Effect of Safety Regulations and Safe

Working Practices on Substation Design 5

John Finn

Contents
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.2 Segregation of Live Conductors and Bare Live Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.2.1 Techniques for Segregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.2.2 Choice of Technique as a Function of the Voltage Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.3 Clearances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.3.1 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.3.2 Calculation of the Basic Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.3.3 Determination of the Safety Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.3.4 Variations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.4 Earthing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.4.1 General Earth Mat or Grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.4.2 Safety Earths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.5 Operation of High-Voltage Switchgear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.5.1 Types of Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.5.2 Locking Off Switches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.5.3 Auxiliary Operating Supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.5.4 Current and Voltage Instrument Circuits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.6 Protection Against Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.6.1 Limitation of the Damage Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.6.2 Extinguishing of the Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.7 Fences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.7.1 External Fences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.7.2 Internal Fences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

J. Finn (*)
CIGRE UK, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
e-mail: finnsjohn@gmail.com

# Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019 41

T. Krieg, J. Finn (eds.), Substations, CIGRE Green Books,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49574-3_5
42 J. Finn

5.1 Introduction

From the very beginning of the use of electrical power, it has been known that
substations present a significant risk to personnel particularly from electric shock.
Consequently, the design of electrical substations has always had to take into
account the relevant measures to protect people who may be building, commission-
ing, operating, maintaining, or decommissioning the substation from these and other
risks. In this section the basic logic behind the measures to be adopted is presented,
and these will be illustrated in many cases by dimensions. Any dimensions presented
in this chapter should be considered as minima, and any designer should be aware
that utilities throughout the world have usually developed specific requirements for
their own substations. These specific requirements that may be incorporated into
safety rules or in some cases legal requirements must be complied with when
designing substations for a particular utility.
This chapter considers the safety measures that should be taken into account in
the design of high-voltage substations while maintaining quality of service.
The following aspects are expanded on within this chapter:

• Segregation of live conductors and bare live equipment

• Clearances
• Earthing (grounding)
• Operation of high-voltage switchgear
• Protection against fire
• Fences

The supervision and control of a high-voltage substation installation requires

auxiliary circuits and low-voltage measuring circuits, and the safety implications of
these must also be taken into account. It should also be noted that the requirements
discussed in this chapter will generally be applicable to substations at all voltage
levels from distribution to transmission.

5.2 Segregation of Live Conductors and Bare Live Equipment

The techniques used for segregating live conductors and bare live equipment can
basically be divided into three main categories:

• Self-protected equipment
• Open equipment rendered inaccessible by screens
• Open equipment rendered inaccessible by distance
5 Effect of Safety Regulations and Safe Working Practices on Substation. . . 43

5.2.1 Techniques for Segregation

a) Self-Protected Equipment

This category or equipment, known as “self protected,” is equipment having an

insulated or metal casing of any kind. It is constructed in such a manner as to make
any contact, even accidental, with live equipment impossible during normal operation.
Such equipment is normally at lower voltages, such as is used in distribution
substations; however, with the increasing use of gas-insulated switchgear, it now
extends to the highest transmission voltages.
Self-protected equipment can be divided into two main types based on the
technology used, and these types are usually also dependent upon the voltage level.

• Category A
For voltages up to about 36 kV, the circuit breaker may be of a drawout type that
means that if it is drawn out from the bus bar and feeder (or circuit) connections,
then bus bar and feeder disconnectors are not necessary. The disconnection of the
circuit breaker is evident from its position in the cubicle.
• Category B
At higher voltages, except for special cases, the circuit breaker is fixed, and the
substation is fitted with bus bar and circuit selectors enclosed in metal casings that
constitute the protection for the equipment and the conductors. It should be
possible to verify the position of these disconnectors at any time. This kind of
arrangement is that usually used in gas-insulated switchgear.

Under normal operating conditions, there is no problem in operating these circuit

breakers safely. However, maintenance work, which requires the dismantling of the
protective casings, may necessitate taking additional safety measures such as
checking that the equipment is dead and disconnected and the conductors involved
in the work are earthed and may need the erection of screens. The specific measures
will differ for each type of equipment and, so it is not possible to give general rules.
Consequently self-protected equipment should be designed in such a way that any
contact, even accidental, with conductors and equipment that may be live is impos-
sible. Furthermore, the equipment should include any sequence controls and inter-
locks necessary for the prevention of dangerous maloperation of any kind.
Where bus selectors and circuit disconnectors are used, it should be possible to
verify the disconnection achieved by these:

• Either directly by visual inspection of the position of the blades or of the circuit
breaker if it is of a withdrawable type and performs the function of the
disconnectors in the withdrawn position
• Or by the use of discrepancy or position indicator lamps which are designed to
have impossibility of error in the indication of the position
44 J. Finn

For such indications to be effective, they must be “active”; this means that the
“open” and “closed” positions must both be obtained by the transmission of a signal
initiated by the effective position of the disconnector. In the case of luminous
indication, two lamps should be used, one corresponding with the open position
and one with the closed.
The switchgear must be designed to enable the fitting of mobile earthing connec-
tions to the conductors and equipment, if necessary using suitably placed fixed takeoff
points. The casings should be designed with any devices to enable the fixing of any
mobile protective screens that may be necessary for the carrying out of certain work.
Finally, it is strongly recommended that the users of such equipment should
prepare, in conjunction with the manufacturers, a detailed operating procedure for
each case concerned and a summary provided to all supervisory staff. It is particu-
larly important for any work that necessitates dismantling of any component of the
casing even if only partial.
With gas-insulated switchgear, there are other considerations that often occur
when it is necessary to carry out work within a gas chamber. Many utilities will not
allow work to be carried out adjacent to a gas barrier if the chamber on the other side
of the barrier is under normal working pressure. The designer of the GIS must
therefore explain how all work can be carried out within a chamber without the
abovementioned condition arising. Furthermore, as gas-insulated switchgear has
become so compact, particularly at voltages of 145 kV and below, some utilities
insist upon having a buffer chamber between bays to enable safe access to all the
parts of the equipment and to ease disassembly when required. This buffer chamber
will assist in avoiding working adjacent to a barrier with pressure on the other side.

b) Open Equipment Rendered Inaccessible by Screens

When screens are provided, whatever their construction solid or grill, insulating or
conducting, brick or prefabricated, or fixed or movable, they must constitute an
effective protection for staff against approaching dangerously close to live equipment
and conductors during simple inspection and operation and when carrying out work.
Protection walls and screens must be designed and arranged such that:

• They delimit the functional volumes intended to receive equipment related to a

given operating component.
• Any normal switching operation may be carried out without opening or disman-
tling any of their elements, and that it is not necessary to enter into any completely
closed cubicle.
• The safety measures, which have to be taken to enable the work to be carried out such
as checking that the equipment is not live, fitting short circuiting, and earthing devices
and screens where necessary, can be taken without danger to staff or equipment.

c) Open Equipment Made Inaccessible by Distance

This technique is based solely upon maintaining suitable distances between the
live equipment and conductors, on the one hand, and the operational staff
5 Effect of Safety Regulations and Safe Working Practices on Substation. . . 45

movement areas required for enabling switching operations and carrying out
work, on the other.
Determining the required distances depends upon a number of criteria that are
explained in Sect. 5.3.

5.2.2 Choice of Technique as a Function of the Voltage Level

The choice of technique is usually based on the voltage level of the substation. The
following solutions that are not listed in any preferential order may be considered.
These solutions follow the normal custom and practice and the technology of
equipment offered by the manufacturers:

a) Up to 1,000 V (rms voltage value in the case of AC)

• Maximum use of self-protected equipment and of insulated connections.
Failing this, rendering inaccessible by means of screens or by distance
b) From 1,000 to 25,000 V
• Use of open equipment made inaccessible by means of the use of solid screens
or grills normally forming functional cubicles.
• Use of open equipment rendered inaccessible by distance.
• Use of self-protected material and equipment. This technique is now used
extensively with metal-enclosed and metal-clad switchgear.
c) Above 25,000 V
• In the majority of cases, this is achieved by rendering inaccessible by distance.
• Use of self-protected equipment, particularly when space is limited. This is, of
course, the technique used when gas-insulated switchgear is employed.
• Rendering inaccessible by the use of solid screens or grills is usually reserved
for indoor substations using open equipment.

5.3 Clearances

There are many different values used for the insulation and safety clearances used by
different utilities throughout the world. These clearances have been derived in many
different ways, sometimes not following any particular logic related to the opera-
tional voltages. In this section the work published by CIGRE in Electra No19 dated
November 1971 is used as the basis to explain the logic of how safety clearances
may be derived. Many utilities have a similar approach, but the actual figures used
may vary, and in some cases, the same name is used but for a different parameter. See
Table 5.1 below for a typical example of safety clearances. Furthermore, the
techniques and tools used for maintenance have changed over the years, and this is
reflected in example, Table 5.1, which shows how this may affect the safety
clearances.
The method adopted uses a common rule based on the voltage level of the
substation, but the method of application takes into account, in each case, the
operating conditions of the equipment. For the purpose of this description, the
 46

Table 5.1 Determination of safety distances in air

Distances d’ éloignement (safety distances)

Circulation du personnel Zone de travail en 1’ absence
Niveau Distance Valeur de bose (Figs. 3 et 4) a Circulation d’ engins Fig. V
d’engins lourde (Fig. 6 )
de tenue au de non – Valeur de la
choc cmorcege Valeur Sou» connexions A la Horizontale Vinicole Zòne du sécurité
majoration b Valeur
1 kv 2 cm de bosse des
Zsee de Zsee de totole m
base Zone de isolateurs
Valeur secuies Valeur secuies Valeur 15 = 5 +
On % orrondie cm sécurité Gobarit Debarement
totale m 8m (Pertis lias) totale m (Pertis lias) totale m 13 + 14
3 en cm 4 5= 2+4 sortie (Portie 13 m 14 m
7=5+6 9m 10 = 5 + 9 11 m 12 = 5 + 11
fie) 6 m
Staff circulation Work zone in the absence Vehicle circulation
Basic value
Impulse Non- (Figs. 3 and 4) of heavy machines (Fig. 6 c) Fig. V
voltage flashover Amount of
with stand distance addition d Below connections
Horizontal Vertical Safety zone
1 kv CEI values
2 cm Basic Safety Total Safety Safety Total Total
In % Rounded value zone value m Total
zone zone value m Gauge Tolerance value m
3 in cm cm (fixed part) 7= 5+ 6 value m
(fixed part) (fixed party) 12 = 5 13 m 14 m 15 = 5 +
4 5=2+4 6m 10 = 5 + 9
8m 9m 11 m + 11 13 + 14
60 9 10 1 10 2.25 2.25 1.75 1.25 0.70
75 12 1 13
95 16 2 18
125 22 2 24
170 32 3 35
250 48 5 53

Minimun de 3,00
325 63 7 70 Minimun de 3,00
380 75 8 83 3.08
Minimun de 3,00

450 92 10 102 3.27

550 115 12 127 3.52 3.02
650 138 14 152 3.77 3.27
750 162 17 179 4.04 3.54 3.04
To be determined in each case

To be determined in each case

825 180 18 198 4.23 3.73 3.23

A determiner dans chaque cas

900 196 20 216 4.41 3.91 3.41

A determiner dans chaque cas

1050 230 23 253 4.78 4.23 3.78

1425 305 6 18 353 5.48 4.98 4.48
1550 330 20 350 5.73 5.26 4.75
a-Dans le cas d'utilisation d’utilisation d’engins lourds, la zone de securité (Partie variable) est à augmenter de l’ encombrement maximal des engins utilisés compte tenu de leurs déploiements et dos haubons éventuels.
b-Cette majoration pout no pas être appliquée lorsque les condition de réalisation des frevoux assurent par allés – mémo le respect dons fous les cas d’une valour do base au moins dgalo â la distance de non amorçage.
c-When heavy machines are used, the safety zone (variable part) should be increased by the maximum dimensions of the machines used taking into account their radius of manceuvre and any guys.
d-This addition may be ignored when the conditions under which the work is carried out are adequate in themselves to ensure maintenance of a basicvalue at least equal to the non-flashover voltage under all conditions.
J. Finn
5 Effect of Safety Regulations and Safe Working Practices on Substation. . . 47

distances so obtained were defined as “safety distances.” These distances should be

applied as minima where they exceed any other distances specified for a country or
utility, but only in agreement with the utility concerned.

5.3.1 Definition

The “safety distance” means the minimum distance to be maintained in air between the
live piece of equipment or conductor, on the one hand, and the earth or another piece of
equipment or conductor on which it is necessary to carry out work, on the other.
(It should be noted that these distances are in air and do not relate to insulator
lengths or creepage distances.)
This “safety distance” is made up of two values as follows:

• A basic value, related to the impulse withstand voltage for the substation, which
determines a “guard” zone around the conducting parts.
(It should be noted that the impulse voltage withstand level is chosen rather than
the highest voltage on the system, because for each standard withstand level, there
is a precise corresponding non-flashover distance. However, the highest voltage
on the system has a number of different impulse withstand levels and hence a
number of different distances for non-flashover.)
• A value which is a function of movements to be made by staff or the nature of jobs
to be carried out taking into account the devices which will be used. This
determines a zone called the “safety zone” within which any danger inherent in
the electrical risk has been removed.

5.3.2 Calculation of the Basic Value

The basic value must guarantee no risk of flashover under the least favorable
conditions. In order to achieve this, it is selected by taking the impulse withstand
level for the substation and then looking up the corresponding non-flashover dis-
tance in air. This distance is then increased by a safety factor of 5–10% to allow for a
slight scatter in the positioning of equipment due to manufacturing tolerances and for
slight geometrical differences in the equipment made by different manufacturers.
The safety factor can only be guaranteed if the impulse voltage taken as the basis for
the calculation of the basic value is never exceeded. This requires that the substation
has equipment capable of limiting the incoming surges, for example, surge arresters,
spark gaps, or similar devices to provide the required degree of protection. Usually
the basic value is the design clearance chosen for phase to earth.

5.3.3 Determination of the Safety Zone

In order to derive the safety zone, it is necessary to add to the basic value, determined
as described in Sect. 5.3.2, a variable factor based upon:
48 J. Finn

Fig. 5.1 Average dimensions of plant operators

• The height of the operators

• The nature of the work to be carried out on the equipment
• The operating procedure and taking into account the requirement for movement
and access

A method of determining the mean dimensions to be used taking into account the
above is given in Fig. 5.1.
These dimensions are basically guidelines and can be increased if considered
prudent. Further clearances also need to be taken into consideration.
Table 5.1 summarizes the process of deriving the safety distance.
a) Movement of Staff

If there are no grills or screens fitted, then the safety distance between the ground
and the lowest live parts must take into account the free movement for the operating
staff.
5 Effect of Safety Regulations and Safe Working Practices on Substation. . . 49

From consideration of the dimensions in Fig. 5.1 above, this height should be
equal to the basic value plus 2.25 m (this dimension corresponds to the average
height of a worker with his arms outstretched). However, as the basic value for
impulse withstand voltages less than 380 kV is very small, a minimum value for the
safety distance for staff circulation of 3.0 m is adopted. Also the distance between the
base of any post insulator and the ground should not be less than 2.25 m. The
insulator is considered as a live component of steadily reducing voltage, and only the
lowest metal parts are at earth potential. This is summarized in Fig. 5.2 below.
The distances defined are to be considered as taken from the highest point accessible
without climbing in the normal course of movement (such as raised cable ducts, steps,
or gratings from which switching operations are performed if these are provided).
When the dimensions mentioned above cannot be achieved, then access to the
live equipment and conductors should be prevented by the provision of screens,
grills, or enclosures. Examples of such screens or enclosures being:
• A guard rail or safety rail 1.2 m in height separated from the equipment or
conductors by a distance equal to the basic value plus at least 0.6 m
• An enclosure or grill of height 2.25 m spaced from the equipment or conductors
by a distance equal to the basic value

Examples are shown in Fig. 5.3 below.

b) Movement of Vehicles

The variable part of the horizontal safety distance comprises the profile of the
vehicle or machine that needs to move plus an amount of 0.7 m to allow for
unavoidable inaccuracies in driving (see examples in Fig. 5.4).

Fig. 5.2 Staff movement in substations – example of making inaccessible by distance

50 J. Finn

Fig. 5.3 Staff movements in substations – example of making inaccessible by grills, screens, or
enclosures

Fig. 5.4 Examples of vehicle movement within substation – rendering inaccessible by distance
5 Effect of Safety Regulations and Safe Working Practices on Substation. . . 51

Fig. 5.5 Example of maintenance work using light tools – rendered inaccessible by distance

c) Work on Equipment or on a Conductor

When it is necessary to carry out work in a substation while leaving the adjacent
circuits live, then the safety distance from the live equipment is derived using the
same principles. It comprises a basic value plus a variable amount determined for
each piece of equipment as a function of the mode of operation of the maintenance
work intended and of the dimensions of the tools used. However, this safety zone
value should never be less than 3.0 m. The safety distance is measured from the
extreme position that the live equipment or conductor may occupy to the edge of the
equipment that is to be worked on. Under no circumstances should the work involve
any penetration into the basic value. In the case of routine maintenance work that
does not require equipment other than light portable tools, the variable part may be
determined as follows:

• 1.75 m horizontally corresponding to a man with his arms outstretched

• 1.25 m vertically above the working plane corresponding to that part of the
worker passing above the plane when his arms are outstretched

An example of this is shown in Fig. 5.5. This is typical of routine maintenance of

substation switchgear. Figure 5.6 shows work when a heavy machine is used.

d) Marking Out the Safety Zones

It is prudent that the safety zones for circulation are permanently marked out and
those for carrying out work are marked out during the period of the work. For
circulation zones the following are recommended:
52 J. Finn

Fig. 5.6 Examples of work carried out using heavy equipment in plant rendered inaccessible by
distance
5 Effect of Safety Regulations and Safe Working Practices on Substation. . . 53

• Laterally a permanent means of indication remaining visible under all circum-

stances. Simply painting marks on the road surface would not be sufficient in
countries that may have lying snow for considerable periods of time.
• Vertically the placement of a safety gauge at the entry to each road leading into the
high-voltage installation. This is to ensure that no load projects beyond the limits
of the plant safety distance and that the forks of lifting devices or crane booms are
fully lowered.

When work is being carried out in the substation, the safe working area will be
clearly marked out using screens, chains, or flags in accordance with the safety
requirements of the particular utility concerned.

5.3.4 Variations

As explained at the beginning of this section, there are variations between different
countries that affect not only the dimensions but also the nomenclature. However,
the basic principles are the same that a safety zone is created by taking a basic value
based on the impulse withstand voltage and adding to it a distance to allow for the
height and movement of personnel. As an example of the changes, in the UK, the
basic value is actually called the “safety distance,” and the dimension which is the
“safety distance” in CIGRE terms is called the “design clearance for safety,” and
values are given for vertical and horizontal. The other differences are that the basic
value which is normally the phase-to-earth design clearance, in the UK, is increased
by 300 mm and the height which is 2.25 m in CIGRE is 2.4 m. The horizontal reach
distance however is reduced from 1.75 to 1.5 m, although it is recommended that the
vertical design clearance for safety should be used in all directions where practicable.
All of these clearances were originally derived when work was carried out from
ladders or from fixed scaffold platforms. However, in more recent times, the use of
mobile elevated working platform (MEWP for short, also commonly known as
cherry pickers, see Fig. 5.7) has become commonplace. This has given rise to a
new source of danger. When scaffolded platforms were used, the platform height
could be controlled such that it did not infringe the safety zone. However, with a
MEWP, the height of the platform is infinitely variable within the total reach of the
device unless it is restrained by chains. This was first seen as a problem when a
fatality occurred because an operative in a MEWP raised the platform higher than
would normally be required, infringed the basic value, and was electrocuted. The
problem was something which was defined as an “over-sailing conductor.” This is
defined as follows:

• Exposed HV conductors above or in proximity to any reasonably foreseeable

work area, which would normally remain energized during such work activities

If a conductor over a work area would normally be de-energized when work is

carried out below it, then this is not a problem, but where the conductor overhead
54 J. Finn

Fig. 5.7 Example of a MEWP being used to carry out maintenance work

belongs to a different circuit to the one being worked on, and so would normally
remain live, then this is where problems occur.
In order to avoid these problems, the design of substations should try to avoid the
use of over-sailing conductors whenever practicable, and also to make allowance for
the possible overshoots when operating a MEWP, both the vertical and horizontal
design clearances for safety have been increased by 2 m. This has a significant effect
upon the dimensions of the switchgear bays particularly at the lower voltages such as
145 kV. This means that while at one time in the 1990s the whole emphasis on
substation design was to make them as compact as possible, this is in direct conflict
with the utility operational staff who want safe easy access for maintenance which
naturally drives up the bay dimensions. It is therefore important to fully understand
the user’s requirements before designing a substation for safe working.

5.4 Earthing

This section is dealing with the safety aspects of earthing and not with the earthing of
main, auxiliary, or instrument transformer neutrals. It is concerned particularly with
the substation earth mat or grid and its importance to the safety of personnel. More
details of substation earthing systems are given in ▶ Sect. 11.7.
Firstly, consider the different types of hazardous potentials that may arise when an
earth fault occurs. These are:

• Rise of Earth Potential or Grid Potential Rise (GPR)

This is the rise in voltage of the earth system at the substation site above true earth
when a fault occurs at the site. In some countries, sites are designated as “hot” or
5 Effect of Safety Regulations and Safe Working Practices on Substation. . . 55

Fig. 5.8 Hazardous potentials during an earth fault

“cold” depending upon the magnitude of the rise of earth potential. Typically a
site with a grid potential rise in excess of 650 V is considered to be a “hot” site.
• Step Voltage
This is the voltage that can occur between the feet of a person (usually assumed to
be 1 m apart) who is walking across the site at a time when a fault occurs.
• Touch Voltage
This is the voltage between the hand and foot of a person who touches a metal
frame or panel in the site at the time a fault occurs. This tends to be more serious
than step voltage as the resulting current path is through the heart.
• Mesh Voltage
This is the voltage that occurs in the center of the meshes within the earth grid
when a fault occurs.
• Transferred Voltage
This is the voltage that can be transferred from a site that has a fault to a remote
location where there is no fault present. In theory this transferred voltage can be
equal to the full rise of earth potential at the faulted site.

These hazardous potentials are illustrated in Fig. 5.8.

The purpose of the earth mat or grid is to limit these hazardous potentials to
values that are not dangerous. The following items are connected to the earth grid:

• Permanently, the various frames and fittings of the plant

• Occasionally, high-voltage conductors or equipment on which it is necessary to
carry out work

5.4.1 General Earth Mat or Grid

The earth mat must be designed to be totally free from corrosion resulting from the
action of the surrounding soil. It has to be designed such that any contact with a
metal likely to cause corrosion by electrolytic action cannot occur even accidentally.
56 J. Finn

The design of the earth mat is a grid of conductors laid approximately 500 mm below
the surface of the ground and covering the whole extent of the site. The actual extent
will depend upon whether the fence is connected to the substation earth mat or is
earthed separately. The pitch of this grid, which is usually relatively small, will be
dictated by the calculation of the hazardous voltages.
These calculations take into account:

• The layout of the substation

• The soil resistivity
• The number of earth return paths via overhead line earth wires or cable sheaths
• The earth fault level and its duration

These calculations are a specialized activity, and it may be prudent to place these
with a specialized organization equipped with suitable software.
Connection of the equipment frames to the earth mat should be such that in the
case of damage to the earth grid or to a connection circuit, no metal component
should be disconnected from earth. This condition means that usually a minimum of
two conductors will be required; however, connections to the earth grid that are
visible above ground can use a single conductor. The earth grid has to be designed to
be able to carry the maximum earth fault current for the duration of the earth fault,
usually 1 s for voltages in excess of 170 kV and 3 s for voltages below this.

5.4.2 Safety Earths

For any work carried out on high-voltage plant, it is necessary to have earthing
points either side of the work area for protection of operating personnel against any
improper reestablishment of the voltage whatever the cause.

a) Types of Device

The required connections to earth can be effected by:

• Earthing switches in a suitable position capable of closing and having a suitable

current rating
• Earthing switches that have discharge capability only, operation of which pre-
cedes the connection of portable earthing devices capable of carrying the fault
current.
• Earthing blades designed solely to pass steep-fronted surges, closure of which
must be preceded by a check for absence of voltage and followed by placing of
portable earths.
• Solely by the placing of portable earthing devices that should be preceded by a
check for the absence of voltage.
• Earth switches associated with the earthing of the line ends of overhead line
circuits that are mounted on multi-circuit towers that have a special induced
5 Effect of Safety Regulations and Safe Working Practices on Substation. . . 57

Fig. 5.9 Testing of a line end earth switch with whip contacts during 10 kV 400 A inductive
breaking duty

current making and breaking duty for electrostatically and electromagnetically

induced voltages (Fig. 5.9). It is strongly recommended that line end earth
switches are closed during the application or removal of any additional portable
earthing devices which may be applied.
• Some utilities, where ferroresonance of power transformers is likely, may use
specially designed earthing switches to enable the quenching of the ferro-
resonance before re-energizing the circuit. This may be done automatically within
an auto-reclose sequence.

b) Performance of Earthing Devices

The current values to be used for determining the making capacities and current
passing capacities should be the maximum earth fault currents for the substation
concerned. The duration of the current usually is 1 s for voltages in excess of 170 kV
and 3 s for voltages below this.

c) Placing of Portable Devices

The placing of portable earthing devices can be quite difficult because of:

• The relative weight of the components to be moved due to the current-carrying

requirement (Note: it is often necessary to connect as many as four portable earths
in parallel to carry the fault current.)
58 J. Finn

• The height of the high-voltage connections to be earthed frequently in excess of

6m
• The arrangement of the connections that must have a suitable length of horizontal
section to enable the temporary connections to be attached
• The environment and in particular the proximity of components which are still
live and for which the safety distance may be less than that of the hot stick being
used for the application of the portable earths

It should be noted that the portable device will only be effective if the jaws of the
device have been adequately tightened at both the high-voltage end and also at the
earth end.
In order to minimize these difficulties and increase the level of safety, it is
recommended to place takeoff points at the high-voltage and earth end for connec-
tion of portable earthing devices, during the construction of the substation. These
will normally consist of spigots at the high-voltage end and connection points on the
structures at the earth end. These need to be designed to accommodate the size and
number of portable earth connections, required to carry the fault current, to be
attached. On 500 kV substations, specially designed guided portable earthing
devices may be used to increase the level of safety.

5.5 Operation of High-Voltage Switchgear

5.5.1 Types of Control

a) Remote Control

This method of control is now the most common method with control frequently
being carried out from a control center remote from the substation. Initially remote
control was limited to circuit breakers, disconnectors, and the control of tap changers
of transformers. These days most control functions can be carried out remotely. For a
device to be remotely controlled, it must have an operating medium which can be
electric, pneumatic, or hydraulic or a combination of these.
When the equipment is operated remotely, then maloperation only involves a risk
to the equipment itself. To avoid maloperation, precise operating procedures will
usually be prepared, and these are frequently supplemented by position compatibility
interlocks with other equipment within the bay or throughout the substation.

b) Local Control Using an Operating Medium

This usually means operating locally a piece of equipment that is normally

operated remotely. In these circumstances, the procedures and interlocks normally
applicable during remote control should remain effective. In cases where, if a fault
5 Effect of Safety Regulations and Safe Working Practices on Substation. . . 59

Fig. 5.10 Installation of an earthed safety grating

occurs during operation, dangerously high voltage may be reached, an operating

grating may be provided for the operator to ensure that no current path is
possible from the control to earth via his body. This can be achieved in two
alternative ways:

• The grating that the operator stands on is connected to the operating handle and
also to earth. The voltage, which the operator can experience, is limited by the
short length of conductor between the handle and the grating (see Fig. 5.10).
• The grating on which the operator stands is insulated from earth so that there is no
current path possible through his body (see Fig. 5.11).

Where the frequency of this type of operation is low, then the grating could be
removable and only put in place during switching operations.

c) Direct Mechanical Local Control

This relates to disconnectors that are operated by means of a handle or lever integral
with the moving parts of the switch. In this case safety of the operating personnel is
always involved, and so a fixed grating as shown in either Figs. 5.10 or 5.11 should be
provided. These devices should also be fitted with position compatibility interlocks
with other equipment within the bay or throughout the substation.
60 J. Finn

Fig. 5.11 Installation of an insulated safety grating

d) Manual Local Control

This relates to single-phase disconnectors that are operated by means of a hot

stick. Fortunately these are not so common these days, and the use of these devices
should be strongly discouraged.

5.5.2 Locking Off Switches

Independent of any interlock, either mechanical or electrical, it will usually be

necessary to be able to lock off a switch. Such locking off is required where it is
necessary to ensure the isolation of an area where work is to be carried out.
The locking off should be achieved by mechanically blocking the isolating switch
by means of a padlock or other lockable device from which the key can be removed.
In addition to locking off, it would normally be prudent to also:

• Place notices indicating that the switch is locked off and the reason for so doing
• Remove from service all remote control devices

5.5.3 Auxiliary Operating Supplies

It should be possible to remove from service the auxiliary power supplies used for
operating the switching devices without affecting other circuits or bays within the
substation. This can be achieved by means of a padlockable switch or valve or a
key-operated switch from which the key can be removed. To avoid the risk of removing
5 Effect of Safety Regulations and Safe Working Practices on Substation. . . 61

the auxiliary power supplies for bays other than the one being worked on, the auxiliary
power supply distribution should be arranged with separate circuits for each bay.

5.5.4 Current and Voltage Instrument Circuits

a) Current Circuits

It is frequently necessary to be able to carry out work on the current circuits of

protection or other devices while the main circuit is still in service. In order to do this,
a method of short-circuiting the current transformers and isolating them from the
relevant protection circuits may be required. This can be achieved by specially
designed test switches or test blocks or the use of bolted changeover links.

b) Voltage Transformer Circuits

It is absolutely essential to be able to isolate voltage transformers on the

low-voltage side in order to prevent the back energizing of the primary circuit if
test voltages are applied to the secondary side. This can be achieved by removing the
fuses or locking off the miniature circuit breaker for circuits running from these
devices. If fuses are used, it is prudent to be able to block off access to replace the
fuse by means of a padlock as well as putting the fuses into the safety lockout box
associated with the work permit.

5.6 Protection Against Fire

This section is dealing only with fire associated with power transformers or oil-filled
reactors, where the consequences can be particularly serious and extensive because
of the large volume of oil that can catch fire and spread widely (Fig. 5.12). For more
details on protection against fire, please refer to ▶ Sect. 11.10.
The recommendations relate to:

• Limiting the damaged area and minimizing damage as far as possible

• Extinguishing the fire in and around the transformer

5.6.1 Limitation of the Damage Zone

This can be done in various ways.

a) Oil Containment

A bunded area should be provided around the transformer to prevent the spread of
any oil that may escape from the transformer tank. These days this is frequently
required by law simply because of the environmental effect of oil escaping into the
62 J. Finn

Fig. 5.12 A transformer fire in a 400 kV substation

ground and contaminating watercourses. From the fire limitation point of view, the
oil passing into the collection tank will normally pass through a flame trap, the
simplest form being stone chippings laid on top of a metal grid such that as the
burning oil passes through the stone, the flames cannot pass through.

b) Separation

Many utilities limit the damage from transformer fires simply by separation. One
method of achieving this is that a fire damage zone is calculated based upon
experience with oil fires in a bund. Provided that no equipment associated with a
bay other than the transformer bay itself and no common substation equipment
encroaches into this fire damage zone, then no further protection is provided.

c) Fire Walls

Where it is not possible to achieve satisfactory separation, then the construction

of a fire wall to protect the equipment that would have fallen into the fire damage
zone should be done. This wall will need to be higher than the highest oil-containing
part of the transformer (see Fig. 5.13).

d) Provision of Mobile Firefighting Equipment

Placing in an area close to where the transformers are located mobile firefighting
equipment such that if the fire is detected early enough, it can be extinguished
quickly before it spreads.
5 Effect of Safety Regulations and Safe Working Practices on Substation. . . 63

Fig. 5.13 Example of fire wall for transformer (during construction)

e) Fire Blocks in Trenches

Fire blocks should be located in trenches/ducts in close proximity to the trans-

former to prevent the spread of burning oil that can damage the insulation of the
cables contained within them. These fire blocks will usually consist of sand.

f) Physical Separation of the Control Circuits

The control circuits should be located at some distance from the power circuits
such that they can remain intact for some time in the event of a serious fire on the
power circuit.

5.6.2 Extinguishing of the Fire

When designing the substation, allowance should be made for access for public
firefighting vehicles to the transformer locations.
In some cases consideration can be given to the provision of purpose-designed
fire-extinguishing equipment associated specifically with the transformer. This may
use water deluge, water spray, foam, or other methods. Usually when such equip-
ment is fitted, it will be associated with fire detection devices such as heat and smoke
detectors that will automatically trigger the fire-extinguishing equipment.
64 J. Finn

5.7 Fences

Fences are usually provided around high-voltage substations. The legal requirements
for such fences may vary significantly from country to country. This short section
will deal with the external fences and also any fences required within the overall
substation area.

5.7.1 External Fences

From the safety point of view, the main purpose of the external fence is to prevent the
general public from approaching too close to the electrical conductors and equipment
for safety. In order to achieve this, fences must be separated from live equipment by a
distance at least equal to the horizontal safety distance such that someone outside of the
fence has the same degree of protection as those inside. The fence will normally be a
minimum of 2 m in height, but in some countries, this minimum height will be greater.
Unfortunately in this modern age, the fences around a substation are also required
to prevent unauthorized access to the substation and in some cases to prevent
vandalism to the equipment located inside. In some countries in the worst areas
for intrusion and vandalism, the fences around substations also incorporate electric
fencing over and above the basic fence, and the level of security of such fences can
be the same as that used for prisons (see Fig. 5.14).

Fig. 5.14 External fence around a substation with the same level of security as a prison
5 Effect of Safety Regulations and Safe Working Practices on Substation. . . 65

5.7.2 Internal Fences

There are occasions within substations where the insulation clearance height has not
been achieved, and so it is not permissible to allow people to access these areas. This
is quite often the case with filter equipment where the capacitor stacks may be
mounted at ground level. In these cases it is normal to erect a fence around this
equipment which will normally be the minimum height accepted by the utility. In
order for it to be safe to access the area within this fenced-off enclosure, the
equipment inside the enclosure should normally be dead, isolated, and earthed. To
ensure that this is the case, electromechanical interlocks may be used to ensure that
the gate cannot be opened until the relevant earth switch is closed and conversely the
earth switch cannot be removed until the gate is secured and locked.

References
Brochure 161: General Guidelines for the Design of Outdoor AC Substations (2000)
Brochure 585: Circuit Configuration Optimization (2014)
ELECTRA No. 019: The Effect of Safety Regulations on the Design of Substations (1971)