Republic of the Philippines Consequently, petitioners contend, these questions can no longer be
SUPREME COURT reopened.
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 118910 November 16, 1995
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO
A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T.
APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE
ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V.
VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN.
FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, REP. JOKER P.
ARROYO, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the PHILIPPINE
GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioners seek reconsideration of our decision in this case. They
insist that the decision in the first case has already settled (1)
whether petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc. has a standing to sue and (2)
whether under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office can enter into any form of association or
collaboration with any party in operating an on-line lottery.
Because two members of the Court did not consider themselves
bound by the decision in the first case, petitioners suggest that the
two, in joining the dissenters in the first case in reexamining the
questions in the present case, acted otherwise than according to law.
They cite the following statement in the opinion of the Court:
The voting on petitioners' standing in the previous
case was a narrow one, with seven (7) members
sustaining petitioners' standing and six (6) denying
petitioners' right to bring the suit. The majority was
thus a tenuous one that is not likely to be maintained
in any subsequent litigation. In addition, there have
been changes in the membership of the Court, with
the retirement of Justices Cruz and Bidin and the
appointment of the writer of this opinion and Justice
Francisco. Given this fact it is hardly tenable to insist
on the maintenance of the ruling as to petitioners'
standing.
Petitioners claim that this statement "conveys a none too
subtle suggestion, perhaps a Freudian slip, that the two new
appointees, regardless of the merit of the Decision in the first
Kilosbayan case against the lotto (Kilosbayan, et al. v.
Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)) must of necessity align
themselves with all the Ramos appointees who were
dissenters in the first case and constitute the new majority in
the second lotto case." And petitioners ask, "why should it be
so?"
Petitioners ask a question to which they have made up an answer.
Their attempt at psychoanalysis, detecting a Freudian slip where
none exists, may be more revealing of their own unexpressed wish to
find motives where there are none which they can impute to some
members of the Court.
For the truth is that the statement is no more than an effort
to explain — rather than to justify — the majority's decision to
overrule the ruling in the previous case. It is simply meant to explain
that because the five members of the Court who dissented in the first
case (Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ.) and the two
new members (Mendoza and Francisco, JJ.) thought the previous
ruling to be erroneous and its reexamination not to be barred
by stare decisis, res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment, or law of
the case, it was hardly tenable for petitioners to insist on the first
ruling.
Consequently to petitioners' question "What is the glue that holds
them together," implying some ulterior motives on the part of the new
majority in reexamining the two questions, the answer is: None,
except a conviction on the part of the five, who had been members of
the Court at the time they dissented in the first case, and the two new
members that the previous ruling was erroneous. The eighth Justice
(Padilla, J.) on the other hand agrees with the seven Justices that the
ELA is in a real sense a lease agreement and therefore does not
violate R.A. No. 1169.
The decision in the first case was a split decision: 7-6. With the
retirement of one of the original majority (Cruz, J.) and one of the
dissenters (Bidin, J.) it was not surprising that the first decision in the
first case was later reversed.
It is argued that, in any case, a reexamination of the two questions is
barred because the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming Management
Corporation made a " formal commitment not to ask for a
reconsideration of the Decision in the first lotto case and instead
submit a new agreement that would be in conformity with the PCSO
Charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) and with the Decision of the
Supreme Court in the first Kilosbayan case against on-line, hi-tech
lotto."
To be sure, a new contract was entered into which the majority of the
Court finds has been purged of the features which made the first
contract objectionable. Moreover, what the PCSO said in its
manifestation in the first case was the following:
1. They are no longer filing a motion for
reconsideration of the Decision of this Honorable
Court dated May 5, 1994, a copy of which was
received on May 6, 1994.
2. Respondents PCSO and PGMC are presently
negotiating a new lease agreement consistent with
the authority of PCSO under its charter (R.A. No.
1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) and conformable
with the pronouncements of this Honorable Court in
its Decision of May 5, 1995.
The PGMC made substantially the same manifestation as
the PCSO.
There was thus no "formal commitment" — but only a
manifestation — that the parties were not filing a motion for
reconsideration. Even if the parties made a "formal commitment," the
six (6) dissenting Justices certainly could not be bound thereby not to
insist on their contrary view on the question of standing. Much less
were the two new members bound by any "formal commitment"
made by the parties. They believed that the ruling in the first case
was erroneous. Since in their view reexamination was not barred by
the doctrine of stare decisis, res judicata or conclusiveness of
judgment or law of the case, they voted the way they did with the
remaining five (5) dissenters in the first case to form a new majority
of eight.
Petitioners ask, "Why should this be so?" Because, as explained in
the decision, the first decision was erroneous and no legal doctrine
stood in the way of its reexamination. It can, therefore, be asked
"with equal candor": "Why should this not be so?"
Nor is this the first time a split decision was tested, if not reversed, in
a subsequent case because of change in the membership of a court.
In 1957, this Court, voting 6-5, held in Feliciano v. Aquinas, G.R. No.
L-10201, Sept. 23, 1957 that the phrase "at the time of the election"
in §2174 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 meant that a
candidate for municipal elective position must be at least 23 years of
age on the date of the election. On the other hand, the dissenters
argued that it was enough if he attained that age on the day he
assumed office.
Less than three years later, the same question was before the Court
again, as a candidate for municipal councilor stated under oath in her
certificate of candidacy that she was eligible for that position
although she attained the requisite age (23 years) only when she
assumed office. The question was whether she could be prosecuted
for falsification. In People v. Yang, 107 Phi. 888 (1960), the Court
ruled she could not. Justice, later Chief Justice, Benison, who
dissented in the first case, Feliciano v. Aquinas, supra, wrote the
opinion of the Court, holding that while the statement that the
accused was eligible was "inexact or erroneous, according to the
majority in the Feliciano case," the accused could not be held liable
for falsification, because
the question [whether the law really required
candidates to have the required age on the day of
the election or whether it was sufficient that they
attained it at the beginning of the term of office] has
not been discussed anew, despite the presence of
new members; we simply assume for the purpose of
this decision that the doctrine stands.
Thus because in the meantime there had been a change in the
membership of the Court with the retirement of two members
(Recess and Flex, JJ.) who had taken part in the decision in the first
case and their replacement by new members (Barrera and Gutierrez-
David, JJ.) and the fact that the vote in the first case was a narrow
one (6 to 5), the Court allowed that the continuing validity of its ruling
in the first case might well be doubted. For this reason it gave the
accused the benefit of the doubt that she had acted in the good faith
belief that it was sufficient that she was 23 years of age when she
assumed office.
In that case, the change in the membership of the Court and the
possibility of change in the ruling were noted without anyone —
much less would-be psychoanalysts — finding in the statement of the
Court any Freudian slip. The possibility of change in the rule as a
result of change in membership was accepted as a sufficient reason
for finding good faith and lack of criminal intent on the part of the
accused.
Indeed, a change in the composition of the Court could prove the
means of undoing an erroneous decision. This was the lesson
of Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457 (1871). The Legal Tender Acts, which
were passed during the Civil War, made U.S. notes (greenbacks)
legal tender for the payment of debts, public or private, with certain
exceptions. The validity of the acts, as applied to preexisting debts,
was challenged in Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603 (1869). The
Court was then composed of only eight (8) Justices because of
Congressional effort to limit the appointing power of President
Johnson. Voting 5-3, the Court declared the acts void. Chief Justice
Chase wrote the opinion of the Court in which four others, including
Justice Grier, concurred. Justices Miller, Swayne and Davis
dissented. A private memorandum left by the dissenting Justices
described how an effort was made "to convince an aged and infirm
member of the court [Justice Grier] that he had not understood the
question on which he voted," with the result that what was originally
a 4-4 vote was converted into a majority (5-3) for holding the acts
invalid.
On the day the decision was announced, President Grant nominated
to the Court William Strong and Joseph P. Bradley to fill the vacancy
caused by the resignation of Justice Grier and to restore the
membership of the Court to nine. In 1871, Hepburn v. Griswold was
overruled in the Legal Tender Cases, as Knox v. Lee came to be
known, in an opinion by Justice Strong, with a dissenting opinion by
Chief Justice Chase and the three other surviving members of the
former majority. There were allegations that the new Justices were
appointed for their known views on the validity of the Legal Tender
Acts, just as there were others who defended the character and
independence of the new Justices. History has vindicated the
overruling of the Hepburn case by the new majority. The Legal
Tender Cases proved to be the Court's means of salvation from what
Chief Justice Hughes later described as one of the Court's "self-
inflicted wounds."1
We now consider the specific grounds for petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
I. We have held that because there are no genuine issues of
constitutionality in this case, the rule concerning real party in interest,
applicable to private litigation rather than the more liberal rule
on standing, applies to petitioners. Two objections are made against
that ruling: (1) that the constitutional policies and principles invoked
by petitioners, while not supplying the basis for affirmative relief from
the courts, may nonetheless be resorted to for striking down laws or
official actions which are inconsistent with them and (2) that the
Constitution, by guaranteeing to independent people's organizations
"effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political
and economic decision-making" (Art. XIII, §16), grants them standing
to sue on constitutional grounds.
The policies and principles of the Constitution invoked by petitioner
read:
Art. II, §5. The maintenance of peace and order, the
protection life, liberty, and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the
enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.
Id., §12. The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government.
Id., §13. The State recognizes the vital role of the
youth in nation-building and shall promote and
protect their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in
the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage
their involvement in public and civic affairs.
Id., §17. The State shall give priority to education,
science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to
foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social
progress, and promote total human liberation and
development.
As already stated, however, these provisions are not self-executing.
They do not confer rights which can be enforced in the courts but
only provide guidelines for legislative or executive action. By
authorizing the holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect
determined that consistently with these policies and principles of the
Constitution, the PCSO may be given this authority. That is why we
said with respect to the opening by the PAGCOR of a casino in
Cagayan de Oro, "the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue.
Gambling is not illegal per se. . . . It is left to Congress to deal with
the activity as it sees fit." (Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.,
234 SCRA 255, 268 [1994]).
It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the validity of the law
allowing lotteries. It is the contract entered into by the PCSO and the
PGMC which they are assailing. This case, therefore, does not raise
issues of constitutionality but only of contract law, which petitioners,
not being privies to the agreement, cannot raise.
Nor does Kilosbayan's status as a people's organization give it the
requisite personality to question the validity of the contract in this
case. The Constitution provides that "the State shall respect the role
of independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue
and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and
collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful
means," that their right to "effective and reasonable participation at
all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not
be abridged." (Art. XIII, §§ 15-16)
These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real
parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may
invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases
involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and
controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, §5. This requirement lies at the
very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decision-
making in the courts from decision-making in the political
departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just
any party.
Petitioners quote extensively from the speech of Commissioner
Garcia before the Constitutional Commission, explaining the
provisions on independent people's organizations. There is nothing
in the speech, however, which supports their claim of standing. On
the contrary, the speech points the way to the legislative and
executive branches of the government, rather than to the courts, as
the appropriate fora for the advocacy of petitioners' views.2 Indeed,
the provisions on independent people's organizations may most
usefully be read in connection with the provision on initiative and
referendum as a means whereby the people may propose or enact
laws or reject any of those passed by Congress. For the fact is that
petitioners' opposition to the contract in question is nothing more
than an opposition to the government policy on lotteries.
It is nevertheless insisted that this Court has in the past accorded
standing to taxpayers and concerned citizens in cases involving
"paramount public interest." Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens
and legislators have indeed been allowed to sue but then only (1) in
cases involving constitutional issues and
(2) under certain conditions. Petitioners do not meet these
requirements on standing.
Taxpayers are allowed to sue, for example, where there is a claim of
illegal disbursement of public funds. (Pascual v. Secretary of Public
Works, 110 Phi. 331 (1960); Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333
(1976); Bugnay Const. & Dev. v. Laron, 176 SCRA 240 (1989); City
Council of Cebu v. Cuizon, 47 SCRA 325 [1972]) or where a tax
measure is assailed as unconstitutional. (VAT Cases [Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance], 235 SCRA 630 [1994]) Voters are allowed to
question the validity of election laws because of their obvious interest
in the validity of such laws. (Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774
[1967]) Concerned citizens can bring suits if the constitutional
question they raise is of "transcendental importance" which must be
settled early. (Emergency Powers Cases [Araneta v. Dinglasan], 84
Phi. 368 (1949); Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Ass'n v. Feliciano,
121 Phi. 358 (1965); Philconsa v. Gimenez, 122 Phi. 894 (1965);
CLU v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 [1991]) Legislators are
allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they
claim infringes their prerogatives qua legislators. (Philconsa v.
Enriquez, 235 506 (1994); Guingona v. PCGG, 207 SCRA 659
(1992); Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); Tolentino v.
Comelec, 41 SCRA 702 (1971); Tatad v. Garcia, G.R. No. 114222,
April 16, 1995 (Mendoza, J., concurring))
Petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that these various
litigants have. Petitioners assert an interest as taxpayers, but they do
not meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set
forth in Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392, 403 (1980), to wit:
While, concededly, the elections to be held involve
the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their
Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax
money is "being extracted and spent in violation of
specific constitutional protections against abuses of
legislative power" (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., 83
[1960]), or that there is a misapplication of such
funds by respondent COMELEC (see Pascual vs.
Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), or
that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain
respondent from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
(Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18
SCRA 300 [1966]), citing Philippine Constitution
Association vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479
[1965]). Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit,
per se, is no assurance of judicial review. As held by
this Court in Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677
[1972]), speaking through our present Chief Justice,
this Court is vested with discretion as to whether or
not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.
(Emphasis added)
Petitioners' suit does not fall under any of these categories of
taxpayers' suits.
Neither do the other cases cited by petitioners support their
contention that taxpayers have standing to question government
contracts regardless of whether public funds are involved or not.
In Gonzales v. National Housing, Corp., 94 SCRA 786 (1979),
petitioner filed a taxpayer's suit seeking the annulment of a contract
between the NHC and a foreign corporation. The case was
dismissed by the trial court. The dismissal was affirmed by this Court
on the grounds of res judicata and pendency of a prejudicial
question, thus avoiding the question of petitioner's standing.
On the other hand, in Gonzales v. Raquiza, 180 SCRA 254 (1989),
petitioner sought the annulment of a contract made by the
government with a foreign corporation for the purchase of road
construction equipment. The question of standing was not discussed,
but even if it was, petitioner's standing could be sustained because
he was a minority stockholder of the Philippine National Bank, which
was one of the defendants in the case.
In the other case cited by petitioners, City Council of Cebu v. Cuizon,
47 SCRA 325 (1972), members of the city council were allowed to
sue to question the validity of a contract entered into by the city
government for the purchase of road construction equipment
because their contention was that the contract had been made
without their authority. In addition, as taxpayers they had an interest
in seeing to it that public funds were spent pursuant to an
appropriation made by law.
But, in the case at bar, there is an allegation that public funds are
being misapplied or misappropriated. The controlling doctrine is that
of Gonzales v. Marcos, 65 SCRA 624 (1975) where it was held that
funds raised from contributions for the benefit of the Cultural Center
of the Philippines were not public funds and petitioner had no
standing to bring a taxpayer's suit to question their disbursement by
the President of the Philippines.
Thus, petitioners' right to sue as taxpayers cannot be sustained.
Nor as concerned citizens can they bring this suit because no
specific injury suffered by them is alleged. As for the petitioners, who
are members of Congress, their right to sue as legislators cannot be
invoked because they do not complain of any infringement of their
rights as legislators.
Finally, in Valmonte v. PCSO, G.R. No. 78716, September 22, 1987,
we threw out a petition questioning another form of lottery conducted
by the PCSO on the ground that petitioner, who claimed to be a
"citizen, lawyer, taxpayer and father of three minor children," had no
direct and personal interest in the lottery. We said: "He must be able
to show, not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury
as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby
in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining
has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he
is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of." In the
case at bar, petitioners have not shown why, unlike petitioner in the
Valmonte case, they should be accorded standing to bring this suit.
The case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. 224 SCRA 792 (1993) is
different. Citizens' standing to bring a suit seeking the cancellation of
timber licenses was sustained in that case because the Court
considered Art. II, §16 a right-conferring provision which can be
enforced in the courts. That provision states:
The State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature. (Emphasis)
In contrast, the policies and principles invoked by petitioners
in this case do not permit of such categorization.
Indeed, as already stated, petitioners' opposition is not really to the
validity of the ELA but to lotteries which they regard to be immoral.
This is not, however, a legal issue, but a policy matter for Congress
to decide and Congress has permitted lotteries for charity.
Nevertheless, although we have concluded that petitioners do not
have standing, we have not stopped there and dismissed their case.
For in the view we take, whether a party has a cause of action and,
therefore, is a real party in interest or one with standing to raise a
constitutional question must turn on whether he has a right which has
been violated. For this reason the Court has not ducked the
substantive issues raised by petitioners.
II. R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P No . 42, states:
§1. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. —
The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office,
hereinafter designated the Office, shall be the
principal government agency for raising and
providing for funds for health programs, medical
assistance and services and charities of national
character, and as such shall have the general
powers conferred in section thirteen of Act
Numbered One Thousand Four Hundred Fifty-Nine,
as amended, and shall have the authority:
A. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races,
lotteries and other similar activities, in such
frequency and manner, as shall be determined, and
subject to such rules and regulations as shall be
promulgated by the Board of Directors.
B. Subject to the approval of the Minister of Human
Settlements, to engage in health and welfare-related
investments, programs, projects and activities which
 may be profit-oriented, by itself or in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any person,
association, company or entity, whether domestic or
foreign, except for the activities mentioned in the
preceding paragraph (A), for the purpose of
providing for permanent and continuing sources of
funds for health programs, including the expansion
of existing ones, medical assistance and services,
and/or charitable grants: Provided, That such
investments will not compete with the private sector
in areas where investments are adequate as may be
determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority.
Petitioners insist on the ruling in the previous case that the PCSO
cannot hold and conduct charity sweepstakes, lotteries and other
similar activities in collaboration, association or joint venture with any
other party because of the clause "except for the activities mentioned
in the preceding paragraph (A)" in paragraph (B) of §1. Petitioners
contend that the ruling is the law of this case because the parties are
the same and the case involves the same issue, i.e., the meaning of
this statutory provision.
The "law of the case" doctrine is inapplicable, because this case is
not a continuation of the first one. Petitioners also say that inquiry
into the same question as to the meaning of the statutory provision is
barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The general rule on the
"conclusiveness of judgment," however, is subject to the exception
that a question may be reopened if it is a legal question and the two
actions involve substantially different claims. This is generally
accepted in American law from which our Rules of Court was
adopted. (Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 59 L.Ed.2d 147, 210
(1979); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW 2d, ON JUDGMENTS, §28;
P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN AND D. SHAPIRO, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1058, n.2 [3rd
Ed., 1988]) There is nothing in the record of this case to suggest that
this exception is inapplicable in this jurisdiction.
Indeed, the questions raised in this case are legal questions and the
claims involved are substantially different from those involved in the
prior case between the parties. As already stated, the ELA is
substantially different from the Contract of Lease declared void in the
first case.
Borrowing from the dissenting opinion of Justice Feliciano,
petitioners argue that the phrase "by itself or in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any other party" qualifies not only §1
(B) but also §1 (A), because the exception clause ("except for the
activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph [A]") "operates, as it
were, as a renvoi clause which refers back to Section 1(A) and in this
manner avoids the necessity of simultaneously amending the text of
Section 1(A)."
This interpretation, however, fails to take into account not only the
location of the phrase in paragraph (B), when it should be in
paragraph (A) had that been the intention of the lawmaking authority,
but also the phrase "by itself." In other words, under paragraph (B),
the PCSO is prohibited from "engag[ing] in . . . investments,
programs, projects and activities" if these involve sweepstakes
races, lotteries and other similar activities not only "in collaboration,
association or joint venture" with any other party but also "by itself."
Obviously, this prohibition cannot apply when the PCSO conducts
these activities itself. Otherwise, what paragraph (A) authorizes the
PCSO to do, paragraph (B) would prohibit.
The fact is that the phrase in question does not qualify the authority
of the PCSO under paragraph (A), but rather the authority granted to
it by paragraph (B). The amendment of paragraph (B) by B.P. Blg. 42
was intended to enable the PCSO to engage in certain investments,
programs, projects and activities for the purpose of raising funds for
health programs and charity. That is why the law provides that such
investments by the PCSO should "not compete with the private
sector in areas where investments are adequate as may be
determined by the National Economic and Development Authority."
Justice Davide, then an Assemblyman, made a proposal which was
accepted, reflecting the understanding that the bill they were
discussing concerned the authority of the PCSO to invest in the
business of others. The following excerpt from the Record of the
Batasan Pambansa shows this to be the subject of the discussion:
MR. DAVIDE. May I introduce an amendment after
"adequate". The intention of the amendment is not to
leave the determination of whether it is adequate or
not to anybody. And my amendment is to add after
"adequate" the words AS MAY BE DETERMINED
BY THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY. As a mater of fact, it
will strengthen the authority to invest in these areas,
provided that the determination of whether the
private sector's activity is already adequate must be
determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority.
Mr. ZAMORA. Mr. Speaker, the committee accepts
the proposed amendment.
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
(2 RECORD OF THE BATASAN PAMBANSA, Sept.
6, 1979,
p. 1007)
Thus what the PCSO is prohibited from doing is from investing in a
business engaged in sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar
activities. It is prohibited from doing so whether "in collaboration,
association or joint venture" with others or "by itself." This seems to
be the only possible interpretation of §1 (A) and (B) in light of its text
and its legislative history. That there is today no other entity engaged
in sweepstakes races, lotteries and the like does not detract from the
validity of this interpretation.
III. The Court noted in its decision that the provisions of the first
contract, which were considered to be features of a joint venture
agreement, had been removed in the new contract. For instance, §5
of the ELA provides that in the operation of the on-line lottery, the
PCSO must employ "its own competent and qualified personnel."
Petitioners claim, however, that the "contemporaneous
interpretation" of PGMC officials of this provision is otherwise. They
cite the testimony of Glen Barroga of the PGMC before a Senate
committee to the effect that under the ELA the PGMC would be
operating the lottery system "side by side" with PCSO personnel as
part of the transfer of technology.
Whether the transfer of technology would result in a violation of
PCSO's franchise should be determined by facts and not by what
some officials of the PGMC state by way of opinion. In the absence
of proof to the contrary, it must be presumed that §5 reflects the true
intention of the parties. Thus, Art. 1370 of the Civil Code says that "If
the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulations shall control." The intention of the parties must be
ascertained from their "contemporaneous and subsequent acts." (Art.
1371; Atlantic Gulf Co. v. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 166 [1908]) It
cannot simply be judged from what one of them says. On the other
hand, the claim of third parties, like petitioners, that the clause on
upgrading of equipment would enable the parties after a while to
change the contract and enter into something else in violation of the
law is mere speculation and cannot be a basis for judging the validity
of the contract.
IV. It is contended that §1 of E.O. No. 301 covers all types of
"contract[s] for public services or for furnishing of supplies, materials
and equipment to the government or to any of its branches, agencies
or instrumentalities" and not only contracts of purchase and sale.
Consequently, a lease of equipment, like the ELA, must be submitted
to public bidding in order to be valid. This contention is based on two
premises: (1) that §1 of E.O. No. 301 applies to any contract
whereby the government acquires title to or the use of the equipment
and (2) that the words "supplies," "materials," and "equipment" are
distinct from each other so that when an exception in §1 speaks of
"supplies," it cannot be construed to mean "equipment."
Petitioners' contention will not bear analysis. For example, the term
"supplies" is used in paragraph (a), which provides that a contract for
the furnishing of "supplies" in order to meet an emergency is exempt
from public bidding. Unless "supplies" is construed to include
"equipment," however, the lease of heavy equipment needed for
rescue operations in case of a calamity will have to be submitted to
public bidding before it can be entered into by the government.
In dissent Justice Feliciano says that in such a situation the
government can simply resort to expropriation, paying compensation
afterward. This is just like purchasing the equipment through
negotiation when the question is whether the purchase should be by
public bidding, not to mention the fact that the power to expropriate
may not be exercised when the government can very well negotiate
with private owners.
Indeed, there are fundamental difficulties in simultaneously
contending (1) that E.O. No. 301, §1 covers both contracts of sale
and lease agreements and (2) that the words "supplies,"
"materials" and "equipment" can not be interchanged. Thus, under
paragraph (b) of §1, public bidding is not required "whenever the
supplies are to be used in connection with a project or activity which
cannot be delayed without causing detriment to the public service."
Following petitioners' theory, there should be a public bidding before
the government can enter into a contract for the lease of bulldozers
and dredging equipment even if these are urgently needed in areas
ravaged by lahar because, first, lease contracts are covered by the
general rule and, second, the exception to public bidding in
paragraph (b) covers only "supplies" but not equipment.
To take still another example. Paragraph (d), which does away with
the requirement of public bidding "whenever the supplies under
procurement have been unsuccessfully placed on bid for at least two
consecutive times, either due to lack of bidders or the offers received
in each instance were exorbitant or nonconforming to specifications."
Again, following the theory of the petitioners, a contract for the lease
of equipment cannot be entered into even if there are no bids
because, first, lease contracts are governed by the general rule on
public bidding and, second, the exception to public bidding in
paragraph (d) applies only to contracts for the furnishing of
"supplies."
Other examples can be given to show the absurdity of interpreting §1
as applicable to any contract for the furnishing of supplies, materials
and equipment and of considering the words "supplies," "materials"
and "equipment" to be not interchangeable. Our ruling that §1 of E.O.
No. 301 does not cover the lease of equipment avoids these
fundamental difficulties and is supported by the text of §1, which is
entitled "Guidelines for Negotiated Contracts" and by the fact that the
only provisions of E.O. No. 301 on leases, namely, §§6 and 7,
concern the lease of buildings by or to the government. Thus the text
of §1 reads:
§1. Guidelines for Negotiated Contracts. — Any
provision of law, decree, executive order or other
issuances to the contrary notwithstanding, no
contract for public services or for furnishing supplies,
materials and equipment to the government or any
of its branches, agencies or instrumentalities shall
be renewed or entered into without public bidding,
except under any of the following situations:
a. Whenever the supplies are
urgently needed to meet an
emergency which may involve the
loss of, or danger to, life and/or
property;
b. Whenever the supplies are to be
used in connection with a project or
activity which cannot be delayed
without causing detriment to the
public service;
c. Whenever the materials are
sold by an exclusive distributor or
manufacturer who does not have
subdealers selling at lower prices
and for which no suitable substitute
can be obtained elsewhere at more
advantageous terms to the
government;
d. Whenever the supplies under
procurement have been
unsuccessfully placed on bid for at
least two consecutive times, either
due to lack of bidders or the offers
received in each instance were
exhorbitant or non-conforming to
specifications;
e. In cases where it is apparent that
the requisition of the needed
supplies through negotiated
purchase is most advantageous to
the government to be determined by
the Department Head concerned;
and
f. Whenever the purchase is made
from an agency of the government.
Indeed, the purpose for promulgating E.O. No. 301 was merely to
decentralize the system of reviewing negotiated contracts of
purchase for the furnishing of supplies, materials and equipment as
well as lease contracts of buildings. Theretofore, E.O. No. 298,
promulgated on August 12, 1940, required consultation with the
Secretary of Justice and the Department Head concerned and the
approval of the President of the Philippines before contracts for the
furnishing of supplies, materials and equipment could be made on a
negotiated basis, without public bidding. E.O. No. 301 changed this
by providing as follows:
§2. Jurisdiction over Negotiated Contracts. — In line
with the principles of decentralization and
accountability, negotiated contracts for public
services or for furnishing supplies, materials or
equipment may be entered into by the department or
agency head or the governing board of the
government-owned or controlled corporation
concerned, without need of prior approval by higher
authorities, subject to availability of funds,
compliance with the standards or guidelines
prescribed in Section 1 hereof, and to the audit
jurisdiction of the commission on Audit in
accordance with existing rules and regulations.
 Negotiated contracts involving P2,000,000 up to
P10,000,000 shall be signed by the Secretary and
two other Undersecretaries.
xxx xxx xxx
§7. Jurisdiction Over Lease Contracts. — The heads
of agency intending to rent privately-owned buildings
or spaces for their use, or to lease out government-
owned buildings or spaces for private use, shall
have authority to determine the reasonableness of
the terms of the lease and the rental rates thereof,
and to enter into such lease contracts without need
of prior approval by higher authorities, subject to
compliance with the uniform standards or guidelines
established pursuant to Section 6 hereof by the
DPWH and to the audit jurisdiction of COA or its duly
authorized representative in accordance with
existing rules and regulations.
In sum, E.O. No. 301 applies only to contracts for the purchase of
supplies, materials and equipment, and it was merely to change the
system of administrative review of emergency purchases, as
theretofore prescribed by E.O. No. 298, that E.O. No. 301 was
issued on July 26, 1987. Part B of this Executive Order applies to
leases of buildings, not of equipment, and therefore does not govern
the lease contract in this case. Even if it applies, it does not require
public bidding for entering into it.
Our holding that E.O. No. 301, §1 applies only to contracts of
purchase and sale is conformable to P.D. No. 526, promulgated on
August 2, 1974, which is in pari materia. P.D. No. 526 requires local
governments to hold public bidding in the "procurement of supplies."
By specifying "procurement of supplies" and excepting from the
general rule "purchases" when made under certain circumstances,
P.D. No. 526, §12 indicates quite clearly that it applies only to
contracts of purchase and sale. This provision reads:
§12. Procurement without public bidding. —
Procurement of supplies may be made without the
benefit of public bidding in the following modes:
(1) Personal canvass of responsible merchants;
(2) Emergency purchases;
(3) Direct purchases from manufacturers or
exclusive distributors;
(4) Thru the Bureau of Supply Coordination; and
(5) Purchase from other government entities or
foreign governments.
Sec. 3 broadly defines the term "supplies" as including —
everything except real estate, which
may be needed in the transaction of
public business, or in the pursuit of
any undertaking, project, or activity,
whether of the nature of equipment,
furniture, stationery, materials for
construction, or personal property of
any sort, including non-personal or
contractual services such as the
repair and maintenance of
equipment and furniture, as well as
trucking, hauling, janitorial, security,
and related or analogous services.
Thus, the texts of both E.O. No. 301, §1 and of P.D. No. 526, §§1
and 12, make it clear that only contracts for the purchase and sale of
supplies, materials and equipment are contemplated by the rule
concerning public biddings.

Finally, it is contended that equipment leases are attractive and

commonly used in place of contracts of purchase and sale because
of "multifarious credit and tax constraints" and therefore could not
have been left out from the requirement of public bidding. Obviously
these credit and tax constraints can have no attraction to the
government when considering the advantages of sale over lease of
equipment. The fact that lease contracts are in common use is not a
reason for implying that the rule on public bidding applies not only to
government purchases but also to lease contracts. For the fact also
is that the government leases equipment, such as copying machines,
personal computers and the like, without going through public
bidding.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the motion for reconsideration

of petitioners is DENIED with finality.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for
themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA
CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and
MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER,
INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department
of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department
of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204934
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES,
INC. [ALFI], represented by its President, Maria Concepcion
S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro,
Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez &
Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L.
Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista,
Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A.
Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on
behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C.
Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel F emando C.
Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C.
Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta
for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon
Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses
Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on
behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph
Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor,
Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for themselves
and on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho,
Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho,
Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael
Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie
Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A.
Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor child
Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor
children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas,
Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws &
Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON.
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary,
Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ARSENIO M.
BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA
Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON
WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-
Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE
CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo
Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF
CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President
Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Donato
Marcos,Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204957
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and
VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department
of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204988
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by
Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his personal
capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr.
Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board
and in his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON,
IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd.,
ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and
MARLON I. YAP,Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON.
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and
HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior
and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205003
EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON.
SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205043
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE
APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR
SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
DILG SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205138
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX),
herein represented by its National President, Atty. Ricardo M
. Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo
B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel
J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal,
Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito
M. Diokno and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department
of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department
of Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, HON.
CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social
Welfare and Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN,
Director-General, National Economic and Development
Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General, Food
and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS,
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD
OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on
Women, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205478
REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D.,
CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE MILLADO-
LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and
ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS
ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO,
ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known
as Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary
of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary of the Department of Education; and HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of Interior
and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205491
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C.
TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their Posterity,
and the rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the
Philippines, Respondent.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205720
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by
Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in her personal
capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL
A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A.
MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B.
PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON.
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and
HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 206355
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON
PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA,
STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA
CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207111
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY
VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO,
ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-
GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department
of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department
of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207172
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN
CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE
BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A.
RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N.
RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department
of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department
of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207563
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M.
KASHIM, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health, and
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management,Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers
of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed
this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to
live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of
others and with the common good."1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's
emergence as a developed country, leaving our people
beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment.
While governmental policies have been geared towards the
revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social
services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the poor,
but every member of society. The government continues to tread
on a trying path to the realization of its very purpose, that is, the
general welfare of the Filipino people and the development of the
country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the main facet of a
representative government, endeavors to enact laws and policies
that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the executive is
closed set to fully implement these measures and bring concrete
and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz.
Seemingly distant is the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as
an inert governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes on
clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate.
Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then
willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret legislation vis-a-
vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine
society together - the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the
issues of population growth control, abortion and contraception.
As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on
the subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in
various media. From television debates2 to sticker
campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-political activists to mass
gatherings organized by members of the clergy4 - the clash
between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious
conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep
division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold
support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354,
otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by
Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law,
challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the
doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes
down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and
lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces
the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and
two (2) petitions- in-intervention, to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses
Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in
their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and
taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the
Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic,
privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the
Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president,
Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in
their personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the
generations unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for
Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in
their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force
Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve
Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation,
Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned educational institution,
and several others,13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve
Life);
(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his
capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by
Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate
of the Philippines,16 in their capacities as a citizens and
taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the
Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several
others19 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers
(PAX);
(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and
several others,21 in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by
spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty.
Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers
 and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is
also proceeding in his capacity as a member of the Bar
(Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-
Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and several others,25 in
their capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of
its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint
Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-
Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in
their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the
Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John
Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in their capacities as
citizens (Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by
Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several others,31in
their capacities as citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah
and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as
citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S.
Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer
(Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang
Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are
assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following
GROUNDS:
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared
policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law
would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives,
intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives,
in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution
which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother
and the life of the unborn from conception.35
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to
protection against hazardous products. The petitioners
posit that the RH Law provides universal access to
contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it
causes cancer and other health problems.36
• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The
petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the
constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it
authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of
contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds
for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their
beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring
religious freedom.37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious
objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms
of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer
patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to
other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on
reproductive health programs and service, although it is against
their religious beliefs and convictions.38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that skilled health
professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to,
Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers,
medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses,
public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are
specifically charged with the duty to implement these Rules,
cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of
mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is
an affront to their religious beliefs.41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious
freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to
satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling
state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free
exercise of religion and the right to free speech.42
• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on
involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH
Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary
servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth
program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48)
hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under
threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other
forms of punishment.43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are
covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would effectively be
forced to render reproductive health services since the lack of
PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of the
public would no longer be able to avail of the practitioners
services.44
• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the
law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates against
the poor as it makes them the primary target of the
government program that promotes contraceptive use.
The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting
reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to
introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the
number of the poor.45
• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the
due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing the
penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is
vague because it does not define the type of conduct to
be treated as "violation" of the RH Law.46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law
violates the right to due process by removing from them (the
people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what
kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they
shall offer."47 It ignores the management prerogative inherent in
corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance
with their own discretion and judgment.
• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel
a person to explain a full range of family planning
methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his
own preferred way of family planning. The petitioners note
that although exemption is granted to institutions owned
and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to
refer their patients to another healthcare facility willing to
perform the service or procedure.48
• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's
family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that
the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive health
education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise
their children in accordance with their beliefs.49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who
will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes
any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of
spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall
well-being of their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed
that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are
deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child
should use contraceptives.50
 • The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-
delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners question
the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to
determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to
be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule
provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution.52
• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local
Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH
Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the
local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the
powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local
Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their
respective comments-in-intervention in defense of the
constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in
behalf of the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C.
Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr.
Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G.
Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health
(C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De
Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention in
conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia
Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive
arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the
petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case
or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for
judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to
question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions
for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement
of the assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments
raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO),
enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed
legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or
until July 17, 2013.62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with
the counsels of the parties to determine and/or identify the
pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which
these issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July
9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases
were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was
ordered extended until further orders of the Court.63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the same
time posed several questions for their clarification on some
contentions of the parties.64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has
allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of contraceptive
drugs and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country
enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale,
Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices were
allowed, they could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless
such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a duly licensed drug
store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner."65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969,
contained provisions relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or
anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37
thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical product or
device capable of provoking abortion or preventing conception as
classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered
or sold to any person without a proper prescription by a duly
licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN
Declaration on Population, which recognized that the population
problem should be considered as the principal element for long-
term economic development, enacted measures that promoted
male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population
growth.67 Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365,
approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a
National Policy on Population, Creating the Commission on
Population and for Other Purposes. " The law envisioned that
"family planning will be made part of a broad educational
program; safe and effective means will be provided to couples
desiring to space or limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates
will be further reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E
. Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No. 79,68 dated
December 8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning
a part of a broad educational program," provided "family planning
services as a part of over-all health care," and made "available all
acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to all
Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing
pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family
planning methods evolved from being a component of
demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of
public health, particularly, reproductive health.69 Under that policy,
the country gave priority to one's right to freely choose the
method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its
adherence to the commitments made in the International
Conference on Population and Development.70 Thus, on August
14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna
Carta for Women, " which, among others, mandated the State to
provide for comprehensive health services and programs for
women, including family planning and sex education.71
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the
country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From a paltry
number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of
the country reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92
million in 2010.72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that
the measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the
RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and
the marginalized, access and information to the full range of
modem family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective
to provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be
achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it
mandatory for health providers to provide information on the full
range of modem family planning methods, supplies and services,
and for schools to provide reproductive health education. To put
teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to
carry out its mandates.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to
fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception,
women's health and population control.
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be 3] Facial Challenge
declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues
that the government sponsored contraception program, the very 4] Locus Standi
essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and
the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and 5] Declaratory Relief
promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante - the
situation prior to the passage of the RH Law - must be
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
maintained."73 It explains:
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and
contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act No. 5921
and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of 1] Right to Life
contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription
duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable 2] Right to Health
and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its
agencies - the entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries 3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
down to the barangay officials in the remotest areas of the
country - is made to play in the implementation of the 4] The Family
contraception program to the fullest extent possible using
taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and provider 5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
of all forms of family planning methods and the implementer of
the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and
6] Due Process
universal access to, a full range of family planning methods,
devices and supplies.74
7] Equal Protection
ISSUES
8] Involuntary Servitude
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the
parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to the 9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
following principal issues:
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of
judicial review over the controversy. DISCUSSION

1] Power of Judicial Review Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its
implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some
2] Actual Case or Controversy procedural impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its
power of judicial review over the controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the
OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative and political
wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in the
crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian
democratic process"75 and "characterized by an inordinate amount
of transparency."76 The OSG posits that the authority of the Court
to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak,"
since the Constitution vests the discretion to implement the
constitutional policies and positive norms with the political
departments, in particular, with Congress.77 It further asserts that
in view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-
Terrorism Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition
utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the
acts of the legislature.79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it
cannot prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to be
enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government
has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.
It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it
is not a speech-regulating measure.80
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality
of the actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is often
sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and
accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the
basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the
separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government, which obtains not through express provision but by
actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines;82 (b) the
executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes
and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three
branches of government.85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the
doctrine of separation of powers which imposes upon the courts
proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their
respect for the other branches of government, in striking down the
acts of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily,
the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution.86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social
disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated.87 In order to address this, the Constitution impresses
upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal
branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at
the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only
at a very limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts
of the executive and the legislative branches are null because
they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.88 Thus,
while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice
or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.89 The
Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect
those cherished rights and principles embodied in the
Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial
power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes no
distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to
judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise.
The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The
Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative
and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their
collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted
in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as
mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the
Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no
more authority of proscribing the actions under review.90 This is in
line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly
provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government. [Emphases supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally
declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review
and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and
executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on
applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC,92 Aldaba v.
COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless others. In
Tanada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground
that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch
is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political.
The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of
the Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the
application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised
before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue
which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.
[Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice
Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and
the balancing of powers among the three great departments of
government through the definition and maintenance of the
boundaries of authority and control between them. To him,
judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in that
balancing operation.95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court
does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and
every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete
with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis
mota of the case.96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do
not present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law
has yet to be implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised
by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication
since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions
and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has
been adversely affected by its operation.98 In short, it is contended
that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would
amount to an advisory opinion.99 The rule is that courts do not sit
to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly
interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must
be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words,
the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a
legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other;
that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a
decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of
facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is
the requirement of ripeness.101 A question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on
the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence
of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result
of the act complained of102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the
Republic of the Philippines,103 where the constitutionality of an
unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that the
Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there
was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate the
petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the
Court ruled that the fact of the law or act in question being not yet
effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are
not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular
violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken
judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or
controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing
rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to
carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the
subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated
earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a
right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because
medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being
criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations
thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to
be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and
other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged
by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be
challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating
measure.105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also
known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched
to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected
speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment.106 These
include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of
the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.107 After all, the
fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and
peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's
freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts
are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the
U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some
modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of
facial challenges to strictly penal statues,108 it has expanded its
scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also
those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights.109 The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For
unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded
jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our
Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its
duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have
seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life,
speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned
above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court
has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to
determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny.
To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there
exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as
a reactive branch of government, acting only when the
Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the
Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to
file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as applied
challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the
assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against
them,111 and the government has yet to distribute reproductive
health devices that are abortive.112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the
"transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens
and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and
substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act.113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies
the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute
only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits
one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded
on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court.
This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party
standing.115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on
standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-
traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the
matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest."116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court
held that in cases of paramount importance where serious
constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement
may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where
there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial
review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens
and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of
several executive orders although they had only an indirect and
general interest shared in common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may
not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court
has time and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi
requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue,
not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by
a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of
transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is,
after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more
than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-
traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters
or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not
have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly
treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance
of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the
technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at
bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have
potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being
of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just
determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with
the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not
inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and
promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not
only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised
must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law
drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life
and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other
constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the
issues of contraception and reproductive health have already
caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the
Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of
transcendental importance warranting immediate court
adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to
life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the
Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking
action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at
this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being
imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the
mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable
consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are
essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has
no original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the
petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would
just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over
which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching
implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may
consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law,
claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule.
According to them, being one for reproductive health with
responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the
constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true
intent - to act as a population control measure.123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law
is not a birth or population control measure,124 and that the
concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health"
are both interrelated as they are inseparable.125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law,
the Court sees it as principally a population control measure. The
corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the
country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our
women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-
preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes
the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the
marginalized, with access to information on the full range of
modem family planning products and methods. These family
planning methods, natural or modem, however, are clearly
geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law
is to reduce the number of births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-
natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law,
however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions
on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal,
affordable, and quality reproductive health care services,
methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent
pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the
whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in
fact, the central idea of the RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the
provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the
RH Law loses its very foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the
other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance,
maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention
and management of reproductive tract infections including
HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for
Women."128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one
subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The
Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero,
it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not
require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue
all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is
sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as
to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect,
and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the
nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal
rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple
or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law
shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible
parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding
objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the
first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and
guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to
equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health which
includes reproductive health, the right to education and
information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics,
cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title
of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average person
reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment
or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either
in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different
one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act."129
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and
"responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the
goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated
under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that
Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the
contents of the assailed legislation.
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to
life and health of the unborn child under Section 12, Article II of
the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to
abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting
abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers contraceptives
that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning
contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to
implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of the
Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which
already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-
abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices,
injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective
family planning products and supplies, medical research shows
that contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill
the fertilized ovum which already has life.131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human
good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction of
contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the
dignity of man.132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law
requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify that
the product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the
assailed legislation effectively confirms that abortifacients are not
prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the agency that
will actually supervise or administer the use of these products and
supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully
make a certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient
purposes.133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the
intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply the
prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not
violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only
"non-abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods,
devices products and supplies shall be made accessible to the
public.134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative
determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by
enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due
consideration to various studies and consultations with the World
Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical field,
it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such
a determination and pass judgment only when a particular drug or
device is later on determined as an abortive.135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional
protection of one's right to life is not violated considering that
various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the
implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that
the RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically provides
that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of
the fertilized ovum are allowed.136
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being
enjoys the right to life.137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded
on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or
dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes
and transcends any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample
protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family
planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage. From
the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The
Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs
and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on
contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization,138 to
the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the
ratification of numerous international agreements, the country has
long recognized the need to promote population control through
the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic
development. Through the years, however, the use of
contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from
being a component of demographic management, to one
centered on the promotion of public health, particularly,
reproductive health.140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures
promoting women's rights and health and the overall promotion of
the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No.
6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No.
9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of Women"
were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the
Philippine national population program has always been
grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion"
and the "principle of non-coercion."141 As will be discussed later,
these principles are not merely grounded on administrative policy,
but rather, originates from the constitutional protection expressly
provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious
freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the
question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that
should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and
evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon
that the individual members of the Court could express their own
views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at
fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be
made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive
the support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from
conception. This is undisputable because before conception,
there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise
that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to
conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because,
amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded
the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization.
They are waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence,
the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception
is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male
sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert
that conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum
in the uterus.143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary
meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar
Council:144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that
where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that the language employed in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of
the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the text of the provision
to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of
the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and
the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum
- from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First,
because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a
lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose
consciousness it should ever be present as an important
condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of
the word "conception" which, as described and defined by all
reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at
fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the
act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the
fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing into
a being like its parents.145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term
"conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the male
spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and
maturation under normal conditions.146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal
personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v.
Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was
written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not
acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child
inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State
must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn
already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child
being delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the
US Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect for human
life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and
substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life."
Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a
baby or a child.149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the
intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception" used in
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations,
it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect
the following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which
reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life
of the unborn from the moment of conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when
the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human life. x x
x.150
xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such,
the beginning of human life, it was explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner.
The first question that needs to be answered is: Is the fertilized
ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized
ovum is alive. First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in
nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing this upon
fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from
within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the
continuous process of cell division. All these processes are vital
signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that biologically the
fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally
categorical "yes." At the moment of conception, the nuclei of the
ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes
from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to
form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is
found only - and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the
fertilized ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we
must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and human,
then, as night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is
human.151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of
conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization" was not
because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception"
was described by us here before with the scientific phrase
"fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some
people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from the moment of
conception."152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample
protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for
the purpose of writing a Constitution, without specifying "from the
moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because
according to the Commissioner's own admission, he would leave
it to Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can
define life to begin from six months after fertilization; and that
would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by
science that life begins from the moment of conception. There
can be no doubt about it. So we should not give any doubt to
Congress, too.153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question
on that point. Actually, that is one of the questions I was going to
raise during the period of interpellations but it has been
expressed already. The provision, as proposed right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of
the unborn from the moment of conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this
mean when the egg meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right
to determine whether certain contraceptives that we know today
are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-
called contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus.
If fertilization has already occurred, the next process is for the
fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What
happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the
opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore,
if we take the provision as it is proposed, these so called
contraceptives should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is
what is called abortifacient and, therefore, would be
unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to
Congress to state whether or not these certain contraceptives are
abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now
proposed, they are already considered abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the
Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall
provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child
from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or
upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also
apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to
prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it
determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution
did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional.
In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need
to have a constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized
that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an
abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the
courts to decide on based on established evidence.155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy
the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus
prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the
union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that
similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-
abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
 xxx xxx xxx Atty. Noche:

Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life
bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would like not only to yet.
protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of
people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would Justice Bersamin:
just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of
the term "protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of There is no life.
conception." I raised some of these implications this afternoon
when I interjected in the interpellation of Commissioner Regalado.
Atty. Noche:
I would like to ask that question again for a categorical answer.
So, there is no life to be protected.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the
unborn from the moment of conception" we are also actually
saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are Justice Bersamin:
already being encouraged at this point in time. Is that the sense
of the committee or does it disagree with me? To be protected.

Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives Atty. Noche:
would be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet
unshaped. Under Section 12, yes.

Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more Justice Bersamin:
about some contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine device
which actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized So you have no objection to condoms?
from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from the moment of
conception," what really occurs is that some of these Atty. Noche:
contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.
Not under Section 12, Article II.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
Justice Bersamin:
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156
Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 have porosity?
Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the oral
arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy,
Atty. Noche:
even condoms are not classified as abortifacients.157
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect,
Your Honor, but I am discussing here Section 12, Article II, Your
Honor, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical
foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health
Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy
usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum
and forms a viable zygote."159
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes
to form a zygote from which the embryo develops."160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological
Obstetrics),161 used by medical schools in the Philippines, also
concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment
of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in
the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic
composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that:
"Human development begins after the union of male and female
gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization
(conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins
with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary
oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the
haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their
chromosomes to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as
a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or
primordium, of a human being."162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the
same position. They wrote: "Although life is a continuous process,
fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary
circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism is
thereby formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes present
in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote.
Thus the diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is
formed. The embryo now exists as a genetic unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association
came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill
(Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the
same time that PMA maintains its strong position that fertilization
is sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus
human life, begins. Human lives are sacred from the moment of
conception, and that destroying those new lives is never licit, no
matter what the purported good outcome would be. In terms of
biology and human embryology, a human being begins
immediately at fertilization and after that, there is no point along
the continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a
"potential" human being can be posited. Any philosophical, legal,
or political conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a
human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of
conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent with the
factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral,
political, or religious view of human life or of human embryos.164
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood
under medical parlance, and more importantly, following the
intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable
conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life
of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined
moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory
advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at
implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and conception are
two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process.
They are not identical and synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the
WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the
implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of
conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be
medically detected."167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of
any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning
of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is
not an inanimate object - it is a living human being complete with
DNA and 46 chromosomes.168 Implantation has been
conceptualized only for convenience by those who had population
control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not
only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize
the utilization of any drug or device that would prevent the
implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be
provocative and further aggravate religious-based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion
and abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987
Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception
was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing
abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it
otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the record
of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the
protection of the unborn from conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-
abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-abortion
decision passed by the Supreme Court.169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this
intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted
not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it
finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be
afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by
Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody
the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it
should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation.170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under
Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the
destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:
1] xx x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the
following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of
methods, facilities, services and supplies that contribute to
reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive
health-related problems. It also includes sexual health, the
purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal
relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the
following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion
complications;
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals
and couples, to decide freely and responsibly whether or not to
have children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to
make other decisions concerning reproduction, free of
discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the information and
means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual
health and reproductive health: Provided, however, That
reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and access to
abortifacients.
3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against
abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive
order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation
contrary to or is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the
Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended
accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in
prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law
defines an abortifacient as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion
or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be
afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using the word " or,"
the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent
implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that
induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus,
an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted
in the mother's womb, upon determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court
finds that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution,
recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the
State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes
clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that
induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively
above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of
the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb
(third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb is
an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean
at all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman
suggests. It also does not declare either that protection will only
be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest.
Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the
fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum
must be protected the moment it becomes existent - all the way
until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life
is only recognized and afforded protection from the moment the
fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or
device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to
implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords
protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction
abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at
fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is
implanted in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that
instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It
started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device
that induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized
ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under
Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply included or to be
included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that
said product and supply is made available on the condition that it
is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd.
The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or
device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency
cannot be present in every instance when the contraceptive
product or supply will be used.171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe,
legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however, the Court
finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the
legislative intent and mean that "any product or supply included or
to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA
that said product and supply is made available on the condition
that it cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is
consistent with the proviso under the second paragraph of the
same section that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or
acquire by any means emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital
pills, abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their
other forms or equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the
RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the
meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as
follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the
following terms shall be defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion
or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be
defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or
the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is
redefined, viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and
scientifically proven modern family planning method, device, or
health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents
pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or
prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's
womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows
"contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that
primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach
and be implanted in the mother's womb.172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del
Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the insertion of
the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR173 must
be struck down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section
3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared
invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier
"primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives
which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to
insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an
"abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent
here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would
permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually
abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism.174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by
the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With
this, together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section
4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against abortion, the
undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the
PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives that do
not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction
of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb,
but also those that do not have the secondary action of acting the
same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting
abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be
construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the
RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent with each
other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in Section
3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold
the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit
only those contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an
abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of
contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn
from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of
the Constitution."175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no
abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of life must be
upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health
because it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives,
intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies
in the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in
the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all
national hospitals.176Citing various studies on the matter, the
petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical
cancer is greatly increased in women who use oral contraceptives
as compared to women who never use them. They point out that
the risk is decreased when the use of contraceptives is
discontinued. Further, it is contended that the use of combined
oral contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased
risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of
ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of
myocardial infarction.177 Given the definition of "reproductive
health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the
RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only
seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex
lives.180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the
Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere statement of the
administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-
executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the
claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women.181
The Court's Position
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health.
In this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions
protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II
of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to
health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States'
duty to provide for the health of the people, viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social
services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall
be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to
provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective
food and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate
health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the
country's health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for
disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and
self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade
malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions
are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the
contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered
self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement
these self-executing provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v.
GSIS,183 it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If
the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to
ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it
has always been, that –
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-
executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary
is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the
legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be
effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of
the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely
meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute. (Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners,
particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and
contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo -
under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution
of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed by
a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be maintained.185
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this
regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is
no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its
requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court
agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the
effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated
proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and
dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require
the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in
place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that
only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public.
As aptly explained by respondent Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives,
the same cannot be dispensed and used without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale,
Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the
Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical
Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not
repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not
inconsistent with the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of
contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly governed by RA
No. 4729 which provides in full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or
corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute whether for
or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless
such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug
store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:
"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical,
or portion which is used exclusively for the purpose of
preventing fertilization of the female ovum: and
 "(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device,
material, or agent introduced into the female reproductive
system for the primary purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the
provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not more
than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six
months or more than one year or both in the discretion of the
Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of
RA No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and
devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature
and kind or device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or
resold, or otherwise be made available to the consuming public
except through a prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy,
duly established in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the
RH Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension of the
petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated
proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is
completely unwarranted and baseless.186 [Emphases in the
Original. Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with
Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning
Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and
monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the whole
country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local
government bodies to plan and implement this procurement and
distribution program. The supply and budget allotments shall be
based on, among others, the current levels and projections of the
following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples
who want to space or limit their children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method
used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement,
distribution and monitoring program consistent with the overall
provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and
devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which
is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will
procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of
these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of
contraceptive drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately
done. The public health must be protected by all possible means.
As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and
burden are assumed by the government in supplying
contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable
for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to
their use.187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive
has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It
behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or
devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency
tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the public
are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds
that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is
premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must first
be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded
herein, to be determined as the case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot
legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices
are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9
that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the
EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as
operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and
approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise
to determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or
intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of
the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion
or removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL
supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion
of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and
other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning
products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL
is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA
that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective
family planning products and supplies. There can be no
predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives
are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the
proper scientific examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal
ligation are not covered by the constitutional proscription, there
are those who, because of their religious education and
background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether
abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these are medical
practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not
only the use of contraceptives but also the willing participation
and cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive use.
Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely opposed
to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the transmission of
life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms true
love and denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of
Human life."188
The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of
contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their taxes on
contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since
contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.189
2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts
to address religious sentiments by making provisions for a
conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is
nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the
conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking
reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who
would be able to provide for the patient's needs. For the
petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious objector to
cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating
his/her religious beliefs.190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty
to refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly limited, because
although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the
option to refer a patient seeking reproductive health services and
information - no escape is afforded the conscientious objector in
Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking
reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other
individuals to conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in
public health facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers
involved in the implementation of the law referred to in Section
23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14
of the RH Law, are also not recognize.191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners
meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer the matter to
another health care service provider is still considered a
compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers. They
add that compelling them to do the act against their will violates
the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of
the law are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion of
Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive
effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono
reproductive health services to indigents encroach upon the
religious freedom of those upon whom they are required.192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a
conscientious objector to refer the person seeking reproductive
health care services to another provider infringes on one's
freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an
unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin under
Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief may be
regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are
passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the
public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling
state interest to justify regulation of religious freedom because it
mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state
interests. It does not explain how the rights of the people (to
equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable human
development, health, education, information, choice and to make
decisions according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural
beliefs and the demands of responsible parenthood) are being
threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment of
religious freedom.194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law
requiring would-be couples to attend family planning and
responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of
compliance. They claim that the provision forces individuals to
participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it
contravenes their religious beliefs.195 As the assailed law dangles
the threat of penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-
compliance with its provisions, the petitioners claim that the RH
Law forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and
information to contraception against their beliefs must be struck
down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law
does not provide that a specific mode or type of contraceptives be
used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions
any religion or belief.196 They point out that the RH Law only seeks
to serve the public interest by providing accessible, effective and
quality reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child
health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social
justice health guarantees of the Constitution,197 and that what the
law only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive
others of their right to reproductive health.198 They assert that the
assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which is
an assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion
against his free will.199
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family
planning should be allowed, the petitioners are effectively going
against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same
right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the RH
Law.200 In other words, by seeking the declaration that the RH Law
is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court
recognize only the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family
planning methods and impose this on the entire citizenry.201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the
same does not violate the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise between the
interests of the religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to
keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the citizen who
needs access to information and who has the right to expect that
the health care professional in front of her will act professionally.
For the respondents, the concession given by the State under
Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to
freely exercise one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on
the rights of others.202
Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is
minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration, location and
impact.203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15
, the respondents claim that it is a reasonable regulation providing
an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information
regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant
nutrition. It is argued that those who object to any information
received on account of their attendance in the required seminars
are not compelled to accept information given to them. They are
completely free to reject any information they do not agree with
and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without
intervention of the State.204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion
that natural family planning is the only method acceptable to
Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and
surveys on the matter, they highlight the changing stand of the
Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years and note
the general acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its
followers in planning their families.
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a
heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic,
cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown
us that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these
various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a
single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is
tolerant towards all - the religious people of different sects and
the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our people
generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be,
and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting
our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present
Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty
God, in order to build a just and humane society, and establish a
Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations,
promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony,
and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of
independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime
of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and
promulgate this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God "
manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and
consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical
experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that
the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far
as it instills into the mind the purest principles of
morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion
to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain
benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such
as tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in
government institutions, and optional religious instructions in
public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so
that the State would not encroach into the affairs of the church,
and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and State
was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on
mutual respect. Generally, the State cannot meddle in the
1âwphi1
internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and
dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and
discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church
cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the
rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its
beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the
country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever
be preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-cited
provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which
refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of
God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization.
Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations
collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to
provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit of
its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following
mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of
the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.
Section 29.
xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid,
or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support
of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system
of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious
teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher,
minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any
penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom
provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from
sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against other
religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious
groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state
religion and the use of public resources for the support or
prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the
respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.207 Under this
part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from
unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief
and faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the
Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the
support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any
sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any
creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise
of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude.
It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are
all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience
directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought
to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common
good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the
observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously
between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be
characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state
regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law
which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's
secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on
religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose
without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed
to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to
promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In
simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government
from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs
and practice, while the establishment clause prohibits
government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for
religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion
clauses were intended to deny government the power to use
either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs
and practices.210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the
principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of
two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's
belief. The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v.
Secretary of Education:211
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded
only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of
belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One
may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and
unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical
when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards.
But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief,
there is quite a stretch of road to travel.212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome
power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to
the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is
translated into external acts that affect the public welfare."213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the
State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality.
This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor,
(Escritor)214 where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-
accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit,
intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution."215 In
the same case, it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to
these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be
allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion,
but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion
without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is to remove
a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's
religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is
not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but
an exemption from its application or its 'burdensome effect,'
whether by the legislature or the courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the
compelling state interest test is proper.218Underlying the
compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a
fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to
strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine
these limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free Exercise
Clause, American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear
and present danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this
test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty.
The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of permissibility
of religious freedom is whether it violates the established
institutions of society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the
"immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine that a
law of general applicability may burden religious exercise
provided the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the
goal of the law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the
"compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went
back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and
immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly
recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and
present danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible
Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear
and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test
involved, in one form or another, religious speech as this test is
often used in cases on freedom of expression. On the other hand,
the Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious freedom
will not prevail over established institutions of society and law.
Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German has
been overruled by Ebralinag which employed the "grave and
immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that
employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as explained
previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of the
case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible
Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and
present danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were
appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate
effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having
been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality
approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to
Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct arising from
religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is proper
where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct
has different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be
immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching.
A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a
substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore
necessary. However, not any interest of the state would suffice to
prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental
right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights -
"the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the
words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the
Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The
entire constitutional order of limited government is premised upon
an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos
implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and
humane society and establish a government." As held in
Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of
interests which balances a right with just a colorable state interest
is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of
the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious
liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a
compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter
religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are
destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between the state's
interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide.
The "compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering
religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to the
paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in
Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on
Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by
upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect
the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be
preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining supplied.]
The Court's Position
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to
determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's participation
in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral
from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong
according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared
that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of
worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are
unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the
province of the civil courts."220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends
only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the
Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in
this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the
Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as
vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine
whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious
freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects
religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is replete with
assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of
his religion or defy his religious convictions against his free will.
Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are the
following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all
persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of
these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the
right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to
education and information, and the right to choose and make
decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social
institution and the foundation of the family which in turn is the
foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their
religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access,
without bias, to all methods of family planning, including effective
natural and modern methods which have been proven medically
safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with
scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such
as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and
marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other
government measures of identifying marginalization: Provided,
That the State shall also provide funding support to promote
modern natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings
Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and
their religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals
and couples to have the number of children they desire with due
consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the
resources available and affordable to them and in accordance
with existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions.
[Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of
family planning methods that are in accordance with their
religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration
the State's obligations under various human rights instruments.
[Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) ,
women's and people's organizations, civil society, faith-based
organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to
ensure that reproductive health and population and development
policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of
women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent
to respond to the needs and aspirations of the family and
children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to
determine and achieve the desired number of children, spacing
and timing of their children according to their own family life
aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness,
health status, sociocultural and economic concerns consistent
with their religious convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases
supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted
allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical
practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is
an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent
neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what
the government can do with religion, it also limits what religious
sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither
cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy
for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict
other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to
adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state
religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition
that the State cannot enhance its population control program
through the RH Law simply because the promotion of
contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the
State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives
without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion.
One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud
his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State
demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are
Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's.221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote
reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in
line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion
cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof.
The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a
medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health
care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare
provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious
or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly
burdened by government legislation or practice, the compelling
state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine
of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case,
the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would
warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless
the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling
state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular
objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for
exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious
objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened. As in
Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a
conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to
the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the
other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of
penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament of
medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are incongruent with
what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by
the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his
will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive
health products, services, procedures and methods, his
conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled
to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin
A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the
free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the
human conscience.222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out
clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes pro-
life health providers complicit in the performance of an act that
they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in
conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may
not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the
offensive act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily
intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an
externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn
includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to
individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the
protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees
the liberty of the individual to utter what is in his mind and the
liberty not to utter what is not in his mind.223 While the RH Law
seeks to provide freedom of choice through informed consent,
freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious
conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden,
whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion.224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral
convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the
State, on the other, to provide access and information on
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods
to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing
of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that
the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or
private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a
conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with
the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act
contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative
of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional
right to free exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the
Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and Wood v. NHS
Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board,225 that the midwives
claiming to be conscientious objectors under the provisions of
Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to
delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor ward who were
involved in abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if
'participation' were defined according to whether the person was
taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean more
complexity and uncertainty."227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the
applicable principle was the same - they could not be forced to
assist abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group
and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of
the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse
to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section
23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being
violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section
23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the
dissemination of information regarding programs and services
and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the
religious freedom of health care service providers should be
respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v.
Office of the Executive Secretary228 it was stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers
of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed
this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to
live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of
others and with the common good."10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by
law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set consequences
for either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be
toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for
an effective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected
right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The
punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or
refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform
reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible
religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee
which the Court cannot allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city
or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses,
supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office
are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions
of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as
conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause.
The conscientious objection clause should be equally protective
of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no
perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt
from the mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other
conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical
practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public
or private sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in
every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free
exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the
government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place
inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The mind must
be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious
sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or
through the media and, thus, seek other candid views in
occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation.
Embraced in such concept then are freedom of religion, freedom
of speech, of the press, assembly and petition, and freedom of
association.229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such
exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also because it is
violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution.
Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between the
RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-
Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is replete with
provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and respecting
religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications.
Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the IRR-
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR
and I have not thoroughly dissected the nuances of the
provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot
find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled health
professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers,
chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising midwives, among
others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with
the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these
Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you
agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private
practitioners who can be conscientious objectors, skilled health
professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do
you agree with this? Is this not against the constitutional right to
the religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law,
the law must prevail.230
Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether
the respondents, in defense of the subject provisions, were able
to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain
conscientious objectors in their choice of services to render; and
2] discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory character of
the law is the least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of
the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions
proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously silent in the
establishment of a more compelling state interest that would
rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to
adhere to an action contrary to his religious convictions. During
the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and
evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the
following:
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What
is the compelling State interest in imposing this duty to refer to a
conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his
religious belief?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Ahh, Your Honor, ..
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a
compelling State interest, this is an ordinary health legislation
involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure
free exercise matter. This is a regulation by the State of the
relationship between medical doctors and their patients.231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which
would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious
objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the
government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the
threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe.
It also means the freedom to act or not to act according to what
one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled
to act against one's belief or is prevented from acting according to
one's belief.233
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the
life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the
subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing,
number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future
event that is contingent on whether or not the mother decides to
adopt or use the information, product, method or supply given to
her or whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On
the other hand, the burden placed upon those who object to
contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient
seeks consultation on reproductive health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the
infringement of the conscientious objector's religious freedom, the
respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a
person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the
respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to
show that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state
objective is the least intrusive means.234 Other than the assertion
that the act of referring would only be momentary, considering
that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the very
action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it
behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no other means
can be undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without
violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health
concerns of women may still be addressed by other practitioners
who may perform reproductive health-related procedures with
open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is
forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the
protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional
freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the
Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected.
Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729
or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of
the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The
Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in
relation to health services and programs. The pertinent provision
of Magna Carta on comprehensive health services and programs
for women, in fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health
Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide for a
comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health
services and programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle
and which addresses the major causes of women's mortality and
morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive
health services, due respect shall be accorded to women's
religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a family in
accordance with their religious convictions, and the demands of
responsible parenthood, and the right of women to protection
from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services
to address pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective
methods of family planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality
education and health services without prejudice to the
primary right and duty of parents to educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract
infections, including sexually transmitted diseases, HIV,
and AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract
cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and other
gynecological conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-
related complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children,
women and children victims and survivors shall be
provided with comprehensive health services that include
psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal
interventions and assistance towards healing, recovery,
and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual
dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and medical
standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing
years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental
health problems of women and girls. In addition, healthy
lifestyle activities are encouraged and promoted through
programs and projects as strategies in the prevention of
diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State
shall provide women in all sectors with appropriate, timely,
complete, and accurate information and education on all the
above-stated aspects of women's health in government education
and training programs, with due regard to the following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in
the rearing of the youth and the development of moral
character and the right of children to be brought up in an
atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment
and strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms
human dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning
methods including fertility awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually
replied that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen maternal
deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended
pregnancies, lives changed, x x x."235 He, however, failed to
substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures from
reputable sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health
Organization reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate
dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was
still no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the
proponents still insist that such number of maternal deaths
constitute a compelling state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery
of social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not
be solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold
on religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid
exception set forth in the law. While generally healthcare service
providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care
procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an
exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the
right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering
that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial
of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother
in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban,
representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we
are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does
not contemplate an emergency."237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of
a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both
lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one
should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal
author of the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of the
principle of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of
either the mother of the child is never justified to bring about a
"good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the child
and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to
try to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not
necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to save
both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the
above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the
mother's life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence,
the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother
is never pitted against the child because both their lives are
equally valuable.238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother,
procedures endangering the life of the child may be resorted to
even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical
practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a
medical practitioner in this case would have been more than
justified considering the life he would be able to save.
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition
for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds the same
to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A
cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious
freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires
is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood,
family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not
even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included
in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly
noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during their
attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept
the information given to them, are completely free to reject the
information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to
decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the
State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i)
thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by intruding into
marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity
and fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its
solidarity and total development.240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the
family as it is the basic social institution. In fact, one article, Article
XV, is devoted entirely to the family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their
religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and
nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the
planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect
them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control
population growth, contains provisions which tend to wreck the
family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the
father from participating in the decision making process regarding
their common future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of
their authority over their minor daughter simply because she is
already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private,
who shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health
procedures on any person of legal age on the ground of lack of
consent or authorization of the following persons in the following
instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in
case of disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the
procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like
tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very nature, should
require mutual consent and decision between the husband and
the wife as they affect issues intimately related to the founding of
a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the
State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family."
One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared
by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to participate
in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that
affect them " is equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual
decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse who
would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from
participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the
husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and
endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing
the population. This would be a marked departure from the policy
of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social
institution.241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a
private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of them.
Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a
family because the size of the family or the number of their
children significantly matters. The decision whether or not to
undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by,
both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own
destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it
prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling
interest, the State should see to it that they chart their destiny
together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of
R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for
Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in all
matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the
joint decision on the number and spacing of their children.
Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law
states, is a shared responsibility between parents. Section
23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family by
giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to decide
whether to undergo reproductive health procedure.242
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the
protected zone of marital privacy and such state intervention
would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by
the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first
recognized in Marje v. Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking
through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as
such is accorded recognition independently of its identification
with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection."244 Marje adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court
in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where Justice William O. Douglas
wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older
than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage
is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring,
and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association
that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social
projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any
involved in our prior decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made
the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its
amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of
married persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy
rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote
that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of
privacy."246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will
decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases
where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is already
a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law
provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to family
planning services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, That
minors will not be allowed access to modern methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s
except when the minor is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that
when a minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the
parents are excluded from the decision making process of the
minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet
emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because
there is a need to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the
comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents. The
State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes
to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is
no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity
in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to
protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social
institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional
mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty of parents in
the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of
moral character shall receive the support of the Government."247 In
this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify
the right of parents. It imports the assertion that the right of
parents is superior to that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to
exercise parental control over their minor-child or the right of the
spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the
very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal
and family life, would result in the violation of one's privacy with
respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and
strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and
violative of the recognition that the State affords couples entering
into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the
foundation of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over
the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child,
whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state
substitution of their parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception
provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to
the consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction
must be made. There must be a differentiation between access to
information about family planning services, on one hand, and
access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family
planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to
information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional
objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to
under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that
would enable her to take proper care of her own body and that of
her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution
mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of
the unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person
to make informed decisions is essential in the protection and
maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with
respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation,
the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control is
unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise parental
guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in
deciding whether to accept or reject the information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must
be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of
emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who
has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should
not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be
emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate
medical care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right,
that is, the right to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section
23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be struck down. By effectively limiting the
requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical
procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental authority
in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures."
Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of
an abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section
23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of their
constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right
would be an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and
strengthen the family.
5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section
24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and Development-
Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine
and/or imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom .
According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively force
educational institutions to teach reproductive health education
even if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to
their students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United
States and statistical data gathered in the country, the petitioners
aver that the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase
of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families; the
acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of
poverty"; the aging of society; and promotion of promiscuity
among the youth.251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of
Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a
curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of
instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and
whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners
and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the
premature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to
rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
provides that the natural and primary right and duty of parents in
the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of
moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Like
the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987
Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of
parents in preparing the youth to become productive members of
society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents
in the development of their children by recognizing that said role
shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing
the youth is superior to that of the State.252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to
aid parents in the moral development of the youth. Indeed, the
Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the
youth and their important role in nation building.253 Considering
that Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-
reproductive health education, but also for values formation; the
development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against
discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and
children and other forms of gender based violence and teen
pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in
adolescents; women's rights and children's rights; responsible
teenage behavior; gender and development; and responsible
parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and
Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of
responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical
and emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds that
the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision
supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the
parents in the moral development of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory
reproductive health education program shall be developed in
conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school
officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it
will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By
imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the
petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section
3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise
their objection to their participation in the reproductive health
education program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on
the ground that the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court
reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness
and, thus violates the due process clause of the Constitution.
According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health
service provider" among those who may be held punishable but
does not define who is a "private health care service provider."
They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only
makes reference to a "private health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed
legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious groups from
rendering reproductive health service and modern family planning
methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions are also
exempt from giving reproductive health information under Section
23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health procedures under
Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding,
restricting and providing of incorrect information, but at the same
time fails to define "incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its
application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1)
it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially
the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and
(2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.255 Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a
statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance
with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts
of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it
must be construed together with the other parts and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of
"private health care service provider," reference must be made to
Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service
provider," viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health
care institution, which is duly licensed and accredited and
devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities
for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment
and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury,
disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical
and nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is a
doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker
engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay
health worker who has undergone training programs under any
accredited government and NGO and who voluntarily renders
primarily health care services in the community after having been
accredited to function as such by the local health board in
accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of
Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in
Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care service
provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious
reason that they are used synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be
exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service
and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from
being obligated to give reproductive health information and to
render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the
qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be
exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service
and modem family planning methods, necessarily includes
exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health
information and to render reproductive health procedures. The
terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the
providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH
Law punishes health care service providers who intentionally
withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information regarding
reproductive health programs and services. For ready reference,
the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private,
who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination
thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect information
regarding programs and services on reproductive health including
the right to informed choice and access to a full range of legal,
medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning
methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing
to agree with a copy or model or with established rules;
inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty,
morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On
the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness or
deliberateness that is intentional.258 Used together in relation to
Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to
mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of
programs and services on reproductive health. Public health and
safety demand that health care service providers give their
honest and correct medical information in accordance with what
is acceptable in medical practice. While health care service
providers are not barred from expressing their own personal
opinions regarding the programs and services on reproductive
health, their right must be tempered with the need to provide
public health and safety. The public deserves no less.
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal
protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates
against the poor because it makes them the primary target of the
government program that promotes contraceptive use . They
argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the
poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively
reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various
provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those
mentioned in the guiding principles259 and definition of terms260 of
the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions
from the mandatory reproductive health education program
imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the
occasion to expound on the concept of equal protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was
founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection
of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every
unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair
play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to
provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue
favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in
general may be challenged on the basis of the due process
clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an
unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it
down is the equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst itutions to treat
similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of
the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a
state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its
improper execution through the state's duly constituted
authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice under
the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not
draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that
are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions,
not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the
departments of the government including the political and
executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state
denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or
whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws
to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires
is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass
the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
"Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it
must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the
class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the
members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the
classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that
the members of the class should possess the same
characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice;
and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the
classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an
individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as
long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others,
does not justify the non-application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances
only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number
included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace
all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and
conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that
should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases
supplied; citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the
government's reproductive health care program is not a violation
of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11,
Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct
necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by
providing that they be given priority in addressing the health
development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social
services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall
be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to
provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor
and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues
and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the
contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to
reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of
contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction
abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or
stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the
advancement of reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children
a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples
who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that
the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have
children only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a
deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to
do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of
government programs to promote basic reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions
from the mandatory reproductive health education program under
Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of
those who are less fortunate attend public educational institutions
does not amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the
assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests
between public educational institutions and private educational
institutions, particularly because there is a need to recognize the
academic freedom of private educational institutions especially
with respect to religious instruction and to consider their
sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm
as it violates the constitutional prohibition against involuntary
servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation
requiring private and non-government health care service
providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive
health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude
because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against
their will.262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services
envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced
labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service
providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving
pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the
imposition is within the powers of the government, the
accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a
privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is
undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power and
a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect
and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the
practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with
conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A
fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress263 to prescribe
the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which
affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and
the public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or
trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether.264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary
servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or
other similar means of coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of
the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages
private and non- government reproductive healthcare service
providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-
accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they
choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government
reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to
choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when,
where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly,
therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to
render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of
such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with
PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an
unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed
by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state
interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it
should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt
from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and
convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health
service, pro bona or otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to
the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or
product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL).266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does
not only have the power but also the competency to evaluate,
register and cover health services and methods. It is the only
government entity empowered to render such services and highly
proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services
and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated
with what is ordinarily understood as "health products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by
R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby
created an office to be called the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration
shall be under the Office of the Secretary and shall have the
following functions, powers and duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act
and of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to the
same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of
samples of health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection
with the implementation of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the
preparation of health products standards, and to
recommend standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy,
quality and fill of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical
requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of
appropriate authorization and spot-check for compliance
with regulations regarding operation of manufacturers,
importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug
outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health
products, as determined by the FDA;
"x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health
products prior to the issuance of appropriate
authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and
quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors,
importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers,
and non-consumer users of health products to report to
the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said
product has caused or contributed to the death, serious
illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any
person;
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon
verified complaint for health products, whether or not
registered with the FDA Provided, That for registered
health products, the cease and desist order is valid for
thirty (30) days and may be extended for sixty ( 60) days
only after due process has been observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or
withdrawal of any health product found to have caused
death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or
patient, or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe,
dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all
concerned to implement the risk management plan which
is a requirement for the issuance of the appropriate
authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and
duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry out
the mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole
agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines available to
the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and
functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of
necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to
ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and
medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods." From
the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress
intended that the public be given only those medicines that are
proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in
accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research
standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was
explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice,267 as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the
government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The
growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar
and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in
legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems
attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not
have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to
provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific
solutions.
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous
Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim
that the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to local
government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local
Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the
duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services
and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-
reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and
discharging the duties and functions currently vested
upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and
responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved
to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units
shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge
such other functions and responsibilities as are
necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and
effective provision of the basic services and facilities
enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not
limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to
take on the functions and responsibilities that have
already been devolved upon them from the national
agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and
facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of
the same provision provides a categorical exception of
cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities,
programs and services.268 Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b)
hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other
facilities, programs and services funded by the National
Government under the annual General Appropriations
Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and
those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are
not covered under this Section, except in those cases
where the local government unit concerned is duly
designated as the implementing agency for such projects,
facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national
government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as
the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for
which funding has been provided by the national government
under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program
involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the
LGU.269 A complete relinquishment of central government powers
on the matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be
implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it.270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether
it pertains to the establishment of health care facilities,271 the hiring
of skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health
workers,273 it will be the national government that will provide for
the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute.
The national government still has the say when it comes to
national priority programs which the local government is called
upon to implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are
merely encouraged to provide these services. There is nothing in
the wording of the law which can be construed as making the
availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said
reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue
encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy
enjoyed by the local governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of
local governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH
Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III,
Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the
ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of
the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to
the policy statements for the guidance of the regional
government. These provisions relied upon by the petitioners
simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the
regional government, which can, in no manner, be characterized
as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that
would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable
autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting
jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et
imperio in the relationship between the national and the regional
governments.274 Except for the express and implied limitations
imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted
to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all
subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or
common interest.275
11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural
law,276 suffice it to say that the Court does not duly recognize it as
a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only
guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted by man
emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not
obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in
conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable
legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and
notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers
and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are
interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual
law of the past or present.277 Unless, a natural right has been
transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike
down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited
by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty-
bound to examine every law or action and whether it conforms
with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is
to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances
involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable.279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction
the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or
form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of
the government by providing information and making non-
abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public,
especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as
unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to
medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and
quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and
supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of
some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of
what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional
safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State,
one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the
rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room
for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant
and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to
reign as we exist alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does
not escape the Court that what it seeks to address is the problem
of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said
that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large
population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if
population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the
country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the
country in the long run. The European and Asian countries, which
embarked on such a program generations ago , are now
burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young
workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy.
These young workers represent a significant human capital which
could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their
economy. These countries are now trying to reverse their
programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even
with incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by
remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because
we have an ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What
would happen if the country would be weighed down by an
ageing population and the fewer younger generation would not be
able to support them? This would be the situation when our total
fertility rate would go down below the replacement level of two (2)
children per woman.280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but
the State should not use coercive measures (like the penal
provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to
solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in
the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has
laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the
lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law
should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of
circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into
the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the
legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy
every unjust situation that may arise from the application of a
particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation
if that would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with
apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out
the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the
Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled
jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and
accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what
the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body.281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere
compilation and enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive
and reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if
the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there
will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive
Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women or
The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive
provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of
"no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family
planning method should be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following
provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-
IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and
non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned
and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in
an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or
minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to
modem methods of family planning without written
consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the
RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or
refuses to disseminate information regarding programs
and services on reproductive health regardless of his or
her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in
the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not
in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive
health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in
the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of
parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR,
which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires
and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a)
of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19,
2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby
LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have
been herein declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the

RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or
refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No.
8344, to another health care service provider within the
same facility or one which is conveniently accessible
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the

RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any public officer who refuses to support
reproductive health programs or shall do any act that
hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the

RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive
health service in so far as they affect the conscientious
objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936
JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL
CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR,respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral
Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner,
Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain
and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents,
from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro
Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of said petitioner
as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district
of the Province of Tayabas.
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as
admitted by the respondents are as follows:
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were
candidates voted for the position of member of the
National Assembly for the first district of the Province of
Tayabas;
(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of
canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of
the National Assembly for the said district, for having
received the most number of votes;
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his
oath of office;
(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in
session assembled, passed the following resolution:
[No. 8]
RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS
ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS
CONTRA QUIENES NO SE HA
PRESENTADO PROTESTA.
Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de
los Diputados contra quienes no se
hubiere presentado debidamente una
protesta antes de la adopcion de la
presente resolucion sean, como por la
presente, son aprobadas y confirmadas.
Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.
(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent
Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a
"Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed
after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and
praying, among other-things, that said respondent be
declared elected member of the National Assembly for the
first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position
be nullified;
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission
adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which provides:
6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta
que no se haya presentado en o antes de este
dia.
(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner,
Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid
protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion
to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8
of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8
of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the
period during which protests against the election of its
members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid
resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula
for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in
question was filed out of the prescribed period;
(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent,
Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal"
alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision
barring the presentation of a protest against the election
of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation;
(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner,
Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid "Answer
to the Motion of Dismissal";
(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the
Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on
January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to
Dismiss the Protest."
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds
for the issuance of the writ prayed for:
(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction
upon the electoral Commission solely as regards the
merits of contested elections to the National Assembly;
(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction
the power to regulate the proceedings of said election
contests, which power has been reserved to the
Legislative Department of the Government or the National
Assembly;
(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created
in pursuance of the Constitution, whose exclusive
jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of
controversies submitted to them for decision and to
matters involving their internal organization, the Electoral
Commission can regulate its proceedings only if the
National Assembly has not availed of its primary power to
so regulate such proceedings;
(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is,
therefore, valid and should be respected and obeyed;
(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance
appended to the Constitution and paragraph 6 of article 7
of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd
Congress of the United States) as well as under section 1
and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the
Constitution, this Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass
upon the fundamental question herein raised because it
involves an interpretation of the Constitution of the
Philippines.
On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed
an answer in behalf of the respondent Electoral Commission
interposing the following special defenses:
(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by
the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative
Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly"; that in
adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, fixing this
date as the last day for the presentation of protests
against the election of any member of the National
Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in the
legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted it by the
Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential to
carry out the power and functions conferred upon the
same by the fundamental law; that in adopting its
resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of
the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in question,
and declaring itself with jurisdiction to take cognizance of
said protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions as an instrumentality of the Legislative
Department of the Commonwealth Government, and
hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or
control of the Supreme Court;
(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of
December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
members of the National Assembly against whom no
protest had thus far been filed, could not and did not
deprive the electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to take
cognizance of election protests filed within the time that
might be set by its own rules:
(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with
quasi-judicial functions, created by the Constitution as an
instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not
an "inferior tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person"
within the purview of section 226 and 516 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, against which prohibition would lie.
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an
answer in his own behalf on March 2, 1936, setting forth the
following as his special defense:
(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the
Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, there was
no existing law fixing the period within which protests
against the election of members of the National Assembly
should be filed; that in fixing December 9, 1935, as the
last day for the filing of protests against the election of
members of the National Assembly, the Electoral
Commission was exercising a power impliedly conferred
upon it by the Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial
attributes;
(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest
before the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935,
the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said
Electoral Commission;
(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired
jurisdiction over the protest filed by said respondent and
over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral
Commission of January 23, 1936, denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss said protest was an act within the
jurisdiction of the said commission, and is not reviewable
by means of a writ of prohibition;
(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires
confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of
its members, and that such confirmation does not operate
to limit the period within which protests should be filed as
to deprive the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over
protest filed subsequent thereto;
 (e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent
entity created by the Constitution, endowed with quasi-
judicial functions, whose decision are final and
unappealable;
( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional
creation, is not an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or
person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the
Code of Civil Procedure; and that neither under the
provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II (should be
article VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of
section 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could it be
subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions to a
writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court;
(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie
Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the united States)
has no application to the case at bar.
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was
submitted for decision, the petitioner prayed for the issuance of a
preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral
Commission which petition was denied "without passing upon the
merits of the case" by resolution of this court of March 21, 1936.
There was no appearance for the other respondents.
The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to
the following two principal propositions:
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the controversy
upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of
the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election
by resolution of the National Assembly?
We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon
the merits of the controversy. However, the question of
jurisdiction having been presented, we do not feel justified in
evading the issue. Being a case primæ impressionis, it would
hardly be consistent with our sense of duty to overlook the
broader aspect of the question and leave it undecided. Neither
would we be doing justice to the industry and vehemence of
counsel were we not to pass upon the question of jurisdiction
squarely presented to our consideration.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system
of government. It obtains not through express provision but by
actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate
and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of
the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our
Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that
this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is
subject to the further check that a bill may become a law
notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a
vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the
National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene
the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the
other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the
Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on
Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers;
and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential
to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to
determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be
established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds
for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial
department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the
judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn,
with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the
other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the
law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if
violative of the Constitution.
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes
and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the
legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The
overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the
several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say
just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of
social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of
the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking
perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the
power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide,
that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty
however limited, has established a republican government
intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a
system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations
and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution
sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations
upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions
and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the
Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct
the course of government along constitutional channels, for then
the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of
rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitation
and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they
should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no
express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the
possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of
its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by
popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not
expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our
constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who
is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify
or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn
and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution
and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in
truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy"
which properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to
actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren
legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people
as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the governments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power
provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to be
remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system
itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the
people who are authors of this blessing must also be its
guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice
to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of their constitution."
In the Last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our
government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the
crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms
and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No.
8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the herein
petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral
Commission has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935,
fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the
National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the
petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect
of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain
protests against the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, submitted after December 3,
1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of
December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if,
as contended by the respondents, the Electoral Commission has
the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of
the National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935,
by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day
for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does
a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National
Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the
other. From the very nature of the republican government
established in our country in the light of American experience and
of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn
and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and
defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as
we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional
organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral
Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting
within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond
the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people
and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The
Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the
government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority
under the fundamental law between department powers and
agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the
judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases. Discarding the
English type and other European types of constitutional
government, the framers of our constitution adopted the American
type where the written constitution is interpreted and given effect
by the judicial department. In some countries which have declined
to follow the American example, provisions have been inserted in
their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power
to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of
what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct
prohibition courts are bound to assume what is logically their
function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921,
expressly provides that courts shall have no power to examine
the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian
Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose
constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this
power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa.
Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to
constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29,
1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the
Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established to
pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of
the present controversy shows the necessity of a final
constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between
two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to
take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the
conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined,
would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system
which may be in the long run prove destructive of the entire
framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura
vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our
constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we
are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the
present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject mater of the present controversy for
the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now
proceed to pass upon the second proposition and determine
whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935,
and in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against
the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation thereof by the National Assembly on December 3,
1935. As able counsel for the petitioner has pointed out, the issue
hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the
Constitution which provides:
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of
three Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief
Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly,
three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest
number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest
number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission
shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." It is
imperative, therefore, that we delve into the origin and history of
this constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its
framers and the people who adopted it so that we may properly
appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule that
"the assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of its members", was taken from clause 1 of section
5, Article I of the Constitution of the United States providing that
"Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and
Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the
insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and
House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges
of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective
members . . ." apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive the
Legislative over the particular case s therein specified. This court
has had occasion to characterize this grant of power to the
Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, as
"full, clear and complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of
Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)
The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for
the purpose of deciding contested elections to the legislature was
taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee
on Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention,
which sub-committee submitted a report on August 30, 1934,
recommending the creation of a Tribunal of Constitutional
Security empowered to hear legislature but also against the
election of executive officers for whose election the vote of the
whole nation is required, as well as to initiate impeachment
proceedings against specified executive and judicial officer. For
the purpose of hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was to be
composed of three justices designated by the Supreme Court and
six members of the house of the legislature to which the contest
corresponds, three members to be designed by the majority party
and three by the minority, to be presided over by the Senior
Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a member in which case
the latter shall preside. The foregoing proposal was submitted by
the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees to the Convention
on September 15, 1934, with slight modifications consisting in the
reduction of the legislative representation to four members, that
is, two senators to be designated one each from the two major
parties in the Senate and two representatives to be designated
one each from the two major parties in the House of
Representatives, and in awarding representation to the executive
department in the persons of two representatives to be
designated by the President.
Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also
preparing its report. As submitted to the Convention on
September 24, 1934 subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed
Article on the Legislative Department, reads as follows:
The elections, returns and qualifications of the members
of either house and all cases contesting the election of
any of their members shall be judged by an Electoral
Commission, constituted, as to each House, by three
members elected by the members of the party having the
largest number of votes therein, three elected by the
members of the party having the second largest number
of votes, and as to its Chairman, one Justice of the
Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice.
The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with
comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed by the Committee on
Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired by the
Spanish plan (art. 121, Constitution of the Spanish Republic of
1931), was soon abandoned in favor of the proposition of the
Committee on Legislative Power to create a similar body with
reduced powers and with specific and limited jurisdiction, to be
designated as a Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship
Committee modified the proposal of the Committee on Legislative
Power with respect to the composition of the Electoral
Commission and made further changes in phraseology to suit the
project of adopting a unicameral instead of a bicameral
legislature. The draft as finally submitted to the Convention on
October 26, 1934, reads as follows:
(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the National Assembly and all cases
contesting the election of any of its Members shall be
judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three
members elected by the party having the largest number
of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the
members of the party having the second largest number
of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be
presided over by one of said justices.
During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates
Labrador, Abordo, and others, proposing to strike out the whole
subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the
following: "The National Assembly shall be the soled and
exclusive judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of the
Members", the following illuminating remarks were made on the
floor of the Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to
the scope of the said draft:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to
the scope of the meaning of the first four lines, paragraph
6, page 11 of the draft, reading: "The elections, returns
and qualifications of the Members of the National
Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of
its Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission,
. . ." I should like to ask from the gentleman from Capiz
whether the election and qualification of the member
whose elections is not contested shall also be judged by
the Electoral Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of
the members, there is nothing to be judged; that is why
the word "judge" is used to indicate a controversy. If there
is no question about the election of a member, there is
nothing to be submitted to the Electoral Commission and
there is nothing to be determined.
Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the
Electoral Commission shall confirm also the election of
those whose election is not contested?
Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the
gentleman knows, the action of the House of
Representatives confirming the election of its members is
just a matter of the rules of the assembly. It is not
constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man files his
credentials that he has been elected, that is sufficient,
unless his election is contested.
Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient,
as we have observed that for purposes of the auditor, in
the matter of election of a member to a legislative body,
because he will not authorize his pay.
Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the
municipal president who is elected? What happens with
regards to the councilors of a municipality? Does anybody
confirm their election? The municipal council does this: it
makes a canvass and proclaims — in this case the
municipal council proclaims who has been elected, and it
ends there, unless there is a contest. It is the same case;
there is no need on the part of the Electoral Commission
unless there is a contest. The first clause refers to the
case referred to by the gentleman from Cavite where one
person tries to be elected in place of another who was
declared elected. From example, in a case when the
residence of the man who has been elected is in question,
or in case the citizenship of the man who has been
elected is in question.
However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of
the commission, it may do so by certain maneuvers upon
its first meeting when the returns are submitted to the
assembly. The purpose is to give to the Electoral
Commission all the powers exercised by the assembly
referring to the elections, returns and qualifications of the
members. When there is no contest, there is nothing to be
judged.
Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.
Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr.
Delegate.
Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as
that propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos Norte
when I arose a while ago. However I want to ask more
questions from the delegate from Capiz. This paragraph 6
on page 11 of the draft cites cases contesting the election
as separate from the first part of the sections which refers
to elections, returns and qualifications.
Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact
the cases of contested elections are already included in
the phrase "the elections, returns and qualifications." This
phrase "and contested elections" was inserted merely for
the sake of clarity.
Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral
Commission, at its own instance, refuse to confirm the
elections of the members."
Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.
Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?
THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so
desires.
Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.
Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz
believe that unless this power is granted to the assembly,
the assembly on its own motion does not have the right to
contest the election and qualification of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is
right. If this draft is retained as it is, even if two-thirds of
the assembly believe that a member has not the
qualifications provided by law, they cannot remove him for
that reason.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be
retained by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.
Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications
of the members.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of
the assembly has the right to question the eligibility of its
members?
Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility,
he must go to the Electoral Commission and make the
question before the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall
decide whether the election is contested or not contested.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.
Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if
the Electoral Commission has power and authority to
pass upon the qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly even though that question has not
been raised.
Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power,
because they can only judge.
In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading
"The election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship
Committee in response to an amendment introduced by
Delegates Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols, Lim, Mumar and
others. In explaining the difference between the original draft and
the draft as amended, Delegate Roxas speaking for the
Sponsorship Committee said:
xxx xxx xxx
Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, señor Presidente, consiste
solamente en obviar la objecion apuntada por varios
Delegados al efecto de que la primera clausula
del draft que dice: "The elections, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly"
parece que da a la Comision Electoral la facultad de
determinar tambien la eleccion de los miembros que no
ha sido protestados y para obviar esa dificultad, creemos
que la enmienda tien razon en ese sentido, si
enmendamos el draft, de tal modo que se lea como sigue:
"All cases contesting the election", de modo que los
jueces de la Comision Electoral se limitaran solamente a
 los casos en que haya habido protesta contra las actas."
Before the amendment of Delegate Labrador was voted
upon the following interpellation also took place:
El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda,
quisiera
El Sr. PRESIDENTE. ¿Que dice el Comite?
El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres
miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria y tres a la
Corte Suprema, ¿no cree Su Señoria que esto equivale
practicamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros del
Tribunal Supremo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la
Commission esta constituido en esa forma, tanto los
miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como
los miembros de la Corte Suprema consideraran la
cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el
partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.
El Sr. CONEJERO. ¿Cree Su Señoria que en un caso
como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria
como los de la minoria prescindieran del partidismo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les
daria el triunfo.
xxx xxx xxx
The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and
others seeking to restore the power to decide contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly to the National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote
of ninety-eight (98) against fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.)
sought to amend the draft by reducing the representation of the
minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral
Commission to two members each, so as to accord more
representation to the majority party. The Convention rejected this
amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46),
thus maintaining the non-partisan character of the commission.
As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as
follows:
(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly
shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of
three members elected by the party having the largest
number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected
by the members of the party having the second largest
number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be
presided over by one of said justices.
The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it
as follows:
SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission
composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members
chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be
nominated by the party having the largest number of
votes, and three by the party having the second largest
number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the
Commission shall be its chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of the election,
 returns, and qualifications of the Members of the National
Assembly.
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February
8, 1935, the Style Committee, through President Recto, to
effectuate the original intention of the Convention, agreed to
insert the phrase "All contests relating to" between the phrase
"judge of" and the words "the elections", which was accordingly
accepted by the Convention.
The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the legislature long lodged in the
legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan
tribunal, is by no means a mere experiment in the science of
government.
Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth
edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58), gives a vivid account of the
"scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties
in the disposition of contests by the House of Commons in the
following passages which are partly quoted by the petitioner in his
printed memorandum of March 14, 1936:
153. From the time when the commons established their
right to be the exclusive judges of the elections, returns,
and qualifications of their members, until the year 1770,
two modes of proceeding prevailed, in the determination
of controverted elections, and rights of membership. One
of the standing committees appointed at the
commencement of each session, was denominated the
committee of privileges and elections, whose functions
was to hear and investigate all questions of this
description which might be referred to them, and to report
their proceedings, with their opinion thereupon, to the
house, from time to time. When an election petition was
referred to this committee they heard the parties and their
witnesses and other evidence, and made a report of all
the evidence, together with their opinion thereupon, in the
form of resolutions, which were considered and agreed or
disagreed to by the house. The other mode of proceeding
was by a hearing at the bar of the house itself. When this
court was adopted, the case was heard and decided by
the house, in substantially the same manner as by a
committee. The committee of privileges and elections
although a select committee. The committee of privileges
and elections although a select committee was usually
what is called an open one; that is to say, in order to
constitute the committee, a quorum of the members
named was required to be present, but all the members of
the house were at liberty to attend the committee and vote
if they pleased.
154. With the growth of political parties in parliament
questions relating to the right of membership gradually
assumed a political character; so that for many years
previous to the year 1770, controverted elections had
been tried and determined by the house of commons, as
mere party questions, upon which the strength of
contending factions might be tested. Thus, for Example, in
1741, Sir Robert Walpole, after repeated attacks upon his
government, resigned his office in consequence of an
adverse vote upon the Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell
remarks, of the trial of election cases, as conducted under
this system, that "Every principle of decency and justice
were notoriously and openly prostituted, from whence the
younger part of the house were insensibly, but too
successfully, induced to adopt the same licentious
conduct in more serious matters, and in questions of
higher importance to the public welfare." Mr. George
Grenville, a distinguished member of the house of
commons, undertook to propose a remedy for the evil,
and, on the 7th of March, 1770, obtained the unanimous
leave of the house to bring in a bill, "to regulate the trial of
controverted elections, or returns of members to serve in
parliament." In his speech to explain his plan, on the
motion for leave, Mr. Grenville alluded to the existing
practice in the following terms: "Instead of trusting to the
merits of their respective causes, the principal
dependence of both parties is their private interest among
us; and it is scandalously notorious that we are as
earnestly canvassed to attend in favor of the opposite
sides, as if we were wholly self-elective, and not bound to
act by the principles of justice, but by the discretionary
impulse of our own inclinations; nay, it is well known, that
in every contested election, many members of this house,
who are ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial capacity
between the competitors, enlist themselves as parties in
the contention, and take upon themselves the partial
management of the very business, upon which they
should determine with the strictest impartiality."
155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described,
that Mr. Grenville brought in a bill which met with the
approbation of both houses, and received the royal assent
on the 12th of April, 1770. This was the celebrated law
since known by the name of the Grenville Act; of which
Mr. Hatsell declares, that it "was one of the nobles works,
for the honor of the house of commons, and the security
of the constitution, that was ever devised by any minister
or statesman." It is probable, that the magnitude of the
evil, or the apparent success of the remedy, may have led
many of the contemporaries of the measure to the
information of a judgement, which was not acquiesced in
by some of the leading statesmen of the day, and has not
been entirely confirmed by subsequent experience. The
bill was objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey,
afterwards chief justice of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis,
Mr. Dyson, who had been clerk of the house, and Mr.
Charles James Fox, chiefly on the ground, that the
introduction of the new system was an essential alteration
of the constitution of parliament, and a total abrogation of
one of the most important rights and jurisdictions of the
house of commons.
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the
problem of insuring the non-partisan settlement of the
controverted elections of its members by abdicating its
prerogative to two judges of the King's Bench of the High Court of
Justice selected from a rota in accordance with rules of court
made for the purpose. Having proved successful, the practice has
become imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary
Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by
Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43
Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt and Illegal Practices Preventions Act,
1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act,
1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol.
XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which
were originally heard by the Committee of the House of
Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the
Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which were
originally determined by each house, are since 1922 tried in the
High Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests
against the election of members of the Upper House of the Diet
are to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22
of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of Poland of
March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Free City of
Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to decide
contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly in the
Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative contests,
the Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the
Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920
(art. 19) and the Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June 2,
1927 (art. 43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.
The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is
recruited both from the legislature and the judiciary is by no
means unknown in the United States. In the presidential elections
of 1876 there was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes
received by each of the two opposing candidates. As the
Constitution made no adequate provision for such a contingency,
Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United States
Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a
special Electoral Commission composed of five members elected
by the Senate, five members elected by the House of
Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth
justice to be selected by the four designated in the Act. The
decision of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by
the two houses voting separately. Although there is not much of a
moral lesson to be derived from the experience of America in this
regard, judging from the observations of Justice Field, who was a
member of that body on the part of the Supreme Court
(Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United States and its
Appellate Power under the Constitution [Albany, 1913] —
Relentless Partisanship of Electoral Commission, p. 25 et seq.),
the experiment has at least abiding historical interest.
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our
fundamental law were in their majority men mature in years and
experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the
history and political development of other countries of the world.
When , therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral
Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the
exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their
own experience but also having in view the experience of other
enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral
Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the
framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the
vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its
creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that
body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that,
upon the approval of the constitutional the creation of the
Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and
"ultimate justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural
Address, March 4, 1861.)
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is
evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the
powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters
pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an
independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the
knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional
precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining
legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which
prompted the people, acting through their delegates to the
Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral
Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which
both the majority and minority parties are equally represented to
off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and
further endowed with judicial temper by including in its
membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested
with the necessary authority in the performance and execution of
the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution.
Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government,
it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its
authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the
legislative department than to any other. The location of the
provision (section 4) creating the Electoral Commission under
Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is
very indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that it is
constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But it is a
body separate from and independent of the legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature.
The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is
an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National
Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative
power as an express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex
parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs.Whisman, 36 S.D.,
260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf
of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the
proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of
the commission to lay down the period within which protests
should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be
ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case would be
invested with the power to determine contested cases involving
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power
of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the
framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this authority
from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would
be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time
to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral
Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of
cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to
render that authority effective whenever and whenever the
National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that
intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The
power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in
procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by
the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral
Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the
constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be
permitted.
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the
learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the importance and
necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of the
national Assembly as a coordinate department of the government
and of according validity to its acts, to avoid what he
characterized would be practically an unlimited power of the
commission in the admission of protests against members of the
National Assembly. But as we have pointed out hereinabove, the
creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate
rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with which
protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled
rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or
duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise
of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred
(Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139).
In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to
the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral
Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such
rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to
judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be
deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission.
It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the
petitioner, the Electoral Commission may abuse its regulative
authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to
the disturbance of the tranquillity and peace of mind of the
members of the National Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is
not argument against the concession of the power as there is no
power that is not susceptible of abuse. In the second place, if any
mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral
Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all
cases relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not
judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary processes of
democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not
intended to be corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however,
that the people in creating the Electoral Commission reposed as
much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the
specified cases assigned to it, as they have given to the Supreme
Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the
agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to
achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional organ working
within its own particular sphere of discretionary action must be
deemed to be animated with the same zeal and honesty in
accomplishing the great ends for which they were created by the
sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional
agencies might leave much to be desired in given instances, is
inherent in the perfection of human institutions. In the third place,
from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be interfered
with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that
its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenge
in appropriate cases over which the courts may exercise
jurisdiction.
But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the
present case, there are considerations of equitable character that
should not be overlooked in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits
of the controversy. The Commonwealth Government was
inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date the
Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned in section 6 of
Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new National Assembly
convened on November 25th of that year, and the resolution
confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose A. Angara was
approved by that body on December 3, 1935. The protest by the
herein respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the
petitioner was filed on December 9 of the same year. The
pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was
formally organized but it does appear that on December 9, 1935,
the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a
resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election
protest. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its
resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission
had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had
actually been organized. As a mater of fact, according to certified
copies of official records on file in the archives division of the
National Assembly attached to the record of this case upon the
petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court
the six members of the National Assembly constituting the
Electoral Commission were respectively designated only on
December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National
Assembly confirming non-protested elections of members of the
National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for
the presentation of protests, the result would be that the National
Assembly — on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental
power of regulation in such cases — had already barred the
presentation of protests before the Electoral Commission had had
time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to
be followed in a matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by
the Constitution. This result was not and could not have been
contemplated, and should be avoided.
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly
confirming the election of members against whom no protests
had been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935,
can not be construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation
of election contests. While there might have been good reason for
the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members
of the legislature at the time when the power to decide election
contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by
the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral
Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power
to be "the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to
fix the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by
the National Assembly of the returns of its members against
whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal
purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral
Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the
motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the
respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any
member is not required by the Constitution before he can
discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of fact,
certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is
sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the national
Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said body
(No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted
December 6, 1935).
Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of
Commons and in the Congress of the United States, confirmation
is neither necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his
seat. The return of the proper election officers is sufficient, and
the member-elect presenting such return begins to enjoy the
privileges of a member from the time that he takes his oath of
office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694,
695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order
only in cases of contested elections where the decision is
adverse to the claims of the protestant. In England, the judges'
decision or report in controverted elections is certified to the
Speaker of the House of Commons, and the House, upon being
informed of such certificate or report by the Speaker, is required
to enter the same upon the Journals, and to give such directions
for confirming or altering the return, or for the issue of a writ for a
new election, or for carrying into execution the determination as
circumstances may require (31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the
United States, it is believed, the order or decision of the particular
house itself is generally regarded as sufficient, without any actual
alternation or amendment of the return (Cushing, Law and
Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).
Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in
force, each house of the Philippine Legislature fixed the time
when protests against the election of any of its members should
be filed. This was expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones
Law making each house the sole judge of the election, return and
qualifications of its members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act
No. 3387) empowering each house to respectively prescribe by
resolution the time and manner of filing contest in the election of
member of said bodies. As a matter of formality, after the time
fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had already expired,
each house passed a resolution confirming or approving the
returns of such members against whose election no protests had
been filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted as
cutting off the filing of further protests against the election of
those members not theretofore contested (Amistad vs. Claravall
[Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period,
p. 89; Urguello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine
Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine
Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 637-640;
Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine
Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 1121, 1122;
Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature,
Record — First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The
Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No.
3387, section 478, must be deemed to have been impliedly
abrogated also, for the reason that with the power to determine all
contest relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, is inseparably linked the
authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power.
There was thus no law nor constitutional provisions which
authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have
fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests
against the election of its members. And what the National
Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by indirection
through the medium of confirmation.
Summarizing, we conclude:
(a) That the government established by the Constitution
follows fundamentally the theory of separation of power
into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the
overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult
the delimitation of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several
departments and among the agencies thereof, the
judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is
the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to
resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial
review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies,
and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or
agency of the government transcends the Constitution,
which is the source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent
constitutional creation with specific powers and functions
to execute and perform, closer for purposes of
classification to the legislative than to any of the other two
departments of the governments.
(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the
present Constitution went into effect, each house of the
legislature was respectively the sole judge of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective
members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the
powers previously exercised by the legislature with
respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of its members, to the Electoral
Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the
Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and
carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter
alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time
and manner of filing protests.
( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral
Commission was to have an independent constitutional
organ pass upon all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration,
which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly
were to retain the power to prescribe rules and
regulations regarding the manner of conducting said
contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed
not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house
of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of
the elections, returns and qualifications of its elective
members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387
empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the
time and manner of filing contests against the election of
its members, the time and manner of notifying the
adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any,
and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the
election is contested or not, is not essential before such
member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the
privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the
election of any member against whom no protest had
been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot
deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power
to prescribe the time within which protests against the
election of any member of the National Assembly should
be filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting
within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the
respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein
petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National
Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the
time for filing protests against the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent
the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character
of the Electoral Commission as a constitutional creation and as to
the scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the present
controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the
Electoral Commission is an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or
person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral
Commission is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner.
So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Diaz, Concepcion, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 163087 February 20, 2006
SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. and JOSE MARCEL
PANLILIO, Petitioners,
vs.
ROGELIO S. SOLUTA, JOSELITO SANTOS, EDNA BERNATE,
VICENTA DELOLA, FLORENTINO MATILLA, and
GLOWHRAIN-SILAHIS UNION CHAPTER, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The present Petition for Review on Certiorari partially assails the
Court of Appeals Decision1 of March 26, 2004 holding herein
petitioners Silahis International Hotel, Inc. and Jose Marcel
Panlilio, along with Floro Maniego and Steve Villanueva, civilly
liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code, for violation
of respondents’ constitutional right against unreasonable search
of their office.
Petitioner Jose Marcel Panlilio (Panlilio) was the Vice President
for Finance of his co-petitioner Silahis International Hotel, Inc.
(hotel), while respondents Rogelio Soluta (Soluta), Joselito
Santos, Edna Bernate (Edna), Vicenta Delola (Vicenta), and
Florentino Matilla (Matilla) were employees of the hotel and
officers of the Glowhrain-Silahis Union Chapter, the hotel
employees union (the union).
Petitioners’ version of the antecedents of the case are as follows:
In late 1987, as Coronel Floro Maniego (Maniego), General
Manager of the Rapier Enforcement Professional Investigation
and Security Agency, Inc. (REPISA) which the hotel contracted to
provide its security force, had been receiving reports that sale
and/or use of marijuana, dollar smuggling, and prostitution were
going on in the union office at the hotel and that there existed a
theft syndicate, he conducted a surveillance, with the approval of
Panlilio, of suspected members and officers of the union.2
In the morning of January 11, 1988, Panlilio, his personal
secretary Andy Dizon, Maniego, Bulletin reporter Nonoy Rosales,
and REPISA security guard Steve Villanueva (Villanueva) entered
the union office located at the hotel basement, with the
permission of union officer Henry Babay (Babay) who was
apprised about the suspected illegal activities, and searched the
premises in the course of which Villanueva found a plastic bag
under a table. When opened, the plastic bag yielded dry leaves of
marijuana.3 Panlilio thereupon ordered Maniego to investigate
and report the matter to the authorities.
On the other hand, respondents’ version follows:
On January 10, 1988, Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman
of the hotel, stayed overnight at the female locker room at the
basement of the hotel. At dawn of January 11, 1988, she heard
pounding sounds outside, prompting her to open the door of the
locker room upon which she saw five men in barong tagalog
whom she failed to recognize but she was sure were not
employees of the hotel,4 forcibly opening the door of the union
office.5 She even saw one of the men hid something behind his
back. She then closed the door and went back to bed. Soon after
she heard the door of the union office opened.
In the morning of January 11, 1988, as union officer Soluta was
trying in vain to open the door of the union office, Loida narrated
to him what she had witnessed at dawn.
Soluta thus immediately lodged a complaint before the Security
Officer. And he fetched a locksmith, Efren Guevarra, who tried to
assist him, Edna, Arnold Ilustrisimo and Ed Bautista open the
door. At that instant, men in barong tagalog armed with clubs
arrived and started hitting Soluta and his companions, drawing
them to run to the female locker room, and to thereafter proceed
to the Engineering Office where they called for police assistance.6
While awaiting the arrival of the police, Babay and Panlilio, on the
latter’s request, met. At the meeting, Panlilio told Babay that they
proceed to the union office where they would settle the mauling
incident, to which Babay replied that the door of the office could
not be opened. Panlilio thereupon instructed Villanueva to force
open the door, and the latter did. Once inside, Panlilio and his
companions began searching the office, over the objection of
Babay who even asked them if they had a search warrant.7 A
plastic bag was found containing marijuana flowering tops.
As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the
union office and after the police conducted an investigation of the
incident, a complaint against the 13 union officers,8 namely:
Babay, Isaac Asuncion, Jr., Soluta, Teodoro Gimpayan, Vicenta,
Edna, Arnulfo Ilustrisimo, Irene Velarde, Joselito Santos, Renato
Lina, Avelino Meneses, Matilla, and Norman Agtani9 was filed
before the Fiscal’s Office of Manila, for violation of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6425, as amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179
(The Dangerous Drugs Act).
An Information10 indicting the union officers was subsequently
filed by the Fiscal’s Office before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila.
After trial, Branch 5 of the RTC acquitted the accused. The trial
court disposed:
WHEREFORE, with the specimen and/or the marijuana flowering
tops allegedly found inside the Union Office occupied by the
accused not admissible in evidence, coupled by the suspicious
circumstance of confiscation, for lack of sufficient evidence,
accused Henry Babay, Isaac Asuncion, Jr., Rogelio Soluta,
Teodoro F. Gimpayan, Vicente Delola, Edna Bernate, Arnulfo
Ilustrisimo, Irene Velarde, Joselito Santos, Avelino Meneses,
Florentino Matilla and Norman Agtani, are ACQUITTED of the
charge. The bonds they put up for their provisional liberty are
cancelled.
The Branch Clerk is directed to turn over the custody of the
seized plastic bag containing flowering tops of marijuana to the
NBI Director as Permanent Custodian of the seized Dangerous
Drugs.
SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Soluta and his fellow union officers, together with the union,
thereafter filed before the Manila RTC a Complaint12against
petitioners et al. including prosecuting Fiscal Jose Bautista and
Atty. Eduardo Tutaan who assisted in the prosecution of the case
against them, for malicious prosecution and violation of their
constitutional right against illegal search.
After trial, Branch 55 of the Manila RTC, by Decision13 dated June
2, 1994, held the hotel, Panlilio, Maniego and Villanueva jointly
and severally liable for damages as a result of malicious
prosecution and illegal search of the union office. The dispositive
portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the defendants Silahis International Hotel, Inc.,
Jose Marcel Panlilio, Floro Maniego and Steve Villanueva,
individually and collectively, jointly and severally, to pay to:
1. Plaintiffs Union, Rogelio S. Soluta, Joselito Santos,
Florentino Matilla, Vicenta Delola and Edna Bernate-
Dacanay, jointly, the sum of P70,900.00
as actual damages, and the further sum of
P1,000.00 each for the same plaintiffs, except the Union,
in the same concept and nature.
2. Plaintiffs Rogelio Soluta, Joselito Santos, Florentino
Matilla, Vicenta Delola and Edna Bernate-Dacanay the
sum of P100,000.00 each for moral damages.
3. Plaintiffs Joselito Santos, Florentino Matilla, Vicenta
Delola and Edna-Bernate-Dacanay the sum of
P30,000.00 each as exemplary damages.
4. To all the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the sum of
P30,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees.
The complaint, insofar as plaintiff Erlisa Ilustrisimo and
defendants Ramos, Bautista and Tutaan are concerned, is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All the counterclaims of the defendants are likewise dismissed for
lack of factual and legal basis.
Costs against the remaining defendants.
SO ORDERED.14 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the
trial court’s decision. It found herein petitioners et al. civilly liable
for damages for violation of individual respondents’ constitutional
right against illegal search, not for malicious prosecution, set
aside the award of actual damages to respondent union, and
reduced the award of actual damages to individual respondents
to ₱50,000. The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 55, is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the
first paragraph of the dispositive portion should read:
"1. Plaintiffs Rogelio Soluta, Joselito Santos, Florentino Matilla,
Vicenta Delola and Edna Bernate-Dacanay, jointly, the sum of
P50,000.00 as actual damages, and the further sum of P1,000.00
each for the same plaintiffs in the same concept and nature."
The Decision is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.15
Hence, the present petition of Panlilio and the hotel, they
contending that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS
CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR
DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CIVIL CODE IN THAT:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ APPLICATION OF
PEOPLE V. ARUTA (288 SCRA 626[1998]) AND
SECTION 13, RULE 126 OF THE RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE IN THE INSTANT CASE IS LEGALLY
FLAWED.
2. PETITIONERS’ SEARCH OF THE UNION OFFICE IN
THE INSTANT CASE WAS ENTIRELY REASONABLE
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.16
While petitioners concede that the appellate court correctly cited
the principles enunciated in People v. Aruta17 and Section 13,
Rule 12618 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, it gravely erred
when it applied Aruta to justify petitioners’ alleged liability under
Article 32 of the New Civil Code. They argue that Aruta does not
involve Article 32 as nowhere in the decision is there any
reference to Article 32.19
Similarly, petitioners argue that being private persons, they are
not covered by the standards set forth in Aruta as the
constitutional protection against illegal searches and seizures is
not meant to be invoked against private individuals.20
Petitioners further argue that the search of the union office was
reasonable under the circumstances,21 given that the hotel owns
the room where the union holds office; the search was not without
probable cause as it was conducted precisely due to reports
received by petitioners that the union office was being used as a
venue for illegal activities, particularly the sale and/or use of
prohibited drugs;22 and the search was conducted with the
consent and in the presence of union officer Babay.23
The petition fails.
Article 32 of the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private
individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates
or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:
xxxx
(9) The right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
xxxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages
may also be adjudicated. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As constitutional rights, like the right to be secure in one’s person,
house, papers, and effects against unreasonable search and
seizures, occupy a lofty position in every civilized and democratic
community and not infrequently susceptible to abuse, their
violation, whether constituting a penal offense or not, must be
guarded against. As the Code Commission noted,
xxxx
(3) Direct and open violations of the Penal Code trampling upon
the freedoms named are not so frequent as those subtle, clever
and indirect ways which do not come within the pale of the penal
law. It is in these cunning devices of suppressing or curtailing
freedom, which are not criminally punishable, where the greatest
danger to democracy lies. The injured citizen will always have,
under the new Civil Code, adequate civil remedies before the
courts because of the independent civil action, even in those
instances where the act or omission complained of does not
constitute a criminal offense.24
The Code Commission thus deemed it necessary to hold not only
public officers but also private individuals civilly liable for violation
of rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. That is why it
is not even necessary that the defendant under this Article should
have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its
main purpose, which is the effective protection of individual
rights.25 It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional
right of the plaintiff.
In the present case, as priorly stated, petitioners had, by their
own claim, already received reports in late 1987 of illegal
activities allegedly undertaken in the union office and Maniego
conducted surveillance of the union officers. Yet, in the morning
of January 11, 1988, petitioners and their companions barged into
and searched the union office without a search warrant, despite
ample time for them to obtain one, and notwithstanding the
objection of Babay.
The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality, it
not falling under any of the exceptional instances when a
warrantless search is allowed by law. Petitioners’ violation of
individual respondents’ constitutional right against unreasonable
search thus furnishes the basis for the award of damages under
Article 32 of the Civil Code.
In MHP Garments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,26 a case for unfair
competition, the progression of time between the receipt of the
information and the raid of the stores of the therein private
respondents’ premises showed that there was sufficient time for
the therein petitioners and the raiding party to apply for a judicial
warrant. Yet they did not apply for one. They went on with the raid
and seized the goods of the therein private Respondents. Under
the circumstances, this court upheld the grant of damages by the
trial court to the therein private respondents for violation of their
right against unreasonable search and seizure.
As for petitioners’ contention that property rights justified the
search of the union office, the same does not lie. For
respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office, had the
right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure.27
Neither does petitioners’ claim that they were allowed by union
officer Babay to enter the union office lie. Babay’s account of why
petitioners and company went to the union office – to consider
Panlilio’s suggestion to settle the mauling incident is more
credible, as is his claim that he protested the search, and even
asked if they were armed with a search warrant.
While it is doctrinal that the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures is a personal right which may be waived expressly
or impliedly, a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There
must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to
relinquish it to constitute a waiver thereof.28 There must be proof
of the following: (a) that the right exists; (b) that the person
involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right; and, (c) that the said person had an
actual intention to relinquish the right. In other words, the waiver
must be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. The
evidence shows otherwise, however.
That a violation of one’s constitutional right against illegal search
and seizure can be the basis for the recovery of damages under
Article 32 in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the New Civil
Code, there is no doubt. Since the complaint29 filed before the trial
court was for damages due to malicious prosecution and violation
of constitutional right against illegal search and seizure, the
award by the trial court of actual damages to respondent union
was correctly set aside by the appellate court.
Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or
indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights
and liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor alone who must
answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused
to the aggrieved party.30 Such being the case, petitioners,
together with Maniego and Villanueva, the ones who orchestrated
the illegal search, are jointly and severally liable for actual, moral
and exemplary damages to herein individual respondents in
accordance with the earlier-quoted pertinent provision of Article
32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
xxxx
(6) Illegal search; Costs against petitioners.

xxxx SO ORDERED.

(10) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
32, 34 and 35. (Emphasis supplied) Associate Justice

Petitioners magnify the citation by the appellate court of Aruta

allegedly "to justify [their] liability" under Article 32 of the Civil
Code, which petitioners allege is erroneous as said case did not
involve Article 32.

Aruta was, however, cited by the appellate court, not to justify

petitioners’ liability but to rule out the legality of the search in the
union office as the search was not done as an incident of a lawful
arrest.

Petitioners cite People v. Marti31 to support their thesis that the

determinants in the validity of the constitutional right against
searches and seizure cannot be invoked against private
individuals.

But the ruling of this Court in Marti, a criminal case, bears on the
issue of whether "an act of a private individual, allegedly in
violation of [one’s] constitutional rights, [may] be invoked against
the State." In other words, the issue in that case was whether the
evidence obtained by a private person, acting in a private
capacity without the participation of the State, is admissible.

The issue in the present civil case, however, is whether

respondent individual can recover damages for violation of
constitutional rights. As reflected above, Article 32, in relation to
Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code, allows so.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing ratiocinations, the petition

is DENIED.
G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997 firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the
same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner, the bid of petitioner.
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent
HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION GSIS state —
and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL, respondents. I. EXECUTION OF THE
NECESSARY CONTRACTS
WITH GSIS/MHC —

BELLOSILLO, J.: 1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the

conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995
The FiIipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in (reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder
the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to
to qualified Filipinos,1 is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire the other Qualified Bidders:
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which
owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain a. The Highest Bidder must
that the provision is not self-executing but requires an negotiate and execute with the
implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask GSIS/MHC the Management
whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and Contract, International
patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution. Marketing/Reservation System
Contract or other type of contract
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service specified by the Highest Bidder in
Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program its strategic plan for the Manila
of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 Hotel. . . .
December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to
51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. b. The Highest Bidder must
The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to execute the Stock Purchase and
provide management expertise and/or an international Sale Agreement with GSIS . . . .
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen
the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.2 In a close K. DECLARATION OF THE
bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino PARTNER —
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000
shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
 The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning
Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following
conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary
contracts with GSIS/MHC not later
than October 23, 1995 (reset to
November 3, 1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the
GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee
on Privatization)/OGCC (Office of
the Government Corporate
Counsel) are obtained.3
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary
contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28
September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share
tendered by Renong Berhad.4 In a subsequent letter dated 10
October 1995 petitioner sent a manager's check issued by
Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33.000.000.00)
as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group,
Messrs. Renong Berhad . . .5 which respondent GSIS refused to
accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent
GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the
sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS
and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this
Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the
Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents
from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the
Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the First Division. The
case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici
curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of
the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been
identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a
historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine
heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation
of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of
independence and its power and capacity to release the full
potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has
become a part of the national patrimony.6 Petitioner also argues
that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the
ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by
respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled
corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part
of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national
economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of
stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national
economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987
Constitution, applies.7
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of
the national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part
of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has
matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules
mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that
these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in
terms of price per share.8
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second
par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and
requires implementing legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said
provision to Operate, there must be existing laws "to lay down
conditions under which business may be done."9
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila
Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony which only
refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine
wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in
the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987
Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of
the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that have
transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do
not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation. What is
more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State,
not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own
separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national
patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable
since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of
the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the
building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot
be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the
disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the
Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right from the
beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the
bidding rules which provides that if for any reason, the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer
this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids
provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the
highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced.
Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching
bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason,
the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus
the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since
Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of
shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the
privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of
discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its
discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did
abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should
fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and
respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act
required of them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws
for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme,
imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from
which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation. 10 It prescribes the permanent
framework of a system of government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes
certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The
fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law
to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with
which all private rights must be determined and all public
authority administered. 11 Under the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the
constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the
legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private
persons for private purposes is null and void and without any
force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in
every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies
and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact
laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely
establish an outline of government providing for the different
departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain
fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. 12 A provision which
lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision
which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they quote from
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission —
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional
provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right MR. RODRIGO. Madam
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution President, I am asking this
itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and question as the Chairman of the
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that Committee on Style. If the wording
the subject is referred to the legislature for action. 13 of "PREFERENCE" is given to
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," can it be
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have understood as a preference to
been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often qualified Filipinos vis-a-
become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate vis Filipinos who are not qualified.
directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory So, why do we not make it clear?
enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has To qualified Filipinos as against
evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, aliens?
unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary
to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that THE PRESIDENT. What is the
all provisions of the constitution are self-executing If the question of Commissioner
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to "QUALIFIED?".
ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental
law.14 This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say
as it has always been, that — definitely "TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS" as against whom? As
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be against aliens or over aliens?
considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly MR. NOLLEDO. Madam
intended, the provisions of the Constitution should President, I think that is
be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule understood. We use the word
would give the legislature discretion to determine "QUALIFIED" because the existing
when, or whether, they shall be effective. These laws or prospective laws will
provisions would be subordinated to the will of the always lay down conditions under
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely which business may be done. For
meaningless by simply refusing to pass the example, qualifications on the
needed implementing statute. 15 setting up of other financial
structures, et cetera (emphasis
supplied by respondents)
 MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter
of style.
MR. NOLLEDO Yes, 16
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in
such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing
but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is
not precluded from enacting other further laws to enforce the
constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute
squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the
legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still
enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly
granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a
provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement,
provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights
secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable
safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that
legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for
the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not
render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such
legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express
provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not
necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-
executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the
subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it
more available. 17 Subsequent legislation however does not
necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not,
by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of
Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the
first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly
are not self-executing. 18 The argument is flawed. If the first and
third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still
to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of
enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and
the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority
over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the
third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second
paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its
language require any legislation in order to give preference to
qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A
constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and
non-self-executing in another. 19
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain
constitutional provisions are merely statements of principles and
policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed in
the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially
enforceable rights — are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine
Amusements and Gaming Corporation 20 speaks of constitutional
provisions on personal dignity, 21 the sanctity of family life, 22 the
vital role of the youth in nation-building 23 the promotion of social
justice, 24 and the values of education. 25 Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance 26 refers to the constitutional provisions on social justice
and human rights 27 and on education. 28 Lastly, Kilosbayan,
Inc. v. Morato 29 cites provisions on the promotion of general
welfare, 30 the sanctity of family life, 31 the vital role of the youth in
nation-building 32 and the promotion of total human liberation and
development. 33A reading of these provisions indeed clearly
shows that they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights
but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the
provisions manifest that they are only principles upon which the
legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the
1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very
words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable When our Constitution
mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares
that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action
may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is
no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right,
such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and
puissance, and from which all legislations must take their
bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission 34 explains —
The patrimony of the Nation that should be
conserved and developed refers not only to out
rich natural resources but also to the cultural
heritage of out race. It also refers to our
intelligence in arts, sciences and letters.
Therefore, we should develop not only our lands,
forests, mines and other natural resources but
also the mental ability or faculty of our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony
pertains to heritage. 35 When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of
Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel
when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly
Filipino, Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then
become the venue of various significant events which have
shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the
1930's. It was the site of the festivities during the inauguration of
the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest
House of the Philippine Government. it plays host to dignitaries
and official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine
hospitality. 36
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The
Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City. 37During World
War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military
Administration into a military headquarters. When the American
forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the
Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places fro their
final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950's and 1960's, the hotel
became the center of political activities, playing host to almost
every political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a
renovation and reaped numerous international recognitions, an
acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the
hotel was the site of a failed coup d' etat where an aspirant for
vice-president was "proclaimed" President of the Philippine
Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute
witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the
Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own
historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty,
independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become
part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the
equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional
shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that
anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control
and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC
cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the
hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain
respondents' claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not
applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding
shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon
which the building stands. 38
The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as
used in Our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60%
of which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner
Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to
introduce an amendment to the
Nolledo amendment. And the
amendment would consist in
substituting the words
"QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" with the
following: "CITIZENS OF THE
PHILIPPINES OR
CORPORATIONS OR
ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE
CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING
STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY
SUCH CITIZENS.
xxx
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President,
apparently the proponent is
agreeable, but we have to raise a
question. Suppose it is a
corporation that is 80-percent
Filipino, do we not give it
preference?
MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo
amendment would refer to an
individual Filipino. What about a
corporation wholly owned by
Filipino citizens?
MR. MONSOD. At least 60
percent, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in
fact, we would be limiting it if we
say that the preference should
only be 100-percent Filipino.
MR: DAVIDE. I want to get that
meaning clear because
"QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" may
refer only to individuals and not to
juridical personalities or entities.
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam
President. 39
xxx xxx
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote,
may I request that the amendment
be read again.
MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment
will read: "IN THE GRANT OF
RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL
GIVE PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." And the
 word "Filipinos" here, as intended
by the proponents, will include not
only individual Filipinos but also
Filipino-controlled entities or
entities fully-controlled by
Filipinos. 40
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was
explained thus —
MR. FOZ. Madam President, I
would like to request
Commissioner Nolledo to please
restate his amendment so that I
can ask a question.
MR. NOLLEDO. "IN THE GRANT
OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL
GIVE PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS."
MR FOZ. In connection with that
amendment, if a foreign enterprise
is qualified and a Filipino
enterprise is also qualified, will the
Filipino enterprise still be given a
preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more
qualified in some aspects than the
Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino
still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is
"yes."
MR. FOZ. Thank you, 41
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision
Commissioner Nolledo continues —
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead
of "MUST," it will be "SHALL — THE STATE
SHALL GlVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS. This embodies the so-called "Filipino
First" policy. That means that Filipinos should be
given preference in the grant of concessions,
privileges and rights covering the national
patrimony. 42
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional
Commission regarding the subject provision was still further
clarified by Commissioner Nolledo 43 —
Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the
"Pro-Filipino" bias in all economic concerns. It is
better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy . . .
This provision was never found in previous
Constitutions . . . .
The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that
preference shall be given to those citizens who
can make a viable contribution to the common
good, because of credible competence and
efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the
pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino
citizens or organizations that are incompetent or
inefficient, since such an indiscriminate
preference would be counter productive and
inimical to the common good.
 In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and
concessions, when a choice has to be made
between a "qualified foreigner" end a "qualified
Filipino," the latter shall be chosen over the
former."
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so
considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one of
the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in
accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference here
is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven
management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant
equity ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall
management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate
the Manila Hotel. 44
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the
Constitution by arguing that the subject provision is not self-
executory and requires implementing legislation is quite
disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional provision
— by the government itself — is only too distressing. To adopt
such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure
faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some of the provisions
of the Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation
have juridical life of their own and can be the source of a judicial
remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a defense that
arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or
guiding legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G.
Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt —
The executive department has a constitutional
duty to implement laws, including the Constitution,
even before Congress acts — provided that there
are discoverable legal standards for executive
action. When the executive acts, it must be guided
by its own understanding of the constitutional
command and of applicable laws. The
responsibility for reading and understanding the
Constitution and the laws is not the sole
prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive
would have to ask Congress, or perhaps the
Court, for an interpretation every time the
executive is confronted by a constitutional
command. That is not how constitutional
government operates. 45
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is
addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself
possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument
again is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of
the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the
State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As
correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact
alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and
MHC a "state action." In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of
persons distinct from the government are considered "state
action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it
engages in is a "public function;" (2) when the government is so
significantly involved with the private actor as to make the
government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the
government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident
that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in
respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of
"state action." Without doubt therefore the transaction. although
entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the
State and therefore subject to the constitutional command. 46
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to
the people but also to the government as elements of the State.
After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power
— legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional
mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the
three(3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case
the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to
the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government
instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the
higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules
expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared
the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the
necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since
the "Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows
preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest
bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared
the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to
make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into
one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee
respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987
Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to
all the bidders and other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject
constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the
bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules
be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic
principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must
conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which
violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [if] for any
reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are
willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per
share. 47 Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason
enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the
foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even
the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason
than the constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in
a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that
the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign
entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the
award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life
and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor
contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is,
omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to
sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy
may discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws
of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public
scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider
when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person
therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of
its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights
and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped
from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was
well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in
the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners
alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded
the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails
to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the
case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the
inception of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate,
petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad.
Thus it did not have the right or personality then to compel
respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had
matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by
respondent GSIS of petitioner's matching bid did the latter have a
cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional
safeguard unless perhaps the award has been finally made. To
insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a
Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to
insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market
player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment,
regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The
miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we
would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an
opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of
forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and
parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by
Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is
left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of
shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the
bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as
well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the
corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the
bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian
firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is
embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a
guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so
must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the
Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance,
the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is
tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the
intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less
undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court
encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but
avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such
preference is ordained by the Constitution. The position of the
Court on this matter could have not been more appropriately
articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa —
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is
not its function to substitute its judgment for that of
the legislature or the executive about the wisdom
and feasibility of legislation economic in nature,
the Supreme Court has not been spared criticism
for decisions perceived as obstacles to economic
progress and development . . . in connection with
a temporary injunction issued by the Court's First
Division against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a
Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements
were published in a major daily to the effect that
injunction "again demonstrates that the Philippine
legal system can be a major obstacle to doing
business here.
Let it be stated for the record once again that
while it is no business of the Court to intervene in
contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as
the judge of whether they are viable or attainable,
it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do
not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not
adopted or implemented with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no matter
how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed
criticism. 48
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its
business viability and preventing further losses, regardless of the
character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-
material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective
should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and
dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-
material values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the
Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all,
there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw
itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved. 49
Nationalism is inherent, in the very concept of the Philippines
being a democratic and republican state, with sovereignty
residing in the Filipino people and from whom all government
authority emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of
the people must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher
purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must
adhere to such basic concept. Protection of foreign investments,
while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands
of nationalism. 50
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just
any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake
of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of
property in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic
relic that has hosted many of the most important events in the
short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a
hotel where heads of states would prefer to be housed as a
strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the
highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus
the Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant
role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine
history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection
of the Filipino soul — a place with a history of grandeur; a most
historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a
country. 51
And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and
accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation,
will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to
CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the
matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of
the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter
to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts
and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco and
Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined
efforts of respondents to sell the historical landmark — this Grand
Old Dame of hotels in Asia — to a total stranger. For, indeed, the
conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien
hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever
manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation's soul for some
pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which
cannot be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained
by the Filipinos Manila Hotel — and all that it stands for — is sold
to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the
nation's cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the
other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the
national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous
and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning
of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for accused-
appellant.
BIDIN, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special
Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX)
convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b), Article
IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1
of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as
follows:
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the
appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went
to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita,
Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages.
Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley
Reyes) attended to them. The appellant informed Anita
Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in
Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract
necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name,
passport number, the date of shipment and the name and
address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ,
Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland" (Decision, p. 6)
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could
examine and inspect the packages. Appellant, however,
refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained
books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in
Zurich. In view of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes
no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. The four
(4) packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated
box one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was
placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before
the box was sealed with masking tape, thus making the
box ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8).
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of
Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
(proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following
standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final
inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar
odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he
squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves
and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles,
he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the
opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one
of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the
contents thereof (tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987;
Emphasis supplied).
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the
shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examination of the samples he extracted from the
cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987).
 He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's
shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the
afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He was
interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes
informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in
his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents,
and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office at Ermita,
Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987).
submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for
laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were
marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist.
(Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation
of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.

Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to
packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI wit:
agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and
took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN
gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been
EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND SEIZED
contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p. 38,
OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.
October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
The package which allegedly contained books was
APPELLANT DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT
likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the
HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE
package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana
UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT
leaves. The package which allegedly contained
OBSERVED.
tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried
marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the
cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6, 1987). THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE
APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the
INTO HIS POSSESSION (Appellant's Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p.
box and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt"
55)
acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3,
October 7, 1987).
1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed
offense had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no
against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
avail. Appellant's stated address in his passport being the Manila
communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore
Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the
argues that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence
latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while
(Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the
NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried
leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
 Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the 1935
Charter which, worded as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Sec. 1
[3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth
Amendment ** to the United States Constitution. As such, the
Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States
Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are
considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.
Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio
by the US Federal Supreme Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6
L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA
383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by
virtue of a defective search and seizure warrant, abandoning in
the process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's
Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the admissibility of evidence
was not affected by the illegality of its seizure. The 1973 Charter
(Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is
carried over up to the present with the advent of the 1987
Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the
exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of
evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard
against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache & Co.,
(Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de Leon,
66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986];
Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also Salazar v.
Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990).
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the
evidence so obtained were invariably procured by the State
acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized
government agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character
since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily
discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private
capacity and without the intervention and participation of State
authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant
validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may
an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's
constitutional rights, be invoked against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental
interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
be invoked against the State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345
[1972]:
1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search
and seizure) refers to the immunity of one's person,
whether citizen or alien, from interference by government,
included in which is his residence, his papers, and other
possessions. . . .
. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such
have the access except under the circumstances above
noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house,
however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any
unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called
upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to
respect the privacies of his life. . . . (Cf. Schermerber v.
California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States,
116 US 616 [1886]; Emphasis supplied).
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65
L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in construing the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures declared that:
(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful
searches and seizures, and as shown in previous cases,
its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin
and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint
upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not
intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental
agencies; as against such authority it was the purpose of
the Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of
unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the possession
of his property, subject to the right of seizure by process
duly served.
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661
[1968]) where a parking attendant who searched the automobile
to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana instead, without
the knowledge and participation of police authorities, was
declared admissible in prosecution for illegal possession of
narcotics.
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121),
it was held that the search and seizure clauses are restraints
upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals
(citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892
(1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v.
Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517
(1967). The Court there said:
The search of which appellant complains, however, was
made by a private citizen — the owner of a motel in which
appellant stayed overnight and in which he left behind a
travel case containing the evidence***complained of. The
search was made on the motel owner's own initiative.
Because of it, he became suspicious, called the local
police, informed them of the bag's contents, and made it
available to the authorities.
The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not
require exclusion of evidence obtained through a search
by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment only
proscribes governmental action."
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession
of the Government without the latter transgressing appellant's
rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees
no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against
him in the prosecution of the offense charged.
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI
agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence later
on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be
clarified in two days. In both instances, the argument stands to
fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily
foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an illegal
search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the
case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of
the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the
packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard
operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary
measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs
or the Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp.
7-8; Original Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the
illicit cargo, he took samples of the same to the NBI and later
summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he
opened the parcel containing the rest of the shipment and
entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly,
the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal
one, contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the
reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search
and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and
look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having
observed that which is open, where no trespass has been
committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429
SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are identified without
a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the
search that is prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US
559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US 23,
10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).
In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise
held that where the property was taken into custody of the police
at the specific request of the manager and where the search was
initially made by the owner there is no unreasonable search and
seizure within the constitutional meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant
to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds support in
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the
liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must
always be subject to protection. But protection against whom?
Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of
Rights answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of
fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional
democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against
the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship
between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the
relation between individuals, between a private individual
and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to
declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere
inaccessible to any power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of
Commissioner Bernas , Record of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis
supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and
seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the
law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant
must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of
constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or
initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own
and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the
intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot
be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to
bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935
Constitution has been modified by the present phraseology found
in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any
evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition
against illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the
evidence was procured by police authorities or private individuals
(Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo, p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in
laying down the principles of the government and fundamental
liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between
individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the
modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art.
III) relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of
arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance
thereof (SeeSoliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular
No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987].
The modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to whom
the restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search and
seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed with the State
and did not shift to anyone else.
Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and
seizure may only be invoked against the State by an individual
unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree
with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the
Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State
would result in serious legal complications and an absurd
interpretation of the constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an
individual effected through private seizure equally applies, in pari
passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of
appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and communication.
2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the
lower court erred in convicting him despite the undisputed fact
that his rights under the constitution while under custodial
investigation were not observed.
Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully
examined the records of the case and found nothing to indicate,
as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not informed of his
constitutional rights or that he gave statements without the
assistance of counsel. The law enforcers testified that
accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is
presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (See.
5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given full faith
and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary. What is
clear from the records, on the other hand, is that appellant
refused to give any written statement while under investigation as
testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI, Thus:
Fiscal Formoso:
You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes.
What about the accused here, did you investigate the
accused together with the girl?
WITNESS:
 Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the
girl but the accused availed of his constitutional right not
to give any written statement, sir. (TSN, October 8, 1987,
p. 62; Original Records, p. 240)
The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not
contradicted by the defense on cross-examination. As borne out
by the records, neither was there any proof by the defense that
appellant gave uncounselled confession while being
investigated. What is more, we have examined the assailed
judgment of the trial court and nowhere is there any reference
made to the testimony of appellant while under custodial
investigation which was utilized in the finding of conviction.
Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore misplaced.
3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant
would like us to believe that he was not the owner of the
packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain
Michael, a German national, whom appellant met in a pub along
Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their 30-minute conversation,
Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave him
P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the German national
was about to leave the country the next day (October 15, 1987,
TSN, pp. 2-10).
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's
disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving and contrary to human
experience. It can easily be fabricated. An acquaintance with a
complete stranger struck in half an hour could not have pushed a
man to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out
P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily accede to
comply with the undertaking without first ascertaining its contents.
As stated by the trial court, "(a) person would not simply entrust
contraband and of considerable value at that as the marijuana
flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete
stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the other hand,
would not simply accept such undertaking to take custody of the
packages and ship the same from a complete stranger on his
mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily
agreed to do the errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative
self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot
be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo,
171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).
Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering
that, as per records of the Interpol, he was previously convicted of
possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the Federal Republic
of Germany on January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the
frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national, was
likewise convicted for drug abuse and is just about an hour's drive
from appellant's residence in Zurich, Switzerland (TSN, October
8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records, p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p.
93).
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of
a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the
common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342
[1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see
also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga,
123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castañares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]).
As records further show, appellant did not even bother to ask
Michael's full name, his complete address or passport number.
Furthermore, if indeed, the German national was the owner of the
merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the contract
of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary,
appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof
giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person
possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by
him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore
estopped to claim otherwise.
Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court
in rendering the assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is hereby Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which
AFFIRMED. No costs. the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
SO ORDERED. men." 1 Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr. and Feliciano, JJ., concur. Computerized Identification Reference System" on two
important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation
of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it
impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of
privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be
vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against
further erosion.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos On
Manila December 12, 1996 and reads as follows:

EN BANC ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED

IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM

G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998 WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino
citizens and foreign residents with the facility
BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner, to conveniently transact business with basic
service and social security providers and
vs. other government instrumentalities;

RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR
VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS,
CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO
VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL
COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION
ON AUDIT, respondents.
WHEREAS, this will require a computerized
system to properly and efficiently identify
persons seeking basic services on social
security and reduce, if not totally eradicate
fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations;

WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative

effort among the various basic services and
PUNO, J.: social security providing agencies and other
government intrumentalities is required to
achieve such a system;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS,
President of the Republic of the Philippines,
by virtue of the powers vested in me by law,
do hereby direct the following:
Sec. 1. Establishment of a National
Compoterized Identification Reference
System. A decentralized Identification
Reference System among the key basic
services and social security providers is
hereby established.
Sec. 2. Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee.
An Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee
(IACC) to draw-up the implementing guidelines
and oversee the implementation of the System
is hereby created, chaired by the Executive
Secretary, with the following as members:
Head, Presidential Management Staff
Secretary, National Economic Development
Authority
Secretary, Department of the Interior and
Local Government
Secretary, Department of Health
Administrator, Government Service Insurance
System,
Administrator, Social Security System,
Administrator, National Statistics Office
Managing Director, National Computer Center.
Sec. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer
Center (NCC) is hereby designated as
secretariat to the IACC and as such shall
provide administrative and technical support
to the IACC.
Sec. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The
Population Reference Number (PRN)
generated by the NSO shall serve as the
common reference number to establish a
linkage among concerned agencies. The IACC
Secretariat shall coordinate with the different
Social Security and Services Agencies to
establish the standards in the use of
Biometrics Technology and in computer
application designs of their respective
systems.
Sec. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination
Campaign. The Office of the Press Secretary,
in coordination with the National Statistics
Office, the GSIS and SSS as lead agencies and
other concerned agencies shall undertake a
massive tri-media information dissemination
campaign to educate and raise public
awareness on the importance and use of the
PRN and the Social Security Identification
Reference.
Sec. 6. Funding. The funds necessary for the
implementation of the system shall be sourced
from the respective budgets of the concerned
agencies.
 Sec. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The
NSO, GSIS and SSS shall submit regular
reports to the Office of the President through
the IACC, on the status of implementation of
this undertaking.
Sec. 8. Effectivity. This Administrative Order
shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of
December in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen
Hundred and Ninety-Six.
(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general
circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On
January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against
respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the
heads of the government agencies, who as members of the
Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the
implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.
Petitioner contends:
A. THE ESTABLISNMENT OF A NATIONAL
COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION
REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A
LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O.
NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS,
THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS
OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS
BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE
EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO
APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR
EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308
INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR
A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL
OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE
CONSTITUTION. 2
Respondents counter-argue:
A. THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A
JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A
JUDICIAL REVIEW;
B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN
THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT
ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE
POWERS OF CONGRESS;
C. THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION
REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED
FROM THE BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED
AGENCIES;
D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN
INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY. 3
We now resolve.
 I as its result would be to throttle an important constitutional
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the
threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of the
petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More
specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal
interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O.
No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear.
Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As
a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing
to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No.
308 is a usurpation of legislative power. 4 As taxpayer and
member of the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the
misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds
to implement A.O. No. 308. 5
The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not
affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No.
308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O.
No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His
action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated
cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents
themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308
without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997,
respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the
publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the
National Identification (ID) card. 6 Respondent Executive
Secretary Torres has publicly announced that
representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed
the guidelines for the national identification system. 7 All
signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to
implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the
formality of the rules to pass judgment on its
constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that
we tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance
principle and a fundamental right.
II
We now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O.
No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and
hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He
alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of
identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the
life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident,
and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to
trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is
understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line
between the power of the Legislature to make laws and the
power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their
delicate balance of power and cannot be allowed. Hence, the
exercise by one branch of government of power belonging to
another will be given a stricter scrutiny by this Court.
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is
not indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority, under the
Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal
them." 8 The Constitution, as the will of the people in their
original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this
power in the Congress of the Philippines. 9 The grant of
legislative power to Congress is broad, general and
comprehensive. 10 The legislative body possesses plenary
power for all purposes of civil government. 11 Any power,
deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is
necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution
has lodged it elsewhere. 12 In fine, except as limited by the
Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power
embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general
concern or common interest. 13
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the
President executes the laws. 14 The executive power is vested
in the Presidents. 15 It is generally defined as the power to
enforce and administer the laws. 16 It is the power of carrying
the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance. 17
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the
Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole
and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and
employees of his department. 18 He has control over the
executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that
he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the
executive department, bureau and office or interfere with the
discretion of its officials.19 Corollary to the power of control,
the President also has the duty of supervising the
enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace
and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power
over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to
discharge his duties effectively. 20
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying
policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmental organs. 21 It enables the President to fix a
uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the
official conduct of his agents. 22 To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308
involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an
administrative order. An administrative order is:
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the
President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operation in pursuance of his
duties as administrative head shall be
promulgated in administrative orders. 23
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the
President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in
harmony with the law and should be for the sole
purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the
legislative policy. 24 We reject the argument that A.O.
No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the
Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general
law and "incorporates in a unified document the
major structural, functional and procedural principles
of governance." 25 and "embodies changes in
administrative structure and procedures designed to
serve the
people." 26 The Code is divided into seven (7) Books:
Book I deals with Sovereignty and General
Administration, Book II with the Distribution of
Powers of the three branches of Government, Book III
on the Office of the President, Book IV on the
Executive Branch, Book V on Constitutional
Commissions, Book VI on National Government
Budgeting, and Book VII on Administrative
Procedure. These Books contain provisions on the
organization, powers and general administration of
the executive, legislative and judicial branches of
government, the organization and administration of
departments, bureaus and offices under the executive
branch, the organization and functions of the
Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional
bodies, the rules on the national government budget,
as well as guideline for the exercise by administrative
agencies of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
powers. The Code covers both the internal
administration of government, i.e, internal
organization, personnel and recruitment, supervision
and discipline, and the effects of the functions
performed by administrative officials on private
individuals or parties outside government. 27
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely
implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes
for the first time a National Computerized Identification
Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate
adjustment of various contending state policies — the
primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest
against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of
policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza
states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important
freedom of thought. As said administrative order redefines
the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-
vis the State as well as the line that separates the
administrative power of the President to make rules and the
legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it
deals with a subject that should be covered by law.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.D. No.
308 is not a law because it confers no right, imposes no
duty, affords no proctection, and creates no office. Under
A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with
government agencies delivering basic services to the people
without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will
refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid
dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that
without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his
rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the
contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no
duty cannot stand.
Again, with due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly
expand the limits of administrative legislation and
consequently erodes the plenary power of Congress to make
laws. This is contrary to the established approach defining
the traditional limits of administrative legislation. As well
stated by Fisher: ". . . Many regulations however, bear
directly on the public. It is here that administrative legislation
must he restricted in its scope and application. Regulations
are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-
making that Congress enacts in the form of a public law.
Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect,
the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an
independent source of power to make laws." 28
III
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the
subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as
an administrative legislation because facially it violates the
right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let
alone." 29 In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 30 the
United States Supreme Court gave more substance to the
right of privacy when it ruled that the right has a
constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of
privacy which can be found within the penumbras of the
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments, 31 viz:
Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras formed by emanations from these
guarantees that help give them life and
substance . . . various guarantees create
zones of privacy. The right of association
contained in the penumbra of the First
Amendment is one, as we have seen. The
Third Amendment in its prohibition against the
quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time
of peace without the consent of the owner is
another facet of that privacy. The Fourth
Amendment explicitly affirms the ''right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses
and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its
Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen
to create a zone of privacy which government
may not force him to surrender to his
detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides:
"The enumeration in the Constitution, of
 certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people."
In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc, 32 we adopted the
Griswold ruling that there is a constitutional right to
privacy. Speaking thru Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice,
Enrique Fernando, we held:
xxx xxx xxx
The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut
statute which made the use of contraceptives
a criminal offence on the ground of its
amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of
the right of privacy of married persons;
rightfully it stressed "a relationship lying
within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees." It has
wider implications though. The constitutional
right to privacy has come into its own.
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to
privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty;
in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is
particularly apt: "The concept of limited
government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
This is indeed one of the basic distinctions
between absolute and limited government.
Ultimate and pervasive control of the
individual, in all aspects of his life, is the
hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a
system of limited government safeguards a
private sector, which belongs to the individual,
firmly distinguishing it from the public sector,
which the state can control. Protection of this
private sector — protection, in other words, of
the dignity and integrity of the individual —
has become increasingly important as modern
society has developed. All the forces of a
technological age — industrialization,
urbanization, and organization — operate to
narrow the area of privacy and facilitate
intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity
to maintain and support this enclave of private
life marks the difference between a democratic
and a totalitarian society."
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the
right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several
provisions of our Constitution. 33 It is expressly recognized in
section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public
safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protectad in
various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz: 34
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or
 warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing
the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order
of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health as may
be provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those
employed in the public and private sectors, to
form unions, associations, or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in
our laws. The Civil Code provides that "[e]very person shall
respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of
his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as
actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and
prying into the privacy of another. 35 It also holds a public
officer or employee or any private individual liable for
damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of
another person, 36 and recognizes the privacy of letters and
other private communications. 37 The Revised Penal Code
makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, 38the
revelation of trade and industrial secrets, 39 and trespass to
dwelling. 40 Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws
like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, 41 the Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Act 42 and the Intellectual Property Code. 43 The
Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise
recognize the privacy of certain information. 44
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the
right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show
that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is
predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provides
our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently
transact business with basic service and social security
providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the
need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent
transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking
basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are
compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308.
But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness,
the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put
our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides
for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a "common
reference number to establish a linkage among concerned
agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and
"computer application designs."
Biometry or biometrics is "the science of the applicatin of
statistical methods to biological facts; a mathematical
analysis of biological data." 45 The term "biometrics" has
evolved into a broad category of technologies which provide
precise confirmation of an individual's identity through the
use of the individual's own physiological and behavioral
characteristics. 46 A physiological characteristic is a relatively
stable physical characteristic such as a fingerprint, retinal
scan, hand geometry or facial features. A behavioral
characteristic is influenced by the individual's personality
and includes voice print, signature and keystroke. 47 Most
biometric idenfication systems use a card or personal
identificatin number (PIN) for initial identification. The
biometric measurement is used to verify that the individual
holding the card or entering the PIN is the legitimate owner
of the card or PIN. 48
A most common form of biological encoding is finger-
scanning where technology scans a fingertip and turns the
unique pattern therein into an individual number which is
called a biocrypt. The biocrypt is stored in computer data
banks 49 and becomes a means of identifying an individual
using a service. This technology requires one's fingertip to
be scanned every time service or access is
provided. 50 Another method is the retinal scan. Retinal scan
technology employs optical technology to map the capillary
pattern of the retina of the eye. This technology produces a
unique print similar to a finger print. 51 Another biometric
method is known as the "artificial nose." This device
chemically analyzes the unique combination of substances
excreted from the skin of people. 52 The latest on the list of
biometric achievements is the thermogram. Scientists have
found that by taking pictures of a face using infra-red
cameras, a unique heat distribution pattern is seen. The
different densities of bone, skin, fat and blood vessels all
contribute to the individual's personal "heat signature." 53
In the last few decades, technology has progressed at a
galloping rate. Some science fictions are now science facts.
Today, biometrics is no longer limited to the use of
fingerprint to identify an individual. It is a new science that
uses various technologies in encoding any and all biological
characteristics of an individual for identification. It is
noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific
biological characteristics and what particular biometrics
technology shall be used to identify people who will seek its
coverage. Considering the banquest of options available to
the implementors of A.O. No. 308, the fear that it threatens
the right to privacy of our people is not groundless.
A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further
look will show that it does not state whether encoding of
data is limited to biological information alone for
identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims
that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will
contribute to the "generation of population data for
development planning." 54 This is an admission that the PRN
will not be used solely for identification but the generation of
other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of
A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can
give the government the roving authority to store and
retrieve information for a purpose other than the
identification of the individual through his PRN.
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under
A.O. No. 308 cannot be undarplayed as the dissenters do.
Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must
present his PRN everytime he deals with a government
agency to avail of basic services and security. His
transactions with the government agency will necessarily be
recorded — whether it be in the computer or in the
documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may
include his transactions for loan availments, income tax
returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements
for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the
use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge
formidable informatin base through the electronic linkage of
the files. 55 The data may be gathered for gainful and useful
government purposes; but the existence of this vast
reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert
invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for
some of our authorities to resist. 56
We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will
be limited to the name, address and other basic personal
infomation about the individual. 57 Even that hospitable
assumption will not save A.O. No. 308 from constitutional
infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear and
categorical terms how these information gathered shall he
handled. It does not provide who shall control and access
the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose.
These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and
guaranty the integrity of the information. 58 Well to note, the
computer linkage gives other government agencies access
to the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against
leakage of information. When the access code of the control
programs of the particular computer system is broken, an
intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of
the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data
stored within the system. 59
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of
assuring that personal information which will be gathered
about our people will only be processed for unequivocally
specified purposes. 60 The lack of proper safeguards in this
regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's
liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track
down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous
persons to access confidential information and circumvent
the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for
"fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. 61 The
possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and
computer technology are accentuated when we consider that
the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed
on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data
encoded. 62 They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of
Rights seeks to prevent. 63
The ability of sophisticated data center to generate a
comprehensive cradle-to-grave dossier on an individual and
transmit it over a national network is one of the most graphic
threats of the computer revolution. 64 The computer is
capable of producing a comprehensive dossier on
individuals out of information given at different times and for
varied purposes. 65 It can continue adding to the stored data
and keeping the information up to date. Retrieval of stored
date is simple. When information of a privileged character
finds its way into the computer, it can be extracted together
with other data on the subject. 66Once extracted, the
information is putty in the hands of any person. The end of
privacy begins.
Though A.O. No. 308 is undoubtedly not narrowly drawn, the
dissenting opinions would dismiss its danger to the right to
privacy as speculative and hypothetical. Again, we cannot
countenance such a laidback posture. The Court will not be
true to its role as the ultimate guardian of the people's liberty
if it would not immediately smother the sparks that endanger
their rights but would rather wait for the fire that could
consume them.
We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy with
regard to the Natioal ID and the use of biometrics technology
as it stands on quicksand. The reasonableness of a person's
expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1)
whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an
expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is
one that society recognizes as reasonable. 67 The factual
circumstances of the case determines the reasonableness of
the expectation. 68 However, other factors, such as customs,
physical surroundings and practices of a particular activity,
may serve to create or diminish this expectation. 69 The use
of biometrics and computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does
not assure the individual of a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 70 As technology advances, the level of reasonably
expected privacy decreases. 71 The measure of protection
granted by the reasonable expectation diminishes as
relevant technology becomes more widely accepted. 72 The
security of the computer data file depends not only on the
physical inaccessibility of the file but also on the advances
in hardware and software computer technology. A.O. No. 308
is so widely drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable
expectation of privacy, regardless of technology used,
cannot be inferred from its provisions.
The rules and regulations to be by the IACC cannot remedy
this fatal defect. Rules and regulations merely implement the
policy of the law or order. On its face, A.O. No. gives the
IACC virtually infettered discretion to determine the metes
and bounds of the ID System.
Nor do your present laws prvide adequate safeguards for a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Commonwealth Act. No.
591 penalizes the disclosure by any person of data furnished
by the individual to the NSO with imprisonment and
fine. 73 Republic Act. No. 1161 prohibits public disclosure of
SSS employment records and reports. 74 These laws,
however, apply to records and data with the NSO and the
SSS. It is not clear whether they may be applied to data with
the other government agencies forming part of the National
ID System. The need to clarify the penal aspect of A.O. No.
308 is another reason why its enactment should be given to
Congress.
Next, the Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's
abridgment of the right of privacy by using the rational
relationship test. 75 He stressed that the purposes of A.O. No.
308 are: (1) to streamline and speed up the implementation
of basic government services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding
duplication of services, and (3) generate population data for
development planning. He cocludes that these purposes
justify the incursions into the right to privacy for the means
are rationally related to the end. 76
We are not impressed by the argument. In Morfe v.
Mutuc, 77 we upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police power
measure. We declared that the law, in compelling a public
officer to make an annual report disclosing his assets and
liabilities, his sources of income and expenses, did not
infringe on the individual's right to privacy. The law was
enacted to promote morality in public administration by
curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official
corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the
public service. 78
The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For
one, R.A. 3019 is a statute, not an administrative order.
Secondly, R.A. 3019 itself is sufficiently detailed. The law is
clear on what practices were prohibited and penalized, and it
was narrowly drawn to avoid abuses. IN the case at bar, A.O.
No. 308 may have been impelled by a worthy purpose, but, it
cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly
drawn. And we now hod that when the integrity of a
fundamental right is at stake, this court will give the
challenged law, administrative order, rule or regulation a
stricter scrutiny. It will not do for the authorities to invoke the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties. Nor is it enough for the authorities to prove that their
act is not irrational for a basic right can be diminished, if not
defeated, even when the government does not act
irrationally. They must satisfactorily show the presence of
compelling state interests and that the law, rule or regulation
is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. This approach is
demanded by the 1987 Constitution whose entire matrix is
designed to protect human rights and to prevent
authoritarianism. In case of doubt, the least we can do is to
lean towards the stance that will not put in danger the rights
protected by the Constitutions.
The case of Whalen v. Roe 79 cited by the Solicitor General is
also off-line. In Whalen, the United States Supreme Court
was presented with the question of whether the State of New
York could keep a centralized computer record of the names
and addresses of all persons who obtained certain drugs
pursuant to a doctor's prescription. The New York State
Controlled Substance Act of 1972 required physicians to
identify parties obtaining prescription drugs enumerated in
the statute, i.e., drugs with a recognized medical use but with
a potential for abuse, so that the names and addresses of the
patients can be recorded in a centralized computer file of the
State Department of Health. The plaintiffs, who were patients
and doctors, claimed that some people might decline
necessary medication because of their fear that the
computerized data may be readily available and open to
public disclosure; and that once disclosed, it may stigmatize
them as drug addicts. 80 The plaintiffs alleged that the statute
invaded a constitutionally protected zone of privacy, i.e., the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters, and the interest in independence in making certain
kinds of important decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court held
that while an individual's interest in avoiding disclosuer of
personal matter is an aspect of the right to privacy, the
statute did not pose a grievous threat to establish a
constitutional violation. The Court found that the statute was
necessary to aid in the enforcement of laws designed to
minimize the misuse of dangerous drugs. The patient-
identification requirement was a product of an orderly and
rational legislative decision made upon recommmendation
by a specially appointed commission which held extensive
hearings on the matter. Moreover, the statute was narrowly
drawn and contained numerous safeguards against
indiscriminate disclosure. The statute laid down the
procedure and requirements for the gathering, storage and
retrieval of the informatin. It ebumerated who were
authorized to access the data. It also prohibited public
disclosure of the data by imposing penalties for its violation.
In view of these safeguards, the infringement of the patients'
right to privacy was justified by a valid exercise of police
power. As we discussed above, A.O. No. 308 lacks these vital
safeguards.
Even while we strike down A.O. No. 308, we spell out in neon
that the Court is not per se agains the use of computers to
accumulate, store, process, retvieve and transmit data to
improve our bureaucracy. Computers work wonders to
achieve the efficiency which both government and private
industry seek. Many information system in different
countries make use of the computer to facilitate important
social objective, such as better law enforcement, faster
delivery of public services, more efficient management of
credit and insurance programs, improvement of
telecommunications and streamlining of financial
activities. 81 Used wisely, data stored in the computer could
help good administration by making accurate and
comprehensive information for those who have to frame policy
and make key decisions. 82 The benefits of the computer has
revolutionized information technology. It developed the
internet, 83 introduced the concept of cyberspace 84 and the
information superhighway where the individual, armed only with
his personal computer, may surf and search all kinds and
classes of information from libraries and databases connected
to the net.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to
privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy.
The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological
advancements that enhance public service and the common
good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly
focused 85 and a compelling interest justify such
intrusions. 86 Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by
proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent
unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that any law or order
that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to
strict scrutiny. The reason for this stance was laid down
in Morfe v. Mutuc, to wit:
 The concept of limited government has always take note of the well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the
included the idea that governmental powers disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by an
stop short of certain intrusions into the unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the
personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one threat is that because of its record-keeping, the society will
of the basic disctinctions between absolute have lost its benign capacity to forget." 89 Oblivious to this
and limited government. Ultimate and counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too quick in
pervasive control of the individual, in all labelling the right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close
aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the with the statement that the right to privacy was not engraved in
our Constitution for flattery.
absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited
government safeguards a private sector,
which belongs to the individual, firmly IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Adminisrative
distinguishing it from the public sector, which Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized
the state can control. Protection of this private Identification Reference System" declared null and void for
sector — protection, in other words, of the being unconstitutional.
dignity and integrity of the individual — has
become increasingly important as modern SO ORDERED.
society has developed. All the forces of a
technological age — industrialization,
urbanization, and organization — operate to
narrow the area of privacy and facilitate
intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity
to maintain and support this enclave of private
life marks the difference between a democratic
and a totalitarian society. 87

IV

The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of

man living in a mass society. The threats emanate from
various sources — governments, journalists, employers,
social scientists, etc. 88 In th case at bar, the threat comes from
the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No.
308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving
information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate
delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of
the computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive the danger
that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a
devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to
G.R. No. 104768 July 21, 2003
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q.
RAMAS and ELIZABETH DIMAANO, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to
set aside the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (First
Division)1 dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil
Case No. 0037. The first Resolution dismissed petitioner’s
Amended Complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated
items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second
Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in its Amended
Complaint, or in the alternative, for the remand of this case to the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) for further proceedings allowing
petitioner to complete the presentation of its evidence.
Antecedent Facts
Immediately upon her assumption to office following the
successful EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino
issued Executive Order No. 1 ("EO No. 1") creating the
Presidential Commission on Good Government ("PCGG"). EO
No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1 vested the
PCGG with the power "(a) to conduct investigation as may be
necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of
this order" and the power "(h) to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this
order." Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito
R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board ("AFP Board")
tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt
practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or
retired.2
Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various
reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major
General Josephus Q. Ramas ("Ramas"). On 27 July 1987, the
AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and
recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas.
The relevant part of the Resolution reads:
III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION:
Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a
house and lot located at 15-Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon City. He
is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot
has an area of 3,327 square meters.
The value of the property located in Quezon City may be
estimated modestly at ₱700,000.00.
The equipment/items and communication facilities which were
found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano and were confiscated
by elements of the PC Command of Batangas were all covered
by invoice receipt in the name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO
Command Coy, MSC, PA. These items could not have been in
the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by
respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Army.
Aside from the military equipment/items and communications
equipment, the raiding team was also able to confiscate money in
the amount of ₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the
house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.
Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military
Security Command, Philippine Army, stationed at Camp Eldridge,
Los Baños, Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the
mistress of respondent. That respondent usually goes and stays
and sleeps in the alleged house of Elizabeth Dimaano in
Barangay Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives,
Elizabeth Dimaano embraces and kisses respondent. That on
February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car went to the
residence of Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4) attache cases filled
with money and owned by MGen Ramas.
Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth
Dimaano had no visible means of income and is supported by
respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary.
Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have
used the military equipment/items seized in her house on March
3, 1986 without the consent of respondent, he being the
Commanding General of the Philippine Army. It is also impossible
for Elizabeth Dimaano to claim that she owns the ₱2,870,000.00
and $50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of income.
This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and
Liabilities of respondent. There was an intention to cover the
existence of these money because these are all ill-gotten and
unexplained wealth. Were it not for the affidavits of the members
of the Military Security Unit assigned at Camp Eldridge, Los
Baños, Laguna, the existence and ownership of these money
would have never been known.
The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were also
submitted for scrutiny and analysis by the Board’s consultant.
Although the amount of ₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars
were not included, still it was disclosed that respondent has an
unexplained wealth of ₱104,134. 60.
IV. CONCLUSION:
In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima facie case
exists against respondent for ill-gotten and unexplained wealth in
the amount of ₱2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.
V. RECOMMENDATION:
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas
(ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act" and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as "The Act for
the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property."3
Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture
under Republic Act No. 1379 ("RA No. 1379") 4against Ramas.
Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General
Francisco I. Chavez filed an Amended Complaint naming the
Republic of the Philippines ("petitioner"), represented by the
PCGG, as plaintiff and Ramas as defendant. The Amended
Complaint also impleaded Elizabeth Dimaano ("Dimaano") as co-
defendant.
The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the
Commanding General of the Philippine Army until 1986. On the
other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military
Security Unit, Philippine Army, assigned as a clerk-typist at the
office of Ramas from 1 January 1978 to February 1979. The
Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas "acquired funds,
assets and properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as
an army officer and his other income from legitimately acquired
property by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or
using his power, authority and influence as such officer of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and close
associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos."5
The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a
previous inquiry, found reasonable ground to believe that
respondents have violated RA No. 1379.6 The Amended
Complaint prayed for, among others, the forfeiture of
respondents’ properties, funds and equipment in favor of the
State.
Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses
and Compulsory Counterclaim to the Amended Complaint. In his
Answer, Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a
residential house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at
₱700,000, which was not out of proportion to his salary and other
legitimate income. He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu
City and the cash, communications equipment and other items
confiscated from the house of Dimaano.
Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint.
Admitting her employment as a clerk-typist in the office of Ramas
from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership
of the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles
taken from her house by the Philippine Constabulary raiding
team.
After termination of the pre-trial,7 the court set the case for trial on
the merits on 9-11 November 1988.
On 9 November 1988, petitioner asked for a deferment of the
hearing due to its lack of preparation for trial and the absence of
witnesses and vital documents to support its case. The court
reset the hearing to 17 and 18 April 1989.
On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the
complaint in order "to charge the delinquent properties with being
subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by
defendant Dimaano alone x x x."8
Nevertheless, in an order dated 17 April 1989, the
Sandiganbayan proceeded with petitioner’s presentation of
evidence on the ground that the motion for leave to amend
complaint did not state when petitioner would file the amended
complaint. The Sandiganbayan further stated that the subject
matter of the amended complaint was on its face vague and not
related to the existing complaint. The Sandiganbayan also held
that due to the time that the case had been pending in court,
petitioner should proceed to present its evidence.
After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a
postponement of the trial.
On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the trial,
petitioner manifested its inability to proceed to trial because of the
absence of other witnesses or lack of further evidence to present.
Instead, petitioner reiterated its motion to amend the complaint to
conform to the evidence already presented or to change the
averments to show that Dimaano alone unlawfully acquired the
monies or properties subject of the forfeiture.
The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the
case for over a year mainly because of its many postponements.
Moreover, petitioner would want the case to revert to its
preliminary stage when in fact the case had long been ready for
trial. The Sandiganbayan ordered petitioner to prepare for
presentation of its additional evidence, if any.
During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted its
inability to present further evidence. Giving petitioner one more
chance to present further evidence or to amend the complaint to
conform to its evidence, the Sandiganbayan reset the trial to 18
May 1990. The Sandiganbayan, however, hinted that the re-
setting was without prejudice to any action that private
respondents might take under the circumstances.
However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability
to proceed to trial because it had no further evidence to present.
Again, in the interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan granted
petitioner 60 days within which to file an appropriate pleading.
The Sandiganbayan, however, warned petitioner that failure to
act would constrain the court to take drastic action.
Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on
Republic v. Migrino.9 The Court held in Migrino that the PCGG
does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military
officers by reason of mere position held without a showing that
they are "subordinates" of former President Marcos.
On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a
resolution, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the
Amended Complaint, without pronouncement as to costs. The
counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the
confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry
and land titles are ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.
The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the
Hon. Ombudsman, who has primary jurisdiction over the forfeiture
cases under R.A. No. 1379, for such appropriate action as the
evidence warrants. This case is also referred to the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a
determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano
in connection herewith.
SO ORDERED.
On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for
Reconsideration.
In answer to the Motion for Reconsideration, private respondents
filed a Joint Comment/Opposition to which petitioner filed its
Reply on 10 January 1992.
On 25 March 1992, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution
denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the
following grounds:
(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in
accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court in Cruz,
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan10 and Republic v. Migrino11 which
involve the same issues.
(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary
investigations in criminal cases was conducted against
Ramas and Dimaano.
(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not
constitute a prima facie case against him.
(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items
confiscated.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
A. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONER’S EVIDENCE
CANNOT MAKE A CASE FOR FORFEITURE AND THAT
THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF CONSPIRACY,
COLLUSION OR RELATIONSHIP BY CONSANGUINITY
OR AFFINITY BY AND BETWEEN RESPONDENT
RAMAS AND RESPONDENT DIMAANO
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SUCH
CONCLUSIONS WERE CLEARLY UNFOUNDED AND
PREMATURE, HAVING BEEN RENDERED PRIOR TO
THE COMPLETION OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE
EVIDENCE OF THE PETITIONER.
 B. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE
PETITIONER, INCLUDING THE FILING OF THE
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT, SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT IN LINE WITH
THE RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CRUZ,
JR. v. SANDIGANBAYAN, 194 SCRA 474 AND
REPUBLIC v. MIGRINO, 189 SCRA 289,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:
1. The cases of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,
supra, and Republic v. Migrino, supra, are clearly
not applicable to this case;
2. Any procedural defect in the institution of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 0037 was cured
and/or waived by respondents with the filing of
their respective answers with counterclaim; and
3. The separate motions to dismiss were evidently
improper considering that they were filed after
commencement of the presentation of the
evidence of the petitioner and even before the
latter was allowed to formally offer its evidence
and rest its case;
C. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE ARTICLES AND THINGS SUCH
AS SUMS OF MONEY, COMMUNICATIONS
EQUIPMENT, JEWELRY AND LAND TITLES
CONFISCATED FROM THE HOUSE OF RESPONDENT
DIMAANO WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND
THEREFORE EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE.12
The Court’s Ruling
First Issue: PCGG’s Jurisdiction to Investigate Private
Respondents
This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by
this Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan13 and Republic v.
Migrino.14
The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the
jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture
petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth
under RA No. 1379.
We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.
The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained
wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, whether in the
active service or retired.15 The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to
make the necessary recommendations to appropriate
government agencies on the action to be taken based on its
findings.16 The PCGG gave this task to the AFP Board pursuant to
the PCGG’s power under Section 3 of EO No. 1 "to conduct
investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and to
carry out the purposes of this order." EO No. 1 gave the PCGG
specific responsibilities, to wit:
SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of
assisting the President in regard to the following matters:
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, whether located in the
Philippines or abroad, including the takeover and sequestration of
all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them,
during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking
undue advantage of their public office and/ or using their powers,
authority, influence, connections or relationship.
(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the
President may assign to the Commission from time to time.
x x x.
The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel who
fall under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of
EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated
ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former President
Marcos by being the latter’s immediate family, relative,
subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of their
public office or using their powers, influence x x x;17 or (2) AFP
personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided
the President assigns their cases to the PCGG.18
Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned
Ramas’ case to the PCGG. Therefore, Ramas’ case should fall
under the first category of AFP personnel before the PCGG could
exercise its jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that Ramas
was undoubtedly a subordinate of former President Marcos
because of his position as the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army. Petitioner claims that Ramas’ position enabled
him to receive orders directly from his commander-in-chief,
undeniably making him a subordinate of former President
Marcos.
We hold that Ramas was not a "subordinate" of former President
Marcos in the sense contemplated under EO No. 1 and its
amendments.
Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically
make him a "subordinate" as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association
with former President Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue in this
wise:
A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will
readily show what is contemplated within the term ‘subordinate.’
The Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1 express the urgent need to
recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close
associates both here and abroad.
EO No. 2 freezes ‘all assets and properties in the Philippines in
which former President Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda
Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates,
dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or participation.’
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem
generis that is-
‘[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or
things by words of a particular and specific meaning, such
general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but
are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same
kind or class as those specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co,
Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58, citing Black
on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203].’
[T]he term "subordinate" as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one
who enjoys a close association with former President Marcos
and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative,
and close associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business
associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2.
xxx
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a
government official or employee during the administration of
former President Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing
that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his
close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his
wife. (Emphasis supplied)
Ramas’ position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine
Army with the rank of Major General19 does not suffice to make
him a "subordinate" of former President Marcos for purposes of
EO No. 1 and its amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima
facie showing that Ramas was a close associate of former
President Marcos, in the same manner that business associates,
dummies, agents or nominees of former President Marcos were
close to him. Such close association is manifested either by
Ramas’ complicity with former President Marcos in the
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President or by
former President Marcos’ acquiescence in Ramas’ own
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any.
This, the PCGG failed to do.
Petitioner’s attempt to differentiate the instant case from Migrino
does not convince us. Petitioner argues that unlike in Migrino, the
AFP Board Resolution in the instant case states that the AFP
Board conducted the investigation pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A in relation to RA No. 1379. Petitioner asserts that there
is a presumption that the PCGG was acting within its jurisdiction
of investigating crony-related cases of graft and corruption and
that Ramas was truly a subordinate of the former President.
However, the same AFP Board Resolution belies this contention.
Although the Resolution begins with such statement, it ends with
the following recommendation:
V. RECOMMENDATION:
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas
(ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act" and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as "The Act for
the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property."20
Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute
private respondents under EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, the result
yielded a finding of violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379
without any relation to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence
of relation to EO No. 1 and its amendments proves fatal to
petitioner’s case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and
limited purpose, and necessarily its powers must be construed to
address such specific and limited purpose.
Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the
Amended Complaint do not show that the properties Ramas
allegedly owned were accumulated by him in his capacity as a
"subordinate" of his commander-in-chief. Petitioner merely
enumerated the properties Ramas allegedly owned and
suggested that these properties were disproportionate to his
salary and other legitimate income without showing that Ramas
amassed them because of his close association with former
President Marcos. Petitioner, in fact, admits that the AFP Board
resolution does not contain a finding that Ramas accumulated his
wealth because of his close association with former President
Marcos, thus:
10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft Board of
the New Armed Forces of the Philippines did not
categorically find a prima facie evidence showing that
respondent Ramas unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue
of his close association or relation with former President
Marcos and/or his wife, it is submitted that such omission
was not fatal. The resolution of the Anti-Graft Board should be
read in the context of the law creating the same and the objective
of the investigation which was, as stated in the above, pursuant to
Republic Act Nos. 3019 and 1379 in relation to Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-a;21 (Emphasis supplied)
Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a
prima facie showing that the ill-gotten wealth was accumulated by
a "subordinate" of former President Marcos that vests jurisdiction
on PCGG. EO No. 122 clearly premises the creation of the PCGG
on the urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth amassed by
former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates. Therefore, to say that such
omission was not fatal is clearly contrary to the intent behind the
creation of the PCGG.
In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,23 the Court outlined the cases that
fall under the jurisdiction of the PCGG pursuant to EO Nos. 1,
2,24 14,25 14-A:26
A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive Order No. 1
in relation with Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Executive Order No. 14,
shows what the authority of the respondent PCGG to investigate
and prosecute covers:
(a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action for
the recovery of ill-gotten wealth under Republic Act No.
1379, accumulated by former President Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad,
including the take-over or sequestration of all business
enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them,
during his administration, directly or through his
nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public
office and/or using their powers, authority and influence,
connections or relationships; and
(b) the investigation and prosecution of such offenses
committed in the acquisition of said ill-gotten wealth as
contemplated under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No.
1.
However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act not otherwise falling under the foregoing
categories, require a previous authority of the President for
the respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute in
accordance with Section 2 (b) of Executive Order No. 1.
Otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is vested in the
Ombudsman and other duly authorized investigating
agencies such as the provincial and city prosecutors, their
assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor and his assistants and
the state prosecutors. (Emphasis supplied)
The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should
investigate and prosecute forfeiture petitions not falling under EO
No. 1 and its amendments. The preliminary investigation of
unexplained wealth amassed on or before 25 February 1986 falls
under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, while the authority to
file the corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the Solicitor
General.27 The Ombudsman Act or Republic Act No. 6770 ("RA
No. 6770") vests in the Ombudsman the power to conduct
preliminary investigation and to file forfeiture proceedings
involving unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February 1986.28
After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still
pursued this case despite the absence of a prima facie finding
that Ramas was a "subordinate" of former President Marcos. The
petition for forfeiture filed with the Sandiganbayan should be
dismissed for lack of authority by the PCGG to investigate
respondents since there is no prima facie showing that EO No. 1
and its amendments apply to respondents. The AFP Board
Resolution and even the Amended Complaint state that there are
violations of RA Nos. 3019 and 1379. Thus, the PCGG should
have recommended Ramas’ case to the Ombudsman who has
jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of ordinary
unexplained wealth and graft cases. As stated in Migrino:
[But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to
investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent for
violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also
be enjoined from proceeding with the case, without prejudice to
any action that may be taken by the proper prosecutory agency.
The rule of law mandates that an agency of government be
allowed to exercise only the powers granted to it.
Petitioner’s argument that private respondents have waived any
defect in the filing of the forfeiture petition by submitting their
respective Answers with counterclaim deserves no merit as well.
Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus,
there is no jurisdiction to waive in the first place. The PCGG
cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never
granted to it. PCGG’s powers are specific and limited. Unless
given additional assignment by the President, PCGG’s sole task
is only to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their
relatives and cronies.29 Without these elements, the PCGG cannot
claim jurisdiction over a case.
Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction of
the PCGG to investigate and prosecute their cases by filing their
Motion to Dismiss as soon as they learned of the pronouncement
of the Court in Migrino. This case was decided on 30 August
1990, which explains why private respondents only filed their
Motion to Dismiss on 8 October 1990. Nevertheless, we have
held that the parties may raise lack of jurisdiction at any stage of
the proceeding.30 Thus, we hold that there was no waiver of
jurisdiction in this case. Jurisdiction is vested by law and not by
the parties to an action.31
Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct the preliminary investigation.
The Ombudsman may still conduct the proper preliminary
investigation for violation of RA No. 1379, and if warranted, the
Solicitor General may file the forfeiture petition with the
Sandiganbayan.32 The right of the State to forfeit unexplained
wealth under RA No. 1379 is not subject to prescription, laches or
estoppel.33
Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case
Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence
Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in
dismissing the case before completion of the presentation of
petitioner’s evidence.
We disagree.
Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of
this case, we find that petitioner has only itself to blame for non-
completion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this case has
been pending for four years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed
it. Petitioner filed its Amended Complaint on 11 August 1987, and
only began to present its evidence on 17 April 1989. Petitioner
had almost two years to prepare its evidence. However, despite
this sufficient time, petitioner still delayed the presentation of the
rest of its evidence by filing numerous motions for postponements
and extensions. Even before the date set for the presentation of
its evidence, petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a Motion for Leave
to Amend the Complaint.34 The motion sought "to charge the
delinquent properties (which comprise most of petitioner’s
evidence) with being subject to forfeiture as having been
unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x x."
The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the presentation
of petitioner’s evidence since petitioner did not state when it
would file the amended complaint. On 18 April 1989, the
Sandiganbayan set the continuation of the presentation of
evidence on 28-29 September and 9-11 October 1989, giving
petitioner ample time to prepare its evidence. Still, on 28
September 1989, petitioner manifested its inability to proceed
with the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan issued
an Order expressing its view on the matter, to wit:
The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a narration of
the above events because this case has been ready for trial for
over a year and much of the delay hereon has been due to the
inability of the government to produce on scheduled dates for pre-
trial and for trial documents and witnesses, allegedly upon the
failure of the military to supply them for the preparation of the
presentation of evidence thereon. Of equal interest is the fact that
this Court has been held to task in public about its alleged failure
to move cases such as this one beyond the preliminary stage,
when, in view of the developments such as those of today, this
Court is now faced with a situation where a case already in
progress will revert back to the preliminary stage, despite a five-
month pause where appropriate action could have been
undertaken by the plaintiff Republic.35
On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that it was
conducting a preliminary investigation on the unexplained wealth
of private respondents as mandated by RA No. 1379.36 The PCGG
prayed for an additional four months to conduct the preliminary
investigation. The Sandiganbayan granted this request and
scheduled the presentation of evidence on 26-29 March 1990.
However, on the scheduled date, petitioner failed to inform the
court of the result of the preliminary investigation the PCGG
supposedly conducted. Again, the Sandiganbayan gave petitioner
until 18 May 1990 to continue with the presentation of its
evidence and to inform the court of "what lies ahead insofar as
the status of the case is concerned x x x."37 Still on the date set,
petitioner failed to present its evidence. Finally, on 11 July 1990,
petitioner filed its Re-Amended Complaint.38 The Sandiganbayan
correctly observed that a case already pending for years would
revert to its preliminary stage if the court were to accept the Re-
Amended Complaint.
Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself
to blame for failure to complete the presentation of its evidence.
The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner more than sufficient time to
finish the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan
overlooked petitioner’s delays and yet petitioner ended the long-
string of delays with the filing of a Re-Amended Complaint, which
would only prolong even more the disposition of the case.
Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz
prompted the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case since the
PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the case
against private respondents. This alone would have been
sufficient legal basis for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the
forfeiture case against private respondents.
Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing
the case before completion of the presentation of petitioner’s
evidence.
Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the
properties confiscated from Dimaano’s house as illegally seized
and therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a
significant effect on petitioner’s case since these properties
comprise most of petitioner’s evidence against private
respondents. Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its
case against private respondents if these properties are
inadmissible in evidence.
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at
Dimaano’s residence a search warrant captioned "Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition." Dimaano was not
present during the raid but Dimaano’s cousins witnessed the raid.
The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure receipt
together with other items not included in the search warrant. The
raiding team seized these items: one baby armalite rifle with two
magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45;
communications equipment, cash consisting of ₱2,870,000 and
US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding
team conducted the search and seizure "on March 3, 1986 or five
days after the successful EDSA revolution."39 Petitioner argues
that a revolutionary government was operative at that time by
virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino
and Vice President Laurel were "taking power in the name and by
the will of the Filipino people."40 Petitioner asserts that the
revolutionary government effectively withheld the operation of the
1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents’
exclusionary right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising
from an illegal search applies only beginning 2 February 1987,
the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner
contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights had already
reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search.
Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items
taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her
since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did not
enjoy any constitutional right.
Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As
succinctly stated in President Aquino’s Proclamation No. 3 dated
25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was "done in defiance of
the provisions of the 1973 Constitution."41 The resulting
government was indisputably a revolutionary government bound
by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that
the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the
Philippines, assumed under international law.
The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government
was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during
the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of
power by the revolutionary government following the cessation of
resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately
before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2)
whether the protection accorded to individuals under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("Covenant")
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Declaration")
remained in effect during the interregnum.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was
not operative during the interregnum. However, we rule that the
protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the
Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government were the supreme law because no
constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and
orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the
successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the
directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus,
during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any
exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was
neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.
As the Court explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S.
Puno:42
A revolution has been defined as "the complete overthrow of the
established government in any country or state by those who
were previously subject to it" or as "a sudden, radical and
fundamental change in the government or political system,
usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence."
In Kelsen's book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined
as that which "occurs whenever the legal order of a community is
nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a way not prescribed by
the first order itself."
It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful
one, and more popularly known as the "people power revolution"
that the Filipino people tore themselves away from an existing
regime. This revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power
of the Aquino government.
From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has
been defined as "an inherent right of a people to cast out their
rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system
of government or institutions by force or a general uprising when
the legal and constitutional methods of making such change have
proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable." It
has been said that "the locus of positive law-making power lies
with the people of the state" and from there is derived "the right of
the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of
government without regard to the existing constitution."
xxx
It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino’s rise to the presidency
was not due to constitutional processes; in fact, it was
achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973
Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier
declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential
election. Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs.
Aquino’s Government which was met by little resistance and her
control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet
and other key officers of the administration, the departure of the
Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of the Judiciary and the Military
signaled the point where the legal system then in effect, had
ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino. (Emphasis supplied)
To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution
remained operative during the interregnum would render void all
sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission on
Good Government ("PCGG") before the adoption of the Freedom
Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the freezing
and even the take-over of private property by mere executive
issuance without judicial action, would violate the due process
and search and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in power was
concededly a revolutionary government bound by no constitution.
No one could validly question the sequestration orders as
violative of the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights
during the interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the
Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the
sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the
Freedom Constitution.
In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs. Presidential
Commission on Good Government,43 petitioner Baseco, while
conceding there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum,
questioned the continued validity of the sequestration orders
upon adoption of the Freedom Constitution in view of the due
process clause in its Bill of Rights. The Court ruled that the
Freedom Constitution, and later the 1987 Constitution, expressly
recognized the validity of sequestration orders, thus:
If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing
considerations as to the validity and propriety of sequestration,
freeze and takeover orders, it should be dispelled by the fact that
these particular remedies and the authority of the PCGG to issue
them have received constitutional approbation and sanction. As
already mentioned, the Provisional or "Freedom" Constitution
recognizes the power and duty of the President to enact
"measures to achieve the mandate of the people to . . . (r)ecover
ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the
previous regime and protect the interest of the people through
orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts." And as
also already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution treats of, and ratifies the "authority to issue
sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated
March 25, 1986."
The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987
Constitution were fully aware that the sequestration orders would
clash with the Bill of Rights. Thus, the framers of both
constitutions had to include specific language recognizing the
validity of the sequestration orders. The following discourse by
Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission is instructive:
FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something
schizophrenic about the arguments in defense of the present
amendment.
For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salonga’s lecture in
the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, of which all of us
have been given a copy. On the one hand, he argues that
everything the Commission is doing is traditionally legal. This is
repeated by Commissioner Romulo also. Minister Salonga
spends a major portion of his lecture developing that argument.
On the other hand, almost as an afterthought, he says that in the
end what matters are the results and not the legal niceties, thus
suggesting that the PCGG should be allowed to make some legal
shortcuts, another word for niceties or exceptions.
Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it asking the
CONCOM for special protection? The answer is clear. What they
are doing will not stand the test of ordinary due process, hence
they are asking for protection, for exceptions. Grandes malos,
grandes remedios, fine, as the saying stands, but let us not say
grandes malos, grande y malos remedios. That is not an
allowable extrapolation. Hence, we should not give the
exceptions asked for, and let me elaborate and give three
reasons:
First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of the work
of the CONCOM is to hasten constitutional normalization. Very
much at the heart of the constitutional normalization is the full
effectivity of the Bill of Rights. We cannot, in one breath, ask for
constitutional normalization and at the same time ask for a
temporary halt to the full functioning of what is at the heart of
constitutionalism. That would be hypocritical; that would be a
repetition of Marcosian protestation of due process and rule of
law. The New Society word for that is "backsliding." It is tragic
when we begin to backslide even before we get there.
Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend to
become ingrained. The committee report asks for extraordinary
exceptions from the Bill of Rights for six months after the
convening of Congress, and Congress may even extend this
longer.
Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds repeated
become vice. What the committee report is asking for is that we
should allow the new government to acquire the vice of
disregarding the Bill of Rights.
Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to shed. The
practitioners of the vice begin to think that they have a vested
right to its practice, and they will fight tooth and nail to keep the
franchise. That would be an unhealthy way of consolidating the
gains of a democratic revolution.
Third, the argument that what matters are the results and not the
legal niceties is an argument that is very disturbing. When it
comes from a staunch Christian like Commissioner Salonga, a
Minister, and repeated verbatim by another staunch Christian like
Commissioner Tingson, it becomes doubly disturbing and even
discombobulating. The argument makes the PCGG an
auctioneer, placing the Bill of Rights on the auction block. If the
price is right, the search and seizure clause will be sold. "Open
your Swiss bank account to us and we will award you the search
and seizure clause. You can keep it in your private safe."
Alternatively, the argument looks on the present government as
hostage to the hoarders of hidden wealth. The hoarders will
release the hidden health if the ransom price is paid and the
ransom price is the Bill of Rights, specifically the due process in
the search and seizure clauses. So, there is something positively
revolving about either argument. The Bill of Rights is not for sale
to the highest bidder nor can it be used to ransom captive dollars.
This nation will survive and grow strong, only if it would become
convinced of the values enshrined in the Constitution of a price
that is beyond monetary estimation.
For these reasons, the honorable course for the Constitutional
Commission is to delete all of Section 8 of the committee report
and allow the new Constitution to take effect in full vigor. If
Section 8 is deleted, the PCGG has two options. First, it can
pursue the Salonga and the Romulo argument — that what the
PCGG has been doing has been completely within the pale of the
law. If sustained, the PCGG can go on and should be able to go
on, even without the support of Section 8. If not sustained,
however, the PCGG has only one honorable option, it must bow
to the majesty of the Bill of Rights.
The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by staunch
Christians. Let me conclude with what another Christian replied
when asked to toy around with the law. From his prison cell,
Thomas More said, "I'll give the devil benefit of law for my nation’s
safety sake." I ask the Commission to give the devil benefit of law
for our nation’s sake. And we should delete Section 8.
Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)
Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against
the amendment excepting sequestration orders from the Bill of
Rights, the Constitutional Commission still adopted the
amendment as Section 26,44 Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.
The framers of the Constitution were fully aware that absent
Section 26, sequestration orders would not stand the test of due
process under the Bill of Rights.
Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution
remained in force during the interregnum, absent a constitutional
provision excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights,
would clearly render all sequestration orders void during the
interregnum. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the
Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the
Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of
the 1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure
government, assumed responsibility for the State’s good faith
compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a
signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory
State "to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory
and subject to its jurisdiction the rights45 recognized in the present
Covenant." Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary
government had the duty to insure that "[n]o one shall be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence."
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory,
provides in its Article 17(2) that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his property." Although the signatories to the
Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding document, being
only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as
part of the generally accepted principles of international law and
binding on the State.46 Thus, the revolutionary government was
also obligated under international law to observe the rights47 of
individuals under the Declaration.
The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or
the Declaration during the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary
government could have repudiated all its obligations under the
Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue
here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the Declaration as
part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human
beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid
down in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government
did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same
way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure
government, the revolutionary government could not escape
responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with its treaty
obligations under international law.
It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on
25 March 1986 that the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if
contravened, rendered such directives and orders void. The
Provisional Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of the
1973 Constitution.48 The Provisional Constitution served as a self-
limitation by the revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the
absolute powers entrusted to it by the people.
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights
existed, directives and orders issued by government officers were
valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority
granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives
and orders should not have also violated the Covenant or the
Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government
presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary
government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge
upon proper application, specified the items to be searched and
seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items
specifically described in the warrant.
However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not
included in the warrant. As admitted by petitioner’s witnesses, the
raiding team confiscated items not included in the warrant, thus:
Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian
AJ AMORES
Q. According to the search warrant, you are supposed to seize
only for weapons. What else, aside from the weapons, were
seized from the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The communications equipment, money in Philippine currency
and US dollars, some jewelries, land titles, sir.
Q. Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to be seized
from the house of Elizabeth Dimaano. Do you know the reason
why your team also seized other properties not mentioned in said
search warrant?
A. During the conversation right after the conduct of said raid, I
was informed that the reason why they also brought the other
items not included in the search warrant was because the money
and other jewelries were contained in attaché cases and cartons
with markings "Sony Trinitron", and I think three (3) vaults or steel
safes. Believing that the attaché cases and the steel safes were
containing firearms, they forced open these containers only to
find out that they contained money.
xxx
Q. You said you found money instead of weapons, do you know
the reason why your team seized this money instead of
weapons?
A. I think the overall team leader and the other two officers
assisting him decided to bring along also the money because at
that time it was already dark and they felt most secured if they will
bring that because they might be suspected also of taking money
out of those items, your Honor.49
Cross-examination
Atty. Banaag
Q. Were you present when the search warrant in connection with
this case was applied before the Municipal Trial Court of
Batangas, Branch 1?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the search warrant applied for by you was for the search
and seizure of five (5) baby armalite rifles M-16 and five (5) boxes
of ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx
AJ AMORES
Q. Before you applied for a search warrant, did you conduct
surveillance in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance together
with the MSU elements, your Honor.
Q. And this party believed there were weapons deposited in the
house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. But they did not mention to you, the applicant for the search
warrant, any other properties or contraband which could be found
in the residence of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. They just gave us still unconfirmed report about some hidden
items, for instance, the communications equipment and money.
However, I did not include that in the application for search
warrant considering that we have not established concrete
evidence about that. So when…
Q. So that when you applied for search warrant, you had reason
to believe that only weapons were in the house of Miss Elizabeth
Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.50
xxx
Q. You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along with one
armalite rifle M-16 and how many ammunition?
A. Forty, sir.
Q. And this became the subject of your complaint with the issuing
Court, with the fiscal’s office who charged Elizabeth Dimaano for
Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know what happened to that case?
A. I think it was dismissed, sir.
Q. In the fiscal’s office?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as the .45
caliber pistol had a Memorandum Receipt in the name of Felino
Melegrito, is that not correct?
A. I think that was the reason, sir.
Q. There were other articles seized which were not included in
the search warrant, like for instance, jewelries. Why did you seize
the jewelries?
A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his
assistant to bring along also the jewelries and other items, sir. I
do not really know where it was taken but they brought along also
these articles. I do not really know their reason for bringing the
same, but I just learned that these were taken because they
might get lost if they will just leave this behind.
xxx
Q. How about the money seized by your raiding team, they were
not also included in the search warrant?
A. Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken considering that the
money was discovered to be contained in attaché cases. These1âwphi 1
attaché cases were suspected to be containing pistols or other
high powered firearms, but in the course of the search the
contents turned out to be money. So the team leader also
decided to take this considering that they believed that if they will
just leave the money behind, it might get lost also.
Q. That holds true also with respect to the other articles that were
seized by your raiding team, like Transfer Certificates of Title of
lands?
A. Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the vaults that
were opened.51
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the
warrant did not include the monies, communications equipment,
jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The
search warrant did not particularly describe these items and the
raiding team confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding
team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that
these items could be the subject of warrantless search and
seizure.52 Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it
seized these items.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these
items are contraband per se,53 and they are not, they must be
returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them.
However, we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner
of these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant could
not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the
possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned
immediately to Dimaano.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The
questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 18
November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037,
remanding the records of this case to the Ombudsman for such
appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and referring this
case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a
determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth
Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO, J.:
While I concur in the result of the ponencia of Mr. Justice Carpio,
the ruling on whether or not private respondent Dimaano could
invoke her rights against unreasonable search and seizure and to
the exclusion of evidence resulting therefrom compels this
humble opinion. The ponencia states that "(t)he correct issue is
whether the Bill of Rights was operative during the interregnum
from February 26, 1986 (the day Corazon C. Aquino took her
oath as President) to March 24, 1986 (immediately before the
adoption of the Freedom Constitution)."1 The majority holds that
the Bill of Rights was not operative, thus private respondent
Dimaano cannot invoke the right against unreasonable search
and seizure and the exclusionary right as her house was
searched and her properties were seized during the interregnum
or on March 3, 1986. My disagreement is not with the ruling that
the Bill of Rights was not operative at that time, but with the
conclusion that the private respondent has lost and cannot invoke
the right against unreasonable search and seizure and the
exclusionary right. Using a different lens in viewing the problem at
hand, I respectfully submit that the crucial issue for resolution is
whether she can invoke these rights in the absence of a
constitution under the extraordinary circumstances after the 1986
EDSA Revolution. The question boggles the intellect, and is
interesting, to say the least, perhaps even to those not half-
interested in the law. But the question of whether the Filipinos
were bereft of fundamental rights during the one month
interregnum is not as perplexing as the question of whether the
world was without a God in the three days that God the Son
descended into the dead before He rose to life. Nature abhors a
vacuum and so does the law.
I. Prologue
The ponencia suggests that the Constitution, the Bill of Rights in
particular, is the only source of rights, hence in its absence,
private respondent Dimaano cannot invoke her rights against
unreasonable search and seizure and to the exclusion of
evidence obtained therefrom. Pushing the ponencia’s line of
reasoning to the extreme will result in the conclusion that during
the one month interregnum, the people lost their constitutionally
guaranteed rights to life, liberty and property and the
revolutionary government was not bound by the strictures of due
process of law. Even before appealing to history and philosophy,
reason shouts otherwise.
The ponencia recognized the EDSA Revolution as a "successful
revolution"2 that installed the Aquino government. There is no
right to revolt in the 1973 Constitution, in force prior to February
23-25, 1986. Nonetheless, it is widely accepted that under natural
law, the right of revolution is an inherent right of the people. Thus,
we justified the creation of a new legal order after the 1986 EDSA
Revolution, viz:
"From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has
been defined as ‘an inherent right of a people to cast out their
rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system
of government or institutions by force or a general uprising when
the legal and constitutional methods of making such change have
proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable.’ (H.
Black, Handbook of American Constitutional Law II, 4th edition,
1927) It has been said that ‘the locus of positive law-making
power lies with the people of the state’ and from there is derived
‘the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any
existing form of government without regard to the existing
constitution.’ (‘Political Rights as Political Questions, The Paradox
of Luther v. Borden’, 100 Harvard Law Review 1125, 1133
[1987])"3
It is my considered view that under this same natural law, private
respondent Dimaano has a right against unreasonable search
and seizure and to exclude evidence obtained as a consequence
of such illegal act. To explain my thesis, I will first lay down the
relevant law before applying it to the facts of the case at bar.
Tracking down the elusive law that will govern the case at bar will
take us to the labyrinths of philosophy and history. To be sure,
the difficulty of the case at bar lies less in the application of the
law, but more in finding the applicable law. I shall take up the
challenge even if the route takes negotiating, but without
trespassing, on political and religious thickets.
II. Natural Law and Natural Rights
As early as the Greek civilization, man has alluded to a higher,
natural standard or law to which a state and its laws must
conform. Sophocles unmistakably articulates this in his poignant
literary piece, Antigone. In this mid-fifth century Athenian tragedy,
a civil war divided two brothers, one died defending Thebes, and
the other, Polyneices, died attacking it. The king forbade
Polyneices’ burial, commanding instead that his body be left to be
devoured by beasts. But according to Greek religious ideas, only
a burial -even a token one with a handful of earth- could give
repose to his soul. Moved by piety, Polyneices’ sister, Antigone,
disobeyed the command of the king and buried the body. She
was arrested. Brought before the king who asks her if she knew
of his command and why she disobeyed, Antigone replies:
 ". . .These laws were not ordained of Zeus,
And she who sits enthroned with gods below,
Justice, enacted not these human laws.
Nor did I deem that thou, a mortal man,
Couldst by a breath annul and override
The immutable unwritten laws of heaven.
They were not born today nor yesterday;
They die not; and none knoweth whence they sprang."4
Antigone was condemned to be buried alive for violating the order
of the king.5
Aristotle also wrote in his Nicomachean Ethics: "Of political justice
part is natural, part legal – natural, that which everywhere has the
same force and does not exist by people’s thinking this or that;
legal, that which is originally indifferent, but when it has been laid
down is not indifferent, e.g. that a prisoner’s ransom shall be
mina, or that a goat and not two sheep shall be sacrificed, and
again all the laws that are passed for particular cases, . .
."6 Aristotle states that "(p)articular law is that which each
community lays down and applies to its own members: this is
partly written and partly unwritten. Universal law is the law of
Nature. For there really is, as every one to some extent divines, a
natural justice and injustice that is binding on all men, even on
those who have no association or covenant with each other. It is
this that Sophocles’ Antigone clearly means when she says that
the burial of Polyneices was a just act in spite of the prohibition:
she means that it was just by nature."7
Later, the Roman orator Cicero wrote of natural law in the first
century B.C. in this wise:
"True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of
universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to
duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its
prohibitions. And it does not lay its commands or prohibitions
upon good men in vain, though neither have any effect on the
wicked. It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to
attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it
entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or
people, and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder
or interpreter of it. And there will not be different laws at Rome
and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one
eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and at
all times, and there will be one master and ruler, that is, God,
over us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its
enforcing judge. Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself
and denying his human nature, and by reason of this very fact he
will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes what is
commonly considered punishment."8
This allusion to an eternal, higher, and universal natural law
continues from classical antiquity to this day. The face of natural
law, however, has changed throughout the classical, medieval,
modern, and contemporary periods of history.
In the medieval times, shortly after 1139, Gratian published the
Decretum, a collection and reconciliation of the canon laws in
force, which distinguished between divine or natural law and
human law. Similar to the writings of the earliest Church Fathers,
he related this natural law to the Decalogue and to Christ’s
commandment of love of one’s neighbor. "The law of nature is
that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel, by which
everyone is commanded to do unto others as he would wish to be
done unto him, and is prohibited from doing unto others that
which he would be unwilling to be done unto himself."9 This
natural law precedes in time and rank all things, such that
statutes whether ecclesiastical or secular, if contrary to law, were
to be held null and void.10
The following century saw a shift from a natural law concept that
was revelation-centered to a concept related to man’s reason and
what was discoverable by it, under the influence of Aristotle’s
writings which were coming to be known in the West. William of
Auxerre acknowledged the human capacity to recognize good
and evil and God’s will, and made reason the criterion of natural
law. Natural law was thus id quod naturalis ratio sine omni
deliberatione aut sine magna dictat esse faciendum or "that which
natural reason, without much or even any need of reflection, tells
us what we must do."11 Similarly, Alexander of Hales saw human
reason as the basis for recognizing natural law12and St.
Bonaventure wrote that what natural reason commands is called
the natural law.13 By the thirteenth century, natural law was
understood as the law of right reason, coinciding with the biblical
law but not derived from it.14
Of all the medieval philosophers, the Italian St. Thomas Aquinas
is indisputably regarded as the most important proponent of
traditional natural law theory. He created a comprehensive and
organized synthesis of the natural law theory which rests on both
the classical (in particular, Aristotelian philosophy) and Christian
foundation, i.e., on reason and revelation.15 His version of the
natural law theory rests on his vision of the universe as governed
by a single, self-consistent and overarching system of law under
the direction and authority of God as the supreme lawgiver and
judge.16 Aquinas defined law as "an ordinance of reason for the
common good, made by him who has care of the community, and
promulgated."17 There are four kinds of laws in his natural law
theory: eternal, natural, human, and divine.
First, eternal law. To Aquinas, a law is a dictate of practical
reason (which provides practical directions on how one ought to
act as opposed to "speculative reason" which provides
propositional knowledge of the way things are) emanating from
the ruler who governs a perfect community.18 Presupposing that
Divine Providence rules the universe, and Divine Providence
governs by divine reason, then the rational guidance of things in
God the Ruler of the universe has the nature of a law. And since
the divine reason’s conception of things is not subject to time but
is eternal, this kind of law is called eternal law.19 In other words,
eternal law is that law which is a "dictate" of God’s reason. It is
the external aspect of God’s perfect wisdom, or His wisdom
applied to His creation.20 Eternal law consists of those principles
of action that God implanted in creation to enable each thing to
perform its proper function in the overall order of the universe.
The proper function of a thing determines what is good and bad
for it: the good consists of performing its function while the bad
consists of failing to perform it.21
Then, natural law. This consists of principles of eternal law which
are specific to human beings as rational creatures. Aquinas
explains that law, as a rule and measure, can be in a person in
two ways: in one way, it can be in him that rules and measures;
and in another way, in that which is ruled and measured since a
thing is ruled and measured in so far as it partakes of the rule or
measure. Thus, since all things governed by Divine Providence
are regulated and measured by the eternal law, then all things
partake of or participate to a certain extent in the eternal law; they
receive from it certain inclinations towards their proper actions
and ends. Being rational, however, the participation of a human
being in the Divine Providence, is most excellent because he
participates in providence itself, providing for himself and others.
He participates in eternal reason itself and through this, he
possesses a natural inclination to right action and right end. This
participation of the rational creature in the eternal law is called
natural law. Hence, the psalmist says: "The light of Thy
countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us, thus implying that the
light of natural reason, by which we discern what is good and
what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing
else than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore
evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational
creature’s participation in the eternal law."22 In a few words, the
"natural law is a rule of reason, promulgated by God in man’s
nature, whereby man can discern how he should act."23
Through natural reason, we are able to distinguish between right
and wrong; through free will, we are able to choose what is right.
When we do so, we participate more fully in the eternal law rather
than being merely led blindly to our proper end. We are able to
choose that end and make our compliance with eternal law an act
of self-direction. In this manner, the law becomes in us a rule and
measure and no longer a rule and measure imposed from an
external source.24 The question that comes to the fore then is
what is this end to which natural law directs rational creatures?
The first self-evident principle of natural law is that "good is to be
pursued and done, and evil is to be avoided. All other precepts of
the natural law are based upon this, so that whatever the practical
reason naturally apprehends as man’s good (or evil) belongs to
the precept of the natural law as something to be done or
avoided."25 Because good is to be sought and evil avoided, and
good is that which is in accord with the nature of a given creature
or the performance of a creature’s proper function, then the
important question to answer is what is human nature or the
proper function of man. Those to which man has a natural
inclination are naturally apprehended by reason as good and
must thus be pursued, while their opposites are evil which must
be avoided.26 Aquinas identifies the basic inclinations of man as
follows:
"1. To seek the good, including his highest good, which is
eternal happiness with God.27
2. To preserve himself in existence.
3. To preserve the species - that is, to unite sexually.
4. To live in community with other men.
5. To use his intellect and will - that is, to know the truth
and to make his own decision."28
As living creatures, we have an interest in self-preservation; as
animals, in procreation; and as rational creatures, in living in
society and exercising our intellectual and spiritual capacities in
the pursuit of knowledge."29 God put these inclinations in human
nature to help man achieve his final end of eternal happiness.
With an understanding of these inclinations in our human nature,
we can determine by practical reason what is good for us and
what is bad.30 In this sense, natural law is an ordinance of
reason.31 Proceeding from these inclinations, we can apply the
natural law by deduction, thus: good should be done; this action
is good; this action should therefore be done.32 Concretely, it is
good for humans to live peaceably with one another in society,
thus this dictates the prohibition of actions such as killing and
stealing that harm society.33
From the precepts of natural law, human reason needs to
proceed to the more particular determinations or specialized
regulations to declare what is required in particular cases
considering society’s specific circumstances. These particular
determinations, arrived at by human reason, are called human
laws (Aquinas’ positive law). They are necessary to clarify the
demands of natural law. Aquinas identifies two ways by which
something may be derived from natural law: first, like in science,
demonstrated conclusions are drawn from principles; and second,
as in the arts, general forms are particularized as to details like
the craftsman determining the general form of a house to a
particular shape.34 Thus, according to Aquinas, some things are
derived from natural law by way of conclusion (such as "one must
not kill" may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that
"one should do harm to no man") while some are derived by way
of determination (such as the law of nature has it that the evildoer
should be punished, but that he be punished in this or that way is
not directly by natural law but is a derived determination of
it).35 Aquinas says that both these modes of derivation are found
in the human law. But those things derived as a conclusion are
contained in human law not as emanating therefrom exclusively,
but having some force also from the natural law. But those things
which are derived in the second manner have no other force than
that of human law.36
Finally, there is divine law which is given by God, i.e., the Old
Testament and the New Testament. This is necessary to direct
human life for four reasons. First, through law, man is directed to
proper actions towards his proper end. This end, which is eternal
happiness and salvation, is not proportionate to his natural
human power, making it necessary for him to be directed not just
by natural and human law but by divinely given law. Secondly,
because of uncertainty in human judgment, different people form
different judgments on human acts, resulting in different and even
contrary laws. So that man may know for certain what he ought to
do and avoid, it was necessary for man to be directed in his
proper acts by a God-given law for it is certain that such law
cannot err. Thirdly, human law can only judge the external actions
of persons. However, perfection of virtue consists in man
conducting himself right in both his external acts and in his
interior motives. The divine law thus supervenes to see and judge
both dimensions. Fourthly, because human law cannot punish or
forbid all evils, since in aiming to do away with all evils it would do
away with many good things and would hinder the advancement
of the common good necessary for human development, divine
law is needed.37 For example, if human law forbade backbiting
gossip, in order to enforce such a law, privacy and trust that is
necessary between spouses and friends would be severely
restricted. Because the price paid to enforce the law would
outweigh the benefits, gossiping ought to be left to God to be
judged and punished. Thus, with divine law, no evil would remain
unforbidden and unpunished.38
Aquinas’ traditional natural law theory has been advocated,
recast and restated by other scholars up to the contemporary
period.39 But clearly, what has had a pervading and lasting impact
on the Western philosophy of law and government, particularly on
that of the United States of America which heavily influenced the
Philippine system of government and constitution, is the modern
natural law theory.
In the traditional natural law theory, among which was Aquinas’,
the emphasis was placed on moral duties of man -both rulers and
subjects- rather than on rights of the individual citizen.
Nevertheless, from this medieval theoretical background
developed modern natural law theories associated with the
gradual development in Europe of modern secular territorial state.
These theories increasingly veered away from medieval
theological trappings40 and gave particular emphasis to the
individual and his natural rights.41
One far-reaching school of thought on natural rights emerged with
the political philosophy of the English man, John Locke. In the
traditional natural law theory such as Aquinas’, the monarchy was
not altogether disfavored because as Aquinas says, "the rule of
one man is more useful than the rule of the many" to achieve "the
unity of peace."42Quite different from Aquinas, Locke emphasized
that in any form of government, "ultimate sovereignty rested in the
people and all legitimate government was based on the consent
of the governed."43 His political theory was used to justify
resistance to Charles II over the right of succession to the English
throne and the Whig Revolution of 1688-89 by which James II
was dethroned and replaced by William and Mary under terms
which weakened the power of the crown and strengthened the
power of the Parliament.44
Locke explained his political theory in his major work, Second
Treatise of Government, originally published in 1690,45 where he
adopted the modern view that human beings enjoyed natural
rights in the state of nature, before the formation of civil or
political society. In this state of nature, it is self-evident that all
persons are naturally in a "state of perfect freedom to order their
actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they
think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking
leave or depending upon the will of any other man."46Likewise, in
the state of nature, it was self-evident that all persons were in a
state of equality, "wherein all the power and jurisdiction is
reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing
more evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank,
promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the
use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst
another without subordination or subjection . . ."47 Locke quickly
added, however, that though all persons are in a state of liberty, it
is not a state of license for the "state of nature has a law of nature
to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that
law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all
equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life
health, liberty, or possessions. . ."48 Locke also alludes to an
"omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker" whose "workmanship they
(mankind) are, made to last during his (the maker’s) . .
.pleasure."49 In other words, through reason, with which human
beings arrive at the law of nature prescribing certain moral
conduct, each person can realize that he has a natural right and
duty to ensure his own survival and well-being in the world and a
related duty to respect the same right in others, and preserve
mankind.50 Through reason, human beings are capable of
recognizing the need to treat others as free, independent and
equal as all individuals are equally concerned with ensuring their
own lives, liberties and properties.51 In this state of nature, the
execution of the law of nature is placed in the hands of every
individual who has a right to punish transgressors of the law of
nature to an extent that will hinder its violation.52 It may be
gathered from Locke’s political theory that the rights to life, health,
liberty and property are natural rights, hence each individual has
a right to be free from violent death, from arbitrary restrictions of
his person and from theft of his property.53 In addition, every
individual has a natural right to defend oneself from and punish
those who violate the law of nature.
But although the state of nature is somewhat of an Eden before
the fall, there are two harsh "inconveniences" in it, as Locke puts
them, which adversely affect the exercise of natural rights. First,
natural law being an unwritten code of moral conduct, it might
sometimes be ignored if the personal interests of certain
individuals are involved. Second, without any written laws, and
without any established judges or magistrates, persons may be
judges in their own cases and self-love might make them partial
to their side. On the other hand, ill nature, passion and revenge
might make them too harsh to the other side. Hence, "nothing but
confusion and disorder will follow."54 These circumstances make it
necessary to establish and enter a civil society by mutual
agreement among the people in the state of nature, i.e., based on
a social contract founded on trust and consent. Locke writes:
"The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural
liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with
other men to join and unite into a community for their comfortable,
safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure
enjoyment of their properties (used in the broad sense, referring
to life, liberty and property) and a greater security against any,
that are not of it."55
This collective agreement then culminated in the establishment of
a civil government.
Three important consequences of Locke’s theory on the origin of
civil government and its significance to the natural rights of
individual subjects should be noted. First, since it was the
precariousness of the individual’s enjoyment of his natural and
equal right to life, liberty, and property that justified the
establishment of civil government, then the "central, overriding
purpose of civil government was to protect and preserve the
individual’s natural rights. For just as the formation by individuals
of civil or political society had arisen from their desire to ‘unite for
the mutual Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and Estates,
which I (Locke) call by the general name, Property,’56 so, too, did
the same motive underlie - in the second stage of the social
contract - their collective decision to institute civil
government."57 Locke thus maintains, again using the term
"property" in the broad sense, that, "(t)he great and chief end,
therefore, of men’s uniting into common-wealths, and putting
themselves under government, is the preservation of their
property."58 Secondly, the central purpose that has brought a civil
government into existence, i.e., the protection of the individual’s
natural rights, sets firm limits on the political authority of the civil
government. A government that violates the natural rights of its
subjects has betrayed their trust, vested in it when it was first
established, thereby undermining its own authority and losing its
claim to the subjects’ obedience. Third and finally, individual
subjects have a right of last resort to collectively resist or rebel
against and overthrow a government that has failed to discharge
its duty of protecting the people’s natural rights and has instead
abused its powers by acting in an arbitrary or tyrannical manner.
The overthrow of government, however, does not lead to
dissolution of civil society which came into being before the
establishment of civil government.59
Locke’s ideas, along with other modern natural law and natural
rights theories, have had a profound impact on American political
and legal thought. American law professor Philip Hamburger
observes that American natural law scholars generally agree "that
natural law consisted of reasoning about humans in the state of
nature (or absence of government)" and tend "to emphasize that
they were reasoning from the equal freedom of humans and the
need of humans to preserve themselves."60 As individuals are
equally free, they did not have the right to infringe the equal rights
of others; even self-preservation typically required individuals to
cooperate so as to avoid doing unto others what they would not
have others do unto them.61 With Locke’s theory of natural law as
foundation, these American scholars agree on the well-known
analysis of how individuals preserved their liberty by forming
government, i.e., that in order to address the insecurity and
precariousness of one’s life, liberty and property in the state of
nature, individuals, in accordance with the principle of self-
preservation, gave up a portion of their natural liberty to civil
government to enable it "to preserve the residue."62 "People must
cede to [government] some of their natural rights, in order to vest
it with powers."63 That individuals "give up a part of their natural
rights to secure the rest" in the modern natural law sense is said
to be "an old hackneyed and well known principle"64 thus:
"That Man, on entering into civil society, of necessity, sacrifices a
part of his natural liberty, has been pretty universally taken for
granted by writers on government. They seem, in general, not to
have admitted a doubt of the truth of the proposition. One feels as
though it was treading on forbidden ground, to attempt a
refutation of what has been advanced by a Locke, a Bacari[a],
and some other writers and statesmen."65
But, while Locke’s theory showed the necessity of civil society
and government, it was careful to assert and protect the
individual’s rights against government invasion, thus implying a
theory of limited government that both restricted the role of the
state to protect the individual’s fundamental natural rights to life,
liberty and property and prohibited the state, on moral grounds,
from violating those rights.66 The natural rights theory, which is
the characteristic American interpretation of natural law, serves
as the foundation of the well-entrenched concept of limited
government in the United States. It provides the theoretical basis
of the formulation of limits on political authority vis-à-vis the
superior right of the individual which the government should
preserve.67
Locke’s ideas undoubtedly influenced Thomas Jefferson, the
eminent statesman and "philosopher of the (American) revolution
and of the first constitutional order which free men were permitted
to establish."68 Jefferson espoused Locke’s theory that man is
free in the state of nature. But while Locke limited the authority of
the state with the doctrine of natural rights, Jefferson’s originality
was in his use of this doctrine as basis for a fundamental law or
constitution established by the people.69 To obviate the danger
that the government would limit natural liberty more than
necessary to afford protection to the governed, thereby becoming
a threat to the very natural liberty it was designed to protect,
people had to stipulate in their constitution which natural rights
they sacrificed and which not, as it was important for them to
retain those portions of their natural liberty that were inalienable,
that facilitated the preservation of freedom, or that simply did not
need to be sacrificed.70 Two ideas are therefore fundamental in
the constitution: one is the regulation of the form of government
and the other, the securing of the liberties of the people.71 Thus,
the American Constitution may be understood as comprising
three elements. First, it creates the structure and authority of a
republican form of government; second, it provides a division of
powers among the different parts of the national government and
the checks and balances of these powers; and third, it inhibits
government’s power vis-à-vis the rights of individuals, rights
existent and potential, patent and latent. These three parts have
one prime objective: to uphold the liberty of the people.72
But while the constitution guarantees and protects the
fundamental rights of the people, it should be stressed that it
does not create them. As held by many of the American
Revolution patriots, "liberties do not result from charters; charters
rather are in the nature of declarations of pre-existing
rights."73 John Adams, one of the patriots, claimed that natural
rights are founded "in the frame of human nature, rooted in the
constitution of the intellect and moral world."74 Thus, it is said of
natural rights vis-à-vis the constitution:
". . . (t)hey exist before constitutions and independently of them.
Constitutions enumerate such rights and provide against their
deprivation or infringement, but do not create them. It is supposed
that all power, all rights, and all authority are vested in the people
before they form or adopt a constitution. By such an instrument,
they create a government, and define and limit the powers which
the constitution is to secure and the government respect. But they
do not thereby invest the citizens of the commonwealth with any
natural rights that they did not before possess."75 (emphasis
supplied)
A constitution is described as follows:
"A Constitution is not the beginning of a community, nor the origin
of private rights; it is not the fountain of law, nor the incipient state
of government; it is not the cause, but consequence, of personal
and political freedom; it grants no rights to the people, but is the
creature of their power, the instrument of their convenience.
Designed for their protection in the enjoyment of the rights and
powers which they possessed before the Constitution was made,
it is but the framework of the political government, and
necessarily based upon the preexisting condition of laws, rights,
habits and modes of thought. There is nothing primitive in it; it is
all derived from a known source. It presupposes an organized
society, law, order, propriety, personal freedom, a love of political
liberty, and enough of cultivated intelligence to know how to
guard against the encroachments of tyranny."76 (emphasis
supplied)
That Locke’s modern natural law and rights theory was influential
to those who framed and ratified the United States constitution
and served as its theoretical foundation is undeniable.77 In a letter
in which George Washington formally submitted the Constitution
to Congress in September 1787, he spoke of the difficulties of
drafting the document in words borrowed from the standard
eighteenth-century natural rights analysis:
"Individuals entering into society, must give up a share of liberty
to preserve the rest. The magnitude of the sacrifice must depend
as well on situation and circumstance, as on the object to be
obtained. It is at all times difficult to draw with precision the line
between those rights which must be surrendered, and those
which may be reserved . . . ."78(emphasis supplied)
Natural law is thus to be understood not as a residual source of
constitutional rights but instead, as the reasoning that implied the
necessity to sacrifice natural liberty to government in a written
constitution. Natural law and natural rights were concepts that
explained and justified written constitutions.79
With the establishment of civil government and a constitution,
there arises a conceptual distinction between natural rights and
civil rights, difficult though to define their scope and delineation. It
has been proposed that natural rights are those rights that
"appertain to man in right of his existence."80 These were
fundamental rights endowed by God upon human beings, "all
those rights of acting as an individual for his own comfort and
happiness, which are not injurious to the natural rights of
others."81 On the other hand, civil rights are those that "appertain
to man in right of his being a member of society."82 These rights,
however, are derived from the natural rights of individuals since:
"Man did not enter into society to become worse off than he was
before, nor to have fewer rights than he had before, but to have
those rights better secured. His natural rights are the foundation
of all his rights."83
Civil rights, in this sense, were those natural rights – particularly
rights to security and protection – which by themselves,
individuals could not safeguard, rather requiring the collective
support of civil society and government. Thus, it is said:
"Every civil right has for its foundation, some natural right pre-
existing in the individual, but to the enjoyment of which his
individual power is not, in all cases, sufficiently competent."84
The distinction between natural and civil rights is "between that
class of natural rights which man retains after entering into
society, and those which he throws into the common stock as a
member of society."85 The natural rights retained by the
individuals after entering civil society were "all the intellectual
rights, or rights of the mind,"86i.e., the rights to freedom of
thought, to freedom of religious belief and to freedom of
expression in its various forms. The individual could exercise
these rights without government assistance, but government has
the role of protecting these natural rights from interference by
others and of desisting from itself infringing such rights.
Government should also enable individuals to exercise more
effectively the natural rights they had exchanged for civil rights –
like the rights to security and protection - when they entered into
civil society.87
American natural law scholars in the 1780s and early 1790s
occasionally specified which rights were natural and which were
not. On the Lockean assumption that the state of nature was a
condition in which all humans were equally free from subjugation
to one another and had no common superior, American scholars
tended to agree that natural liberty was the freedom of individuals
in the state of nature.88 Natural rights were understood to be
simply a portion of this undifferentiated natural liberty and were
often broadly categorized as the rights to life, liberty, and
property; or life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. More
specifically, they identified as natural rights the free exercise of
religion, freedom of conscience,89 freedom of speech and press,
right to self-defense, right to bear arms, right to assemble and
right to one’s reputation.90 In contrast, certain other rights, such as
habeas corpus and jury rights, do not exist in the state of nature,
but exist only under the laws of civil government or the
constitution because they are essential for restraining
government.91 They are called civil rights not only in the sense
that they are protected by constitutions or other laws, but also in
the sense that they are acquired rights which can only exist under
civil government.92
In his Constitutional Law, Black states that natural rights may be
used to describe those rights which belong to man by virtue of his
nature and depend upon his personality. "His existence as an
individual human being, clothed with certain attributes, invested
with certain capacities, adapted to certain kind of life, and
possessing a certain moral and physical nature, entitles him,
without the aid of law, to such rights as are necessary to enable
him to continue his existence, develop his faculties, pursue and
achieve his destiny."93 An example of a natural right is the right to
life. In an organized society, natural rights must be protected by
law, "and although they owe to the law neither their existence nor
their sacredness, yet they are effective only when recognized and
sanctioned by law."94 Civil rights include natural rights as they are
taken into the sphere of law. However, there are civil rights which
are not natural rights such as the right of trial by jury. This right is
not founded in the nature of man, nor does it depend on
personality, but it falls under the definition of civil rights which are
the rights secured by the constitution to all its citizens or
inhabitants not connected with the organization or administration
of government which belong to the domain of political rights.
"Natural rights are the same all the world over, though they may
not be given the fullest recognition under all governments. Civil
rights which are not natural rights will vary in different states or
countries."95
From the foregoing definitions and distinctions, we can gather
that the inclusions in and exclusions from the scope of natural
rights and civil rights are not well-defined. This is understandable
because these definitions are derived from the nature of man
which, in its profundity, depth, and fluidity, cannot simply and
completely be grasped and categorized. Thus, phrases such as
"rights appertain(ing) to man in right of his existence", or "rights
which are a portion of man’s undifferentiated natural liberty,
broadly categorized as the rights to life, liberty, and property; or
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness", or "rights that belong to
man by virtue of his nature and depend upon his personality"
serve as guideposts in identifying a natural right. Nevertheless,
although the definitions of natural right and civil right are not
uniform and exact, we can derive from the foregoing definitions
that natural rights exist prior to constitutions, and may be
contained in and guaranteed by them. Once these natural rights
enter the constitutional or statutory sphere, they likewise acquire
the character of civil rights in the broad sense (as opposed to civil
rights distinguished from political rights), without being stripped of
their nature as natural rights. There are, however, civil rights
which are not natural rights but are merely created and protected
by the constitution or other law such as the right to a jury trial.
Long after Locke conceived of his ideas of natural rights, civil
society, and civil government, his concept of natural rights
continued to flourish in the modern and contemporary period.
About a hundred years after the Treatise of Government, Locke’s
natural law and rights theory was restated by the eighteenth-
century political thinker and activist, Thomas Paine. He wrote his
classic text, The Rights of Man, Part 1 where he argued that the
central purpose of all governments was to protect the natural and
imprescriptible rights of man. Citing the 1789 French Declaration
of the Rights of Man and of Citizens, Paine identified these rights
as the right to liberty, property, security and resistance of
oppression. All other civil and political rights - such as to limits on
government, to freedom to choose a government, to freedom of
speech, and to fair taxation - were derived from those
fundamental natural rights.96
Paine inspired and actively assisted the American Revolution and
defended the French Revolution. His views were echoed by the
authors of the American and the French declarations that
accompanied these democratic revolutions.97 The American
Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776, the revolutionary
manifesto of the thirteen newly-independent states of America
that were formerly colonies of Britain, reads:
"We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the
Pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these Rights, Governments
are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the
Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of
Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of
the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new
Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and
organizing its Powers in such Form as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."98 (emphasis supplied)
His phrase "rights of man" was used in the 1789 French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens, proclaimed by
the French Constituent Assembly in August 1789, viz:
"The representatives of the French people, constituted in a
National Assembly, considering that ignorance, oblivion or
contempt of the Rights of Man are the only causes of public
misfortunes and of the corruption of governments, have resolved
to lay down in a solemn Declaration, the natural, inalienable and
sacred Rights of Man, in order that this Declaration, being always
before all the members of the Social Body, should constantly
remind them of their Rights and their Duties. . ."99 (emphasis
supplied)
Thereafter, the phrase "rights of man" gradually replaced "natural
rights" in the latter period of the eighteenth century, thus
removing the theological assumptions of medieval natural law
theories. After the American and French Revolutions, the doctrine
of the rights of man became embodied not only in succinct
declarations of rights, but also in new constitutions which
emphasized the need to uphold the natural rights of the individual
citizen against other individuals and particularly against the state
itself.100
Considerable criticism was, however, hurled against natural law
and natural rights theories, especially by the logical positivist
thinkers, as these theories were not empirically verifiable.
Nevertheless, the concept of natural rights or rights of man
regained force and influence in the 1940s because of the growing
awareness of the wide scale violation of such rights perpetrated
by the Nazi dictatorship in Germany. The British leader Winston
Churchill and the American leader Franklin Roosevelt stated in
the preface of their Atlantic Charter in 1942 that "complete victory
over their enemies is essential to decent life, liberty,
independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human
rights and justice, in their own land as well as in other lands."
(emphasis supplied) This time, natural right was recast in the idea
of "human rights" which belong to every human being by virtue of
his or her humanity. The idea superseded the traditional concept
of rights based on notions of God-given natural law and of social
contract. Instead, the refurbished idea of "human rights" was
based on the assumption that each individual person was entitled
to an equal degree of respect as a human being.101
With this historical backdrop, the United Nations Organization
published in 1948 its Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) as a systematic attempt to secure universal recognition
of a whole gamut of human rights. The Declaration affirmed the
importance of civil and political rights such as the rights to life,
liberty, property; equality before the law; privacy; a fair trial;
freedom of speech and assembly, of movement, of religion, of
participation in government directly or indirectly; the right to
political asylum, and the absolute right not to be tortured. Aside
from these, but more controversially, it affirmed the importance of
social and economic rights.102 The UDHR is not a treaty and its
provisions are not binding law, but it is a compromise of
conflicting ideological, philosophical, political, economic, social
and juridical ideas which resulted from the collective effort of 58
states on matters generally considered desirable and imperative.
It may be viewed as a "blending (of) the deepest convictions and
ideals of different civilizations into one universal expression of
faith in the rights of man."103
On December 16, 1966, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Optional Protocol to the Civil
and Political Rights providing for the mechanism of checking state
compliance to the international human rights instruments such as
through a reportorial requirement among governments. These
treaties entered into force on March 23, 1976104 and are binding
as international law upon governments subscribing to them.
Although admittedly, there will be differences in interpreting
particular statements of rights and freedoms in these United
Nations instruments "in the light of varied cultures and historical
traditions, the basis of the covenants is a common agreement on
the fundamental objective of the dignity and worth of the human
person. Such agreement is implied in adherence to the (United
Nations) Charter and corresponds to the universal urge for
freedom and dignity which strives for expression, despite varying
degrees of culture and civilization and despite the countervailing
forces of repression and authoritarianism."105
Human rights and fundamental freedoms were affirmed by the
United Nations Organization in the different instruments
embodying these rights not just as a solemn protest against the
Nazi-fascist method of government, but also as a recognition that
the "security of individual rights, like the security of national rights,
was a necessary requisite to a peaceful and stable world
order."106 Moskowitz wrote:
"The legitimate concern of the world community with human rights
and fundamental freedoms stems in large part from the close
relation they bear to the peace and stability of the world. World
War II and its antecedents, as well as contemporary events,
clearly demonstrate the peril inherent in the doctrine which
accepts the state as the sole arbiter in questions pertaining to the
rights and freedoms of the citizen. The absolute power exercised
by a government over its citizens is not only a source of disorder
in the international community; it can no longer be accepted as
the only guaranty of orderly social existence at home. But orderly
social existence is ultimately a matter which rests in the hands of
the citizen. Unless the citizen can assert his human rights and
fundamental freedoms against his own government under the
protection of the international community, he remains at the
mercy of the superior power."107
Similar to natural rights and civil rights, human rights as the
refurbished idea of natural right in the 1940s, eludes definition.
The usual definition that it is the right which inheres in persons
from the fact of their humanity seemingly begs the question.
Without doubt, there are certain rights and freedoms so
fundamental as to be inherent and natural such as the integrity of
the person and equality of persons before the law which should
be guaranteed by all constitutions of all civilized countries and
effectively protected by their laws.108 It is nearly universally
agreed that some of those rights are religious toleration, a
general right to dissent, and freedom from arbitrary
punishment.109 It is not necessarily the case, however, that what
the law guarantees as a human right in one country should also
be guaranteed by law in all other countries. Some human rights
might be considered fundamental in some countries, but not in
others. For example, trial by jury which we have earlier cited as
an example of a civil right which is not a natural right, is a basic
human right in the United States protected by its constitution, but
not so in Philippine jurisdiction.110 Similar to natural rights, the
definition of human rights is derived from human nature, thus
understandably not exact. The definition that it is a "right which
inheres in persons from the fact of their humanity", however, can
serve as a guideline to identify human rights. It seems though that
the concept of human rights is broadest as it encompasses a
human person’s natural rights (e.g., religious freedom) and civil
rights created by law (e.g. right to trial by jury).
In sum, natural law and natural rights are not relic theories for
academic discussion, but have had considerable application and
influence. Natural law and natural rights theories have played an
important role in the Declaration of Independence, the Abolition
(anti-slavery) movement, and parts of the modern Civil Rights
movement.111 In charging Nazi and Japanese leaders with "crimes
against humanity" at the end of the Second World War, Allied
tribunals in 1945 invoked the traditional concept of natural law to
override the defense that those charged had only been obeying
the laws of the regimes they served.112 Likewise, natural law,
albeit called by another name such as "substantive due process"
which is grounded on reason and fairness, has served as legal
standard for international law, centuries of development in the
English common law, and certain aspects of American
constitutional law.113 In controversies involving the Bill of Rights,
the natural law standards of "reasonableness" and "fairness" or
"justified on balance" are used. Questions such as these are
common: "Does this form of government involvement with religion
endanger religious liberty in a way that seems unfair to some
group? Does permitting this restriction on speech open the door
to government abuse of political opponents? Does this police
investigative practice interfere with citizens’ legitimate interests in
privacy and security?"114 Undeniably, natural law and natural
rights theories have carved their niche in the legal and political
arena.
III. Natural Law and Natural Rights
in Philippine Cases and the Constitution
A. Traces of Natural Law and
Natural Rights Theory in Supreme Court Cases
Although the natural law and natural rights foundation is not
articulated, some Philippine cases have made reference to
natural law and rights without raising controversy. For example, in
People v. Asas,115 the Court admonished courts to consider
cautiously an admission or confession of guilt especially when it
is alleged to have been obtained by intimidation and force. The
Court said: "(w)ithal, aversion of man against forced self-affliction
is a matter of Natural Law."116 In People v. Agbot,117 we did not
uphold lack of instruction as an excuse for killing because we
recognized the "offense of taking one’s life being forbidden by
natural law and therefore within instinctive knowledge and feeling
of every human being not deprived of reason."118 In Mobil Oil
Philippines, Inc. v. Diocares, et al.,119 Chief Justice Fernando
acknowledged the influence of natural law in stressing that the
element of a promise is the basis of contracts. In Manila Memorial
Park Cemetery, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al.,120 the Court
invoked the doctrine of estoppel which we have repeatedly
pronounced is predicated on, and has its origin in equity, which
broadly defined, is justice according to natural law. In Yu Con v.
Ipil, et al.,121 we recognized the application of natural law in
maritime commerce.
The Court has also identified in several cases certain natural
rights such as the right to liberty,122 the right of expatriation,123 the
right of parents over their children which provides basis for a
parent’s visitorial rights over his illegitimate children,124 and the
right to the fruits of one’s industry.125
In Simon, Jr. et al. v. Commission on Human Rights,126 the Court
defined human rights, civil rights, and political rights. In doing so,
we considered the United Nations instruments to which the
Philippines is a signatory, namely the UDHR which we have ruled
in several cases as binding upon the Philippines,127 the ICCPR
and the ICESCR. Still, we observed that "human rights" is so
generic a term that at best, its definition is inconclusive. But the
term "human rights" is closely identified to the "universally
accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is
generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights,
encompassing almost all aspects of life,"128 i.e., the individual’s
social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations.129 On the
other hand, we defined civil rights as referring to:
". . . those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or
country, or, in a wider sense, to all inhabitants, and are not
connected with the organization or administration of government.
They include the rights to property, marriage, equal protection of
the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined, civil
rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his
citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also refer, in
its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or
redressed in a civil action."130
Guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution,
unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt
are also identified as civil rights.131 The Court’s definition of civil
rights was made in light of their distinction from political rights
which refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
establishment or administration of government, the right of
suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in
general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the
management of government.132
To distill whether or not the Court’s reference to natural law and
natural rights finds basis in a natural law tradition that has
influenced Philippine law and government, we turn to Philippine
constitutional law history.
B. History of the Philippine Constitution
and the Bill of Rights
During the Spanish colonization of the Philippines, Filipinos
ardently fought for their fundamental rights. The Propaganda
Movement spearheaded by our national hero Jose Rizal, Marcelo
H. del Pilar, and Graciano Lopez-Jaena demanded assimilation of
the Philippines by Spain, and the extension to Filipinos of rights
enjoyed by Spaniards under the Spanish Constitution such as the
inviolability of person and property, specifically freedom from
arbitrary action by officialdom particularly by the Guardia Civil and
from arbitrary detention and banishment of citizens. They
clamored for their right to liberty of conscience, freedom of
speech and the press, freedom of association, freedom of
worship, freedom to choose a profession, the right to petition the
government for redress of grievances, and the right to an
opportunity for education. They raised the roof for an end to the
abuses of religious corporations.133
With the Propaganda Movement having apparently failed to bring
about effective reforms, Andres Bonifacio founded in 1892 the
secret society of the Katipunan to serve as the military arm of the
secessionist movement whose principal aim was to create an
independent Filipino nation by armed revolution.134 While
preparing for separation from Spain, representatives of the
movement engaged in various constitutional projects that would
reflect the longings and aspirations of the Filipino people. On May
31, 1897, a republican government was established in Biak-na-
Bato, followed on November 1, 1897 by the unanimous adoption
of the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
popularly known as the Constitution of Biak-na-Bato, by the
revolution’s representatives. The document was an almost exact
copy of the Cuban Constitution of Jimaguayu,135 except for four
articles which its authors Felix Ferrer and Isabelo Artacho added.
These four articles formed the constitution’s Bill of Rights and
protected, among others, religious liberty, the right of association,
freedom of the press, freedom from imprisonment except by
virtue of an order issued by a competent court, and freedom from
deprivation of property or domicile except by virtue of judgment
passed by a competent court of authority.136
The Biak-na-Bato Constitution was projected to have a life-span
of two years, after which a final constitution would be drafted.
Two months after it was adopted, however, the Pact of Biak-na-
Bato was signed whereby the Filipino military leaders agreed to
cease fighting against the Spaniards and guaranteed peace for at
least three years, in exchange for monetary indemnity for the
Filipino men in arms and for promised reforms. Likewise, General
Emilio Aguinaldo, who by then had become the military leader
after Bonifacio’s death, agreed to leave the Philippines with other
Filipino leaders. They left for Hongkong in December 1897.
A few months later, the Spanish-American war broke out in April
1898. Upon encouragement of American officials, Aguinaldo
came back to the Philippines and set up a temporary dictatorial
government with himself as dictator. In June 1898, the
dictatorship was terminated and Aguinaldo became the President
of the Revolutionary Government.137 By this time, the relations
between the American troops and the Filipino forces had become
precarious as it became more evident that the Americans planned
to stay. In September 1898, the Revolutionary Congress was
inaugurated whose primary goal was to formulate and promulgate
a Constitution. The fruit of their efforts was the Malolos
Constitution which, as admitted by Felipe Calderon who drafted it,
was based on the constitutions of South American
Republics138 while the Bill of Rights was substantially a copy of
the Spanish Constitution.139 The Bill of Rights included among
others, freedom of religion, freedom from arbitrary arrests and
imprisonment, security of the domicile and of papers and effects
against arbitrary searches and seizures, inviolability of
correspondence, due process in criminal prosecutions, freedom
of expression, freedom of association, and right of peaceful
petition for the redress of grievances. Its Article 28 stated that
"(t)he enumeration of the rights granted in this title does not imply
the prohibition of any others not expressly stated."140 This
suggests that natural law was the source of these rights.141 The
Malolos Constitution was short-lived. It went into effect in January
1899, about two months before the ratification of the Treaty of
Paris transferring sovereignty over the Islands to the United
States. Within a month after the constitution’s promulgation, war
with the United States began and the Republic survived for only
about ten months. On March 23, 1901, American forces captured
Aguinaldo and a week later, he took his oath of allegiance to the
United States.142
In the early months of the war against the United States,
American President McKinley sent the First Philippine
Commission headed by Jacob Gould Schurman to assess the
Philippine situation. On February 2, 1900, in its report to the
President, the Commission stated that the Filipino people wanted
above all a "guarantee of those fundamental human rights which
Americans hold to be the natural and inalienable birthright of the
individual but which under Spanish domination in the Philippines
had been shamefully invaded and ruthlessly trampled
upon."143(emphasis supplied) In response to this, President
McKinley, in his Instruction of April 7, 1900 to the Second
Philippine Commission, provided an authorization and guide for
the establishment of a civil government in the Philippines and
stated that "(u)pon every division and branch of the government
of the Philippines . . . must be imposed these inviolable rules . . ."
These "inviolable rules" were almost literal reproductions of the
First to Ninth and the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, with the addition of the prohibition of bills of attainder
and ex post facto laws in Article 1, Section 9 of said Constitution.
The "inviolable rules" or Bill of Rights provided, among others,
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law; that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense or be compelled to be a witness against
himself; that the right to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; that no law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the
rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances. Scholars have
characterized the Instruction as the "Magna Charta of the
Philippines" and as a "worthy rival of the Laws of the Indies."144
The "inviolable rules" of the Instruction were re-enacted almost
exactly in the Philippine Bill of 1902,145 an act which temporarily
provided for the administration of the affairs of the civil
government in the Philippine Islands,146 and in the Philippine
Autonomy Act of 1916,147 otherwise known as the Jones Law,
which was an act to declare the purpose of the people of the
United States as to the future of the Philippine Islands and to
provide an autonomous government for it.148 These three organic
acts - the Instruction, the Philippine Bill of 1902, and the Jones
Law - extended the guarantees of the American Bill of Rights to
the Philippines. In Kepner v. United States,149 Justice Day
prescribed the methodology for applying these "inviolable rules"
to the Philippines, viz: "(t)hese principles were not taken from the
Spanish law; they were carefully collated from our own
Constitution, and embody almost verbatim the safeguards of that
instrument for the protection of life and liberty."150 Thus, the
"inviolable rules" should be applied in the sense "which has been
placed upon them in construing the instrument from which they
were taken."151(emphasis supplied)
Thereafter, the Philippine Independence Law, popularly known as
the Tydings-McDuffie Law of 1934, was enacted. It guaranteed
independence to the Philippines and authorized the drafting of a
Philippine Constitution. The law provided that the government
should be republican in form and the Constitution to be drafted
should contain a Bill of Rights.152 Thus, the Constitutional
Convention of 1934 was convened. In drafting the Constitution,
the Convention preferred to be generally conservative on the
belief that to be stable and permanent, the Constitution must be
anchored on the experience of the people, "providing for
institutions which were the natural outgrowths of the national
life."153 As the people already had a political organization
buttressed by national traditions, the Constitution was to sanctify
these institutions tested by time and the Filipino people’s
experience and to confirm the practical and substantial rights of
the people. Thus, the institutions and philosophy adopted in the
Constitution drew substantially from the organic acts which had
governed the Filipinos for more than thirty years, more particularly
the Jones Law of 1916. In the absence of Philippine precedents,
the Convention considered precedents of American origin that
might be suitable to our substantially American political system
and to the Filipino psychology and traditions.154 Thus, in the words
of Claro M. Recto, President of the Constitutional Convention, the
1935 Constitution was "frankly an imitation of the American
charter."155
Aside from the heavy American influence, the Constitution also
bore traces of the Malolos Constitution, the German Constitution,
the Constitution of the Republic of Spain, the Mexican
Constitution, and the Constitutions of several South American
countries, and the English unwritten constitution. Though the
Tydings-McDuffie law mandated a republican constitution and the
inclusion of a Bill of Rights, with or without such mandate, the
Constitution would have nevertheless been republican because
the Filipinos were satisfied with their experience of a republican
government; a Bill of Rights would have nonetheless been also
included because the people had been accustomed to the role of
a Bill of Rights in the past organic acts.156
The Bill of Rights in the 1935 Constitution was reproduced largely
from the report of the Convention’s committee on bill of rights.
The report was mostly a copy of the Bill of Rights in the Jones
Law, which in turn was borrowed from the American constitution.
Other provisions in the report drew from the Malolos Constitution
and the constitutions of the Republic of Spain, Italy and Japan.
There was a conscious effort to retain the phraseology of the
well-known provisions of the Jones Law because of the
jurisprudence that had built around them. The Convention
insistently avoided including provisions in the Bill of Rights not
tested in the Filipino experience.157 Thus, upon submission of its
draft bill of rights to the President of the Convention, the
committee on bill of rights stated:
"Adoption and adaptation have been the relatively facile work of
your committee in the formulation of a bill or declaration of rights
to be incorporated in the Constitution of the Philippine Islands. No
attempt has been made to incorporate new or radical changes. . .
The enumeration of individual rights in the present organic law
(Acts of Congress of July 1, 1902, August 29, 1916) is considered
ample, comprehensive and precise enough to safeguard the
rights and immunities of Filipino citizens against abuses or
encroachments of the Government, its powers or agents. . .
Modifications or changes in phraseology have been avoided,
wherever possible. This is because the principles must remain
couched in a language expressive of their historical
background, nature, extent and limitations, as construed and
expounded by the great statesmen and jurists that have
vitalized them."158(emphasis supplied)
The 1935 Constitution was approved by the Convention on
February 8, 1935 and signed on February 19, 1935. On March
23, 1935, United States President Roosevelt affixed his signature
on the Constitution. By an overwhelming majority, the Filipino
voters ratified it on May 14, 1935.159
Then dawned the decade of the 60s. There grew a clamor to
revise the 1935 charter for it to be more responsive to the
problems of the country, specifically in the socio-economic arena
and to the sources of threats to the security of the Republic
identified by then President Marcos. In 1970, delegates to the
Constitution Convention were elected, and they convened on
June 1, 1971. In their deliberations, "the spirit of moderation
prevailed, and the . . . Constitution was hardly notable for its
novelty, much less a radical departure from our constitutional
tradition."160Our rights in the 1935 Constitution were reaffirmed
and the government to which we have been accustomed was
instituted, albeit taking on a parliamentary rather than presidential
form.161
The Bill of Rights in the 1973 Constitution had minimal difference
from its counterpart in the 1935 Constitution. Previously, there
were 21 paragraphs in one section, now there were twenty-three.
The two rights added were the recognition of the people’s right to
access to official records and documents and the right to speedy
disposition of cases. To the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures, a second paragraph was added that evidence
obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.162
The 1973 Constitution went into effect on January 17, 1973 and
remained the fundamental law until President Corazon Aquino
rose to power in defiance of the 1973 charter and upon the "direct
exercise of the power of the Filipino people"163 in the EDSA
Revolution of February 23-25, 1986. On February 25, 1986, she
issued Proclamation No. 1 recognizing that "sovereignty resides
in the people and all government authority emanates from them"
and that she and Vice President Salvador Laurel were "taking
power in the name and by the will of the Filipino people."164 The
old legal order, constitution and enactments alike, was
overthrown by the new administration.165 A month thenceforth,
President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3, "Declaring National
Policy to Implement the Reforms Mandated by the People,
Protecting their Basic Rights, Adopting a Provisional Constitution,
and Providing for an Orderly Transition to Government under a
New Constitution." The Provisional Constitution, otherwise known
as the "Freedom Constitution" adopted certain provisions of the
1973 Constitution, including the Bill of Rights which was adopted
in toto, and provided for the adoption of a new constitution within
60 days from the date of Proclamation No. 3.166
Pursuant to the Freedom Constitution, the 1986 Constitutional
Commission drafted the 1987 Constitution which was ratified and
became effective on February 2, 1987.167 As in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions, it retained a republican system of
government, but emphasized and created more channels for the
exercise of the sovereignty of the people through recall, initiative,
referendum and plebiscite.168 Because of the wide-scale violation
of human rights during the dictatorship, the 1987 Constitution
contains a Bill of Rights which more jealously safeguards the
people’s "fundamental liberties in the essence of a constitutional
democracy", in the words of ConCom delegate Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, S.J.169 It declares in its state policies that "(t)he state
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights."170 In addition, it has a separate Article
on Social Justice and Human Rights, under which, the
Commission on Human Rights was created.171
Considering the American model and origin of the Philippine
constitution, it is not surprising that Filipino jurists and legal
scholars define and explain the nature of the Philippine
constitution in similar terms that American constitutional law
scholars explain their constitution. Chief Justice Fernando, citing
Laski, wrote about the basic purpose of a civil society and
government, viz:
"The basic purpose of a State, namely to assure the happiness
and welfare of its citizens is kept foremost in mind. To paraphrase
Laski, it is not an end in itself but only a means to an end, the
individuals composing it in their separate and identifiable
capacities having rights which must be respected. It is their
happiness then, and not its interest, that is the criterion by which
its behavior is to be judged; and it is their welfare, and not the
force at its command, that sets the limits to the authority it is
entitled to exercise."172 (emphasis supplied)
Citing Hamilton, he also defines a constitution along the lines of
the natural law theory as "a law for the government, safeguarding
(not creating) individual rights, set down in writing."173 (emphasis
supplied) This view is accepted by Tañada and Fernando who
wrote that the constitution "is a written instrument organizing the
government, distributing its powers and safeguarding the rights of
the people."174 Chief Justice Fernando also quoted Schwartz that
"a constitution is seen as an organic instrument, under which
governmental powers are both conferred and circumscribed.
Such stress upon both grant and limitation of authority is
fundamental in American theory. ‘The office and purpose of the
constitution is to shape and fix the limits of governmental
activity.’"175 Malcolm and Laurel define it according to Justice
Miller’s definition in his opus on the American
Constitution176 published in 1893 as "the written instrument by
which the fundamental powers of government are established,
limited and defined, and by which those powers are distributed
among the several departments for their safe and useful exercise
for the benefit of the body politic."177 The constitution exists to
assure that in the government’s discharge of its functions, the
"dignity that is the birthright of every human being is duly
safeguarded."178
Clearly then, at the core of constitutionalism is a strong concern
for individual rights179 as in the modern period natural law
theories. Justice Laurel as delegate to the 1934 Constitutional
Convention declared in a major address before the Convention:
"There is no constitution, worthy of the name, without a bill or
declaration of rights. (It is) the palladium of the people’s liberties
and immunities, so that their persons, homes, their peace, their
livelihood, their happiness and their freedom may be safe and
secure from an ambitious ruler, an envious neighbor, or a
grasping state."180
As Chairman of the Committee on the Declaration of Rights, he
stated:
"The history of the world is the history of man and his arduous
struggle for liberty. . . . It is the history of those brave and able
souls who, in the ages that are past, have labored, fought and
bled that the government of the lash - that symbol of slavery and
despotism - might endure no more. It is the history of those great
self-sacrificing men who lived and suffered in an age of cruelty,
pain and desolation, so that every man might stand, under the
protection of great rights and privileges, the equal of every other
man."181
Being substantially a copy of the American Bill of Rights, the
history of our Bill of Rights dates back to the roots of the
American Bill of Rights. The latter is a charter of the individual’s
liberties and a limitation upon the power of the state182 which
traces its roots to the English Magna Carta of 1215, a first in
English history for a written instrument to be secured from a
sovereign ruler by the bulk of the politically articulate community
that intended to lay down binding rules of law that the ruler
himself may not violate. "In Magna Carta is to be found the germ
of the root principle that there are fundamental individual rights
that the State -sovereign though it is - may not
infringe."183(emphasis supplied)
In Sales v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,184 quoting Allado v.
Diokno,185 this Court ruled that the Bill of Rights guarantees the
preservation of our natural rights, viz:
"The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect the people against
arbitrary and discriminatory use of political power. This bundle of
rights guarantees the preservation of our natural rights which
include personal liberty and security against invasion by the
government or any of its branches or
instrumentalities."186 (emphasis supplied)
We need, however, to fine tune this pronouncement of the Court,
considering that certain rights in our Bill of Rights, for example
habeas corpus, have been identified not as a natural right, but a
civil right created by law. Likewise, the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures has been identified in Simon as a civil
right, without expounding however what civil right meant therein -
whether a natural right existing before the constitution and
protected by it, thus acquiring the status of a civil right; or a right
created merely by law and non-existent in the absence of law. To
understand the nature of the right against unreasonable search
and seizure and the corollary right to exclusion of evidence
obtained therefrom, we turn a heedful eye on the history, concept
and purpose of these guarantees.
IV. History of the Guarantee against
Unreasonable Search and Seizure and the
Right to Exclusion of Illegally Seized Evidence
in the United States and in the Philippines
The origin of the guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure in the Philippine constitutions can be traced back to
hundreds of years ago in a land distant from the Philippines.
Needless to say, the right is well-entrenched in history.
The power to search in England was first used as an instrument
to oppress objectionable publications.187 Not too long after the
printing press was developed, seditious and libelous publications
became a concern of the Crown, and a broad search and seizure
power developed to suppress these publications.188 General
warrants were regularly issued that gave all kinds of people the
power to enter and seize at their discretion under the authority of
the Crown to enforce publication licensing statutes.189 In 1634, the
ultimate ignominy in the use of general warrants came when the
early "great illuminary of the common law,"190 and most influential
of the Crown’s opponents,191 Sir Edward Coke, while on his death
bed, was subjected to a ransacking search and the manuscripts
of his Institutes were seized and carried away as seditious and
libelous publications.192
The power to issue general warrants and seize publications grew.
They were also used to search for and seize smuggled
goods.193 The developing common law tried to impose limits on
the broad power to search to no avail. In his History of the Pleas
of Crown, Chief Justice Hale stated unequivocally that general
warrants were void and that warrants must be used on "probable
cause" and with particularity.194 Member of Parliament, William
Pitt, made his memorable and oft-quoted speech against the
unrestrained power to search:
"The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the
forces of the Crown. It may be frail - its roof may shake - the wind
may blow through it - the storm may enter - the rain may enter;
but the King of England may not enter; all his force dares not
cross the threshold of the ruined tenement."195
Nevertheless, legislation authorizing general warrants continued
to be passed.196
In the 16th century, writs of assistance, called as such because
they commanded all officers of the Crown to participate in their
execution,197 were also common. These writs authorized searches
and seizures for enforcement of import duty laws.198 The "same
powers and authorities" and the "like assistance" that officials had
in England were given to American customs officers when
parliament extended the customs laws to the colonies. The abuse
in the writs of assistance was not only that they were general, but
they were not returnable and once issued, lasted six months past
the life of the sovereign.199
These writs caused profound resentment in the colonies.200 They
were predominantly used in Massachusetts, the largest port in the
colonies201 and the seat of the American revolution. When the
writs expired six months after the death of George II in October
1760,202 sixty-three Boston merchants who were opposed to the
writs retained James Otis, Jr. to petition the Superior Court for a
hearing on the question of whether new writs should be
issued.203 Otis used the opportunity to denounce England’s whole
policy to the colonies and on general warrants.204 He pronounced
the writs of assistance as "the worst instrument of arbitrary power,
the most destructive of English liberty and the fundamental
principles of law, that ever was found in an English law book"
since they placed "the liberty of every man in the hands of every
petty officer."205 Otis was a visionary and apparently made the first
argument for judicial review and nullifying of a statute exceeding
the legislature’s power under the Constitution and "natural
law."206 This famous debate in February 1761 in Boston was
"perhaps the most prominent event which inaugurated the
resistance of the colonies to the oppressions of the mother
country. ‘Then and there,’ said John Adams, ‘then and there was
the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims
of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was
born.’"207 But the Superior Court nevertheless held that the writs
could be issued.208
Once the customs officials had the writs, however, they had great
difficulty enforcing the customs laws owing to rampant smuggling
and mob resistance from the citizenry.209 The revolution had
begun. The Declaration of Independence followed. The use of
general warrants and writs of assistance in enforcing customs
and tax laws was one of the causes of the American
Revolution.210
Back in England, shortly after the Boston debate, John Wilkes, a
member of Parliament, anonymously published the North Briton,
a series of pamphlets criticizing the policies of the British
government.211 In 1763, one pamphlet was very bold in
denouncing the government. Thus, the Secretary of the State
issued a general warrant to "search for the authors, printers, and
publishers of [the] seditious and treasonable paper."212 Pursuant
to the warrant, Wilkes’ house was searched and his papers were
indiscriminately seized. He sued the perpetrators and obtained a
judgment for damages. The warrant was pronounced illegal "as
totally subversive of the liberty" and "person and property of every
man in this kingdom."213
Seeing Wilkes’ success, John Entick filed an action for trespass
for the search and seizure of his papers under a warrant issued
earlier than Wilkes’. This became the case of Entick v.
Carrington,214 considered a landmark of the law of search and
seizure and called a familiar "monument of English
freedom".215 Lord Camden, the judge, held that the general
warrant for Entick’s papers was invalid. Having described the
power claimed by the Secretary of the State for issuing general
search warrants, and the manner in which they were executed,
Lord Camden spoke these immortalized words, viz:
"Such is the power and therefore one would naturally expect that
the law to warrant it should be clear in proportion as the power is
exorbitant. If it is law, it will be found in our books; if it is not to be
found there, it is not law.
The great end for which men entered into society was to secure
their property. That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable
in all instances where it has not been taken away or abridged by
some public law for the good of the whole. The cases where this
right of property is set aside by positive law are various.
Distresses, executions, forfeitures, taxes, etc., are all of this
description, wherein every man by common consent gives up that
right for the sake of justice and the general good. By the laws of
England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute,
is a trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground without
my license but he is liable to an action though the damage be
nothing; which is proved by every declaration in trespass where
the defendant is called upon to answer for bruising the grass and
even treading upon the soil. If he admits the fact, he is bound to
show by way of justification that some positive law has justified or
excused him. . . If no such excuse can be found or produced, the
silence of the books is an authority against the defendant and the
plaintiff must have judgment. . ."216 (emphasis supplied)
The experience of the colonies on the writs of assistance which
spurred the Boston debate and the Entick case which was a
"monument of freedom" that every American statesman knew
during the revolutionary and formative period of America, could
be confidently asserted to have been "in the minds of those who
framed the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, and were
considered as sufficiently explanatory of what was meant by
unreasonable searches and seizures."217
The American experience with the writs of assistance and the
Entick case were considered by the United States Supreme Court
in the first major case to discuss the scope of the Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure in the
1885 case of Boyd v. United States, supra, where the court ruled,
viz:
"The principles laid down in this opinion (Entick v. Carrington,
supra) affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and
security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case
then before the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they
apply to all invasions, on the part of the Government and its
employees, of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of
life. It is not the breaking of his doors and the rummaging of his
drawers that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal
liberty and private property, where that right has never been
forfeited by his conviction of some public offense; it is the
invasion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the
essence of Lord Camden’s judgment."218(emphasis supplied)
In another landmark case of 1914, Weeks v. United States,219 the
Court, citing Adams v. New York,220 reiterated that the Fourth
Amendment was intended to secure the citizen in person and
property against the unlawful invasion of the sanctity of his home
by officers of the law, acting under legislative or judicial sanction.
With this genesis of the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures and the jurisprudence that had built around it, the Fourth
Amendment guarantee was extended by the United States to the
Filipinos in succinct terms in President McKinley’s Instruction of
April 7, 1900, viz:
". . . that the right to be secure against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated."221
This provision in the Instruction was re-enacted in Section 5 of
the Philippine Bill of 1902, this time with a provision on warrants,
viz:
"That the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated.
xxx xxx xxx
That no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or things to be seized."222
The above provisions were reproduced verbatim in the Jones
Law of 1916.
Then came the 1935 Constitution which provides in Article IV,
Section 1(3), viz:
"Section 1(3). The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized."
Initially, the Constitutional Convention’s committee on bill of rights
proposed an exact copy of the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution in their draft, viz:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized."223
During the debates of the Convention, however, Delegate Vicente
Francisco proposed to amend the provision by inserting the
phrase "to be determined by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may
produce" in lieu of "supported by oath or affirmation." His
proposal was based on Section 98 of General Order No. 58 or the
Code of Criminal Procedure then in force in the Philippines which
provided that: "(t)he judge or justice of the peace must, before
issuing the warrant, examine on oath or affirmation the
complainant and any witness he may produce and take their
deposition in writing."224 The amendment was accepted as it was
a remedy against the evils pointed out in the debates, brought
about by the issuance of warrants, many of which were in blank,
upon mere affidavits on facts which were generally found
afterwards to be false.225
When the Convention patterned the 1935 Constitution’s
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures after the
Fourth Amendment, the Convention made specific reference to
the Boyd case and traced the history of the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure back to the issuance of general
warrants and writs of assistance in England and the American
colonies.226 From the Boyd case, it may be derived that our own
Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures, which is an almost exact copy of the Fourth
Amendment, seeks to protect rights to security of person and
property as well as privacy in one’s home and possessions.
Almost 40 years after the ratification of the 1935 Constitution, the
provision on the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures was amended in Article IV, Section 3 of the 1973
Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be
violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or
such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
Noticeably, there were three modifications of the 1935
counterpart, namely: (1) the clause was made applicable to
searches and seizures "of whatever nature and for any purpose";
(2) the provision on warrants was expressly made applicable to
both "search warrant or warrant of arrest"; and (3) probable cause
was made determinable not only by a judge, but also by "such
other officer as may be authorized by law."227 But the concept and
purpose of the right remained substantially the same.
As a corollary to the above provision on searches and seizures,
the exclusionary rule made its maiden appearance in Article IV,
Section 4(2) of the Constitution, viz:
"Section 4 (1). The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of
the court, or when public safety and order require otherwise.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
That evidence obtained in violation of the guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures is inadmissible was an
adoption of the Court’s ruling in the 1967 case of Stonehill v.
Diokno.228
Sections 3 and 4 of the 1973 Constitution were adopted in toto in
Article I, Section 1 of the Freedom Constitution which took effect
on March 25, 1986, viz:
"Section 1. The provision of . . . ARTICLE IV (Bill of Rights) . . . of
the 1973 Constitution, as amended, remain in force and effect
and are hereby adopted in toto as part of this Provisional
Constitution."229
Thereafter, pursuant to the Freedom Constitution, the 1987
Constitution was drafted and ratified on February 2, 1987.
Sections 2 and 3, Article III thereof provide:
"Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by a
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 3 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence
shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when
public safety and order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
The significant modification of Section 2 is that probable cause
may be determined only by a judge and no longer by "such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law." This was a
reversion to the counterpart provision in the 1935 Constitution.
Parenthetically, in the international arena, the UDHR provides a
similar protection in Article 12, viz:
"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his
honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of
the law against such interference or attacks."
The ICCPR similarly protects this human right in Article 17, viz:
"1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks
upon his honour and reputation.
2. Everyone has the right to protection of the law against such
interference or attacks."
In the United States, jurisprudence on the Fourth Amendment
continued to grow from the Boyd case. The United States
Supreme Court has held that the focal concern of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect the individual from arbitrary and
oppressive official conduct.230 It also protects the privacies of life
and the sanctity of the person from such interference.231 In later
cases, there has been a shift in focus: it has been held that the
principal purpose of the guarantee is the protection of privacy
rather than property, "[f]or the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places."232 The tests that have more recently been
formulated in interpeting the provision focus on privacy rather
than intrusion of property such as the "constitutionally protected
area" test in the 1961 case of Silverman v. United States233 and
the "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard in Katz v. United
States234 which held that the privacy of communication in a public
telephone booth comes under the protection of the Fourth
Amendment.
Despite the shift in focus of the Fourth Amendment in American
jurisdiction, the essence of this right in Philippine jurisdiction has
consistently been understood as respect for one’s personality,
property, home, and privacy. Chief Justice Fernando explains,
viz:
"It is deference to one’s personality that lies at the core of this
right, but it could be also looked upon as a recognition of a
constitutionally protected area, primarily one’s home, but not
necessarily excluding an office or a hotel room. (Cf. Hoffa v.
United States, 385 US 293 [1966]) What is sought to be regarded
is a man’s prerogative to choose who is allowed entry in his
residence, for him to retreat from the cares and pressures, even
at times the oppressiveness of the outside world, where he can
truly be himself with his family. In that haven of refuge, his
individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be
welcome but likewise in the objects he wants around him. There
the state, however powerful, does not as such have access
except under the circumstances noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. (Cf.
Cooley: ‘Near in importance to exemption from any arbitrary intrusion into that privacy which was regarded as sacred as any
control of the person is that maxim of the common law which of the kingly prerogatives. . .
secures to the citizen immunity in his home against the prying
eyes of the government, and protection in person, property, and ‘A man’s house is his castle,’ has become a maxim among the
papers against even the process of the law, except in specified civilized peoples of the earth. His protection therein has become
cases. The maxim that ‘every man’s house is his castle,’ is made a matter of constitutional protection in England, America, and
part of our constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting Spain, as well as in other countries.
unreasonable searches and seizures, and has always been
looked upon as of high value to the citizen.’ (1 Constitutional xxx xxx xxx
Limitations, pp. 610-611 [1927]) In the language of Justice Laurel,
this provision is ‘intended to bulwark individual security, home,
So jealously did the people of England regard this right to enjoy,
and legitimate possessions’ (Rodriquez v. Vollamiel, 65 Phil. 230,
unmolested, the privacy of their houses, that they might even take
239 (1937). Laurel con.) Thus is protected ‘his personal privacy
the life of the unlawful intruder, if it be nighttime. This was also
and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.’ There is
the sentiment of the Romans expressed by Tully: ‘Quid enim
to be no invasion ‘on the part of the government and its
sanctius quid omni religione munitius, quam domus uniuscu
employees of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of
jusque civium.’ "237(emphasis supplied)
life.’ (Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616, 630
[1886])"235 (emphasis supplied)
The Court reiterated this in the 1911 case of United States v. De
Los Reyes, et al.,238 to demonstrate the uncompromising regard
As early as 1904, the Court has affirmed the sanctity and privacy
placed upon the privacy of the home that cannot be violated by
of the home in United States v. Arceo,236 viz:
unreasonable searches and seizures, viz:
"The inviolability of the home is one of the most fundamental of all
"In the case of McClurg vs. Brenton (123 Iowa, 368), the court,
the individual rights declared and recognized in the political codes
speaking of the right of an officer to enter a private house to
of civilized nations. No one can enter into the home of another
search for the stolen goods, said:
without the consent of its owners or occupants.
‘The right of the citizen to occupy and enjoy his home, however
The privacy of the home - the place of abode, the place
mean or humble, free from arbitrary invasion and search, has for
where man with his family may dwell in peace and enjoy the
centuries been protected with the most solicitous care by every
companionship of his wife and children unmolested by
court in the English-speaking world, from Magna Charta down to
anyone, even the king, except in rare cases - has always
the present, and is embodied in every bill of rights defining the
been regarded by civilized nations as one of the most sacred
limits of governmental power in our own republic.
personal rights to whom men are entitled. Both the common
and the civil law guaranteed to man the right to absolute
protection to the privacy of his home. The king was powerful; he ‘The mere fact that a man is an officer, whether of high or low
was clothed with majesty; his will was the law, but, with few degree, gives him no more right than is possessed by the
exceptions, the humblest citizen or subject might shut the door of ordinary private citizen to break in upon the privacy of a home
his humble cottage in the face of the monarch and defend his and subject its occupants to the indignity of a search for the
evidence of crime, without a legal warrant procured for that
purpose. No amount of incriminating evidence, whatever its
source, will supply the place of such warrant. At the closed door
of the home, be it palace or hovel, even blood-hounds must wait
till the law, by authoritative process, bids it open. . .’"239 (emphasis
supplied)
It is not only respect for personality, privacy and property, but to
the very dignity of the human being that lies at the heart of the
provision.
There is also public interest involved in the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure. The respect that government
accords its people helps it elicit allegiance and loyalty of its
citizens. Chief Justice Fernando writes about the right against
unreasonable search and seizure as well as to privacy of
communication in this wise:
"These rights, on their face, impart meaning and vitality to that
liberty which in a constitutional regime is a man’s birth-right.
There is the recognition of the area of privacy normally beyond
the power of government to intrude. Full and unimpaired respect
to that extent is accorded his personality. He is free from the
prying eyes of public officials. He is let alone, a prerogative even
more valued when the agencies of publicity manifest less and
less diffidence in impertinent and unwelcome inquiry into one’s
person, his home, wherever he may be minded to stay, his
possessions, his communication. Moreover, in addition to the
individual interest, there is a public interest that is likewise served
by these constitutional safeguards. They make it easier for state
authority to enlist the loyalty and allegiance of its citizens, with the
unimpaired deference to one’s dignity and standing as a human
being, not only to his person as such but to things that may be
considered necessary appurtenances to a decent existence. A
government that thus recognizes such limits and is careful not to
trespass on what is the domain subject to his sole control is likely
to prove more stable and enduring."240 (emphasis supplied)
In the 1967 case of Stonehill, et al. v. Diokno,241 this Court
affirmed the sanctity of the home and the privacy of
communication and correspondence, viz:
"To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be
to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights
guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the
sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication
and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or
passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to
be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted -
to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to
imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when
the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even
though by legal means."242 (emphasis supplied)
Even after the 1961 Silverman and 1967 Katz cases in the
United States, which emphasized protection of privacy rather than
property as the principal purpose of the Fourth Amendment, this
Court declared the avowed purposes of the guarantee in the 1981
case of People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City,243 viz:
"The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures is to prevent violations of
private security in person and property and unlawful
invasion of the security of the home by officers of the
law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give
remedy against such usurpation when attempted. (Adams v. New
York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The
right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and
happiness and to the peace and security of every individual,
whether it be of home or of persons and
correspondence. (Tañada and Carreon, Political Law of the
Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]). The constitutional inviolability
of this great fundamental right against unreasonable
searches and seizures must be deemed absolute as nothing
is closer to a man’s soul than the serenity of his privacy and
the assurance of his personal security. Any interference
allowable can only be for the best causes and
reasons."244 (emphasis supplied)
Even if it were conceded that privacy and not property is the
focus of the guarantee as shown by the growing American
jurisprudence, this Court has upheld the right to privacy and its
central place in a limited government such as the Philippines’, viz:
"The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof.
Emerson is particularly apt: ‘The concept of limited government
has always included the idea that governmental powers stop
short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This
is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and
limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the
individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute
state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a
private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly
distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can
control. Protection of this private sector - protection, in other
words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual- has become
increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the
forces of technological age - industrialization, urbanization, and
organization - operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate
intrusion to it. In modern times, the capacity to maintain and
support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a
democratic and a totalitarian society.’"245 (emphasis supplied)
The right to privacy discussed in Justice Douglas’ dissent in the
Hayden case is illuminating. We quote it at length, viz:
"Judge Learned Hand stated a part of the philosophy of the
Fourth Amendment in United States v. Poller, 43 F2d 911, 914:
‘[I]t is only fair to observe that the real evil aimed at by the Fourth
Amendment is the search itself, that invasion of a man’s privacy
which consists in rummaging about among his effects to secure
evidence against him. If the search is permitted at all, perhaps it
does not make so much difference what is taken away, since the
officers will ordinarily not be interested in what does not
incriminate, and there can be no sound policy in protecting what
does.
xxx xxx xxx
The constitutional philosophy is, I think, clear. The personal
effects and possessions of the individual (all contraband and
the like excepted) are sacrosanct from prying eyes, from the
long arm of the law, from any rummaging by police. Privacy
involves the choice of the individual to disclose or to reveal
what he believes, what he thinks, what he possesses. The
article may be nondescript work of art, a manuscript of a book, a
personal account book, a diary, invoices, personal clothing,
jewelry, or whatnot. Those who wrote the Bill of Rights
believed that every individual needs both to communicate
with others and to keep his affairs to himself. That dual
aspect of privacy means that the individual should have the
freedom to select for himself the time and circumstances
when he will share his secrets with others and decide the
extent of the sharing (footnote omitted). This is his
prerogative not the States’. The Framers, who were as
knowledgeable as we, knew what police surveillance meant and
how the practice of rummaging through one’s personal effects
could destroy freedom.
xxx xxx xxx
I would . . . leave with the individual the choice of opening
his private effects (apart from contraband and the like) to the
police and keeping their contents as secret and their
integrity inviolate. The existence of that choice is the very
essence of the right of privacy.’"246 (emphasis supplied)
Thus, in Griswold v. Connecticut,247 the United States Supreme
Court upheld the right to marital privacy and ruled that lawmakers
could not make the use of contraceptives a crime and sanction
the search of marital bedrooms, viz:
"Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of
marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?
The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding
the marriage relationship.
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights – older
than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage
is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring,
and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association
that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social
projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any
involved in our prior decisions."248 (emphasis supplied)
In relation to the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, private respondent Dimaano likewise claims a right to
the exclusionary rule, i.e., that evidence obtained from an
unreasonable search cannot be used in evidence against her. To
determine whether this right is available to her, we again examine
the history, concept, and purpose of this right in both the
American and Philippine jurisdictions.
The exclusionary rule has had an uneven history in both the
United States and Philippine jurisdictions. In common law, the
illegal seizure of evidence did not affect its admissibility because
of the view that physical evidence was the same however it was
obtained. As distinguished from a coerced confession, the illegal
seizure did not impeach the authenticity or reliability of physical
evidence. This view prevailed in American jurisdiction until the
Supreme Court ruled in the 1914 Weeks case that evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment was inadmissible
in federal court as it amounted to theft by agents of the
government. This came to be known as the exclusionary rule and
was believed to deter federal law enforcers from violating the
Fourth Amendment. In 1949, the Fourth Amendment was
incorporated into the Due Process Clause under the Fourteenth
Amendment249 and made applicable in the state system in Wolf v.
Colorado,250 but the Court rejected to incorporate the exclusionary
rule. At the time Wolf was decided, 17 states followed the Weeks
doctrine while 30 states did not.251 The Court reasoned:
"We cannot brush aside the experience of States which deem the
incidence of such conduct by the police too slight to call for a
deterrent remedy not by way of disciplinary measures but by
overriding the relevant rules of evidence. There are, moreover,
reasons for excluding evidence unreasonably obtained by the
federal police which are less compelling in the case of police
under State or local authority. The public opinion of a community
can far more effectively be exerted against oppressive conduct on
the part of police directly responsible to the community itself than
can local opinion, sporadically aroused, be brought to bear upon
remote authority pervasively exerted throughout the country."252
This difference in treatment on the federal and state level of
evidence obtained illegally resulted in the "silver platter" doctrine.
State law enforcement agents would provide federal officers with
illegally seized evidence, which was then admissible in federal
court because, as with illegally seized evidence by private
citizens, federal officers were not implicated in obtaining it. Thus,
it was said that state law enforcers served up the evidence in
federal cases in "silver platter." This pernicious practice was
stopped with the United States Supreme Court’s 1960 decision,
Elkins v. United States.253 Twelve years after Wolf, the United
States Supreme Court reversed Wolf and incorporated the
exclusionary rule in the state system in Mapp v. Ohio254 because
other means of controlling illegal police behavior had failed.255 We
quote at length the Mapp ruling as it had a significant influence in
the exclusionary rule in Philippine jurisdiction, viz:
". . . Today we once again examine the Wolf’s constitutional
documentation of the right of privacy free from unreasonable
state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led by
it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence
secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic
right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that
very same unlawful conduct. . .
Since the Fourth Amendment’s right to privacy has been declared
enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same
sanction of exclusion as it is used against the Federal
Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks
rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and
seizures would be a ‘form of words’, valueless and undeserving of
mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so
too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy
would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual
nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing
evidence as not to permit this Court’s high regard as freedom
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ At that time that the
Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the
States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this court
as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers
the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence
seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf ‘stoutly adhered’ to
that proposition. The right to privacy, when conceded operatively
enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction
by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and
enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd,
Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the
substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally
unreasonable searches - state or federal - it was logically and
constitutionally necessary that the exclusion doctrine - an
essential part of the right to privacy - be also insisted upon as an
essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf
case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional right by
Wolf could not consistently tolerate denial of its most important
constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence
which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the
unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in
reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the
Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule
‘is to deter - to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in
the only available way - by removing the incentive to disregard it.’
(Elkins v. United States, 364 US at 217)
xxx xxx xxx
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to
destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the
liberties of the people rest. (Cf. Marcus v. Search Warrant of
Property, 6 L ed 2d post, p. 1127) Having once recognized that
the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is
enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure
against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore
constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to
remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same
manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by its Due
Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the
whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement
itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded
on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that
which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no
less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and to
the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true
administration of justice."256 (emphasis supplied)
It is said that the exclusionary rule has three purposes. The major
and most often invoked is the deterrence of unreasonable
searches and seizures as stated in Elkins v. United States257 and
quoted in Mapp: "(t)he rule is calculated to prevent, not repair. Its
purpose is to deter – to compel respect for constitutional guaranty
in the only effective available way – by removing the incentive to
disregard it."258 Second is the "imperative of judicial integrity", i.e.,
that the courts do not become "accomplices in the willful
disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold . . . by
permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such
invasions. . . A ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial . . . has
the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced
the evidence, while an application of the exclusionary rule
withholds the constitutional imprimatur."259 Third is the more
recent purpose pronounced by some members of the United
States Supreme Court which is that "of assuring the people – all
potential victims of unlawful government conduct – that the
government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus
minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in
government."260 The focus of concern here is not the police but
the public. This third purpose is implicit in the Mapp declaration
that "no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional evidence."261
In Philippine jurisdiction, the Court has likewise swung from one
position to the other on the exclusionary rule. In the 1920 case of
Uy Kheytin v. Villareal,262 the Court citing Boyd, ruled that "seizure
or compulsory production of a man’s private papers to be used
against him" was tantamount to self-incrimination and was
therefore "unreasonable search and seizure." This was a
proscription against "fishing expeditions." The Court restrained
the prosecution from using the books as evidence. Five years
later or in 1925, we held in People v. Carlos263 that although the
Boyd and Silverthorne Lumber Co. and Silverthorne v. United
States264 cases are authorities for the doctrine that documents
obtained by illegal searches were inadmissible in evidence in
criminal cases, Weeks modified this doctrine by adding that the
illegality of the search and seizure should have initially been
directly litigated and established by a pre-trial motion for the
return of the things seized. As this condition was not met, the
illegality of the seizure was not deemed an obstacle to
admissibility. The subject evidence was nevertheless excluded,
however, for being hearsay. Thereafter, in 1932, the Court did not
uphold the defense of self-incrimination when "fraudulent books,
invoices and records" that had been seized were presented in
evidence in People v. Rubio.265 The Court gave three reasons: (1)
the public has an interest in the proper regulation of the party’s
books; (2) the books belonged to a corporation of which the party
was merely a manager; and (3) the warrants were not issued to
fish for evidence but to seize "instruments used in the violation of
[internal revenue] laws" and "to further prevent the perpetration of
fraud."266
The exclusionary rule applied in Uy Kheytin was reaffirmed
seventeen years thence in the 1937 case of Alvarez v. Court of
First Instance267 decided under the 1935 Constitution. The Court
ruled that the seizure of books and documents for the purpose of
using them as evidence in a criminal case against the possessor
thereof is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant
unreasonable and the presentation of evidence offensive of the
provision against self-incrimination. At the close of the Second
World War, however, the Court, in Alvero v. Dizon,268again
admitted in evidence documents seized by United States military
officers without a search warrant in a prosecution by the
Philippine Government for treason. The Court reasoned that this
was in accord with the Laws and Customs of War and that the
seizure was incidental to an arrest and thus legal. The issue of
self-incrimination was not addressed at all and instead, the Court
pronounced that even if the seizure had been illegal, the evidence
would nevertheless be admissible following jurisprudence in the
United States that evidence illegally obtained by state officers or
private persons may be used by federal officers.269
Then came Moncado v. People’s Court270 in 1948. The Court
made a categorical declaration that "it is established doctrine in
the Philippines that the admissibility of evidence is not affected by
the illegality of the means used for obtaining it." It condemned the
"pernicious influence" of Boyd and totally rejected the doctrine in
Weeks as "subversive of evidentiary rules in Philippine
jurisdiction." The ponencia declared that the prosecution of those
guilty of violating the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures was adequate protection for the people. Thus it became
settled jurisprudence that illegally obtained evidence was
admissible if found to be relevant to the case271until the 1967
landmark decision of Stonehill v. Diokno272 which overturned the
Moncado rule. The Court held in Stonehill, viz:
". . . Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of
the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be
abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common
law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely
‘because the constable has blundered,’ (People v. Defore, 140
NE 585) upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other
than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained (Wolf v.
Colorado, 93 L.Ed. 1782), such as common-law action for
damages against the searching officer, against the party who
procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those
assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal
punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure,
and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up
this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule,
realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures."273
The Court then quoted the portion of the Mapp case which we
have quoted at length above in affirming that the exclusionary
rule is part and parcel of the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. The Stonehill ruling was incorporated in Article 4,
Section 4(2) of the 1973 Constitution and carried over to Article 3,
Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution.
V. Application of the Natural Law
Culled from History and Philosophy:
Are the Rights Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure
and to the Exclusion of Illegally Seized Evidence Natural Rights
which Private Respondent Dimaano Can Invoke?
In answering this question, Justice Goldberg’s concurring opinion
in the Griswold case serves as a helpful guidepost to determine
whether a right is so fundamental that the people cannot be
deprived of it without undermining the tenets of civil society and
government, viz:
"In determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not left
at large to decide cases in light of their personal and private
notions. Rather, they must look to the ‘traditions and [collective]
conscience of our people’ to determine whether a principle is ‘so
rooted [there] . . . as to be ranked as fundamental.’ (Snyder v.
Com. of Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). The inquiry is
whether a right involved ‘is of such character that it cannot be
denied without violating those ‘fundamental principles of liberty
and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions.’ . . . Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67
(1932)"274 (emphasis supplied)
In deciding a case, invoking natural law as solely a matter of the
judge’s personal preference, invites criticism that the decision is a
performative contradiction and thus self-defeating. Critics would
point out that while the decision invokes natural law that abhors
arbitrariness, that same decision is tainted with what it abhors as
it stands on the judge’s subjective and arbitrary choice of a school
of legal thought. Just as one judge will fight tooth and nail to
defend the natural law philosophy, another judge will match his
fervor in defending a contrary philosophy he espouses. However,
invoking natural law because the history, tradition and moral fiber
of a people indubitably show adherence to it is an altogether
different story, for ultimately, in our political and legal tradition, the
people are the source of all government authority, and the courts
are their creation. While it may be argued that the choice of a
school of legal thought is a matter of opinion, history is a fact
against which one cannot argue - and it would not be turning
somersault with history to say that the American Declaration of
Independence and the consequent adoption of a constitution
stood on a modern natural law theory foundation as this is
"universally taken for granted by writers on government."275 It is
also well-settled in Philippine history that the American system of
government and constitution were adopted by our 1935
Constitutional Convention as a model of our own republican
system of government and constitution. In the words of Claro M.
Recto, President of the Convention, the 1935 Constitution is
"frankly an imitation of the American Constitution." Undeniably
therefore, modern natural law theory, specifically Locke’s natural
rights theory, was used by the Founding Fathers of the American
constitutional democracy and later also used by the
Filipinos.276 Although the 1935 Constitution was revised in 1973,
minimal modifications were introduced in the 1973 Constitution
which was in force prior to the EDSA Revolution. Therefore, it
could confidently be asserted that the spirit and letter of the 1935
Constitution, at least insofar as the system of government and the
Bill of Rights were concerned, still prevailed at the time of the
EDSA Revolution. Even the 1987 Constitution ratified less than a
year from the EDSA Revolution retained the basic provisions of
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions on the system of government
and the Bill of Rights, with the significant difference that it
emphasized respect for and protection of human rights and
stressed that sovereignty resided in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.
Two facts are easily discernible from our constitutional history.
First, the Filipinos are a freedom-loving race with high regard for
their fundamental and natural rights. No amount of subjugation or
suppression, by rulers with the same color as the Filipinos’ skin or
otherwise, could obliterate their longing and aspiration to enjoy
these rights. Without the people’s consent to submit their natural
rights to the ruler,277 these rights cannot forever be quelled, for
like water seeking its own course and level, they will find their
place in the life of the individual and of the nation; natural right, as
part of nature, will take its own course. Thus, the Filipinos fought
for and demanded these rights from the Spanish and American
colonizers, and in fairly recent history, from an authoritarian ruler.
They wrote these rights in stone in every constitution they crafted
starting from the 1899 Malolos Constitution. Second, although
Filipinos have given democracy its own Filipino face, it is
undeniable that our political and legal institutions are American in
origin. The Filipinos adopted the republican form of government
that the Americans introduced and the Bill of Rights they
extended to our islands, and were the keystones that kept the
body politic intact. These institutions sat well with the Filipinos
who had long yearned for participation in government and were
jealous of their fundamental and natural rights. Undergirding
these institutions was the modern natural law theory which
stressed natural rights in free, independent and equal individuals
who banded together to form government for the protection of
their natural rights to life, liberty and property. The sole purpose
of government is to promote, protect and preserve these rights.
And when government not only defaults in its duty but itself
violates the very rights it was established to protect, it forfeits its
authority to demand obedience of the governed and could be
replaced with one to which the people consent. The Filipino
people exercised this highest of rights in the EDSA Revolution of
February 1986.
I will not endeavor to identify every natural right that the Filipinos
fought for in EDSA. The case at bar merely calls us to determine
whether two particular rights - the rights against unreasonable
search and seizure and to the exclusion of evidence obtained
therefrom - have the force and effect of natural rights which
private respondent Dimaano can invoke against the government.
I shall first deal with the right against unreasonable search and
seizure. On February 25, 1986, the new president, Corazon
Aquino, issued Proclamation No. 1 where she declared that she
and the vice president were taking power in the name and by the
will of the Filipino people and pledged "to do justice to the
numerous victims of human rights violations."278 It is implicit from
this pledge that the new government recognized and respected
human rights. Thus, at the time of the search on March 3, 1986, it
may be asserted that the government had the duty, by its own
pledge, to uphold human rights. This presidential issuance was
what came closest to a positive law guaranteeing human rights
without enumerating them. Nevertheless, even in the absence of
a positive law granting private respondent Dimaano the right
against unreasonable search and seizure at the time her house
was raided, I respectfully submit that she can invoke her natural
right against unreasonable search and seizure.
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a core right
implicit in the natural right to life, liberty and property. Our well-
settled jurisprudence that the right against unreasonable search
and seizure protects the people’s rights to security of person and
property, to the sanctity of the home, and to privacy is a
recognition of this proposition. The life to which each person has
a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may
be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life
lived with the assurance that the government he established and
consented to, will protect the security of his person and property.
The ideal of security in life and property dates back even earlier
than the modern philosophers and the American and French
revolutions, but pervades the whole history of man. It touches
every aspect of man’s existence, thus it has been described, viz:
"The right to personal security emanates in a person’s legal and
uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health,
and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to
enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a
deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to
the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and
lawful desires of the individual."279
The individual in the state of nature surrendered a portion of his
undifferentiated liberty and agreed to the establishment of a
government to guarantee his natural rights, including the right to
security of person and property, which he could not guarantee by
himself. Similarly, the natural right to liberty includes the right of a
person to decide whether to express himself and communicate to
the public or to keep his affairs to himself and enjoy his privacy.
Justice Douglas reminds us of the indispensability of privacy in
the Hayden case, thus: "Those who wrote the Bill of Rights
believed that every individual needs both to communicate with
others and to keep his affairs to himself." A natural right to liberty
indubitably includes the freedom to determine when and how an
individual will share the private part of his being and the extent of
his sharing. And when he chooses to express himself, the natural
right to liberty demands that he should be given the liberty to be
truly himself with his family in his home, his haven of refuge
where he can "retreat from the cares and pressures, even at
times the oppressiveness of the outside world," to borrow the
memorable words of Chief Justice Fernando. For truly, the drapes
of a man’s castle are but an extension of the drapes on his body
that cover the essentials. In unreasonable searches and seizures,
the prying eyes and the invasive hands of the government
prevent the individual from enjoying his freedom to keep to
himself and to act undisturbed within his zone of privacy. Finally,
indispensable to the natural right to property is the right to one’s
possessions. Property is a product of one’s toil and might be
considered an expression and extension of oneself. It is what an
individual deems necessary to the enjoyment of his life. With
unreasonable searches and seizures, one’s property stands in
danger of being rummaged through and taken away. In sum, as
pointed out in De Los Reyes, persons are subjected to indignity
by an unreasonable search and seizure because at bottom, it is a
violation of a person’s natural right to life, liberty and property. It is
this natural right which sets man apart from other beings, which
gives him the dignity of a human being.
It is understandable why Filipinos demanded that every organic
law in their history guarantee the protection of their natural right
against unreasonable search and seizure and why the UDHR
treated this right as a human right. It is a right inherent in the right
to life, liberty and property; it is a right "appertain(ing) to man in
right of his existence", a right that "belongs to man by virtue of his
nature and depends upon his personality", and not merely a civil
right created and protected by positive law. The right to protect
oneself against unreasonable search and seizure, being a right
indispensable to the right to life, liberty and property, may be
derived as a conclusion from what Aquinas identifies as man’s
natural inclination to self-preservation and self-actualization. Man
preserves himself by leading a secure life enjoying his liberty and
actualizes himself as a rational and social being in choosing to
freely express himself and associate with others as well as by
keeping to and knowing himself. For after all, a reflective grasp of
what it means to be human and how one should go about
performing the functions proper to his human nature can only be
done by the rational person himself in the confines of his private
space. Only he himself in his own quiet time can examine his life
knowing that an unexamined life is not worth living.
Every organic law the Filipinos established (the Malolos, 1935,
1973, and 1987 Constitutions) and embraced (the Instruction,
Philippine Bill of 1902, and Jones Law) in the last century
included a provision guaranteeing the people’s right against
unreasonable search and seizure because the people ranked this
right as fundamental and natural. Indeed, so fundamental and
natural is this right that the demand for it spurred the American
revolution against the English Crown. It resulted in the
Declaration of Independence and the subsequent establishment
of the American Constitution about 200 years ago in 1789. A
revolution is staged only for the most fundamental of reasons -
such as the violation of fundamental and natural rights - for
prudence dictates that "governments long established should not
be changed for light and transient reasons."280
Considering that the right against unreasonable search and
seizure is a natural right, the government cannot claim that
private respondent Dimaano is not entitled to the right for the
reason alone that there was no constitution granting the right at
the time the search was conducted. This right of the private
respondent precedes the constitution, and does not depend on
positive law. It is part of natural rights. A violation of this right
along with other rights stirred Filipinos to revolutions. It is the
restoration of the Filipinos’ natural rights that justified the
establishment of the Aquino government and the writing of the
1987 Constitution. I submit that even in the absence of a
constitution, private respondent Dimaano had a fundamental and
natural right against unreasonable search and seizure under
natural law.
We now come to the right to the exclusion of evidence illegally
seized. From Stonehill quoting Mapp, we can distill that the
exclusionary rule in both the Philippine and American jurisdictions
is a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" for it is a
necessary part of the guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures, which in turn is "an essential part of the right to
privacy" that the Constitution protects. If the exclusionary rule
were not adopted, it would be to "grant the right (against
unreasonable search and seizure) but in reality to withhold its
privilege and enjoyment." Thus, the inevitable conclusion is that
the exclusionary rule is likewise a natural right that private
respondent Dimaano can invoke even in the absence of a
constitution guaranteeing such right.
To be sure, the status of the exclusionary right as a natural right
is admittedly not as indisputable as the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures which is firmly supported by
philosophy and deeply entrenched in history. On a lower tier,
arguments have been raised on the constitutional status of the
exclusionary right. Some assert, on the basis of United States v.
Calandra,281 that it is only a "judicially-created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the
party aggrieved."282 Along the same line, others contend that the
right against unreasonable search and seizure merely requires
some effective remedy, and thus Congress may abolish or limit
the exclusionary right if it could replace it with other remedies of a
comparable or greater deterrent effect. But these contentions
have merit only if it is conceded that the exclusionary rule is
merely an optional remedy for the purpose of deterrence.283
Those who defend the constitutional status of the exclusionary
right, however, assert that there is nothing in Weeks that says
that it is a remedy284 or a manner of deterring police officers.285 In
Mapp, while the court discredited other means of enforcing the
Fourth Amendment cited in Wolf, the thrust of the opinion was
broader. Justice Clarke opined that "no man is to be convicted on
unconstitutional evidence"286 and held that "the exclusionary rule
is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments."287
Formulated in the Aquinian concept of human law, the debate is
whether the exclusionary right is the first kind of human law which
may be derived as a conclusion from the natural law precept that
one should do no harm to another man, in the same way that
conclusions are derived from scientific principles, in which case
the exclusionary right has force from natural law and does not
depend on positive law for its creation; or if it is the second kind of
human law which is derived by way of determination of natural
law, in the same way that a carpenter determines the shape of a
house, such that it is merely a judicially or legislatively chosen
remedy or deterrent, in which case the right only has force insofar
as positive law creates and protects it.
In holding that the right against unreasonable search and seizure
is a fundamental and natural right, we were aided by philosophy
and history. In the case of the exclusionary right, philosophy can
also come to the exclusionary right’s aid, along the lines of
Justice Clarke’s proposition in the Mapp case that no man shall
be convicted on unconstitutional evidence. Similarly, the
government shall not be allowed to convict a man on evidence
obtained in violation of a natural right (against unreasonable
search and seizure) for the protection of which, government and
the law were established. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
the brazen violation of natural rights and allow law enforcers to
act with more temerity than a thief in the night for they can disturb
one’s privacy, trespass one’s abode, and steal one’s property
with impunity. This, in turn, would erode the people’s trust in
government.
Unlike in the right against unreasonable search and seizure,
however, history cannot come to the aid of the exclusionary right.
Compared to the right against unreasonable search and seizure,
the exclusionary right is still in its infancy stage in Philippine
jurisdiction, having been etched only in the 1973 Constitution
after the 1967 Stonehill ruling which finally laid to rest the debate
on whether illegally seized evidence should be excluded. In the
United States, the exclusionary right’s genesis dates back only to
the 1885 Boyd case on the federal level, and to the 1961 Mapp
case in the state level. The long period of non-recognition of the
exclusionary right has not caused an upheaval, much less a
revolution, in both the Philippine and American jurisdictions.
Likewise, the UDHR, a response to violation of human rights in a
particular period in world history, did not include the exclusionary
right. It cannot confidently be asserted therefore that history can
attest to its natural right status. Without the strength of history and
with philosophy alone left as a leg to stand on, the exclusionary
right’s status as a fundamental and natural right stands on
unstable ground. Thus, the conclusion that it can be invoked even
in the absence of a constitution also rests on shifting sands.
Be that as it may, the exclusionary right is available to private
respondent Dimaano as she invoked it when it was already
guaranteed by the Freedom Constitution and the 1987
Constitution. The AFP Board issued its resolution on Ramas’
unexplained wealth only on July 27, 1987. The PCGG’s petition
for forfeiture against Ramas was filed on August 1, 1987 and was
later amended to name the Republic of the Philippines as plaintiff
and to add private respondent Dimaano as co-defendant.
Following the petitioner’s stance upheld by the majority that the
exclusionary right is a creation of the Constitution, then it could be
invoked as a constitutional right on or after the Freedom
Constitution took effect on March 25, 1986 and later, when the
1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987.
VI. Epilogue
The Filipino people have fought revolutions, by the power of the
pen, the strength of the sword and the might of prayer to claim
and reclaim their fundamental rights. They set these rights in
stone in every constitution they established. I cannot believe and
so hold that the Filipinos during that one month from February 25
to March 24, 1986 were stripped naked of all their rights,
including their natural rights as human beings. With the
extraordinary circumstances before, during and after the EDSA
Revolution, the Filipinos simply found themselves without a
constitution, but certainly not without fundamental rights. In that
brief one month, they retrieved their liberties and enjoyed them in
their rawest essence, having just been freed from the claws of an
authoritarian regime. They walked through history with bare feet,
unshod by a constitution, but with an armor of rights guaranteed
by the philosophy and history of their constitutional tradition.
Those natural rights inhere in man and need not be granted by a
piece of paper.
To reiterate, the right against unreasonable search and seizure
which private respondent Dimaano invokes is among the sacred
rights fought for by the Filipinos in the 1986 EDSA Revolution. It
will be a profanity to deny her the right after the fight had been
won. It does not matter whether she believed in the righteousness
of the EDSA Revolution or she contributed to its cause as an
alleged ally of the dictator, for as a human being, she has a
natural right to life, liberty and property which she can exercise
regardless of existing or non-existing laws and irrespective of the
will or lack of will of governments.
I wish to stress that I am not making the duty of the Court
unbearably difficult by taking it to task every time a right is
claimed before it to determine whether it is a natural right which
the government cannot diminish or defeat by any kind of positive
law or action. The Court need not always twice measure a law or
action, first utilizing the constitution and second using natural law
as a yardstick. However, the 1986 EDSA Revolution was
extraordinary, one that borders the miraculous. It was the first
revolution of its kind in Philippine history, and perhaps even in the
history of this planet. Fittingly, this separate opinion is the first of
its kind in this Court, where history and philosophy are invoked
not as aids in the interpretation of a positive law, but to recognize
a right not written in a papyrus but inheres in man as man. The
unnaturalness of the 1986 EDSA revolution cannot dilute nor
defeat the natural rights of man, rights that antedate constitutions,
rights that have been the beacon lights of the law since the Greek
civilization. Without respect for natural rights, man cannot rise to
the full height of his humanity.
I concur in the result.
G.R. No. 162994 September 17, 2004
DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO and
PEDRO A. TECSON, petitioners,
vs.
GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
Confronting the Court in this petition is a novel question, with
constitutional overtones, involving the validity of the policy of a
pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying
employees of any competitor company.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing
the Decision1 dated May 19, 2003 and the Resolution dated
March 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
62434.2
Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent
Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as medical
representative on October 24, 1995, after Tecson had undergone
training and orientation.
Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which
stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by
existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing
or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-
employees or employees of competing drug companies and
should management find that such relationship poses a possible
conflict of interest, to resign from the company.
The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides that
an employee is expected to inform management of any existing
or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-
employees or employees of competing drug companies. If
management perceives a conflict of interest or a potential conflict
between such relationship and the employee’s employment with
the company, the management and the employee will explore the
possibility of a "transfer to another department in a non-
counterchecking position" or preparation for employment outside
the company after six months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the
Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with
Bettsy, an employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals3(Astra), a
competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was Astra’s Branch Coordinator in
Albay. She supervised the district managers and medical
representatives of her company and prepared marketing
strategies for Astra in that area.
Even before they got married, Tecson received several reminders
from his District Manager regarding the conflict of interest which
his relationship with Bettsy might engender. Still, love prevailed,
and Tecson married Bettsy in September 1998.
In January 1999, Tecson’s superiors informed him that his
marriage to Bettsy gave rise to a conflict of interest. Tecson’s
superiors reminded him that he and Bettsy should decide which
one of them would resign from their jobs, although they told him
that they wanted to retain him as much as possible because he
was performing his job well.
Tecson requested for time to comply with the company policy
against entering into a relationship with an employee of a
competitor company. He explained that Astra, Bettsy’s employer,
was planning to merge with Zeneca, another drug company; and
Bettsy was planning to avail of the redundancy package to be
offered by Astra. With Bettsy’s separation from her company, the
potential conflict of interest would be eliminated. At the same
time, they would be able to avail of the attractive redundancy
package from Astra.
In August 1999, Tecson again requested for more time resolve
the problem. In September 1999, Tecson applied for a transfer in
Glaxo’s milk division, thinking that since Astra did not have a milk
division, the potential conflict of interest would be eliminated. His
application was denied in view of Glaxo’s "least-movement-
possible" policy.
In November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-
Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo to
reconsider its decision, but his request was denied.
Tecson sought Glaxo’s reconsideration regarding his transfer and
brought the matter to Glaxo’s Grievance Committee. Glaxo,
however, remained firm in its decision and gave Tescon until
February 7, 2000 to comply with the transfer order. Tecson defied
the transfer order and continued acting as medical representative
in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
During the pendency of the grievance proceedings, Tecson was
paid his salary, but was not issued samples of products which
were competing with similar products manufactured by Astra. He
was also not included in product conferences regarding such
products.
Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance
machinery level, they submitted the matter for voluntary
arbitration. Glaxo offered Tecson a separation pay of one-half (½)
month pay for every year of service, or a total of ₱50,000.00 but
he declined the offer. On November 15, 2000, the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered
its Decision declaring as valid Glaxo’s policy on relationships
between its employees and persons employed with competitor
companies, and affirming Glaxo’s right to transfer Tecson to
another sales territory.
Aggrieved, Tecson filed a Petition for Review with the Court of
Appeals assailing the NCMB Decision.
On May 19, 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated
its Decision denying the Petition for Review on the ground that
the NCMB did not err in rendering its Decision. The appellate
court held that Glaxo’s policy prohibiting its employees from
having personal relationships with employees of competitor
companies is a valid exercise of its management prerogatives.4
Tecson filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate
court’s Decision, but the motion was denied by the appellate court
in its Resolution dated March 26, 2004.5
Petitioners filed the instant petition, arguing therein that (i) the
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the NCMB’s finding that the
Glaxo’s policy prohibiting its employees from marrying an
employee of a competitor company is valid; and (ii) the Court of
Appeals also erred in not finding that Tecson was constructively
dismissed when he was transferred to a new sales territory, and
deprived of the opportunity to attend products seminars and
training sessions.6
Petitioners contend that Glaxo’s policy against employees
marrying employees of competitor companies violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because it creates invalid
distinctions among employees on account only of marriage. They
claim that the policy restricts the employees’ right to marry.7
They also argue that Tecson was constructively dismissed as
shown by the following circumstances: (1) he was transferred
from the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area to the
Butuan-Surigao-Agusan sales area, (2) he suffered a diminution
in pay, (3) he was excluded from attending seminars and training
sessions for medical representatives, and (4) he was prohibited
from promoting respondent’s products which were competing with
Astra’s products.8
In its Comment on the petition, Glaxo argues that the company
policy prohibiting its employees from having a relationship with
and/or marrying an employee of a competitor company is a valid
exercise of its management prerogatives and does not violate the
equal protection clause; and that Tecson’s reassignment from the
Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales area to the Butuan City-
Surigao City and Agusan del Sur sales area does not amount to
constructive dismissal.9
Glaxo insists that as a company engaged in the promotion and
sale of pharmaceutical products, it has a genuine interest in
ensuring that its employees avoid any activity, relationship or
interest that may conflict with their responsibilities to the
company. Thus, it expects its employees to avoid having personal
or family interests in any competitor company which may
influence their actions and decisions and consequently deprive
Glaxo of legitimate profits. The policy is also aimed at preventing
a competitor company from gaining access to its secrets,
procedures and policies.10
It likewise asserts that the policy does not prohibit marriage per
se but only proscribes existing or future relationships with
employees of competitor companies, and is therefore not violative
of the equal protection clause. It maintains that considering the
nature of its business, the prohibition is based on valid grounds.11
According to Glaxo, Tecson’s marriage to Bettsy, an employee of
Astra, posed a real and potential conflict of interest. Astra’s
products were in direct competition with 67% of the products sold
by Glaxo. Hence, Glaxo’s enforcement of the foregoing policy in
Tecson’s case was a valid exercise of its management
prerogatives.12 In any case, Tecson was given several months to
remedy the situation, and was even encouraged not to resign but
to ask his wife to resign form Astra instead.13
Glaxo also points out that Tecson can no longer question the
assailed company policy because when he signed his contract of
employment, he was aware that such policy was stipulated
therein. In said contract, he also agreed to resign from
respondent if the management finds that his relationship with an
employee of a competitor company would be detrimental to the
interests of Glaxo.14
Glaxo likewise insists that Tecson’s reassignment to another
sales area and his exclusion from seminars regarding
respondent’s new products did not amount to constructive
dismissal.
It claims that in view of Tecson’s refusal to resign, he was
relocated from the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area to
the Butuan City-Surigao City and Agusan del Sur sales area.
Glaxo asserts that in effecting the reassignment, it also
considered the welfare of Tecson’s family. Since Tecson’s
hometown was in Agusan del Sur and his wife traces her roots to
Butuan City, Glaxo assumed that his transfer from the Bicol
region to the Butuan City sales area would be favorable to him
and his family as he would be relocating to a familiar territory and
minimizing his travel expenses.15
In addition, Glaxo avers that Tecson’s exclusion from the seminar
concerning the new anti-asthma drug was due to the fact that
said product was in direct competition with a drug which was
soon to be sold by Astra, and hence, would pose a potential
conflict of interest for him. Lastly, the delay in Tecson’s receipt of
his sales paraphernalia was due to the mix-up created by his
refusal to transfer to the Butuan City sales area (his
paraphernalia was delivered to his new sales area instead of
Naga City because the supplier thought he already transferred to
Butuan).16
The Court is tasked to resolve the following issues: (1) Whether
the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Glaxo’s policy against its
employees marrying employees from competitor companies is
valid, and in not holding that said policy violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution; (2) Whether Tecson was
constructively dismissed.
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
The stipulation in Tecson’s contract of employment with Glaxo
being questioned by petitioners provides:
…
10. You agree to disclose to management any existing or
future relationship you may have, either by consanguinity
or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing
drug companies. Should it pose a possible conflict of
interest in management discretion, you agree to resign
voluntarily from the Company as a matter of Company
policy.
…17
The same contract also stipulates that Tescon agrees to abide by
the existing company rules of Glaxo, and to study and become
acquainted with such policies.18 In this regard, the Employee
Handbook of Glaxo expressly informs its employees of its rules
regarding conflict of interest:
1. Conflict of Interest
Employees should avoid any activity, investment
relationship, or interest that may run counter to the
responsibilities which they owe Glaxo Wellcome.
Specifically, this means that employees are expected:
a. To avoid having personal or family interest,
financial or otherwise, in any competitor supplier
or other businesses which may consciously or
unconsciously influence their actions or decisions
and thus deprive Glaxo Wellcome of legitimate
profit.
b. To refrain from using their position in Glaxo
Wellcome or knowledge of Company plans to
advance their outside personal interests, that of
their relatives, friends and other businesses.
c. To avoid outside employment or other interests
for income which would impair their effective job
performance.
d. To consult with Management on such activities
or relationships that may lead to conflict of
interest.
1.1. Employee Relationships
Employees with existing or future relationships either by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees of competing
drug companies are expected to disclose such
relationship to the Management. If management
perceives a conflict or potential conflict of interest, every
effort shall be made, together by management and the
employee, to arrive at a solution within six (6) months,
either by transfer to another department in a non-counter
checking position, or by career preparation toward outside
employment after Glaxo Wellcome. Employees must be
prepared for possible resignation within six (6) months, if
no other solution is feasible.19
No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeals when
it ruled that Glaxo’s policy prohibiting an employee from having a
relationship with an employee of a competitor company is a valid
exercise of management prerogative.
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing
formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs
and information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra
are rival companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical
industry.
The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with
employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees is
reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that
nature might compromise the interests of the company. In laying
down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its
interests against the possibility that a competitor company will
gain access to its secrets and procedures.
That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests
cannot be denied. No less than the Constitution recognizes the
right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect
its right to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion
and growth.20 Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the
constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it
does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of
the workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights
which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest
of fair play.21
As held in a Georgia, U.S.A case,22 it is a legitimate business
practice to guard business confidentiality and protect a
competitive position by even-handedly disqualifying from jobs
male and female applicants or employees who are married to a
competitor. Consequently, the court ruled than an employer that
discharged an employee who was married to an employee of an
active competitor did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.23 The Court pointed out that the policy was applied to men
and women equally, and noted that the employer’s business was
highly competitive and that gaining inside information would
constitute a competitive advantage.
The challenged company policy does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution as petitioners erroneously
suggest. It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal
protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting
under color of its authority.24 Corollarily, it has been held in a long
array of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection
clause erects no shield against merely private conduct, however,
discriminatory or wrongful.25 The only exception occurs when the
state29 in any of its manifestations or actions has been found to
have become entwined or involved in the wrongful private
conduct.27 Obviously, however, the exception is not present in this
case. Significantly, the company actually enforced the policy after
repeated requests to the employee to comply with the policy.
Indeed, the application of the policy was made in an impartial and
even-handed manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.
In any event, from the wordings of the contractual provision and
the policy in its employee handbook, it is clear that Glaxo does
not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between
its employees and those of competitor companies. Its employees
are free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their
own choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a
conflict of interest between the employee and the company that
may arise out of such relationships. As succinctly explained by
the appellate court, thus:
The policy being questioned is not a policy against
marriage. An employee of the company remains free to
marry anyone of his or her choosing. The policy is not
aimed at restricting a personal prerogative that belongs
only to the individual. However, an employee’s personal
decision does not detract the employer from exercising
management prerogatives to ensure maximum profit and
business success. . .28
The Court of Appeals also correctly noted that the assailed
company policy which forms part of respondent’s Employee Code
of Conduct and of its contracts with its employees, such as that
signed by Tescon, was made known to him prior to his
employment. Tecson, therefore, was aware of that restriction
when he signed his employment contract and when he entered
into a relationship with Bettsy. Since Tecson knowingly and
voluntarily entered into a contract of employment with Glaxo, the
stipulations therein have the force of law between them and, thus,
should be complied with in good faith."29 He is therefore estopped
from questioning said policy.
The Court finds no merit in petitioners’ contention that Tescon
was constructively dismissed when he was transferred from the
Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales area to the Butuan City-
Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area, and when he was
excluded from attending the company’s seminar on new products
which were directly competing with similar products manufactured
by Astra. Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an
involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment
becomes impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a
demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when a clear
discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes
unbearable to the employee.30 None of these conditions are
present in the instant case. The record does not show that
Tescon was demoted or unduly discriminated upon by reason of
such transfer. As found by the appellate court, Glaxo properly
exercised its management prerogative in reassigning Tecson to
the Butuan City sales area:
. . . In this case, petitioner’s transfer to another place of
assignment was merely in keeping with the policy of the
 company in avoidance of conflict of interest, and thus
valid…Note that [Tecson’s] wife holds a sensitive
supervisory position as Branch Coordinator in her
employer-company which requires her to work in close
coordination with District Managers and Medical
Representatives. Her duties include monitoring sales of
Astra products, conducting sales drives, establishing and
furthering relationship with customers, collection,
monitoring and managing Astra’s inventory…she
therefore takes an active participation in the market war
characterized as it is by stiff competition among
pharmaceutical companies. Moreover, and this is
significant, petitioner’s sales territory covers Camarines
Sur and Camarines Norte while his wife is supervising a
branch of her employer in Albay. The proximity of their
areas of responsibility, all in the same Bicol Region,
renders the conflict of interest not only possible, but
actual, as learning by one spouse of the other’s market
strategies in the region would be inevitable.
[Management’s] appreciation of a conflict of interest is
therefore not merely illusory and wanting in factual
basis…31
In Abbott Laboratories (Phils.), Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission,32 which involved a complaint filed by a medical
representative against his employer drug company for illegal
dismissal for allegedly terminating his employment when he
refused to accept his reassignment to a new area, the Court
upheld the right of the drug company to transfer or reassign its
employee in accordance with its operational demands and
requirements. The ruling of the Court therein, quoted hereunder,
also finds application in the instant case:
By the very nature of his employment, a drug salesman or
medical representative is expected to travel. He should
anticipate reassignment according to the demands of their
business. It would be a poor drug corporation which
cannot even assign its representatives or detail men to
new markets calling for opening or expansion or to areas
where the need for pushing its products is great. More so
if such reassignments are part of the employment
contract.33
As noted earlier, the challenged policy has been implemented by
Glaxo impartially and disinterestedly for a long period of time. In
the case at bar, the record shows that Glaxo gave Tecson several
chances to eliminate the conflict of interest brought about by his
relationship with Bettsy. When their relationship was still in its
initial stage, Tecson’s supervisors at Glaxo constantly reminded
him about its effects on his employment with the company and on
the company’s interests. After Tecson married Bettsy, Glaxo gave
him time to resolve the conflict by either resigning from the
company or asking his wife to resign from Astra. Glaxo even
expressed its desire to retain Tecson in its employ because of his
satisfactory performance and suggested that he ask Bettsy to
resign from her company instead. Glaxo likewise acceded to his
repeated requests for more time to resolve the conflict of interest.
When the problem could not be resolved after several years of
waiting, Glaxo was constrained to reassign Tecson to a sales
area different from that handled by his wife for Astra. Notably, the
Court did not terminate Tecson from employment but only
reassigned him to another area where his home province,
Agusan del Sur, was included. In effecting Tecson’s transfer,
Glaxo even considered the welfare of Tecson’s family. Clearly,
the foregoing dispels any suspicion of unfairness and bad faith on
the part of Glaxo.34
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG,
as members of the Philippine Senate and as taxpayers;
GREGORIO ANDOLANA and JOKER ARROYO as members
of the House of Representatives and as taxpayers; NICANOR
P. PERLAS and HORACIO R. MORALES, both as taxpayers;
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, NATIONAL ECONOMIC
PROTECTIONISM ASSOCIATION, CENTER FOR
ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES, LIKAS-KAYANG
KAUNLARAN FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE RURAL
RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT, DEMOKRATIKONG
KILUSAN NG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, INC., and
PHILIPPINE PEASANT INSTITUTE, in representation of
various taxpayers and as non-governmental
organizations, petitioners,
vs.
EDGARDO ANGARA, ALBERTO ROMULO, LETICIA RAMOS-
SHAHANI, HEHERSON ALVAREZ, AGAPITO AQUINO,
RODOLFO BIAZON, NEPTALI GONZALES, ERNESTO
HERRERA, JOSE LINA, GLORIA. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
ORLANDO MERCADO, BLAS OPLE, JOHN OSMEÑA,
SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON REVILLA, RAUL ROCO,
FRANCISCO TATAD and FREDDIE WEBB, in their respective
capacities as members of the Philippine Senate who
concurred in the ratification by the President of the
Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization; SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as
Secretary of Budget and Management; CARIDAD
VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National Treasurer;
RIZALINO NAVARRO, in his capacity as Secretary of Trade
and Industry; ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as
Secretary of Agriculture; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, in his
capacity as Secretary of Finance; ROBERTO ROMULO, in his
capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; and TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World Trade
Organization, abetted by the membership thereto of the vast
majority of countries has revolutionized international business
and economic relations amongst states. It has irreversibly
propelled the world towards trade liberalization and economic
globalization. Liberalization, globalization, deregulation and
privatization, the third-millennium buzz words, are ushering in a
new borderless world of business by sweeping away as mere
historical relics the heretofore traditional modes of promoting and
protecting national economies like tariffs, export subsidies, import
quotas, quantitative restrictions, tax exemptions and currency
controls. Finding market niches and becoming the best in specific
industries in a market-driven and export-oriented global scenario
are replacing age-old "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies that
unilaterally protect weak and inefficient domestic producers of
goods and services. In the words of Peter Drucker, the well-
known management guru, "Increased participation in the world
economy has become the key to domestic economic growth and
prosperity."
Brief Historical Background
To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by
the Second World War, plans for the establishment of three
multilateral institutions — inspired by that grand political body, the
United Nations — were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks and
Bretton Woods. The first was the World Bank (WB) which was to
address the rehabilitation and reconstruction of war-ravaged and
later developing countries; the second, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) which was to deal with currency problems; and
the third, the International Trade Organization (ITO), which was to
foster order and predictability in world trade and to minimize
unilateral protectionist policies that invite challenge, even
retaliation, from other states. However, for a variety of reasons,
including its non-ratification by the United States, the ITO, unlike
the IMF and WB, never took off. What remained was only GATT
— the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT was a
collection of treaties governing access to the economies of treaty
adherents with no institutionalized body administering the
agreements or dependable system of dispute settlement.
After half a century and several dizzying rounds of negotiations,
principally the Kennedy Round, the Tokyo Round and the
Uruguay Round, the world finally gave birth to that administering
body — the World Trade Organization — with the signing of the
"Final Act" in Marrakesh, Morocco and the ratification of the WTO
Agreement by its members.1
Like many other developing countries, the Philippines joined
WTO as a founding member with the goal, as articulated by
President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the Senate (infra), of
improving "Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its
major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its
exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products." The
President also saw in the WTO the opening of "new opportunities
for the services sector . . . , (the reduction of) costs and
uncertainty associated with exporting . . . , and (the attraction of)
more investments into the country." Although the Chief Executive
did not expressly mention it in his letter, the Philippines — and
this is of special interest to the legal profession — will benefit
from the WTO system of dispute settlement by judicial
adjudication through the independent WTO settlement bodies
called (1) Dispute Settlement Panels and (2) Appellate Tribunal.
Heretofore, trade disputes were settled mainly through
negotiations where solutions were arrived at frequently on the
basis of relative bargaining strengths, and where naturally, weak
and underdeveloped countries were at a disadvantage.
The Petition in Brief
Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines "to place
nationals and products of member-countries on the same footing
as Filipinos and local products" and (2) that the WTO "intrudes,
limits and/or impairs" the constitutional powers of both Congress
and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court
assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987
Constitution to "develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give
preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential
use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced
goods."
Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine
participation in worldwide trade liberalization and economic
globalization? Does it proscribe Philippine integration into a global
economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized? These
are the main questions raised in this petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
praying (1) for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the
concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the ratification by the
President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and (2)
for the prohibition of its implementation and enforcement through
the release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of
public officials and employees, as well as the use of government
properties and resources by respondent-heads of various
executive offices concerned therewith. This concurrence is
embodied in Senate Resolution No. 97, dated December 14,
1994.
The Facts
On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary
of The Department of Trade and Industry (Secretary Navarro, for
brevity), representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Negotiations (Final Act, for brevity).
By signing the Final Act,2 Secretary Navarro on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, agreed:
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement
for the consideration of their respective competent
authorities, with a view to seeking approval of the
Agreement in accordance with their procedures;
and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and
Decisions.
On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate
received a letter dated August 11, 1994 from the President of the
Philippines,3 stating among others that "the Uruguay Round Final
Act is hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence
pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution."
On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate
received another letter from the President of the
Philippines4 likewise dated August 11, 1994, which stated among
others that "the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Ministerial
Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services are hereby submitted to the
Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of
the Constitution."
On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines certified
the necessity of the immediate adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution
entitled "Concurring in the Ratification of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization."5
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted
Resolution No. 97 which "Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that
the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the ratification by the
President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization."6 The text of the WTO Agreement is
written on pages 137 et seq. of Volume I of the 36-
volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and
includes various agreements and associated legal instruments
(identified in the said Agreement as Annexes 1, 2 and 3 thereto
and collectively referred to as Multilateral Trade Agreements, for
brevity) as follows:
ANNEX 1
Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreement on Trade in
Goods
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Agriculture
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of he
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the
General on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection
Agreement on Rules of Origin
Agreement on Imports Licensing Procedures
Agreement on Subsidies and Coordinating
Measures
Agreement on Safeguards
Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in
Services and Annexes
Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual
Property Rights
 ANNEX 2 The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are
twenty-five declarations and decisions on a wide
Understanding on Rules and range of matters, such as measures in favor of
Procedures Governing least developed countries, notification procedures,
the Settlement of Disputes relationship of WTO with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and agreements on
ANNEX 3 technical barriers to trade and on dispute
settlement.
Trade Policy Review Mechanism
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services dwell on, among other things, standstill
On December 16, 1994, the President of the Philippines
or limitations and qualifications of commitments to
signed7 the Instrument of Ratification, declaring:
existing non-conforming measures, market
access, national treatment, and definitions of non-
NOW THEREFORE, be it known that I, FIDEL V. resident supplier of financial services, commercial
RAMOS, President of the Republic of the presence and new financial service.
Philippines, after having seen and considered the
aforementioned Agreement Establishing the
On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed. After
World Trade Organization and the agreements
careful deliberation on respondents' comment and petitioners'
and associated legal instruments included in
reply thereto, the Court resolved on December 12, 1995, to give
Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
due course to the petition, and the parties thereafter filed their
Agreement which are integral parts thereof,
respective memoranda. The court also requested the Honorable
signed at Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994,
Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations
do hereby ratify and confirm the same and every
stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, to submit a paper, hereafter
Article and Clause thereof.
referred to as "Bautista Paper,"9 for brevity, (1) providing a
historical background of and (2) summarizing the said
To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of agreements.
the Philippines is composed of the Agreement Proper and "the
associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2)
During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996, the Court
and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof."
directed:
On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro
(a) the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate
embodies not only the WTO Agreement (and its integral annexes
Committee Report on the matter in controversy
aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and
and (2) the transcript of proceedings/hearings in
Decisions and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in
the Senate; and
Financial Services. In his Memorandum dated May 13, 1996,8 the
Solicitor General describes these two latter documents as follows:
 (b) the Solicitor General, as counsel for
respondents, to file (1) a list of Philippine treaties
signed prior to the Philippine adherence to the
WTO Agreement, which derogate from Philippine
sovereignty and (2) copies of the multi-volume
WTO Agreement and other documents mentioned
in the Final Act, as soon as possible.
After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court said it would
consider the case submitted for resolution. In a Compliance dated
September 16, 1996, the Solicitor General submitted a printed
copy of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, and in another Compliance dated October 24, 1996,
he listed the various "bilateral or multilateral treaties or
international instruments involving derogation of Philippine
sovereignty." Petitioners, on the other hand, submitted their
Compliance dated January 28, 1997, on January 30, 1997.
The Issues
In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996, petitioners
summarized the issues as follows:
A. Whether the petition presents a political
question or is otherwise not justiciable.
B. Whether the petitioner members of the Senate
who participated in the deliberations and voting
leading to the concurrence are estopped from
impugning the validity of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization or of
the validity of the concurrence.
C. Whether the provisions of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization
contravene the provisions of Sec. 19, Article II,
and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, all of the 1987
Philippine Constitution.
D. Whether provisions of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization unduly
limit, restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty
specifically the legislative power which, under
Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution is
"vested in the Congress of the Philippines";
E. Whether provisions of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization
interfere with the exercise of judicial power.
F. Whether the respondent members of the
Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
they voted for concurrence in the ratification of the
constitutionally-infirm Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization.
G. Whether the respondent members of the
Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
they concurred only in the ratification of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, and not with the Presidential
submission which included the Final Act,
Ministerial Declaration and Decisions, and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel for
respondents "synthesized the several issues raised by petitioners
into the following": 10
 1. Whether or not the provisions of the
"Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization and the Agreements and Associated
Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1),
two (2) and three (3) of that agreement" cited by
petitioners directly contravene or undermine the
letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and
Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
2. Whether or not certain provisions of the
Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the
exercise of legislative power by Congress.
3. Whether or not certain provisions of the
Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power
by this Honorable Court in promulgating the rules
of evidence.
4. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate
"in the ratification by the President of the
Philippines of the Agreement establishing the
World Trade Organization" implied rejection of the
treaty embodied in the Final Act.
By raising and arguing only four issues against the seven
presented by petitioners, the Solicitor General has effectively
ignored three, namely: (1) whether the petition presents a political
question or is otherwise not justiciable; (2) whether petitioner-
members of the Senate (Wigberto E. Tañada and Anna
Dominique Coseteng) are estopped from joining this suit; and (3)
whether the respondent-members of the Senate acted in grave
abuse of discretion when they voted for concurrence in the
ratification of the WTO Agreement. The foregoing
notwithstanding, this Court resolved to deal with these three
issues thus:
(1) The "political question" issue — being very fundamental and
vital, and being a matter that probes into the very jurisdiction of
this Court to hear and decide this case — was deliberated upon
by the Court and will thus be ruled upon as the first issue;
(2) The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because this
defense is waivable and the respondents have effectively waived
it by not pursuing it in any of their pleadings; in any event, this
issue, even if ruled in respondents' favor, will not cause the
petition's dismissal as there are petitioners other than the two
senators, who are not vulnerable to the defense of estoppel; and
(3) The issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the respondent senators will be taken up as an integral part of the
disposition of the four issues raised by the Solicitor General.
During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted that the
respondents did not question the locus standi of petitioners.
Hence, they are also deemed to have waived the benefit of such
issue. They probably realized that grave constitutional issues,
expenditures of public funds and serious international
commitments of the nation are involved here, and that
transcendental public interest requires that the substantive issues
be met head on and decided on the merits, rather than skirted or
deflected by procedural matters. 11
To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon shortly are:
(1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A
JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY? OTHERWISE
STATED, DOES THE PETITION INVOLVE A
POLITICAL QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS
COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION?
(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO
AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE ANNEXES
CONTRAVENE SEC. 19, ARTICLE II, AND
 SECS. 10 AND 12, ARTICLE XII, OF THE
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
(3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID
AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES LIMIT,
RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR THE EXERCISE OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER BY CONGRESS?
(4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR
INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE OF
JUDICIAL POWER BY THIS COURT IN
PROMULGATING RULES ON EVIDENCE?
(5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE
SENATE IN THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS
ANNEXES SUFFICIENT AND/OR VALID,
CONSIDERING THAT IT DID NOT INCLUDE
THE FINAL ACT, MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS
AND DECISIONS, AND THE UNDERSTANDING
ON COMMITMENTS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES?
The First Issue: Does the Court
Have Jurisdiction Over the Controversy?
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground
that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch
is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political.
The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of
the Constitution is upheld." 12 Once a "controversy as to the
application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised
before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue
which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide." 13
The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters 14 raised in
the petition is clearly set out in the 1987 Constitution, 15 as follows:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.
The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department's duty and
power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of government including Congress. It is
an innovation in our political law. 16As explained by former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, 17 "the judiciary is the final arbiter on
the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of
its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a
judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature."
As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many
cases, 18 it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty
and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve
grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases,
committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department
of the government.
As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is
no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, we have no hesitation at all in holding that this petition
should be given due course and the vital questions raised therein
ruled upon under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when
proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. On this, we have xxx xxx xxx
no equivocation.
Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and
We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this independent national economy effectively
petition, this Court will not review the wisdom of the decision of controlled by Filipinos.
the President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the
WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy xxx xxx xxx
espoused by said international body. Neither will it rule on
the propriety of the government's economic policy of Article XII
reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative
restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
exercise its constitutional duty "to determine whether or not there
had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO xxx xxx xxx
Agreement and its three annexes.
Sec. 10. . . . The Congress shall enact measures
Second Issue: The WTO Agreement that will encourage the formation and operation of
and Economic Nationalism enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by
Filipinos.
This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the petition.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, the
Petitioners vigorously argue that the "letter, spirit and intent" of
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
the Constitution mandating "economic nationalism" are violated
by the so-called "parity provisions" and "national treatment"
clauses scattered in various parts not only of the WTO xxx xxx xxx
Agreement and its annexes but also in the Ministerial Decisions
and Declarations and in the Understanding on Commitments in Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential
Financial Services. use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally produced goods, and adopt measures that
Specifically, the "flagship" constitutional provisions referred to are help make them competitive.
Sec 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, of the
Constitution, which are worded as follows: Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional principles are
desecrated by the following WTO provisions quoted in their
Article II memorandum: 19

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES a) In the area of investment measures related to

AND STATE POLICIES trade in goods (TRIMS, for brevity):
 Article 2
National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions.
1. Without prejudice to other rights
and obligations under GATT 1994,
no Member shall apply any TRIM
that is inconsistent with the
provisions of Article II or Article XI
of GATT 1994.
2. An illustrative list of TRIMS that
are inconsistent with the
obligations of general elimination
of quantitative restrictions provided
for in paragraph I of Article XI of
GATT 1994 is contained in the
Annex to this Agreement."
(Agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures, Vol. 27,
Uruguay Round, Legal
Instruments, p. 22121, emphasis
supplied).
The Annex referred to reads as follows:
ANNEX
Illustrative List
1. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation
of national treatment provided for in paragraph 4
of Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are
mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or
under administrative rulings, or compliance with
which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and
which require:
(a) the purchase or use by an
enterprise of products of domestic
origin or from any domestic
source, whether specified in terms
of particular products, in terms of
volume or value of products, or in
terms of proportion of volume or
value of its local production; or
(b) that an enterprise's purchases
or use of imported products be
limited to an amount related to the
volume or value of local products
that it exports.
2. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations
of general elimination of quantitative restrictions
provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT
1994 include those which are mandatory or
enforceable under domestic laws or under
administrative rulings, or compliance with which is
necessary to obtain an advantage, and which
restrict:
(a) the importation by an
enterprise of products used in or
related to the local production that
it exports;
(b) the importation by an
enterprise of products used in or
related to its local production by
restricting its access to foreign
exchange inflows attributable to
the enterprise; or
 (c) the exportation or sale for
export specified in terms of
particular products, in terms of
volume or value of products, or in
terms of a preparation of volume
or value of its local production.
(Annex to the Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment
Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay
Round Legal Documents, p.
22125, emphasis supplied).
The paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994
referred to is quoted as follows:
The products of the territory of any
contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting
party shall be accorded treatment
no less favorable than that
accorded to like products of
national origin in respect of laws,
regulations and requirements
affecting their internal sale,
offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use,
the provisions of this paragraph
shall not prevent the application of
differential internal transportation
charges which are based
exclusively on the economic
operation of the means of
transport and not on the nationality
of the product." (Article III, GATT
1947, as amended by the Protocol
Modifying Part II, and Article XXVI
of GATT, 14 September 1948, 62
UMTS 82-84 in relation to
paragraph 1(a) of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round,
Legal Instruments p. 177,
emphasis supplied).
(b) In the area of trade related aspects of
intellectual property rights (TRIPS, for brevity):
Each Member shall accord to the
nationals of other Members
treatment no less favourable than
that it accords to its own
nationals with regard to the
protection of intellectual property. .
. (par. 1 Article 3, Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspect of
Intellectual Property rights, Vol.
31, Uruguay Round, Legal
Instruments, p. 25432 (emphasis
supplied)
(c) In the area of the General Agreement on Trade
in Services:
National Treatment
1. In the sectors inscribed in its
schedule, and subject to any
conditions and qualifications set
out therein, each Member shall
accord to services and service
suppliers of any other Member, in
respect of all measures affecting
the supply of services, treatment
no less favourable than it accords
 to its own like services and service
suppliers.
2. A Member may meet the
requirement of paragraph I by
according to services and service
suppliers of any other Member,
either formally suppliers of any
other Member, either formally
identical treatment or formally
different treatment to that it
accords to its own like services
and service suppliers.
3. Formally identical or formally
different treatment shall be
considered to be less favourable if
it modifies the conditions of
completion in favour of services or
service suppliers of the Member
compared to like services or
service suppliers of any other
Member. (Article XVII, General
Agreement on Trade in Services,
Vol. 28, Uruguay Round Legal
Instruments, p. 22610 emphasis
supplied).
It is petitioners' position that the foregoing "national treatment"
and "parity provisions" of the WTO Agreement "place nationals
and products of member countries on the same footing as
Filipinos and local products," in contravention of the "Filipino
First" policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render
meaningless the phrase "effectively controlled by Filipinos." The
constitutional conflict becomes more manifest when viewed in the
context of the clear duty imposed on the Philippines as a WTO
member to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the
annexed agreements. 20 Petitioners further argue that these
provisions contravene constitutional limitations on the role exports
play in national development and negate the preferential
treatment accorded to Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally produced goods.
On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor General
counter (1) that such Charter provisions are not self-executing
and merely set out general policies; (2) that these nationalistic
portions of the Constitution invoked by petitioners should not be
read in isolation but should be related to other relevant provisions
of Art. XII, particularly Secs. 1 and 13 thereof; (3) that read
properly, the cited WTO clauses do not conflict with Constitution;
and (4) that the WTO Agreement contains sufficient provisions to
protect developing countries like the Philippines from the
harshness of sudden trade liberalization.
We shall now discuss and rule on these arguments.
Declaration of Principles
Not Self-Executing
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of
principles and state policies." The counterpart of this article in the
1935 Constitution 21 is called the "basic political creed of the
nation" by Dean Vicente Sinco. 22 These principles in Article II are
not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement
through the courts. 23They are used by the judiciary as aids or as
guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the
legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case
of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, 24 the principles and state
policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII
are not "self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give
rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for
legislation."
In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor 25 that broad
constitutional principles need legislative enactments to implement
the, thus:
On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates
Sections 11 (Personal Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13
(Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social
Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational
Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution,
suffice it to state also that these are merely
statements of principles and policies. As such,
they are basically not self-executing, meaning a
law should be passed by Congress to clearly
define and effectuate such principles.
In general, therefore, the 1935
provisions were not intended to be
self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts.
They were rather directives
addressed to the executive and to
the legislature. If the executive and
the legislature failed to heed the
directives of the article, the
available remedy was not judicial
but political. The electorate could
express their displeasure with the
failure of the executive and the
legislature through the language of
the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2).
The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged
infringement of board constitutional principles are sourced from
basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial
authority to wade "into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making." Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in
his concurring opinion in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., 26 explained
these reasons as follows:
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must,
before the trial court, show a more specific legal
right — a right cast in language of a significantly
lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the
Constitution — that is or may be violated by the
actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public
respondent by petitioners so that the trial court
can validly render judgment grating all or part of
the relief prayed for. To my mind, the court should
be understood as simply saying that such a more
specific legal right or rights may well exist in our
corpus of law, considering the general policy
principles found in the Constitution and the
existence of the Philippine Environment Code,
and that the trial court should have given
petitioners an effective opportunity so to
demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings
on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which
is an essential component of a cause of action be
a specific, operable legal right, rather than a
constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two
(2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right
claimed to have been violated or disregarded is
given specification in operational terms,
defendants may well be unable to defend
themselves intelligently and effectively; in other
words, there are due process dimensions to this
matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration —
where a specific violation of law or applicable
regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can
be expected to fall back on the expanded
conception of judicial power in the second
paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution which reads:
 Sec. 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the
right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the
right to health" are combined with remedial
standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully
submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted
ocean of social and economic policy making. At
least in respect of the vast area of environmental
protection and management, our courts have no
claim to special technical competence and
experience and professional qualification. Where
no specific, operable norms and standards are
shown to exist, then the policy making
departments — the legislative and executive
departments — must be given a real and effective
opportunity to fashion and promulgate those
norms and standards, and to implement them
before the courts should intervene.
Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with
Other Constitutional Mandates to Attain
Balanced Development of Economy
On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from
merely laying down general principles relating to the national
economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in
relation to the other sections in said article, especially Secs. 1
and 13 thereof which read:
Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a
more equitable distribution of opportunities,
income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the
amount of goods and services produced by the
nation for the benefit of the people; and an
expanding productivity as the key to raising the
quality of life for all especially the underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full
employment based on sound agricultural
development and agrarian reform, through
industries that make full and efficient use of
human and natural resources, and which are
competitive in both domestic and foreign markets.
However, the State shall protect Filipino
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and
trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the
economy and all regions of the country shall be
given optimum opportunity to develop. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that
serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms
and arrangements of exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays down
the basic goals of national economic development, as follows:
1. A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and
wealth;
2. A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services
provided by the nation for the benefit of the people; and
3. An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of
life for all especially the underprivileged.
With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the
ideals of economic nationalism (1) by expressing preference in
favor of qualified Filipinos "in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony" 27 and
in the use of "Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally-
produced goods"; (2) by mandating the State to "adopt measures
that help make them competitive; 28 and (3) by requiring the State
to "develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos." 29 In similar language, the
Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world
as it requires the pursuit of "a trade policy that serves the general
welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on
the basis of equality ad reciprocity"; 30 and speaks of industries
"which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets" as
well as of the protection of "Filipino enterprises
against unfair foreign competition and trade practices."
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel
vs. Government Service Insurance System, et al., 31 this Court
held that "Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is
a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rule for
its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable." However, as the constitutional provision itself
states, it is enforceable only in regard to "the grants of rights,
privileges and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony" and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It
refers to exceptions rather than the rule. The issue here is not
whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or
not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough
balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to
ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we
hold that there are.
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of
Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time,
it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the
world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits
protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition
and trade practices that are unfair. 32 In other words, the
Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did
not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution
does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services
and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either.
In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
WTO Recognizes Need to
Protect Weak Economies
Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the WTO itself
has some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing
economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members.
Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and
veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are
made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each member's
vote equal in weight to that of any other. There is no WTO
equivalent of the UN Security Council.
WTO decides by consensus whenever possible,
otherwise, decisions of the Ministerial Conference
and the General Council shall be taken by the
majority of the votes cast, except in cases of
interpretation of the Agreement or waiver of the
obligation of a member which would require three
 fourths vote. Amendments would require two
thirds vote in general. Amendments to MFN
provisions and the Amendments provision will
require assent of all members. Any member may
withdraw from the Agreement upon the expiration
of six months from the date of notice of
withdrawals. 33
Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more
effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one
negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO,
developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their
economic agenda more decisively than outside the Organization.
This is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a negotiating
strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the
WTO Agreement recognize the need of developing countries like
the Philippines to "share in the growth in international
trade commensurate with the needs of their economic
development." These basic principles are found in the
preamble 34of the WTO Agreement as follows:
The Parties to this Agreement,
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade
and economic endeavour should be conducted
with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring
full employment and a large and steadily growing
volume of real income and effective demand, and
expanding the production of and trade in goods
and services, while allowing for the optimal use of
the world's resources in accordance with the
objective of sustainable development, seeking
both to protect and preserve the environment and
to enhance the means for doing so in a manner
consistent with their respective needs and
concerns at different levels of economic
development,
Recognizing further that there is need for positive
efforts designed to ensure that developing
countries, and especially the least developed
among them, secure a share in the growth in
international trade commensurate with the needs
of their economic development,
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives
by entering into reciprocal and mutually
advantageous arrangements directed to the
substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to
trade and to the elimination of discriminatory
treatment in international trade relations,
Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated,
more viable and durable multilateral trading
system encompassing the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, the results of past trade
liberalization efforts, and all of the results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Determined to preserve the basic principles and to
further the objectives underlying this multilateral
trading system, . . . (emphasis supplied.)
Specific WTO Provisos
Protect Developing Countries
So too, the Solicitor General points out that pursuant to and
consistent with the foregoing basic principles, the WTO
Agreement grants developing countries a more lenient treatment,
giving their domestic industries some protection from the rush of
foreign competition. Thus, with respect to tariffs in general,
preferential treatment is given to developing countries in terms of
the amount of tariff reduction and the period within which the
reduction is to be spread out. Specifically, GATT requires an
average tariff reduction rate of 36% for developed countries to be
effected within a period of six (6) years while developing countries
— including the Philippines — are required to effect an average
tariff reduction of only 24% within ten (10) years.
In respect to domestic subsidy, GATT requires developed
countries to reduce domestic support to agricultural products
by 20% over six (6) years, as compared to only 13% for
developing countries to be effected within ten (10) years.
In regard to export subsidy for agricultural products, GATT
requires developed countries to reduce their budgetary outlays for
export subsidy by 36% and export volumes receiving export
subsidy by 21% within a period of six (6) years. For developing
countries, however, the reduction rate is only two-thirds of that
prescribed for developed countries and a longer period of ten (10)
years within which to effect such reduction.
Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in protection from unfair
foreign competition and trade practices including anti-dumping
measures, countervailing measures and safeguards against
import surges. Where local businesses are jeopardized by unfair
foreign competition, the Philippines can avail of these measures.
There is hardly therefore any basis for the statement that under
the WTO, local industries and enterprises will all be wiped out
and that Filipinos will be deprived of control of the economy.
Quite the contrary, the weaker situations of developing nations
like the Philippines have been taken into account; thus, there
would be no basis to say that in joining the WTO, the respondents
have gravely abused their discretion. True, they have made a
bold decision to steer the ship of state into the yet uncharted sea
of economic liberalization. But such decision cannot be set aside
on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, simply because we
disagree with it or simply because we believe only in other
economic policies. As earlier stated, the Court in taking
jurisdiction of this case will not pass upon the advantages and
disadvantages of trade liberalization as an economic policy. It will
only perform its constitutional duty of determining whether the
Senate committed grave abuse of discretion.
Constitution Does Not
Rule Out Foreign Competition
Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and
independent national economy" 35 does not necessarily rule out
the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It
contemplates neither "economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy in
the international community." As explained by Constitutional
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional
policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a
developing country that is keenly aware of
overdependence on external assistance for even
its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or
economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding
mendicancy in the international community.
Independence refers to the freedom from undue
foreign control of the national economy, especially
in such strategic industries as in the development
of natural resources and public utilities. 36
The WTO reliance on "most favored nation," "national treatment,"
and "trade without discrimination" cannot be struck down as
unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and
reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from
envisioning a trade policy based on "equality and
reciprocity," 37 the fundamental law encourages industries that are
"competitive in both domestic and foreign markets," thereby
demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade
environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of
robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign
markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have
shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And
given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and
managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity
to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy
of laissez faire.
 Constitution Favors Consumers,
Not Industries or Enterprises
The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in
favor of any business or enterprise, nor does it contain any
specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be
pampered with a total proscription of foreign competition. On the
other hand, respondents claim that WTO/GATT aims to make
available to the Filipino consumer the best goods and services
obtainable anywhere in the world at the most reasonable prices.
Consequently, the question boils down to whether WTO/GATT
will favor the general welfare of the public at large.
Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of favoring the
general welfare) to reality?
Will WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos' general
welfare because it will — as promised by its promoters — expand
the country's exports and generate more employment?
Will it bring more prosperity, employment, purchasing power and
quality products at the most reasonable rates to the Filipino
public?
The responses to these questions involve "judgment calls" by our
policy makers, for which they are answerable to our people during
appropriate electoral exercises. Such questions and the answers
thereto are not subject to judicial pronouncements based on
grave abuse of discretion.
Constitution Designed to Meet
Future Events and Contingencies
No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in existence when the
Constitution was drafted and ratified in 1987. That does not mean
however that the Charter is necessarily flawed in the sense that
its framers might not have anticipated the advent of a borderless
world of business. By the same token, the United Nations was not
yet in existence when the 1935 Constitution became effective.
Did that necessarily mean that the then Constitution might not
have contemplated a diminution of the absoluteness of
sovereignty when the Philippines signed the UN Charter, thereby
effectively surrendering part of its control over its foreign relations
to the decisions of various UN organs like the Security Council?
It is not difficult to answer this question. Constitutions are
designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary events.
They should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown
circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters that a Constitution
can withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels but at the same
time bend with the refreshing winds of change necessitated by
unfolding events. As one eminent political law writer and
respected jurist 38explains:
The Constitution must be quintessential rather
than superficial, the root and not the blossom, the
base and frame-work only of the edifice that is yet
to rise. It is but the core of the dream that must
take shape, not in a twinkling by mandate of our
delegates, but slowly "in the crucible of Filipino
minds and hearts," where it will in time develop its
sinews and gradually gather its strength and
finally achieve its substance. In fine, the
Constitution cannot, like the goddess Athena, rise
full-grown from the brow of the Constitutional
Convention, nor can it conjure by mere fiat an
instant Utopia. It must grow with the society it
seeks to re-structure and march apace with the
progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes
of history the dynamism and vitality that will keep
it, far from becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing,
living law attuned to the heartbeat of the nation.
Third Issue: The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power
The WTO Agreement provides that "(e)ach Member shall ensure
the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative
procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed
Agreements." 39 Petitioners maintain that this undertaking "unduly
limits, restricts and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the
legislative power which under Sec. 2, Article VI of the 1987
Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress of the
Philippines. It is an assault on the sovereign powers of the
Philippines because this means that Congress could not pass
legislation that will be good for our national interest and general
welfare if such legislation will not conform with the WTO
Agreement, which not only relates to the trade in goods . . . but
also to the flow of investments and money . . . as well as to a
whole slew of agreements on socio-cultural matters . . . 40
More specifically, petitioners claim that said WTO proviso
derogates from the power to tax, which is lodged in the
Congress. 41 And while the Constitution allows Congress to
authorize the President to fix tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts,
such authority is subject to "specified limits and . . . such
limitations and restrictions" as Congress may provide, 42 as in fact
it did under Sec. 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Sovereignty Limited by
International Law and Treaties
This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by
which petitioners stressed their arguments on this issue.
However, while sovereignty has traditionally been deemed
absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is
however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed
to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the
family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not
envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the
world. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the
Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity,
with all nations." 43 By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is
bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which
are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. 44 One of
the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law
is pacta sunt servanda — international agreements must be
performed in good faith. "A treaty engagement is not a mere
moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the
parties . . . A state which has contracted valid international
obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications
as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken." 45
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the
absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may
surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for
greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact.
After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit
of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also
commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute
rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record agreements
between States concerning such widely diverse matters as, for
example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of territory,
the termination of war, the regulation of conduct of hostilities, the
formation of alliances, the regulation of commercial relations, the
settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing conduct in
peace and the establishment of international organizations. 46 The
sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be
considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1)
limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the
family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations.
As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, "Today, no nation can build its
destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The
age of interdependence is here." 47
UN Charter and Other Treaties
Limit Sovereignty
Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its
51 charter members, it consented to restrict its sovereign rights
under the "concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation."47-A Under
Article 2 of the UN Charter, "(a)ll members shall give the United
Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with
the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to
any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or
enforcement action." Such assistance includes payment of its
corresponding share not merely in administrative expenses but
also in expenditures for the peace-keeping operations of the
organization. In its advisory opinion of July 20, 1961, the
International Court of Justice held that money used by the United
Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and in the Congo
were "expenses of the United Nations" under Article 17,
paragraph 2, of the UN Charter. Hence, all its members must
bear their corresponding share in such expenses. In this sense,
the Philippine Congress is restricted in its power to appropriate. It
is compelled to appropriate funds whether it agrees with such
peace-keeping expenses or not. So too, under Article 105 of the
said Charter, the UN and its representatives enjoy diplomatic
privileges and immunities, thereby limiting again the exercise of
sovereignty of members within their own territory. Another
example: although "sovereign equality" and "domestic jurisdiction"
of all members are set forth as underlying principles in the UN
Charter, such provisos are however subject to enforcement
measures decided by the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter.
A final example: under Article 103, "(i)n the event of a conflict
between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other
international agreement, their obligation under the present charter
shall prevail," thus unquestionably denying the Philippines — as a
member — the sovereign power to make a choice as to which of
conflicting obligations, if any, to honor.
Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many
other international pacts — both bilateral and multilateral — that
involve limitations on Philippine sovereignty. These are
enumerated by the Solicitor General in his Compliance dated
October 24, 1996, as follows:
(a) Bilateral convention with the United States
regarding taxes on income, where the Philippines
agreed, among others, to exempt from tax,
income received in the Philippines by, among
others, the Federal Reserve Bank of the United
States, the Export/Import Bank of the United
States, the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation of the United States. Likewise, in said
convention, wages, salaries and similar
remunerations paid by the United States to its
citizens for labor and personal services performed
by them as employees or officials of the United
States are exempt from income tax by the
Philippines.
(b) Bilateral agreement with Belgium, providing,
among others, for the avoidance of double
taxation with respect to taxes on income.
(c) Bilateral convention with the Kingdom of
Sweden for the avoidance of double taxation.
(d) Bilateral convention with the French Republic
for the avoidance of double taxation.
(e) Bilateral air transport agreement with Korea
where the Philippines agreed to exempt from all
customs duties, inspection fees and other duties
or taxes aircrafts of South Korea and the regular
equipment, spare parts and supplies arriving with
said aircrafts.
(f) Bilateral air service agreement with Japan,
where the Philippines agreed to exempt from
customs duties, excise taxes, inspection fees and
other similar duties, taxes or charges fuel,
lubricating oils, spare parts, regular equipment,
stores on board Japanese aircrafts while on
Philippine soil.
(g) Bilateral air service agreement with Belgium
where the Philippines granted Belgian air carriers
the same privileges as those granted to Japanese
and Korean air carriers under separate air service
agreements.
(h) Bilateral notes with Israel for the abolition of
transit and visitor visas where the Philippines
exempted Israeli nationals from the requirement of
obtaining transit or visitor visas for a sojourn in the
Philippines not exceeding 59 days.
(i) Bilateral agreement with France exempting
French nationals from the requirement of
obtaining transit and visitor visa for a sojourn not
exceeding 59 days.
(j) Multilateral Convention on Special Missions,
where the Philippines agreed that premises of
Special Missions in the Philippines are inviolable
and its agents can not enter said premises without
consent of the Head of Mission concerned.
Special Missions are also exempted from customs
duties, taxes and related charges.
(k) Multilateral convention on the Law of Treaties.
In this convention, the Philippines agreed to be
governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.
(l) Declaration of the President of the Philippines
accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice. The International
Court of Justice has jurisdiction in all legal
disputes concerning the interpretation of a treaty,
any question of international law, the existence of
any fact which, if established, would constitute a
breach "of international obligation."
In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has effectively agreed to
limit the exercise of its sovereign powers of taxation, eminent
domain and police power. The underlying consideration in this
partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of
the other contracting states in granting the same privilege and
immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens. The
same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine commitments under
WTO-GATT.
International treaties, whether relating to nuclear
disarmament, human rights, the environment, the
law of the sea, or trade, constrain domestic
political sovereignty through the assumption of
external obligations. But unless anarchy in
international relations is preferred as an
alternative, in most cases we accept that the
benefits of the reciprocal obligations involved
outweigh the costs associated with any loss of
political sovereignty. (T)rade treaties that structure
relations by reference to durable, well-defined
substantive norms and objective dispute
resolution procedures reduce the risks of larger
countries exploiting raw economic power to bully
smaller countries, by subjecting power relations to
some form of legal ordering. In addition, smaller
countries typically stand to gain disproportionately
from trade liberalization. This is due to the simple
fact that liberalization will provide access to a
larger set of potential new trading relationship
 than in case of the larger country gaining
enhanced success to the smaller country's
market. 48
The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of
sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution,
based on the rationale that the Philippines "adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land and adheres to the policy of . . . cooperation and amity with
all nations."
Fourth Issue: The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power
Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General
Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 49 intrudes
on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedures. 50
To understand the scope and meaning of Article 34, TRIPS, 51 it
will be fruitful to restate its full text as follows:
Article 34
Process Patents: Burden of Proof
1. For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect
of the infringement of the rights of the owner
referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of Article 28, if the
subject matter of a patent is a process for
obtaining a product, the judicial authorities shall
have the authority to order the defendant to prove
that the process to obtain an identical product is
different from the patented process. Therefore,
Members shall provide, in at least one of the
following circumstances, that any identical product
when produced without the consent of the patent
owner shall, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, be deemed to have been obtained by
the patented process:
(a) if the product obtained by the
patented process is new;
(b) if there is a substantial
likelihood that the identical product
was made by the process and the
owner of the patent has been
unable through reasonable efforts
to determine the process actually
used.
2. Any Member shall be free to provide that the
burden of proof indicated in paragraph 1 shall be
on the alleged infringer only if the condition
referred to in subparagraph (a) is fulfilled or only if
the condition referred to in subparagraph (b) is
fulfilled.
3. In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the
legitimate interests of defendants in protecting
their manufacturing and business secrets shall be
taken into account.
From the above, a WTO Member is required to provide a rule of
disputable (not the words "in the absence of proof to the
contrary") presumption that a product shown to be identical to one
produced with the use of a patented process shall be deemed to
have been obtained by the (illegal) use of the said patented
process, (1) where such product obtained by the patented
product is new, or (2) where there is "substantial likelihood" that
the identical product was made with the use of the said patented
process but the owner of the patent could not determine the exact
process used in obtaining such identical product. Hence, the
"burden of proof" contemplated by Article 34 should actually be
understood as the duty of the alleged patent infringer to
overthrow such presumption. Such burden, properly understood,
actually refers to the "burden of evidence" (burden of going
forward) placed on the producer of the identical (or fake) product
to show that his product was produced without the use of the
patented process.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the
"burden of proof" since, regardless of the presumption provided
under paragraph 1 of Article 34, such owner still has to introduce
evidence of the existence of the alleged identical product, the fact
that it is "identical" to the genuine one produced by the patented
process and the fact of "newness" of the genuine product or the
fact of "substantial likelihood" that the identical product was made
by the patented process.
The foregoing should really present no problem in changing the
rules of evidence as the present law on the subject, Republic Act
No. 165, as amended, otherwise known as the Patent Law,
provides a similar presumption in cases of infringement of
patented design or utility model, thus:
Sec. 60. Infringement. — Infringement of a design
patent or of a patent for utility model shall consist
in unauthorized copying of the patented design or
utility model for the purpose of trade or industry in
the article or product and in the making, using or
selling of the article or product copying the
patented design or utility model. Identity or
substantial identity with the patented design or
utility model shall constitute evidence of copying.
(emphasis supplied)
Moreover, it should be noted that the requirement of Article 34 to
provide a disputable presumption applies only if (1) the product
obtained by the patented process in NEW or (2) there is a
substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the
process and the process owner has not been able through
reasonable effort to determine the process used. Where either of
these two provisos does not obtain, members shall be free to
determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions
of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.
By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our
disposition of the third issue — derogation of legislative power —
will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that the
reciprocity clause more than justifies such intrusion, if any
actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain an
unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the
concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial
system.
So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international
conventions on patents, trademarks and copyrights, the
adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure will not be
substantial. 52
Fifth Issue: Concurrence Only in the WTO Agreement and
Not in Other Documents Contained in the Final Act
Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO
Agreement and its annexes — but not in the other documents
referred to in the Final Act, namely the Ministerial Declaration and
Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services — is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes
abuse of discretion. They submit that such concurrence in the
WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a rejection
of the Final Act, which in turn was the document signed by
Secretary Navarro, in representation of the Republic upon
authority of the President. They contend that the second letter of
the President to the Senate 53 which enumerated what constitutes
the Final Act should have been the subject of concurrence of the
Senate.
"A final act, sometimes called protocol de cloture, is an instrument
which records the winding up of the proceedings of a diplomatic
conference and usually includes a reproduction of the texts of
treaties, conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed
upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending the
conference." 54 It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a summary of
the proceedings of a protracted conference which may have
taken place over several years. The text of the "Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations" is contained in just one page 55 in Vol. I of the
36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. By
signing said Final Act, Secretary Navarro as representative of the
Republic of the Philippines undertook:
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement
for the consideration of their respective competent
authorities with a view to seeking approval of the
Agreement in accordance with their procedures;
and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and
Decisions.
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in
exactly what the Final Act required from its signatories, namely,
concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement.
The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted
without need for ratification. They were approved by the ministers
by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT which provides that
representatives of the members can meet "to give effect to those
provisions of this Agreement which invoke joint action, and
generally with a view to facilitating the operation and furthering
the objectives of this Agreement." 56
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services also
approved in Marrakesh does not apply to the Philippines. It
applies only to those 27 Members which "have indicated in their
respective schedules of commitments on standstill, elimination of
monopoly, expansion of operation of existing financial service
suppliers, temporary entry of personnel, free transfer and
processing of information, and national treatment with respect to
access to payment, clearing systems and refinancing available in
the normal course of business."57
On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself expresses what
multilateral agreements are deemed included as its integral
parts, 58 as follows:
Article II
Scope of the WTO
1. The WTO shall provide the common
institutional frame-work for the conduct of trade
relations among its Members in matters to the
agreements and associated legal instruments
included in the Annexes to this Agreement.
2. The Agreements and associated legal
instruments included in Annexes 1, 2, and 3,
(hereinafter referred to as "Multilateral
Agreements") are integral parts of this Agreement,
binding on all Members.
3. The Agreements and associated legal
instruments included in Annex 4 (hereinafter
referred to as "Plurilateral Trade Agreements") are
also part of this Agreement for those Members
that have accepted them, and are binding on
those Members. The Plurilateral Trade
Agreements do not create either obligation or
rights for Members that have not accepted them.
 4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994 as specified in annex 1A (hereinafter
referred to as "GATT 1994") is legally distinct from
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
dated 30 October 1947, annexed to the Final Act
adopted at the conclusion of the Second Session
of the Preparatory Committee of the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Employment,
as subsequently rectified, amended or modified
(hereinafter referred to as "GATT 1947").
It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of what it was
concurring in as shown by the members' deliberation on August
25, 1994. After reading the letter of President Ramos dated
August 11, 1994, 59 the senators
of the Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was
concurring in, as follows: 60
THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Now, the question of the
validity of the submission came up in the first day
hearing of this Committee yesterday. Was the
observation made by Senator Tañada that what
was submitted to the Senate was not the
agreement on establishing the World Trade
Organization by the final act of the Uruguay
Round which is not the same as the agreement
establishing the World Trade Organization? And
on that basis, Senator Tolentino raised a point of
order which, however, he agreed to withdraw
upon understanding that his suggestion for an
alternative solution at that time was acceptable.
That suggestion was to treat the proceedings of
the Committee as being in the nature of briefings
for Senators until the question of the submission
could be clarified.
And so, Secretary Romulo, in effect, is the
President submitting a new . . . is he making a
new submission which improves on the clarity of
the first submission?
MR. ROMULO: Mr. Chairman, to make sure that it
is clear cut and there should be no
misunderstanding, it was his intention to clarify all
matters by giving this letter.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
Can this Committee hear from Senator Tañada
and later on Senator Tolentino since they were
the ones that raised this question yesterday?
Senator Tañada, please.
SEN. TAÑADA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Based on what Secretary Romulo has read, it
would now clearly appear that what is being
submitted to the Senate for ratification is not the
Final Act of the Uruguay Round, but rather the
Agreement on the World Trade Organization as
well as the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions,
and the Understanding and Commitments in
Financial Services.
I am now satisfied with the wording of the new
submission of President Ramos.
SEN. TAÑADA. . . . of President Ramos, Mr.
Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tañada.
Can we hear from Senator Tolentino? And after
him Senator Neptali Gonzales and Senator Lina.
SEN. TOLENTINO, Mr. Chairman, I have not
seen the new submission actually transmitted to
us but I saw the draft of his earlier, and I think it
now complies with the provisions of the
Constitution, and with the Final Act itself . The
Constitution does not require us to ratify the Final
Act. It requires us to ratify the Agreement which is
now being submitted. The Final Act itself specifies
what is going to be submitted to with the
governments of the participants.
In paragraph 2 of the Final Act, we read and I
quote:
By signing the present Final Act, the
representatives agree: (a) to submit as
appropriate the WTO Agreement for the
consideration of the respective competent
authorities with a view to seeking approval of the
Agreement in accordance with their procedures.
In other words, it is not the Final Act that was
agreed to be submitted to the governments for
ratification or acceptance as whatever their
constitutional procedures may provide but it is the
World Trade Organization Agreement. And if that
is the one that is being submitted now, I think it
satisfies both the Constitution and the Final Act
itself .
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tolentino,
May I call on Senator Gonzales.
SEN. GONZALES. Mr. Chairman, my views on
this matter are already a matter of record. And
they had been adequately reflected in the journal
of yesterday's session and I don't see any need
for repeating the same.
Now, I would consider the new submission as an
act ex abudante cautela.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Gonzales.
Senator Lina, do you want to make any comment
on this?
SEN. LINA. Mr. President, I agree with the
observation just made by Senator Gonzales out of
the abundance of question. Then the new
submission is, I believe, stating the obvious and
therefore I have no further comment to make.
Epilogue
In praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the
WTO Agreement, petitioners are invoking this Court's
constitutionally imposed duty "to determine whether or not there
has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence
therein via Senate Resolution No. 97. Procedurally, a writ
of certiorari grounded on grave abuse of discretion may be issued
by the Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when it is amply
shown that petitioners have no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. 61 Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must
be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 62 Failure on
the part of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will
result in the dismissal of the petition. 63
In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the
Senate, whose act is under review, is one of two sovereign
houses of Congress and is thus entitled to great respect in its
actions. It is itself a constitutional body independent and
coordinate, and thus its actions are presumed regular and done in
good faith. Unless convincing proof and persuasive arguments
are presented to overthrow such presumptions, this Court will
resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the foregoing well-
accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion and the
presumption of regularity in the Senate's processes, this Court
cannot find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse of
discretion to the Senate's exercise of its power of concurrence in
the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of Article VII of the
Constitution. 64
It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional
principles require the State to develop an independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or
prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally
produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles — while
serving as judicial and legislative guides — are not in themselves
sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally
fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate
which mandate the pursuit of a "trade policy that serves the
general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity" and the
promotion of industries "which are competitive in both domestic
and foreign markets," thereby justifying its acceptance of said
treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the
exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the
adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the
Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all
nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and
overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby
making it "a part of the law of the land" is a legitimate exercise of
its sovereign duty and power. We find no "patent and gross"
arbitrariness or despotism "by reason of passion or personal
hostility" in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this
Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with
petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to
strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal
reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to
nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the
exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludably, what the
Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether
such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm
of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the
elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation
should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and
economic globalization is a matter that our people should
determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO
Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the
political desire of a member.
The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best
seller Megatrends, predicts an Asian Renaissance 65 where "the
East will become the dominant region of the world economically,
politically and culturally in the next century." He refers to the "free
market" espoused by WTO as the "catalyst" in this coming Asian
ascendancy. There are at present about 31 countries including
China, Russia and Saudi Arabia negotiating for membership in
the WTO. Notwithstanding objections against possible limitations
on national sovereignty, the WTO remains as the only viable
structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the
development of international trade law. The alternative to WTO is
isolation, stagnation, if not economic self-destruction. Duly
enriched with original membership, keenly aware of the
advantages and disadvantages of globalization with its on-line
experience, and endowed with a vision of the future, the
Philippines now straddles the crossroads of an international
strategy for economic prosperity and stability in the new
millennium. Let the people, through their duly authorized elected
officers, make their free choice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all
surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents
ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE
SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and
ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and
PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented
by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA
R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and
DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all
surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents
GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN,
minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE
PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her
parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA
CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her
parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA
DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA
DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor,
represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE
CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO,
MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ,
minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and
AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA
MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors,
represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING,
DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed
ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR
and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all
surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents
ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and
MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by
their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN
MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors
and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA
OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH
JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their
parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO,
CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed
BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO,
JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE
ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his
capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch
66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos
to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners
dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-
generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice."
Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners
have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or
impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which
was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal
plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly
represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as
an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc.
(PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation
organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted
action geared for the protection of our environment and natural
resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio
S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in
this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala,
was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the
petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class
suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic
of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use
and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for
themselves and others who are equally concerned about the
preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors
further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that
judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements
in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and
equitable under the premises."5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the
Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty
million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and
verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of
flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic,
biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also
the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed,
endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence
reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful
ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of
a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per
cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and
other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a
consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of
environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting
from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the
"aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization
of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water,
incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of
Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion
and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural
productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one
billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately
the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering
and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and
fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities,
including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures,
(f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential
destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical
reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of
drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h)
increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the
absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and
agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent
mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the
lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for
the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and
the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the
earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to
perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the
phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the
"greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental
consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of
unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted
as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they
expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as
documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the
trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing
allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had
some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's land
mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there
remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of
said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the
country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere
850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests
are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the
Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million
hectares of immature and uneconomical
secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's,
predecessors have granted timber license
agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut
the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for
commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding
areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about
200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per
hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and
holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft
of forest resources after the end of this ensuing
decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous
consequences, serious injury and irreparable
damage of this continued trend of deforestation to
the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations
yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a
matter of fact, the environmental damages
enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already
being felt, experienced and suffered by the
generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA
holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest
stands will work great damage and irreparable
injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and
their successors — who may never see, use,
benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique
natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural
resource property he holds in trust for the benefit
of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right
to a balanced and healthful ecology and are
entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as
the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative
remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2,
1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final
demand to cancel all logging permits in the
country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990
is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to
cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious
damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant
to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights
of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be
left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare,
barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna
and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had
been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the
aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the
public policy enunciated in the Philippine
Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part,
states that it is the policy of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve
conditions under which man and nature can thrive
in productive and enjoyable harmony with each
other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other
requirements of present and future generations of
Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental
quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and
well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to
cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory
to the Constitutional policy of the State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full
and efficient use of natural resources (sic)."
(Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
 b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section
2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural
heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article
XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to
a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16,
Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the
highest law of humankind — the natural law —
and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation
and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in law other than the instant action to
arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's
vital life support systems and continued rape of
Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr.,
filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds,
namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and
(2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which
properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of
Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the
petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and
unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3)
the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the
defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the
aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In the said order, not only was
the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of
action against him and that it raises a political question —
sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of
the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts
which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask
this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the
ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion
in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors
not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in
this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition
and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda
after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in
behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably
states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations
concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles
19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the
concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the
concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-
perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on
the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No.
192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's
alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License
Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is
available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the
Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that
the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not
contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be
considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they
may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so
requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners
failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by
the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous
allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly
entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its
capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them,
do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the
theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in
the country is a political question which should be properly
addressed to the executive or legislative branches of
Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources
is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for
the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents
submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due
process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain
period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its
effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless
the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have
violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and
regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be
violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural
matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class
suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not
take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the
said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the
complaint is of common and general interest not just to several,
but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the
parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally
impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise
declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and
representative enough to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a
valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant
petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners
minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they
can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the
succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue
in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created
world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources to the end that their exploration, development
and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as
future generations. 10Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for
the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of
their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed,
We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a
meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and
arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for
the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's
challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions
of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the
Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with
the defendant. For although we believe that
plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it
(sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient
definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking
to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong
they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1,
Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that
the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions
and vague conclusions based on unverified data.
In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its
Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the
matter before it, being impressed with political
color and involving a matter of public policy, may
not be taken cognizance of by this Court without
doing violence to the sacred principle of
"Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal
branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it
cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction,
grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to
cancel all existing timber license agreements in
the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements. For to
do otherwise would amount to "impairment of
contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the
plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal
right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the
complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions
based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies
these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right —
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first
time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated
in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is
provided for in the preceding section of the same
article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the
right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found
under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not
under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important
than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter.
Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for
it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners —
the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic
rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of
the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as
state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost
not only for the present generation, but also for those to come —
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During
the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange
transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and
Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in
question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the
State to provide sanctions against
all forms of pollution — air, water
and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right
to healthful (sic) environment
necessarily carries with it the
correlative duty of not impairing
the same and, therefore, sanctions
may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious
management and conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental
balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related
provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation,
development and utilization of the country's natural
resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on
10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly
mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible
for the conservation, management, development and proper use
of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically
forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in
reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain,
as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as
may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of
the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and
future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the
following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby
declared the policy of the State to ensure the
sustainable use, development, management,
renewal, and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, including the protection and
enhancement of the quality of the environment,
and equitable access of the different segments of
the population to the development and the use of
the country's natural resources, not only for the
present generation but for future generations as
 well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize
and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their
utilization, development and conservation of our
natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book
IV of the Administrative Code of 1987,15 specifically in Section 1
thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State
shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people,
the full exploration and development as well as
the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources, consistent with
the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality
of the environment and the objective of making
the exploration, development and utilization of
such natural resources equitably accessible to the
different segments of the present as well as future
generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a
true value system that takes into account social
and environmental cost implications relative to the
utilization, development and conservation of our
natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a
sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the
quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the
other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR;
however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's
being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of
Environment and Natural Resources shall be
primarily responsible for the implementation of the
foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be
in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization, and conservation of the
country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set
the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation,
and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special
attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future
generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment
Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of
the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions
under which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social,
economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and
well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each
generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for
succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand,
gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to
a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty
— under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions
under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to
protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the
corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives
rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of
the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of
discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology;
hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs
should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of
the legal right or rights of the other; and its
essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff,
correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal
right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on
the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the
question submitted to the court for resolution involves the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other
matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of
the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is
deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in
such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the
court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down
the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and
circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the
ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure
to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and
deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or
recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot
on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the
statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well
as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF
ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the
claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may
thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears
stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is
concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the
grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise
a political question. Policy formulation or determination by the
executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely
put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a
right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in
legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political
question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the
exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects
executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review.
The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political
Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of
this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the
traditional concept of judicial power, involving the
settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as
law. The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts
of justice to review what was before forbidden
 territory, to wit, the discretion of the political
departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the
judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the
power to rule upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the legislature and
to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of
"grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic
phrase that can expand or contract according to
the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this
Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional
objection becomes even less tenable and
decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
assume that the issue presented before us was
political in nature, we would still not be precluded
from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us that now covers, in proper
cases, even the political question. Article VII,
Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the
complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the
Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it
cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction,
grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to
cancel all existing timber license agreements in
the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements. For to
do otherwise would amount to "impairment of
contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if
not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first
place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons,
even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If
he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the
Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and
advantages to the timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses
according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in
policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was
aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every
timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform
Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so
requires, the President may amend, modify,
replace or rescind any contract, concession,
permit, licenses or any other form of privilege
granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or
rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protested by the due process
clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of
Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. A timber license is not a contract within
the purview of the due process clause; it is only a
license or privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or
public welfare as in this case.
 A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what
otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal,
granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it
create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J.
168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither
is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong
Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co.,
Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license
agreements are the principal instruments by which
the State regulates the utilization and disposition
of forest resources to the end that public welfare
is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that
they merely evidence a privilege granted by the
State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the
latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the
particular concession area and the forest products
therein. They may be validly amended, modified,
replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive
when national interests so require. Thus, they are
not deemed contracts within the purview of the
due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee)
and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R.
No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment
clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of
contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are
contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an
executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of
existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause
cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a
law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation
of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature
and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the
exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of
advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general
welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of
government, is not meant to be absolute. The
same is understood to be subject to reasonable
legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of
public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other
words, the constitutional guaranty of non-
impairment of obligations of contract is limited by
the exercise of the police power of the State, in
the interest of public health, safety, moral and
general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New
York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs.
Auditor General,30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property
and the making of contracts are normally matters
of private and not of public concern. The general
rule is that both shall be free of governmental
interference. But neither property rights nor
contract rights are absolute; for government
 cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his
property to the detriment of his fellows, or
exercise his freedom of contract to work them
harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is
that of the public to regulate it in the common
interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power
of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-
impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin
the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases
of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other
instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not
entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is
hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent
Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby
set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to
implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned
timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND
R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE MANOTOC,
TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E.
MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented
by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG,
SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL
RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice,
Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense
and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Before the Court is a controversy of grave national importance.
While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's
decision in this case would undeniably have a profound effect on
the political, economic and other aspects of national life.
We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was
deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people power"
revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino
was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary
government. Her ascension to and consolidation of power have
not been unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led
by political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television
station Channel 7 by rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the
support of "Marcos loyalists" and the unseccessful plot of the
Marcos spouses to surreptitiously return from Hawii with
mercenaries aboard an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms
dealer [Manila Bulletin, January 30, 1987] awakened the nation to
the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to
the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers in the country.
The ratification of the 1987 Constitution enshrined the victory of
"people power" and also clearly reinforced the constitutional
moorings of Mrs. Aquino's presidency. This did not, however, stop
bloody challenges to the government. On August 28, 1987, Col.
Gregorio Honasan, one of the major players in the February
Revolution, led a failed coup that left scores of people, both
combatants and civilians, dead. There were several other armed
sorties of lesser significance, but the message they conveyed
was the same — a split in the ranks of the military establishment
that thraetened civilian supremacy over military and brought to
the fore the realization that civilian government could be at the
mercy of a fractious military.
But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in
misguided elements and among rabid followers of Mr. Marcos.
There are also the communist insurgency and the seccessionist
movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of
Mr. Marcos, to the extent that the communists have set up a
parallel government of their own on the areas they effectively
control while the separatist are virtually free to move about in
armed bands. There has been no let up on this groups'
determination to wrest power from the govermnent. Not only
through resort to arms but also to through the use of propaganda
have they been successful in dreating chaos and destabilizing the
country.
Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The
accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation attributed
to Mr. Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated. The
efforts at economic recovery, three years after Mrs. Aquino
assumed office, have yet to show concrete results in alleviating
the poverty of the masses, while the recovery of the ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcoses has remained elusive.
Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return
to the Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire
consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the
stability of government is threatened from various directions and
the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has
stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and
his family.
The Petition
This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case
of a dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty
years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and
who within the short space of three years seeks to return, is in a
class by itself.
This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to
order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos
and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to
the Philippines.
The Issue
Th issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise
of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
According to the petitioners, the resolution of the case would
depend on the resolution of the following issues:
1. Does the President have the power to bar the Philippines is a clear and present danger to
return of former President Marcos and family to national security, public safety, or public health a
the Philippines? political question?

a. Is this a political question? d. Assuming that the Court may inquire as to

2. Assuming that the President has the power to
bar former President Marcos and his family from
returning to the Philippines, in the interest of
"national security, public safety or public health
a. Has the President made a finding that the
return of former President Marcos and his family
to the Philippines is a clear and present danger to
national security, public safety or public health?
b. Assuming that she has made that finding
(1) Have the requirements of due
process been complied with in
making such finding?
The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right
of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under
(2) Has there been prior notice to
the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:
petitioners?
(3) Has there been a hearing?
(4) Assuming that notice and
hearing may be dispensed with,
has the President's decision,
including the grounds upon which
it was based, been made known to
petitioners so that they may
controvert the same?
c. Is the President's determination that the return
of former President Marcos and his family to the
whether the return of former President Marcos
and his family is a clear and present danger to
national security, public safety, or public health,
have respondents established such fact?
3. Have the respondents, therefore, in
implementing the President's decision to bar the
return of former President Marcos and his family,
acted and would be acting without jurisdiction, or
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, in performing any act which would
effectively bar the return of former President
Marcos and his family to the Philippines?
[Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 5-7; Rollo, pp.
234-236.1
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing
the same within the limits prescribed by law shall
not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public
 safety, or public health, as may be provided by
law.
The petitioners contend that the President is without power to
impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court
may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the
President impair their right to travel because no law has
authorized her to do so. They advance the view that before the
right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the
government, there must be legislation to that effect.
The petitioners further assert that under international law, the
right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom
of movement and residence within the borders of
each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country,
including his own, and to return to his country.
Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which had been ratified by the Philippines, provides:
Article 12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State
shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty
of movement and freedom to choose his
residence.
2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country,
including his own.
3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be
subject to any restrictions except those which are
provided by law, are necessary to protect national
security, public order (order public), public health
or morals or the rights and freedoms of others,
and are consistent with the other rights
recognized in the present Covenant.
4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right
to enter his own country.
On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the
issue in this case involves a political question which is non-
justiciable. According to the Solicitor General:
As petitioners couch it, the question involved is
simply whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E.
Marcos and his family have the right to travel and
liberty of abode. Petitioners invoke these
constitutional rights in vacuo without reference to
attendant circumstances.
Respondents submit that in its proper formulation,
the issue is whether or not petitioners Ferdinand
E. Marcos and family have the right to return to
the Philippines and reside here at this time in the
face of the determination by the President that
such return and residence will endanger national
security and public safety.
It may be conceded that as formulated by
petitioners, the question is not a political question
as it involves merely a determination of what the
law provides on the matter and application thereof
to petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family. But
when the question is whether the two rights
claimed by petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and
 family impinge on or collide with the more
primordial and transcendental right of the State to
security and safety of its nationals, the question
becomes political and this Honorable Court can
not consider it.
There are thus gradations to the question, to wit:
Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family
have the right to return to the Philippines and
reestablish their residence here? This is clearly a
justiciable question which this Honorable Court
can decide.
Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family
have their right to return to the Philippines and
reestablish their residence here even if their return
and residence here will endanger national security
and public safety? this is still a justiciable question
which this Honorable Court can decide.
Is there danger to national security and public
safety if petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and
family shall return to the Philippines and establish
their residence here? This is now a political
question which this Honorable Court can not
decide for it falls within the exclusive authority and
competence of the President of the Philippines.
[Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 9-11; Rollo,
pp. 297-299.]
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to
national security over individual rights. In support thereof, they
cite Article II of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to
serve and protect the people. The Government
may call upon the people to defend the State and,
in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be
required, under conditions provided by law, to
render personal, military, or civil service.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order,
the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for
the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.
Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos
and family from returning to the Philippines for reasons of national
security and public safety has international precedents. Rafael
Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, Anastacio Somoza Jr. of
Nicaragua, Jorge Ubico of Guatemala, Fulgencio batista of Cuba,
King Farouk of Egypt, Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez of El
Salvador, and Marcos Perez Jimenez of Venezuela were among
the deposed dictators whose return to their homelands was
prevented by their governments. [See Statement of Foreign
Affairs Secretary Raul S. Manglapus, quoted in Memorandum for
Respondents, pp. 26-32; Rollo, pp. 314-319.]
The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of
the scope of presidential power and its limits. We, however, view
this issue in a different light. Although we give due weight to the
parties' formulation of the issues, we are not bound by its narrow
confines in arriving at a solution to the controversy.
At the outset, we must state that it would not do to view the case
within the confines of the right to travel and the import of the
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the leading cases of Kent
v. Dulles [357 U.S. 116, 78 SCt 1113, 2 L Ed. 2d 1204] and Haig
v. Agee [453 U.S. 280, 101 SCt 2766, 69 L Ed. 2d 640) which
affirmed the right to travel and recognized exceptions to the
exercise thereof, respectively.
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the
right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the
Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally
connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to
one's country, a totally distinct right under international law,
independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the
Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of
movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to
leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate
and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to
freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each
state" [Art. 13(l)] separately from the "right to leave any country,
including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On
the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence" [Art. 12(l)] and
the right to "be free to leave any country, including his own." [Art.
12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are
necessary to protect national security, public order, public health
or morals or enter qqqs own country" of which one cannot be
"arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It would therefore be
inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to
one's country in the same context as those pertaining to the
liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights
specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of
the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-
considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a
generally accepted principle of international law and, under our
Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the
Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to
travel and enjoys a different protection under the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being
"arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Thus, the rulings in the cases Kent and Haig which refer to the
issuance of passports for the purpose of effectively exercising the
right to travel are not determinative of this case and are only
tangentially material insofar as they relate to a conflict between
executive action and the exercise of a protected right. The issue
before the Court is novel and without precedent in Philippine, and
even in American jurisprudence.
Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue
of whether or not there can be limitations on the right to travel in
the absence of legislation to that effect is rendered unnecessary.
An appropriate case for its resolution will have to be awaited.
Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we find now a
need to explain the methodology for its resolution. Our resolution
of the issue will involve a two-tiered approach. We shall first
resolve whether or not the President has the power under the
Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines. Then, we shall determine, pursuant to the express
power of the Court under the Constitution in Article VIII, Section
1, whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when she determined that the return of the Marcose's to the
Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare
and decided to bar their return.
Executive Power
The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers
of the three great branches of government. To recall the words of
Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139
(1936)], "the Constitution has blocked but with deft strokes and in
bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and
the judicial departments of the government." [At 157.1 Thus, the
1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[the legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines" Art VI, Sec.
11, "[t]he executive power shall bevested in the President of the
Philippines" [Art. VII, Sec. 11, and "[te judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] These provisions not only
establish a separation of powers by actual division [Angara v.
Electoral Commission, supra] but also confer plenary legislative,
executive and judicial powers subject only to limitations provided
in the Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in Ocampo v.
Cabangis [15 Phil. 626 (1910)] pointed out "a grant of the
legislative power means a grant of all legislative power; and a
grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power
which may be exercised under the government." [At 631-632.1 If
this can be said of the legislative power which is exercised by two
chambers with a combined membership of more than two
hundred members and of the judicial power which is vested in a
hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said of the executive power
which is vested in one official the President.
As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive
power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." [Art.
VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by
executive power" although in the same article it touches on the
exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of
control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the
power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers
under the commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract
or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or
international agreements, the power to submit the budget to
Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Sec. 14-
23].
The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain
powers of the President did the framers of the Constitution intend
that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no
other? Are these se enumerated powers the breadth and scope
of "executive power"? Petitioners advance the view that the
President's powers are limited to those specifically enumerated in
the 1987 Constitution. Thus, they assert: "The President has
enumerated powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly
denied to her. Inclusion unius est exclusio alterius[Memorandum
for Petitioners, p. 4- Rollo p. 233.1 This argument brings to mind
the institution of the U.S. Presidency after which ours is legally
patterned.**
Corwin, in his monumental volume on the President of the United
States grappled with the same problem. He said:
Article II is the most loosely drawn chapter of the
Constitution. To those who think that a
constitution ought to settle everything beforehand
it should be a nightmare; by the same token, to
those who think that constitution makers ought to
leave considerable leeway for the future play of
political forces, it should be a vision realized.
We encounter this characteristic of Article 11 in its
opening words: "The executive power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of
America." . . .. [The President: Office and Powers,
17871957, pp. 3-4.]
Reviewing how the powers of the U.S. President were exercised
by the different persons who held the office from Washington to
the early 1900's, and the swing from the presidency by
commission to Lincoln's dictatorship, he concluded that "what the
presidency is at any particular moment depends in important
measure on who is President." [At 30.]
This view is shared by Schlesinger who wrote in The Imperial
Presidency:
For the American Presidency was a peculiarly
personal institution. it remained of course, an
agency of government subject to unvarying
demands and duties no remained, of cas
President. But, more than most agencies of
government, it changed shape, intensity and
 ethos according to the man in charge. Each
President's distinctive temperament and
character, his values, standards, style, his habits,
expectations, Idiosyncrasies, compulsions,
phobias recast the WhiteHouse and pervaded the
entire government. The executive branch, said
Clark Clifford, was a chameleon, taking its color
from the character and personality of the
President. The thrust of the office, its impact on
the constitutional order, therefore altered from
President to President. Above all, the way each
President understood it as his personal obligation
to inform and involve the Congress, to earn and
hold the confidence of the electorate and to
render an accounting to the nation and posterity
determined whether he strengthened or
weakened the constitutional order. [At 212- 213.]
We do not say that the presidency is what Mrs. Aquino says it is
or what she does but, rather, that the consideration of tradition
and the development of presidential power under the different
constitutions are essential for a complete understanding of the
extent of and limitations to the President's powers under the 1987
Constitution. The 1935 Constitution created a strong President
with explicitly broader powers than the U.S. President. The 1973
Constitution attempted to modify the system of government into
the parliamentary type, with the President as a mere figurehead,
but through numerous amendments, the President became even
more powerful, to the point that he was also the de facto
Legislature. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the
presidential system of government and restored the separation of
legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual
distribution among three distinct branches of government with
provision for checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power"
is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state
as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in
such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself
withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the
execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It
also grants the President other powers that do not involve the
execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the
country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987
Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise
of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is
traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power."
Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be
limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution.
In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific
powers so enumerated,
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the
government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive. Thus, in the landmark decision of Springer v.
Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928), on
the issue of who between the Governor-General of the
Philippines and the Legislature may vote the shares of stock held
by the Government to elect directors in the National Coal
Company and the Philippine National Bank, the U.S. Supreme
Court, in upholding the power of the Governor-General to do so,
said:
...Here the members of the legislature who
constitute a majority of the "board" and
"committee" respectively, are not charged with the
performance of any legislative functions or with
the doing of anything which is in aid of
performance of any such functions by the
legislature. Putting aside for the moment the
question whether the duties devolved upon these
members are vested by the Organic Act in the
Governor-General, it is clear that they are not
legislative in character, and still more clear that
 they are not judicial. The fact that they do not fall
within the authority of either of these two
constitutes logical ground for concluding that they
do fall within that of the remaining one among
which the powers of government are divided ....[At
202-203; Emphasis supplied.]
We are not unmindful of Justice Holmes' strong dissent. But in his
enduring words of dissent we find reinforcement for the view that
it would indeed be a folly to construe the powers of a branch of
government to embrace only what are specifically mentioned in
the Constitution:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not
establish and divide fields of black and white.
Even the more specific of them are found to
terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from
one extreme to the other. ....
xxx xxx xxx
It does not seem to need argument to show that
however we may disguise it by veiling words we
do not and cannot carry out the distinction
between legislative and executive action with
mathematical precision and divide the branches
into watertight compartments, were it ever so
desirable to do so, which I am far from believing
that it is, or that the Constitution requires. [At 210-
211.]
The Power Involved
The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he
prime duty of theGovernment is to serve and protect the people"
and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order,the protection of
life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general
welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the
blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance
of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and
the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to
guide governmental action. But such does not mean that they are
empty words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in
drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing
action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making
any decision as President of the Republic, the President has to
consider these principles, among other things, and adhere to
them.
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow
the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under
the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in
arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and
uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under
the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and
advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the
Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a
social contract whereby the people have surrendered their
sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest
the officers of the Government exercising the powers delegated
by the people forget and the servants of the people become
rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.]
The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the
persons who seek to return to the country are the deposed
dictator and his family at whose door the travails of the country
are laid and from whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten
wealth are sought to be recovered. The constitutional guarantees
they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of
even the preferred freedoms of speech and ofexpression,
although couched in absolute terms, admits of limits and must be
adjusted to the requirements of equally important public interests
[Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, October 7,
1981.]
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general
welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of
certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual
power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded
on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To
paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the
President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the
Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand [See
Corwin, supra, at 153]. It is a power borne by the President's duty
to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as
a power implicit in the President's duty to take care that the laws
are faithfully executed [see Hyman, The American President,
where the author advances the view that an allowance of
discretionary power is unavoidable in any government and is best
lodged in the President].
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the
President's powers as protector of the peace. Rossiter The
American Presidency].The power of the President to keep the
peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief
powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against
external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not
only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but
is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of
maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in
times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide
discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties
in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative
want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief
provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the
enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the
President's exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers short of
the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep
the peace, and maintain public order and security.
That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar
the Marcose's from returning has been recognized by
memembers of the Legislature, and is manifested by the
Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives and signed
by 103 of its members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to
return to the Philippines "as a genuine unselfish gesture for true
national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective
adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under the
Constitution and our laws." [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p.
321.1 The Resolution does not question the President's power to
bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, rather, it
appeals to the President's sense of compassion to allow a man to
come home to die in his country.
What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the
Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be
considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions
guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to
certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one.
It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to
those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit
in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to
safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such
request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader
discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it
must be granted or denied.
The Extent of Review
Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." [Art. VIII,
Sec. 1] Given this wording, we cannot agree with the Solicitor
General that the issue constitutes a political question which is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to decide.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question
doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas
which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have
normally left to the political departments to decide. But
nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction
the determination of which is exclusively for the President, for
Congress or for the people themselves through a plebiscite or
referendum. We cannot, for example, question the President's
recognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature or
improvident such action may appear. We cannot set aside a
presidential pardon though it may appear to us that the
beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend
the Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute brought
before us because the power is reserved to the people.
There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our
determination thereof on the political question doctrine. The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission cited by
petitioners show that the framers intended to widen the scope of
judicial review but they did not intend courts of justice to settle all
actual controversies before them. When political questions are
involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is
being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will
not substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned and
decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone
to decide. In this light, it would appear clear that the second
paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, defining
"judicial power," which specifically empowers the courts to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government, incorporates in the fundamental law the ruling
in Lansang v. Garcia [G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, 42
SCRA 4481 that:]
Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the
Executive the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus under specified
conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation
of powers underlying our system of government,
the Executive is supreme within his own sphere.
However, the separation of powers, under the
Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes
hand in hand with the system of checks and
balances, under which the Executive is supreme,
as regards the suspension of the privilege, but
only if and when he acts within the sphere alloted
to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to
determine whether or not he has so acted is
vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this
respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme. In the
exercise of such authority, the function of the
Court is merely to check — not to supplant the
Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has
gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in
him or to determine the wisdom of his act [At 479-
480.]
Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or
not there exist factual bases for the President to conclude that it
was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to
the Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that
she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused
her discretion in deciding to bar their return.
We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral
arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers
by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and
respondents were represented, there exist factual bases for the
President's decision..
The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend
that the country is not besieged from within by a well-organized
communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao,
rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder
with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials,
to mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts of
the Marcose's and their followers to destabilize the country, as
earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the
return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and
intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate
more chaos.
As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may
be contained. The military establishment has given assurances
that it could handle the threats posed by particular groups. But it
is the catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove
to be the proverbial final straw that would break the camel's back.
With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted
arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the
return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national
interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.
It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the
Philippines will cause the escalation of violence against the State,
that would be the time for the President to step in and exercise
the commander-in-chief powers granted her by the Constitution to
suppress or stamp out such violence. The State, acting through
the Government, is not precluded from taking pre- emptive action
against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are
perceived as apt to become serious and direct. Protection of the
people is the essence of the duty of government. The
preservation of the State the fruition of the people's sovereignty is
an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to
preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful
execution the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.
We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now
beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the
plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close
associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the
Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the
Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its
efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the
Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the
continually increasing burden imposed on the economy by the
excessive foreign borrowing during the Marcos regime, which
stifles and stagnates development and is one of the root causes
of widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting
precarious state of our economy is of common knowledge and is
easily within the ambit of judicial notice.
The President has determined that the destabilization caused by
the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved
during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse.
Given what is within our individual and common knowledge of the
state of the economy, we cannot argue with that determination.
WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the
President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his
family at the present time and under present circumstances
poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in
prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999
LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated January 4,
1990 temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and
Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. It is
the submission of public respondents that:
1. The Decision in this case having become final and
executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit
of authority of the executive authority. The
issuance of the TRO may be construed as
trenching on that sphere of executive authority;
2. The issuance of the temporary restraining order . .
. creates dangerous precedent as there will never
be an end to litigation because there is always a
possibility that Congress may repeal a law.
3. Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on
the death penalty bill. To be certain, whatever
question may now be raised on the Death Penalty
Law before the present Congress within the 6-
month period given by this Honorable Court had in
all probability been fully debated upon . . .
4. Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex
praeterito, the law looks forward while the judge
looks at the past, . . . the Honorable Court in
issuing the TRO has transcended its power of
judicial review.
5. At this moment, certain
circumstances/supervening events transpired to
the effect that the repeal or modification of the law
imposing death penalty has become nil, to wit:
a. The public pronouncement of President
Estrada that he will veto any law imposing
the death penalty involving heinous
crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et
al., that they are against the repeal of the
law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to
repeal the law only bears his signature
and that of Senator Pimentel.
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration, public respondents attached a copy of House
Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled
"Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representative
to reject any move to review Republic Act No. 7659
which provided for the re-imposition of death penalty, notifying the
Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the
position of the House of Representative on this matter, and urging
the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately
implement the death penalty law." The Resolution was concurred
in by one hundred thirteen (113) congressman.
In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay the Court is not changing even a comma of its final Decision. It is
order. . . is within the scope of judicial power and duty and does appropriate to examine with precision the metes and bounds of
not trench on executive powers nor on congressional the Decision of this Court that became final. These metes and
prerogatives; (2) the exercise by this Court of its power to stay bounds are clearly spelled out in the Entry of Judgment in this
execution was reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction case, viz:
to address incidental matters involved or arising from the petition;
(4) public respondents are estopped from challenging the Court's ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
jurisdiction; and (5) there is no certainty that the law on capital
punishment will not be repealed or modified until Congress This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a
convenes and considers all the various resolutions and bills filed decision rendered in the above-entitled case was
before it. filed in this Office, the dispositive part of which
reads as follows:
Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions
concern matters that are not incidents in G.R. No. 117472, where WHEREFORE, the petition is
the death penalty was imposed on petitioner on automatic review DENIED insofar as petitioner
of his conviction by this Court. The instant motions were filed in seeks to declare the assailed
this case, G.R. No. 132601, where the constitutionality of R.A. statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as
No. 8177 (Lethal Injection Law) and its implementing rules and unconstitutional; but GRANTED
regulations was assailed by petitioner. For this reason, the Court insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of
in its Resolution of January 4, 1999 merely noted the Motion to the Rules and Regulations to
Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray dated January 7, Implement Republic Act No. 8177
1999 and Entry of Appearance of her counsel dated January 5, are concerned, which are hereby
1999. Clearly, she has no legal standing to intervene in the case declared INVALID because (a)
at bar, let alone the fact that the interest of the State is properly Section 17 contravenes Article 83
represented by the Solicitor General. of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 25 of
We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public Republic Act No. 7659; and (b)
respondents. Section 19 fails to provide for
review and approval of the Lethal
I Injection Manual by the Secretary
of Justice, and unjustifiably makes
First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public the manual confidential, hence
respondents that this Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at unavailable to interested parties
bar and hence can no longer restrain the execution of the including the accused/convict and
petitioner. Obviously, public respondents are invoking the rule counsel. Respondents are hereby
that final judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the enjoined from enforcing and
principle that "it is just as important that there should be a place to implementing Republic Act No.
end as there should be a place to begin litigation." 1 To start with, 8177 until the aforesaid Sections
 17 and 19 of the Rules and
Regulations to Implement
Republic Act No. 8177 are
appropriately amended, revised
and/or corrected in accordance
with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

and that the same has,

on November 6, 1988 become final and executory
and is hereby recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgment.

Manila, Philippine.

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The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the
Secretary of Justice, the Honorable Serafin Cuevas, filed with this
Court on October 21, 1998 a Compliance where he submitted the
Amended Rules and Regulations implementing R.A. No. 8177 in
compliance with our Decision. On October 28, 1998, Secretary
Cuevas submitted a Manifestation informing the Court that he has
caused the publication of the said Amended Rules and
Regulations as required by the Administrative Code. It is
crystalline that the Decision of this Court that became final and
unalterable mandated: (1) that R.A. No. 8177 is not
unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and
Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are invalid, and (3) R.A.
No. 8177 cannot be enforced and implemented until sections 17
and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177
are amended. It is also daylight clear that this Decision was not
altered a whit by this Court. Contrary to the submission of the
Solicitor General, the rule on finality of judgment cannot divest
this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same
judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well
established jurisprudence on this issue as
follows: 2
xxx xxx xxx
the finality
l of a judgment does not mean that the
Court R has lost all its powers nor the case. By the
finality
e of the judgment, what the court loses is its
jurisdiction
c to amend, modify or alter the same.
Even o after the judgment has become final the
courtr retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce
it. 3 There
d is a difference between the jurisdiction
of thes court to execute its judgment and its
jurisdiction
O to amend, modify or alter the same.
Thefformer continues even after the judgment has
becomef final for the purpose of enforcement of
judgment;
i the latter terminates when the judgment
becomes
c final. 4 . . . For after the judgment has
becomee final facts and circumstances may
transpire which can render the execution unjust or
impossible.5
In truth, the arguments of the Solicitor General has long been
rejected by this Court. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, as
early as 1915, this Court has unequivocably ruled in the case
of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First Instance, 6 viz:
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in
various decisions, which constitute jurisprudence
on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the
sentence has been pronounced and the period for
reopening the same cannot change or alter its
judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated . . .
When in cases of appeal or review the cause has
been returned thereto for execution, in the event
that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a
ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it
does not follow from this cessation of functions on
the part of the court with reference to the ending
of the cause that the judicial authority terminates
by having then passed completely to the
Executive. The particulars of the execution itself,
which are certainly not always included in the
judgment and writ of execution, in any event are
absolutely under the control of the judicial
authority, while the executive has no power over
the person of the convict except to provide for
carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the
case at bar, which is that of execution of a capital
sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis
that postponement of the date can be requested.
There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-
known principle that notwithstanding the order of
execution and the executory nature thereof on the
date set or at the proper time, the date therefor
can be postponed, even in sentences of death.
Under the common law this postponement can be
ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the
King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and
(3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state
this principle of the common law to render
impossible that assertion in absolute terms that
after the convict has once been placed in jail the
trial court can not reopen the case to investigate
the facts that show the need for postponement. If
one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is
acknowledged that even after the date of the
execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the
general rule that after the (court) has performed
its ministerial duty of ordering the execution . . .
and its part is ended, if however a circumstance
arises that ought to delay the execution, and there
is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency
and to order a postponement. Then the question
arises as to whom the application for postponing
the execution ought to be addressed while the
circumstances is under investigation and so to
who has jurisdiction to make the investigation.
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential
aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial
subtraction for our Constitution 7 vests the entirety of judicial
power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. To be sure, the important part of a litigation,
whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions
where supervening events may change the circumstance of the
parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the
litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforseen,
supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the
inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and
orders to make them conformable to law and justice. 8 For this
purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that "when by law
jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary
writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect
may be employed by such court or officer and if the procedure to
be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically
pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or
mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable
to the spirit of said law or rules." It bears repeating that what the
Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision
to give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light of
supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The
Court, contrary to popular misimpression, did not restrain the
effectivity of a law enacted by Congress. 1âwphi 1.nêt
The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public
respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction to restrain the
execution of petitioner is that it can diminish the independence of
the judiciary. Since the implant of republicanism in our soil, our
courts have been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their final
decisions. In accord with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court
promulgated rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure
which, among others, spelled out the rules on execution of
judgments. These rules are all predicated on the assumption that
courts have the inherent, necessary and incidental power to
control and supervise the process of execution of their decisions.
Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction and effects of judgments
in civil cases. Rule 120 governs judgments in criminal cases. It
should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our
Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the
words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and
integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the
maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." 9 Hence, our
Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it
enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the
power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-
existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of
Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13,
Article VIII provides:
Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power
to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to
the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
The existing laws on pleading, practice and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and
are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power
of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The Congress have the power to repeal,
alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines.
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it
may appear on its surface. In In re Cunanan 10Congress in the
exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court
regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar
Flunkers Act of 1953 11 which considered as a passing grade, the
average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to
August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court
struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr.
Justice Diokno held that " . . . the disputed law is not a legislation;
it is a judgment — a judgment promulgated by this Court during
the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and
although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even
now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this
Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may
do so. Any attempt on the part of these department would be a
clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in
question." 12The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious,
therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice
of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by
Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other
authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the
license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of
the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission
to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the
1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power
of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, . . . which, however, may be
repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa . .
. ." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec.5. The Supreme Court shall
have the following powers.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate
rules concerning
pleading, practice,
and procedure in
all courts, the
 admission to the (5) Promulgate
practice of law, rules concerning
and the integration the protection and
of the Bar, which, enforcement of
however, may be constitutional
repealed, altered, rights, pleading,
or supplemented practice and
by the Batasang procedure in all
Pambansa. Such courts, the
rules shall provide admission to the
a simplified and practice of law, the
inexpensive Integrated Bar, and
procedure for the legal assistance to
speedy disposition the
of cases, shall be underprivileged.
uniform for all Such rules shall
courts of the same provide a simplified
grade, and shall and inexpensive
not diminish, procedure for the
increase, or modify speedy disposition
substantive rights. of cases, shall be
uniform for all
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further courts of the same
strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving to it the grade, and shall
additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of not diminish,
the Bar. 13 increase, or modify
substantive rights.
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more Rules of procedure
independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making of special courts
power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides: and quasi-judicial
bodies shall
remain effective
xxx xxx xxx
unless
disapproved by the
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall Supreme Court.
have the following powers:
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court
xxx xxx xxx for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional stress, inter alia, that the non-
rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disclosure of the date of execution
disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial deprives herein respondent of vital
bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the information necessary for the
power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules exercise of his statutory powers,
concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to as well as renders nugatory the
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer constitutional guarantee that
shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. recognizes the people's right to
If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the information of public concern, and
independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public (b) to ask this Honorable Court to
respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the provide the appropriate relief.
process of execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and
which it has exercised since time immemorial. 6. The non-disclosure of the date
of execution deprives herein
To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail respondent of vital information
the jurisdiction of this Court to control and supervise the necessary for the exercise of his
implementation of its decision in the case at bar. As aforestated, power of supervision and control
our Decision became final and executory on November 6, 1998. over the Bureau of Corrections
The records reveal that after November 6, 1998, or on December pursuant to Section 39, Chapter 8,
8, 1998, no less than the Secretary of Justice recognized the Book IV of the Administrative
jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Manifestation and Urgent Code of 1987, in relation to Title
Motion to compel the trial judge, the Honorable Thelma A. III, Book IV of such Administrative
Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104, Quezon City to provide him ". . . a Code, insofar as the enforcement
certified true copy of the Warrant of Execution dated November of Republic Act No. 8177 and the
17, 1998 bearing the designated execution day of death convict Amended Rules and Regulations
Leo Echegaray and allow (him) to reveal or announce the to Implement Republic Act No.
contents thereof, particularly the execution date fixed by such trial 8177 is concerned and for the
court to the public when requested." The relevant portions of the discharge of the mandate of
Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by the Secretary of Justice seeing to it that laws and rules
beseeching this Court "to provide the appropriate relief" state: relative to the execution of
sentence are faithfully observed.
xxx xxx xxx
7. On the other hand, the willful
5. Instead of filing a comment on omission to reveal the information
Judge Ponferrada's Manifestation about the precise day of execution
however, herein respondent is limits the exercise by the President
submitting the instant of executive clemency powers
Manifestation and Motion (a) to pursuant to Section 19, Article VII
(Executive Department) of the
1987 Philippine Constitution and
Article 81 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, which
provides that the death sentence
shall be carried out "without
prejudice to the exercise by the
President of his executive
powers at all times." (Emphasis
supplied) For instance, the
President cannot grant
reprieve, i.e., postpone the
execution of a sentence to a day
certain (People v. Vera, 65 Phil.
56, 110 [1937]) in the absence of a
precise date to reckon with. The
exercise of such clemency power,
at this time, might even work to the
prejudice of the convict and defeat
the purpose of the Constitution
and the applicable statute as when
the date at execution set by the
President would be earlier than
that designated by the court.
8. Moreover, the deliberate non-
disclosure of information about the
date of execution to herein
respondent and the public violates
Section 7, Article III (Bill of Rights)
and Section 28, Article II
(Declaration of Principles and
State Policies) of the 1987
Philippine Constitution which read:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to
information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to
government research data used as
basis for policy development shall,
be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may
beprovided by law.
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law, the
State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public
interest.
9. The "right to information"
provision is self-executing. It
supplies "the rules by means of
which the right to information may
be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on
the Constitutional Limitations, 167
[1972]) by guaranteeing the right
and mandating the duty to afford
access to sources of information.
Hence, the fundamental right
therein recognized may be
asserted by the people upon the
ratification of the Constitution
without need for any ancillary act
of the Legislature (Id., at p. 165)
What may be provided for by the
Legislature are reasonable
conditions and limitations upon the
access to be afforded which must,
of necessity, be consistent with the
declared State policy of full public
 disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest
(Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28).
However, it cannot be
overemphasized that whatever
limitation may be prescribed by the
Legislature, the right and the duty
under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become
operative and enforceable by
virtue of the adoption of the New
Charter." (Decision of the
Supreme Court En Banc in
Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 534-
535 [1987].
The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date
of execution of petitioner Echegaray was filed by his counsel,
Atty. Theodore Te, on December 7, 1998. He invoked his client's
right to due process and the public's right to information. The
Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondents, did not
oppose petitioner's motion on the ground that this Court has no
more jurisdiction over the process of execution of Echegaray.
This Court granted the relief prayed for by the Secretary of
Justice and by the counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution of
December 15, 1998. There was not a whimper of protest from the
public respondents and they are now estopped from contending
that this Court has lost its jurisdiction to grant said relief. The
jurisdiction of this Court does not depend on the convenience of
litigants.
II
Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention
that the "decision in this case having become final and executory,
its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the
executive department . . .. By granting the TRO, the Honorable
Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive
function." 14 Public respondents cite as their authority for this
proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which
reads:
Except in cases of impeachment, or as
otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
President may grant reprieves, commutations,
and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after
conviction by final judgment. He shall also have
the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence
of a majority of all the members of the Congress.
The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the
interpretation suggested by the public respondents. The provision
is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after
conviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority for the
President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of
all the members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot
be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the
enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an
accused who has been convicted by final judgment still
possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the
appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who become
insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a
state of insanity. 15 As observed by Antieau, "today, it is generally
assumed that due process of law will prevent the government
from executing the death sentence upon a person who is insane
at the time of execution." 16 The suspension of such a death
sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a
usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects
is the same — the temporary suspension of the execution of the
death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that
Congress can at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the
penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an
amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But by no
stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its
plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the
power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to
save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the
simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
Indeed, in various States in the United States, laws have even
been enacted expressly granting courts the power to suspend
execution of convicts and their constitutionality has been upheld
over arguments that they infringe upon the power of the President
to grant reprieves. For the public respondents therefore to
contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an
accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-
equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our
government.
III
Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution
of petitioner must be put in its proper perspective as it has been
grievously distorted especially by those who make a living by
vilifying courts. Petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for
Issuance of TRO on December 28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He
invoked several grounds, viz: (1) that his execution has been set
on January 4, the first working day of 1999; (b) that members of
Congress had either sought for his executive clemency and/or
review or repeal of the law authorizing capital punishment; (b.1)
that Senator Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that clemency
be granted to the petitioner and that capital punishment be
reviewed has been concurred by thirteen (13) other senators;
(b.2) Senate President Marcelo Fernan and Senator Miriam S.
Defensor have publicly declared they would seek a review of the
death penalty law; (b.3) Senator Paul Roco has also sought the
repeal of capital punishment, and (b.4) Congressman Salacrib
Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35) other congressmen are
demanding review of the same law.
When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in
its traditional recess and would only resume session on January
18, 1999. Even then, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the
Court to a Special Session on January 4, 1991 17 at 10. a.m. to
deliberate on petitioner's Very Urgent Motion. The Court hardly
had five (5) hours to resolve petitioner's motion as he was due to
be executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had the difficult problem of
resolving whether petitioner's allegations about the moves in
Congress to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law are mere
speculations or not. To the Court's majority, there were good
reasons why the Court should not immediately dismiss
petitioner's allegations as mere speculations and surmises. They
noted that petitioner's allegations were made in a pleading under
oath and were widely publicized in the print and broadcast media.
It was also of judicial notice that the 11th Congress is a new
Congress and has no less than one hundred thirty (130) new
members whose views on capital punishment are still
unexpressed. The present Congress is therefore different from
the Congress that enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No.
7659) and the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). In contrast,
the Court's minority felt that petitioner's allegations lacked clear
factual bases. There was hardly a time to verify petitioner's
allegations as his execution was set at 3 p.m. And verification
from Congress was impossible as Congress was not in session.
Given these constraints, the Court's majority did not rush to
judgment but took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily
restraining the execution of petitioner. The suspension was
temporary — "until June 15, 1999, coeval with the constitutional
duration of the present regular session of Congress, unless it
sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law
is going to be made." The extreme caution taken by the Court
was compelled, among others, by the fear that any error of the
Court in not stopping the execution of the petitioner will preclude
any further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. As life was at,
stake, the Court refused to constitutionalize haste and the
hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority felt it needed the
certainty that the legislature will not petitioner as alleged by his
counsel. It was believed that law and equitable considerations
demand no less before allowing the State to take the life of one
its citizens.
The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its
desired result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue whether
Congress is disposed to review capital punishment. The public
respondents, thru the Solicitor General, cite posterior events that
negate beyond doubt the possibility that Congress will repeal or
amend the death penalty law. He names these supervening
events as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada
that he will veto any law imposing the death
penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that
they are against the repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal
the law only bears his signature and that of
Senator Pimentel. 18
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration, the Solicitor General cited House Resolution
No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution
expressing the sense of the House of Representatives to reject
any move to review R.A. No. 7659 which provided for the
reimposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary
and the Executive Department of the position of the House of
Representative on this matter and urging the President to exhaust
all means under the law to immediately implement the death
penalty law." The Golez resolution was signed by 113
congressman as of January 11, 1999. In a marathon session
yesterday that extended up 3 o'clock in the morning, the House of
Representative with minor, the House of Representative with
minor amendments formally adopted the Golez resolution by an
overwhelming vote. House Resolution No. 25 expressed the
sentiment that the House ". . . does not desire at this time to
review Republic Act 7659." In addition, the President has stated
that he will not request Congress to ratify the Second Protocol in
review of the prevalence of heinous crimes in the country. In light
of these developments, the Court's TRO should now be lifted as it
has served its legal and humanitarian purpose.
A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ".
. . the question of capital punishment had been the subject of
endless discussion and will probably never be settled so long as
men believe in punishment." 19 In our clime and time when
heinous crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on the legal
and moral predicates of capital punishment has been regrettably
blurred by emotionalism because of the unfaltering faith of the pro
and anti-death partisans on the right and righteousness of their
postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if it is no more than an
exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when the
debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that
wound, when anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny,
it is the especial duty of this Court to assure that the guarantees
of the Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan
reminds us ". . . it is the very purpose of the Constitution — and
particularly the Bill of Rights — to declare certain values
transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political
majorities." 20 Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice
than the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom only
when we can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by the
winds of rage. The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by
rage, especially the rage of the mob which is the mother of
unfairness. The business of courts in rendering justice is to be fair
and they can pass their litmus test only when they can be fair to
him who is momentarily the most hated by society. 21
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents'
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion to
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and lifts the Temporary
Restraining Order issued in its Resolution of January 4, 1999.
The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma
A. Ponferrada, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to
set anew the date for execution of the convict/petitioner in
accordance with applicable provisions of law and the Rules of This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Court, without further delay. Rules of Court in relation to Section 191 of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on both questions of
SO ORDERED. fact and law, the Decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals in
C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled "Raymond Manalo and
Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus The Secretary of National
Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines,
respondents."

This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF
STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioners,
vs.
RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the
rest of the world behind secret walls, they are not separated from
the constitutional protection of their basic rights. The constitution
is an overarching sky that covers all in its protection. The case at
bar involves the rights to life, liberty and security in the first
petition for a writ of Amparo filed before this Court.
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)2 filed before this Court by
herein respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to
stop herein petitioners (therein respondents) and/or their officers
and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other
basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary remedies,
Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner,
Inspection and Access Orders, and all other legal and equitable
reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5)3 of the 1987 Constitution
and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In our Resolution
dated August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary of the
Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the
AFP, their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their
stead, including but not limited to the Citizens Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit their Comment; and (2)
enjoined them from causing the arrest of therein petitioners, or
otherwise restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of
their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as guaranteed
under Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution.5
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. Forthwith,
therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to
Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting
Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs. They
prayed that: (1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ
of Amparo under Sec. 266 of the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue
the writ commanding therein respondents to make a verified
return within the period provided by law and containing the
specific matter required by law; (3) they be granted the interim
reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs prayed for
in the petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court,
after hearing, render judgment as required in Sec. 187 of
the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just and equitable reliefs.8
On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23,
2007 Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule and further
resolved, viz:
WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to
respondents requiring them to file with the CA (Court of
Appeals) a verified written return within five (5) working
days from service of the writ. We REMAND the petition to
the CA and designate the Division of Associate Justice
Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the summary hearing on
the petition on November 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and decide
the petition in accordance with the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo.9
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
in favor of therein petitioners (herein respondents), the dispositive
portion of which reads, viz:
ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
AMPARO is GRANTED.
The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF STAFF are hereby
REQUIRED:
1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court
within five days from notice of this decision all
official and unofficial reports of the investigation
undertaken in connection with their case, except
those already on file herein;
2. To confirm in writing the present places of
official assignment of M/Sgt Hilario aka Rollie
Castillo and Donald Caigas within five days from
notice of this decision.
3. To cause to be produced to this Court all
medical reports, records and charts, reports of
any treatment given or recommended and
medicines prescribed, if any, to the petitioners, to
include a list of medical and (sic) personnel
(military and civilian) who attended to them from
February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007 within
five days from notice of this decision.
The compliance with this decision shall be made under
the signature and oath of respondent AFP Chief of Staff
or his duly authorized deputy, the latter's authority to be
express and made apparent on the face of the sworn
compliance with this directive.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the
facts as alleged by herein respondents:
Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two
weeks before February 14, 2006, several uniformed and armed
soldiers and members of the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all
the residents of their barangay in San Idelfonso, Bulacan.
Respondents were not able to attend as they were not informed
of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers when he
passed by the barangay hall.11
On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in
Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past noon, several
armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army
boots, entered their house and roused him. They asked him if he
was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was
Raymond, not Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on both
cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He was then handcuffed,
brought to the rear of his house, and forced to the ground face
down. He was kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and face up to
the light, then forcibly brought near the road. He told his mother to
follow him, but three soldiers stopped her and told her to stay.12
Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized
brothers Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, "Puti" de la
Cruz, and "Pula" de la Cruz, who all acted as lookout. They were
all members of the CAFGU and residing in Manuzon, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also recognized brothers Randy Mendoza
and Rudy Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU. While he was
being forcibly taken, he also saw outside of his house
two barangay councilors, Pablo Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa,
with some soldiers and armed men.13
The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he
was blindfolded. Before being blindfolded, he saw the faces of the
soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he
learned their names. The one who drove the van was Rizal
Hilario alias Rollie Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40
years of age or older. The leader of the team who entered his
house and abducted him was "Ganata." He was tall, thin, curly-
haired and a bit old. Another one of his abductors was "George"
who was tall, thin, white-skinned and about 30 years old.14
The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought
inside the van and made to sit beside Raymond. Both of them
were beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice of the
person beside him as his brother Reynaldo's. The van stopped
several times until they finally arrived at a house. Raymond and
Reynaldo were each brought to a different room. With the doors
of their rooms left open, Raymond saw several soldiers
continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo on the head and other
parts of his body with the butt of their guns for about 15 minutes.
After which, Reynaldo was brought to his (Raymond's) room and
it was his (Raymond's) turn to be beaten up in the other room.
The soldiers asked him if he was a member of the New People's
Army. Each time he said he was not, he was hit with the butt of
their guns. He was questioned where his comrades were, how
many soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA members he
had helped. Each time he answered none, they hit him.15
In the next days, Raymond's interrogators appeared to be high
officials as the soldiers who beat him up would salute them, call
them "sir," and treat them with respect. He was in blindfolds when
interrogated by the high officials, but he saw their faces when
they arrived and before the blindfold was put on. He noticed that
the uniform of the high officials was different from those of the
other soldiers. One of those officials was tall and thin, wore white
pants, tie, and leather shoes, instead of combat boots. He spoke
in Tagalog and knew much about his parents and family, and
a habeas corpus case filed in connection with the respondents'
abduction.16 While these officials interrogated him, Raymond was
not manhandled. But once they had left, the soldier guards beat
him up. When the guards got drunk, they also manhandled
respondents. During this time, Raymond was fed only at night,
usually with left-over and rotten food.17
On the third week of respondents' detention, two men arrived
while Raymond was sleeping and beat him up. They doused him
with urine and hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of wood,
slapped his forehead twice with a .45 pistol, punched him on the
mouth, and burnt some parts of his body with a burning wood.
When he could no longer endure the torture and could hardly
breathe, they stopped. They then subjected Reynaldo to the
same ordeal in another room. Before their torturers left, they
warned Raymond that they would come back the next day and kill
him.18
The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for
the guards to get drunk, then made noise with the chains put on
him to see if they were still awake. When none of them came to
check on him, he managed to free his hand from the chains and
jumped through the window. He passed through a helipad and
firing range and stopped near a fishpond where he used stones to
break his chains. After walking through a forested area, he came
near a river and an Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some
women who were doing the laundry, asked where he was and the
road to Gapan. He was told that he was in Fort Magsaysay.19 He
reached the highway, but some soldiers spotted him, forcing him
to run away. The soldiers chased him and caught up with him.
They brought him to another place near the entrance of what he
saw was Fort Magsaysay. He was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and
hit with chains until his back bled. They poured gasoline on him.
Then a so-called "Mam" or "Madam" suddenly called, saying that
she wanted to see Raymond before he was killed. The soldiers
ceased the torture and he was returned inside Fort Magsaysay
where Reynaldo was detained.20
For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the
torture. Their wounds were treated. When the wounds were
almost healed, the torture resumed, particularly when
respondents' guards got drunk.21
Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was
detained in a room enclosed by steel bars. He stayed all the time
in that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did everything
there, including urinating, removing his bowels, bathing, eating
and sleeping. He counted that eighteen people22 had been
detained in that bartolina, including his brother Reynaldo and
himself.23
For about three and a half months, the respondents were
detained in Fort Magsaysay. They were kept in a small house
with two rooms and a kitchen. One room was made into
the bartolina. The house was near the firing range, helipad and
mango trees. At dawn, soldiers marched by their house. They
were also sometimes detained in what he only knew as the
"DTU."24
At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He
checked their body and eyes, took their urine samples and
marked them. When asked how they were feeling, they replied
that they had a hard time urinating, their stomachs were aching,
and they felt other pains in their body. The next day, two ladies in
white arrived. They also examined respondents and gave them
medicines, including orasol, amoxicillin and mefenamic acid.
They brought with them the results of respondents' urine test and
advised them to drink plenty of water and take their medicine.
The two ladies returned a few more times. Thereafter, medicines
were sent through the "master" of the DTU, "Master" Del Rosario
alias Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were kept in the DTU for
about two weeks. While there, he met a soldier named Efren who
said that Gen. Palparan ordered him to monitor and take care of
them.25
One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle.
They, along with Efren and several other armed men wearing
fatigue suits, went to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan. Respondents were detained for one or two weeks in a
big two-storey house. Hilario and Efren stayed with them. While
there, Raymond was beaten up by Hilario's men.26
From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang,
San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo. They were detained in a
big unfinished house inside the compound of "Kapitan" for about
three months. When they arrived in Sapang, Gen. Palparan
talked to them. They were brought out of the house to a
basketball court in the center of the compound and made to sit.
Gen. Palparan was already waiting, seated. He was about two
arms' length away from respondents. He began by asking if
respondents felt well already, to which Raymond replied in the
affirmative. He asked Raymond if he knew him. Raymond lied
that he did not. He then asked Raymond if he would be scared if
he were made to face Gen. Palparan. Raymond responded that
he would not be because he did not believe that Gen. Palparan
was an evil man.27
Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his
affidavit, viz:
Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, "Ngayon na kaharap mo
na ako, di ka ba natatakot sa akin?"
Sumagot akong, "Siyempre po, natatakot din..."
Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: "Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang
pagkakataon na mabuhay, basta't sundin n'yo ang lahat
ng sasabihin ko... sabihin mo sa magulang mo - huwag
pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa Karapatan at sa
Human Right dahil niloloko lang kayo. Sabihin sa
magulang at lahat sa bahay na huwag paloko doon.
Tulungan kami na kausapin si Bestre na sumuko na sa
gobyerno."28
Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they
felt they could not do otherwise. At about 3:00 in the morning,
Hilario, Efren and the former's men - the same group that
abducted them - brought them to their parents' house. Raymond
was shown to his parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo
because he still could not walk. In the presence of Hilario and
other soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen.
Palparan told him. As they were afraid, Raymond's parents
acceded. Hilario threatened Raymond's parents that if they
continued to join human rights rallies, they would never see their
children again. The respondents were then brought back to
Sapang.29
When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was
about to leave. He was talking with the four "masters" who were
there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario and Cabalse.30 When Gen.
Palparan saw Raymond, he called for him. He was in a big white
vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan
told him to gain back his strength and be healthy and to take the
medicine he left for him and Reynaldo. He said the medicine was
expensive at Php35.00 each, and would make them strong. He
also said that they should prove that they are on the side of the
military and warned that they would not be given another
chance.31 During his testimony, Raymond identified Gen.
Palparan by his picture.32
One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the
medicine left by Gen. Palparan. The medicine, named "Alive,"
was green and yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given
a box of this medicine and instructed to take one capsule a day.
Arman checked if they were getting their dose of the medicine.
The "Alive" made them sleep each time they took it, and they felt
heavy upon waking up.33
After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left
Raymond at Sapang. Arman instructed Raymond that while in
Sapang, he should introduce himself as "Oscar," a military trainee
from Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in Bulacan. While there, he saw
again Ganata, one of the men who abducted him from his house,
and got acquainted with other military men and civilians.34
After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to
Camp Tecson under the 24th Infantry Battalion. He was fetched by
three unidentified men in a big white vehicle. Efren went with
them. Raymond was then blindfolded. After a 30-minute ride, his
blindfold was removed. Chains were put on him and he was kept
in the barracks.35
The next day, Raymond's chains were removed and he was
ordered to clean outside the barracks. It was then he learned that
he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many
soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He was also ordered to
clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met
Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a
student of the University of the Philippines and was abducted in
Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had been subjected to
severe torture and raped. She was crying and longing to go home
and be with her parents. During the day, her chains were
removed and she was made to do the laundry.36
After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two
days from his arrival, two other captives, Karen Empeño and
Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room
with "Allan" whose name they later came to know as Donald
Caigas, called "master" or "commander" by his men in the
24th Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the
adjoining room. At times, Raymond and Reynaldo were
threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their
chains were removed, but were put back on at night. They were
threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed.37
On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He
told the detainees that they should be thankful they were still alive
and should continue along their "renewed life." Before the hearing
of November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to their
parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However, their
parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were brought
back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September
2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to
continue using the name "Oscar" and holding himself out as a
military trainee. He got acquainted with soldiers of the
24th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in
his affidavit.38
On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen,
and Manuel, were transferred to a camp of the 24th Infantry
Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp.
They stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the
battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom
Raymond knew as "Mar" and "Billy" beat him up and hit him in the
stomach with their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered
enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to clean, cook,
and help in raising livestock.39
Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched,
Caigas and some other soldiers brought him and Manuel with
them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were
brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he
witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers
said he was killed because he had a son who was a member of
the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his house.40 Another
time, in another "Operation Lubog," Raymond was brought to
Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men stayed. When they
arrived, only the old man of the house who was sick was there.
They spared him and killed only his son right before Raymond's
eyes.41
From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel
were transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea.
Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A retired army
soldier was in charge of the house. Like in Limay, the five
detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed in
Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007.42
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay.
Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to bring food to
detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he
witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz:
Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog
na kami. Nakita ko si Donald na inaayos ang kanyang
baril, at nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung
mayroon man kaming makita o marinig, walang nangyari.
Kinaumagahan, nakita naming ang bangkay ng isa sa
mga bihag na dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa
kanyang katawan at ito'y sinunog. Masansang ang amoy.
Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and
ibinaba ng mga unipormadong sundalo mula sa 6 x 6 na
trak at dinala sa loob ng kampo. May naiwang mga bakas
ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy
ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.
Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na
dalawang Ita. Itinali sila sa labas ng kubo, piniringan,
ikinadena at labis na binugbog. Nakita kong nakatakas
ang isa sa kanila at binaril siya ng sundalo ngunit hindi
siya tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong pinatay nila iyong
isang Ita malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at
ibinaon ito.
Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala
sa kampo. Ibinaba ang mga bangkay mula sa pick up
trak, dinala ang mga bangkay sa labas ng bakod.
Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong sinilaban, at
napakamasangsang ang amoy.
May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama
niya. Pinakain ko sila. Sabi nila sa akin na dinukot sila sa
Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko na sila nakita.
xxx xxx xxx
Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni
Lat si Manuel dahil kakausapin daw siya ni Gen.
Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang suot pang-
itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na
galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang
hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng
kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel.
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang
mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa
amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil
pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin
kami o hindi.
Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald.
Tinanong kami kung ano ang sabi ni Manuel sa amin.
Sabi ni Donald huwag na raw naming hanapin ang
dalawang babae at si Manuel, dahil magkakasama na
yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na kami ni Reynaldo ay
magbagong buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang
trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na kami kinakadena.43
On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were
brought to Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry for Donald
(Caigas). Caigas told respondents to also farm his land, in
exchange for which, he would take care of the food of their family.
They were also told that they could farm a small plot adjoining his
land and sell their produce. They were no longer put in chains
and were instructed to use the names Rommel (for Raymond)
and Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent themselves as cousins
from Rizal, Laguna.44
Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the
highway from where they stayed. They helped farm adjoining
lands for which they were paid Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they
saved their earnings. When they had saved Php1,000.00 each,
Raymond asked a neighbor how he could get a cellular phone as
he wanted to exchange text messages with a girl who lived
nearby. A phone was pawned to him, but he kept it first and did
not use it. They earned some more until they had saved
Php1,400.00 between them.
There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and
Reynaldo were housed in one of them while their guards lived in
the other three. Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong, the
head of the guards. Respondents' house did not have electricity.
They used a lamp. There was no television, but they had a radio.
In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong and his cohorts had a
drinking session. At about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up the
volume of the radio. When none of the guards awoke and took
notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway,
leaving behind their sleeping guards and barking dogs. They
boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus freed from
captivity.45
Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of
Raymond's affidavit insofar as they related to matters they
witnessed together. Reynaldo added that when they were taken
from their house on February 14, 2006, he saw the faces of his
abductors before he was blindfolded with his shirt. He also named
the soldiers he got acquainted with in the 18 months he was
detained. When Raymond attempted to escape from Fort
Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely beaten up and told that they
were indeed members of the NPA because Raymond escaped.
With a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on the back and
punched in the face until he could no longer bear the pain.
At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo
were in Sapang, Reynaldo was separated from Raymond and
brought to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario. He was kept in the house of
Kapitan, a friend of Hilario, in a mountainous area. He was
instructed to use the name "Rodel" and to represent himself as a
military trainee from Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario
brought along Reynaldo in his trips. One time, he was brought to
a market in San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the
vehicle while Hilario was buying. He was also brought to Tondo,
Manila where Hilario delivered boxes of "Alive" in different
houses. In these trips, Hilario drove a black and red vehicle.
Reynaldo was blindfolded while still in Bulacan, but allowed to
remove the blindfold once outside the province. In one of their
trips, they passed by Fort Magsaysay and Camp Tecson where
Reynaldo saw the sign board, "Welcome to Camp Tecson."46
Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of
respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr. Molino
specialized in forensic medicine and was connected with the
Medical Action Group, an organization handling cases of human
rights violations, particularly cases where torture was involved.
He was requested by an NGO to conduct medical examinations
on the respondents after their escape. He first asked them about
their ordeal, then proceeded with the physical examination. His
findings showed that the scars borne by respondents were
consistent with their account of physical injuries inflicted upon
them. The examination was conducted on August 15, 2007, two
days after respondents' escape, and the results thereof were
reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took photographs of the scars. He
testified that he followed the Istanbul Protocol in conducting the
examination.47
Petitioners dispute respondents' account of their alleged
abduction and torture. In compliance with the October 25, 2007
Resolution of the Court, they filed a Return of the Writ
of Amparo admitting the abduction but denying any involvement
therein, viz:
13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not
at any time arrested, forcibly abducted, detained, held
incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody by the
military. This is a settled issue laid to rest in the habeas
corpus case filed in their behalf by petitioners' parents
before the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 94431
against M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as head of
the 24th Infantry Battalion; Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, as
Commander of the 7th Infantry Division in Luzon; Lt. Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity as the
Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and
members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit
(CAFGU), namely: Michael dela Cruz, Puti dela Cruz,
Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and
Rudy Mendoza. The respondents therein submitted a
return of the writ... On July 4, 2006, the Court of Appeals
dropped as party respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C.
Esperon, Jr., then Commanding General of the Philippine
Army, and on September 19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S.
Palparan, then Commanding General, 7th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army, stationed at Fort Magsaysay,
Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding that no
evidence was introduced to establish their personal
involvement in the taking of the Manalo brothers. In a
Decision dated June 27, 2007..., it exonerated M/Sgt.
Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence
 establishing his involvement in any capacity in the
disappearance of the Manalo brothers, although it held
that the remaining respondents were illegally detaining
the Manalo brothers and ordered them to release the
latter.48
Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein
respondent (herein petitioner) Secretary of National Defense,
which attested that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007
and was thus unaware of the Manalo brothers' alleged abduction.
He also claimed that:
7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in
actual military directional operations, neither does he
undertake command directions of the AFP units in the
field, nor in any way micromanage the AFP operations.
The principal responsibility of the Secretary of National
Defense is focused in providing strategic policy direction
to the Department (bureaus and agencies) including the
Armed Forces of the Philippines;
8. In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the
Honorable Supreme Court in this case, I have directed the
Chief of Staff, AFP to institute immediate action in
compliance with Section 9(d) of the Amparo Rule and to
submit report of such compliance... Likewise, in a
Memorandum Directive also dated October 31, 2007, I
have issued a policy directive addressed to the Chief of
Staff, AFP that the AFP should adopt the following rules
of action in the event the Writ of Amparo is issued by a
competent court against any members of the AFP:
(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to
the death or disappearance of the person
identified in the petition which may aid in the
prosecution of the person or persons responsible;
(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements
from them concerning the death or
disappearance;
(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and
time of death or disappearance as well as any
pattern or practice that may have brought about
the death or disappearance;
(5) to identify and apprehend the person or
persons involved in the death or disappearance;
and
(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a
competent court.49
Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own
affidavit, attached to the Return of the Writ, attesting that he
received the above directive of therein respondent Secretary of
National Defense and that acting on this directive, he did the
following:
3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP), I have caused to be issued
directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of
establishing the circumstances of the alleged
disappearance and the recent reappearance of the
petitioners.
3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and
submission of the result thereof to Higher headquarters
and/or direct the immediate conduct of the investigation
on the matter by the concerned unit/s, dispatching Radio
Message on November 05, 2007, addressed to the
 Commanding General, Philippine Army (Info:
COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D PA and CO 24 IB PA). A Copy
of the Radio Message is attached as ANNEX "3" of this
Affidavit.
3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations
conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit
relative to the circumstances of the alleged
disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ
of Amparohas been sought for as soon as the same has
been furnished Higher headquarters.
3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same
units relative to another Petition for the Writ
of Amparo (G.R. No. 179994) filed at the instance of
relatives of a certain Cadapan and Empeño pending
before the Supreme Court.
3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will
exert earnest efforts to establish the surrounding
circumstances of the disappearances of the petitioners
and to bring those responsible, including any military
personnel if shown to have participated or had complicity
in the commission of the complained acts, to the bar of
justice, when warranted by the findings and the
competent evidence that may be gathered in the
process.50
Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col.
Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC) PA, earlier filed in G.R. No. 179994,
another Amparo case in this Court, involving Cadapan, Empeño
and Merino, which averred among others, viz:
10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition
implicating the 24th Infantry Batallion detachment as
detention area, I immediately went to the 24th IB
detachment in Limay, Bataan and found no untoward
incidents in the area nor any detainees by the name of
Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino
being held captive;
11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel
Merino in the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan;
12) After going to the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made
further inquiries with the Philippine National Police, Limay,
Bataan regarding the alleged detentions or deaths and
were informed that none was reported to their good office;
13) I also directed Company Commander 1st Lt. Romeo
Publico to inquire into the alleged beachhouse in Iba,
Zambales also alleged to be a detention place where
Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino
were detained. As per the inquiry, however, no such
beachhouse was used as a detention place found to have
been used by armed men to detain Cadapan, Empeño
and Merino.51
It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient
time, the affidavits of Maj. Gen Jovito S. Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt.
Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, and other persons implicated by
therein petitioners could not be secured in time for the submission
of the Return and would be subsequently submitted.52
Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary
hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U. Jimenez, Provost Marshall,
7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, based in Fort Magsaysay,
Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. The territorial jurisdiction of this
Division covers Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan,
Pampanga, Tarlac and a portion of Pangasinan.53 The
24th Infantry Battalion is part of the 7th Infantry Division.54
On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the
Commanding General of the 7th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Jovito
Palaran,55 through his Assistant Chief of Staff,56 to investigate the
alleged abduction of the respondents by CAFGU auxiliaries under
his unit, namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman de la
Cruz, aka Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz, aka Pula; CAA Randy
Mendoza; ex-CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning; and a civilian
named Rudy Mendoza. He was directed to determine: (1) the
veracity of the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo by
the alleged elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the
administrative liability of said auxiliaries, if any.57 Jimenez testified
that this particular investigation was initiated not by a complaint
as was the usual procedure, but because the Commanding
General saw news about the abduction of the Manalo brothers on
the television, and he was concerned about what was happening
within his territorial jurisdiction.58
Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of
having them execute sworn statements and conducting an
investigation on May 29, 2006.59 The investigation started at 8:00
in the morning and finished at 10:00 in the evening.60 The
investigating officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad, took the
individual sworn statements of all six persons on that day. There
were no other sworn statements taken, not even of the Manalo
family, nor were there other witnesses summoned and
investigated61 as according to Jimenez, the directive to him was
only to investigate the six persons.62
Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the
statements.63 The six persons were not known to Jimenez as it
was in fact his first time to meet them.64 During the entire time that
he was beside Lingad, a subordinate of his in the Office of the
Provost Marshall, Jimenez did not propound a single question to
the six persons.65
Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29,
2006, but Marcelo Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza had to come
back the next day to sign their statements as the printing of their
statements was interrupted by a power failure. Jimenez testified
that the two signed on May 30, 2006, but the jurats of their
statements indicated that they were signed on May 29,
2006.66 When the Sworn Statements were turned over to
Jimenez, he personally wrote his investigation report. He began
writing it in the afternoon of May 30, 2006 and finished it on June
1, 2006.67 He then gave his report to the Office of the Chief of
Personnel.68
As petitioners largely rely on Jimenez's Investigation Report
dated June 1, 2006 for their evidence, the report is herein
substantially quoted:
III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO
and REYNALDO MANALO who were forcibly taken from
their respective homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14 February 2006 by unidentified
armed men and thereafter were forcibly disappeared.
After the said incident, relatives of the victims filed a case
for Abduction in the civil court against the herein
suspects: Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti
Dela Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy
Mendoza as alleged members of the Citizen Armed
Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU).
a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka
Pula dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "B") states that he
was at Sitio Mozon, Brgy. Bohol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan doing the concrete building of a church
located nearby his residence, together with some
neighbor thereat. He claims that on 15 February 2006, he
was being informed by Brgy. Kagawad Pablo Umayan
about the abduction of the brothers Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo. As to the allegation that he was one of
the suspects, he claims that they only implicated him
because he was a CAFGU and that they claimed that
those who abducted the Manalo brothers are members of
the Military and CAFGU. Subject vehemently denied any
participation or involvement on the abduction of said
victims.
b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino
Aka Puti dtd 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "C") states that he is
a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan and a CAA member based at Biak na
Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo being his neighbors are
active members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and he
also knows their elder Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE of
being an NPA Leader operating in their province. That at
the time of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers
and for accusing him to be one of the suspects, he claims
that on February 14, 2006, he was one of those working
at the concrete chapel being constructed nearby his
residence. He claims further that he just came only to
know about the incident on other day (15 Feb 06) when
he was being informed by Kagawad Pablo Kunanan. That
subject CAA vehemently denied any participation about
the incident and claimed that they only implicated him
because he is a member of the CAFGU.
c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas
dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "O") states that he is a
resident of Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan and a member of CAFGU based at Biak na Bato
Detachment. That being a neighbor, he was very much
aware about the background of the two (2) brothers
Raymond and Reynaldo as active supporters of the CPP
NPA in their Brgy. and he also knew their elder brother
"KUMANDER BESTRE" TN: Rolando Manalo. Being one
of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he
was at Brgy. Magmarate, San Miguel, Bulacan in the
house of his aunt and he learned only about the incident
when he arrived home in their place. He claims further
that the only reason why they implicated him was due to
the fact that his mother has filed a criminal charge against
their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE who is an
NPA Commander who killed his father and for that reason
they implicated him in support of their brother. Subject
CAA vehemently denied any involvement on the
abduction of said Manalo brothers.
d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated
May 29, 2006 in (Exhibit "E") states that he is a resident
of Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being
his barriomate when he was still unmarried and he knew
them since childhood. Being one of the accused, he
claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at his residence
in Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that he
was being informed only about the incident lately and he
was not aware of any reason why the two (2) brothers
were being abducted by alleged members of the military
and CAFGU. The only reason he knows why they
implicated him was because there are those people who
are angry with their family particularly victims of summary
execution (killing) done by their brother @ KA Bestre
Rolando Manalo who is an NPA leader. He claims further
that it was their brother @ KA BESTRE who killed his
father and he was living witness to that incident. Subject
civilian vehemently denied any involvement on the
abduction of the Manalo brothers.
e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated
29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "F") states that he is a resident of
Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan, a farmer and a former CAA based at Biak na
Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being their barrio
mate. He claims further that they are active supporters of
CPP/NPA and that their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA
BESTRE is an NPA leader. Being one of the accused, he
claims that on 14 February 2006, he was in his residence
at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan. That he vehemently denied any participation of
the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and learned
only about the incident when rumors reached him by his
barrio mates. He claims that his implication is merely
fabricated because of his relationship to Roman and
Maximo who are his brothers.
f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated
29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "G") states that he is a resident of
Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan, the Chief of Brgy. Tanod and a CAFGU member
based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan.
He claims that he knew very well the brothers Raymond
and Reynaldo Manalo in their barangay for having been
the Tanod Chief for twenty (20) years. He alleged further
that they are active supporters or sympathizers of the
CPP/NPA and whose elder brother Rolando Manalo @
KA BESTRE is an NPA leader operating within the area.
Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 Feb 2006
he was helping in the construction of their concrete chapel
in their place and he learned only about the incident which
is the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo when
one of the Brgy. Kagawad in the person of Pablo
Cunanan informed him about the matter. He claims
further that he is truly innocent of the allegation against
him as being one of the abductors and he considers
everything fabricated in order to destroy his name that
remains loyal to his service to the government as a CAA
member.
IV. DISCUSSION
5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in
this particular case, the proof of linking them to the
alleged abduction and disappearance of Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo that transpired on 14 February 2006 at
Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan, is unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement
theretofore to that incident is considered doubtful, hence,
no basis to indict them as charged in this investigation.
Though there are previous grudges between each
families (sic) in the past to quote: the killing of the father
of Randy and Rudy Mendoza by @ KA BESTRE TN:
Rolando Manalo, this will not suffice to establish a fact
that they were the ones who did the abduction as a form
of revenge. As it was also stated in the testimony of other
accused claiming that the Manalos are active
sympathizers/supporters of the CPP/NPA, this would not
also mean, however, that in the first place, they were in
connivance with the abductors. Being their neighbors and
as members of CAFGU's, they ought to be vigilant in
protecting their village from any intervention by the leftist
group, hence inside their village, they were fully aware of
the activities of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in so far
as their connection with the CPP/NPA is concerned.
V. CONCLUSION
6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that
the alleged charges of abduction committed by the above
named respondents has not been established in this
investigation. Hence, it lacks merit to indict them for any
administrative punishment and/or criminal liability. It is
therefore concluded that they are innocent of the charge.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz,
Roman dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza, and two (2) civilians
Maximo F. Dela Cruz and Rudy L. Mendoza be
exonerated from the case.
8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed.69
In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate
court's assessment of the foregoing evidence and assail the
December 26, 2007 Decision on the following grounds, viz:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND
GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN BELIEVING AND GIVING
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE INCREDIBLE,
UNCORROBORATED, CONTRADICTED, AND
OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED, REHEARSED AND SELF-
SERVING AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN
RESPONDENT RAYMOND MANALO.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND
GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN REQUIRING RESPONDENTS
(HEREIN PETITIONERS) TO: (A) FURNISH TO THE
MANALO BROTHER(S) AND TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS ALL OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS
OF THE INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN
CONNECTION WITH THEIR CASE, EXCEPT THOSE
ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE COURT; (B) CONFIRM IN
WRITING THE PRESENT PLACES OF OFFICIAL
ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO aka ROLLIE
CASTILLO AND DONALD CAIGAS; AND (C) CAUSE TO
BE PRODUCED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL
MEDICAL REPORTS, RECORDS AND CHARTS, AND
REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT GIVEN OR
RECOMMENDED AND MEDICINES PRESCRIBED, IF
ANY, TO THE MANALO BROTHERS, TO INCLUDE A
LIST OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND
CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO THEM FROM
FEBRUARY 14, 2006 UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007.70
The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us hearken to its
beginning.
The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring
proposition in the recommendations that resulted from a two-day
National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and
Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July 16-17,
2007. The Summit was "envisioned to provide a broad and fact-
based perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances,"71 hence "representatives from all sides
of the political and social spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders
in the justice system"72 participated in mapping out ways to
resolve the crisis.
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in
light of the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced
disappearances."73 It was an exercise for the first time of the
Court's expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our
people's constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance
in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of
the martial law regime.74 As the Amparo Rule was intended to
address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and
"enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is
confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal
killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings."75 On the other
hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following
characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals
acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government;
the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the
person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law."76
The writ of Amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo" literally means
"protection" in Spanish.77 In 1837, de Tocqueville's Democracy in
America became available in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its
description of the practice of judicial review in the U.S. appealed
to many Mexican jurists.78 One of them, Manuel Crescencio
Rejón, drafted a constitutional provision for his native state,
Yucatan,79 which granted judges the power to protect all persons
in the enjoyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea
was incorporated into the national constitution in 1847, viz:
The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the
Republic in the exercise and preservation of those rights
granted to him by this Constitution and by laws enacted
pursuant hereto, against attacks by the Legislative and
Executive powers of the federal or state governments,
limiting themselves to granting protection in the specific
case in litigation, making no general declaration
concerning the statute or regulation that motivated the
violation.80
Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican
constitutionalism.81 If, after hearing, the judge determines that a
constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the
official, or the official's superiors, to cease the violation and to
take the necessary measures to restore the petitioner to the full
enjoyment of the right in question. Amparo thus combines the
principles of judicial review derived from the U.S. with the
limitations on judicial power characteristic of the civil law tradition
which prevails in Mexico. It enables courts to enforce the
constitution by protecting individual rights in particular cases, but
prevents them from using this power to make law for the entire
nation.82
The writ of Amparo then spread throughout the Western
Hemisphere, gradually evolving into various forms, in response to
the particular needs of each country.83 It became, in the words of
a justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one piece of
Mexico's self-attributed "task of conveying to the world's legal
heritage that institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her
own painful history conceived."84 What began as a protection
against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of
constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes:
(1) Amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom,
equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) Amparo contra leyes for
the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes; (3) Amparo
casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality
of a judicial decision; (4) Amparo administrativo for the judicial
review of administrative actions; and (5) Amparo agrario for the
protection of peasants' rights derived from the agrarian reform
process.85
In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of Amparo has
been constitutionally adopted to protect against human rights
abuses especially committed in countries under military juntas. In
general, these countries adopted an all-encompassing writ to
protect the whole gamut of constitutional rights, including socio-
economic rights.86 Other countries like Colombia, Chile, Germany
and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the protection of the
writ of Amparo only to some constitutional guarantees or
fundamental rights.87
In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly
provide for the writ of Amparo, several of the
above Amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The
second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial
power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." The
Clause accords a similar general protection to human rights
extended by the Amparo contra leyes, Amparo casacion,
and Amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the
remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of the 1987
Constitution.88 The Clause is an offspring of the U.S. common law
tradition of judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case
of Marbury v. Madison.89
While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave
Abuse Clause through remedies of injunction or prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a petition for habeas
corpus under Rule 102,90 these remedies may not be adequate to
address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve
a petition for a writ of Amparo through summary proceedings and
the availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under
the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law
traditions - borne out of the Latin American and Philippine
experience of human rights abuses - offers a better remedy to
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats
thereof. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of
a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to
make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an
action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility
requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings.91
The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in
addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation
of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in
that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it
will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action.
In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles
is to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances.
In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for
"Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order"92 to
stop petitioners and/or their officers and agents from depriving the
respondents of their right to liberty and other basic rights on
August 23, 2007,93 prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule.
They also sought ancillary remedies including Protective Custody
Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access
Orders and other legal and equitable remedies under Article VIII,
Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of
the Rules of Court. When the Amparo Rule came into effect on
October 24, 2007, they moved to have their petition treated as
an Amparo petition as it would be more effective and suitable to
the circumstances of the Manalo brothers' enforced
disappearance. The Court granted their motion.
With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the
petitioner. Petitioners' first argument in disputing the Decision of
the Court of Appeals states, viz:
The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in
believing and giving full faith and credit to the incredible
uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted,
rehearsed and self-serving affidavit/testimony of herein
respondent Raymond Manalo.94
In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and
refine the ore of petitioners' cause of action, to determine whether
the evidence presented is metal-strong to satisfy the degree of
proof required.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the
following causes of action, viz:
Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of Amparo is a
remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of
proof required, viz:
 Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence
Required. - The parties shall establish their claims
by substantial evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the petition
are proven by substantial evidence, the court
shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as
may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege
shall be denied. (emphases supplied)
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.95
After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the
findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents were abducted
from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were continuously
detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The abduction,
detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated
by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing
manner. His account is dotted with countless candid details of
respondents' harrowing experience and tenacious will to escape,
captured through his different senses and etched in his memory.
A few examples are the following: "Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng
kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel."96 "(N)ilakasan ng
mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di
nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel."97 "May
naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga
bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas."98 "Tumigil ako
sa may palaisdaan kung saan ginamit ko ang bato para tanggalin
ang mga kadena."99 "Tinanong ko sa isang kapit-bahay kung
paano ako makakakuha ng cell phone; sabi ko gusto kong i-text
ang isang babae na nakatira sa malapit na lugar."100
We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based
on respondent Raymond Manalo's affidavit and testimony, viz:
...the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were
sufficiently identified by the petitioners (herein
respondents) to be military personnel and CAFGU
auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the six armed men who
barged into his house through the rear door were military
men based on their attire of fatigue pants and army boots,
and the CAFGU auxiliaries, namely: Michael de la Cruz,
Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and Pula de la Cruz,
all members of the CAFGU and residents of Muzon, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan, and the brothers Randy Mendoza and
Rudy Mendoza, also CAFGU members, served as
lookouts during the abduction. Raymond was sure that
three of the six military men were Ganata, who headed
the abducting team, Hilario, who drove the van, and
George. Subsequent incidents of their long captivity, as
narrated by the petitioners, validated their assertion of the
participation of the elements of the 7th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army, and their CAFGU auxiliaries.
We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction
was the suspicion that the petitioners were either
members or sympathizers of the NPA, considering that
the abductors were looking for Ka Bestre, who turned out
to be Rolando, the brother of petitioners.
The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into
the abduction were, at best, merely superficial. The
investigation of the Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry
Division focused on the one-sided version of the CAFGU
auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness might be due to
the fact that the Provost Marshall could delve only into the
participation of military personnel, but even then the
Provost Marshall should have refrained from outrightly
exculpating the CAFGU auxiliaries he perfunctorily
investigated...
Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also
established. At the very least, he was aware of the
petitioners' captivity at the hands of men in uniform
assigned to his command. In fact, he or any other officer
tendered no controversion to the firm claim of Raymond
that he (Gen. Palparan) met them in person in a
safehouse in Bulacan and told them what he wanted them
and their parents to do or not to be doing. Gen.
Palparan's direct and personal role in the abduction might
not have been shown but his knowledge of the dire
situation of the petitioners during their long captivity at the
hands of military personnel under his command bespoke
of his indubitable command policy that unavoidably
encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction of
civilians without due process of law and without probable
cause.
In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former
Special Sixth Division (Justices Buzon, chairman;
Santiago-Lagman, Sr., member; and Romilla-Lontok, Jr.,
member/ponente.) found no clear and convincing
evidence to establish that M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario had
anything to do with the abduction or the detention.
Hilario's involvement could not, indeed, be then
established after Evangeline Francisco, who allegedly
saw Hilario drive the van in which the petitioners were
boarded and ferried following the abduction, did not
testify. (See the decision of the habeas proceedings at
rollo, p. 52)
However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario
drove the white L-300 van in which the petitioners were
brought away from their houses on February 14, 2006.
Raymond also attested that Hilario participated in
subsequent incidents during the captivity of the
petitioners, one of which was when Hilario fetched them
from Fort Magsaysay on board a Revo and conveyed
them to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan
where they were detained for at least a week in a house
of strong materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) and then
Hilario (along with Efren) brought them to Sapang, San
Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo, to an unfinished
house inside the compound of Kapitan where they were
kept for more or less three months. (Exhibit D, rollo, p.
205) It was there where the petitioners came face to face
with Gen. Palparan. Hilario and Efren also brought the
petitioners one early morning to the house of the
petitioners' parents, where only Raymond was presented
to the parents to relay the message from Gen. Palparan
not to join anymore rallies. On that occasion, Hilario
warned the parents that they would not again see their
sons should they join any rallies to denounce human
rights violations. (Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205-206) Hilario was
also among four Master Sergeants (the others being
Arman, Ganata and Cabalse) with whom Gen. Palparan
conversed on the occasion when Gen. Palparan required
Raymond to take the medicines for his health. (Exhibit D,
rollo, p. 206) There were other occasions when the
petitioners saw that Hilario had a direct hand in their
torture.
It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the
abduction and forced disappearance of the petitioners
was established. The participation of other military
personnel like Arman, Ganata, Cabalse and Caigas,
among others, was similarly established.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found
them personally involved in the abduction. We also do,
for, indeed, the evidence of their participation is
overwhelming.101
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond
Manalo's statements were not corroborated by other independent
and credible pieces of evidence.102 Raymond's affidavit and
testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent
Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared
by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left
by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents,103 also
corroborate respondents' accounts of the torture they endured
while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalo's familiarity with
the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the "DTU," as shown in
his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the
"Division Training Unit,"104 firms up respondents' story that they
were detained for some time in said military facility.
In Ortiz v. Guatemala,105 a case decided by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, the Commission considered
similar evidence, among others, in finding that complainant Sister
Diana Ortiz was abducted and tortured by agents of the
Guatemalan government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped
and tortured in early November 1989. The Commission's findings
of fact were mostly based on the consistent and credible
statements, written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her
ordeal.106 These statements were supported by her recognition of
portions of the route they took when she was being driven out of
the military installation where she was detained.107 She was also
examined by a medical doctor whose findings showed that the
111 circular second degree burns on her back and abrasions on
her cheek coincided with her account of cigarette burning and
torture she suffered while in detention.108
With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the
torture perpetrated on the victim during detention, it logically
holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will
come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their
account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their
written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be
corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left by
the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the
places where they were detained. Where powerful military officers
are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify
against them comes as no surprise.
We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of
the writ of Amparo. There is no quarrel that the enforced
disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo has now passed as they have escaped from captivity and
surfaced. But while respondents admit that they are no longer in
detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not
"free in every sense of the word"109 as their "movements continue
to be restricted for fear that people they have named in their
Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond)
are still at large and have not been held accountable in any way.
These people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents'
rights to life, liberty and security."110 (emphasis supplied)
Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once
again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a
direct violation of their right to security of person.111
Elaborating on the "right to security, in general," respondents
point out that this right is "often associated with liberty;" it is also
seen as an "expansion of rights based on the prohibition against
torture and cruel and unusual punishment." Conceding that there
is no right to security expressly mentioned in Article III of the 1987
Constitution, they submit that their rights "to be kept free from
torture and from incommunicado detention and solitary detention
places112 fall under the general coverage of the right to security of
person under the writ of Amparo." They submit that the Court
ought to give an expansive recognition of the right to security of
person in view of the State Policy under Article II of the 1987
Constitution which enunciates that, "The State values the dignity
of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights." Finally, to justify a liberal interpretation of the right to
security of person, respondents cite the teaching in Moncupa v.
Enrile113 that "the right to liberty may be made more meaningful
only if there is no undue restraint by the State on the exercise of
that liberty"114 such as a requirement to "report under
unreasonable restrictions that amounted to a deprivation of
liberty"115 or being put under "monitoring and surveillance."116
In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in
the threat to their right to life and liberty, and a violation of
their right to security.
Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if
it has indeed been violated as respondents assert. The right
to security or the right to security of person finds a textual
hook in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution which
provides, viz:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge...
At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one's person,
including the extensions of his/her person - houses, papers, and
effects - against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits
the state's power over a person's home and possessions, but
more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person
himself.117 The purpose of this provision was enunciated by the
Court in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, viz: 118
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures is to prevent
violations of private security in person and property and
unlawful invasion of the security of the home by officers of
the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to
give remedy against such usurpation when attempted.
(Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76
Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to privacy is an essential
condition to the dignity and happiness and to the
peace and security of every individual, whether it be
of home or of persons and correspondence. (Tañada
and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139
[1962]). The constitutional inviolability of this great
fundamental right against unreasonable searches and
seizures must be deemed absolute as nothing is closer
to a man's soul than the serenity of his privacy and
the assurance of his personal security. Any
interference allowable can only be for the best causes
and reasons.119 (emphases supplied)
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1120 guarantees
essentially the right to be alive121 - upon which the enjoyment of
all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is
a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: "The life to which
each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person
and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler.
Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he
established and consented to, will protect the security of his
person and property. The ideal of security in life and property...
pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of
man's existence."122 In a broad sense, the right to security of
person "emanates in a person's legal and uninterrupted
enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his
reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment
of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of
life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment
of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of
the individual."123
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various
permutations of the exercise of this right.
First, the right to security of person is "freedom from
fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which human
beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom
from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest
aspiration of the common people." (emphasis supplied) Some
scholars postulate that "freedom from fear" is not only an
aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international
human right.124 It is the "right to security of person" as the word
"security" itself means "freedom from fear."125 Article 3 of the
UDHR provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of
person.126 (emphasis supplied)
In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of
person, viz:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of
person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or
detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except
on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure
as are established by law. (emphasis supplied)
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from
fear" is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or
security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a
reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by
the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded
as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one
person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their
imagination, strength of character or past experience with the
stimulus. Thus, in the Amparo context, it is more correct to say
that the "right to security" is actually the "freedom from
threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with violation"
Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form
of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of
the provision.127
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of
bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III,
Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general
rule, one's body cannot be searched or invaded without a search
warrant.128 Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a
search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment,
physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree
of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates.
Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime
against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity
or security of a person.129
Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of
bodily integrity. When employed to vitiate the free will such as to
force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating
information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily and
psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person
includes the exercise of free will. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and psychological
invasion, viz:
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or
any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him (any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense). Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that
vitiate the free will - although not involving invasion of bodily
integrity - nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to
security in the sense of "freedom from threat" as afore-discussed.
Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing
abuses of persons under investigation for the commission of an
offense. Victims of enforced disappearances who are not even
under such investigation should all the more be protected from
these degradations.
An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person
as a right against torture was made by the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) in the recent case of Popov v.
Russia.130 In this case, the claimant, who was lawfully detained,
alleged that the state authorities had physically abused him in
prison, thereby violating his right to security of person. Article 5(1)
of the European Convention on Human Rights provides, viz:
"Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one
shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law ..." (emphases
supplied) Article 3, on the other hand, provides that "(n)o one
shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment." Although the application failed on the facts as the
alleged ill-treatment was found baseless, the ECHR relied heavily
on the concept of security in holding, viz:
...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the
attention of domestic authorities at the time when they
could reasonably have been expected to take measures
in order to ensure his security and to investigate the
circumstances in question.
xxx xxx xxx
... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody
or to comply with the procedural obligation under Art.3 to
conduct an effective investigation into his
allegations.131 (emphasis supplied)
The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women has also made a statement that the protection of the
bodily integrity of women may also be related to the right to
security and liberty, viz:
...gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the
enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental
freedoms under general international law or under specific
human rights conventions is discrimination within the
meaning of article 1 of the Convention (on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). These
rights and freedoms include . . . the right to liberty
and security of person.132
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of
protection of one's rights by the government. In the context of
the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the
right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom
from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity)
under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this
third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees
full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the
1987 Constitution.133 As the government is the chief guarantor of
order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to
life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if
government does not afford protection to these rights especially
when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting
effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus
to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and
bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court
of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in
the Velasquez Rodriguez Case,134viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a
serious manner and not as a mere formality
preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must
have an objective and be assumed by the State as its
own legal duty, not as a step taken by private
 interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim
or his family or upon their offer of proof, without an
effective search for the truth by the government.135
This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee
of government protection has been interpreted by the United
Nations' Human Rights Committee136 in not a few cases involving
Article 9137 of the ICCPR. While the right to security of person
appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the
Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can
exist independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there
need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to
security of person to be invoked. In Delgado Paez v.
Colombia,138 a case involving death threats to a religion teacher
at a secondary school in Leticia, Colombia, whose social views
differed from those of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the
Committee held, viz:
The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a
separate paragraph. Its location as a part of paragraph
one could lead to the view that the right to security arises
only in the context of arrest and detention. The travaux
préparatoires indicate that the discussions of the first
sentence did indeed focus on matters dealt with in the
other provisions of article 9. The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, in article 3, refers to the right to life,
the right to liberty and the right to security of the
person. These elements have been dealt with in
separate clauses in the Covenant. Although in the
Covenant the only reference to the right of security of
person is to be found in article 9, there is no evidence
that it was intended to narrow the concept of the right
to security only to situations of formal deprivation of
liberty. At the same time, States parties have
undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined in the
Covenant. It cannot be the case that, as a matter of
law, States can ignore known threats to the life of
persons under their jurisdiction, just because that he
or she is not arrested or otherwise detained. States
parties are under an obligation to take reasonable and
appropriate measures to protect them. An
interpretation of article 9 which would allow a State
party to ignore threats to the personal security of
non-detained persons within its jurisdiction would
render totally ineffective the guarantees of the
Covenant.139(emphasis supplied)
The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia,140 which
involved a political activist and prisoner of conscience who
continued to be intimidated, harassed, and restricted in his
movements following his release from detention. In a catena of
cases, the ruling of the Committee was of a similar
import: Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea,141 involving
discrimination, intimidation and persecution of opponents of the
ruling party in that state; Tshishimbi v. Zaire,142 involving the
abduction of the complainant's husband who was a supporter of
democratic reform in Zaire; Dias v. Angola,143 involving the
murder of the complainant's partner and the harassment he
(complainant) suffered because of his investigation of the
murder; and Chongwe v. Zambia,144 involving an assassination
attempt on the chairman of an opposition alliance.
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has
interpreted the "right to security" not only as prohibiting the State
from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on
the State to afford protection of the right to liberty.145 The ECHR
interpreted the "right to security of person" under Article 5(1) of
the European Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on
disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey.146 In this case,
the claimant's son had been arrested by state authorities and had
not been seen since. The family's requests for information and
investigation regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The
claimant suggested that this was a violation of her son's right to
security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:
 ... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been
effected in conformity with the substantive and procedural
rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with
the very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the
individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control
over that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to
account for his or her whereabouts. For this
reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the
authorities to take effective measures to safeguard
against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a
prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim
that a person has been taken into custody and has
not been seen since.147 (emphasis supplied)
Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to
the case at bar, we now determine whether there is a continuing
violation of respondents' right to security.
First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from
threat to respondents' life, liberty and security.
While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if
they escaped, their families, including them, would be killed. In
Raymond's narration, he was tortured and poured with gasoline
after he was caught the first time he attempted to escape from
Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain "Mam," who wanted to see
him before he was killed, spared him.
This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the
threat to be killed has come to pass. It should be stressed that
they are now free from captivity not because they were released
by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily freed by their abductors. It
ought to be recalled that towards the end of their ordeal,
sometime in June 2007 when respondents were detained in a
camp in Limay, Bataan, respondents' captors even told them that
they were still deciding whether they should be executed.
Respondent Raymond Manalo attested in his affidavit, viz:
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang
mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa
amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil
pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin
kami o hindi.148
The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the
eye while they were in detention. With their escape, this
continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they
have surfaced and implicated specific officers in the military not
only in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other
persons known to have disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan,
Karen Empeño, and Manuel Merino, among others.
Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been
under concealment and protection by private citizens because of
the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their
free will as they are forced to limit their movements or
activities.149 Precisely because respondents are being shielded
from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected
to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-to-face
intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security.
Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents' abduction,
detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion
that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted,
tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to
their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a
writ of Amparo.
Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by
the government. Apart from the failure of military elements to
provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the
abduction, detention, and torture, they also miserably failed in
conducting an effective investigation of respondents' abduction as
revealed by the testimony and investigation report of petitioners'
own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the
7th Infantry Division.
The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very
limited, superficial, and one-sided. He merely relied on the Sworn
Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and
civilians whom he met in the investigation for the first time. He
was present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was
taking the sworn statements, but he did not propound a single
question to ascertain the veracity of their statements or their
credibility. He did not call for other witnesses to test the alibis
given by the six implicated persons nor for the family or neighbors
of the respondents.
In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested
that in a Memorandum Directive dated October 31, 2007, he
issued a policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that
the AFP should adopt rules of action in the event the writ
of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members
of the AFP, which should essentially include verification of the
identity of the aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of
relevant evidence; identification of witnesses and securing
statements from them; determination of the cause, manner,
location and time of death or disappearance; identification and
apprehension of the person or persons involved in the death or
disappearance; and bringing of the suspected offenders before a
competent court.150 Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted
his own affidavit attesting that he received the above directive of
respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this
directive, he immediately caused to be issued a directive to the
units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances
of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the
respondents, and undertook to provide results of the
investigations to respondents.151 To this day, however, almost a
year after the policy directive was issued by petitioner Secretary
of National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents have not
been furnished the results of the investigation which they now
seek through the instant petition for a writ of Amparo.
Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to
warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of respondents'
right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government.
In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security as
"freedom from threat" is violated by the apparent threat to their
life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a
guarantee of protection by the government is likewise violated by
the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the
military.
Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals,
which petitioners question.
First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and
unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in connection
with their case, except those already in file with the court.
Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places
of official assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and
Donald Caigas.
Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of
Appeals all medical reports, records and charts, and reports
of any treatment given or recommended and medicines
prescribed, if any, to the Manalo brothers, to include a list of
medical personnel (military and civilian) who attended to
them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007.
With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue
that the production order sought by respondents partakes of the
characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the
requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must be complied
with prior to the grant of the production order, namely: (1) the
application must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search
warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and
the things to be seized; (3) there exists probable cause with one
specific offense; and (4) the probable cause must be personally
determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce.152 In the case at bar, however, petitioners point out that
other than the bare, self-serving and vague allegations made by
respondent Raymond Manalo in his unverified declaration and
affidavit, the documents respondents seek to be produced are
only mentioned generally by name, with no other supporting
details. They also argue that the relevancy of the documents to
be produced must be apparent, but this is not true in the present
case as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not
been shown.
Petitioners' arguments do not hold water. The production order
under the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a search
warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a protection of
the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government,
not a protection of the government from the demand of the people
such as respondents.
Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the
production of documents or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in relevant part, viz:
Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.
Upon motion of any party showing good cause
therefor, the court in which an action is pending
may (a) order any party to produce and permit the
inspection and copying or photographing, by or on
behalf of the moving party, of any designated
documents, papers, books of accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, not
privileged, which constitute or contain evidence
material to any matter involved in the action and
which are in his possession, custody or control...
In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad,153 the
respondent judge, under authority of Rule 27, issued a subpoena
duces tecum for the production and inspection of among others,
the books and papers of Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The
company questioned the issuance of the subpoena on the ground
that it violated the search and seizure clause. The Court struck
down the argument and held that the subpoena pertained to a
civil procedure that "cannot be identified or confused with
unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution..."
Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself
undertook "to provide results of the investigations conducted or to
be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances
of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the
Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has
been furnished Higher headquarters."
With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert
that the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt.
Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as the
submission of a list of medical personnel, is irrelevant, improper,
immaterial, and unnecessary in the resolution of the petition for a
writ of Amparo. They add that it will unnecessarily compromise
and jeopardize the exercise of official functions and duties of
military officers and even unwittingly and unnecessarily expose
them to threat of personal injury or even death.
On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of
assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald
Caigas, whom respondents both directly implicated as
perpetrators behind their abduction and detention, is relevant in
ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of
territorial jurisdiction. Such disclosure would also help ensure that
these military officers can be served with notices and court
processes in relation to any investigation and action for violation
of the respondents' rights. The list of medical personnel is also
relevant in securing information to create the medical history of
respondents and make appropriate medical interventions, when
applicable and necessary.
In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and
security, these rights are snuffed out from victims of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of Amparo is a
tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind
secret walls.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 26, 2007
is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT
ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO,
PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON,
ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN
PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for
petitioners.
Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization
(hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union
composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino,
Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion
Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo
Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a
mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest
against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in
by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as
those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M.
and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed
the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate
Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent Court reproduced
the following stipulation of facts of the parties — parties —
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company
learned of the projected mass demonstration at
Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of
the Pasig Police Department to be participated by
the first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as well
as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to
4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning
of March 4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on
March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the
Company's canteen, and those present were: for
the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de
Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section
heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano,
(2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4)
Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6)
Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to
confirm or deny said projected mass
demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969.
PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as
spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the
planned demonstration and stated that the
demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled
because it has already been agreed upon in the
meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the
Company because the union has no quarrel or
dispute with Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon,
Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO
that the demonstration is an inalienable right of
the union guaranteed by the Constitution but
emphasized, however, that any demonstration for
that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal
operation of the Company. For which reason, the
Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned the
PBMEO representatives that workers who belong
to the first and regular shifts, who without previous
leave of absence approved by the Company,
particularly , the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to
report for work the following morning (March 4,
1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is
a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore,
would be amounting to an illegal strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969,
another meeting was convoked Company
represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union
panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino,
Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio
Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3,
1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the
PBMEO representatives that while all workers
may join the Malacañang demonstration, the
workers for the first and regular shift of March 4,
1969 should be excused from joining the
demonstration and should report for work; and
thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in
order not to violate the provisions of the CBA,
particularly Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT — NO
STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this warning
of the Company shall be dismiss; De Leon
reiterated the Company's warning that the officers
shall be primarily liable being the organizers of the
mass demonstration. The union panel countered
that it was rather too late to change their plans
inasmuch as the Malacañang demonstration will
be held the following morning; and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of
PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company which
was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the
contents of which are as follows: 'REITERATING
REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES
 JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.'
(Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.)
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400
proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the
respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be
required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers
in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the
demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969,
respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on
March 4, 1969, with the respondent Court, a charge against
petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift,
charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to
Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No.
875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' "
(Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge was accompanied by the
joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex
"B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was
filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T.
Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-
30, rec.)
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that
they did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the
respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on
March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was a valid
exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the
alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass
demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not
directed against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts
submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order
dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty
of bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio
Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente,
Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and
Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said
unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered to
have lost their status as employees of the respondent Company
(Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23,
1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that they filed on
September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on
Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration of said order
dated September 15, 1969, on the ground that it is contrary to law
and the evidence, as well as asked for ten (10) days within which
to file their arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the
Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. )
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969
(p. 63, rec.), respondent Company averred that herein petitioners
received on September 22, 1969, the order dated September 17
(should be September 15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the
amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein
petitioners had five (5) days from September 22, 1969 or until
September 27, 1969, within which to file their motion for
reconsideration; and that because their motion for reconsideration
was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly dismissed,
invoking Bien vs. Castillo,1 which held among others, that a
motion for extension of the five-day period for the filing of a
motion for reconsideration should be filed before the said five-day
period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their
written arguments dated October 11, 1969, in support of their
motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en
banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration of herein
petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the
reglementary period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-
75, rec.), which herein petitioners received on October 28, 1969
(pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969,
which was released on October 24, 1969 and addressed to the
counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements
of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the Court
of Industrial Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be
filed within five (5) days from receipt of its decision or order and
that an appeal from the decision, resolution or order of the C.I.R.,
sitting en banc, shall be perfected within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent
court a petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, on
the ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration
on time was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake
committed by the president of the petitioner Union and of the
office clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the
said president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from
the order dated October 9, 1969, herein petitioners filed on
November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal
(Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).
---------------------------------End of Facts-------------------------------------
I refuse to listen.6 And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles
which underlie the issues posed by the case at bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the
dignity and worth of the human personality is the central core as
well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable
character of man as an individual must be "protected to the
largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the
citadel of his person."2
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty,
equality and security "against the assaults of opportunism, the
expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small
encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no
patience with general principles."3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose
of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty
and property, to free speech, or free press, freedom of worship
and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections."4 Laski proclaimed that "the happiness of the individual,
not the well-being of the State, was the criterion by which its
behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its power, set the
limits to the authority it was entitled to exercise."5
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the
right to petition are included among the immunities reserved by
the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice
Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the
ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect
the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who
liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are
not safe unless the liberties of all are protected.7
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are
not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's
enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete
fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not
merely in the periodic establishment of the government through
their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as
well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is
accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate
governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as
well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public
officers and employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the
primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized.8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the
"threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as
the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space
to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow
specificity."9
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but
human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished
by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless
attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an
efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of
the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs — political,
economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and
of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to
the preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions; 10 and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity
and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." 11
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is
underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational
relation between the means employed by the law and its object or
purpose — that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor
oppressive — would suffice to validate a law which restricts or
impairs property rights. 12 On the other hand, a constitutional or
valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent
criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it has
been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando
in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the
opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr. Justice
Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas,
Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 14 believes that
the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute
when directed against public officials or "when exercised in
relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we
shall be governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the
balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the
improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned
Hand, viz. — whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is
necessary to avoid the danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that
the mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike,
concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence
temporary stoppage of work," herein petitioners are guilty
bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective
bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by foregoing
principles governing a democratic society, such conclusion
cannot be sustained. The demonstration held petitioners on
March 4, 1969 before Malacañang was against alleged abuses of
some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private
respondent firm, said demonstrate was purely and completely an
exercise of their freedom expression in general and of their right
of assembly and petition for redress of grievances in particular
before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive,
again the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They
exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid
protection from what they believe were police excesses. As
matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to
protect herein petitioner Union and its members from the
harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest herein of
private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the
cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free
from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform
more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as
well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to
intercede for its employees with the local police. Was it securing
peace for itself at the expenses of its workers? Was it also
intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the local police
to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to defend its own
employees all the more weakened the position of its laborers the
alleged oppressive police who might have been all the more
emboldened thereby subject its lowly employees to further
indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as
their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution
of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private
respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only
the weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the
untrammeled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The
pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage
by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the
morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the
preservation merely of their property rights. Such apprehended
loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life
and death of the firm or its owners or its management. The
employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused,
harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by the
peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the
condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the
local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right
to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material
loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The
debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized
in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The
wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying
day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is
like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances — over property rights has been
sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted
boon — at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of
the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened
civilization — becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice
have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can
produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To
regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the
employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and
hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a
cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating
employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective
bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech"
and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the
constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition. 19
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working
shifts of the employees, according to the respondent Court
Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the "duty ...
to observe regular working hours." The strain construction of the
Court of Industrial Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny
the workers the right to stage mass demonstration against police
abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over
the mind and life the workers and deserves severe
condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be
predicated on such a slender ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4,
1969 could not have been legally enjoined by any court, such an
injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the
workers, even if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or
strike. 20 The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case
at bar concedes that the mass demonstration was not a
declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in any industrial
dispute although there is concerted act and the occurrence of a
temporary stoppage work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its
employees to participate in the demonstration and that they
suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6
A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss or damage
to the firm will be averted. This stand failed appreciate the sine
qua non of an effective demonstration especially by a labor union,
namely the complete unity of the Union members as well as their
total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the
maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also
immediately action on the part of the corresponding government
agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the
local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of
expression. 21 If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by
that much the circulation of the issues raised by the
demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more
persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover,
the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a
substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate
their position and abet continued alleged police persecution. At
any rate, the Union notified the company two days in advance of
their projected demonstration and the company could have made
arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might
sustain by reason of the absence of its workers for one day,
especially in this case when the Union requested it to excuse only
the day-shift employees who will join the demonstration on March
4, 1969 which request the Union reiterated in their telegram
received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4, 1969,
the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a
lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the
firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work for
the day shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And to
regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held
against the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross
vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian
as it is unconstitutional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice.
Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit
all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration
against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of
the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an
unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom
of assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the
respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in
Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875,
otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right "to
engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while
Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their
rights guaranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration
staged by the workers of the respondent firm on March 4, 1969,
was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police
abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint on the
right of the employees to engage in such common action to better
shield themselves against such alleged police indignities. The
insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the workers for
the morning and regular shift should not participate in the mass
demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated,
"a potent means of inhibiting speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection
deserves at least equal protection as the concerted action of
employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint charging bank
president with immorality, nepotism, favoritism an discrimination
in the appointment and promotion of bank employees. 23 We
further ruled in the Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that for
the employees to come within the protective mantle of Section 3
in relation to Section 4(a-1) on Republic Act No. 875, "it is not
necessary that union activity be involved or that collective
bargaining be contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is
for the furtherance of their interests. 24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the
questioned order of respondent Court dated September 15, 1969,
the company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union guaranteed by
the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the
normal operation of the company" and "warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular
shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the
Company, particularly the officers present who are the organizers
of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following
morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure
is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be
amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such
threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining
the mass demonstration. However, the issues that the employees
raised against the local police, were more important to them
because they had the courage to proceed with the demonstration,
despite such threat of dismissal. The most that could happen to
them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from
work on the day of the demonstration. One day's pay means
much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family to support.
Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that
their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from
police abuses. But management was adamant in refusing to
recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free speech, free
assembly and the right to petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it
necessary to demand from the workers proof of the truth of the
alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby
concedes that the evidence of such abuses should properly be
submitted to the corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over
their complaint and to whom such complaint may be referred by
the President of the Philippines for proper investigation and action
with a view to disciplining the local police officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a large
extent the operations of the complainant company," the
respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not make any finding
as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This
significant circumstance can only mean that the firm did not
sustain any loss or damage. It did not present evidence as to
whether it lost expected profits for failure to comply with purchase
orders on that day; or that penalties were exacted from it by
customers whose orders could not be filled that day of the
demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by the
customers by reason of its failure to deliver the materials ordered;
or that its own equipment or materials or products were damaged
due to absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary,
the company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages for its
hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric consumption
that day. Such savings could have amply compensated for
unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by reason
of the absence of its workers for only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech
and assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of
grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8)
leaders of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration and
consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of
social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these
lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution
imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure
the well-being and economic security of all of the people," which
guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of
Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford
protection to labor ...". Respondent Court of Industrial Relations
as an agency of the State is under obligation at all times to give
meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in
favor of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional
safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional
patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial
Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate
the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the
exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for the
purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their
moral, social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in
the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the
very governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement
this policy and failed to keep faith with its avowed mission —
its raison d'etre — as ordained and directed by the Constitution.
V in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional
right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its
judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a
criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional
liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings
even long after the finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus
is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is
convicted by final judgment through a forced confession, which
violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination; 25 or who
is denied the right to present evidence in his defense as a
deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, 26 even after
the accused has already served sentence for twenty-two years. 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private
firm trenched upon these constitutional immunities of petitioners.
Both failed to accord preference to such rights and aggravated
the inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed they had
been subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these
basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial
Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it
issued in the instant case are a nullity. Recognition and protection
of such freedoms are imperative on all public offices including the
courts 28 as well as private citizens and corporations, the exercise
and enjoyment of which must not be nullified by mere procedural
rule promulgated by the Court Industrial Relations exercising a
purely delegate legislative power, when even a law enacted by
Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these
human rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of the
freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the
delivery of one speech, the printing of one article or the staging of
one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to be invoked and
exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors
to be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be
condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights
would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the period for
appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And
eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an
dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required
diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with
which to pay for competent legal services. 28-a
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for
reconsideration of its order or writ should filed within five (5) days
from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said
motion shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date of filing of
such motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated,
these rules of procedure were promulgated by the Court of
Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969,
or seven (7) days from notice on September 22, 1969 of the order
dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners claim
that they could have filed it on September 28, 1969, but it was a
Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed
two (2) days late defeat the rights of the petitioning employees?
Or more directly and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to
comply with a mere Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule
governing the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or
appeal in labor cases, promulgated pursuant to a legislative
delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The answer should
be obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To accord
supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial
Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution,
is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional
government that the Constitution is superior to any statute or
subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence to
natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the
constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations
procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of
Industrial Relations rule as applied in this case does not
implement or reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights
affected,' but instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying
the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of
Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a
mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is
beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A
period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved workers,
who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary
expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for
the filing of the motion for re hearing or reconsideration (See. 10,
Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of
Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration
could have been only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a
Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court
of Industrial are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration
dated September 27, 1969, is based on the ground that the order
sought to be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law,
evidence and facts adduced during the hearing," and likewise
prays for an extension of ten (10) days within which to file
arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the
Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.);
although the arguments were actually filed by the herein
petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long
after the 10-day period required for the filing of such supporting
arguments counted from the filing of the motion for
reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on October 28,
1969 the resolution dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion
for reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed beyond
the reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to
reconsider is filed out of time, or where the arguments in suppf
such motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period
provided for by the Court of Industrial Relations rules, the order or
decision subject of29-a reconsideration becomes final and
unappealable. But in all these cases, the constitutional rights of
free expression, free assembly and petition were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and
defenses presently available must be specifically raised in the
complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or defense not
raised in such pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a
constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the first time
on appeal, if it appears that the determination of the constitutional
issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis mota of
the case without the resolution of which no final and complete
determination of the dispute can be made. 30 It is thus seen that a
procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to
a constitutional right. In the instant case, the procedural rule of
the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must
likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by herein
petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor practice
charged against them and in their defense to the said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms
sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most compelling reason
to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which
impinges on such human rights. 30-a
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the
inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except a particular
case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice
require." 30-b Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion
in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo. 30-c reiterated this principle and
added that
Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove
with all situations without concerning itself about
procedural niceties that do not square with the
need to do justice, in any case, without further
loss of time, provided that the right of the parties
to a full day in court is not substantially impaired.
Thus, this Court may treat an appeal as a
certiorari and vice-versa. In other words, when all
the material facts are spread in the records before
Us, and all the parties have been duly heard, it
matters little that the error of the court a quo is of
judgment or of jurisdiction. We can then and there
render the appropriate judgment. Is within the
contemplation of this doctrine that as it is perfectly
legal and within the power of this Court to strike
down in an appeal acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction or committed with grave abuse of
discretion, it cannot be beyond the admit of its
authority, in appropriate cases, to reverse in a
certain proceed in any error of judgment of a court
a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a
flaw of jurisdiction. If there can be any doubt,
which I do not entertain, on whether or not the
errors this Court has found in the decision of the
Court of Appeals are short of being jurisdiction
nullities or excesses, this Court would still be on
firm legal grounds should it choose to reverse said
decision here and now even if such errors can be
considered as mere mistakes of judgment or only
as faults in the exercise of jurisdiction, so as to
avoid the unnecessary return of this case to the
lower court for the sole purpose of pursuing the
ordinary course of an appeal. (Emphasis
supplied). 30-d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial
Relations rule in this particular case at bar would an unreasoning
adherence to "Procedural niceties" which denies justice to the
herein laborers, whose basic human freedoms, including the right
to survive, must be according supremacy over the property rights
of their employer firm which has been given a full hearing on this
case, especially when, as in the case at bar, no actual material
damage has be demonstrated as having been inflicted on its
property rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it,
obedience to the Constitution renders more imperative the
suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash with
the human rights sanctioned and shielded with resolution concern
by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law. It should
be stressed that the application in the instant case Section 15 of
the Court of Industrial Relations rules relied upon by herein
respondent firm is unreasonable and therefore such application
becomes unconstitutional as it subverts the human rights of
petitioning labor union and workers in the light of the peculiar
facts and circumstances revealed by the record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of
Industrial Relations rules with reference to the case at is also
authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the
C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to
"act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the
case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms ..."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was
re-stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, speaking for the Court, in the
1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et. al., 30-e thus:
As to the point that the evidence being offered by
the petitioners in the motion for new trial is not
"newly discovered," as such term is understood in
the rules of procedure for the ordinary courts, We
hold that such criterion is not binding upon the
Court of Industrial Relations. Under Section 20 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of
Industrial Relations shall adopt its, rules or
procedure and shall have such other powers as
generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided,
however, That in the hearing, investigation and
determination of any question or controversy and
in exercising any duties and power under this Act,
the Court shall act according to justice and equity
and substantial merits of the case, without regard
to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be
bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but
may inform its mind in such manner as it may
deem just and equitable.' By this provision the
industrial court is disengaged from the rigidity of
the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts.
Said court is not even restricted to the specific
relief demanded by the parties but may issue such
orders as may be deemed necessary or expedient
for the purpose of settling the dispute or dispelling
any doubts that may give rise to future disputes.
(Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496, Feb. 17,
1940; Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor,
71 Phil. 124.) For these reasons, We believe that
this provision is ample enough to have enabled
the respondent court to consider whether or not its
previous ruling that petitioners constitute a
minority was founded on fact, without regard to
the technical meaning of newly discovered
evidence. ... (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315;
Chua Kiong v. Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578). (emphasis
supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with
"pedantic rigor" in the instant case is to rule in effect that the poor
workers, who can ill-afford an alert competent lawyer, can no
longer seek the sanctuary of human freedoms secured to them by
the fundamental law, simply because their counsel — erroneously
believing that he received a copy of the decision on September
23, 1969, instead of September 22, 1969 - filed his motion for
reconsideration September 29, 1969, which practically is only one
day late considering that September 28, 1969 was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities
when they ceased to be instruments of justice, for the attainment
of which such rules have been devised. Summarizing the
jurisprudence on this score, Mr. Justice Fernando, speaking for a
unanimous Court in Palma vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated:
As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland
in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910]. The
Villamor decision was cited with approval in
Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600
[1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil.
156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy, 14243, June 30, 1961, 2
SCRA 675.), decided as far back as 1910,
"technicality. when it deserts its proper-office as
an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance
and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration
from courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this
Court has remained committed. The late Justice
Recto in Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936])
was of a similar mind. For him the interpretation of
procedural rule should never "sacrifice the ends
justice." While "procedural laws are no other than
technicalities" view them in their entirety, 'they
were adopted not as ends themselves for the
 compliance with which courts have organized and
function, but as means conducive to the
realization the administration of the law and of
justice (Ibid., p.,128). We have remained
steadfastly opposed, in the highly rhetorical
language Justice Felix, to "a sacrifice of
substantial rights of a litigant in altar of
sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the
sacred principles of justice." (Potenciano v. Court
of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As
succinctly put by Justice Makalintal, they "should
give way to the realities of the situation." (Urbayan
v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016,
1019). In the latest decision in point promulgated
in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing
McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3
SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar was partial to an
earlier formulation of Justice Labrador that rules of
procedure "are not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense"; but are intended "to help secure
substantial justice." (Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and
rule were to be given effect, the dismissal or termination of the
employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is
harsh for a one-day absence from work. The respondent Court
itself recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not
include the dismissal of the other 393 employees who are
members of the same Union and who participated in the
demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter of fact, upon
the intercession of the Secretary of Labor, the Union members
who are not officers, were not dismissed and only the Union itself
and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named as
respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed against them
by the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and
"C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm insinuates that
not all the 400 or so employee participated in the demonstration,
for which reason only the Union and its thirteen (13) officers were
specifically named in the unfair labor practice charge (p. 20,
respondent's brief). If that were so, then many, if not all, of the
morning and regular shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969
and that, as a consequence, the firm continued in operation that
day and did not sustain any damage.
The appropriate penalty — if it deserves any penalty at all —
should have been simply to charge said one-day absence against
their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of
the petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as aforestated
the Union leaders depend on their wages for their daily
sustenance as well as that of their respective families aside from
the fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same time
strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the
localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
The challenge to our liberties comes frequently
not from those who consciously seek to destroy
our system of Government, but from men of
goodwill — good men who allow their proper
concerns to blind them to the fact that what they
propose to accomplish involves an impairment of
liberty.
... The Motives of these men are often
commendable. What we must remember,
however, is thatpreservation of liberties does not
depend on motives. A suppression of liberty has
the same effect whether the suppress or be a
reformer or an outlaw. The only protection against
misguided zeal is a constant alertness of the
infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained
in our Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the
demands of the moment makes easier another,
larger surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights
is a never ending one.
 ... The liberties of any person are the liberties of
all of us.
... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless
the liberties of all are protected.
... But even if we should sense no danger to our
own liberties, even if we feel secure because we
belong to a group that is important and respected,
we must recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code
of fair play for the less fortunate that we in all
honor and good conscience must be observe. 31
The case at bar is worse.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good
intention, but a complete lack of sympathetic understanding of the
plight of its laborers who claim that they are being subjected to
indignities by the local police, It was more expedient for the firm
to conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees in
their fight for their freedoms and security against alleged petty
tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer opportunism. Such
opportunism and expediency resorted to by the respondent
company assaulted the immunities and welfare of its employees.
It was pure and implement selfishness, if not greed.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank
vs. C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner Bank dismissed eight (8)
employees for having written and published "a patently libelous
letter ... to the Bank president demanding his resignation on the
grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and
favoritism as well as discrimination in the promotion of bank
employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled:
It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this
admission of the respondents. Assuming that the
latter acted in their individual capacities when they
wrote the letter-charge they were nonetheless
protected for they were engaged in concerted
activity, in the exercise of their right of self
organization that includes concerted activity for
mutual aid and protection, (Section 3 of the
Industrial Peace Act ...) This is the view of some
members of this Court. For, as has been aptly
stated, the joining in protests or demands, even
by a small group of employees, if in furtherance of
their interests as such, is a concerted activity
protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not
necessary that union activity be involved or that
collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6
A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).
xxx xxx xxx
Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have
allowed the respondents to air their grievances.
xxx xxx xxx
The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to
discipline for what it calls the respondents' libel in
giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be
sure, the right of self-organization of employees is
not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB
324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer
to discharge for cause (Philippine Education Co.
v. Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773, April
29, 1960) is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act
does not touch the normal exercise of the right of
the employer to select his employees or to
discharge them. It is directed solely against the
abuse of that right by interfering with the
countervailing right of self organization (Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S. 177 [1941])...
 xxx xxx xxx Makalintal, C.J, took no part.

In the final sum and substance, this Court is in

unanimity that the Bank's conduct, identified as an
interference with the employees' right of self-
organization or as a retaliatory action, and/or as a
refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an
unfair labor practice within the meaning and
intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace
Act. (Emphasis supplied.) 33

If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to

fortify labor unionism in the Republic Savings case, supra, where
the complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank
president no less, such recognition and protection for free
speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered all the
more justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar, where the
mass demonstration was not against the company nor any of its
officers.

WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:

(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent
Court of Industrial Relations dated September 15 and October 9,
1969; and

(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners,

with full back pay from the date of their separation from the
service until re instated, minus one day's pay and whatever
earnings they might have realized from other sources during their
separation from the service.

With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming

Company, Inc.

Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.