G.R. No.

97336 February 19, 1993

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.

Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the Decision1 of
the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of
Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the
issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.

The antecedents of this case are not complicated:

On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a
complaint2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges
in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and
reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano
Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern
Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his
love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school
semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced
her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the
filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as
a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay
captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked
her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private
respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than
P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her
such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.

In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as averred in
the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He
thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither
sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but
only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money
and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his
Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily
dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation,
he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.

After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order4 embodying the stipulated
facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:

1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the defendant is single,
Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to the
present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of Medicine,
second year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since
July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny
Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.

After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a
decision5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's
fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:

IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant.

1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral
damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's
fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied.6

The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent were
lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual
advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d)
because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that
deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made
some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens,
inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g)
such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of
morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony
because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and
reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.7

The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for the private
respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:

According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she never had a boyfriend before,
defendant started courting her just a few days after they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times
and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day he went with
her to her hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of their
relationship and their intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of
defendant with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant
told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her during the semestral break in October,
1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to
marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days
that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live
together in defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands
and feet while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the
whole day and night until the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but
defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant and kept
reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that he could not do so because he was already married
to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter
consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her
godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him to
marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod
City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.

Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them of his desire to marry Marilou,
he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens,
and even already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding. 8

Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CA-
G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of
factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.

On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's
ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following
analysis:

First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was already 29 years old at the time, does
not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience
with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court, a barrio lass "not used and
accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and certainly would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made by the defendant to marry her."
In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff
must have thought because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be
photographed with defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs.
"D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress
at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic)
a beach party together with the manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn
id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-
56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to go
to plaintiff's hometown in Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special relationship between them?
And this special relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff,
communicated not only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where
plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and
defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the reason why plaintiff resigned from her job
at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).

Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character and must think so low and
have so little respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City for
several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a
common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not
marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or
remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to
satisfy his lust on her. 11 and then concluded:

In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him
and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these (sic)
fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against
morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our women,
coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the
opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as
the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12

Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein the single
issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury
or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private
respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs,
traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino
customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He
stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or
tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim
to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses
good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage had
been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private
respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private
respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if
it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent and had also promised to
marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of
promise is not actionable. 14

On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the petitioner had filed
his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear
that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this
jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter
court having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of
testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect
the result of the case. 15

Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of
substance or values which could alter the result of the case.

Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by
the parties before the lower court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina vs.
Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro,
93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74
Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957;
unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil.
401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA
622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the
Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record
(Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).

Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions in this case.
Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.

And now to the legal issue.

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set
forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely
decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in
England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous
men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many
of the American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of
torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20

As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:

But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully
sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even
though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the
interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:

Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A
promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present
laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise
of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and
family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under
the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that
untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.
21

Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in
Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law
concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international
criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the
Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and
malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are injurious
acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is
even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope
of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's
promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to
fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress,
proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive
device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it
and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury
should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of
love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him
on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on
appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed
marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single
Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its
example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either
Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years
of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the
woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,25 this Court denied recovery of
damages to the woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is
approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant — who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as
highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she
became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found
that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to
bind" him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had been moral
seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced that such seduction existed. The
following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum
refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than
mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement,
superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs.
Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —

To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield
because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from
mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to depart from the
path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have
that effect, and which result in her person to ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer
(27 Phil. 123).

And in American Jurisprudence we find:

On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury;
and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.

Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire of curiosity of the female, and the
defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a
recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by
which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-
appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such
conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the
appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the
defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of
the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend
to fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under article 21 of the
Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in
dismissing the complaint. 27

In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court,
opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be
recovered:

. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of
Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz
Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and
the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of
moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here
mutual lust has intervened). . . .together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the
wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).

Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:

It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists, notwithstanding the incorporation of the present
article31 in the Code. The example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there was seduction, not necessarily
in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit
or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly given
herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an injury which can be the basis for indemnity.

But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action lies. The court, however, must
weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under the circumstances, because an act which
would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an experienced woman thirty years of age.
But so long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not
punishable under the criminal law and there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that
reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for argument's sake,
that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both
parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra
vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as
stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because
of her own doing, 33 for:

. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain
high school graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a
luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her economic security. Her family is in dire need of
financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may
have been offered by the petitioner. 34

These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a condescending,
if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational
background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning,
he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not
have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly
intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and
would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who
honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of
ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional
respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in
blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due
and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have been impelled
by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because
of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as
she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto
with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35
At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.

Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been brought about
by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or
where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36

In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:

Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action by one against the other (Art.
1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both sides is,
more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f.
Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).

We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this Court condones
the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house
after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and
infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, with
costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

 G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961

ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.

Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.

A.P. Salvador for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured
her abortion, could recover damages from physician who caused the same.

The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the of Nita
Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon the
evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz, ordering
the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of
Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the award by a majority vote of three justices as against two, who
rendered a separate dissenting opinion.

The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:

Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 — through her aunt Paula
Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married. Desiring to
conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the
defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the
Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the
defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955,
accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic
on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again
aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was
at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor
gave his consent, to the abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages. Upon
application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06 upon the
provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be error, for
the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an
unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no
alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-
Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it
is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the
injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of
action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no
transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished
from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato
habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality
by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the
condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when
separated from its mother's womb.
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery can not had for
the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. Northampton, 52 Am.
Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those
inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life
and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help, support or services from an unborn child,
they would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes
hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of
their parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should
warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any
basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his
wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his
parental hopes and affections. The lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did
not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise
aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to
investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after
learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal
cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large
money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that,
under the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.

The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:
It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the abortion which his wife
has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be highminded rather than mercenary; and that his
primary concern would be to see to it that the medical profession was purged of an unworthy member rather than
turn his wife's indiscretion to personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the administrative or the
criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a civil action for damages of which not
only he, but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries.

It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without medical necessity to
warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too severely condemned; and the consent
of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an
award of damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.

The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical Examiners for their
information and such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may warrant.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., took no part.
De Leon, J., took no part.

==========================================================

THIRD DIVISION

CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION,

Petitioner,
- versus -
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAO and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA
NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT
AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER),
Respondents.
G.R. No. 182836

Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated October 13, 2009

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1] dated
27 February 2008 and the Resolution[2] dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697,
affirming the Resolution[3] dated 20 November 2007 of respondent Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S.
Montao (Montao) granting bereavement leave and other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano),
grounded on the death of his unborn child.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member
of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines
for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave
and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
concluded between Continental and the Union, which reads:

ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE

xxxx
Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVEThe Company agrees to grant a bereavement leave with pay to any
employee in case of death of the employees legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers and
sisters) based on the following:
2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days
2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days
xxxx
ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS
xxxx
Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCEThe Company shall grant death and accidental insurance
to the employee or his family in the following manner:
xxxx
4.3 DEPENDENTSEleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of the
employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case the employee is single, this
benefit covers the legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with proper legal document to be presented
(e.g. death certificate).[4]

The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature
delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy.[5] According to the Certificate of Fetal
Death dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental
insufficiency.[6]

Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement
leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance.[7]
Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillanos claims for bereavement and other death
benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Despite the series of conferences
held, the parties still failed to settle their dispute,[8] prompting the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National
Capital Region (NCR).[9] In a Submission Agreement dated 9 October 2006, the Union and Continental Steel
submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other
death benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2
and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.[10] The parties mutually chose Atty. Montao, an Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.[11]
When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the dispute, the parties proceeded to
submit their respective Position Papers, [12] Replies,[13] and Rejoinders[14] to Atty. Montao.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to the CBA.
The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state that
the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her
subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. The Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK
Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental
Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano were able to receive death benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.
The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an employee of Mayer Steel, whose wife
also prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already died prior to the delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity
leave, bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution under the CBA between his union and Mayer Steel.[15]
Dugans child was
only 24 weeks in the womb and died before labor, as opposed to Hortillanos child who was already 37-38 weeks in
the womb and only died during labor.
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are located in the same compound as
Continental Steel; and the representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed the CBA with their respective
employees unions were the same as the representatives of Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA with the
Union.
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts in labor legislations and
labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for the laborer.
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of
an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the
benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillanos case.
Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42[16] of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil
personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding
from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery
was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical
personality. A fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent, since it never needed any
support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be supported.
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous. Since neither of the parties
qualified the terms used in the CBA, the legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed automatically accepted by
both parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn child included in the definition of dependent, as used in the
CBA the death of whom would have qualified the parent-employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits
bound the Union to the legally accepted definition of the latter term.
Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of its sister companies, MKK Steel and
Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were irrelevant and incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct
personalities of the companies. Neither could the Union sustain its claim that the grant of bereavement leave and
other death benefits to the parent-employee for the loss of an unborn child constituted company practice.
On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montao, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a Resolution[17] ruling
that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.

Atty. Montao identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:
This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave with pay by the covered employees
as provided under Article X, Section 2 of the parties CBA, three (3) indispensable elements must be present: (1)
there is death; (2) such death must be of employees dependent; and (3) such dependent must be legitimate.
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident insurance as provided under Article XVIII,
Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the parties CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be present: (a) there is death;
(b) such death must be of employees dependent; (c) such dependent must be legitimate; and (d) proper legal
document to be presented.[18]
Atty. Montao found that there was no dispute that the death of an employees legitimate dependent occurred. The
fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to
rely on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of
someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent, although he/she died
during the labor or delivery. There was also no question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married, making
their dependent, unborn child, legitimate.
In the end, Atty. Montao decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING [herein petitioner Continental
Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00),
representing his bereavement leave pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos
(P11,550.00) representing death benefits, or a total amount of P16,489.00

The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of merit.

All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein dispositions.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on Certiorari,[19] under Section 1,
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101697.
Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montao erred in granting Hortillanos claims for bereavement leave with pay and
other death benefits because no death of an employees dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at whatever
stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA since what was contemplated by the CBA was the
death of a legal person, and not that of a fetus, which did not acquire any juridical personality. Continental Steel
pointed out that its contention was bolstered by the fact that the term death was qualified by the phrase legitimate
dependent. It asserted that the status of a child could only be determined upon said childs birth, otherwise, no such
appellation can be had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillanos entitlement to bereavement leave and
other death benefits under the CBA were lacking.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaos Resolution dated 20
November 2007. The appellate court interpreted death to mean as follows:
[Herein petitioner Continental Steels] exposition on the legal sense in which the term death is used in the CBA fails
to impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which the grant of bereavement leave
and death benefits thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no arguing with [Continental Steel] that the
acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is conditioned on being born alive upon delivery, it does not follow
that such event of premature delivery of a fetus could never be contemplated as a death as to be covered by the
CBA provision, undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief to the affected employee, with whom the dead fetus
stands in a legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and technical significance to the term
death of a legitimate dependent as condition for granting bereavement leave and death benefits under the CBA.
Following [Continental Steels] theory, there can be no experience of death to speak of. The Court, however, does
not share this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with anything less than loss of human life, especially for
the expectant parents. In this light, bereavement leave and death benefits are meant to assuage the employee and
the latters immediate family, extend to them solace and support, rather than an act conferring legal status or
personality upon the unborn child. [Continental Steels] insistence that the certificate of fetal death is for statistical
purposes only sadly misses this crucial point.[20]
Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed
Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao is hereby AFFIRMED
and UPHELD.
With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].[21]
In a Resolution[22] dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration[23] of
Continental Steel.
Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is clear and unambiguous, so that
the literal and legal meaning of death should be applied. Only one with juridical personality can die and a dead fetus
never acquired a juridical personality.
We are not persuaded.
As Atty. Montao identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death;
(2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3)
legitimate relations of the dependent to the employee. The requisites for death and accident insurance under Article
XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse,
or child of a married employee; or a parent, brother, or sister of a single employee; and (4) presentation of the
proper legal document to prove such death, e.g., death certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the provisions of the CBA are clear
and unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying Hortillanos claim for bereavement leave and other death
benefits rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the terms death and dependent as used in the CBA. If the
provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or
construction of the same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management nor the Union sought
to define the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is
misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines
when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on natural persons,
must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil personality,
which reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person
and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may
be lost.
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act
as a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred
any obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or assumed by the childs parents. The rights to
bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child
upon the latters death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil
Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only
those who have acquired juridical personality could die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.[24] Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One
need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No
less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception,[25] that the State must protect equally
with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being
delivered, qualifies as death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a
dependent is one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid
of someone else. Under said general definition,[26] even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillanos
child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillanos wife,
for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question that the dependent may be the parent,
spouse, or child of a married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not
provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil
personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general
sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mothers womb.
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent childs status in relation to his/her parents. In Angeles v.
Maglaya,[27] we have expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful
union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be
more emphatic on the matter: Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
(Emphasis ours.)
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,[28] we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows:
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the Family Code. Now,
there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of
legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless
the law itself gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were
validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her
conception.
Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth element entitling him to death and
accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the death certificate of his unborn child.
Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA, Hortillanos
claims for the same should have been granted by Continental Steel.
We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if
possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said
that the parents grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a
gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive
but died subsequently.
Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death benefits should be
interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating
that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor
of labor.[29] In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. In Marcopper
Mining v. National Labor Relations Commission,[30] we pronounced:
Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that "when the pendulum
of judgment swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both sides, the same must be stilled in favor of labor."
While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of
labor, it insists that what is involved-here is the amended CBA which is essentially a contract between private
persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord
utmost protection and justice to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold.
In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically stated that:
When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence
of the latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged
worker.
Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we declared:
Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution dated 9 May
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao, which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave
pay and other death benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00) and
Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child,
are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation.
SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
 THIRD DIVISION

ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO,
Petitioner,
- versus -
THE MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORPORATION, ROBERTO COYIUTO, JR., NOEL CABRERA,
GERRY ZARAGOZA, DONNA GATDULA, RODNEY P. DIOLA, RAUL VALINO and THELMA SAN JUAN,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 184315

Present:
CORONA, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated: November 25, 2009

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DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

When malice in fact is proven, assertions and proofs that the libelous articles are qualifiedly privileged communications
are futile, since being qualifiedly privileged communications merely prevents the presumption of malice from attaching in a
defamatory imputation.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Amended Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
76995 dated 28 August 2008. The Amended Decision reversed on Motion for Reconsideration the 18 March 2008
Decision[2] of the same court, which in turn affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City
in Civil Case No. 94-1114 dated 8 November 2002 finding herein respondents liable for damages.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the RTC, are as follows:
In his Complaint, plaintiff Alfonso T. Yuchengco alleges that in the last quarter of 1994, Chronicle Publishing Corporation
Chronicle Publishing for brevity) published in the Manila Chronicle a series of defamatory articles against him. In two of
the subject articles (November 10 and 12, 1993 issues), he was imputed to be a Marcos crony or a Marcos-Romualdez
crony, which term according to him is commonly used and understood in Philippine media to describe an individual who
was a recipient of special and underserving favors from former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and/or his brother-in-law
Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez due to special and extra-ordinary closeness to either or both, and which favors allowed an
individual to engage in illegal and dishonorable business activities.
The plaintiff claims that the said articles further branded him as a mere front or dummy for the Marcos and Romualdez
clans in Benguet Corporation, which company sought to take-over the management of Oriental Petroleum Mineral
Corporation (Oriental for brevity). He contends that such an imputation is untrue since his holdings in Benguet Corporation
were legally acquired by him.
Also, he was likewise accused of unsound and immoral business practices by insinuating that he wanted to take control of
Oriental in order to divert its resources to rescue the debt-ridden Benguet Corporation. He claims that the accusation is
untrue since he was merely interested in being represented in the board thereof so as to protect his and his companies
interest therein as shareholders.
The subject articles insinuated that he personally and intentionally caused the failure of Benguet Corporation and that if
even if he ever assumed control of Oriental, it would suffer the same fate as the former. According to him, at the time he
assumed chairmanship of Benguet Corporation, it was already experiencing financial downturns caused by plummeting
world prices of gold and unprofitable investments it ventured into.
Moreover, one of the articles portrayed him as being an unfair and uncaring employer when the employees of Grepalife
Corporation, of which he is the Chairman, staged a strike, when the truth being that he had nothing to do with it. And that
if his group takes over Oriental, it will experience the same labor problems as in Grepalife.
Furthermore, the subject articles accused him of inducing Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC for brevity) to
violate the provisions of the General Banking Act on DOSRI loans. He denies the imputations believing that there is
nothing irregular in the RCBC-Piedras transaction for the acquisition of shares of Oriental.
Also, the plaintiff claims that the subject articles insinuated that he induced others to disobey lawful orders of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC for brevity) when the truth is that the officials of RCBC and Alcorn never
defied any SEC order, and that if ever they did, he never induced them to do so.
Finally, the plaintiff asserts that the subject articles imputed to him the derogatory tag of corporate raider, implying that he
was seeking to profit for something he did not work for. He denies the imputation since he acquired his stake in Oriental
for adequate and valuable consideration at the time when no one was willing to bailout the government from its difficult
and losing position thereto.
In their Answer, the defendants deny liability claiming that the subject articles were not defamatory since they were
composed and published in good faith and only after having ascertained their contents. In any event, they claim that these
articles are privileged and/or constitute reasonable and balance[d] comments on matters of legitimate public interest
which cannot serve as basis for the finding of libel against them. They likewise alleged that they were acting within the
bounds of constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press.
Furthermore, they contend that since plaintiff is a public figure, and assuming that the articles were indeed defamatory,
they cannot be held liable for damages since they were not impelled by actual malice in the composition thereof. They did
not compose and/or publish said articles with the knowledge that they contained falsehoods, or with reckless disregard on
whether or not they contained falsehood.

As to defendant Coyiuto, he claims that he had no participation in the publication of the subject articles nor
consented or approved their publication.
PLAINTIFFS EVIDENCE
During the trial, the plaintiff himself, ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO, testified that prior to his appointment as Ambassador to
Japan, he was the chairman of various business organizations notably: Benguet Corporation (Benguet), Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company, Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), Bank of America Savings Bank, House of
Investments, Inc., Dole Philippines and Philippine Fuji Xerox Corporation. He was also the President of the Philippine
Ambassadors; chairman or vice president of Bantayog ng Bayan; and chairman of AY Foundation, Inc. He was appointed
Philippine Ambassador to Peoples Republic of China after the EDSA Revolution.
As regards the article referring to the November 10, 1993 issue of the Manila Chronicle (Exh. A), he stated that he had
never been a Marcos crony nor had been a business partner of the Romualdezes or had personal dealings with them; that
during the shareholders meeting, the two (2) sons of Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez were elected as directors of Benguet
Corporation pursuant to a Court order; that he had no personal dealings with them; that he had no intention of taking over
Oriental and that Benguet Corporation did not lose the amount as stated in the article; that Benguet Corporation
experienced liquidity problems, and that before he joined the corporation, it had already diversified into many other
financial ventures; that he denied having any business partnership with the Romualdezes at that time.
Regarding the November 12, 1993 issue of the Manila Chronicle (Exh. B), he denied having any partnership with the
Marcos family; that he denied responsibility for the losses incurred by Benguet Corporation, as the losses were due to the
drop of the commodity market, and for having diversified into other non-profitable ventures; that he had no intention
whatsoever of taking over Oriental; that although the Yuchengco family owns a substantial block of shares of RCBC,
Sanwa Bank actually owns twenty-five percent (25%) thereof; that RCBC did not finance his fund but it extended a loan to
Piedras Petroleum, a subsidiary of the Presidential Commission of Good Government (PCGG for brevity); admitted that
Traders Royal Bank also granted a loan to PCGG but such was an independent transaction of RCBC.
About the November 15, 1993 issue of the Manila Chronicle (Exh. C), he denied any knowledge of what transpired at the
Trust Department of RCBC because as Chairman he was not involved in many of the banks transactions. Referring to
November 16, 1993 issue of the Manila Chronicle (Exh. D), he considered the attacks against him to be malicious
considering that he does not see any connection between the labor strike at Grepalife with the case of Alcorn and RCBC;
that the article would like to show that he was the reason for the huge losses incurred by Benguet Corporation.
As regards the November 22, 1993 issue of the Manila Chronicle (Exh. E), he denied giving any interest free loan,
the fact that they gave a loan to PCGG does not mean that they gave a loan to Benedicto since the latter had
already turned over the shares of Piedras to PCGG at that time.
Regarding the November 23, 1993 issue of the Manila Chronicle (Exh. F), he denied extending an interest free loan
considering that he is not the only owner of RCBC; that these series of attacks against him and RCBC were
intended to cause a bank run; that the article imputes that he was responsible for giving an interest free loan.
About the December 5, 1993 issue of the Manila Chronicle (Exh. G), he said the article was intended to humiliate
and embarrass him since he really had no intention of taking over Oriental; that the reason for the attack against his
person was because he and defendant Coyiuto, Jr. were both rivals in the insurance business and that the latter has
always been envious of his position for having owned Malayan Insurance Company.
On cross-examination, plaintiff Yuchengco testified that he does not consider himself a public figure; and that he felt
maligned by the references to him as a Marcos crony. [TSN, 07 February 1997; 10 February 1997; 12 February
1997]
ROSAURO ZARAGOZA testified that he is the Executive Vice-President of RCBC; that the statement in Exhibits D, E and
F with regard to the interest free loan allegedly granted to Piedras Petroleum Company, Inc. (Piedras) are false because
the Piedras deal was a trust transaction which involved an advance in exchange for shares of stock; that plaintiff
Yuchengco did not have a personal interest in the Piedras deal; that Piedras or Oriental Petroleum Mineral Corporation
(Oriental Petroleum) shares were not transferred to plaintiff Yuchengcos name by virtue of the transaction; and that the
defendants did not approach him or RCBC to check the veracity of the subject articles. The affidavit of Mr. Zaragoza
(Exhibit H) was adopted as part of his testimony.
On cross-examination, Mr. Zaragoza testified that he volunteered to testify in the instant case because he was the most
knowledgeable about the Piedras deal; that plaintiff Yuchengco was aggrieved upon reading the subject articles; that
under the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between RCBC and Piedras, should the latter fail to comply with its
obligations under the MOA, it will pay interest at the prevailing market interest rate from the date of advance until full
payment; and that there was a complaint filed with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas against RCBC by Mr. Felipe Remollo
questioning the Piedras deal. [TSN 28 February 1997; 26 June 1997; 27 June 1997; 04 July 1997]
JOSE REVILLA testified that he and Amb. Yuchengco were long time friends, where he (Revilla) worked for him
(Yuchengco) for thirty-two (32) years in his (Yuchengco) credit card company Industrial Finance Corporation Credit Cards;
that knowing Amb. Yuchengco for a considerable period of time, he does not believe the truth of the contents of the
subject articles; that plaintiff Yuchengco appeared distressed when he joked about the subject articles; that other people
approached him to ask whether the subject articles are true [TSN 25 August 1997].
xxxx
DEFENDANTS EVIDENCE
On the other hand, defendants Zaragoza, Gatdula, Cabrera and Valino substantially testified on the following
matters:
GERRY ZARAGOZA testified that he was the Managing Editor of Manila Chronicle in charge of the national and political
news; that defendant San Juan was the other Managing Editor in charge of the lifestyle section; that a story conference is
conducted everyday where the articles, including the pages where they will appear, are discussed; that the editor-in-chief
(defendant Cruz), executive editor (defendant Tolentino) and deputy editor (defendant Cabrera) were the ones
responsible for the decisions of the story conference relative to the printing of the newspaper; that he was not involved in
the writing and editing of the subject articles; that Exhibits A to D are classified as business news; that columns,
specifically Exhibits E and F are not discussed during story conferences; and that Exhibit G, which appeared in the Money
Section did not pass thru him.
On cross-examination, defendant Zaragoza testified that except for the columns, Exhibits A to D and Exhibit G are
considered hard news; that he handled the hard news, while defendant San Juan handled the soft news; and that
defendant Valino was the business editor in charge of the business section (TSN 22 July 1998; 23 September 1998]
DONNABELLE GATDULA claimed that she was a correspondent for Manila Chronicle assigned to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) beat; that she had no participation in the writing or publication of Exhibits A to C and G to E;
that she attended the hearing conducted by the SEC and interviewed the two lawyers of RCBC and SEC Chairman
Rosario Lopez regarding the Oriental Petroleum case; that her name appears as a tag line in Exhibit D, because she only
wrote part of the story; and that she did not write the entire article (Exhibit D) as some of the statements therein were
added by the editor/s; and that she did not discuss Exhibit D with any of the editors.
On cross-examination, defendant Gatdula testified that she does not have a copy of the original article which she wrote;
that she read Exhibit D after it was published; that she did not compare her original story with Exhibit D nor question the
authority of the editor to edit her story; and that she agreed to put her name on Exhibit D. (TSN 23 September 1998; 05
October 1998).
NOEL CABRERA contended that after having gone through the subject articles, he believes that the news stories and
commentaries were fair and that those who wrote the same followed the proper standards; that as regard the contents of
Exhibits E and F, the opinion of Mr. Raul Valino, as written in the said articles, were valid and based on documentary
facts; as to Exhibit D, pertaining to the article of Ms. Donnabelle Gatdula, she based her article on documents pertaining
to the Oriental transaction, other documents, as well as interviews; that at the time the subject articles were written, Amb.
Yuchengco was a public figure, being a very prominent businessman with vast interest in banks and other businesses;
that during the year 1993, the word crony was more or less accepted to mean as a big businessman or close associate of
the late President Marcos, and its use in the column was meant only to supply the perspective as to the figure or subject
involved in the news story, and there is thus no malice or derogatory intent when the same was use On cross-
examination, defendant Cabrera testified that defendant Coyiuto is one of the owners of Manila Chronicle; and that he
only saw the records of Exhibits 8 to 10 and 16 to 20 after the publication of Exhibits A to G (TSN 21 April 1999; 28 April
1999 05 May 1999; 10 May 1999).
RAUL VALINO stated that he was the Acting Business Manager and later Managing Editor and Business Editor-in-Chief
of Manila Chronicle; that after having consulted several dictionaries as to the meaning of the word crony, he did not come
across a definition describing the word to mean someone who is a recipient of any undeserving or special favor from
anyone, that it merely refers to someone who is a friend or a special friend; there was no mention whatsoever in the
subject article that Amb. Yuchengco was being accused of fronting for the late President Marcos (referring to par. 2.3.2 of
the complaint); that nowhere in the said paragraph was Amb. Yuchengco accused of having acted as a front to facilitate
the acquisition of a prohibited interest in a private corporation by a public official while occupying a public office; that
nowhere in the article was Amb. Yuchengco accused of being directly or indirectly involved in unsound business practices
(referring to par. 2.4 of the complaint); that whatever imputation of ill-will in par. 2.4.1 of the complaint was only in plaintiffs
mind; and as regards par. 2.6 of the complaint, that he was merely reporting on what transpired at the picket line and what
the striking employees answered to him; and that he did not state in his columns (Exhibits E and F) that plaintiff
Yuchengco violated banking laws. [TSN 23 February 2000][3]

On 8 November 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of herein petitioner Alfonso T. Yuchengco, disposing
of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. On the First Cause of Action, ordering defendants Chronicle Publishing, Neil H. Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel
Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul Valino and Rodney Diola to pay plaintiff
Yuchengco, jointly and severally:
a. the amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) as moral damages; and
b. the amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) as exemplary damages;
2. On the Second Cause of Action, ordering defendants Roberto Coyiuto, Jr. and Chronicle Publishing to pay
plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally:
a. the amount of Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) as moral damages; and
b. the amount of Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) as exemplary damages;

3. On the Third Cause of Action, ordering all defendants to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally, the
amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as attorneys fee and legal costs.[4]
The respondents, namely the Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation, Neal H. Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel
Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul Valino, Rodney P. Diola, and Roberto Coyiuto,
Jr. appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 76995 and was raffled to the
Fifth Division.
On 18 March 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming the RTC Decision:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the appeals
of defendants-appellants and AFFIRMING the decision dated November 8, 2002 of the trial court IN TOTO.[5]

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On 28 August 2008, the Court of Appeals reversed itself in an
Amended Decision:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated March 18, 2008 is RECONSIDERED and
SET ASIDE. The decision of the court a quo dated November 8, 2002 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Amended Complaint for Damages against the defendants-appellants is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to
costs.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari, where petitioner puts forth the following Assignments of Error:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE
CASE OF ARTURO BORJAL, ET AL. V. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. CITED BY RESPONDENTS IN THEIR
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WARRANTED THE REVERSAL OF THE CA DECISION DATED MARCH
18, 2008.
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE
SUBJECT ARTICLES IN THE COMPLAINT FALL WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATION.
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT
PETITIONER IS A PUBLIC OFFICIAL OR PUBLIC FIGURE.[6]

Libel is defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

Art. 353. Definition of Libel. A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
Based on this definition, this Court has held that four elements constitute the crime of libel, namely (a) defamatory
imputation tending to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt; (b) malice, either in law or in fact; (c) publication; and (d)
identifiability of the person defamed.[7]
Despite being defined in the Revised Penal Code, libel can also be instituted, like in the case at bar, as a purely civil
action, the cause of action for which is provided by Article 33 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
The above elements of libel were adopted as well in a purely civil action for damages. As held by this Court in GMA
Network, Inc. v. Bustos[8]:
An award of damages under the premises presupposes the commission of an act amounting to defamatory imputation or
libel, which, in turn, presupposes malice. Libel is the public and malicious imputation to another of a discreditable act or
condition tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person. Liability for libel attaches
present the following elements: (a) an allegation or imputation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b)
publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice. Of these four elements, the
most apparent in the case at bar would be the publication of the alleged imputation. Libel is published not only when it is
widely circulated, but also when it is made known or brought to the attention or notice of another person other than its
author and the offended party.[9] The circulation of an allegedly libelous matter in a newspaper is certainly sufficient
publication. We are thus left with the determination of the existence of the three remaining elements of libel, namely: (1)
the defamatory imputation; (2) the identity of the person defamed; and (3) the existence of malice.

Defamatory Imputation
Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame or reputation
through false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish esteem, respect, goodwill
or confidence in the plaintiff, or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. It is the publication of anything
that is injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrepute.[10] In determining whether
certain utterances are defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and taken in their plain, natural and
ordinary meaning, as they would naturally be understood by persons hearing (or reading, as in libel) them, unless it
appears that they were used and understood in another sense.[11]

In order to fully appreciate whether the subject articles are, in fact, defamatory, an analysis thereof is in order. The
following are what have been referred to as the subject articles:
Manila Chronicle Issue Date (Author)
Title
Exhibit
10 November 1993 (no by-line)
Yuchengko joins forces with Kokoy
A, A-1 to A-5
12 November 1993 (no by-line)
RCBC probed for violating CB rules
B, B-1 to B-2
15 November 1993(no by-line)
RCBC called to SEC; subtitled Yuchengco Bank defies government order
C, C-1 to C-3
16 November 1993(Donna Gatdula)
Alcorn, RCBC execs own guilt
D, D-1 to D-4
22 November 1993 (Raul Valino)
Bank runs and RCBC free loans
E, E-1 to E-2
23 November 1993(Raul Valino)
RCBC case bugs Bangko Sentral
F, F-1 to F-3
5 December 1993(Rodney P. Diola)
The Battle for Oriental
G, G-1 to G-4
In two of the subject articles, respondents allegedly accused and labeled Yuchengco as a Marcos crony, who took
advantage of his relationship with the former President to gain unwarranted benefits:

Yuchengco joins forces with Kokoy[12]

Alfonso Yuchengco, a Marcos crony who wants to takeover the ownership and management of the highly profitable
Oriental Petroleum Minerals Corp. (OMPC), has tied up with Marcos brother-in-law Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez through
two of his sons, records at the securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) showed yesterday.
Kokoys two sons, Benjamin Philip Gomez Romualdez, 32, and Ferdinand Martin G. Romualdez, 29, are now members of
the board of the debt-ridden and heavily losing Benguet Corp., a company taken over by Marcos during his dictatorship,
but which was sequestered at the start of President Aquinos term.
xxxx
Observers said they believed the elections of the Romualdez sons officially confirmed suspicions that the Marcos and
Romualdez clans really owned Benguet.

Benguets former president, Jaime Ongpin, employed by the company for 10 years before he was named finance
secretary by then President Aquino, committed suicide after being accused of being a Marcos-Romualdez crony.
Yuchengco Bank under CB probe[13]
xxxx
The official said the case was recently brought to Bangko Sentrals attention by an RCBC creditor who felt he was being
cheated by the bank through interest-free loans granted to related interests. Under the interest-free loan scheme,
Yuchengco was able to own OMPC shares of Piedras since they were the same shares RCBC financed and which were
turned over to the bank as payment for the loan. The Central Bank official said that Bangko Sentral is now determining
whether RCBC violated the rule on loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests (DOSRI).
Yuchengco is both a director (chairman) officer, stockholder, and a related interest of RCBC.
xxxx
Violating the DOSRI rule is a criminal offense. The Bangko Sentral official stressed. I believe that that is tantamount, not
only to cheating the depositor, but also robbing the bank of its clients money. If Bangko Sentral does not act decisively on
this matter, the official asked what will prevent the other banks from resorting to this kind of transactions to enrich their
owners and enable them to acquire shares of stock from other companies? The interest-free loan controversy also
involves Traders Royal Bank (TRB), a sequestered bank, owned by Roberto Benedicto, a Marcos crony.
xxxx
The deal could be from one crony to another since Yuchengco is very much associated with the Marcoses and the
Romualdezes, a source opined. Yuchengco owns Benguet Corp., which is heavily losing since he joined the Company as
Chairman in 1989.
xxxx
Since Benguet is encountering all kinds of financial problems, losses and overdue debts, observers say they fear
that Oriental may also suffer the same fate when and should Yuchengco and his partners assume management of
OMPC.
Already, it was noted the Oriental shares sold on the stock market are weakening, and stock observers say this
could be attributed to the planned entry into the company of Yuchengco, Leonardo Siguion-Reyna and their minority
partners.
In another of the subject articles, respondents allegedly insinuated that Yuchengco induced others to disobey the
lawful orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC):
Alcorn, RCBC execs own guilt[14]
Two officials of Alcorn Petroleum and Minerals Corporation (AMPC) and Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC)
admitted before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) yesterday that they ignored the SEC order commanding
them to process all Alcorn shares in the name of R. Coyiuto Securities Inc. and its investor clients such as Oriental
Petroleum and Minerals Corporation (OMPC).
xxxx
RCBC is owned by Alfonso Yuchengco, chairman of the debt-ridden and heavily-losing Benguet Corp. He also owns
Great Pacific Life Insurance Co., whose employees are on strike because of the companys refusal to grant them better
salaries and benefits.
xxxx
SEC insiders said that while Monreal and Ricalde should be punished for disobeying a lawful order from the SEC, people
who masterminded the APMC order should also be penalized once proven guilt
xxxx
Some observers said the APMC order to RCBC could be a ploy to prevent Robert Coyiuto, Jr., chairman and president of
OPMC, from retaining his majority control of Oriental, and a scheme to put on the board members of the Yuchengco
company.

In fact, when Yuchengco created his own OPMC board of directors, he appointed Ricalde as corporate secretary,
OPMC officials pointed out.
In our opinion, observers following the OPMC developments stated, this is a clear and simple case of criminal
conspiracy whose perpetrators must be meted the harshest punishment to prevent corporate thieves from making a
mockery of the law and from illegally taking over corporations which they do not own in the first place.
Yuchengco further presented the following articles which allegedly accused him of inducing Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation (RCBC) to violate the provisions of the General Banking Act on Directors, Officers,
stockholders, and Related Interest (DOSRI) loans:
Bank runs and RCBC free loans[15]
The Bank runs that devastated the economy in the recent past were, first and foremost, instigated by rumors that bank
owners were, themselves, using the publics money to promote their own businesses and interests in violation of Central
Bank rules and regulations.
xxxx
Now here comes Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) being charged with engaging in unsound banking by
lending an interest-free loan of P101 million to one company, Piedras Petroleum Corporation, which Marcos crony
Roberto Benedicto had surrendered to the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).
xxxx
What would happen if all the other banks resort to this kind of lending activity, giving away loans without interest? The
entire banking system would certainly be compromised.
The owners or RCBC, therefore, should not be too liberal with their depositors money. They should also consider what
fatal effects such a practice could inflict on the very system where RCBC operates. The country, at this time, cannot afford
another series of bank runs, nor a run at RCBC.

RCBC case bugs Bangko Sentral[16]

xxxx
The P101 million interest-free loan to Piedras is of national interest for not just one reason alone.

First, the money involved came from the depositors, and not from the pockets of Yuchengco.
Second, banking rules dictate that a bank must be prudent in lending out its clients money, so that its financial viability
must never be put in question. Third, the money lent to a borrower must never end up in the pocket of the owner of the
bank. Fourth, such a practice could lead to a bank run, which the economy cannot afford at this time, even if the run is
confined to just one bank.

Yuchengco further claims that the following article, in labeling him as a corporate raider, implies that he is seeking to
profit from something he did not work for:

The Battle for Oriental[17]

Ledesma says Coyiuto will not wilt from Yuchengcos fabled financial power. Robert has a lot of friends that will help
him fend off a raider like Yuchengco, says Ledesma.
xxxx
Ledesma of OPMC says that even if Coyiuto loses in the bid, hell still remain a very significant player in OPMC given his
substantial personal holdings and proxies in the company. Coyiutos investment in OPMC is now valued at more than a
billion pesos compared to the Yuchengco block which, the Coyiuto group points out, has only minimal investments.
Thats our moral ascendancy over their group. Coyiuto virtually made Oriental what it is today unlike Yuchengco who
is just getting into the act now because Oriental has become an attractive cash cow says Ledesma.
War of Families
The fight for control of Oriental Petroleum gains particular poignancy given the long history of feuding between the
families of Yuchengco and Coyiuto. Their families were bitter rivals in the insurance business way back in the
seventies. The Yuchengcos own the Malayan Group of Insurance Companies while the Coyiutos used to control
Pioneer Insurance. That rivalry seems to have come full circle with their battle in Oriental Petroleum.
Pomento says the best arrangement would have been a modus vivendi between the two groups to stop their
quarrel and work instead for the interest of the company. But given the bad blood that exists between the two
families, that might be a difficult proposition, he says.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals are in agreement that the above articles contain defamatory imputations. Even
the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, wherein the appellate court reversed itself and held that respondents were
not liable for damages, did not modify its earlier ruling affirming the defamatory character of the imputations in the above
articles. The Court of Appeals merely reversed itself on account of the allegedly privileged nature of the articles, which
goes into the element of malice. Malice, as an element of libel, and the defenses affecting the existence of the same shall
be discussed later. In arguing that the subject articles are not really derogatory, respondent Cabrera explains that the
word crony was more or less accepted to describe a big businessman or close associate of the late President Marcos,
and its use in the column was meant only to supply the perspective as to the figure or subject involved in the news story.
Respondent Valino further claimed that after consulting several dictionaries as to the meaning of the word crony, he did
not come across a definition describing the word to mean someone who is a recipient of any undeserving or special favor
from anyone.
We are not swayed by the explanations of respondents Cabrera and Valino. In determining the defamatory
character of words used, the explanation of the respondent should not prevail over what the utterances (or writing)
convey to an ordinary listener (or reader).[18] Furthermore, as held by this Court in United States v. Sotto[19]:
[F]or the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication alleged to be libelous that construction must be adopted
which will give to the matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which the public
would naturally understand what was uttered. The published matter alleged to be libelous must be construed as a whole.
In applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel, the court will disregard any subtle or ingenious explanation
offered by the publisher on being called to account. The whole question being the effect the publication had upon the
minds of the readers, and they not having been assisted by the offered explanation in reading the article, it comes too late
to have the effect of removing the sting, if any there be, from the word used in the publication. (Emphasis supplied.)
In finding that the phrase Marcos crony is derogatory, the trial court took judicial notice of the fact that the said
phrase, as understood in Philippine context, refers to an individual who was the recipient of special and/or
undeserved favors from the late President Marcos due to a special closeness to the latter. This finding, which was
upheld by the Court of Appeals in its original Decision and was not tackled in the Amended Decision, is even
supported by one of the subject articles. In particular, the 10 November 1993 article marked as Exhibit A mentioned
that Benguets former president, Jaime Ongpin, committed suicide after being accused of being a Marcos-
Romualdez crony.[20] This statement highlights the disgrace respondents wanted to associate with the term crony,
which was used to describe Yuchengco in the very same article.
Even a cursory reading of the subject articles would show the intention of the writers to injure the reputation, credit and
virtue of Yuchengco and expose him to public hatred, discredit, contempt and ridicule. The indirect manner in which the
articles attributed the insults to Yuchengco (e.g., the money involved came from depositors, and not from Yuchengco)
does not lessen the culpability of the writers and publishers thereof, but instead makes the defamatory imputations even
more effective. Words calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes more effective to destroy reputation than false
charges directly made. Ironical and metaphorical language is a favored vehicle for slander.[21]
In sum, this Court upholds the ruling of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the subject articles contain defamatory
imputations. All of the following imputations: (1) the labeling of Yuchengco as a Marcos crony, who took advantage of his
relationship with the former President to gain unwarranted benefits; (2) the insinuations that Yuchengco induced others to
disobey the lawful orders of SEC; (3) the portrayal of Yuchengco as an unfair and uncaring employer due to the strike
staged by the employees of Grepalife; (4) the accusation that he induced RCBC to violate the provisions of the General
Banking Act on DOSRI loans; and (5) the tagging of Yuchengco as a corporate raider seeking to profit from something he
did not work for, all exposed Yuchengco to public contempt and ridicule, for they imputed to him a condition that was
dishonorable.

Identification

Defamatory words must refer to an ascertained or ascertainable person, and that person must be the plaintiff.
Statements are not libelous unless they refer to an ascertained or ascertainable person.[22] However, the obnoxious
writing need not mention the libeled party by name. It is sufficient if it is shown that the offended party is the person
meant or alluded to.[23]

In the case at bar, all but one of the subject articles explicitly mention the name of petitioner Yuchengco. The lone
article, which does not mention Yuchengco at all, Bank runs & RCBC free loans,[24] nevertheless chided the
owners of RCBC:

The owners or RCBC, therefore, should not be too liberal with their depositors money. They should also consider
what fatal effects such a practice could inflict on the very system where RCBC operates. The country, at this time,
cannot afford another series of bank runs, nor a run at RCBC.[25]

Identifying Yuchengco in said article by name was, however, not necessary, since the other subject articles, published a
few days before and after this one, had already referred to Yuchengco as the owner of RCBC, sometimes explicitly
(Benguet started to bleed in 1989, the year Yuchengco, who owns Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. [RCBC], took over as
chairman of the company[26]), and sometimes implicitly (the money involved came from depositors, and not from
Yuchengco). While the defamation of a large group does not give rise to a cause of action on the part of an individual, this
is subject to exception when it can be shown that he is the target of the defamatory matter.[27] This Court therefore finds
that Yuchengco was clearly identified as the libeled party in the subject defamatory imputations .

Malice
Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person
defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.[28] It is present when it is shown that the
author of the libelous remarks made such remarks with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to
the truth or falsity thereof.[29]
Malice, however, does not necessarily have to be proven. There are two types of malice malice in law and malice in
fact.[30] Malice in law is a presumption of law. It dispenses with the proof of malice when words that raise the presumption
are shown to have been uttered. It is also known as constructive malice, legal malice, or implied malice.[31] On the other
hand, malice in fact is a positive desire and intention to annoy and injure. It may denote that the defendant was actuated
by ill will or personal spite. It is also called express malice, actual malice, real malice, true malice, or particular malice.[32]

In this jurisdiction, malice in law is provided in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, which also enumerates
exceptions thereto:

Art. 354. Requirement of publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if
no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty;
and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

There is, thus, a presumption of malice in the case of every defamatory imputation, where there is no showing of a
good intention or justifiable motive for making such imputation.

The exceptions provided in Article 354 are also known as qualifiedly privileged communications. The enumeration under
said article is, however, not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters
of public interest are likewise privileged.[33] They are known as qualifiedly privileged communications, since they are
merely exceptions to the general rule requiring proof of actual malice in order that a defamatory imputation may be held
actionable. In other words, defamatory imputations written or uttered during any of the three classes of qualifiedly
privileged communications enumerated above (1) a private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral or social duty; (2) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or
remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions; and (3) fair commentaries on matters of public interest may still be considered actionable if actual malice is
proven. This is in contrast with absolutely privileged communications, wherein the imputations are not actionable, even if
attended by actual malice:

A communication is said to be absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, even if its author has acted in bad
faith. This class includes statements made by members of Congress in the discharge of their functions as such,
official communications made by public officers in the performance of their duties, and allegations or statements
made by the parties or their counsel in their pleadings or motions or during the hearing of judicial proceedings, as
well as the answers given by witnesses in reply to questions propounded to them, in the course of said proceedings,
provided that said allegations or statements are relevant to the issues, and the answers are responsive or pertinent
to the questions propounded to said witnesses. Upon the other hand, conditionally or qualifiedly privileged
communications are those which, although containing defamatory imputations, would not be actionable unless made
with malice or bad faith.[34]

In the case at bar, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the publication of the subject articles was
attended by actual malice

In the instant case, there is preponderance of evidence showing that there exists malice in fact in the writing and
publication of the subject libelous articles.

As correctly found by the trial court, [petitioner] was able to show that [respondents] were animated by a desire to
inflict unjustifiable harm on his reputation as shown by the timing and frequency of the publication of the defamatory
articles. Further, as previously stated, [respondents] failed to show that they had any good intention and justifiable
motive for composing and publishing the vicious and malicious accusations against [petitioner].

Moreover, [respondents] published or caused the publication of the subject defamatory articles with reckless disregard as
to the truth or falsity thereof. As previously stated, there is no proof that the contents of the subject articles are true or that
the respondents exercised a reasonable degree of care before publishing the same. [Respondents] failed to present
evidence showing that they verified the truth of any of the subject articles, especially in light of the categorical denial b y
[petitioner] of the accusations made against him .

[Respondents] did not exercise reasonable degree of care or good faith efforts to arrive at the truth before publishing the
subject defamatory articles. [Respondents] did not present any competent evidence to establish the truth of their
allegations against [petitioner]. There was no showing that [respondents] made any attempt to talk to [petitioner] to verify
the statements contained in the defamatory articles, especially considering the gravity of the accusations made against
[petitioner]. At the very least, [respondents] should have exercised efforts to talk to [petitioner] to clarify the issues and get
his side. [Respondents] failure to verify the truth of the information from [petitioner] himself is in itself an evidence of their
lack of bona fide efforts to verify the accuracy of her information.

The incessant publication of the defamatory articles attacking the honor and reputation of [petitioner] is also proof of
[respondents] malicious scheme to malign and defame the name, honor and reputation of [petitioner]. As earlier pointed
out, in a span of one (1) month, [respondents] wrote and published and/or caused the publication of seven (7) libelous
articles against [petitioner] attacking his honor and reputation as a distinguished businessman, philanthropist, his political
inclination, and as an employer in his insurance company. In fact, the presence of malice is made more evident by
[respondents] baseless and uncalled for attack on the person of [petitioner] as an employer. As aptly noted by the trial
court in the assailed Decision:

Also in one of the articles, herein plaintiff was portrayed as an unfair and uncaring employer due to the strike staged by
the employees of Grepalife suggesting that it was the [petitioner] who was the cause, and of insinuating that if [petitioners]
group takes over control of Oriental, it would experience the same labor problem as in Grepalife. The Court finds that
[respondents] failed to render an unbiased and fair report as to the real cause of the strike except to lay the blame to
[petitioner], without stating, much less describing, his participation thereon, knowing fully well that Grepalife is an entity
distinct from the plaintiff. In other words, the labor policies implemented by Grepalife as regards its employees are
obviously not that of Yuchengco.

Such baseless and malicious accusation of [respondents] on [petitioner] only proves the intention of the
[respondents] in publishing the defamatory articles was not to present an unbiased report on current issues but to
launch a personal attack on the very person of [petitioner].

As earlier explained, as correctly found by the trial court, even the timing of the publication of these subject articles is
highly suspicious inasmuch as the subject libelous articles came out in the Manila Chronicle, a newspaper owned and
under the control of [respondent] Coyiuto, around November to December of 1993, a couple of months prior to the
January stockholders meeting of Oriental Corporation. From this, it is logical to conclude that the publication of the subject
defamatory articles defaming the good name and reputation of [petitioner] is but a part of [a] grand scheme to create a
negative image of [petitioner] so as to negatively affect [petitioners] credibility to the public, more particularly, to the then
stockholders of Oriental Corporation. Worth noting also is the fact that the subject articles did not only portray [petitioner]
in a bad light. Curiously, in these articles, [respondent] Coyiuto, a known rival of [petitioner], was portrayed as the
underdog, the David and [petitioner] as the Goliath in their battle for control over Oriental Corporation. This does not
escape the Courts attention.

These circumstances clearly indicate the presence of actual malice on the part of [respondents] in the publication of
the subject libelous articles.[35] (Emphases supplied.)

When the Court of Appeals granted the Motion for Reconsideration, it did not touch upon its earlier finding of actual
malice on the part of respondents in publishing the subject articles. Instead, the Court of Appeals merely held that
the subject articles were fair commentaries on matters of public interest, and thus fell within the scope of the third
type of qualifiedly privileged communications.

This was a glaring error on the part of the Court of Appeals. As discussed above, whereas there is an absolute bar
to an action in the case of absolutely privileged communication, the same is not true with respect to qualifiedly
privileged communication, wherein the law merely raises a prima facie presumption in favor of the occasion. In the
former, the freedom from liability is absolute, regardless of the existence of actual malice, as contrasted with the
freedom in the latter, where it is conditioned on the want or absence of actual malice. Conditionally or qualifiedly
privileged communications are actionable when made with actual malice.[36]

When malice in fact is proven, assertions and proofs that the libelous articles are qualifiedly privileged
communications are futile, since being qualifiedly privileged communications merely prevents the presumption of
malice from attaching to a defamatory imputation.

Neither is there any reason for this Court to reverse the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that there
was actual malice on the part of the respondents. As held by the courts a quo, Yuchengco was able to show by the
attendant circumstances that respondents were animated by a desire to inflict unjustifiable harm on his reputation,
as shown by the timing and frequency of the publication of the defamatory articles. The portrayal of then Chronicle
Publishing Chairman Coyiuto as an underdog and his rival Yuchengco as the greedy Goliath in their battle for
control over Oriental Corporation, taken with the timing of the publication of these subject articles a couple of
months prior to the January stockholders meeting of Oriental Corporation, clearly indicate that the articles
constituted an orchestrated attack to undermine the reputation of Yuchengco. Furthermore, respondents were
shown to have acted with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of the articles they published, when they were
unable to rebut the categorical denial by Yuchengco of the accusations made against him, and his allegation that he
was not approached by respondents for his side of the stories before the publication thereof. Respondents failure to
present evidence showing that they verified the truth of any of the subject articles is fatal to their cause. In In re: Emil
P. Jurado,[37] this Court ruled that categorical denials of the truth of allegations in a publication place the burden
upon the party publishing it, either of proving the truth of the imputations or of showing that the same was an honest
mistake or error committed despite good efforts to arrive at the truth. There is actual malice when there is either (1)
knowledge of the publications falsity; or (2) reckless disregard of whether the contents of the publication were false
or not.[38] Failure to even get the side of Yuchengco in the published articles clearly constituted reckless disregard
of the truth or falsity of said articles.

Finally, even if we assume for the sake of argument that actual malice was not proven in the case at bar, we
nevertheless cannot adhere to the finding of the Court of Appeals in the Amended Decision that the subject articles
were fair commentaries on matters of public interest, and thus fell within the scope of the third type of qualifiedly
privileged communications.
In Philippine Journalists, Inc. (Peoples Journal) v. Theonen,[39] this Court adopted the pronouncement in the United
States Decision in Gertz v. Robert Welsch, Inc.[40] that, in order to be considered as fair commentaries on matters
of public interest, the individual to whom the defamatory articles were imputed should either be a public officer or a
public figure:

In Borjal v. Court of Appeals, we stated that the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly
privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. We stated
that the doctrine of fair commentaries means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is
deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false
imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person
in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official
may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition.
Again, this argument is unavailing to the petitioners. As we said, the respondent is a private individual, and not a
public official or public figure. We are persuaded by the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., [418 U. S. 323 (1974)] that a newspaper or broadcaster publishing defamatory falsehoods about
an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure may not claim a constitutional privilege against
liability, for injury inflicted, even if the falsehood arose in a discussion of public interest. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, in trying to prove that the subject articles delved on matters concerning public interest, the Court of Appeals
insisted that Yuchengco was a public official or public figure, who must not be too thin-skinned with reference to
comment upon his official acts.[41] The Court of Appeals then noted that Yuchengco was, at the time of the
Amended Decision, appointed as a Presidential Adviser on Foreign Affairs with Cabinet rank, and proceeded to
enumerate[42] the public positions held by Yuchengco through the years.

However, an examination of the subject articles reveals that the allegations therein pertain to Yuchengcos private
business endeavors and do not refer to his duties, functions and responsibilities as a Philippine Ambassador to
China and Japan, or to any of the other public positions he occupied. A topic or story should not be considered a
matter of public interest by the mere fact that the person involved is a public officer, unless the said topic or story
relates to his functions as such. Assuming a public office is not tantamount to completely abdicating ones right to
privacy. Therefore, for the purpose of determining whether or not a topic is a matter of public interest, Yuchengco
cannot be considered a public officer.

Neither is Yuchengco a public figure. The above case Philippine Journalists continues to cite the US case Gertz in
describing who is a public figure:

More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and
comment. Third, this would impose an additional difficulty on trial court judges to decide which publications address
issues of general interest and which do not. Even if the foregoing generalities do not obtain in every instance, the
communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that public officials and public figures have voluntarily
exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them. No such assumption is
justified with respect to a private individual. He has not accepted public office or assumed an influential role in
ordering society. (Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S., at 164) He has relinquished no part of his interest in the
protection of his own good name, and consequently he has a more compelling call on the courts for redress of injury
inflicted by defamatory falsehood. Thus, private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials
and public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery.[43] (Emphasis supplied.)

The records in the case at bar do not disclose any instance wherein Yuchengco had voluntarily thrust himself to the
forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. He cannot,
therefore, be considered a public figure. Since Yuchengco, the person defamed in the subject articles, is neither as
public officer nor a public figure, said articles cannot be considered as qualifiedly privileged communications even if
they deal with matters of public concern.

In view of the foregoing, this Court is constrained to grant the instant Petition and reinstate the Decision of the trial
court, as previously affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its original Decision. This Court, however, finds the award of
damages in the total amount of One Hundred Million Pesos by the trial court to be rather excessive given the
circumstances. This Court, thus, further resolves to reduce the award of damages, as follows:

1. The damages for which Chronicle Publishing, Neil H. Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma San Juan,
Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul Valino and Rodney Diola shall be jointly and severally liable under the first
cause of action shall be reduced as follows:

a. The amount of moral damages shall be reduced from Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) to Two Million Pesos
(P2,000,000.00); and
b. The amount of exemplary damages shall be reduced from Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) to Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00);
2. The damages for which Roberto Coyuito, Jr. and Chronicle Publishing shall be jointly and severally liable under
the second cause of action shall be reduced as follows:
a. The amount of moral damages shall be reduced from Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) to Twenty-Five
Million Pesos (P25,000,000.00); and
b. The amount of exemplary damages shall be reduced from Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) Ten Million
Pesos (P10,000,000.00).

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 76995 dated 28 August 2008, which reversed on Motion for Reconsideration the 18 March 2008 Decision of
the same Court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in
Civil Case No. 94-1114 dated 8 November 2002 finding herein respondents liable for damages, is hereby
REINSTATED, but shall be MODIFIED to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. On the First Cause of Action, ordering defendants Chronicle Publishing, Neil H. Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel
Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul Valino and Rodney Diola to pay plaintiff
Yuchengco, jointly and severally:
a. the amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) as moral damages; and
b. the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as exemplary damages;

2. On the Second Cause of Action, ordering defendants Roberto Coyuito, Jr. and Chronicle Publishing to pay
plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally:
a. the amount of Twenty-Five Million Pesos (P25,000,000.00) as moral damages; and
b. the amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) as exemplary damages;
3. On the Third Cause of Action, ordering all defendants to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally, the amount
of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as attorneys fee and legal costs.

Costs against respondents.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 175822 October 23, 2013

CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. and MICHELLE S. YBAÑEZ, Petitioners,

vs.
SHIRLEY G. QUIÑONES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the ; Rules of Court are the Court of Appeals
Decision1 dated August 3, 2006 and Resolution2 dated November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80309. The assailed
decision reversed and set aside the June 20, 2003 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC),
Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-26984; while the assailed resolution denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner Michelle Ybañez (Ybañez).

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On July 25, 2001, respondent Shirley G. Quiñones, a Reservation Ticketing Agent of Cebu Pacific Air in Lapu Lapu
City, went inside the Guess USA Boutique at the second floor of Robinson’s Department Store (Robinson’s) in Cebu
City. She fitted four items: two jeans, a blouse and a shorts, then decided to purchase the black jeans worth
₱2,098.00.4 Respondent allegedly paid to the cashier evidenced by a receipt5 issued by the store.6
While she was walking through the skywalk connecting Robinson’s and Mercury Drug Store (Mercury) where she
was heading next, a Guess employee approached and informed her that she failed to pay the item she got. She,
however, insisted that she paid and showed the employee the receipt issued in her favor.7 She then suggested that
they talk about it at the Cebu Pacific Office located at the basement of the mall. She first went to Mercury then met
the Guess employees as agreed upon.8
When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess employees allegedly subjected her to humiliation in front of
the clients of Cebu Pacific and repeatedly demanded payment for the black jeans.9 They supposedly even searched
her wallet to check how much money she had, followed by another argument. Respondent, thereafter, went home.
On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a letter to the Director of Cebu Pacific Air narrating the incident,
but the latter refused to receive it as it did not concern the office and the same took place while respondent was off
duty.11 Another letter was allegedly prepared and was supposed to be sent to the Cebu Pacific Office in Robinson’s, but
the latter again refused to receive it.12 Respondent also claimed that the Human Resource Department (HRD) of
Robinson’s was furnished said letter and the latter in fact conducted an investigation for purposes of canceling
respondent’s Robinson’s credit card. Respondent further claimed that she was not given a copy of said damaging letter.13
With the above experience, respondent claimed to have suffered physical anxiety, sleepless nights, mental anguish, fright,
serious apprehension, besmirched reputation, moral shock and social humiliation.14 She thus filed the Complaint for
Damages15 before the RTC against petitioners California Clothing, Inc. (California Clothing), Excelsis Villagonzalo
(Villagonzalo), Imelda Hawayon (Hawayon) and Ybañez. She demanded the payment of moral, nominal, and exemplary
damages, plus attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
In their Answer,17 petitioners and the other defendants admitted the issuance of the receipt of payment. They claimed,
however, that instead of the cashier (Hawayon) issuing the official receipt, it was the invoicer (Villagonzalo) who did it
manually. They explained that there was miscommunication between the employees at that time because prior to the
issuance of the receipt, Villagonzalo asked Hawayon " Ok na ?," and the latter replied " Ok na ," which the former believed
to mean that the item has already been paid.18 Realizing the mistake, Villagonzalo rushed outside to look for respondent
and when he saw the latter, he invited her to go back to the shop to make clarifications as to whether or not payment was
indeed made. Instead, however, of going back to the shop, respondent suggested that they meet at the Cebu Pacific
Office. Villagonzalo, Hawayon and Ybañez thus went to the agreed venue where they talked to respondent.19 They
pointed out that it appeared in their conversation that respondent could not recall whom she gave the payment.20 They
emphasized that they were gentle and polite in talking to respondent and it was the latter who was arrogant in answering
their questions.21 As counterclaim, petitioners and the other defendants sought the payment of moral and exemplary
damages, plus attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
On June 20, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing both the complaint and counterclaim of the parties. From the
evidence presented, the trial court concluded that the petitioners and the other defendants believed in good faith that
respondent failed to make payment. Considering that no motive to fabricate a lie could be attributed to the Guess
employees, the court held that when they demanded payment from respondent, they merely exercised a right under the
honest belief that no payment was made. The RTC likewise did not find it damaging for respondent when the
confrontation took place in front of Cebu Pacific clients, because it was respondent herself who put herself in that situation
by choosing the venue for discussion. As to the letter sent to Cebu Pacific Air, the trial court also did not take it against the
Guess employees, because they merely asked for assistance and not to embarrass or humiliate respondent. In other
words, the RTC found no evidence to prove bad faith on the part of the Guess employees to warrant the award of
damages.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 58,
in Civil Case No. CEB-26984 (for: Damages) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Defendants Michelle Ybañez
and California Clothing, Inc. are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant Shirley G. Quiñones jointly and solidarily
moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) and attorney’s fees in the amount of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00).
SO ORDERED.24
While agreeing with the trial court that the Guess employees were in good faith when they confronted respondent
inside the Cebu Pacific Office about the alleged non-payment, the CA, however, found preponderance of evidence
showing that they acted in bad faith in sending the demand letter to respondent’s employer. It found respondent’s
possession of both the official receipt and the subject black jeans as evidence of payment.25 Contrary to the
findings of the RTC, the CA opined that the letter addressed to Cebu Pacific’s director was sent to respondent’s
employer not merely to ask for assistance for the collection of the disputed payment but to subject her to ridicule,
humiliation and similar injury such that she would be pressured to pay.26 Considering that Guess already started its
investigation on the incident, there was a taint of bad faith and malice when it dragged respondent’s employer who
was not privy to the transaction. This is especially true in this case since the purported letter contained not only a
narrative of the incident but accusations as to the alleged acts of respondent in trying to evade payment.27 The
appellate court thus held that petitioners are guilty of abuse of right entitling respondent to collect moral damages
and attorney’s fees. Petitioner California Clothing Inc. was made liable for its failure to exercise extraordinary
diligence in the hiring and selection of its employees; while Ybañez’s liability stemmed from her act of signing the
demand letter sent to respondent’s employer. In view of Hawayon and Villagonzalo’s good faith, however, they were
exonerated from liability.28
Ybañez moved for the reconsideration29 of the aforesaid decision, but the same was denied in the assailed
November 14, 2006 CA Resolution.
Petitioners now come before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
based on the following grounds:
I.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LETTER SENT TO THE CEBU PACIFIC
OFFICE WAS MADE TO SUBJECT HEREIN RESPONDENT TO RIDICULE, HUMILIATION AND SIMILAR INJURY
II.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES.

The petition is without merit.

Respondent’s complaint against petitioners stemmed from the principle of abuse of rights provided for in the Civil
Code on the chapter of human relations. Respondent cried foul when petitioners allegedly embarrassed her when
they insisted that she did not pay for the black jeans she purchased from their shop despite the evidence of payment
which is the official receipt issued by the shop. The issuance of the receipt notwithstanding, petitioners had the right
to verify from respondent whether she indeed made payment if they had reason to believe that she did not.
However, the exercise of such right is not without limitations. Any abuse in the exercise of such right and in the
performance of duty causing damage or injury to another is actionable under the Civil Code. The Court’s
pronouncement in Carpio v. Valmonte31 is noteworthy:
In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether done willfully or
negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained.
Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity but also universal moral precepts which are designed
to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience and which are meant to serve as guides
for human conduct. First of these fundamental precepts is the principle commonly known as "abuse of rights" under
Article 19 of the Civil Code. It provides that " Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith."x x x32 The elements of
abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole
intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
In this case, petitioners claimed that there was a miscommunication between the cashier and the invoicer leading to
the erroneous issuance of the receipt to respondent. When they realized the mistake, they made a cash count and
discovered that the amount which is equivalent to the price of the black jeans was missing. They, thus, concluded
that it was respondent who failed to make such payment. It was, therefore, within their right to verify from
respondent whether she indeed paid or not and collect from her if she did not. However, the question now is
whether such right was exercised in good faith or they went overboard giving respondent a cause of action against
them.
Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise of legal right
or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acted in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another.34 Good
faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the
intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another.35 Malice or bad faith,
on the other hand, implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral
obliquity.
Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking respondent whether she paid or not. The Guess employees
were able to talk to respondent at the Cebu Pacific Office. The confrontation started well, but it eventually turned
sour when voices were raised by both parties. As aptly held by both the RTC and the CA, such was the natural
consequence of two parties with conflicting views insisting on their respective beliefs. Considering, however, that
respondent was in possession of the item purchased from the shop, together with the official receipt of payment
issued by petitioners, the latter cannot insist that no such payment was made on the basis of a mere speculation.
Their claim should have been proven by substantial evidence in the proper forum.

It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went overboard and tried to force respondent to pay
the amount they were demanding. In the guise of asking for assistance, petitioners even sent a demand letter to
respondent’s employer not only informing it of the incident but obviously imputing bad acts on the part of
respondent.1âwphi1 Petitioners claimed that after receiving the receipt of payment and the item purchased,
respondent "was noted to hurriedly left (sic) the store." They also accused respondent that she was not completely
being honest when she was asked about the circumstances of payment, thus:
x x x After receiving the OR and the item, Ms. Gutierrez was noted to hurriedly left (sic) the store. x x x
When I asked her about to whom she gave the money, she gave out a blank expression and told me, "I can’t
remember." Then I asked her how much money she gave, she answered, "₱2,100; 2 pcs 1,000 and 1 pc 100 bill."
Then I told her that that would (sic) impossible since we have no such denomination in our cash fund at that
moment. Finally, I asked her if how much change and if she received change from the cashier, she then answered,
"I don’t remember." After asking these simple questions, I am very certain that she is not completely being honest
about this. In fact, we invited her to come to our boutique to clear these matters but she vehemently refused saying
that she’s in a hurry and very busy.37
Clearly, these statements are outrightly accusatory. Petitioners accused respondent that not only did she fail to pay
for the jeans she purchased but that she deliberately took the same without paying for it and later hurriedly left the
shop to evade payment. These accusations were made despite the issuance of the receipt of payment and the
release of the item purchased. There was, likewise, no showing that respondent had the intention to evade
payment. Contrary to petitioners’ claim, respondent was not in a rush in leaving the shop or the mall. This is
evidenced by the fact that the Guess employees did not have a hard time looking for her when they realized the
supposed non-payment.
It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the demand letter to respondent’s employer, petitioners
intended not only to ask for assistance in collecting the disputed amount but to tarnish respondent’s reputation in the
eyes of her employer. To malign respondent without substantial evidence and despite the latter’s possession of
enough evidence in her favor, is clearly impermissible. A person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to
honesty and good faith, otherwise, he opens himself to liability.38
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be
excessive or unduly harsh.39 In this case, petitioners obviously abused their rights.
Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles 20 and 2 of the Civil Code which read:
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter
for the same.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals or good
customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

In view of the foregoing, respondent is entitled to an award of moral damages and attorney s fees. Moral damages
may be awarded whenever the defendant s wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code.41 Moral damages are not a bonanza. They are given to ease the defendant s grief and suffering. They
should, thus, reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done.42 They are
awarded not to enrich the complainant but to enable the latter to obtain means, diversions, or amusements that will
serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone.43 We find that the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages awarded by the CA is reasonable under the circumstances. Considering that respondent was compelled to
litigate to protect her interest, attorney s fees in the amount of of₱20,000.00 is likewise just and proper.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
August 3, 2006 and Resolution dated November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80309, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

EN BANC

MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ

Petitioner,
versus -
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE
RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTAO, et.al.,
Respondents.

FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.,

Respondent-Intervenor.

G.R. No. 193459

Present:
CORONA, C.J., CARPIO,CARPIO MORALES,VELASCO, JR.,*NACHURA,LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,BRION,PERALTA,BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO,ABAD,VILLARAMA, JR.,PEREZ,MENDOZA, andSERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:
February 15, 2011
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via petition for certiorari and prohibition the
Resolutions of September 1 and 7, 2010 of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice (public
respondent).
Before the 15th Congress opened its first session on July 26, 2010 (the fourth Monday of July, in accordance with
Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution) or on July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo
Lim, and spouses Felipe and Evelyn Pestao (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint[1] against petitioner,
upon the endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.[2]
A day after the opening of the 15th Congress or on July 27, 2010, Atty. Marilyn Barua-Yap, Secretary General of the
House of Representatives, transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr.[3]
who, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.[4]
On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre
Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed another impeachment complaint[5] against
petitioner with a resolution of endorsement by Party-List Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares, Teodoro Casio,
Rafael Mariano, Luzviminda Ilagan, Antonio Tinio and Emerenciana de Jesus.[6] On even date, the House of
Representatives provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress.
By letter still of even date,[7] the Secretary General transmitted the Reyes groups complaint to Speaker Belmonte
who, by Memorandum of August 9, 2010,[8] also directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of
Business.
On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the Committee on Rules,[9]
instructed Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr., Deputy Secretary General for Operations, through Atty. Cesar Pareja, Executive
Director of the Plenary Affairs Department, to include the two complaints in the Order of Business,[10] which was
complied with by their inclusion in the Order of Business for the following day, August 11, 2010.
On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of Representatives simultaneously referred
both complaints to public respondent.[11]
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form,
which complaints it considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time.
Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published on
September 2, 2010.
On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the September 1, 2010 Resolution of public
respondent. Public respondent refused to accept the motion, however, for prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner
to await the notice for her to file an answer to the complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to
each of the 55 members of public respondent.
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two complaints, which both allege
culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,[12] sufficient in substance. The determination of
the sufficiency of substance of the complaints by public respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their
allegations, hinged on the issue of whether valid judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon. Petitioner was
served also on September 7, 2010 a notice directing her to file an answer to the complaints within 10 days.[13]
Six days following her receipt of the notice to file answer or on September 13, 2010, petitioner filed with this Court
the present petition with application for injunctive reliefs. The following day or on September 14, 2010, the Court En
Banc RESOLVED to direct the issuance of a status quo ante order[14] and to require respondents to comment on
the petition in 10 days. The Court subsequently, by Resolution of September 21, 2010, directed the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) to file in 10 days its Comment on the petition
The Baraquel group which filed the first complaint, the Reyes group which filed the second complaint, and public
respondent (through the OSG and private counsel) filed their respective Comments on September 27, 29 and 30,
2010.
Speaker Belmonte filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene dated October 4, 2010 which the Court granted by
Resolution of October 5, 2010.
Under an Advisory[15] issued by the Court, oral arguments were conducted on October 5 and 12, 2010, followed by
petitioners filing of a Consolidated Reply of October 15, 2010 and the filing by the parties of Memoranda within the
given 15-day period.

The petition is harangued by procedural objections which the Court shall first resolve.
Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. They argue that public respondent
was not exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment
complaints as it was exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature,[16] and that its function is inquisitorial
that is akin to a preliminary investigation.[17]
These same arguments were raised in Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives.[18] The argument that
impeachment proceedings are beyond the reach of judicial review was debunked in this wise:
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme
Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is
discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in
the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to
correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the
power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole
power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the
House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the
exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the
manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead
to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship
on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed
legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride."
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the
Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,
"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power
of judicial review.
xxxx
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional
action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court
to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in
the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Taada v. Angara, in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine
Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy
and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda, this Court declared
null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election,
of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra, it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in the Commission
on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article
VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson, it held that the act of the House of
Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review. In
Taada v. Cuenco, it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in
Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress.
In Angara v. Electoral Commission, it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any
member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge
the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole
and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it
by the Constitution.[19] (citations omitted; italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the expanded certiorari jurisdiction[20] of
this Court reflects, includes the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.[21]
In the present case, petitioner invokes the Courts expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using the special civil actions of
certiorari and prohibition as procedural vehicles. The Court finds it well-within its power to determine whether public
respondent committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its functions
and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from
the Court.
Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance, but simply upholding the
supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will.[22]
Respondents do not seriously contest all the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review, as they only
assert that the petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the course of the proceedings before public respondent. Public respondent argues
that when petitioner filed the present petition[23] on September 13, 2010, it had not gone beyond the determination
of the sufficiency of form and substance of the two complaints.
An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite of ripeness.[24] The question of ripeness is
especially relevant in light of the direct, adverse effect on an individual by the challenged conduct.[25] In the present
petition, there is no doubt that questions on, inter alia, the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two complaints
and on the need to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the
House (Impeachment Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation.
The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment complaints presents a novel
situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took the
cue from the constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an
impeachable officer within a period of one year.
And so the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issue ─ whether public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed Resolutions. Petitioner basically
anchors her claim on alleged violation of the due process clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) and of the one-year bar provision
(Art. XI, Sec 3, par. 5) of the Constitution.

Due process of law

Petitioner alleges that public respondents chairperson, Representative Niel Tupas, Jr. (Rep. Tupas), is the subject of
an investigation she is conducting, while his father, former Iloilo Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had been charged by her
with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. To petitioner, the actions taken
by her office against Rep. Tupas and his father influenced the proceedings taken by public respondent in such a
way that bias and vindictiveness played a big part in arriving at the finding of sufficiency of form and substance of
the complaints against her.
The Court finds petitioners allegations of bias and vindictiveness bereft of merit, there being hardly any indication
thereof. Mere suspicion of partiality does not suffice.[26]
The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body itself. So GMCR, Inc. v. Bell
Telecommunications Phils.[27] teaches:
First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the three members of the
commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of
the commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming
from the rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally
render an NTC order, resolution or decision.
Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not speak
and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body x x x. [28]
In the present case, Rep. Tupas, public respondent informs, did not, in fact, vote and merely presided over the
proceedings when it decided on the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints.[29]
Even petitioners counsel conceded during the oral arguments that there are no grounds to compel the inhibition of
Rep. Tupas.
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Well, the Committee is headed by a gentleman who happened to be a respondent in the charges that the Ombudsman
filed. In addition to that[,] his father was likewise a respondent in another case. How can he be expected to act with
impartiality, in fairness and in accordance with law under that matter, he is only human we grant him that benefit.
JUSTICE MORALES:
Is he a one-man committee?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
He is not a one-man committee, Your Honor, but he decides.
JUSTICE MORALES:
Do we presume good faith or we presume bad faith?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
We presume that he is acting in good faith, Your Honor, but then (interrupted)
JUSTICE MORALES:
So, that he was found liable for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, does that mean that your client will be
deprived of due process of law?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
No, what we are stating, Your Honor, is that expectation of a client goes with the Ombudsman, which goes with the
element of due process is the lack of impartiality that may be expected of him.
JUSTICE MORALES:
But as you admitted the Committee is not a one-man committee?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MORALES:
So, why do you say then that there is a lack of impartiality?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Because if anything before anything goes (sic) he is the presiding officer of the committee as in this case there were
objections relative to the existence of the implementing rules not heard, there was objection made by Congressman Golez
to the effect that this may give rise to a constitutional crisis.
JUSTICE MORALES:
That called for a voluntary inhibition. Is there any law or rule you can cite which makes it mandatory for the chair of the
committee to inhibit given that he had previously been found liable for violation of a law[?]
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
There is nothing, Your Honor. In our jurisprudence which deals with the situation whereby with that background as the
material or pertinent antecedent that there could be no violation of the right of the petitioner to due process. What is the
effect of notice, hearing if the judgment cannot come from an impartial adjudicator.[30] (emphasis and underscoring
supplied) Petitioner contends that the indecent and precipitate haste of public respondent in finding the two
complaints sufficient in form and substance is a clear indication of bias, she pointing out that it only took public
respondent five minutes to arrive thereat.

An abbreviated pace in the conduct of proceedings is not per se an indication of bias, however. So Santos-Concio v.
Department of Justice[31] holds:
Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an
injudicious performance of functions. For ones prompt dispatch may be anothers undue haste. The orderly administration
of justice remains as the paramount and constant consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to
each case.
The presumption of regularity includes the public officers official actuations in all phases of work. Consistent with such
presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present contradictory evidence other than a mere tallying of days or
numerical calculation. This, petitioners failed to discharge. The swift completion of the Investigating Panels initial task
cannot be relegated as shoddy or shady without discounting the presumably regular performance of not just one but five
state prosecutors.[32] (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner goes on to contend that her participation in the determination of sufficiency of form and substance was
indispensable. As mandated by the Impeachment Rules, however, and as, in fact, conceded by petitioners counsel,
the participation of the impeachable officer starts with the filing of an answer.
JUSTICE MORALES:
Is it not that the Committee should first determine that there is sufficiency in form and substance before she is asked to file
her answer (interrupted)
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MORALES:
During which she can raise any defenses she can assail the regularity of the proceedings and related irregularities?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Yes. We are in total conformity and in full accord with that statement, Your Honor, because it is only after a determination
that the complaint is sufficient in form and substance that a complaint may be filed, Your Honor, without that but it may be
asked, how is not your action premature, Your Honor, our answer is- no, because of the other violations involved and that
is (interrupted).[33] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Rule III(A) of the Impeachment Rules of the 15th Congress reflects the impeachment procedure at the Committee-
level, particularly Section 5[34] which denotes that petitioners initial participation in the impeachment proceedings
the opportunity to file an Answer starts after the Committee on Justice finds the complaint sufficient in form and
substance. That the Committee refused to accept petitioners motion for reconsideration from its finding of sufficiency
of form of the impeachment complaints is apposite, conformably with the Impeachment Rules.
Petitioner further claims that public respondent failed to ascertain the sufficiency of form and substance of the
complaints on the basis of the standards set by the Constitution and its own Impeachment Rules.[35]
The claim fails.
The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is an exponent of the express
constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House of Representatives which committed such determinative
function to public respondent. In the discharge of that power and in the exercise of its discretion, the House has
formulated determinable standards as to the form and substance of an impeachment complaint. Prudential
considerations behoove the Court to respect the compliance by the House of its duty to effectively carry out the
constitutional purpose, absent any contravention of the minimum constitutional guidelines.
Contrary to petitioners position that the Impeachment Rules do not provide for comprehensible standards in
determining the sufficiency of form and substance, the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional
requirements and providing that there must be a verified complaint or resolution,[36] and that the substance
requirement is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction
of the committee.[37]
Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of sufficiency of form and
substance of an impeachment complaint is made necessary. This requirement is not explicitly found in the organic
law, as Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution basically merely requires a hearing.[38] In the discharge of its
constitutional duty, the House deemed that a finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an impeachment
complaint is vital to effectively carry out the impeachment process, hence, such additional requirement in the
Impeachment Rules.
Petitioner urges the Court to look into the narration of facts constitutive of the offenses vis--vis her submissions
disclaiming the allegations in the complaints.
This the Court cannot do.
Francisco instructs that this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislature. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. x x x x
Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its
judicial power[.][39] Worse, petitioner urges the Court to make a preliminary assessment of certain grounds raised,
upon a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the complaints, which involve matters of defense.

In another vein, petitioner, pursuing her claim of denial of due process, questions the lack of or, more accurately,
delay in the publication of the Impeachment Rules.
To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3, 2010, public respondent
provisionally adopted the Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter published on September 2, 2010
its Impeachment Rules, admittedly substantially identical with that of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers of
general circulation.[40]
Citing Taada v. Tuvera,[41] petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process since the Impeachment Rules
was published only on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the
complaints. She likewise tacks her contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that
Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.

Public respondent counters that promulgation in this case refers to the publication of rules in any medium of
information, not necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation.[42]
Differentiating Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations[43] which held that
the Constitution categorically requires publication of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, public respondent
explains that the Impeachment Rules is intended to merely enable Congress to effectively carry out the purpose of
Section 3(8), Art. XI of Constitution.

Blacks Law Dictionary broadly defines promulgate as

To publish; to announce officially; to make public as important or obligatory. The formal act of announcing a statute
or rule of court. An administrative order that is given to cause an agency law or regulation to become known or
obligatory.[44] (emphasis supplied)

While promulgation would seem synonymous to publication, there is a statutory difference in their usage.
The Constitution notably uses the word promulgate 12 times.[45] A number of those instances involves the
promulgation of various rules, reports and issuances emanating from Congress, this Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman as well as other constitutional offices.
To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms promulgate and publish, the case of the Judiciary is
in point. In promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, the Court has invariably required the publication of these rules for their effectivity. As far
as promulgation of judgments is concerned, however, promulgation means the delivery of the decision to the clerk of
court for filing and publication.[46]
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution contains a similar provision directing Congress to promulgate its rules for
the canvassing of the certificates in the presidential and vice presidential elections. Notably, when Congress
approved its canvassing rules for the May 14, 2010 national elections on May 25, 2010,[47] it did not require the
publication thereof for its effectivity. Rather, Congress made the canvassing rules effective upon its adoption.
In the case of administrative agencies, promulgation and publication likewise take on different meanings as they are
part of a multi-stage procedure in quasi-legislation. As detailed in one case,[48] the publication of implementing
rules occurs after their promulgation or adoption.

Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understoodthat is, to make known. Generalia
verba sunt generaliter inteligencia. What is generally spoken shall be generally understood. Between the restricted
sense and the general meaning of a word, the general must prevail unless it was clearly intended that the restricted
sense was to be used.[49]
Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict promulgation to publication, the former should be understood to
have been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its
Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a
decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication.
It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when the Constitution itself has not
prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond
the dictates of the Constitution.
Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is but one avenue for Congress to make
known its rules. Jurisprudence emphatically teaches that
x x x in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which
to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of
separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of
courts to direct Congress how to do its work. In the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion
that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and
effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.[50] (italics
in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated so as categorically as
it did in the case of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, per Neri. Other than promulgate, there is no other
single formal term in the English language to appropriately refer to an issuance without need of it being published.

IN FINE, petitioner cannot take refuge in Neri since inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a set of
rules of procedure. Significantly notable in Neri is that with respect to the issue of publication, the Court anchored its
ruling on the 1987 Constitutions directive, without any reliance on or reference to the 1986 case of Taada v.
Tuvera.[51] Taada naturally could neither have interpreted a forthcoming 1987 Constitution nor had kept a tight rein
on the Constitutions intentions as expressed through the allowance of either a categorical term or a general sense
of making known the issuances.
From the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, then Commissioner, now retired Associate Justice Florenz
Regalado intended Section 3(8), Article XI to be the vehicle for the House to fill the gaps in the impeachment
process.

Section 3 (2), there is mention of indorsing a verified complaint for impeachment by any citizen alleging ultimate
facts constituting a ground or grounds for impeachment. In other words, it is just like a provision in the rules of court.
Instead, I propose that this procedural requirement, like indorsement of a complaint by a citizen to avoid harassment
or crank complaints, could very well be taken up in a new section 4 which shall read as follows: THE CONGRESS
SHALL PROMULGATE ITS RULES ON IMPEACHMENT TO EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES
THEREOF. I think all these other procedural requirements could be taken care of by the Rules of Congress.[52]
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The discussion clearly rejects the notion that the impeachment provisions are not self-executing. Section 3(8) does
not, in any circumstance, operate to suspend the entire impeachment mechanism which the Constitutional
Commission took pains in designing even its details.

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and
have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner
similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like
that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the
prevailing view is, as it has always been, that
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing . . . . Unless the
contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule
would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be
subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass
the needed implementing statute.[53] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings taken prior to the
effectivity of the Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of the
Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the
mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution would already run or even lapse while awaiting the
expiration of the 15-day period of publication prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House
would already violate the Constitution for its inaction on the impeachment complaints pending the completion of the
publication requirement.

Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules on impeachment is aimed at effectively
carry[ing] out the purpose of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion when the
House deemed it proper to provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of the 14th Congress, to meet the
exigency in such situation of early filing and in keeping with the effective implementation of the purpose of the
impeachment provisions. In other words, the provisional adoption of the previous Congress Impeachment Rules is
within the power of the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the avowed purpose.

Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, merely aid or supplement
the procedural aspects of impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may be given retroactive application to
pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that,
as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.[54] In the present case, petitioner
fails to allege any impairment of vested rights.

It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislation where the rights of witnesses are involved,
impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the
offender.[55]

Even Neri concedes that the unpublished rules of legislative inquiries were not considered null and void in its
entirety. Rather,

x x x [o]nly those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering
that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective.[56] (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Petitioner in fact does not deny that she was fully apprised of the proper procedure. She even availed of and
invoked certain provisions[57] of the Impeachment Rules when she, on September 7, 2010, filed the motion for
reconsideration and later filed the present petition. The Court thus finds no violation of the due process clause.

The one-year bar rule

Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.

Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July
22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year
from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.

On the other hand, public respondent, respondent Reyes group and respondent-intervenor submit that the initiation
starts with the filing of the impeachment complaint and ends with the referral to the Committee, following Francisco,
but venture to alternatively proffer that the initiation ends somewhere between the conclusion of the Committee
Report and the transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. Respondent Baraquel group, meanwhile,
essentially maintains that under either the prevailing doctrine or the parties interpretation, its impeachment
complaint could withstand constitutional scrutiny.

Contrary to petitioners asseveration, Francisco[58] states that the term initiate means to file the complaint and take
initial action on it.[59] The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action
to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking initial
action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the
Committee on Justice.

Petitioner misreads the remark of Commissioner Joaquin Bernas, S.J. that no second verified impeachment may be
accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action[60] which contemplates a situation where a first
impeachment complaint had already been referred. Bernas and Regalado, who both acted as amici curiae in
Francisco, affirmed that the act of initiating includes the act of taking initial action on the complaint.

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional
Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint
coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment
complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third[61] of the members of the House
of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against
the same official within a one year period.[62] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Court, in Francisco, thus found that the assailed provisions of the 12th Congress Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings ─ Sections 16[63] and 17[64] of Rule V thereof ─ clearly contravene Section 3(5) of
Article XI since they g[a]ve the term initiate a meaning different from filing and referral.[65]
Petitioner highlights certain portions of Francisco which delve on the relevant records of the Constitutional
Commission, particularly Commissioner Maambongs statements[66] that the initiation starts with the filing of the
complaint.

Petitioner fails to consider the verb starts as the operative word. Commissioner Maambong was all too keen to
stress that the filing of the complaint indeed starts the initiation and that the Houses action on the committee
report/resolution is not part of that initiation phase.

Commissioner Maambong saw the need to be very technical about this,[67] for certain exchanges in the
Constitutional Commission deliberations loosely used the term, as shown in the following exchanges.
MR. DAVIDE. That is for conviction, but not for initiation. Initiation of impeachment proceedings still requires a vote of one-
fifth of the membership of the House under the 1935 Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. A two-thirds vote of the membership of the House is required to initiate proceedings.
MR. DAVIDE. No. for initiation of impeachment proceedings, only one-fifth vote of the membership of the House is
required; for conviction, a two-thirds vote of the membership is required.
xxxx
MR. DAVIDE. However, if we allow one-fifth of the membership of the legislature to overturn a report of the committee, we
have here Section 3 (4) which reads:

No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

So, necessarily, under this particular subsection, we will, in effect, disallow one-fifth of the members of the National
Assembly to revive an impeachment move by an individual or an ordinary Member.
MR. ROMULO. Yes. May I say that Section 3 (4) is there to look towards the possibility of a very liberal impeachment
proceeding. Second, we were ourselves struggling with that problem where we are faced with just a verified complaint
rather than the signatures of one-fifth, or whatever it is we decide, of the Members of the House. So whether to put a
period for the Committee to report, whether we should not allow the Committee to overrule a mere verified complaint, are
some of the questions we would like to be discussed.
MR. DAVIDE. We can probably overrule a rejection by the Committee by providing that it can be overturned by, say, one-
half or a majority, or one-fifth of the members of the legislature, and that such overturning will not amount to a refiling
which is prohibited under Section 3 (4).

Another point, Madam President. x x x[68] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

An apparent effort to clarify the term initiate was made by Commissioner Teodulo Natividad:
MR. NATIVIDAD. How many votes are needed to initiate?
MR. BENGZON. One-third.
MR. NATIVIDAD. To initiate is different from to impeach; to impeach is different from to convict. To impeach means to file
the case before the Senate.
MR. REGALADO. When we speak of initiative, we refer here to the Articles of Impeachment.
MR. NATIVIDAD. So, that is the impeachment itself, because when we impeach, we are charging him with the Articles of
Impeachment. That is my understanding.[69] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Capping these above-quoted discussions was the explanation of Commissioner Maambong delivered on at least
two occasions:

[I]
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the amendment
submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the
filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation
starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution
containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.

As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts
on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President
Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the
Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which
initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could
help in rearranging the words because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The
Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on
the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided.
Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.

Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.[70] (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
[II]
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My
reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only with keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules
of the House of Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment.

I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of its provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from
lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: to initiate impeachment proceedings and the comma (,) and insert
on line 19 after the word resolution the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter i in
impeachment and replace the word by with OF, so that the whole section will now read: A vote of at least one-third
of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of
impeachment OF the committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the United States
is concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries
with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words Articles of Impeachment are mentioned on line 25
in the 0case of the direct filing of a verified complaint of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will mention
again, Madam President, that my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the
uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress.

Thank you, Madam President.[71] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To the next logical question of what ends or completes the initiation, Commissioners Bernas and Regalado lucidly
explained that the filing of the complaint must be accompanied by the referral to the Committee on Justice, which is
the action that sets the complaint moving. Francisco cannot be any clearer in pointing out the material dates.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the
House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against
the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-
year period.[72] (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

These clear pronouncements notwithstanding, petitioner posits that the date of referral was considered irrelevant in
Francisco. She submits that referral could not be the reckoning point of initiation because something prior to that
had already been done,[73] apparently citing Bernas discussion.

The Court cannot countenance any attempt at obscurantism.

What the cited discussion was rejecting was the view that the Houses action on the committee report initiates the
impeachment proceedings. It did not state that to determine the initiating step, absolutely nothing prior to it must be
done. Following petitioners line of reasoning, the verification of the complaint or the endorsement by a member of
the House steps done prior to the filing would already initiate the impeachment proceedings.

Contrary to petitioners emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution mentions is impeachment
proceedings. Her reliance on the singular tense of the word complaint[74] to denote the limit prescribed by the
Constitution goes against the basic rule of statutory construction that a word covers its enlarged and plural
sense.[75]

The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment complaint, for it is the matchstick that
kindles the candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a
matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted matchstick
reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment
proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted matchsticks light the
candle at the same time. What is important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such
that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.

A restrictive interpretation renders the impeachment mechanism both illusive and illusory.

For one, it puts premium on senseless haste. Petitioners stance suggests that whoever files the first impeachment
complaint exclusively gets the attention of Congress which sets in motion an exceptional once-a-year mechanism
wherein government resources are devoted. A prospective complainant, regardless of ill motives or best intentions,
can wittingly or unwittingly desecrate the entire process by the expediency of submitting a haphazard complaint out
of sheer hope to be the first in line. It also puts to naught the effort of other prospective complainants who, after
diligently gathering evidence first to buttress the case, would be barred days or even hours later from filing an
impeachment complaint.

Moreover, the first-to-file scheme places undue strain on the part of the actual complainants, injured party or
principal witnesses who, by mere happenstance of an almost always unforeseeable filing of a first impeachment
complaint, would be brushed aside and restricted from directly participating in the impeachment process.

Further, prospective complainants, along with their counsel and members of the House of Representatives who
sign, endorse and file subsequent impeachment complaints against the same impeachable officer run the risk of
violating the Constitution since they would have already initiated a second impeachment proceeding within the same
year. Virtually anybody can initiate a second or third impeachment proceeding by the mere filing of endorsed
impeachment complaints. Without any public notice that could charge them with knowledge, even members of the
House of Representatives could not readily ascertain whether no other impeachment complaint has been filed at the
time of committing their endorsement.

The question as to who should administer or pronounce that an impeachment proceeding has been initiated rests
also on the body that administers the proceedings prior to the impeachment trial. As gathered from Commissioner
Bernas disquisition[76] in Francisco, a proceeding which takes place not in the Senate but in the House[77]
precedes the bringing of an impeachment case to the Senate. In fact, petitioner concedes that the initiation of
impeachment proceedings is within the sole and absolute control of the House of Representatives.[78] Conscious of
the legal import of each step, the House, in taking charge of its own proceedings, must deliberately decide to initiate
an impeachment proceeding, subject to the time frame and other limitations imposed by the Constitution. This
chamber of Congress alone, not its officers or members or any private individual, should own up to its processes.

The Constitution did not place the power of the final say on the lips of the House Secretary General who would
otherwise be calling the shots in forwarding or freezing any impeachment complaint. Referral of the complaint to the
proper committee is not done by the House Speaker alone either, which explains why there is a need to include it in
the Order of Business of the House. It is the House of Representatives, in public plenary session, which has the
power to set its own chamber into special operation by referring the complaint or to otherwise guard against the
initiation of a second impeachment proceeding by rejecting a patently unconstitutional complaint.
Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions that shall be decided without debate,
but any debate thereon is only made subject to the five-minute rule.[79] Moreover, it is common parliamentary
practice that a motion to refer a matter or question to a committee may be debated upon, not as to the merits
thereof, but only as to the propriety of the referral.[80] With respect to complaints for impeachment, the House has
the discretion not to refer a subsequent impeachment complaint to the Committee on Justice where official records
and further debate show that an impeachment complaint filed against the same impeachable officer has already
been referred to the said committee and the one year period has not yet expired, lest it becomes instrumental in
perpetrating a constitutionally prohibited second impeachment proceeding. Far from being mechanical, before the
referral stage, a period of deliberation is afforded the House, as the Constitution, in fact, grants a maximum of three
session days within which to make the proper referral.

As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an impeachment proceeding deals with deadlines.
The Constitution states that [a] verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included
in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter.

In the present case, petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of discretion on the allegedly belated referral of the
first impeachment complaint filed by the Baraquel group. For while the said complaint was filed on July 22, 2010,
there was yet then no session in Congress. It was only four days later or on July 26, 2010 that the 15th Congress
opened from which date the 10-day session period started to run. When, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010,
Speaker Belmonte directed the Committee on Rules to include the complaint in its Order of Business, it was well
within the said 10-day session period.[81]

There is no evident point in rushing at closing the door the moment an impeachment complaint is filed. Depriving the
people (recall that impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic) of reasonable access
to the limited political vent simply prolongs the agony and frustrates the collective rage of an entire citizenry whose
trust has been betrayed by an impeachable officer. It shortchanges the promise of reasonable opportunity to remove
an impeachable officer through the mechanism enshrined in the Constitution.

But neither does the Court find merit in respondents alternative contention that the initiation of the impeachment
proceedings, which sets into motion the one-year bar, should include or await, at the earliest, the Committee on
Justice report. To public respondent, the reckoning point of initiation should refer to the disposition of the complaint
by the vote of at least one-third (1/3) of all the members of the House.[82] To the Reyes group, initiation means the
act of transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.[83] To respondent-intervenor, it should last until the
Committee on Justices recommendation to the House plenary.[84]

The Court, in Francisco, rejected a parallel thesis in which a related proposition was inputed in the therein assailed
provisions of the Impeachment Rules of the 12th Congress. The present case involving an impeachment proceeding
against the Ombudsman offers no cogent reason for the Court to deviate from what was settled in Francisco that
dealt with the impeachment proceeding against the then Chief Justice. To change the reckoning point of initiation on
no other basis but to accommodate the socio-political considerations of respondents does not sit well in a court of
law.

x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. This doctrine, which is really
adherence to precedents," mandates that once a case has been decided one way, then another case involving
exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same manner. This doctrine is one of policy grounded on
the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions. As the renowned jurist Benjamin Cardozo
stated in his treatise The Nature of the Judicial Process:

It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between
another. "If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross
injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I was a
defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of
resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my rights." Adherence to
precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed
administration of justice in the courts.[85]

As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated when the House deliberates on the
resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of
the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is
initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the
initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.[86]

Allowing an expansive construction of the term initiate beyond the act of referral allows the unmitigated influx of
successive complaints, each having their own respective 60-session-day period of disposition from referral. Worse,
the Committee shall conduct overlapping hearings until and unless the disposition of one of the complaints ends
with the affirmance of a resolution for impeachment or the overriding[87] of a contrary resolution (as espoused by
public respondent), or the House transmits the Articles of Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes group),[88] or
the Committee on Justice concludes its first report to the House plenary regardless of the recommendation (as
posited by respondent-intervenor). Each of these scenarios runs roughshod the very purpose behind the
constitutionally imposed one-year bar. Opening the floodgates too loosely would disrupt the series of steps
operating in unison under one proceeding.

The Court does not lose sight of the salutary reason of confining only one impeachment proceeding in a year.
Petitioner concededly cites Justice Adolfo Azcunas separate opinion that concurred with the Francisco ruling.[89]
Justice Azcuna stated that the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: to prevent undue or too frequent harassment;
and 2) to allow the legislature to do its principal task [of] legislation, with main reference to the records of the
Constitutional Commission, that reads:

MR. ROMULO. Yes, the intention here really is to limit. This is not only to protect public officials who, in this case,
are of the highest category from harassment but also to allow the legislative body to do its work which is lawmaking.
Impeachment proceedings take a lot of time. And if we allow multiple impeachment charges on the same individual
to take place, the legislature will do nothing else but that.[90] (underscoring supplied)

It becomes clear that the consideration behind the intended limitation refers to the element of time, and not the
number of complaints. The impeachable officer should defend himself in only one impeachment proceeding, so that
he will not be precluded from performing his official functions and duties. Similarly, Congress should run only one
impeachment proceeding so as not to leave it with little time to attend to its main work of law-making. The doctrine
laid down in Francisco that initiation means filing and referral remains congruent to the rationale of the constitutional
provision.
Petitioner complains that an impeachable officer may be subjected to harassment by the filing of multiple
impeachment complaints during the intervening period of a maximum of 13 session days between the date of the
filing of the first impeachment complaint to the date of referral.

As pointed out during the oral arguments[91] by the counsel for respondent-intervenor, the framework of privilege
and layers of protection for an impeachable officer abound. The requirements or restrictions of a one-year bar, a
single proceeding, verification of complaint, endorsement by a House member, and a finding of sufficiency of form
and substance all these must be met before bothering a respondent to answer already weigh heavily in favor of an
impeachable officer.

Aside from the probability of an early referral and the improbability of inclusion in the agenda of a complaint filed on
the 11th hour (owing to pre-agenda standard operating procedure), the number of complaints may still be filtered or
reduced to nil after the Committee decides once and for all on the sufficiency of form and substance. Besides, if only
to douse petitioners fear, a complaint will not last the primary stage if it does not have the stated preliminary
requisites.

To petitioner, disturbance of her performance of official duties and the deleterious effects of bad publicity are
enough oppression.
Petitioners claim is based on the premise that the exertion of time, energy and other resources runs directly
proportional to the number of complaints filed. This is non sequitur. What the Constitution assures an impeachable
officer is not freedom from arduous effort to defend oneself, which depends on the qualitative assessment of the
charges and evidence and not on the quantitative aspect of complaints or offenses. In considering the side of the
impeachable officers, the Constitution does not promise an absolutely smooth ride for them, especially if the
charges entail genuine and grave issues. The framers of the Constitution did not concern themselves with the media
tolerance level or internal disposition of an impeachable officer when they deliberated on the impairment of
performance of official functions. The measure of protection afforded by the Constitution is that if the impeachable
officer is made to undergo such ride, he or she should be made to traverse it just once. Similarly, if Congress is
called upon to operate itself as a vehicle, it should do so just once. There is no repeat ride for one full year. This is
the whole import of the constitutional safeguard of one-year bar rule.

Applicability of the Rules on Criminal Procedure

On another plane, petitioner posits that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own
Impeachment Rules, the same rules she earlier chastised.
In the exercise of the power to promulgate rules to effectively carry out the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution, the House promulgated the Impeachment Rules, Section 16 of which provides that the Rules of
Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable, apply to impeachment proceedings before
the House.

Finding that the Constitution, by express grant, permits the application of additional adjective rules that Congress
may consider in effectively carrying out its mandate, petitioner either asserts or rejects two procedural devices.
First is on the one offense, one complaint rule. By way of reference to Section 16 of the Impeachment Rules,
petitioner invokes the application of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which states that [a]
complaint or information must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for
various offenses. To petitioner, the two impeachment complaints are insufficient in form and substance since each
charges her with both culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust. She concludes that public
respondent gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own rules.

Petitioner adds that heaping two or more charges in one complaint will confuse her in preparing her defense;
expose her to the grave dangers of the highly political nature of the impeachment process; constitute a whimsical
disregard of certain rules; impair her performance of official functions as well as that of the House; and prevent
public respondent from completing its report within the deadline.

Public respondent counters that there is no requirement in the Constitution that an impeachment complaint must
charge only one offense, and the nature of impeachable offenses precludes the application of the above-said Rule
on Criminal Procedure since the broad terms cannot be defined with the same precision required in defining crimes.
It adds that the determination of the grounds for impeachment is an exercise of political judgment, which issue
respondent-intervenor also considers as non-justiciable, and to which the Baraquel group adds that impeachment is
a political process and not a criminal prosecution, during which criminal prosecution stage the complaint or
information referred thereto and cited by petitioner, unlike an impeachment complaint, must already be in the name
of the People of the Philippines.
The Baraquel group deems that there are provisions[92] outside the Rules on Criminal Procedure that are more
relevant to the issue. Both the Baraquel and Reyes groups point out that even if Sec. 13 of Rule 110 is made to
apply, petitioners case falls under the exception since impeachment prescribes a single punishment removal from
office and disqualification to hold any public office even for various offenses. Both groups also observe that
petitioner concededly and admittedly was not keen on pursuing this issue during the oral arguments.

Petitioners claim deserves scant consideration.

Without going into the effectiveness of the suppletory application of the Rules on Criminal Procedure in carrying out
the relevant constitutional provisions, which prerogative the Constitution vests on Congress, and without delving into
the practicability of the application of the one offense per complaint rule, the initial determination of which must be
made by the House[93] which has yet to pass upon the question, the Court finds that petitioners invocation of that
particular rule of Criminal Procedure does not lie. Suffice it to state that the Constitution allows the indictment for
multiple impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set
known as the Articles of Impeachment.[94] It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only
one impeachable offense.
The second procedural matter deals with the rule on consolidation. In rejecting a consolidation, petitioner maintains
that the Constitution allows only one impeachment complaint against her within one year.

Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate need to consolidate. Its chairperson Rep. Tupas
stated that [c]onsolidation depends on the Committee whether to consolidate[; c]onsolidation may come today or
may come later on after determination of the sufficiency in form and substance, and that for purposes of
consolidation, the Committee will decide when is the time to consolidate[, a]nd if, indeed, we need to
consolidate.[95] Petitioners petition, in fact, initially describes the consolidation as merely contemplated.[96]

Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion, did not yet order a consolidation, the Court will not
venture to make a determination on this matter, as it would be premature, conjectural or anticipatory.[97]
Even if the Court assumes petitioners change of stance that the two impeachment complaints were deemed
consolidated,[98] her claim that consolidation is a legal anomaly fails. Petitioners theory obviously springs from her
proceeding = complaint equation which the Court already brushed aside.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010
of public respondent, the House of Representatives Committee on Justice, are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The
Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on September 14, 2010 is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.