaborates thisthird conception.
Andwhenhe does,itcomestooccupya centralplaceinhisthinking - ineffect
the
replacing 'equipmental'conception as the 'primordial' one on which our
modern, Cartesian is
conception parasitic. In such later writings as An Introduc-
tiontoMetaphysics andContributions toPhilosophy this' primordial '
conception
is identifiedwithwhatHeideggertakesto have been thepre-Socratic Greek
notionofphysis.In experiencing natureas physis,theGreeksencountered it
as a 'processofarising',as a 'self-blossoming or
emergence' 'upsurging pres-
encing'forus of thenaturalworld(see, eg, IM 14-15).In theterminology of
Contributions, nature qua physis is not the natural world but
itself, the'event',
'gift'or 'source'whereby a natural worldbecomespresent forhumanbeingsto
experience.'Natura'and 'nature',whilepurporting totranslate theGreekterm
physis,in effect referto theoutcomeofthis'event',notthe'event'itself,and

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HEIDGEGGER ON NATURE

henceto whatbecomespresent, notto the'presenting'whichenablesthings

tobecomepresent.
In callingnaturequaphysis'primordial', Heideggerdoesnotmean,simply,
thatit is theearliestconception. The priority is also a conceptualone: unless
nature werefirst as the
experienced physis, conception ofnature as a 'world-stuff'
couldneverhavearisen.It is onlybecauseof thewonderandawe thatnature
quaphysisinspires - becauseofa visionofnature as something that'assailsand
enthralls' - thatenquiry intothenatural world,thedetermination tounderstand
itandexplainitsworkings, becamea possibility forhumanbeings.
The questionarisesof therelationship betweenthe'early'and 'later'ac-
countsofthe'primordial' conception of nature. Heidegger'sowntendency was
toresistsuggestions thathislaterthought represented a radical 'turn' away from
thepositionstakeninBeingand Time.Despitethat,itis difficult nottoregard
the'equipmental' accountin thatbookas being,fromthelaterpointof view,
only an articulation of thatparticular, 'privative'andhistorically lateconcep-
tionof natureintegral to technology. (See the section TECHNOLOGY AND
NATUREbelow.)Be thatas itmay,andnotwithstanding thesalientdifferences
betweenthe'early'and 'later'viewson the'primordial' conception ofnature,
twoconvictions his
persistthroughout writings. The first
is that our modern,
Cartesianconception ofnatureis a derivative one,parasitic eitherupona prag-
maticconception ofnatureas ready-made 'equipment' ortheGreekconception
ofnature as 'self-blossoming'/j/ivMs. Second,Heidegger consistently maintains
thatthe'primordial' conceptions are of nature as something essentially related
to,andhencerequiring, humanexistence - whether as so much'equipment' in
relationtoourpracticalpurposes, oras a mysterious that
'presenting' requires
us,as 'theshepherds ofbeing'(LH 239),tobe therecipients ofthat'presenting' .
Without thatreception, nothing would ever become present to orfor anything.
(In part,forHeidegger, thisis becausebeings,inordertobe anything, mustpass
through, as it were,the reception halloflanguage. Language, he famously wrote,
is 'thehouseofBeing'(LH 239) - a descendant oftheinsistence, inBeingand
Time,thatnothing canbe thatcouldnotbe takenupinto'discourse'.) Thesetwo
abidingthemesshouldbe bornein mindduringtheremaining discussion.

THE STATUS OF NATURALSCIENCE

The naturalsciences,as well as thosethatmodelthemselves on these,are,

Heidegger holds,'utterly of
incapable gaining access ... totheir[own] essence'
(QCT 177) - to,thatis, therealstatusof their
assertions and theories.Indeed,
Heidegger continues,the of
typicalself-understanding the sciencesis entirely
mistaken. Championsandpractitioners ofthenaturalsciencesstandardly take
scientific
assertionsandtheories tobe,oratleasttoapproximate to,truthsabout
'natureas such'- natureas itanywayis,quiteindependently ofhumaninterests,

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DAVID E. COOPER

conceptions andperspectives. Whatthisself-understanding ignores, Heidegger

argues, is thatmodern science is thoroughly shapedby certainmethodologi-
cal decisions,ones thatnothing in 'natureas such'dictates.The fundamental
decisionon whichmodernsciencerestswas to countonlywhatis measurable
andquantifiable as theproperfieldof scientific enquiryanddescription. This,
in effect,meansattributing to 'natureas such',whenitis identified withwhat
scienceattempts to delineate,onlythosefeatures whichare thusmeasurable
andquantifiable.
Naturalsciencerests,then,upona 'stipulation inadvance',upon'theprojec-
tion[ontonature]of a fixedground-plan'. Far fromsciencediscovering how
naturein realityis, naturesimply'reports back' to scientists whathas already
beensettledbytheadoptionofthisa priori'ground-plan' (QCT 118ff).Itis not,
forexample,a triumphant scientific that
discovery 'spatio-temporal magnitudes
ofmotion'belongto'natureas such',whilecolours,meanings andemotions, say,
belongelsewhere - tosubjective experience ofnature, forexample.Rather, this
is theinevitableconsequence of the pre-emptive to
stipulation countenance, as
belonging to thereal furniture of nature, only what is measurable and quantifi-
able.This,as Heideggersees it,is obviouswhenone considersthestrategy of
GalileoandDescartesin expellingthesecondary qualities from the domain of
nature.Forthatexpulsionwas,ofcourse,theconsequenceofa priorireasoning,
notofexperimental enquiry.
Heideggeris unimpressed by thefamiliarsuggestion thattheremarkable
explanatory successes ofmodern science a
provide good reason forholdingthat
ityieldsanaccountofhownature anyway, or in itself,is. Scientificexplanations,
Heideggerargues,restupontheestablishment of'causalities': theseare,'strictly
speaking... "if-then" relationships in theformof when-then' ones (CP 102).
Sciencehas indeedbeen successfulin explainingeventsby subsuming them
undersuchgeneral'when-then' One for
regularities. may, example,successfully
explain,in thatsense,whythewaterin thekettlejust boiled,by subsuming
theeventundera 'when-then' regularity, andalso explainsomeregularities by
subsuming them under wider ones. But before hastilyconcluding, fromsuch
successes,thatthesciencesaredelineating 'natureas such',we shouldbearin
mindthatitis,oncemore,a methodological decisiontocountonlyexplanations
ofthis'when-then' variety as authentic.
The explanatory successof naturalscienceis success,therefore, onlyas
measuredby a yardstick thatsciencehas itselfdetermined. Historically,there
havebeendifferent yardsticks. For some older like
thinkers, Aristotle, things
are comprehensively explainedonlywhentheirtelos- theend-state towards
whichtheynaturally tend- is identified. Forothers, likeLeibniz,things arefully
explainedonly when theirnecessity within a divine dispensation is exhibited.
Heidegger'spointis thatitis notempirical, scientific enquiryitselfwhichhas
shownsuchyardsticks tobe chimerical. Insteadithasbeenshifts inmetaphysi-
cal predilections,resulting inthestipulation ofa certainnotionofexplanation,

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HEIDGEGGER ON NATURE

whichhavebeenresponsible fortheatrophy ofthoseolderconceptsofexplana-

tion.Lurkingbehindthatpointis one thatHeideggerinherits fromhisteacher,
EdmundHusserl.It is changesin whatHusserlcalls the' life-world',
whichis
'themeaning-fundament of naturalscience'- shiftsin humanambitions and
in people'ssenseof whatmatters,
interests, in theircomportment towardsthe
naturalworld- thathavebeenresponsible forthemethodological determina-
tionswhichnow privilegetheexplanations and accountsof naturefurnished
bynaturalscience.

TECHNOLOGY AND NATURE

Heidegger'sremarks on technology will,torepeat,be familiar tomanyreaders

ofthisjournal,so I canbe fairly briefinrehearsing them.His accountoftechnol-
ogyineffect elaborates aspectsoftheclaimmadeinBeingand Timethatnature
is 'primordially' experienced as 'ready-to-hand' or 'equipmental' - theforest,
as
say, potential timber. (The aspects, as indicated by that particular example,
arethoserelatedto themoreobviously'economic'andutilitarian dimensions
of 'equipment'.)For 'technology', in his sense,refersnotto theuse of tools
andmachinery inproductive activity, ortoapplications oftechnical knowledge
to suchactivity, butto a 'wayofrevealing'or 'rendering thingsmanifest' - of
and
experiencing interpreting - the natural world which is paradigmatically
manifested bytechnology inthosefamiliar senses(QCT 5). In thetechnologi-
cal wayofrevealing, specifically, thenaturalworldis experienced orencoun-
teredas so much'standing-reserve' - something 'on tap' forus, to be drawn
on andfromso as to serveourpracticalneeds.Wheresucha wayofrevealing
predominates, theresultsare,forexample,that'theearth... revealsitselfas
a coal-mining thesoil as a mineraldeposit',and theriverRhineas a
district,
'water-power supplier'(QCT 14ff).
Thereis, however,an important difference betweentheearlierdiscussion
of 'equipment'andthelaterone of 'standing-reserve'. Thatthenaturalworld
is 'primordially' encountered as 'equipment'is advanced,in Beingand Time,
as an abidingandnecessary aspectofhumanexistence.In thelateressays,on
theotherhand,ourencountering orrevealingnatureinthepragmatic modeof
technology is taken tobe a distinctively modern phenomenon, theculmination,
as Heideggersees it,of'thehistory ofmetaphysics'. Bythis,hemeansanever-
increasing tendency to view and understand the world 'in relationto man'as
thebeingwho'decide[s]... how[other] beingsappear'(LH 234). Thetendency
is towards,eventually, 'theimpression ... thateverything manencounters ex-
istsonlyin so faras itis hisconstruct' It
(QCT 27). is, moreover, because the
technological of
way revealing just is one - thelatest - possibleway, and not
something essentialtohumanexperience ineveryepoch,thatHeidegger is now
able to regarditas a 'monstrous' way. In so regarding it, he is not suggesting

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DAVID E. COOPER

thatit is mistaken to view thenaturalworldas 'standingreserve'.Plainly,a

certainregionmaybe a coal-mining district or a rivermaysupplypower,and
therecan be nothing incorrect in so recognising it.
is
Technology monstrous, rather, in that it 'drives outeveryotherpossibil-
of
ity revealing', to such a degree that it is no longerappreciated as justone
possibility (QCT 27). So, for example, in the modern world, even 'aesthetic'
experience of nature is technological, with the river Rhine,say,beingputon
tap 'for inspection by the touristindustry' so as to yielditsquotaof 'aesthetic'
sensations. Otherhistorical ways revealing notpossessthisall-devour-
of did
ing character: a flower, say,could be revealedas something ofbeauty, butalso
as something 'blossoming forth'from a mysterious process physis,and as
of
something with a significant role in a people's sense of theircommunity. As
such,technology is at the farthestpossible remove from that stancetowards the
natural worldwhich'letsbeingsbe': forto 'letbe' is,precisely, tostandopento
a fullrangeofwaysin whichthingsmaybe 'rendered manifest' to us.
Fromthishegemony of technology, further developments a monstrous
of
kindensue.Foronething, thetechnological viewofnature comestoencompass
humanbeings,so that'manhimselfwillhavetobe takenas standing-reserve'
(QCT 27). Humanbeingsbecome'manpower','humanresources'andthelike.
Andhumannatureitselfis indangerofbeingputontap.Anticipating theambi-
tionsofsomeoftoday'sbiotechnologists, withtheirreadinessto 'shuntaround'
humangeneticmaterial, Heideggerwritesofan 'attackuponthenatureofman
compared with which the explosionofthehydrogen bombmeanslittle'(DT 52).
Eveniftheirgeneshavenotyetbeenshunted around,ina worlddominated by
technology, people themselves certainly been- 'drivenfromtheirnative
have
soil [and]resettled inthewastelands ofindustrial districts'(DT 48). In that,and
otherrespects, thehegemony oftechnology brings with itthe modern'destiny'
of 'homelessness'.Again,withnature'dimmeddown' or levelleddownto
standing-reserve, itis, so to speak,without theresourcesto resistthemodern
urge to 'order' it and 'challenge' it forth to to producea 'maximumyieldat
minimum expense'. Hence the process of a 'devastation oftheearth',appeals
against which in the name of the or
integrity meaning naturalthingssound,
of
to themodernear,onlyholloworquaint.

INTERCONNECTIONS

Such,takenrelatively areHeidegger'sobservations
separately, on naturemade
in thethreecontextsof his enquiriesintotheontologyof (or conceptionof)
nature,themethodsand statusof thenaturalsciences,and thecharacter of
As
technology. notedearlier,Heidegger takesthere be
to intimate connections
betweentheseobservations.Forexample,thehegemony oftechnology, as I put
it,reinforces
thesciences'ownself-understandingoftheirdeliverances,
which

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HEIDGEGGER ON NATURE

inturnreinforces the'forgetfulness' ofa more'primordial' conception ofnature

thanthenaturalscientific one.
I devotethissection,however, to considering thecomplaint that,farfrom
beingintimately connected, Heidegger's observations are at odds withone
another. it is the
Specifically, alleged, technological stance towards nature and
thenaturalscientific conception of it can hardly reinforce one another, since
theyarein opposition. Fromthestandpoint oftheformer, thenaturalworldis
revealedin purelypragmatic, 'equipmental' terms; whereas, accordingto the
scientificconception, nature is what is revealed to detached spectatorship, an
'objective'entity which is what it is quiteindependently of human interests
andperspectives. So how,forinstance, can a viewoftheforestas nextyear's
timbersupplyreinforce and be reinforced by a viewof it as so much'matter
endowedwithforce'?
To understand Heidegger'sresponseto thischarge,we need to consider
hisremarks on therelationship of scienceandtechnology. Thesearedirected,
typically,against the usual view that technology appliedscience.Whileitis
is
truethat'moderntechnology' developedintheeighteenth century, so thatitis
'later',ona 'chronological reckoning' ,than modern (Galilean)physicalscience,
itis nevertheless 'historically earlier'whenconsidered from'thepointofview
oftheessenceholdingswaywithin it'(QCT 23). Moresuccinctly, andcrudely,
scienceis notindependent oftechnology, butan 'offshoot ofa ... proliferation
of tool-preparation' (CP 50). His point,here,is nottheempiricalone that,as
a matter of fact,modernphysicsrequiredthestimulus of burgeoning techno-
logical activitiesin order to take off and develop. Nor is itthe cynical that
one
scientificresearchat anygiventime,however'theoretical', is alwaysshaped
anddirected bycontemporary technical andeconomicneeds.Heidegger is quite
to
happy accept that much scientific research is undertaken 'for itsown sake',
oroutofsheer'curiosity'.
The keyto thepointHeideggerdoes wantto makelies in hisreference to
'theessenceholdingswaywithin'technology. Thatessenceis theordering,
challengingstancetowardsthenaturalworldfromwhichit is addressedas
'standing-reserve', as something to be madeto yieldwhatwe requirefromit.
Butthissamestance,Heideggerargues,also belongstotheessenceofmodern
science.The argument is thatexperimentation is an essentialaspectofscience,
andthatexperimentation shoulditselfbe construed, as itwasbyFrancisBacon,
as an ordering and challenging of materialsso as to 'produceevents'.That
experimentation is a propermethodofenquirywas notsomething thatmodern
sciencehituponas a luckyafter-thought. Rather,giventhe'stipulation' only
toconsiderwhatis measurable andquantifiable, itbelongstothe'ground-plan'
of scienceto engagein experiment. Fornothing willcountas measurable and
quantifiable that
does not lend in at to
itself, principle least, experimental method.
Andsincetheaimofsuchenquiriesis toestablish'when-then' regularities,itis
essentialto scientific to
practice 'produce events' under specificexperimental

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DAVID E. COOPER

conditions. Forhowelse is one toestablish, to therequiredlevelofexactness,

thatwhenX happens,thenY happens?
Crudelyput,then,scientific research andtechnology sharea similar'mind-
set'. Boththeresearcher and thetechnologist put nature on therack,in the
Baconianspirit;bothdemandthatnatureyieldsomething up. Thatin theone
case, the is
yield quantified information acquired under experimental condi-
tionswhile,in theother,it is coal, electricity or whateverin satisfaction of
practicalwants, should not be allowed to conceal the One
affinity. way ap- of
preciating theaffinity is torecognisehowdecisivelyboththescientific attitude
andthetechnological stanceareopposedto theGreekexperience ofnatureas
physis.Natureas a mysterious 'upsurging presenting' is notsomething whose
understanding could be gainedbyputting it on the experimenter's Noris
rack.
itsomething that, thus experienced, could figure humanbeingsonlyas so
for
many resources at our disposal.
One appreciates theaffinity, too,byreflecting that,forscienceandtechnol-
ogyalike, nature must be 'dis-enchanted' - stripped of all thoseaspects(reli-
for
gioussignificance, example) that would make it resistant bothto complete
in
explanation quantifiable 'when-then' terms and to beingregardedas mere
equipment. With these affinities appreciated, it is then easyto see how,invari-
ous ways,naturalscienceandtechnology, onceup andrunning, reinforceone
another'sprojects.The prestige of science,whichowes so muchto a reliance
onprecision machinery and'tool-preparation', is inherited bysophisticated and
'gigantic'interventions in nature that themselves on
rely machinery. The suc-
cessesoftechnological interventions ingetting naturetoproduce'a maximum
yieldat minimum expense'themselves confirm theimpression thatscienceis
getting the world right in its announcement of the 'when-then' that
regularities
inform theseinterventions.
To return to thechargeto whichtheseremarks of Heideggerhavebeena
response: while itis indeed one thing experience naturalworldpragmati-
to the
or
cally anthropocentrically as 'standing-reserve', andanother thingtospectate
it,in thelaboratory, as so much'world-stuff', thereis no difficulty in passing
fromtheone to theother.Forwhat'holdssway'in bothmodesofexperience
is thesame,andall theobstaclestoexperiencing natureinboththosewaysand
no otherhavelongbeen'forgotten'.

THE PIVOTAL CLAIM

Iftheremarks intheprevioussectionarewelltaken,thenHeideggerisjustified
inholdingthattheclaimshemakesaboutnature inthethreecontexts ofenquiry
identified In
'hangtogether'. thisfinal I
section, wanttosuggest,as Heidegger
himselfdoes notexplicitly
do to myknowledge, thatthereis a ratherspecific,
andcrucialwaytheyholdtogether. In myjudgement, theclaimshemakesabout

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 349
HEIDGEGGER ON NATURE

themistaken self-understanding ofthenaturalsciencesarepivotalinthesense

that,iftheseareunwarranted, thenhisotherclaims- concerning thederivative
character of our prevailingconceptionof natureand the 'monstrousness' of
technology - lose theforceHeideggergivesthem.(Maybethosefurther claims
couldbe defended, butnoton thegroundsthatHeideggerdoes.) If I am right,
then,ironically, itis theleastwellknownofHeidegger'sdiscussions thatis most
central. (Mostcommentators onHeidegger onnature, such
including competent
onesas MichaelZimmerman (1990) andCharlesTaylor(1992),havepaidless
attention tohisphilosophy ofthenaturalsciencesthanto hisontologyandhis
discussionoftechnology. An exceptionis GeorgePattison(2000).)
Let'srecallHeidegger'smainclaimaboutthestatusofthenaturalsciences.
These do not,as theirchampionsstandardly assume,deliverassertionsand
theories thataretrueof 'natureas such',natureas itanywayandobjectively is
independent of all humaninterest andperspective. Norwouldithelpifthese
championsmoremodestly maintained thatthesciences,in theircurrent state,
to
onlyapproximate providing such a trueaccount - that it must be leftto an
idealphysicsofthefuture to
actually provide it.For, since thedeliverances of
thesciencesowe to a 'stipulation in advance',to theadoptionof an a priori
'ground-plan', thesciencescannotbe construed as offering evenan approxi-
mationto a trueaccountof 'natureas such'. Rather,theyofferjust one,not
especiallyprivileged, description ofhowtheworldmayrevealitselftous,and
froma certainangleofinterest.
Now supposeHeideggeris wrongaboutthisandthattheself-understanding
ofthenatural sciencesis after all warranted.Suppose,inotherwords,thatscien-
tificrealism, inonesenseofthatelasticexpression, is true:thereis oneandonly
one waytheworldanywayandfundamentally is, andthesciencestellus that
way.What,to beginwith,wouldthenbe thefateofHeidegger'sclaimsabout
thederivative, secondary character ofthisscientific conception ofnature? The
answeris thatthefamiliar chargemadeagainstHeideggerofengaging, notin
ontology, butin 'mere'anthropology wouldbe aneffective one.In otherwords,
hiscriticscouldreasonably chargethatintracing thedependence oftheprevail-
ingconception onearlierconceptions ofnature - thatofphysis,say- Heidegger
is onlytellingan empirical, historical It maywellbe true,thecriticwill
story.
concede,thattheCartesian, scientificpicture ofnaturewouldneverhavearisen
exceptagainstthebackground ofearlierpictures - butso what?Thehistorical,
anthropological storycannotshowthatthecurrently prevailing conception is
secondary in the philosophically crucial sense of being less than fundamental,
of failingto capturegenuine,butnow 'forgotten', dimensions of nature.The
critic,inotherwords,maycheerfully admitthattheprevailing conception has
risenfromtheashesofa forgotten conception, but then wish good riddance to
thelatter Put
conception. simply, Heidegger'scritique of the self-understanding
ofthenaturalsciencesmustbe correctifhe is to be warranted in complaining
oftheatrophy andoblivionofearlierconceptions ofnature.

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350
DAVID E. COOPER

Second,ifHeidegger'scritiqueis notwarranted, thenwhatbecomesofhis

insistence thattorevealnature as ' ' as nomore
technologically standing-reserve ,
thana resourceforus totap,is 'monstrous'? One might, ofcourse,stilladduce
familiar moralreasonsagainstsucha partialwayofrevealing:itmayresultin
ecologicaldevastation, endangerthesurvivalprospects of future generations,
cause suffering to animals,and so on. But whileHeideggeroccasionallyad-
ducessuchconsiderations, theseareclearlynottheonesthatprimarily ground
hisownantipathy to technology. His owncase restson theincompatibility of
technology with that 'lettingthings be' which manifests a properappreciation
of theintegrity of things, a senseof ourselvesas theguardiansof mysterious
processesof being,and a recognition thatit is hubristic forhumanbeingsto
makethemselves themeasureof'howbeingsappear'andtoregardthemselves
as answerable to nothing beyondtheirownprojects.
Butnow,ifthescientific realistis right - ifmodern physics'imageofitsown
statusis accurate- thenappealstotheintegrity ofnature, tonatureas something
we couldbe answerable to, or toa mysterious significance possessedbynatural
processes are misconceived. Nature is simply 'matter endowed withforce',in
whichcasepredicating meaning, integrity or normative measure ofnatural events
andprocessesis senseless.Thenature ofthephysicists is a dis-enchanted one.As
JohnPassmore( 1980) hasinsisted, nature as depictedbyphysicsis notanything
humanbeingscouldbe responsible to, even if,forfamiliar moralreasons,itis
something they should hold themselves responsible for.
Heidegger, then,needstosecurehiscritique ofscientific realism, oftheself-
understanding of thenatural sciences, ifhis further claims aretohave theforce
he imagines.Ifunsecured, thenhisclaimaboutthederivative character ofthe
Cartesianconception is in dangerof reducingto a philosophically unexciting
historical hypothesis, whilehis chargeof 'monstrousness' againsttechnology
is leftwithout thedistinctive kindof grounding thatHeideggerinvokes.As it
happens, Heidegger'scritique of scientific realism is,inmyjudgement, a power-
fulone.Thatis nota judgement I can argueforhere,thoughelsewhereI have
developeda critiquethatowestoHeidegger'sinsights (see Cooper2002). The
centralinsights, itseemsto me,arethat'concerndiscoversnatureas havinga
certaindirection' (HCT 210),andthatitis hubristic toimaginethatwe couldso
setasideortranscend our'concern'- ourinterests, oursenseofwhatmatters,
and so on - as to treatthisas a 'discovery'ofhowtheworldanywayis, quite
independently fromour'concern'.It is disappointing, giventheimportance of
theseinsights - bothin themselves and in thewidereconomyof Heidegger's
thought - thatfewof thecommentators who writeon Heidegger'sviewsof
naturehave devotedmuchattention to his critiqueof theself-understanding
ofthesciences.

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 351
HEIDGEGGER ON NATURE

REFERENCES

(a) WorksbyHeidegger

BP Basic QuestionsofPhenomenology, trans.A. Hofstadter,

Bloomington: Indiana
UniversityPress,1982.
BT BeingandTime, trans.
J.Macquarrie andE. Robinson, Oxford:Blackwell,1980.
CP Contributions
toPhilosophy (From Enowning), trans.
P.Emad and K. Bloom-
Maly,
ington:IndianaUniversityPress,1999.
DT Discourse on Thinking,trans.J.Anderson andE. Freund,NewYork:Harper &
Row,1966.
HCT History oftheConcept ofTime, tr.T. Kiesel,Bloomington: IndianaUniversity
Press,1985.
IM AnIntroductiontoMetaphysics, R. Mannheim,
trans. NewHaven:YaleUniversity
Press,1959.
LH 'Letter
onhumanism*, inBasicWritings, ed.D.Krell,
London: Routledge& Kegan
Paul,1978,189-242.
QCT TheQuestion Concerning Technology (andother essays),trans.W.Lovitt,
New
York:Harper & Row,1977.

(b) Otherworkscited

Cooper,D.E. (2002)TheMeasure Humanism,

ofThings: HumilityandMystery,
Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Passmore,J.(1980)Man'sResponsibility
forNature,2ndedn,London:Duckworth.
G. (2000)TheLaterHeidegger,
Pattison, London:
Routledge.
C. (1992) 'Heidegger,
Taylor, andH. Hall
LanguageandEcology',in H. Dreyfus
(eds.),
Heidegger: A Critical
Reader.Oxford: pp.247-69.
Blackwell,
M.E.
Zimmerman, (1990)Heidegger's withModernity,
Confrontation Bloomington:
Indiana Press.
University

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