d) Cost of suit.
"[4]
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137672. May 31, 2000]
PAZ REYES AGUAM, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
BONIFACIO RONSAYRO, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari seeking to set aside the resolution of the
Court of Appeals[1] dismissing petitioner's appeal because petitioner's motion
for extension to file appellant's brief was filed late by nine (9) days due to
counsel's mistake in counting the period for filing the same. The court also
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.[2]
The facts are as follows:
On January 8, 1998, the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, in an action for sum
of money and damages arising from malicious mischief filed by petitioner Paz
Reyes Aguam against respondent Bonifacio Ronsayro,[3] rendered decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered
in favor of the defendant dismissing the complaint and ordering
the plaintiff to pay the defendant the following:
a) P595,500.00 representing the share of the defendant from
the lot plaintiff sold, plus legal interest until the amount is paid
from date of demand;
b) The amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages;
c) P50,000.00 as and for attorneys fees; and,
In due time, petitioner filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.[5]
On September 25, 1998, the Court Appeals, through the Clerk of Court,
issued a notice addressed to Atty. Carlos G. Nery, Jr., petitioner's counsel,
requiring her as plaintiff-appellant to file within forty-five (45) days from
receipt an appellant's brief, furnishing a copy of the notice to Atty. Eladio P.
Samson, respondent's counsel.[6]
The notice was sent by registered mail to petitioner's counsel, Atty. Carlos G.
Nery at the latter's address of record, 26 Masbate St., West Ave., 1100
Quezon City.[7] The notice was received by an office clerk of a realty firm with
which Atty. Nery was sharing office. She was not an employee of petitioner's
counsel and she did not note down the date of receipt.[8]
On November 25, 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
extension of time to file appellant's brief, asking for ninety (90) days from the
expiry date within which to do so.[9]
On December 11, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for extension
and accordingly dismissed the appeal for failure of the appellant to file brief
within the reglementary period.[10]
On December 14, 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals her
appellant's brief.[11] On December 22, 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the denial and to admit appellant's
brief.[12]
On January 21, 1999, respondent filed an opposition to the motion for
reconsideration.[13]
On February 23, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.[14]
Hence, this appeal.[15]
The issue raised is whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's appeal because of the late filing
of appellant's brief due to counsel's mistake in the counting of the
reglementary period from notice to file appellant's brief.
Technically, the Court of Appeals may dismiss an appeal for failure to file
appellant's brief on time.[16] However, the dismissal
is directory, not mandatory.[17] It is not the ministerial duty of the court to
dismiss the appeal. "The failure of an appellant to file his brief within the time
prescribed does not have the effect of dismissing the appeal
automatically."[18] The court has discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an
appellants appeal. It is a power conferred on the court, not a duty.[19] The
"discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the
tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in
each case."[20] Technicalities, however, must be avoided. The law abhors
technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to
render or dispense justice.[21] "A litigation is not a game of
technicalities."[22] "Law suits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's
thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and
becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration
from courts."[23] Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on
technicality.[24] Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable
plea of technicalities.[25] Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical
grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage
hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be
applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to
help secure, not override substantial justice.[26] It is a far better and more
prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford
the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather
than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the
parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually
resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.
In the case before us, the notice to file appellant's brief was given to counsel
of petitioner. The rules require the notice to file brief to be given to the party
appellant.[27] The reason is that after taking an appeal, the party may change
attorney for purposes of the appeal. Hence, the notice must be given to the
party appellant. Thus, there was here a technical violation committed by the
clerk of the appellate court that ought not to prejudice the appellant.
Moreover, the notice was sent by registered mail. This is, of course, permitted
in the rules.[28] However, the mail matter must be received by the addressee
or his duly authorized representative Service of papers which includes every
written notice on a person who was not a clerk, employee or one in charge of
the attorneys office, is invalid.[29] Here, the notice was received by an
employee of a realty firm with which the counsel was sharing office. She was
not an employee of petitioner's counsel. He was a solo practitioner.
In the higher interest of justice, considering that the delay in filing a motion for
extension to file appellant's brief was only for nine (9) days, and normally, the
Court of Appeals would routinely grant such extension, and the appellant's
brief was actually filed within the period sought, the better course of action for
the Court of Appeals was to admit appellant's brief.
Lapses in the literal observance of a rule of procedure will be overlooked
when they arose from an honest mistake, when they have not prejudiced the
adverse party.[30] The Court can overlook the late filing of the motion for
extension, if strict compliance with the rules would mean sacrificing justice to
technicality.[31]
Consequently, we find that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion
in denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file appellants brief, and
in dismissing the appeal.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal. The Court remands
the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings, and disposition of
the appeal on its merits.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), on official leave.
 [G.R. No. L-44050. July 16, 1985.]
CARMEN SIGUENZA and HELENA SIGUENZA, Petitioner, v. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES PEDRO QUIMBO and LEONADIZA
QUIMBO, Respondents.
Jose Batiguin and Pedro T. Abella for Petitioner.
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. for Private Respondents.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, now
Intermediate Appellate Court, which denied the petition for certiorari and
mandamus for lack of merit and its resolutions denying the two motions for
reconsideration which were subsequently filed.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Apart from the background issue of an allegedly excessive award of damages
facing the lower courts, there was the question of whether or not the
petitioners’ appeal was perfected on time.
The private respondents, spouses Pedro and Leonadiza Quimbo filed a
complaint before the Court of First Instance of Cebu against petitioners
Carmen and Helena Siguenza together with Bert Osmeña and Associates for
breach of contract and payment of damages.
The complaint alleged that the petitioners entered into a contract with the
spouses Quimbo for the sale of two lots purportedly owned by Carmen and
Helena Siguenza, and which were identified as Lot Nos. 1 and 2, Block 1,
Phase II of the Clarita Village; that the said lots were to be paid in the total
amount of P15,200.00 of which the amount of P3,040.00 was to be paid upon
the execution of the contract of sale and the balance of P12,160.00 to be paid
in monthly installments and that subsequently, however, the spouses Quimbo
discovered that as early as 1969, the petitioners had already sold and
conveyed the same lots to Irenea D. Maningo and that both are now covered
by Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. T-48546 and T-48547 in the name of
the latter. The complaint further alleged that because of this double sale, the
spouses Quimbo demanded from the petitioners the return of their down
payment but the latter refused and that as a consequence of the deceit and
misrepresentation employed upon them by said petitioners, the spouses were
also prevented from constructing their house worth P100,000.00 on the lots
which if constructed at the present would cost them three hundred (300%)
percent more than the original amount.
In their answer, petitioners admitted the sale of the lots to the spouses but
argued that they had nothing to do with the sale as the one responsible was
Bert Osmeña and Associates. Petitioners also alleged that the impleading of
Carmen Siguenza as a party defendant had no basis because the lots in
dispute were originally registered only in the name of Helena
Siguenza.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The other defendant, Bert Osmeña and Associates admitted the sale of the
lots to Irenea Maningo but countered that such sale was only for the purpose
of enabling the latter to obtain a loan from the Government Service and
Insurance System. Since the loan did not materialize, the whole transaction
collapsed and during the process of reverting the lots back to the subdivision,
the spouses Quimbo showed interest and deposited money for the lots
although they were fully aware of the status of the said lots. Bert Osmeña and
Associates also alleged that after the down payment no further installments
were paid by the spouses. On March 31, 1975, the trial court rendered
judgment in favor of the spouses Quimbo, the dispositive portion of which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, based on all the foregoing considerations, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants ordering
the latter:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"To pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs P3,040.00, with interest at the legal
rate from June 2, 1971 until the same shall have been fully paid; P100,000.00
as compensation for the pecuniary loss plaintiffs suffered for failure to
construct their residential house; P5,610.00 as reimbursement for the rentals
plaintiffs paid from January 1972 to September 6, 1974; P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
and the costs."cralaw virtua1aw library
On April 14, 1975, the petitioners received a copy of the decision. On April 29,
1975, they filed their motion for reconsideration and on May 14, 1975, they
filed another motion captioned as "Amended Motion for Reconsideration
and/or New Trial." In this latter motion, the petitioners made an enumeration
of the findings and conclusions of the lower court which were allegedly not
supported by evidence. The petitioners also attached a "Deed of Partition"
dated February 25, 1969 for the purpose of showing that petitioner Carmen
Siguenza had no more right over the disputed lots at the time of the sale to
the spouses Quimbo, and therefore, should not have been made a party
defendant in the complaint.
On May 20, 1975, the trial court issued an order denying both the original and
amended motions for reconsideration on the ground that the same were "pro
forma based as it is on a forgotten evidence — a so-called deed of partition
supposedly executed in 1969, which was not introduced by defendants
Carmen and Helena Siguenza; . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The petitioners received the copy of the above order on May 27, 1975. On the
same day, they filed their notice of appeal, appeal bond, and motion for
extension of time to file the record on appeal.
On May 29, 1975, the spouses Quimbo filed a motion for execution of
judgment against the petitioners on the ground that the judgment had become
final and executory for failure of the petitioners to perfect their appeal on time.
The spouses alleged that since the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was
pro forma for not having been accompanied by an affidavit of merit and
verification, said motion did not stop the running of the period to perfect the
appeal.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
On June 30, 1975, the trial court issued the writ of execution prayed for by the
spouses Quimbo on the grounds that the motions filed by the petitioners were
pro forma as they were based on forgotten evidence, i.e., the deed of
partition, and that said motions were not supported by affidavits of merit thus
making them fatally defective. The trial court likewise disapproved the
petitioners’ notice of appeal, appeal bond, and motion for extension to file a
record on appeal for having become academic.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. It ruled
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Even granting, however, that the amended motion for reconsideration and/or
new trial is not pro forma, and was filed on time on May 14, 1975, or on the
last day of the 30-day period from receipt by petitioners on April 14, 1975 of
the decision, petitioners had to perfect then appeal, i.e., to file the notice of
appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal on or before May 28, 1975, the
last day following their receipt on May 27, 1975 of the order denying their
amended motion for reconsideration and/or new trial (Sec. 3, second
paragraph, Rule 41, Rules of Court). It is true that petitioners filed then notice
of appeal, appeal bond and motion for extension of 20 days within which to
file their record on appeal but the period of 20 days as prayed for in their
motion for extension would expire on June 16, 1975. Adding, therefore, the
remaining one day from May 27 to May 28, 1975, petitioners would have filed
their record on appeal on June 17, 1975. But since their record on appeal,
thru their manifestation, was filed only on June 30, 1975 or 13 days after June
17, 1975, the same was filed out of time. Again, while it may be true that
petitioners filed on June 26, 1975 a manifestation praying that they be
allowed to adopt their record on appeal filed by the other defendant therein,
Bert Osmeña & Associates, Inc., said manifestation was likewise filed out of
time.
"On these facts alone, it is needless to pass upon whether or not respondent
Court committed an error in holding the motions for reconsideration and/or
new trial as pro forma, or in not acting upon the motion for extension to file
record on appeal for the reason that we have here considered as granted the
extension of 20 days to petitioner but despite this period, their record on
appeal was filed out of time. Besides, petitioners have no right to presume
that their motion would be granted. Neither can respondent Court be
compelled by mandamus to approve the appeal when the same was not
perfected within the reglementary period."cralaw virtua1aw library
In this petition, the petitioners maintain that the appellate court committed
grave abuse of discretion in holding that they have lost right to
appeal.cralawnad
We agree.
In the case of Castro v. Court of Appeals (132 SCRA 782), we stressed the
importance and real purpose of the remedy of appeal and
ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"An appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. We have advised the
courts to proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to
appeal (National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority v. Municipality of
Libmanan, 97 SCRA 138) and instructed that every party-litigant should be
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his
cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities (A-One Feeds, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 100 SCRA 590).
"The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical
sense. The rules of procedure are used only to help secure not override
substantial justice. (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals (72 SCRA 120). Therefore,
we ruled in Republic v. Court of Appeals (83 SCRA 453) that a six-day delay
in the perfection of the appeal does not warrant its dismissal. And again in
Ramos v. Bagasao 96 SCRA 395), this Court held that the delay of four (4)
days in filing a notice of appeal and a motion for extension of time to file a
record on appeal can be excused on the basis of equity."cralaw virtua1aw
library
We should emphasize, however, that we have allowed the filing of an appeal
in some cases where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it,
only when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the
exercise of our equity jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, the petitioners’ delay in filing their record on appeal should
not be strictly construed as to deprive them of the right to appeal especially
since on its face the appeal appears to be impressed with merit.
In the interest of justice and the speedy disposition of cases, we have also
deemed it proper to decide this case on the merits as a remand to the lower
court for approval of the appeal, its subsequent elevation to the appellate
court and probably, another resort to this Court would only entail undue
burden on the parties and needless delays only to obtain the same judgment
that could very well be laid down through this petition. Furthermore, we have
already promulgated a resolution in the related case of Bert Osmeña &
Associates v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 56545, January 28, 1983, 120
SCRA 395), ordering the petitioners’ co-defendants, Bert Osmeña and
Associates, to pay the respondents the appropriate amounts due them. A
prompt disposition of this present petition would, therefore, enable the private
respondents to collect from the petitioners whatever amounts Bert Osmeña
and Associates have not yet paid to fully satisfy the liability adjudged against
the latter which may be rightly demanded from herein petitioners but not
duplicated as this would be unjust enrichment on the part of the
respondents.cralawnad
Resolving now the merits of the case, we find that the orders of the trial court
ordering the petitioners to pay the private respondents P100,000.00 for
compensatory damages is patently erroneous because no proof whatsoever
was presented or could be presented by the private respondents to show that
they had actually suffered pecuniary loss in that amount. In fact, the whole
amount of P100,000.00 had no basis at all except the respondents’ mere
allegation that they, absent the malice, bad faith, and unlawful and deceitful
acts of the petitioners, "could have then constructed a residential house worth
P100,000.00; that the same residential house cannot now be constructed at
that amount, but very likely at more than three hundred percent more; such
difference constitutes an actual damage on the part of the plaintiffs
(respondents) which are directly logically and naturally caused by the
aforesaid acts of defendants (petitioners) for which said defendants are
liable."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the case of Sy v. Court of Appeals (131 SCRA 127), we ruled that an
alleged loss of income is not recoverable for being speculative as no receipt
or any kind of evidence on the matter was presented to prove it. Likewise, in
the case of Seavan Carrier, Inc. v. GTI Sportswear Corp. (132 SCRA 314-
315), quoting G.A. Machineries, Inc. v. Yaptinchay (126 SCRA 87), we ruled
that for damages under Article 2200 of the Civil Code to be recovered, the
best evidence obtainable by the injured party must be presented; and thus,
"the bare assertion of the respondent that he lost about P54,000.00 and the
accompanying documentary evidence presented to prove the amount lost are
inadequate if not speculative."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the present case, the respondents were not able to prove any actual losses
suffered as a result of the petitioners’ wrongful acts because they have not
even started the construction of their house on the disputed lots. Any alleged
pecuniary loss which they claim to have suffered because of the delay in the
commencement of construction is purely speculative and cannot be the basis
of compensatory damages as provided by law.
As regards the awards of P50,000.00 moral damages and P25,000.00
exemplary damages, we hold that such awards are far too excessive
compared to the actual losses sustained by the respondents. They are
without bases considering that the spouses had only paid a downpayment in
the amount of P3,040.00 and had not yet occupied the property nor
introduced improvements thereon at the time they discovered the fraud
perpetrated against them by the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The
petitioners Carmen and Helena Siguenza are ordered to pay the private
respondents the amounts of P3,040.00 with legal interest from March 25,
1974; P10,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as exemplary damages and
P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees. To avoid duplication of payments resulting in
unjust enrichment, the payment of the aforesaid amounts shall be subject to
whatever payments the private respondents may have already received in
satisfaction of the same liability by virtue of the earlier judgment rendered in
G.R. No. 56545.

In the case of San Andres v. Court of Appeals (116 SCRA 813, we SO ORDERED.
ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, De la Fuente and
"While, indeed, the amount of moral damages is a matter left largely to the Alampay, JJ., concur.
sound discretion of a Court, (Art. 2216, Civil Code) we find that the sums of
P30,000.00 and P5,000.00 awarded herein as moral damages and attorney’s
fees, respectively, by the Court of Appeals, are excessive and should be
reduced to more reasonable amounts, considering the attendant facts and
circumstances. Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation,
are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for
actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
(Malonzo v. Galang, 109 Phil. 16, 20-21. cited in Enervida v. de la Torre, 55
SCRA 339)."cralaw virtua1aw library

The records will show that the injury suffered by the respondents was not
serious or gross and, therefore, out of proportion to the amount of damages
generously awarded by the trial court, and subsequently affirmed by the
appellate court. We note that a total of P188,650.00 in damages was awarded
in a case involving a downpayment of P3,040.00 on a full purchase price of
P15,200.00 payable in installments.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

We thus, hold that the petitioners are liable for the amount of P3,040.00,
representing the downpayment made by the private respondents on the lots
in dispute, with legal interest from March 26, 1974; and for the amounts of
P10,000.00 moral damages, P5,000.00 exemplary damages, and another
P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees, respectively. Petitioners, however, are not liable
for compensatory damages. (See Bert Osmeña and Associates v. Court of
Appeals, supra).
 [G.R. NO. 156613 : February 18, 2008]
MALAYANG KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA ASSOCIATED
ANGLO AMERICAN TOBACCO CORPORATION (MAKAMANGGA -
GAWA), JAIME BERMUDEZ, ET AL., Petitioners, v. ASSOCIATED ANGLO
AMERICAN TOBACCO CORPORATION AND/OR FLORENTE DY, ALICIA
LIM and ALEX DY,Respondents.*
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
which seeks the nullification of the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated June 5, 2002 dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by Malayang
Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Associated Anglo American Tobacco
Corporation (the Union) for failure to comply with Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; and the Resolution dated October 29,
2002,2 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts are as follows.
Respondent Associated Anglo American Tobacco Corporation (ANGLO) and
the Union entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) on
September 12, 1996. On April 2, 1998, the parties signed a Memorandum of
Agreement providing for a moratorium on the negotiations on the forthcoming
CBA between them. In December 1998, ANGLO and the Union convened to
discuss wage increases for the year 1999. Due to a breakdown in the
negotiations, the Union filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board on February 8, 1999.
On March 7, 1999 the Union staged a strike. Thereafter, on April 12, 1999,
ANGLO announced the closure or cessation of its business operations and
applied for a Notice of Closure with the Department of Labor and Employment
due to serious business losses.
On April 22, 1999, ANGLO and the Union executed another Memorandum of
Agreement providing for the referral of their dispute to an accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator (VA). On May 3, 1999, the VA issued a decision finding
the closure legal and awarding financial assistance to the workers and on
May 5, 1999, the parties executed before the VA a document entitled
"Mechanics of Releasing of Goods/Manner of Payments" to implement
compliance with the decision of the VA. Immediately thereafter, the strike was
lifted and except for 44 members of the Union who are individual petitioners in
the present petition, the other striking employees executed Affidavits of
Quitclaim and Release in favor of ANGLO.
On May 13, 1999, the aforementioned 44 members of the Union questioned
the award of the VA before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52734,
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the VA. Said petition was
dismissed by the CA. The CA decision was then elevated to this Court via a
Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 144574, but in a Resolution dated
November 20, 2000, said petition was dismissed. The motion for
reconsideration of said Resolution was denied.
Even while said case questioning the award of the VA was pending before the
CA, herein individual petitioners, who are the very same persons who filed the
case with the CA, also filed several complaints with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) Labor Arbiter. Said complaints were then
consolidated and on May 9, 2000, the Labor Arbiter issued a Decision
dismissing the complaints for lack of merit. Petitioners appealed to the NLRC
but said appellate body affirmed the dismissal of petitioners' complaints. Their
motion for reconsideration before the NLRC was likewise denied.
On April 9, 2002, petitioners filed their Petition for Certiorari before the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69807. The CA then issued on June 5, 2002 the
herein assailed Resolution dismissing the petition on the ground that only one
of the petitioners executed the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping without submitting proof that she is authorized to represent the
other petitioners. Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the dismissal but
the same was denied.
Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari on the following grounds:
I.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION)
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI SOLELY ON THE GROUND THAT THE PETITION WAS
SIGNED BY FLAVIANA BERLIN WHO IS AMONG THE REAL AND
PRINCIPAL PARTIES IN INTEREST IN THE INSTANT CASE.
II.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MAY
HAVE OVERLOOKED THE SETTLED DOCTRINE ON THE RIGID
APPLICATION OF TECHNICAL RULES.3
The petition is without merit.
It is true that under justifiable circumstances, the Court has relaxed the
rule requiring all petitionersto affix their signature to the certification on non-
forum shopping. Recently, the Court has deemed it proper to relax said rule
by considering the signature of only one among numerous petitioners as
substantial compliance in cases where all petitioners share a common
interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense.4 In the present
case, petitioners do share a common cause of action, that of illegal dismissal.
However, a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be
resorted to only if there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.5
In Macawiag v. Balindog,6 the Court emphasized this principle, thus:
The well-settled rule is that certiorari is not available where the aggrieved
party's remedy of appeal is plain, speedy and adequate in the ordinary
course, the reason being that certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any
other adequate remedy. The existence and availability of the right to appeal
are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for certiorari. These
two remedies are mutually exclusive. Consequently, when petitioner filed her
petition in this Court, the decision of the Shari'a District Court was already
final and executory.
In view of the foregoing, as much as we want to review the merits of the
petition, we are constrained by the procedural lapse which this Court cannot
ignore. When a decision becomes final and executory, the court loses
jurisdiction over the case and not even an appellate court would have the
power to review a judgment that has acquired finality. Otherwise, there would
be no end to litigation and would set to naught the main role of courts of
justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the
maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with
finality. x x x
Admittedly, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court
and in the interest of justice, this Court has the discretion to treat a Petition
for Certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45, but not when the petition is
filed well beyond the reglementary period for filing a Petition for Review and
without offering any reason therefor.
The Court ruled in Sebastian v. Morales that:
Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, liberal
construction of the rules is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice.
Thus, litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and
not on technicalities. This does not mean, however, that procedural rules are
to be ignored or disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party.
Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly administration of justice,
namely, to ensure the effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing
for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in
the settlement of disputes. Hence, it is a mistake to suppose that substantive
law and procedural law are contradictory to each other, or as often
suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if
it would result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants.
Litigation is not a game of technicalities, but every case must be prosecuted
in accordance with the prescribed procedure so that issues may be properly
presented and justly resolved. Hence, rules of procedure must be faithfully
followed except only when for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to
relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply
with the prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal application of the
rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking
liberality to explain his failure to abide by the rules.
The fact that petitioner used the Rule 65 modality as a substitute for a lost
appeal is made plain by the following:

First. While the petition was filed within the 60-day period for filing a Petition
for Certiorari, it was nevertheless filed beyond the 15-day period for filing a
Petition for Review . x x x 7

In the present case, petitioners could have appealed to this Court by filing a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. No such petition was filed
within the reglementary period, thus, the CA Decision became final and
executory.

Neither did petitioners convince the Court of the substantial merits of the
action or complaint filed with the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter dismissed their
complaint on the ground of litis pendentia and/or forum shopping. This finding
was affirmed in toto by the NLRC. In their petition and Memorandum
submitted to this Court, petitioners never discussed why they believe both the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC erred in finding them guilty of forum shopping.

Clearly, just like in Macawiag, this petition is merely a substitute for a lost
appeal and should be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

THE HEIRS OF THE LATE RUBEN G.R. No. 116121

REINOSO, SR., represented by
Ruben Reinoso Jr., MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioners, Present:
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the May 20, 1994
Decision[1] and June 30, 1994 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-
G.R. CV No. 19395, which set aside the March 22, 1988 Decision of the
CARPIO,* J.
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Manila (RTC) for non-payment of docket
- versus - VELASCO, JR., Chairperson, fees. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision
PERALTA, appealed from is SET ASIDE and REVERSED and the complaint
in this case is ordered DISMISSED.
ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.
No costs pronouncement.
COURT OF APPEALS, PONCIANO
TAPALES, JOSE GUBALLA, and
SO ORDERED.
FILWRITERS GUARANTY
ASSURANCE CORPORATION,* *

Respondent. The complaint for damages arose from the collision of a

passenger jeepney and a truck at around 7:00 oclock in the evening of June
14, 1979 along E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City. As a result, a passenger of
Promulgated:
the jeepney, Ruben Reinoso, Sr. (Reinoso), was killed. The
passenger jeepney was owned by Ponciano Tapales (Tapales) and driven by
Alejandro Santos (Santos), while the truck was owned by Jose
July 18, 2011 Guballa (Guballa) and driven by Mariano Geronimo (Geronimo).
 On November 7, 1979, the heirs of Reinoso (petitioners) filed a For damages to property:
complaint for damages against Tapales and Guballa. In turn, Guballa filed a
third party complaint against Filwriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation
In favor of defendant Ponciano Tapales and against defendant
(FGAC) under Policy Number OV-09527.
Jose Guballa:

On March 22, 1988, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the

1. Actual damages for repair is already awarded
petitioners and against Guballa. The decision in part, reads: to defendant-cross-claimant Ponciano Tapales by
Br. 9, RTC-Malolos, Bulacan (Vide: Exh. 1-G-
Tapales); hence, cannot recover twice.
In favor of herein plaintiffs and against defendant Jose
Guballa: 2. Compensatory damages (earnings at ₱150.00 ₱9,000.00
per day) and for two (2) months jeepney stayed at
the repair shop.
1. For the death of Ruben Reinoso, Sr. ₱30,000.00 3. Moral damages ... 10,000.00
2. Loss of earnings (monthly income at the time 120,000.00 4. Exemplary damages . 10,000.00
of death (₱2,000.00 Court used ₱1,000.00 only
per month (or ₱12,000.00 only per year) & victim 5. Attorneys fees 15,000.00
then being 55 at death had ten (10) years life
expectancy
or a total of ₱44,000.00

3. Mortuary, Medical & funeral expenses and all 15,000.00

incidental expenses in the wake in serving those Under the 3rd party complaint against 3rd party defendant
who condoled.. Filwriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, the Court hereby
renders judgment in favor of said 3rd party plaintiff by way of
4. Moral damages .. 50,000.00
3rd party liability under policy No. OV-09527 in the amount of
5. Exemplary damages 25,000.00 ₱50,000.00 undertaking plus ₱10,000.00 as and for attorneys
fees.

6. Litigation expenses . 15,000.00

For all the foregoing, it is the well considered view of the Court
7. Attorneys fees 25,000.00 that plaintiffs, defendant Ponciano Tapales and 3rd Party plaintiff
Or a total of ₱250,000.00
Jose Guballa established their claims as specified above,
respectively. Totality of evidence preponderance in their favor.
JUDGMENT
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
In favor of plaintiffs for the death of Ruben Reinoso,
Sr.₱250,000.00;
In favor of defendant Ponciano Tapales due to damage of
his passenger jeepney.₱44,000.00;
In favor of defendant Jose Guballa under Policy No. OV-
09527....₱60,000.00;
All the specified accounts with 6% legal rate of interest per
annum from date of complaint until fully paid (Reformina vs.
Tomol, 139 SCRA 260; and finally;
Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[3]
On appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated May 20, 1994, set aside and reversed
the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint on the ground of non-payment
of docket fees pursuant to the doctrine laid down in Manchester v. CA.[4] In
addition, the CA ruled that since prescription had set in, petitioners could no
longer pay the required docket fees.[5]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision but it was
denied in a resolution dated June 30, 1994.[6] Hence, this appeal, anchored on
the following
GROUNDS:
A. The Court of Appeals MISAPPLIED THE RULING of the
Supreme Court in the case of Manchester Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals to this case.
B. The issue on the specification of the damages appearing
in the prayer of the Complaint was NEVER PLACED IN ISSUE
BY ANY OF THE PARTIES IN THE COURT OF ORIGIN
(REGIONAL TRIAL COURT) NOR IN THE COURT OF
APPEALS.
C. The issues of the case revolve around the more
substantial issue as to the negligence of the private
respondents and their culpability to petitioners.[7]
The petitioners argue that the ruling in Manchester should not have
been applied retroactively in this case, since it was filed prior to the
promulgation of the Manchester decision in 1987. They plead that though this
Court stated that failure to state the correct amount of damages would lead to
the dismissal of the complaint, said doctrine should be applied prospectively.
Moreover, the petitioners assert that at the time of the filing of the complaint in
1979, they were not certain of the amount of damages they were entitled to,
because the amount of the lost income would still be finally determined in the
course of the trial of the case. They claim that the jurisdiction of the trial court
remains even if there was failure to pay the correct filing fee as long as the
correct amount would be paid subsequently.
Finally, the petitioners stress that the alleged defect was never put in issue
either in the RTC or in the CA.
The Court finds merit in the petition.
The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed period
is mandatory.[8] In Manchester v. Court of Appeals,[9] it was held that a court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee. The strict application of this rule was, however, relaxed two (2)
years after in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,[10] wherein the
Court decreed that where the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. This ruling was made on the premise that the plaintiff had
demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional
docket fees required.[11] Thus, in the more recent case of United Overseas
Bank v. Ros,[12] the Court explained that where the party does not deliberately
intend to defraud the court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its
willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional docket fees when required
by the court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., and
not the strict regulations set in Manchester, will apply. It has been on record
that the Court, in several instances, allowed the relaxation of the rule on non-
payment of docket fees in order to afford the parties the opportunity to fully
ventilate their cases on the merits. In the case of La Salette College v.
Pilotin,[13] the Court stated:
Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of
payment of appellate docket fees, we also recognize that its strict
application is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay those
fees within the reglementary period allows only discretionary, not
automatic, dismissal; second, such power should be used by the
court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with
a great deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant
circumstances.[14]
While there is a crying need to unclog court dockets on the one hand,
there is, on the other, a greater demand for resolving genuine disputes fairly
and equitably,[15] for it is far better to dispose of a case on the merit which is a
primordial end, rather than on a technicality that may result in injustice.
In this case, it cannot be denied that the case was litigated before the
RTC and said trial court had already rendered a decision. While it was at that
level, the matter of non-payment of docket fees was never an issue. It was only
the CA which motu propio dismissed the case for said reason.
 Considering the foregoing, there is a need to suspend the strict
application of the rules so that the petitioners would be able to fully and finally
prosecute their claim on the merits at the appellate level rather than fail to
secure justice on a technicality, for, indeed, the general objective of procedure
is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties,
bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the
administration of justice.[16]
The Court also takes into account the fact that the case was filed before
the Manchester ruling came out. Even if said ruling could be applied
retroactively, liberality should be accorded to the petitioners in view of the
recency then of the ruling. Leniency because of recency was applied to the
cases of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals[17] and Spouses
Jimmy and Patri Chan v. RTC of Zamboanga.[18] In the case ofMactan Cebu
International Airport Authority v. Mangubat (Mactan),[19] it was stated that
the intent of the Court is clear to afford litigants full opportunity to comply with
the new rules and to temper enforcement of sanctions in view of the recency of
the changes introduced by the new rules. In Mactan, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) also failed to pay the correct docket fees on time.
We held in another case:
x x x It bears stressing that the rules of procedure are
merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. They were conceived and promulgated to effectively
aid the court in the dispensation of justice.Courts are not
slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial
discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as
they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that, on
the balance, technicalities take a backseat against
substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the
application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than
promote justice, it is always within the power of the Court to
suspend the Rules, or except a particular case from its
operation.[20]
The petitioners, however, are liable for the difference between the actual
fees paid and the correct payable docket fees to be assessed by the clerk of
court which shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2 of Rule
141 which provides:
SEC. 2. Fees in lien. Where the court in its final
judgment awards a claim not alleged, or a relief different from,
or more than that claimed in the pleading, the party concerned
shall pay the additional fees which shall constitute a lien on
the judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The clerk of court
shall assess and collect the corresponding fees.
As the Court has taken the position that it would be grossly unjust if
petitioners claim would be dismissed on a strict application of
the Manchester doctrine, the appropriate action, under ordinary
circumstances, would be for the Court to remand the case to the CA.
Considering, however, that the case at bench has been pending for more than
30 years and the records thereof are already before this Court, a remand of the
case to the CA would only unnecessarily prolong its resolution. In the higher
interest of substantial justice and to spare the parties from further delay, the
Court will resolve the case on the merits.
The facts are beyond dispute. Reinoso, the jeepney passenger, died as
a result of the collision of a jeepney and a truck on June 14, 1979 at
around 7:00 oclock in the evening along E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City. It
was established that the primary cause of the injury or damage was the
negligence of the truck driver who was driving it at a very fast pace. Based on
the sketch and spot report of the police authorities and the narration of
the jeepney driver and his passengers, the collision was brought about
because the truck driver suddenly swerved to, and encroached on, the left side
portion of the road in an attempt to avoid a wooden barricade, hitting the
passenger jeepney as a consequence. The analysis of the RTC appears in
its decision as follows:
Perusal and careful analysis of evidence adduced as well
as proper consideration of all the circumstances and factors
bearing on the issue as to who is responsible for the instant
vehicular mishap convince and persuade this Court that
preponderance of proof is in favor of plaintiffs and defendant
Ponciano Tapales. The greater mass of evidence spread on the
records and its influence support plaintiffs plaint including that of
defendant Tapales.
The Land Transportation and Traffic Rule (R.A. No. 4136),
reads as follows:
Sec. 37. Driving on right side of highway. Unless a
different course of action is required in the interest of the
safety and the security of life, person or property, or
because of unreasonable difficulty of operation in
compliance therewith, every person operating a motor
vehicle or an animal drawn vehicle on highway shall pass
to the right when meeting persons or vehicles coming
toward him, and to the left when overtaking persons or
vehicles going the same direction, and when turning to the
left in going from one highway to another, every vehicle
shall be conducted to the right of the center of the
intersection of the highway.
Having in mind the foregoing provision of law, this Court is
convinced of the veracity of the version of the passenger jeepney
driver Alejandro Santos, (plaintiffs and Tapales witness) that
while running on lane No. 4 westward bound towards Ortigas
Avenue at between 30-40 kms. per hour (63-64 tsn, Jan. 6, 1984)
the sand & gravel truck from the opposite direction driven by
Mariano Geronimo, the headlights of which the former had seen
while still at a distance of about 30-40 meters from the wooden
barricade astride lanes 1 and 2, upon reaching said wooden
block suddenly swerved to the left into lanes 3 and 4 at high
speed napakabilis po ng dating ng truck. (29 tsn, Sept. 26, 1985)
in the process hitting them (Jeepney passenger) at the left side
up to where the reserve tire was in an oblique manner pahilis (57
tsn, Sept. 26, 1985). The jeepney after it was bumped by the
truck due to the strong impact was thrown resting on its right side
while the left side was on top of the Bangketa (side walk). The
passengers of the jeepney and its driver were injured including
two passengers who died. The left side of the jeepney suffered
considerable damage as seen in the picture (Exhs. 4 & 5-
Tapales, pages 331-332, records) taken while at the repair shop.
The Court is convinced of the narration of Santos to the
effect that the gravel & sand truck was running in high speed on
the good portion of E. Rodriguez Avenue (lane 1 & 2) before the
wooden barricade and (having in mind that it had just delivered
its load at the Corinthian Gardens) so that when suddenly
confronted with the wooden obstacle before it had to avoid the
same in a manner of a reflex reaction or knee-jerk response by
forthwith swerving to his left into the right lanes (lanes 3 & 4). At
the time of the bumping, the jeepney was running on its right lane
No. 4 and even during the moments before said bumping, moving
at moderate speed thereon since lane No. 3 was then somewhat
rough because being repaired also according to Mondalia who
has no reason to prevaricate being herself one of those seriously
injured. The narration of Santos and Mondalia are convincing
and consistent in depicting the true facts of the case untainted by
 vacillation and therefore, worthy to be relied upon. Their story is
forfeited and confirmed by the sketch drawn by the investigating
officer Pfc. F. Amaba, Traffic Division, NPD, Quezon City who
rushed to the scene of the mishap (Vide: Resolution of Asst fiscal
Elizabeth B. Reyes marked as Exhs. 7, 7-A, 7-B-Tapales, pp.
166-168, records; the Certified Copy found on pages 598-600,
ibid, with the attached police sketch of Pfc. Amaba, marked as
Exh. 8-Tapales on page 169, ibid; certified copy of which is on
page 594, ibid) indicating the fact that the bumping indeed
occurred at lane No. 4 and showing how the gavel & sand truck
is positioned in relation to the jeepney. The said police sketch
having been made right after the accident is a piece of evidence
worthy to be relied upon showing the true facts of the bumping-
occurrence. The rule that official duty had been performed
(Sec.5(m), R-131, and also Sec. 38, R-a30, Rev. Rules of Court)
there being no evidence adduced and made of record to the
contrary is that said circumstance involving the two vehicles had
been the result of an official investigation and must be taken as
true by this Court.[21]
While ending up on the opposite lane is not conclusive proof of fault in
automobile collisions,[22] the position of the two vehicles, as depicted in the
sketch of the police officers, clearly shows that it was the truck that hit
the jeepney. The evidentiary records disclosed that the truck was speeding
along E. Rodriguez, heading towards Santolan Street, while the
passenger jeepney was coming from the opposite direction. When the truck
reached a certain point near the Meralco Post No. J9-450, the front portion of
the truck hit the left middle side portion of the passenger jeepney, causing
damage to both vehicles and injuries to the driver and passengers of
the jeepney. The truck driver should have been more careful, because, at that
time, a portion of E. Rodriguez Avenue was under repair and a wooden
barricade was placed in the middle thereof.
The Court likewise sustains the finding of the RTC that the truck owner,
Guballa, failed to rebut the presumption of negligence in the hiring and
supervision of his employee. Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
xxxx
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is
demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another,
there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection or supervision of his
employee.[23] Thus, in the selection of prospective employees, employers are
required to examine them as to their qualification, experience and service JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
record. With respect to the supervision of employees, employers must
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and Associate Justice
impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. These facts must be WE CONCUR:
shown by concrete proof, including documentary evidence. [24]Thus, the RTC
committed no error in finding that the evidence presented by respondent
Guballa was wanting. It ruled:
x x x. As expected, defendant Jose Guballa, attempted to ANTONIO T. CARPIO
overthrow this presumption of negligence by showing that he had
exercised the due diligence required of him by seeing to it that Associate Justice
the driver must check the vital parts of the vehicle he is assigned
to before he leaves the compound like the oil, water, brakes,
gasoline, horn (9 tsn, July 17, 1986); and that Geronimo had
been driving for him sometime in 1976 until the collision in
litigation came about (5-6 tsn, ibid); that whenever his trucks gets
out of the compound to make deliveries, it is always accompanied
with two (2) helpers (16-17 tsn, ibid). This was all which he PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
considered as selection and supervision in compliance with the
law to free himself from any responsibility. This Court then cannot Associate Justice Associate Justice
consider the foregoing as equivalent to an exercise of all the care
Chairperson
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
driver Mariano Geronimo.[25]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 20, 1994 Decision

and June 30, 1994 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the March 22, 1988 Decision of the
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Manila, is REINSTATED.
Associate Justice

SO ORDERED.
ATTESTATION
 I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines DECISION
Supreme Court
Manila
NACHURA, J.:
SECOND DIVISION This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision[1] and the Resolution[2] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 7, 2006 and September 27, 2007,
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE G.R. No. 180045
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 50450.
SYSTEM,
Petitioner, Present:

- versus - The facts of the case are as follows:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
Respondents Dionisio Banlasan, Alfredo T. Tafalla, Telesforo D. Rubia,
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS NACHURA, Rogelio A. Alvarez, Dominador A. Escobal, and Rosauro Panis were employed
COMMISSION (NLRC), DIONISIO as security guards by DNL Security Agency (DNL Security). By virtue of the
PERALTA,
BANLASAN, ALFREDO T. TAFALLA,
service contract entered into by DNL Security and petitioner Government
TELESFORO D. RUBIA, ROGELIO A. ABAD, and
ALVAREZ, DOMINADOR A. ESCOBAL, and Service Insurance System on May 1, 1978, respondents were assigned to
MENDOZA, JJ. petitioners Tacloban City office, each receiving a monthly income
ROSAURO PANIS,
of P1,400.00. Sometime in July 1989, petitioner voluntarily increased
Respondents.
Promulgated: respondents monthly salary to P3,000.00.[3]

November 17, 2010
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
In February 1993, DNL Security informed respondents that its service contract
with petitioner was terminated. This notwithstanding, DNL Security instructed
respondents to continue reporting for work to petitioner. Respondents worked
as instructed until April 20, 1993, but without receiving their wages; after which,
they were terminated from employment.[4]
 TWENTY-TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
FORTY-SEVEN & 19/100 (P322,747.19) to be paid by
On June 15, 1995, respondents filed with the National Labor Relations both or either of the said respondent within ten (10)
Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. VIII, Tacloban City, a days from receipt of this decision and to be deposited
with the cashier of this office for proper disposition.
complaint against DNL Security and petitioner for illegal dismissal, separation
pay, salary differential, 13th month pay, and payment of unpaid salary.
SO ORDERED.[6]

On September 30, 1997, Labor Arbiter (LA) Benjamin S. Guimoc rendered a

decision[5] against DNL Security and petitioner, the dispositive portion of which
The LA found that respondents were not illegally terminated from employment
reads:
because the employment of security guards is dependent on the service
contract between the security agency and its client. However, considering that
respondents had been out of work for a long period, and consonant with the
principle of social justice, the LA awarded respondents with separation pay
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in this manner[,] to
equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service, to be paid by DNL
wit:
Security. Because DNL Security instructed respondents to continue working for
petitioner from February 1993 to April 20, 1993, DNL Security was also made
1. Finding no illegal dismissal of complainants; to pay respondents wages for the period. The LA further granted respondents
claim of salary differential, as they were paid wages below the minimum wage,
as well as 13th month pay. For these monetary awards, petitioner was made
2. Ordering respondent DNL Security Agency only to
pay complainants the amount of P176,130.00 solidarily liable with DNL Security, as the indirect employer of respondents. [7]
representing separation pay; the amount
of P42,666.40 representing wages of complainants
from February 1993 to April 20, 1993; DNL Security filed a motion for reconsideration, while petitioner appealed to the
NLRC.[8]

3. Ordering as joint and solidary liability by the

respondents DNL Security Agency and GSIS the
amount of P48,385.87 representing salary In a resolution[9] dated December 9, 1997, the NLRC treated DNL Securitys
th
differential[;] the amount of P55,564.92 as 13 month motion for reconsideration as an appeal, but dismissed the same, as it was not
pay; all in the aggregate sum of THREE HUNDRED
legally perfected. It likewise dismissed petitioners appeal, having been filed
beyond the reglementary period.
Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court before the CA. On September 7, 2006, the CA rendered the assailed
Decision[10] affirming the NLRC ruling. Petitioners motion for reconsideration
was denied by the CA on September 27, 2007.
Hence, the present petition raising the following errors:
The Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in finding
that the public respondent NLRC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing the appeal of the petitioner GSIS,
considering that:
1. The Court of Appeals disregarded the facts and
circumstances evidencing the timeliness of the petitioner
GSIS appeal before the NLRC and sacrificed substantial
justice in the altar of dubious technicalities; and
2. The Court of Appeals misapplied the law and
mistakenly affirmed the public respondent NLRCs decision
that the petitioner GSIS is jointly and severally liable with
DNL Security Agency for payment of the unsubstantiated
amounts of Salary Differentials and the 13th Month Pay to the
private respondent security guards.[11]
Petitioner insists that its appeal before the NLRC was filed on time,
having been filed through registered mail on October 27, 1997, as evidenced
by Registry Receipt No. 34581 countersigned by the postmaster. It adds that,
even assuming that the appeal was indeed filed one day late, the NLRC should
not have strictly applied the Rules in order to effect substantial justice.
Petitioner also claims that although the body of the LA decision made DNL
Security solely liable for respondents wages from February 1993 to April 20,
1993, and for their separation pay, the dispositive portion thereof made
petitioner solidarily liable for said awards. Petitioner further questions the award
of monetary benefits for lack of evidence to substantiate said claims. Lastly,
petitioner argues that the enforcement of the decision is impossible,
considering that petitioners charter unequivocally exempts it from execution. [12]
We partly grant the petition.
The resolution of the petition before us involves the appreciation and
determination of factual matters, mainly on the issue of whether petitioners
appeal was seasonably filed before the NLRC.
Timeliness of an appeal is a factual issue. It requires a review or evaluation of
the evidence which would show when the appeal was actually mailed to and
received by the NLRC.[13] In this case, to prove that it mailed the notice of
appeal and appeal memorandum on October 27, 1997, instead of October 28,
1997, as shown by the stamped date on the envelope, petitioner presented
Registry Receipt No. 34581 bearing the earlier date.
Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, where the filing of pleadings,
appearances, motions, notices, orders, judgments, and all other papers with
the court/tribunal is made by registered mail, the date of mailing, as shown by
the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt, shall be
considered as the date of filing.[14]
Thus, the date of filing is determinable from two sources: from the post office
stamp on the envelope or from the registry receipt, either of which may suffice
to prove the timeliness of the filing of the pleadings. If the date stamped on one
is earlier than the other, the former may be accepted as the date of filing. This
presupposes, however, that the envelope or registry receipt and the dates
appearing thereon are duly authenticated before the tribunal where they are
presented.[15]
In any case, even if the appeal was filed one day late, the same should
have been entertained by the NLRC. Indeed, the appeal must be perfected
within the statutory or reglementary period. This is not only mandatory, but also
jurisdictional. Failure to perfect the appeal on time renders the assailed
decision final and executory and deprives the appellate court or body of the
legal authority to alter the final judgment, much less entertain the appeal.
However, this Court has, time and again, ruled that, in exceptional cases, a
belated appeal may be given due course if greater injustice will be visited upon
the party should the appeal be denied. The Court has allowed this extraordinary
measure even at the expense of sacrificing order and efficiency if only to serve
the greater principles of substantial justice and equity.[16]
The Court notes, however, that while the CA affirmed the dismissal by
the NLRC of petitioners appeal for being filed out of time, it nonetheless delved
into the merits of the case. This notwithstanding, we do not entirely agree with
the appellate courts conclusion affirming in toto the LA decision.
In this case, the LAs discussion of the issues appears to be in conflict
with his final conclusion. This would have required a measure of clarification.
But instead of looking into the errors allegedly committed by the LA, the NLRC
dismissed the appeal on a mere technicality. The CA likewise failed to correct
the apparent mistake in the LA decision. Thus, we are constrained to review
the merits of the case.
We need not discuss DNL Securitys responsibility as respondents direct
employer because DNL Securitys failure to interpose an appeal from the LA
decision has resulted in the finality of the LA decision. The only issue that we
should resolve is the matter of petitioners liability as indirect employer.
The fact that there is no actual and direct employer-employee
relationship between petitioner and respondents does not absolve the former
from liability for the latters monetary claims. When petitioner contracted DNL
Securitys services, petitioner became an indirect employer of respondents,
pursuant to Article 107 of the Labor Code, which reads:

Technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and

completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties. We have
consistently held that technical rules are not binding in labor cases and are not
to be applied strictly if the result would be detrimental to the working man. [17]
 ART. 107. Indirect employer. The provisions of the
immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply to any person,
partnership, association or corporation which, not being an
employer, contracts with an independent contractor for the
performance of any work, task, job or project.
After DNL Security failed to pay respondents the correct wages and
other monetary benefits, petitioner, as principal, became jointly and severally
liable, as provided in Articles 106 and 109 of the Labor Code, which state:
ART. 106. Contractor or subcontractor. Whenever an
employer enters into a contract with another person for the
performance of the formers work, the employees of the contractor
and of the latters subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in
accordance with the provisions of this Code.
In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay
the wages of his employees in accordance with this Code, the
employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor
or subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the work
performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that
he is liable to employees directly employed by him. x x x.
xxxx
ART. 109. Solidary liability. The provisions of existing laws
to the contrary notwithstanding, every employer or indirect
employer shall be held responsible with his contractor or
subcontractor for any violation of any provision of this Code. For
purposes of determining the extent of their civil liability under this
Chapter, they shall be considered as direct employers.
This statutory scheme is designed to give the workers ample protection,
consonant with labor and social justice provisions of the 1987 Constitution.[18]
This Courts pronouncement in Rosewood Processing, Inc. v. NLRC[19] is
noteworthy:
The joint and several liability of the employer or principal
was enacted to ensure compliance with the provisions of the
Code, principally those on statutory minimum wage. The
contractor or subcontractor is made liable by virtue of his or her
status as a direct employer, and the principal as the indirect
employer of the contractors employees. This liability facilitates, if
not guarantees, payment of the workers compensation, thus,
giving the workers ample protection as mandated by the 1987
Constitution. This is not unduly burdensome to the employer.
Should the indirect employer be constrained to pay the workers,
it can recover whatever amount it had paid in accordance with the
terms of the service contract between itself and the contractor.[20]
Petitioners liability covers the payment of respondents salary differential
and 13th month pay during the time they worked for petitioner. In addition,
petitioner is solidarily liable with DNL Security for respondents unpaid
wages from February 1993 until April 20, 1993. While it is true that respondents
continued working for petitioner after the expiration of their contract, based on
the instruction of DNL Security, petitioner did not object to such assignment
and allowed respondents to render service. Thus, petitioner impliedly approved
the extension of respondents services. Accordingly, petitioner is bound by the
provisions of the Labor Code on indirect employment. Petitioner cannot be
allowed to deny its obligation to respondents after it had benefited from their
services. So long as the work, task, job, or project has been performed for
petitioners benefit or on its behalf, the liability accrues for such services. [21] The
principal is made liable to its indirect employees because, after all, it can protect
itself from irresponsible contractors by withholding payment of such sums that
are due the employees and by paying the employees directly, or by requiring a
bond from the contractor or subcontractor for this purpose.[22]
Petitioners liability, however, cannot extend to the payment of
separation pay. An order to pay separation pay is invested with a punitive
character, such that an indirect employer should not be made liable without a
finding that it had conspired in the illegal dismissal of the employees.[23]
It should be understood, though, that the solidary liability of petitioner
does not preclude the application of Article 1217 of the Civil Code on the right
of reimbursement from its co-debtor, viz.:[24]
Art. 1217. Payment made by one of the solidary debtors
extinguishes the obligation. If two or more solidary debtors offer
to pay, the creditor may choose which offer to accept.
He who made the payment may claim from his co-debtors
only the share which corresponds to each, with the interest for
the payment already made. If the payment is made before the
debt is due, no interest for the intervening period may be
demanded.
When one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of his
insolvency, reimburse his share to the debtor paying the
obligation, such share shall be borne by all his co-debtors, in
proportion to the debt of each.
Lastly, we do not agree with petitioner that the enforcement of the
decision is impossible because its charter unequivocally exempts it from
execution. As held in Government Service Insurance System
v. RegionalTrial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71,[25] citing Rubia v. GSIS: [26]
The processual exemption of the GSIS funds and
properties under Section 39 of the GSIS Charter, in our view,
should be read consistently with its avowed principal purpose: to
maintain actuarial solvency of the GSIS in the protection of assets
which are to be used to finance the retirement, disability and life
insurance benefits of its members. Clearly, the exemption should
be limited to the purposes and objects covered. Any interpretation
that would give it an expansive construction to exempt all GSIS
assets from legal processes absolutely would be unwarranted.
Furthermore, the declared policy of the State in Section 39
of the GSIS Charter granting GSIS an exemption from tax, lien,
attachment, levy, execution, and other legal processes should be
read together with the grant of power to the GSIS to invest its
 excess funds under Section 36 of the same Act. Under Section
36, the GSIS is granted the ancillary power to invest in business
and other ventures for the benefit of the employees, by using its
excess funds for investment purposes. In the exercise of such
function and power, the GSIS is allowed to assume a character
similar to a private corporation. Thus, it may sue and be sued, as
also, explicitly granted by its charter x x x.[27]

To be sure, petitioners charter should not be used to evade its liabilities to its
employees, even to its indirect employees, as mandated by the Labor Code.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision

and Resolution dated September 7, 2006 and September 27, 2007,
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 50450, are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioner Government Service Insurance System is declared solidarily liable
with DNL Security to PAY respondents their wage differentials, thirteenth
month pay, and unpaid wages from February 1993 to April 20, 1993, but
is EXONERATED from the payment of respondents separation pay.

SO ORDERED.